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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: April 17, 1984

TO: FAITH WHITTLESEY

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS *LK*
Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison
Room 438 OEOB, Ext. 2741

- FYI
- For Your Review
- Please Return By _____
- Comments

As regards actual negotiations, I think it best to leave it in the Counselor's hands.

However, it is important that, when appropriate, you impress upon senior WH staff, especially NSC, that the "Greek lobby" is not a Washington-based PAC, but represents over a million citizens, who have two senators a dozen congressmen, governors and dozens of other elected officials. They are also very business oriented. The WH must be primed to back the Counselor up should he or Sec Gen or UN be able to make any progress on this issue.



United States Department of State

The Counselor

Note: Kyprianou's message to President Reagan is transmitted in a State Department cable from Embassy Nicosia on March 14, 1984.

The message number is Nicosia 1359.

The message was repeated to the White House situation room on March 14.

*Off Staff 4/10/84
For Linas*

*Linas -
What to do
w/this?
F.*

The Cyprus Issue

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has approved a modest \$39 million cut in security assistance for Turkey. Most of the Executive Branch can live with this figure, even though it is the 7-10 ratio.

The Congress does not seem to want a confrontation this year over Cyprus. The Greek lobby, sensing this, has backed off for now on pressing for a new embargo or deep cuts on Turkish assistance. They have settled for the modest HFAC reductions and have even told me they could accept the full Administration request if there was a package on Varosha (Famagusta) under the UN Secretary-General's auspices. They are anxious for progress on Cyprus, not really motivated by a "get the Turks" mood.

There is hope --but as yet no assurance--that Denktash' meeting on Friday with the SYG will enable the SYG to move ahead on a Varosha package. (I will see Denktash Saturday).

The Greek lobby is also willing to support additional U.S. aid to help rehabilitate Varosha -- in order to encourage both sides to come to an agreement.

In present circumstances, we only need now to avoid having members of the Administration exert further pressure on the Hill on behalf of Turkish assistance. To do so creates an unnecessary issue with Greek-Americans, who are still within our reach for 1984.

Papandreou Speech Lauds Soviets For Curbing Spread of Imperialism

Special to The Washington Post

ATHENS, May 10—Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou today denounced the United States and delivered his strongest praise to date of the Soviet Union, calling Moscow an agent of detente and a brake on imperialism and capitalism worldwide.

In a speech opening the first congress of his Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), Papandreou said, "The Soviet Union's fight for detente is genuine. The U.S.S.R. cannot be called an imperialist power like the United States. It is a force against imperialism and capitalism.

"Even in Africa, the Soviets are only trying to counter U.S. expansionism," Papandreou added.

The three-day Pasok congress, the first in the 10-year history of the party, is being attended by 2,400 delegates from all parts of Greece. The gathering is part of the buildup to the June 17

elections in the 10 member nations of the European Community for national deputies to the Strasbourg-based European Parliament.

In Greece, the vote has taken on the dimensions of a popularity test for the Papandreou government, which swept to power in 1981 ending half a century of rightist political domination.

The Soviet delegation ranked among the largest of 60 foreign delegations attending the congress.

Papandreou's tough foreign policy stance was seen by political observers here as a bid to appease party ideologues who believe Pasok's position has softened since the party came to power.

Party officials have said there was questioning at the grass-roots level of the party of the signing in September of an agreement extending the operation of the four U.S. military bases in Greece for five years.

① Mark - Please
read FYI
② File, Greek - Am
issues

September 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: James A. Baker, III
FROM: Ed Derwinski
SUBJECT: The Greek-American Vote

On the evening of October 6 in Chicago, the United Hellenic American Congress is honoring Archbishop Iakovos for 25 years of service as their spiritual leader. Prominent Greek-Americans from across the country will be in attendance. The President ^{OR THE VICE PRES.} has been invited to address the banquet. Accepting this invitation would give us a big boost with the Greek-Americans in the home stretch. The potential in this event should be understood in the context of the fluid Greek-American vote situation.

The Greek-Americans are surprisingly quiet. Many of their leaders are sympathetic to the Reagan Administration, grateful for our strong stand against Turk Cypriot "independence", and embarrassed by Papandreou's anti-U.S. posturing. But in the absence of movement on Cyprus, and with the Congress debating the military assistance package to Turkey, we run the risk of alienating a naturally emotional voting bloc.

Whatever the difficulty inherent in sustaining Cyprus talks, we cannot avoid a periodic battle with Congress on Turkish aid programs until there is movement on Cyprus. There is no possibility of any quick breakthrough, but we must continue to give visible support to U.N. Secretary Perez de Cuellar's initiative. If and when some progress is achieved, we could make the point that this was due to positive leadership from Ankara, which would help us diffuse the battle over the Turkish aid package.

Leading Greek-Americans desperately wish to support the Reagan-Bush ticket. They know that the Carter Administration did nothing to solve the Cyprus problem. Considering the above, the Reagan-Bush ticket is holding up better than expected with Greek-Americans. However, Mondale and Ferraro have verbally positioned themselves with emotional appeals to Greek-Americans.

Friday, October 26, 1984

Ahepa-PAC Outlines New Directions

The members of the Ahepa-PAC Executive Committee held their sixth policy and planning meeting in Washington, D.C., recently. At the conclusion of the five-hour business session, co-chairman Peter Derzis said that "although Ahepa-PAC has been in existence for only twelve months, it has already had an impact on the political process. Greek-Americans have always been extremely active politically at every level— city, state, and national—and now Ahepa-PAC is coordinating the involvement."

"Greek-Americans are a very diverse group, both socially and economically," adds co-chairman Sam Nakis, "and, beyond having a shared cultural background, many members of our community actually represent a variety of interests. A political action committee traditionally represents very narrow and specific interests; because of the nature of the community we represent, we have a broader perspective."

During the meeting, the Ahepa-PAC Executive Committee identified six domestic and foreign policy issues which reflect concerns common to the majority of the Greek-Americans, and the Executive Committee appointed individual members to draft position papers on them:

(1) Education issues, particularly student loans and federal support for bilingual education and minority cultural programs;

(2) Health issues, with a strong focus on medicare legislation and funding for health research, particularly thalassemia;

(3) Senior citizens, with particular attention on social security benefits and federal support for housing programs sponsored by the Department of Housing's Section 202;

(4) Immigration, all aspects of legislation and policy;

(5) Small business issues in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches;

(6) Foreign policy, to include both broad foreign policy perspectives, as well as specific references to U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

These position papers will be used to identify key legislation in the House and Senate; votes on these bills will be tabulated and used to compile annual Ahepa-PAC voting records for each member of Congress.

The Ahepa-PAC committee also voted unanimously to initiate a political education program aimed at Greek-Americans. The purpose of this program will be to increase political awareness within the community, and to promote an appreciation of America's pluralistic political institutions. The program will include activities at both the grassroots and national levels. ■

The serialization of "Island of the Winds" will continue next week.

State Dept. Faces Greek-American Panelists

A First for the Greek-American Community

In its efforts to begin a new dialogue between the Greek-American community and the U.S. government regarding U.S. policies, Proini Daily has sponsored the first in a series of panel discussions on important issues concerning Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

The event, which took place October 25th, 1984, at the Crystal Palace in Astoria, N.Y., was attended by over 300 members of the Greek-American community and press.

Speaker of the evening was Richard Haass, Deputy for Policy, and Special Cyprus Coordinator, Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Department of State. The panel included the distinguished Dr.

Phoebus Dhrymes, professor of economics at Columbia University, Christopher Hitchens, British journalist and author, and Professor Basil Vlavianos, formerly of New York University, publisher, author and journalist. Moderator was Dr. Amelia Augustus, President of the Women's Economic Round Table of New York.

Fannie Petallides, president and publisher of PROINI and WEEKLY REVIEW PROINI, opened the session.

The following is the second and final part of the full transcript of the discussion that took place.

The Topic: U.S. Policy towards Greece, Turkey and Cyprus


(Continued from last week) **Part II**

Prof. Dhrymes: It is not clear to me that the reduction in American influence in Ankara is because we imposed the embargo, or because we lifted it before it accomplished what allegedly it was set out to accomplish.

If you look at what the Cyprus problem is, there exists a great imbalance. On one side, the force that attaches to the two sides is greatly unequal. On the other hand, the loss that has been suffered by the two sides is also greatly unequal. The Greeks have lost, already, a great deal more than it would have been thought possible for them to lose, say, 10 years prior to 1974. When the imbalance of the perceived wrongs and the force is so great, it is difficult to arrive at a solution, because the person who wields the great force has no incentive to give in. And the person who has suffered what he considers to be a great loss has difficulty accepting a

solution that is desired by the victors. If the U.S. role is merely to expedite the arrival of the solution by the two sides without any involvement, then realistically one would not expect a solution to materialize. I would like you to comment on that. You stress the potential importance of Turkey to the Alliance and U.S. security interests. How do you know that in a case of need, Turkey will fulfill its obligations to NATO? After all, its history of the last 50 years has not been one of alliances with the West.

R. Haass: I find your first point interesting, particularly when I remember what you said a few minutes ago when you spoke—which was about the importance of history. On Cyprus, yes, now there is an imbalance in force, and as you describe, an imbalance of suffering. I think one of the problems and one of the dilemmas that stands in the way of



Richard Haass of the U.S. State Department


progress is the different reading of history. I am not taking sides here, let me just try to explain what I understand to be a Turkish-Cypriot perspective. They look at the history from the independence of Cyprus, and in some cases before, up through the events of 1974, and they say you're right, there was an imbalance of force

and suffering, and both were to the detriment of the Turkish-Cypriot side. This is their view. I think it is only possible to appreciate the impasse which at times we seem to be in now if one takes this view into account.

My purpose is not to say that one side is right or wrong, or that any history is more or less valid. All I would suggest is that those who would try to create political answers for the problems in Cyprus take these historic considerations into account. Obviously, certain concerns of the Turkish-Cypriot community will have to be taken into account if there is going to be any chance of gaining Turkish-Cypriot acceptance which, after all, is one of the prerequisites of progress in Cyprus.

I do think the Turkish side has incentive to compromise. One has to recall that Mr. Denktash's so-called declaration of independence has not been recognized by any country in the world other than Turkey. This administration has condemned that declaration, and this administration has made it clear that we do not see it in any way as a constructive step

(Continued on page 10)



(L. to R.) Speaker Richard Haass, Moderator Dr. Amelia Augustus, Prof. Phoebus Dhrymes of Columbia University, author-journalist Christopher Hitchens, Prof. Basil Vlavianos of New York University (retd.)

State Department

(Continued from page 9)

towards the kind of progress we want to see on Cyprus. I think that as a result Mr. Denktash finds himself in a degree of international isolation that perhaps he would not be in otherwise. Also, economically there is a disparity between the economic wealth and growth patterns of the north and the south. Also, the north of Cyprus however one looks at it is still a fairly small place. All of Cyprus is a small place. It's too small to be divided. Over time, the Turkish-Cypriot people will benefit from being part of a large whole, just as the Greek-Cypriot people would. There is ample incentive there.

The question of the U.S. role in this, and all I can do is somewhat repeat myself, is that we can be expediter, we can assist and I am willing to do that. If anyone has any ideas about how we can do it better, I am all ears. I would point out, though, that a lot of our policy is not terribly new in terms of this administration. Indeed, a lot of it is fairly bipartisan. As you yourself pointed out, it was President Carter and Vice President Mondale who lifted the embargo. This administration has at certain times, you probably thought, supported Turkey unfairly, yet this administration has roundly condemned the declaration of independence. While there are some disagreements, there are some broad areas of consensus about what it is the U.S. can and ought to try to do in Cyprus.

Lastly, will Turkey fulfill its obligations? One, if one looks back to the Korean War it is useful to note that Turkey did send forces to fight there. My basic point is the following: that I have no doubts about the loyalties of either country. The ways to create doubts are for the U.S. in peacetime to be seen as not fulfilling its half of the bargain. To conduct policies such as embargoes of Turkey would obviously create doubts about what Turkey would do in certain situations because the Turks necessarily consider whether or not they would benefit from an alliance that didn't provide them with security assistance. I think one cannot separate one's policy in peacetime from one's expectations in a crisis.

To say things that are somewhat kindly towards Turkey, to point out that there have been improvements, considerable improvement, in Turkey's human rights performance, to point out that there has been a general movement towards democracy in Turkey, to point out that there have been certain types of economic reforms that move Turkey in directions that we in America tend to value, to say that a stable Turkey contributes to the strength of the West — to point these things out is, I suppose, to be pro-Turkish. I don't think that in pointing these things out, I or anyone else is becoming anti-Greek. The U.S. policy towards this part of the world fails when we have to start choosing between Greece and Turkey. This policy starts to succeed when we improve relations with both. That must be our goal. For me to say

certain things that are positive about Turkey, is not an anti-Greek comment. If I say certain negative things about Turkey it is not a pro-Greek comment. There is room enough for good relations with both countries. They will benefit from it, and we will benefit from it if relations improve. There is nothing to fear from that.



W.R. PROHLM—P. PAPANICOLAOU

Christopher Hitchens, British journalist and author of *Cyprus* (Quartet Books).

C. Hitchens: It is one thing to condemn Turkey's sponsored UDI (Universal Declaration of Independence) on Cyprus in the UN, or from the podium of the State Department's spokesman. And it is another to supply Turkey with a billion dollars of military aid, of which a quarter of a billion is to consolidate the occupation and the UDI. If you were Turkey, which message would seem louder to you? Now we can't blame Mr. Haass for this, but he has to speak for an administration which comprises those departments (Defense and State Departments), but we

on their side that they should be ceded Cyprus and the Dodecanese islands. That's on the record, too.

There is a serious point yet to be addressed. If Turkey gets all this aid, if it's up now with Israel and Egypt in military assistance, and if the reason given for that is it is facing a long common border with the Soviet Union, and facing that long common border with "Korean War vintage weapons," why are the sophisticated weapons in the hands of the Turkish army, navy and air force not pointed

Why are the sophisticated weapons ... of the Turkish army ... not pointed North or East? Why are they pointed South or West? ... C. Hitchens

north or east? Why are they pointed south or west? Why is it that everyone in this room who fills out a 1040 form is helping also to pay for the army of the Aegean? An army not even under NATO command or control, and which is pointed at Greece. Why is it that we pay for the garrisoning of Cyprus with this money? How is this in engaging with whatever grand struggle the administration in its Armageddon phase may be planning with the Soviet Union. Even if you take that at its most lenient, it's a waste of money. I think that's probably the kindest thing that can be said about it. Finally, I must say that I want to

Council of Europe and every other international organization which gets a bit of American aid. And there is the occupied part of Cyprus which gets a vast preponderance of American aid. Please, spare us the indignity of referring to them as North and South. It is not a North-South dialogue going on here, and it is not Mr. Denktash and Mr. Kyprianou, and it is not a question of do the Turks have a point.

Mr. Haass: The American government recognizes as the only government in Cyprus, the one led by Mr. Kyprianou. There is no doubt on that score. There will be no doubt on that score. No one should have any doubts whatsoever. If you do only go away with one thing tonight, please go away with that.

The question of aid to Turkey. One, it is a large amount of money — you're right. Turkey is now in third place after Israel and Egypt. But it is not a particularly large amount of money when one looks at it in the context of the condition of the Turkish military. I don't want to belabor the point. Since it was raised, I will address it. Even with all the aid that Turkey is getting, it is not on the verge of becoming some overwhelming modern fighting machine. Turkey still lags far behind the kinds of capabilities it would need to fulfill all of its NATO missions. I think that's the basic point. Secondly, we are all entitled to our own opinions but not to our own facts. It simply is not true that the bulk of Turkey's military is aimed at the Aegean or Greece. If one looks at the bulk of the Turkish military, it is simply aimed in other directions to fulfill other missions.

Whenever I go to Greece, I hear a lot about the Turkish threat. In my meetings with Greek officials in




Illustration courtesy of *Spotlight* biweekly, Institute of Political Studies, Athens.

can point out to him he can't have it both ways. Anyone more than Turkey could when in the Second World War so far from sending intentions to fight on the side of democracy, it bargained eagerly with the Nazis for a pact with them, and gave as its price for coming

register a very strong objection to the increasing habit in Washington of referring to North Cyprus and South Cyprus. We have it four or five times in his last remarks. There is the Republic of Cyprus, recognized by the British Commonwealth, the UN, the

Greece I hear a lot about that. I also hear an awful lot about that here. I can appreciate the roots of that concern. All I can say — I know that I am never terribly convincing when I say it so I admit it in advance — is that in all my meetings in Turkey, I do not

unter the opposite point of view, that the Turks are somehow aring a threat to Greece. I have encountered that nor have I seen evidence of that. one looks at where Turkey is, if looks at the fact that, I think, it has

... in all my meetings in Turkey, I do not encounter... that the Turks are somehow preparing a threat to Greece. ... R. Haass

second longest border with the let Union of any country in NATO, ne looks at the fact that in its hborhood is Syria, Iraq, Iran, hanistan — it is not a neighborhood I would choose to buy a house in. key has ample security problems its border to justify the level of erican aid. When I look at where aid is going, and how it is being islated into military capability, I do see that Turkey poses a military at to Greece.

efore I joined the government, re I went to the Pentagon and then he State Dept., I lived in London worked at an international think called the International Institute Strategic Studies. One of the things colleagues and I did there was to are, every year, a terribly boring me called "The Military Balance." ch basically, on a few hundred es every Fall, would print out the ary forces of every country in the ld to the extent that it was known liely, culling it from a whole host of ces. If you care to pick up a copy look at it, one, for example, mpares the air force of Greece to air force of Turkey, just on paper orgetting about training, forgetting ut a million other calculations that into determinations of military nce — I do not see grounds for a kish military threat, and I have not ountered any evidence of it in my versations in Turkey.

rof. Vlavianos: I'll try to answer your stion, Mr. Haass, regarding the ibility. Our President, Mr. Reagan, almost all his speeches related to ational relations, emphasizes h pride, our adherence to moral iples, respect of human rights, l even philanthropy, and vehe ntly criticizes other nations regarding such principles. Do think that the policies of the U.S. ards Turkey are in line with these ements of our President? If not, it is the reason for that? It would be al pty if we leave this room tonight go home with frustrations that we not get some kind of enlightening anation of this unbelievable fact. re is a lack of respect of our own iples and statements and ideas. are wrecking our credibility all r the world, believe me. I was one he first journalists from the U.S. to o Greece and the Middle East after

the War and I found no one who would not speak with respect and love for the U.S. I am sorry to report that when I went recently there, I could not find one — except some politicians who did that for their own purposes—but not one who spoke with the same respect and love for the U.S. This is a fact. If Mr. Haass does not believe me, I dare say that he is misinformed.

And then look what happens. We do all these things to prevent the expansion of the power of the Soviet Union. Have we succeeded in this? Can



PROF. BASIL VLAVIANOS

we ever succeed without the cooperation of the people involved? If we keep Turkey and Greece divided? If no one believes in our statements, how can we succeed in these efforts?

You mentioned that you have tried to improve relations with both countries — between Greece and Turkey. How in the world can you improve relations if you support both the criminal and the victim at the same time? Suppose someone invades your home and chases you out of your home, and you have a so-called friend coming and financing the criminal who threw you out of your home. Would you ever think you can reach a compromise with that criminal? Or, consider that friend a real friend of yours, or an ally? I don't know. I am at a loss to understand the reasons behind this policy.

From what you said I gather that you follow this policy because Turkey has a long boundary with Russia. We know that; we hear that every day. Isn't that

How in the world can you improve relations if you support both the criminal and the victim at the same time?

... B. Vlavianos

equal to saying that I am going to associate myself with crime, because this is my temporary interest. And do you believe that by associating ourselves with crime, we can finally escape the punishment which always comes to people who associate themselves with crime? Unless you don't consider the invasion of Cyprus a

crime and the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus a crime.

Mr. Haass: I suppose that I look at the Cyprus problem somewhat differently than you. I have come to see the Cyprus problem as more multi-faceted or complex. You may not like what I am going to say, but I have not been a diplomat very long so I still feel I can say things that are undiplomatic. I don't feel that anyone on Cyprus, given the history of the island, has a monopoly on virtue. I don't think that the history of Cyprus is simply black and white. I am not taking sides, I am not measuring the rightness or wrongness, or who is responsible, or who is to blame. I do find it a terribly complex situation. I don't mean to attribute percentages here, but Cyprus is not simple. In part, it is because of the history, which Prof. Dhrymes correctly said one has to take into account.


As a result, I find the current situation, one, not easy to solve and, two, at times, terribly difficult to appreciate or understand. The history of Cyprus did not begin in 1974. It began earlier as Christopher Hitchens said in his book. In order to understand where we are now, one has to go back. People have derived lessons from the history of Cyprus to the extent now that the moral equation is perhaps pragmatism or "real politique" if you will, which is whatever your views of the historical analysis of Cyprus, whatever your

views are about the morality of the situation now, whatever your views of the morality of American policy—there is another criteria by which policy ought to be judged which is efficacy and effectiveness, as well as potential.

The question is, which way is the U.S. more likely to be able to be in a position to be in a helpful role? If the U.S. adopted your perspective and tailored its policy accordingly, I would argue that we would be 100% unsuccessful in trying to bring about progress in Cyprus. We would simply become an advocate of one of the parties; we would lose all credibility and access to the other parties; we would lose influence. I don't think we would accomplish anything. U.S. policy has to be a blend, first, of analysis, and second, of realism. In both cases, having looked at both of those, I and others came out pretty much where we are.

Prof. Vlavianos: This argument that we would be worse off, if we had followed a policy of right towards Turkey — we've heard—in 1978 when the embargo was lifted. They said that we should lift the embargo because Turkey would thus be satisfied and we would achieve better results with Turkey on our side. Nonsense. History proves that this didn't help at all. On the contrary, conditions today are worse than in 1978. I don't think that that argument can be used in connection with this problem.

(Continued on page 12)



Turkey's southern and western borders face the Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq and Iran, countries at odds with Western interests.


State Department

(Continued from page 11)

QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS

Question: How is it that almost every time the Prime Minister of Greece visits another country, signs an agreement, makes a statement on Greek or international problems, the U.S. government, and especially the State Dept., hastens to admonish him because Washington happens to disagree with his views? Does this attitude mean that Greece is not an independent country? That the U.S. government considers it a protectorate? That its Prime Minister has no right to express his views, that he has to be brought back in line in order to fully agree with the U.S. and NATO policies, which most of the time, if not all of the time, runs counter to the national interests of Greece?

R. Haass: Of course, Mr. Papandreu or any Greek figure, public or private, has every right to speak openly, whether at public gatherings, press conferences, or privately, and say



Journalist (L) Dimitri Andreou and (R) Jim Delias, Cyprus Press Counselor.

whatever he pleases. Greece is a 100% independent country, 100% sovereign. In no way is Greece a protectorate of the U.S. Greece and the Prime Minister have every right to express their views. I could only add to that, so does the U.S. The U.S. has every right to express its views, and we do, when we feel it is important to do so. Greece is a member of NATO, and when it or the Prime Minister or, for that matter, other public officials, make public statements which we perceive to be at variance with the positions of the Atlantic Alliance, or somehow or someway detrimental to the security of the Western countries, we have the right and obligation to speak out. If other members of the Atlantic Alliance wish to speak out publicly, or to Greece privately, they obviously have that right as well. Being allies brings with it the right to criticize. We have exchanges with other governments publicly and privately, too. There have been comments by Prime Minister Papandreu in Poland this week about the Korean airliner, when he went to Libya, and so forth, which we found to be particularly worthy of an American comment. And we did comment.

Question: Mr. Haass has shown either misinformation or bias in regard to some issues against Greece and



The mood of quiet frustration shows on the faces of Professor Dhrymes and Christopher Hitchens.

especially against the Greek government. First, during this year in the American press there has been much information about the real mission of the Korean airplane which advocate the facts it was quite possibly, if not really, on a spy mission. Well-known American politicians have made such statements, too. Why has Mr. Haass blamed the Greek government about something that is discussed even in the U.S.? Second, Mr. Haass spoke about the safety of American citizens in Greece. Does he know, because we don't know, of just one case of the safety of an American citizen being in jeopardy during the last year? Third, Mr. Haass spoke about the problems of the American bases in Greece with Greek workers striking. Does he happen to know that the American authorities in Greece continuously violated the Greek labor laws, and were reported to threaten the Greek workers on these bases?


R. Haass: Why blame the Greek Prime Minister for speaking out? Well, I will just make this comment. We did not single him out. We reacted strongly to anyone who has tried to argue, I think without any evidence to sustain that point of view, that this airliner was on assignment. What is particularly upsetting to me and to others in the U.S., and to most Americans, is that the real issue ought to be, why the Soviet Union decided to shoot down in cold blood a plane with 269 people on board. I would like to see a little more attention placed on that dimension rather than what I think is the totally unsubstantial and spurious charge that this was a spy plane.

The question of safety is not something I am going to talk about a lot about in public other than to say that a member of the U.S. military aid mission in Greece did lose his life and there have been other incidences of different types. Terrorism is a problem in today's world that crosses national boundaries. Terrorism is a major problem, not just in the Middle East, but all over. Even though terrorism is a national problem, it will only be solved by every nation contributing to a solution. I call upon every member of the Alliance to do everything it could to take care of what is truly a modern day scourge on all of our lives.

Lastly, there are channels for deciding how to resolve problems

over the American bases. I am not going to use this panel tonight other than to say that the Greek government finally did act in ways which made it once again possible for American servicemen to enter and leave the base without harassment.

Question: In the latest issue of *Defense and Diplomacy*, October 1984, a U.S. official is quoted as follows: "I think the settlement of Cyprus is what's there now, and it will take a couple of generations to recognize it." Does this, in your opinion, reflect the U.S. government's position on Cyprus? Second, the



Cyprus—the shaded portion is the area occupied by Turkish forces.

intransigence of Turkey has been intensified after the lifting of the embargo, not only on the territorial aspect, but also on the constitutional. The continued flow of U.S. military aid has helped that. Since you admit that the settlement on Cyprus would help U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey. What is this administration doing towards a solution?

R. Haass: The answer to your first question is that I've never seen that quotation you site, and I've no idea whether it's a reflection of anyone's comments or not, in the government. All I can say as the person appointed by the Secretary of State to help make and implement U.S. policy towards Cyprus is that that is not our policy.

The question of Turkey's alleged intransigence after the embargo — I think I have talked about tonight already. I think the approach ought to be one of persuasion rather than a punitive approach.

What we are doing [about the

Cyprus solution] is not something I am going to talk about in public. We are active. A few miles from here at the UN we have, what I think, is one of the more promising diplomatic initiatives we have seen in quite a while underway. I think it in part reflects American efforts. If it succeeds, it is not going to be because the U.S. was somehow able to wave its magic wand and make it succeed. It's going to succeed because the parties themselves want it to.

Question: In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus using American weapons. Ten years after, Turkey has occupied almost 40% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus with American weapons. Can the U.S. government give us the guarantee that Turkey will not use American weapons again, to occupy the whole of Cyprus?

R. Haass: In my encounters on Cyprus, in my encounters with the Turkish Cypriot community, in my encounters and meetings in Ankara, I did not come across that ambition or objective such as you described.

Question: Mr. Haass, I'm sorry to say that I didn't hear anything new about the American policy in the Aegean and in Cyprus, unfortunately. I would like to remind you of a statement made by Mr. Evren: "We consider the north of Cyprus Turkish soil. We are not going

to give up even a stone." What do you have to say about that?

R. Haass: The problem that you have heard nothing new, if you'll pardon the vernacular, is your problem as a journalist, not mine. What I came here tonight was not to come up with some startling revelations. Indeed, one of my basic points is that Washington does not have in its hip pocket, some startling revelations to give to you. I would not necessarily look to us for the answers to the problems in this part of the world. I think if people do, they will not get the progress they seek.

The quote you mention comes from a longer article in a recent issue of the *New Yorker*, written by a well-known columnist, Joseph Kraft. This article deals with his impressions of Turkey, and in a specific part, the article deals with an interview he had with President Evren. When you read the entire paragraph or several paragraphs

(Continued on page 13)

of the conversation, it is not clear at all that the President of Turkey is referring to Cyprus, but rather it appears to refer much more to Turkey's homeland and its traditional territories, and it is my understanding that that was the point made by the Turkish government spokesman.

Question: Does the current Administration believe that the ratio of military aid to Greece and Turkey, which is currently at the level of 7:10, should (a) change, as Undersecretary Perle has suggested recently and, (b) should it take into consideration the local balance of power or just the Western interests?

Today, it was announced that the second round of "Proximity talks" under the auspices of the Secretary

Can the U.S. government guarantee that Turkey will not use American weapons again to occupy the whole of Cyprus? ... from the audience

General were interrupted, and they are going to reconvene on the 26th of November. The Greek Cypriot side has made it very clear that it has reached its minimum negotiating position. It cannot make any more compromises, because it feels it would compromise its own security. Is your government going to exercise any sort of pressure to any of the two sides between now and the third round? If not, then if the third round fails, which is the opinion of many observers, what would your government do?

R. Haass: On your first question, let me just state for the record, something that I and my colleagues have stated on more than one occasion. U.S. aid is not determined by fixed levels or ratios, but rather every year we look at a relationship, we look at military requirements, we look at how much money we have globally, and then we start making some calculations. U.S. aid to Turkey and Greece is not determined, nor has it ever been determined by fixed aid ratios between them. What determines it is the specific factors I have just mentioned. Yes, we do take into account U.S. law, obviously. This means we have to take into account the impact of our aid to the military balance of the region, but again that does not mean we have to carry out our policy in some type of fixed ratios, 7:10 or any other.

Secondly, on the question of the UN talks, I don't think the U.S. is in the position to exert pressure. I think the U.S. is in a position to use whatever influence it has. We will use our influence and we will see what comes of it, just as we hope others can use their influence. I do not think American influence is the answer.

You ask, "if this next round fails what then?" My own sincere hope is that I will never have to answer that question.

Question: I am a Greek Cypriot



Some 300 of the Greek and Cypriot communities in N.Y. attended the panel discussion with Richard Haass.

journalist, and I know the ideas of the Greek Cypriot side. They strongly believe that there is not any progress because there was not any move towards the Greek Cypriot positions by the other side. If this situation prevails in the third round of talks, and if the Greek Cypriot side decides to withdraw all its proposals put down till now — acceptance of federation, etc. — how could you describe the situation which will be created, and what will the policy of the U.S. be?

R. Haass: Again, I am not going to comment on the details of the negotiations and where they stand. I don't think that would serve any useful purpose. I am also not going to be drawn out as to what we would do if negotiations fail. Again, the thrust of everything we are trying to do is to avoid that point. It just seems to me though, that obviously, if negotiations don't succeed we are going to find ourselves in a situation that is worse than the one we now find ourselves in. The breakdown of negotiations would serve no useful purpose for anyone on the island of Cyprus. Again, I would just hope we would avoid ever reaching that point.

Question: You talked a lot about progress made in Turkey towards human rights, about the so-called elections, and so on. Could you tell us according to your opinion of the U.S. position, who really runs Turkey today? Mr. Evren? Prime Minister Ozal or the Generals of the National Security Council?

R. Haass: Like all countries which have both a president and a prime minister, there is obviously a sharing of power or authority between the two. In Turkey, obviously Mr. Ozal's government has authority; President Evren has authority as do others. I think like any other country with this type of institutional arrangement, power and authority are distributed and shared, and that is not an exceptional arrangement.

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR

Question: Do you think justifiable the continuous and false insinuations against Hellenism — that it is turning communist — just because, in their frustration as a result of the West's attitude, they are becoming more and more critical of the West's hypocrisy with regard to the ideals of freedom

and democracy?

R. Haass: I don't think anyone is criticizing Hellenism, nor do I think that Hellenism is turning communist. I do, however, think that there is nothing wrong when the leaders or officials of one democracy speak out and criticize, and make comments about the leaders and officials of another democracy. Just as all of you here, I think, would justify and defend Prime Minister Papandreu's right to speak out on what he sees as Greek national interests, I would like to think that those of us in the U.S. deserve no less of an opportunity. I think we have that obligation to the people for whom we work.

While I'm on that subject, I am worried about the U.S.—Greek relationship over time. Regardless of what my reputation might be, regardless of how you feel about what I have said tonight, and regardless of how you perceive this administration, who would derive any satisfaction from the deterioration in U.S.—Greek relations? Greece is an important member of the Atlantic Alliance. Our ties have gone for way too long to suddenly see them in any way injured or disrupted. No one wants to see that happen at all. I think we have made it clear that, despite our differences, we are ready for a very, very normal, constructive, working relationship. I am worried, though, that over time it may get somewhat more difficult to do that, if in Greece the voices of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism gain strength, and if in this country more and more Americans are getting somewhat frustrated with the pronouncements and at times policies of the Greek government. I would like to see this pattern or this momentum ended. I would like to see a more positive relationship restored between our two countries. I think we would both benefit.

Question: What role does the Defense Department envision for Cyprus in the long term, in relation to the Middle East crisis?

R. Haass: I don't know of any. As I said before, Cyprus has been widely applauded and appreciated for the humanitarian contributions it has made, particularly for the welfare and private persons living in Lebanon. But I do not know of any plans whatsoever, long term or near term, for any military role or relationship with Cyprus, vis-a-vis the Middle East or anywhere else.

Question: Besides Turkey, Israel is America's standard ally in the Middle

East. Yet President Reagan, in a memo to the State Department, July 1982, expressed grave concern that Israelis, by using American weapons to invade Lebanon in May 1982, had violated American law and agreement, and stopped the shipments of F-16s to Israel. Why not do the same to Turkey? Why are you regarding Turkey or rewarding Turkey with more aid, instead?

R. Haass: It would take another three hours to discuss all the details of the U.S.—Israeli relationship, not to mention the situation in Lebanon, on which, actually, I was working in the summer of 1982, pretty much full time. The use of security assistance as an assistance as an instrument of foreign policy, or a cut-off in the security assistance or parts of it in the hopes that countries will somehow alter their behavior, I notice hasn't worked particularly well. I don't think it worked particularly on Cyprus; I don't think it had the kind of effect people hoped it would vis-a-vis the Israelis. I am not a great believer in punitive actions towards one's allies on Monday, and then on Tuesday trying to see how much influence one has on those same allies. I just don't think that, as a rule, tends to be an effective foreign policy.

Question: Do you think that the growth of anti-American sentiment in Greece will be greatly resolved or reduced if the U.S. takes a more active role in solving the Cyprus dispute?

R. Haass: I think that to the extent frustrations over Cyprus are a source or a cause of anti-Americanism in Greece, then by definition if we are able to solve the Cyprus problem and reunite the country, then obviously in Greece it would decline. I don't think that is an issue. The question, though, is more whether if the U.S. takes a more active role will anti-Americanism then decline? My answer is no. People will ultimately be less concerned with roles than they will with results. What matters is less how visible or vocal the U.S. is, but rather how effective we are. And more important, how effective those who have the greatest stake in the Cyprus island, i.e., Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, how effective they are.

Question: What would the U.S. do in the event that Turkey would invade the Aegean islands?

R. Haass: Again, all I can do is no doubt disappoint, as I expect I have done regularly tonight, but at least I

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The Neoleas Dance group poses with their instructor, Stelios (Moustakas) Simian-takis.



Members of Mikro Horeftiko with their dance instructor, Koula Sopasia.

Minos Cretan Association Celebrates its Heritage

In a celebration of its Cretan heritage, the Minos Cretan Association recently held its 6th annual dance at the Crystal Palace in Astoria N.Y. The dancing groups of Mikro Horeftiko (children) and Neolea (youth), the girls in colorful embroidered aprons,

the boys in the famous Cretan *trakes* and tall white boots, performed traditional Cretan dances before an enthusiastic crowd of over 500. Among the audience was Greek Consul in New York Veis and Pan-Cretan president Kariotakis.

AHEPA Congratulates President Reagan

Supreme President Cleo N. Zambettis sent the following telegram to President Ronald Reagan on his reelection as President:

As President of the largest organization of Americans of Hellenic descent, I wish to congratulate you upon your reelection as President of the United States. Once again the American people have debated the issues of our time and freely elected our national leaders. It is this great democratic exercise that drew our

forebearers to this country, and which continues to attract oppressed people everywhere.


Please be assured that the AHEPA stands ready to assist you and your administration in its effort to effectuate a fair and just foreign policy, and to advance the cause of justice and human rights in the United States and around the world.

Sincerely,
Cleo N. Zambettis
Supreme President
Order of AHEPA

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will be consistent, if nothing else. I don't see that as about to happen, nor do I see any particular utility in discussing hypothetical questions of that sort. I apologize if I disappoint you but I am afraid that is the way it is going to have to be.

Question: Turkey plays a fundamental role in defending the West. Is Cyprus an enemy of the West, and if so, explain why.

R. Haass: I would have thought that much of what I have said tonight would have made it clear that Cyprus is anything but an enemy of the West. It's rather a close friend of the West. It's part of the West. It is integral to it. Ultimately, I would like to think that there is no inherent choice to be made between good relations with Turkey and good relations with Cyprus and good relations with Greece, as well. To the extent that we have to choose, we lose. To the extent we are successful, we will have good relations with all three countries.

Questions: Do you think that the U.S. can help make a quick solution, or bring about a quick solution of the Cyprus problem by establishing a Camp David-type of Summit among the three parties?

R. Haass: Again, I don't think, as I said before, what we need is new ideas, nor do I think the answer is Camp David or certain types of American involvement. It seems to me now that we have a Secretary General of the UN who knows more about Cyprus than almost everyone else. As you recall he used to be the Secretary General's special Cyprus representative. He is intimately

aware of the problems and knows all the personalities. I can't think of a better man than the one we have right there. To suggest that a Camp David is what is needed suggests that the problem is somehow a lack of outside ideas and outside pressure, I am afraid I just don't subscribe to that school of thought, I think that if the parties are ready to reach a settlement — all the parties involved — I think we will have one, and one does not have to spend a week or weekend or two weeks at Camp David in order to do that.

The Leader

(Continued from page 2)

cannot solve complicated problems. Yet, simple solutions are easier to grasp, easier to believe, more suitable in providing hope and improving the nation's spirit. Above all, that's what Reagan accomplished in his first term. That's exactly what got him "four more years."

Democrats would be wise to make a total reassessment. They must come up with a charismatic candidate, for only a person with charisma can deliver a new message to the nation. However, charisma alone is not enough. The Democrats desperately need to capture a vision that inspires, to articulate a new strategy for the nation as a whole. They should cater less to specific interests; they can do with less technical specifics. What the Democrats need is foresight, more emphasis on the long-term issues that concern Americans the most. It's precisely what they did in the sixties and succeeded. It's exactly what they should do now — starting from scratch.

An American visiting in France came upon a scene where a large church was being erected. He approached three stone masons, one after the other. Of each he asked this question: "What are you doing?" The first replied: "I'm cutting stone." The second said: "I'm cutting stone for seven francs a day." The third responded: "I'm helping to build a great cathedral."

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ANALYSIS Reagan's Re-election—The Aftermath

The Leader Versus the Pro

By Chryssanthos Lazarides

The verdict of the American people is now clear. Ronald Reagan carried the overwhelming majority of the nation. Walter Mondale, on the other hand, campaigned forcefully throughout the country, delivering his message with dignity and style. He was seriously harmed, however, by the poor reputation of the Carter Administration, as well as the abating momentum of liberal ideas. Seemingly, it has been a long time since the sixties when liberalism flourished and exerted a dominant influence on the platform of the Democratic Party. Obviously, the pendulum has moved to the opposite side since then.

It is probably true that no one could defeat Reagan in this election. It would be a serious mistake, however, to interpret the outcome as a personal triumph of Reagan alone. The Republican landslide victory is too large to be wholly accounted for by a difference in personal appeal or by charisma. It is presumably something more fundamental: Reagan generated a momentum because he had a clear vision, a coherent strategy, and an image of consistency. Mondale, on the other hand, was only after the vote of discontent. This is how he won the Democratic primaries; this is how he lost the election.

Reagan's conservative strategy articulated a homogeneous consti-

Chryssanthos Lazarides's political and economic analyses appear in numerous Athens newspapers and magazines. The writer, who is American-born, is a doctoral candidate in economics at the Graduate Center, City University of New York.



WALTER MONDALE

tuency in his support, consisting of all social groups who expect to benefit from U.S. prosperity and U.S. strength. Mondale tried to pull together a loose coalition of voting groups that had only one thing in common—antipathy to Reaganism. Reagan promised a future to everyone. Mondale focused his campaign on the vulnerable points of Reagan's past record.

It was a contest of decisiveness versus despair, a contest of future vision versus past failures; it was also a contest of a homogeneous constituency versus a segmented coalition of discontent. It was a contest that could not have been won by Mondale. The Democratic Party, however, should not blame it all on their candidate. It appears that the Democratic Party, obsessed with its liberal rhetoric and the technical specifics of particular problems, failed to identify the sensitive points of current American mentality. It also failed to realize the anguish of the American people, and to accommodate them with new, inspiring vision. In the seventies, Americans suffered the Vietnam shock, the Iranian hostage crisis humiliation, and the sluggish performance of the economy. Reagan directly addressed



RONALD REAGAN

these sensitive issues with conservative rhetoric, and with a package of simple solutions that, supposedly, could turn the tide. At the same time

the Democrats were busy with the technicalities of budget management and the comparative merits of the Minuteman versus the M.X. Missiles. Ronald Reagan emerged as a leader with a clear sense of direction on long-term issues that are of paramount concern to all Americans—defense, continuing prosperity, and U.S. leadership in the world. Mondale appeared, at best, a potentially good administrator, competent in handling all the routine problems that governments face—the kind of problems that few people understand, and even fewer appreciate. It seems that, at this point, the U.S. needed a national leader rather than a good administrator.

Conservative rhetoric, of course, cannot solve problems. However, it stresses the fundamentals that made this country great. Old ideas are not always suitable for the future. Yet, if there is no alternative vision, it is only natural for people to turn to the past for hope. Similarly, simple solutions

(Continued on p. 18)

The Greek-American Concern

For many Greek-Americans, President Reagan's re-election is bad news. What they fear is that U.S. policy will slide further in favor of Turkey. Their fears are not totally unjustified. Somehow the policymakers of both the Defense and State Departments have been carried away with their perceptions of "the vital importance of Turkey for the Western Alliance." President Reagan is not the only one to blame, however. After all, it was his predecessor, the Democratic President Carter, who abolished the U.S. "embargo" against Turkey in 1978. Since then there has been a steady trend in U.S. policy to become more and more pro-Turkish. It is not a coincidence, of course, that over the same time period, Turkey became more intransigent and more cynical in pushing its expansionary demands on Cyprus and Greece.

It's true, of course, that geography is a strong argument in favor of Turkey. It is a big country, with the second largest army in NATO, and extensive borders with the Soviet Union. It is no wonder that the U.S. strongly desires to make Turkey a stronghold of the West, especially after the fall of the Shah of Iran.

This conventional approach is not a Republican one. In fact, it is the predominant view in both parties. Being bipartisan, however, does not make it any better. For one thing, while addressing Turkey's strategic role, this approach makes the assumption that Greece is backing Turkey in the common framework of NATO. At the same time, by encouraging

Turkish expansionism, the U.S. is alienating Greece. Greece, however, is the important link between Turkey and the rest of NATO. If this link is broken, if Greece is eventually alienated from the Western Alliance, then Turkey is totally isolated and NATO's support of Turkey weakens considerably without the backing of Greece. Turkey becomes the "Achilles heel" of NATO, instead of a stronghold for the West. In alienating Greece from NATO, the U.S. is risking the loss, eventually, of both Greece and Turkey—Not to mention the implications of such a collapse on Yugoslavia's efforts to maintain its neutrality.


How significant is all this? If it is true that U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is counter-productive and self-defeating in the long run, then there is considerable room for the Greek-Americans to argue against it, and campaign effectively for the eventual reappraisal, no matter which Administration is in power. This, in fact, is an obligation of loyalty to both the U.S. and Greece. The reappraisal of U.S. policy in that region will benefit both countries.

During President Reagan's second term in office, U.S. international policy is expected to become tougher in many aspects. The Greek-Americans, however, have a powerful issue on their hands. To a large extent, it is up to them to do the best with it. For the Greek-Americans, the campaign is not over. In fact, it has just begun.

— Chryssanthos Lazarides

Chris Spirou Loses Bid for N.H. Governor

The popular Greek-American Chris Spirou lost an opportunity on November 6 to become the first Greek-born state governor in the U.S. Despite Spirou's energetic campaigning, the momentum of President Reagan's landslide victory over Walter Mondale carried Republicans into gubernatorial office in nine states, including New Hampshire. Republican opponent John Sununu took 68% of the vote in that state, compared to Spirou's 32%. It is of particular interest that the Cuban-American Sununu has a Greek wife.



CHRIS SPIROU

— D.M.