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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. I 1/20/81 - 8/13/81 [3 of 6]
Box 91526 ~~10~~

Date: September 3, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	301626z 3 p. D 6/12/02 NLSS 98-002 #48	3/30/8	P1
2. cable	251340z 5 p. D " " #49	3/25/81	P1
3. cable	231122z 2 p. D " " #50	3/23/81	P1
4. cable	171856z 2 p. R " " #51	3/17/81	P1
5. cable	131728Z 2 p. R " " #52	3/13/81	P1
6. cable	131608Z 2 p. D " " #53	3/13/81	P1
7. cable	111925z 3 p. D " " #54	3/11/81	P1
8. cable	091804z 8 p. D " " #55	3/9/81	P1
9. cable	241917z 9 p. D " " #56	2/24/81	P1
10. cable	201213z 5 p. D " " #57	2/20/81	P1
11. cable	182121z 2 p. D " " #58	2/18/81	P1
12. cable	041036z 4 p. D " " #59	2/4/81	P1
13. cable	291809z 2 p. D " " #60	1/29/81	P1
14. cable	291646z 4 p. D " " #61	1/29/81	P1
15. cable	272037z 2 p. R " " #62	8/27/81	P1
16. cable	272036z 4 p. R " " #63	8/27/81	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. I 1/20/81 - 8/13/81 [3 of 6]
Box 91326 *W*

Date: September 3, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. cable	262156z 3 p. <i>R 6/12/02 NLSS 98-002 #64</i>	8/26/81	P1
18. cable	221315z 3 p. <i>R " " #65</i>	8/22/81	P1
19. cable	2000127z 2 p. <i>R " " #66</i>	8/20/81	P1
20. cable	150040z 3 p. <i>R " " #67</i>	8/15/81	P1
21. cable	120144z 3p. <i>D " " #68</i>	8/12/81	P1
22. cable	072027z 3 p. <i>R " " #69</i>	8/7/81	P1
23. cable	241426z 3 p. <i>R " " #70</i>	7/24/81	P1
24. cable	232042z 2 p. <i>D " " #71</i>	7/23/81	P1
25. cable	121725z 2 p. <i>R " " #72</i>	7/12/81	P1
26. cable	042108z 4 p. <i>R " " #73</i>	7/4/81	P1
27. cable	020139z 2 p. <i>R " " #74</i>	7/2/81	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-3 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: AN COL VP
 EOP: THOMSON, EURE, EEUR, WEUR, DEPOL
 WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
 DE RUEHLD #5049 0701856
 O 171856Z MAR 81
 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3994

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 05049

NOPIB
 E.O. 12065; RDS-3 3/17/10 (STREATOR, EDWARD J.) DR-M
 TAGS: MILI PL UK UR GE CZ
 SUBJECT: ~~IS~~ WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS IN AND AROUND POLAND
 REF: (A) STATE 66167, (B) MOSCOW 3609, (C) MOSCOW 3572,
 (D) LONDON 4818

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PER REF A, POLCOUNS SHARED SUBSTANCE OF REF C WITH MALLABY'S FCD PLANNING STAFF DEPUTY ROGER GARSIDE MARCH 17, FOLLOWING UP DEMARCHE REPORTED IN REF D. LIKE EMBASSY MOSCOW (REF B), GARSIDE FOUND KORNIYENKO'S DISTINCTION INTERESTING, AND NEITHER PLANNING STAFF NOR EAST EUROPEAN/SOVIET DEPARTMENT (WITH WHOM HE CHECKED) HAD EVER HEARD OF SOVIETS USING IT BEFORE.

3. GARSIDE ALSO REPORTED THAT BRITISH HAD CALLED IN SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR V.I. DOLGOV; NOTED TO HIM THAT THEY HAD REPORTS THAT AN EXERCISE MIGHT TAKE PLACE SOON INVOLVING MORE THAN 25,000 MEN; NOTED ALSO THAT THERE WAS PROVISION IN THE FINAL ACT FOR VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES OF THIS KIND; AND POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MADE SUCH NOTIFICATION IN THE PAST. DOLGOV GAVE NO SUBSTANTIVE REACTION TO THE DEMARCHE. STREATOR

LONDON 5049

DTG: 171856Z MAR 81 SSN: 043716
TOR: 070/2032Z

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002-51

*****S E C R E T*****

BY HOS, NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

LONDON 5049

DTG:171856Z MAR 81 PSN: 043716
TOR: 076/2032Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

SIT131 R

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL VP
EOB: THOMSON, EURF, EUR, WEUR, DEPOL
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHLD #4818 0721729
O 131728Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3853

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 04818

NOBIS
E.O. 12065: RDS 3 3/13/10 (STREATOR, E.J.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, PL, CZ, UR, GE
SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS IN AND AROUND POLAND.
REF: STATE 63758

1. ~~(S)~~ SUBSTANCE OF REF DISCUSSED WITH FCO PLANNING STAFF HEAD MALLABY AT 1100 MARCH 13.

2. ~~(S)~~ LATER THAT AFTERNOON MALLABY RESPONDED THAT IN VIEW OF DIFFERENCES IN OUR ASSESSMENTS OF LIKELIHOOD THAT THERE WILL BE MORE THAN 25,000 TROOPS INVOLVED -- THE UK BELIEVES IT UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL REACH THAT LEVEL -- THE BRITISH WILL NOT MAKE AN APPROACH TO THE MFA IN MOSCOW. INSTEAD, THEY WILL SPEAK TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE IN LONDON, INDICATING THAT THEY HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY AWARE OF WARSAW PACT PARTICIPATION IN THE SOYUZ 81 EXERCISE AND DO NOT BELIEVE NOTIFICATION HAS BEEN GIVEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSCE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PROVISIONS. THEY WILL ASK THAT THE SOVIETS CONFIRM.

3. ~~(S)~~ ACCORDING TO MALLABY, THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS INTERROGATIVE APPROACH IS TO ELICIT A DIRECT RESPONSE EITHER INDICATING PERHAPS THAT SOME OF THE LOCAL COUNTRIES MAY HAVE BEEN INFORMED OR POSSIBLY A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THE EXERCISE WILL NOT INVOLVE A MANDATORY REPORTING LEVEL

DECLASSIFIED LONDON 4918

NLS 598-002 # 52

DTG:131728Z MAR 81 SSNI 038802
TOR: 072/1856Z

BY LOJ NARA DATE 6/12/02

*****~~SECRET~~*****

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 03/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF PARTICIPATION. THE BRITISH ARE NOT PREPARED TO
SUGGEST FURTHER STEPS AT THIS TIME. STREATOR

LONDON 4818

DTG:131728Z MAR 81 ESN: 036802
TOR: 072/1856Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

DATE 02/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
FOBIARA, WEUR, DEPOL

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHLD #3647 0861714

O 261714Z FEB 81

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3191

AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0655

AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0600

NATO COLLECTIVE

BT

UNCLAS LONDON 03647

E.O. 12065 IN/A

TAGS: PEPR, UK, ES

SUBJECT: BRITISH OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON EL SALVADOR

REF: STATE 248581

HMG HAS GIVEN US A COPY OF BRITAIN'S OFFICIAL STATEMENT
ON EL SALVADOR, THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

- HMG HAVE NOW HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE US GOVERNMENT ABOUT ARMS SUPPLIES TO INSURGENT GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR. THIS POINTS TO ACTIVITIES WHICH CAN ONLY BE REGARDED AS GROSS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF EL SALVADOR AND HMG SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN CALLING FOR IT TO END.

- HMG NOTE, WITH CONCERN, THE CONTINUING VIOLENCE INSIDE EL SALVADOR AND THE SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP THIS CAUSES TO THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY. HMG CONDEMN SUCH VIOLENCE FROM WHATEVER QUARTER. THEY LOOK TO THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO PROTECT THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE FROM VIOLATIONS OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO EXERCISE FIRM CONTROL OVER ALL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS.

- HMG CONSIDER THAT THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR SHOULD BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE PEACEFULLY AND DEMOCRATICALLY.

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****

DATE 02/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

END TEXT. MORRIS

PSNI 018134

TOR: 057/17134Z

RTGI 201714Z FEB 81

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****

6

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

STATE NODIS

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 144

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE067
OO RUFHC RUEHLD RUEHMO RUEHIL
DE RUEHC #9564 2392053
ZNY SSSSS Z7H
O 272037Z AUG 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2550
INFO RUFHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5446
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2296
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 229564
NODIS
E.O. 12065:RDS-1,3 8/25/01) (HAIG, JR., ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: PEPR, AF, UK, US

SUBJECT: LETTER TO CARRINGTON ON AFGHANISTAN SITUATION

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO LORD CARRINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR PETER, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU THE AUGUST 21 DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN I HAD WITH AGHA SHAHI HERE IN WASHINGTON.

I TOLD SHAHI FRANKLY THAT THERE WAS SOME NERVOUSNESS IN WASHINGTON OVER THE PROSPECT OF PROXIMITY TALKS AT THE UNGA. I REITERATED OUR HOPE THAT THE GA WILL PRODUCE A VIGOROUS RESOLUTION, AND AT THE SAME TIME, UNDERSCORED OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE EC INITIATIVE. I SAID THAT WE ARE CONCERNED THAT NO ACTIONS BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE BABRAK REGIME, AND POINTED OUT THAT MANY WOULD READ PROXIMITY TALKS AS AKIN TO BILATERAL NEGOTIATION.

SHAHI RESPONDED THAT PAKISTAN WOULD WORK HARD TO INSURE NO WEAKENING IN THE UNGA RESOLUTION OR IN ITS SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN MUST SHOW, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS SERIOUS

ABOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IF IT IS TO RETAIN THIRD WORLD SUPPORT FOR THE GA RESOLUTION. THE ACCEPTANCE OF PROXIMITY TALKS WAS THEREFORE SIMPLY TACTICAL.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #62

SENSITIVE

BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 145

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ACCORDING TO SHAHI THE PROXIMITY TALKS ON REFUGEES AND THEIR RETURN WILL TAKE PLACE IN SEPTEMBER. THEY WILL FALL APART HE SAYS WHEN PAKISTAN REPORTS IN THE SECOND ROUND -- THAT THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES WILL NOT CONSIDER RETURNING TO AFGHANISTAN UNTIL THE SOVIETS WITHDRAW. PAKISTAN WILL THEN ASK KABUL TO DISCUSS A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND KABUL WILL PRESUMABLY BREAK OFF THE TALKS.

SHAHI TOLD WALDHEIM THAT HIS SEPTEMBER REPORT TO THE GA MUST RAISE NO FALSE HOPES AND MUST UNDERSCORE THAT THERE IS NO NARROWING OF THE GULF ON THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS BETWEEN KABUL AND PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO ADHERE TO ITS POSITION THAT IRAN MUST BE A PARTICIPANT IN ANY DISCUSSIONS.

SHAHI TERMED THE EC INITIATIVE HELPFUL IN HIGHLIGHTING THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM. HE SAID HE WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU ITS POSSIBLE LINKAGE WITH THE GA RESOLUTION. HE BELIEVES THAT LINKAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE A MISTAKE, AS WE DO, SINCE THE SOVIETS ARE OPPOSED TO ANY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. HE POINTED OUT HOWEVER THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RECENTLY TOLD THE PAKS THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE TO EXPLORE GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN MIGHT BE EXPLORED AT A LATER DATE.

I FIND SHAHI'S COMMENTS ON PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY SOMEWHAT REASSURING, ALTHOUGH WE WILL WANT TO WATCH THE PROXIMITY TALKS CLOSELY. YOU UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM YOURSELF ON UNGA TACTICS. IN THE MEANTIME, JEAN KIRKPATRICK IS IN SOUTH ASIA AND WILL MEET PRESIDENT ZIA AND AGHA SHAHI THIS SATURDAY. I WILL GIVE YOU A READOUT OF THOSE MEETINGS AS SOON AS I HAVE IT.

WITH BEST WISHES, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT. HAIG
BT

#9564
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 177

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #63

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 6/12/02

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY
O P 272036Z AUG 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY PARTS PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 229563

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/25/87 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M. JR)

TAGS: UK, SUPN

SUBJECT: LETTER TO CARRINGTON ON WESTERN CAMPAIGN

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO CARRINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO REPEAT NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PETER:

YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PRESSING NEED TO DO A MUCH BETTER JOB OF PROMOTING OUR POLICIES AND COUNTERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA. I ALSO HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH HANS-DIETRICH AND CLAUDE. I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU HERE SOME SUGGESTIONS ABOUT LAUNCHING A MAJOR EFFORT. IN MY VIEW, THE STRONG POLITICAL DECLARATION ADOPTED BY THE SEVEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT BEGINNING FOR THE

* * * * *

SIT: "RVA" COL JP VP
FOB: PIPES RENT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:026128

DTG:272036

TOR:2400019

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 178

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNDTATION:

KIND OF BROAD-GAUGED EFFORT WHICH WE NEED TO UNDERTAKE.

TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE, WE NEED BOTH TO EDUCATE AND TO

INSPIRE. WE MUST BE CANDID ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT, AND GO ON THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE WITH POSITIVE WESTERN PROPOSALS. TO TURN AROUND A SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND RESPONSIVE WESTERN POSTURE, WE NEED TO PURSUE THE SAME COMBINATION OF PRESSURE AND PROMISE WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED TO SUCH A FINE ART.

WE ALREADY HAVE UNDERTAKEN THIS COMBINATION OF STEPS IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR AREAS: AFGHANISTAN, CSCE/CDE AND TNF. OUR EFFORTS TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON WESTERN INITIATIVES AND POLICIES IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, AND TO EDUCATE OUR PEOPLE ABOUT SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE AND THREATS, MUST BE CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED. IN ADDITION, TO HELP ON THE EDUCATIONAL SIDE, WE INTEND TO MAKE PUBLIC A NUMBER OF STUDIES ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, SOVIET COVERT ACTIVITY, AND ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET PROXIES AND SURROGATES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

AS ESSENTIAL AS THESE EXISTING PROGRAMS ARE, THEY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT BY THEMSELVES TO INFUSE OUR PUBLICS WITH A NEW SENSE OF PURPOSE AND CONFIDENCE. OUR PUBLICS OF COURSE DIFFER, AND WE WILL EACH NEED TO SHAPE OUR EFFORT SO AS TO MAKE IT MOST EFFECTIVE AT HOME. AND THIS MUST BE A CONTINUING PROCESS. BUT I HAVE TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR PARALLEL ACTIONS FOR THE NEAR-TERM.

I PROPOSE WE CONSIDER RECOMMENDING THAT THE SEVEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WHO MET AT OTTAWA SEND PRIVATE LETTERS TO BREZHNEV, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BROAD THEMES ADDRESSED IN THE LETTERS WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. LOOKING TOWARD THE UNGA, THE LETTERS WOULD STRESS THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES DESIRE A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND A REDUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS WHICH ARE SO PROMINENT TODAY. THEY WOULD REITERATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO MEET LEGITIMATE SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT THAT PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS DEPENDS UPON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE USSR TO EXERCISE GREATER RESTRAINT IN ITS INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 179 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST RESTRAIN AN ARMS BUILD-UP WHICH HAS ALREADY GONE FAR BEYOND REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE, AND DEMONSTRATE GENUINE SERIOUSNESS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WOULD BE A SOVIET DECISION TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH THREATEN PEACE AROUND THE

WORLD, INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA, AND TO TAKE STEPS TO CEASE EXTERNAL STIMULATION OF VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE. THE LETTERS WOULD STATE THAT THE WEST IS READY TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS BUT THAT THE USSR MUST NOW DECIDE WHETHER IT IS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN BUILDING A MORE RESTRAINED AND HUMANE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE SOVIETS HAVE USED SUCH HIGH-LEVEL LETTERS CONTINUALLY AND OFTEN TO GOOD EFFECT. TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO SEND LETTERS FROM WESTERN LEADERS WOULD PROVIDE BOTH THE SOVIETS AND OUR PUBLICS WITH A HIGH-PROFILE DEMONSTRATION OF OUR APPROACH, INVITING AND CHALLENGING THE SOVIETS TO JOIN IN AN EFFORT TO SET EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND DURABLE BASIS.

MY OTHER SUGGESTION IS THAT WE FIND WAYS TO FOCUS MUCH GREATER ATTENTION ON WESTERN VALUES. WE HAVE FOR TOO LONG PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS REVOLUTIONARY AND PROGRESSIVE, WHEN WE ARE THE MOST INNOVATIVE AND GENUINELY PROGRESSIVE SOCIETIES. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE HOW THE WESTERN VALUES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND INITIATIVE MEET MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL - NEEDS BETTER THAN TOTALITARIAN REGIMES. AND WE MUST TRANSLATE THESE VALUES INTO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WHICH COULD HELP CREATE A BETTER WORLD.

THIS WILL BE THE OVERALL THEME OF A SPEECH I AM GIVING IN BERLIN NEXT MONTH. I AM CONSIDERING FLOATING A GENERAL IDEA TO HELP ELIMINATE THE HUMAN DIVISIONS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. I MIGHT SUGGEST THAT AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE A CONFERENCE BE HELD AS PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS TO EXAMINE THE LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN EUROPE, AND TO PROPOSE MEANS OF DEALING WITH THEM. THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT OUR EXISTING PROPOSAL

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 180

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR A CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, BUT WOULD NOT BE LINKED TO IT OR TO THIS STAGE OF CSCE, AND TIMING WOULD BE PURPOSEFULLY "IN THE FUTURE" IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE OUR MADRID STRATEGY. YOU MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS ON WAYS TO EMPHASIZE FREEDOM.

I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THIS GENERAL APPROACH, AND PARTICULARLY YOUR REACTION TO THE SUGGESTION FOR LETTERS TO BREZHNEV. CLEARLY WE HAVE LIMITED TIME IF THIS IS TO BE DONE BEFORE OUR MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO AT THE UNGA. I ALSO HAVE WRITTEN TO HANS DIETRICH AND CLAUDE.

IF I CAN HEAR FROM EACH OF YOU BY SEPTEMBER 1ST, I THEN WOULD APPROACH THE OTHER THREE ON THE LETTER. WE ALSO NEED TO DISCUSS OUR GENERAL EFFORT WITH THE OTHER ALLIES. I SUGGEST A REINFORCED NAC IN MID-SEPTEMBER. I WOULD PLAN TO HAVE LARRY EAGLEBURGER JOIN TAP BENNETT TO LAUNCH THIS IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE OFFENSIVE.

WITH BEST WISHES,
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

END TEXT,
HAIG

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
O 262156Z AUG 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 228521

NODIS
E.O. 12065:RDS-1 8/26/01 (HAIG, JR., ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS:PSDC, PEPR, UR, CH, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO GROMYKO

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. YOU SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT ASAP TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO. IF GROMYKO IS NOT AVAILABLE, YOU MAY DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO.

3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. MINISTER: WE HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE VIEWS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS CONVEYED BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON JUNE 17 AND JULY 2. ALTHOUGH THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SPECIFIC QUESTION OF POSSIBLE TRANSFERS OF ARMS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN CONVEYED TO YOU, I AM WRITING IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A FULL AND ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF THAT POSITION.

DESPITE THE STRAINS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT CHARACTERIZED OUR RELATIONSHIP AS ONE OF "HOSTILITY." IT IS, THEREFORE, REGRETTABLE

* * * * *

SIT: RVA COL JP VP
EOR: PIPES
WHSR COMMENTS: CHECKLIST

PSN:024721

DTG:262156

TOR:2390036

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 598-002#64

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

PAGE 219 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT YOU HAVE CHOSEN IN YOUR RECENT COMMUNICATIONS TO CHARACTERIZE THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS BEING MOTIVATED BY HOSTILE INTENT TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. THE POLICIES WHICH WE FOLLOW TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARE DEVELOPED IN OUR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT ANY THIRD COUNTRY.

AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN ATTEMPT BY ANY THIRD COUNTRY TO INFLUENCE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS IMPORTANT COUNTRY, OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY. WE ARE AWARE OF NO "ASSURANCES" BY THIS OR ANY PREVIOUS UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION BY WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF VETO IN THIS REGARD.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS IN THE SECURITY AREA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IS A NORMAL PART OF THE PROCESS OF THE BROADENING OF CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. AS CHINA'S POLICIES AND PRACTICES ARE NOT THREATENING TO THE UNITED STATES, NOR TO OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, IT IS NO LONGER CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TREAT CHINA AS AN ADVERSARY. INDEED, AS I STATED ON MY RECENT ASIAN TRIP, THE UNITED STATES REGARDS CHINA AS A FRIENDLY COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE ARE NOT ALLIED, BUT WITH WHICH WE SHARE MANY COMMON INTERESTS.

AS FOR THE QUESTION OF POTENTIAL ARMS TRANSFERS, SINCE WE HAVE AUTHORIZED AS YET NO SPECIFIC SALES TO CHINA, IT IS A MISINTERPRETATION OF OUR POSITION TO SPEAK OF OUR HAVING EMBARKED UPON A POLICY OF "ARMING CHINA." ANY REQUEST WHICH WE MIGHT RECEIVE FROM THE CHINESE WILL BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED ON ITS MERITS, WITH DUE REGARD GIVEN TO ITS APPROPRIATENESS, THE STATUS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHINESE, THE EFFECTS ON OTHERS IN THE AREA, AND OUR APPRECIATION OF THE NEEDS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THUS, OUR DECISIONS WILL NOT BE MADE IN A POLITICAL OR MILITARY VACUUM. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE CANNOT HELP NOTING THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION, IN FORMULATING AND CARRYING OUT ITS OWN POLICIES, HAS PERSISTENTLY FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERNS OVER THE IMPACT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN THIRD AREAS, INCLUDING SOUTHWEST ASIA, SOUTHEAST ASIA,

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ARICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

LET ME ASSURE YOU, MR. MINISTER, THAT OUR PURPOSE IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS NOT TO COMPLICATE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS INTERESTED IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN ALL AREAS, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF RECIPROCITY AND RESTRAINT.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT.

4. AFGHANISTAN - SHOULD GROMYKO RAISE THE LATEST DRA PROPOSAL, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- IT IS THE ILLEGAL INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN BY SOVIET TROOPS THAT HAVE CAUSED THE AFGHAN CRISIS.

-- THE AFGHAN PROPOSAL IGNORES UN RESOLUTIONS WHICH CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS AND THUS-- POINT THE WAY TOWARD A SETTLEMENT.

-- WE REGRET THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT FOUND THESE UN RESOLUTIONS OR THE EC CONFERENCE PROPOSAL ACCEPTABLE,-- THEY WOULD HELP LEAD THE CRISIS TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE AFGHAN PROPOSAL CLEARLY DOES NOT ADVANCE THIS PURPOSE. HAIG

BT

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
U 221315Z AUG 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 225114

NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12065: GDS 8/17/87 (BRIGGS, EVERETT E.)
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, NU,

SUBJECT: LETTER TO LORD CARRINGTON ON U.S.-NICARAGUAN
RELATIONS

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY
TO FOREIGN SECRETARY CARRINGTON,
SEPTEL CONVEYS POINTS TO BE MADE ORALLY AT TIME
OF DELIVERY (WHICH SHOULD BE AS SOON AS FEASIBLE),
3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR PETER:

I ASKED TOM ENDERS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, TO GO TO MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
LAST WEEK TO TAKE THE MEASURE OF THE SANDINISTA
LEADERSHIP AND TO SEE IF THERE MIGHT BE ANY BASIS
FOR NORMALIZING OUR RELATIUNS WITH NICARAGUA.

ENDERS HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES WITH THE SANDINISTA
LEADERS, CULMINATING INA LENGTHY, PRIVATE MEETING
WITH DANIFL URTEGA. AT THIS MEETING,
HE STRESSED THAT FOR THE UNITED STATES, THE PRIMARY

* * * * *

SIT: RVA NAN JP VP
EOB: FONTAINE
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:019754

DTG:221315

TDR:2341534

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NLS 598-002 #65

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BY: LOJ NARA, DATE 6/2/02

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SOURCE OF CONCERN HAS BEEN THE CONTINUED TRANSIT ACROSS NICARAGUA OF ARMS AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL DESTINED FOR THE MARXIST-LENINIST GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR. COMANDANTE ORTEGA DID NOT DENY THE EXISTENCE OF THIS TRAFFIC, WHILE DISCLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT.

ENDERS ALSO EMPHASIZED THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE EXPANSION IN THE NUMBER OF ARMED FORCES IN NICARAGUA ITSELF, AND OF THE ACQUISITION BY THE SANDINISTAS OF MODERN, OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE DEFENSIVE NEEDS OF THAT COUNTRY OR TO ANY SUPPOSED EXTERNAL THREAT. HE POINTED OUT THAT NICARAGUA NOW POSES A REAL THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS. HE MADE CLEAR OUR REJECTION OF RECENT ARBITRARY ACTS AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFL/CIO WHO ARE IN NICARAGUA TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY.

ORTEGA AND ENDERS REACHED AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING AT THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR MEETING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXCHANGES, THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD ASSESS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, AND THAT ENDERS WOULD BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO MANAGUA TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN A FEW WEEKS. IN THE MEANTIME, BOTH SIDES WOULD MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON WAYS OF LOWERING BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TENSIONS. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD AVOID RHETORICAL ATTACKS ON EACH OTHER AND ANY ACTS TENDING TO DISRUPT THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS.

IN ADDITION TO NICARAGUA'S CURTAILING ARMS TRAFFICKING, THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE IN MIND FOR LOWERING TENSIONS WOULD INCLUDE ARMS CONTROLS AND MILITARY FORCE LEVEL RESTRICTIONS, A REAFFIRMATION OF RIO TREATY AND OAS COMMITMENTS REGARDING NON-INTERVENTION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, IMPROVED MONITORING OF EXILE GROUPS, AND PERHAPS THE RESUMPTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. WE AND THE NICARAGUANS WILL BE DISCUSSING THOSE POSSIBILITIES IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

WE SINCERELY HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SANDINISTA LEADERSHIP IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, AND THAT THEY WILL SHARE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR A RESTORATION OF NORMALCY IN OUR RELATIONS. WE HAVE BEEN AT GREAT PAINS TO REASSURE THEM THAT WE RESPECT THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION AND WISH TO HAVE AMICABLE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY, ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND RECIPRO-
CITY.

HOWEVER THIS TURNS OUT, I BELIEVE WE MUST GO THROUGH THE CURRENT PROCESS IN A SERIOUS FASHION, AND ENSURE THAT OTHERS UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE WILLING TO EXHAUST ALL POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING.

WE SHALL BE GAUGING VERY CLOSELY WHETHER THE SANDINIS-
TAS DESIRE OR ARE NOW EVEN ABLE TO HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH US; AND AFTER A PRUDENT PERIOD, WE SHALL MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO WHAT OUR OWN POLICY MUST BE AND WHAT ACTIONS MAY BE IN ORDER. THIS IS THE MESSAGE WE HAVE GIVEN THE SANDINISTAS; THEY UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS FULLY AND, I HOPE, HAVE BEEN SOBERED BY THEM. A SINE QUA NON OF ANY UNDERSTANDING MUST BE A COMPLETE END TO ARMS TRAFFICK-
ING AND INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

I SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

WITH EVERY GOOD PERSONAL WISH.

SINCERELY, (SIGNED) AL. END TEXT. HAIG

BT

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE676

DD RUFHC RUEHLD RUFHDL RUFHFR

DF RUFHC #1022 2320019

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 200012Z AUG 81 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUFHID/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2189

RUFHDL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9777

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8643

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 221022

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/81/91 (HULMFS, H. ALLEN, ACTING)

TAGS: CSCF, UK, FR, GE

SUBJECT: CSCE: BONN EXPERTS MEETING

REF: STATE 216866

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. UK FMRUFF, IN LOW-KEY DEMARCHE ON AUGUST 18, LEFT WITH DEPTOFF COPY OF FCD INSTRUCTION QUESTIONING -- USEFULNESS OF PROJECTED AUGUST 26 CSCE EXPERTS MEETING IN BONN. AFTER QUESTIONING NEED FOR SUCH AN EARLY MEETING AND EXPRESSING PREFERENCE INSTEAD FOR FIRST DISCUSSING CSCE AT SEPTEMBER 17 QUAD, INSTRUCTION GOES ON TO STATE UK AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE AUGUST 26 SO MEETING WILL BE USEFUL. SIMILAR INSTRUCTION WAS SENT TO BRITISH EMBASSIES IN BONN AND PARIS.

3. DEPTOFF RESPONDED THAT WE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THE AUGUST 26 MEETING WAS TIMELY, GIVEN OUR CONCERN OVER PREPARING THE FALL SESSION AT MADRID MOST THOROUGHLY AND DOING ALL POSSIBLE TO END MADRID CONSTRUCTIVELY IN DECEMBER. WE ALSO WERE CONCERNED ABOUT DIFFERENCES EXPRESSED WITHIN THE FOUR OVER THE AGREED WESTERN AREA

FORMULATION FOR A CDE, ON WHICH WE HAD TO STAND FIRM AND MAKE THE SOVIETS COME TO US. WE BELIEVED OUR STRATEGY PAPER WOULD HELP SIGNIFICANTLY TO FOCUS THE DISCUSSION AT THE AUGUST 26 MEETING, AND THIS WOULD GIVE US THE OPPORTUNITY BETTER TO PREPARE THE SEPTEMBER

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NLS 598-002#66

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BY L0J NARA, DATE 6/12/02

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

17 QUAD DISCUSSION OF CSCE. THE EXPERTS' GET-TOGETHER ALSO PROVIDED A CHANCE TO DISCUSS AT FOUR THE NORWEGIAN PROPOSAL FOR AN INFORMAL CSCE MEETING IN OSLO BEFORE MADRID RESUMES (SEPTEL).

4. IF HOST GOVTS COME BACK TO YOU QUESTIONING THE UTILITY OF THE EXPERTS' MEETING, YOU SHOULD RESPOND ALONG LINES SET OUT IN PARA 3 ABOVE. CLARK

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#1022
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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81/A259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA404
PP RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #7079 2270102
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 150040Z AUG 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2003
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8438
INFO RUFHNL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9638
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1999
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE 6771
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 217079
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/14/01 (DERIVATIVE)

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PK, FR, GW

SUBJECT: CONTROL OF NUCLEAR GRADE CALCIUM METAL TO
PAKISTAN (EXPORT ALERT NO. 11)

REFS: (A) PARIS 22583 (NOTAL); (B) LONDON 14210 (NOTAL)

1. ~~TS~~ DEPARTMENT IS ENCOURAGED BY ACTIONS TAKEN BY GOF TO CONTROL HIGH-PURITY CALCIUM METAL, AND HAS TAKEN CORRESPONDING ACTIONS IN THE U.S. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF THE URGENCY OF PAKISTANI EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE THE MATERIAL THAT IT MAY BE DESIRABLE FOR THE CONCERNED WESTERN COUNTRIES TO INTENSIFY THIS EFFORT. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE FRENCH TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS QUESTION

2. ~~TS~~ FOR PARIS: EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO M. LEYGUNIE:

-- U.S. APPRECIATES ACTION TAKEN BY FRENCH ON NUCLEAR GRADE CALCIUM METAL. WE HAVE RECEIVED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SINCE RAISING THIS QUESTION WITH YOU THAT AGENTS ACTING ON BEHALF OF PAKISTAN WERE SEEKING TO ACQUIRE A SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF CALCIUM METAL OF SUITABLE PURITY FROM COMPANIES IN THE U.S. UTILIZING THE "ENDUSE" CONTROLS AVAILABLE TO THE USG, WE HAVE NOTIFIED THE COMPANIES CON-

CERNED THAT THE MATERIAL IN QUESTION WOULD BE INTENDED FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE USE AND WOULD THUS REQUIRE A

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NLS 598-002 #67

SENSITIVE

BY NOT NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

"VALIDATED" LICENSE. MOREOVER, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO TH COMPANIES THAT IF THEY WERE TO APPLY FOR SUCH A LICENSE, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROVED.

-- AS AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION, WE ARE INVOKING CERTAIN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES TO PLACE NUCLEAR GRADE CALCIUM AND MAGNESIUM METAL IMMEDIATELY ON OUR LIST OF ITEMIZED EQUIPMENT AND SUBSTANCES WHICH REQUIRE A VALIDATED LICENSE TO ANY END USER. WE ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF AN EXPORT CONTROL DEFINITION AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE DESCRIPTION FORMERLY USED IN THE COCOM LIST. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO OUR CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER IF THE GDF WOULD PROVIDE US ON AN URGENT BASIS WITH ITS DEFINITION FOR NUCLEAR GRADE CALCIUM METAL.

-- YOUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT PURCHASING AGENTS ASSOCIATED WITH PAKISTAN'S SENSITIVE NUCLEAR PROGRAM MAY HAVE RECEIVED BONA FIDE OFFERS OF CALCIUM FLOURIDE FROM THE WEST GERMAN CHEMICAL FIRMS HOESCHT AND U.S. PARST AND COMPANY. ALTHOUGH CALCIUM FLOURIDE IS WIDELY AVAILABLE AND HAS MANY OTHER NON-NUCLEAR USES AND THUS IS NOT SUBJECT TO EXPORT CONTROL, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE EMPLOYED BY THE PAKISTANIS TOGETHER WITH CALCIUM METAL IN THE PRODUCTION OF METALLIC PLUTONIUM OR URANIUM FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES PURPOSES.

-- IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PAKISTANIS CONTINUE TO SEEK CALCIUM METAL FROM A GERMAN FIRM, POSSIBLY THROUGH MR. HEINZ MEBUS. THE CHANCES OF DENYING CALCIUM METAL TO THE PAKISTANIS WOULD BE IMPROVED IF THE FRG AND OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS WERE ALERTED TO ITS IMPORTANCE AND ASKED TO CONTROL THE SUBSTANCE.

-- WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE UP THIS MATTER WITH BONN AND OTHER NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. IF NOT, WE WOULD PLAN TO DO SO. (IF ASKED ABOUT OTHER POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS, YOU MAY INDICATE THAT WE ARE INVESTIGATING WHICH FIRMS HAVE SUPPLIED OR COULD SUPPLY SUCH MATERIALS. WE BELIEVE THERE MAY BE SUCH FIRMS IN NATO COUNTRIES IN ADDITION TO FRANCE AND THE U.S.)

3. ~~TO~~ FOR LONDON: EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO INFORM REEVE OF FCO OF THE SUBSTANCE OF ABOVE. HAIG
BT

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

#7079
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RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1211 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL JP VP
FOBI: PIPES WETTERING RENT
WHOR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9877 2102039
O 072027Z AUG 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1654
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8034
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9379
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3320
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 209877
NDDIS
F.O. 120651 XGDS-3 8/7/81 (SECRETARY HAIG)

TAGS: PEPR, 6P, WA

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO CONTACT GROUP
FOREIGN MINISTERS

REF: STATE 207566

1. THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING
POINTS ORALLY ON A URGENT BASIS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER
ONLY:

1- SECRETARY HAIG HAS NOW HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW
REPORTS FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARIES ABRAMS, CROCKER AND
EAGLEBURGER OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN THE CONTACT GROUP AND
THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING IN PARIS.

2- THE SECRETARY UNDERSTANDS SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS WAS
MADE ON NEXT STEPS ON THE NAMIBIA QUESTION, BUT IS DIS-

SECSTATE WASHDC 9877

DTG:072027Z AUG 81 PSNI 001112
TOR: 220/0023Z

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #69

*****~~SECRET~~*****

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

DATE 06/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

APPOINTED TO HEAR THAT LITTLE WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON THE ANGOLA TRACK OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS.

- IT IS VERY CLEAR TO SECRETARY HAIG THAT THE HOPE FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT RESTS ON CREATING CONDITIONS OF CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCED SECURITY AS THE SOUTH AFRICANS FACE UP TO SOME TOUGH DECISIONS. THEIR POSITION ON THE NEED

FOR COORDINATED MOVEMENT ON THE CUBAN TROOP ISSUE IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR.

- PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY HAIG ARE PERSUADED THAT WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT PRESSURE PRETORIA TO SETTLE EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF PARALLEL PROGRESS IN ANGOLA. THIS IS A FIRM U.S. POSITION THAT WOULD NOT CHANGE UNDER ANY FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

- SECRETARY HAIG HAD HOPED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS IN OTTAWA HAD LAID A BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING ON THIS KEY POINT, AND THAT IT WOULD NOW BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE A GAME PLAN FOR ORCHESTRATING OUR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE EFFORTS VIS A VIS THE ANGOLANS, THE CUBANS AND THE SOVIETS.

- AT A MINIMUM WE WILL NEED TO START WITH A DIPLOMATIC LINE THAT DOES NOT SIGNAL DIVISION IN WESTERN RANKS AND THUS INVITE A DISASTER DOWN THE ROAD. IN THE SECRETARY'S OPINION, A DIVIDED WESTERN POSITION LATER ON ANGOLA WOULD BE AT LEAST AS HARMFUL AS THE CONTINUED STALEMATE ON NAMIBIA.

- IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT SECRETARY HAIG ASKED CROCKER AND EAGLEBURGER TO RAISE THE NEED FOR JOINT THINKING ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED IN OUR UPCOMING CONTACTS WITH KEY PARTIES.

- WE DO NOT ASK THAT THE CONTACT GROUP AS SUCH ADDRESS ANGOLA, NOR DO WE INTEND EXPLICIT LINKAGE OF THE TWO-ISSUES IN PUBLIC COMMENTARY OR IN DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH THE OTHER AFRICAN FRONTLINE STATES. BUT WE CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT COMMON AGREEMENT THAT WE WILL SAY MORE OR LESS THE SAME THING TO OUR AFRICAN CONTACTS ON THIS SUBJECT, AS WELL AS COMMON GROUND AS TO HOW EACH OF US WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE

SECSTATE WASHDC 9877

DTG:072027Z AUG 81 P8N1 001112
TOR: 220/0023Z

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.

5- THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO BE PLACED IN THE POSITION THAT THIS ISSUE IS ONLY OF CONCERN TO PRETORIA AND WASHINGTON, BUT NOT TO OUR KEY WESTERN ALLIES IN AFRICA.

6- CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS THE SECRETARY'S HOPE AS YOU CONSIDER THE DRAFT LANGUAGE PLACED ON THE TABLE IN PARIS THAT YOU WILL SHARE OUR SENSE OF THE NEED TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION NOW.

7- WE WILL SOON PROPOSE MID-SEPTEMBER DATES FOR A SENIOR-LEVEL MEETING TO CARRY FURTHER THIS DISCUSSION AND PREPARE THE GROUND FOR OUR OWN MEETING DURING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

CLARK

SECSTATE WASHDC 9877

DTG:072027Z AUG 81 PSN: 001112
TOR: 220/0023Z

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*****E-O-R-E-T*****

DATE 07/20/81

WHITEHOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION

ASST
ROBI KEMP, GUHIN
WHBR COMMENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC 0800 2001433
O P 041600Z JUL 81 ZPPG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0800
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 714Z

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1035
WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 0710
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 105000
NDPDR

R.O. 100551 ROOM#1 7/23/81 (BORIGHT, JOHN P.) 085/N

PARIS PARM, MNUC, PRK

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF CALCIUM METAL BY PAKISTAN
(EXPORT ALERT NUMBER 11)

REFS: (A) STATE 577141 (B) STATE 901311 (C) PARIS 10301

11 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

AS EMBASSY PARIS WILL RECALL, DEPARTMENT HAS PREVIOUSLY
SAID WITH GOE THE EFFORTS BY PAKISTAN TO PURCHASE METALLIC
CALCIUM FOR NUCLEAR PURPOSES (REFS A AND B). GOE HAS
CONFIRMED USG THAT IT IS CONTROLLING THE EXPORT OF HIGH
PURITY CALCIUM AND MAGNESIUM (REF C).

SECSTATE WASHDC 0800

DTG 1001433Z JUL 81
TORI 000/1430Z
*****E-O-R-E-T*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #70

BY WJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

DATE 07/28/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT PAKISTAN'S "NEW LABS" FACILITY WILL BE COMPLETED SHORTLY. SINCE METALLIC CALCIUM WOULD BE USED FOR PREPARATION OF ANY PLUTONIUM PRODUCED IN THAT FACILITY FOR USE IN A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, PAKISTAN IS ACTIVELY LOOKING FOR A SOURCE OTHER THAN DIRECT FRENCH SUPPLY. IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, IT SHOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE GOV TO INTENSIFY ITS MONITORING OF DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN NUCLEAR-GRADE CALCIUM METAL.

THE U.S. HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MR. HEINZ MEBUS, A WEST GERMAN NATIONAL, IS THE LIKELY CANDIDATE TO ATTEMPT THE PURCHASE OF CALCIUM METAL FOR THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM. BEGIN FYI: MR. MEBUS IS A KEY ACTOR IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. HE HAS SUPPLIED A LARGE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN'S URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING PROGRAMS BY EMPLOYING VARIOUS METHODS INCLUDING THE USE OF "FRONT COMPANYING" AS WELL AS THROUGH HIS PERSONAL PURCHASING ACTIVITIES. END FYI.

AS NOTED IN REF C, THE FRENCH FIRM MINEMET (SOCIETE FRANCAISE DE MINERAIS ET DE METAUX) IS APPARENTLY THE ONLY EUROPEAN FIRM CAPABLE OF SUPPLYING METALLIC CALCIUM OF SUITABLE PURITY FOR NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS. WE THEREFORE, CONSIDER IT LIKELY THAT MR. MEBUS MAY ATTEMPT TO APPROACH MINEMET DIRECTLY OR THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES.

FOR PARIS EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE GOV OFFICIALS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY AND MAKE OUR CONCERNS KNOWN USING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS.

WE BELIEVE THAT A WEST GERMAN NATIONAL, MR. HEINZ MEBUS, MAY ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT FRENCH EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS CONCERNING CALCIUM METAL. IN THE PAST, MR. MEBUS HAS SUPPLIED A LARGE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN'S URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM. WE BELIEVE HE MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO BUY CALCIUM METAL FOR PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PROGRAM, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY.

SECSTATE WASHDC 0608

DTG: 061428Z JUL 81 R01: 00000
TOR: 000/0400Z

*****E-C-R-E-T*****

DATE 07/28/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) 1

WE SUGGEST THAT THE GOF CAUTION MINEMET TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF ANY ATTEMPTS TO PURCHASE CALCIUM METAL BY FIRMS OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE ITS REGULAR CUSTOMERS. MINEMET AND THE GOF SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY SUSPICIOUS OF SMALL SWISS, DUTCH, OR GERMAN TRADING COMPANIES.

THE GOF MAY ALSO WISH TO APPROACH THE PRO ON THIS SPECIFIC CASE, AND REQUEST GERMAN ASSISTANCE IN ASSURING THAT METALLIC CALCIUM OR MAGNESIUM OF SUITABLE PURITY ARE NOT EXPORTED TO PAKISTAN.

IF ASKED, THE U.S. HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN TO THE PRO OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF MRS. MESSIA.

FOR LONDON, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO INFORM THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF HMGO OF OUR DEMARCHE AND TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THE TEXT OF PARA 6. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 5600

DTOR 1048400Z JUL 81 001 00000
TORI 200/1400Z

*****E-C-R-E-T*****

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PAGE 1 = 426

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/29/81//210

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

MESSAGE:

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OO RUEHC RUEHLD
DE RUEHC #2750 1931736
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 121725Z JUL 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 0950
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 182750
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/12/01

TAGS: PEPR, AF, UK

SUBJECT: LETTER TO FOREIGN SECRETARY CARRINGTON RE NAMIBIA

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO
FOREIGN SECRETARY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. BEGIN TEXT

DEAR PETER

I HAVE THOUGHT HARD ABOUT YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE GET THE
CONTACT GROUP TOGETHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE CURRENT
STATE OF PLAY. GIVEN THE FACT THAT YOU WILL BE HERE ON
FRIDAY, YOU AND I WILL HAVE AMPLE TIME TO DISCUSS NAMIBIA
BILATERALLY BEFORE A CONTACT GROUP MEETING. THE QUESTION,
THEN, IS HOW TO HANDLE THE OTHER FOUR.

FRANKLY, I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT WE MUST AVOID GIVING
OFFENSE TO ANY OF OUR FRIENDS. I DO NOT SEE HOW WE COULD
GATHER IN THE QUADRIPARTITE FORMAT EITHER BEFORE OR
DURING OTTAWA WITHOUT RISKING SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE
JAPANESE AND ITALIANS, WHO ARE TNORDINATELY SENSITIVE
ABOUT ANYTHING THAT SMACKS OF SECOND-CLASS STATUS.
FURTHER, I SEE ALMOST CERTAIN PROBLEMS WITH A CONTACT
GROUP SESSION DURING THE SUMMTT ITSELF, SINCE I VERY
MUCH DOUBT THAT THERE WOULD BE ENOUGH TIME FOR IN-DEPTH
CONSIDERATION OF NAMIBIA WITH EVERYTHING ELSE WE WILL
HAVE TO DO.

THUS, I BELIEVE THE BEST WAY FOR ME TO PROCEED WOULD BE
TO INVITE CLAUDE AND HANS-DIETRICH TO STOIN WASHINGTON

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NLS 598-002 #72

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 = 427

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/29/81//210

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

ON SATURDAY, JULY 18, I WOULD MEET WITH EACH INDIVIDUALLY TO GO OVER THE SAME GROUND I WOULD ALREADY HAVE COVERED WITH YOU. THE MEETINGS SHOULD PROBABLY BE ANNOUNCED, TO AVOID CLAIMS OF PRE-COOKING THE SUMMIT. ONCE WE HAVE CONSULTED BILATERALLY (I WILL TALK TO MARK MACGUIGAN BRIEFLY HERE IN NASSAU, AND BRIEF HIM IN MORE DETAIL ON THE EDGES OF THE SUMMIT), WE WOULD HAVE A FEW DAYS FOR REFLECTION, AND COULD THEN HAVE A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AT THE SUMMIT'S CLOSE. I WOULD PROPOSE THAT WE FIVE GATHER IN OTTAWA ON TUESDAY, JULY 2 FOR DINNER FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF OUR CHIEFS IF WE INDIVIDUALLY CONCLUDE DURING THE BILATERALS THAT SUCH A MEETING IS DESIRABLE. THERE CLEARLY WOULD BE MORE WORK FOR OUR EXPERTS TO DO TOGETHER SUBSEQUENTLY, BUT WE COULD SHAPE THEIR MANDATE AT OTTAWA.

OF COURSE, WE WILL HAVE TO BE FLEXIBLE BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF COORDINATING TRAVEL PLANS. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR GERMAN AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES CANNOT STOP IN WASHINGTON BEFORE OTTAWA, I WOULD PROPOSE TO TALK WITH THEM SEPARATELY AT THE SUMMIT. FURTHER, IF YOU OR THEY WOULD PREFER TO HOLD THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, WE COULD REMAIN OVERNIGHT AND MEET IN OTTAWA, OR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON FOR A MEETING HERE ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON. THAT WOULD BE MORE TIME-CONSUMING, AND I PERSONALLY WOULD PREFER THE SUGGESTION OF A DINNER MEETING TUESDAY EVENING. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT THIS PLAN OFFERS US THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS WITH A TOUGH PROBLEM. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SINCERELY,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG END TEXT RASHISH
BT
#2750
NNNN

SENSITIVE

DATE 07/10/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHATS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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BT~~SECRET~~ STATE 175923

MODIR

FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR
P.O. 12065 IRDS-1 7/4/01 (THE SECRETARY)

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PEPR, PDIP, PGOV, SF,

SUBJECT: NAMIBIA AND THE CONTACT GROUP

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)2. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED ON AN URGENT BASIS TO DELIVER THE
FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. QUOTE: DEAR MR. MINISTER:

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO REPORT ON BILL CLARK'S
RECENT TRIP TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. AT THE MAY 21-22 CONTACT
GROUP MEETING IN WASHINGTON CHAIRED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
BROCKER, IT WAS THE CLEAR CONSENSUS THAT OUR GOVERNMENT

SECSTATE WASHDC 5923

DTG: 042108Z JUL 81 PSN: 015175
TOR: 185/0334Z

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NLS

598-002#73

*****~~SECRET~~*****

BY

LJS

NARA, DATE

6/12/02

DATE 07/10/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING A SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO MOVE THE NAMIBIA TALKS FORWARD. IT WAS OUR COLLECTIVE JUDGMENT THAT A NUMBER OF FORMULATIONS IN FOREIGN MINISTER PIK BOTHA'S MAY 19 LETTER DEPARTED FUNDAMENTALLY FROM UNSC RESOLUTION 435 AND WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIABLE WITH THE AFRICANS.

BILL CLARK'S MISSION HAD AS ITS PRIMARY PURPOSE TO SEEK MORE REASONABLE POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES. SPECIFICALLY, HE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF THE UNTAG MILITARY PRESENCE,

CEASE-FIRE AND TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE UN PLAN, THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES (AND SOUTH AFRICA'S GUARANTOR ROLE), AND THE QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY AS RAISED IN THE MAY 19 LETTER. IN ADDITION, THE MISSION HAD THE PURPOSE OF MEETING THE INTERNAL PARTIES (INCLUDING INTERNAL SWAPO), HEARING THEIR VIEWS ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND, LASTLY, PROVIDING PRIME MINISTER MUGABE AN INTERIM REPORT ON WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS STAND.

IN THAT MISSION AND SINCE, WE HAVE BEEN OPERATING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONTACT GROUP CONSENSUS OF MAY 21-22. INDEED, WE HAVE BEEN DOING PRECISELY WHAT OUR FOUR ALLIES WISHED US TO DO, RECOGNIZING WE ARE IN THE BEST POSITION TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

THE STATUS OF OUR PROCESS IS AS FOLLOWS. THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF NAMIBIA'S STATUS AND ITS ULTIMATE CONSTITUTION IS OF LESS CONCERN TO SOUTHERN AFRICA THAN BEFORE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS RECOGNIZE THAT PAPER GUARANTEES HAVE THEIR LIMITATIONS WHEN WEIGHED AGAINST THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. ON WALVIS BAY, THEY ACCEPT THAT ITS STATUS AND THEIR CLAIMS CANNOT BE AN ELEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT PACKAGE. WE FIND APPARENT CONSENSUS AMONG THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND SEVERAL INTERNAL PARTIES (INCLUDING THE DTA) THAT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OR GUIDELINES SHOULD BE AGREED UPON PRIOR TO AN ELECTION, BUT THAT THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SHOULD, AS IN THE UN PLAN, WRITE THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF. WE WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF UNTAG. BILL CLARK WAS TOLD THAT A REDUCED NUMBER

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TOR: 186/0334Z

DATE 07/10/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF TROOPS, DRAWN FROM ACCEPTABLE COUNTRIES, AND DEPLOYED IN THE NORTH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. ON THE OTHER TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS PUT IN QUESTION IN THE MAY 19 LETTER, WE NEED GREATER CLARIFICATION FROM SOUTH AFRICANS.

THE SOUTH AFRICANS CONTINUE IN THEIR GRAVE CONCERN OVER THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA. THEIR READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD IS PREMISED ON ACHIEVING, AT SOME POINT, CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. ACCORDINGLY, WE CONCLUDE IT ESSENTIAL WE GO BACK TO THEM TODAY TO CLARIFY THIS AND REMAINING AMBIGUITY ON THE PROVISIONS OF UNSC RES. 435. THIS WE ARE NOW

GOING. SPECIFICALLY, WE ARE GOING BACK TO THEM TO INDICATE THE URGENT NEED NOW FOR WRITTEN CONFIRMATION THAT WOULD ENABLE THE CONTACT GROUP TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS. WE BELIEVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, BUT SOME AMBIGUITY REMAINS. IN CONCLUSION, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE MINDFUL OF OUR OBLIGATION TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU ON NAMIBIA. MY AND BILL'S TRAVEL AND OUR NEED TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT EXTENDED THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS SOMEWHAT. HOWEVER, THE FACT IS THAT WE ARE UNDER A MANDATE FROM THE CONTACT GROUP TO OBTAIN MORE FORTHCOMING POSITIONS FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS, A PROCESS YET INCOMPLETE. YOU HAVE MY PERSONAL ASSURANCE THAT THIS IS OUR OBJECTIVE AND WE ARE WHOLLY SERIOUS ABOUT IT. AS SOON AS WE HAVE FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION, WE WILL ASK THE CONTACT GROUP TO JOIN US AGAIN IN ADVANCING THE PROCESS. WE EXPECT THIS TO BE POSSIBLE PRIOR TO THE OTTAWA SUMMIT.

FOR LONDON: I ALSO WANT TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO WISH YOU WELL FOR YOUR TRAVELS TO MOSCOW. I HOPE YOU HAVE NOTICED THAT WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE CAN PUBLICLY FROM HERE TO SUPPORT YOUR AFGHAN INITIATIVE.

FOR PARIS: YOU ARE QUITE CORRECT, CLAUDE, THAT WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT TO CONSULT BILATERALLY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. BILL CLARK MET TODAY WITH AMBASSADOR DE LABOULAYE, AND WE WILL MEET WITH HIM AGAIN MONDAY TO

SECSTATE WASHDC 5923

DTG: 042108Z JUL 81 PSN: 015175
TOR: 186/0334Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 07/10/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GO OVER OUR CONCLUSIONS ON WHERE WE STAND ON THE ISSUES. THIS CLEARLY INDICATES OUR READINESS TO CARRY OUT MY COMMITMENT TO YOU ON THESE MATTERS.

FOR BONNI: AS YOU KNOW, I MET WITH DOBRYNIN. AMONGST OTHER THINGS, WE HAD A BRIEF CHAT ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE PROPER VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE CAME TO NO CONCLUSIONS. I'VE ASKED MY PEOPLE TO GIVE YOUR EMBASSY A MORE DETAILED READ OUT EARLY IN THE WEEK. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 5923

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*****SECRET*****

DATE 07/10/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

UNTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

ATT: COL VP
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DE RUEHC #3891 1830200
O 020139Z JUL 81 ZPFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9928
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8029
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 7994
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2764

INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4209
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6657
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 173891
NODIS
W.O. 12065; RDS-1 7/17/81 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: SF, WA, REPR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY ON NAMIBIA

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON
NAMIBIA FROM THE SECRETARY TO HOST GOVERNMENT FOREIGN
MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT: NOW THAT I HAVE RETURNED FROM MY
ASIAN TRIP AND HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW
FULLY WITH BILL CLARK THE RESULTS OF HIS TALKS WITH

SECSTATE WASHDC 3891

DTG:020139Z JUL 81 PSN: 011676
TOR: 183/0202Z

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NLS 598-002 #74

*****SECRET*****

BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

DATE 07/10/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1 SENIOR SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON JUNE 11-
2 I WANTED TO GET TO YOU IMMEDIATELY ON THIS
3 IMPORTANT SUBJECT.

4 IN BRIEF, WE BELIEVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOWED
5 FLEXIBILITY AND MOVEMENT IN SOME AREAS. ONE IS AN
6 APPARENT READINESS TO DEFINE AND NEGOTIATE CONSTI-
7 TUTIONAL PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
8 RATHER THAN A FULLBLOWN CONSTITUTION PRIOR TO INDE-
9 PENDENCE. WE ALSO WERE PLEASED THAT THE SOUTH AFRI-
0 CANS SEEM TO ACCEPT A SCALED-DOWN UNTAG MILITARY
1 PRESENCE DRAWN FROM APPROPRIATE COUNTRIES.

2 AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THERE REMAINS SOME
3 AMBIGUITY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION.

4 WE, THEREFORE, FEEL IT NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO THEM
5 AGAIN TO OBTAIN A CLEARER AND MORE REASONABLE FORMU-
6 LATION. ACCORDINGLY, I AM SENDING A MESSAGE TO PIK BOTHA
7 SETTING FORTH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THINGS STAND AND
8 WHAT MUST BE DONE ON THEIR PART.

9 I WILL BE BACK TO YOU PROMPTLY ONCE WE HAVE THEIR
0 RESPONSE, AND WE WILL THEN WANT TO GET THE CONTACT GROUP
1 TOGETHER. IF THEIR RESPONSE IS PROMISING, WE WOULD
2 SUGGEST THAT CONTACT GROUP WORKING GROUPS BE ESTABLISHED
3 TO COORDINATE ON POLICY AMONG THE FIVE ON SUCH CRITICAL
4 ISSUES AS CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND TRANSITIONAL
5 ARRANGEMENTS.

6 WE SHARE THE FRUSTRATIONS WHICH ALL OF YOU MUST FEEL
7 OVER THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY AND VERY MUCH APPRECIATE
8 YOUR FOREBEARANCE. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOU TO WORK
9 WITH US IN THIS RESPECT AND LOOK FORWARD TO OUR UPCOMING
0 DISCUSSIONS IN OTTAWA. END TEXT. HAIG

RECSTATE WASHDC 3891

DTG: 020139Z JUL 81 PSN: 011676
TOR: 183/0202Z