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A SUGGESTED LABOR STRATEGY

This paper is intended to provide background information and strategy recommendations to achieve four basic objectives for the Reagan Administration.

- A) To hold, and to attempt to expand for 1984, the 44% of the union vote received by President Reagan in 1980.
- B) To expand the group of national labor leaders supporting the President by building alliances with selected labor groups.
- C) To develop a group of state, local and regional labor leaders who will be ^{publicly} supportive of the President and his policies.
- D) To move organized labor closer to a policy of bipartisanship.

To achieve these objectives it will be necessary to implement a strategy that considers the impact of the President and his policies on the total labor force and on the elected labor officials of the national unions and employee associations in the country.

LABOR UNREST AND REASSESSMENT

As the Administration begins to shape a strategy for working with the political activities of organized labor, the following comments and observations must be considered:

1. There is a growing unrest among rank and file members of labor unions. This unrest stems from a number of factors:
 - a) Rank and file union members are beginning to question the traditional alliance with the Democratic Party. This questioning of the Labor/Democratic alliance comes from both ends of the labor spectrum: The liberally-oriented union members are beginning to believe that the Democratic Party has shifted to the right, that the Democratic officeholders are no longer as responsive to them as in the past. The middle-of-the-road and more conservative union members tend to be disillusioned with the Labor/Democratic alliance because they believe that the Democratic Party has become the party of big-spending, softness on defense and foreign policy issues,

and has espoused too many liberal social causes. (The middle-of-the-road and more conservative union members are increasing in numbers as their incomes rise. Basically these union members are beginning to question whether the Democratic Party is still the "party of the working man".)

- b) A growing feeling that many of the elected union leaders have "lost touch" with the rank and file and that their leaders no longer speak for them on economic, social and political issues. This attitude becomes more pronounced as union members rise in the economic structure and their wage levels increase. The 1979 California referendum on Proposition 13 is a good case in point; nearly all of the labor leaders were opposed to Proposition 13, while polls showed strong support for its passage from the rank and file.
 - c) A perception by growing numbers of rank and file union members that their elected union leaders have become too closely aligned with the Democratic Party and that they should be more "independent" in their political outlook. This was made quite evident in the 1980 Presidential campaign where the endorsement of Jimmy Carter met strong resistance and opposition at the local union level.
2. While there is growing unrest in the rank and file, one should not assume that these attitudes dominate the labor movement. They don't! But there are clear signs that the numbers of union members holding these views is increasing.
3. The growing unrest in the rank and file and the results of the 1980 election is prompting many national labor leaders to reassess their political activities and operations. Some are merely disenchanted with the Democratic Party and what they perceive to be Democratic officeholders' lack of "responsiveness". Others have become sensitive to the changing economic status of their members and the growing restiveness of the rank and file, while others have decided that the political climate of the country is changing and that they need to be more pragmatic if they are to be politically effective.

To varying degrees, elected national union leaders are examining the following questions:

- a) Should they seek ties with both Democrats and Republicans.

- b) How do they relate to a Republican Administration (and a popular Republican President) and a Republican/conservative-oriented Congress. This is the first time they've had to face that question since 1954.
- c) Should labor begin to narrow its political agenda. (Many leaders feel that organized labor needs to concentrate more on "gut" labor issues and deemphasize social issues - civil rights, welfare, women's right, etc.)
- d) How can labor have a greater impact on the Presidential nominating process - so they don't get stuck with candidates like Jimmy Carter.

The first stage of this reassessment by labor leaders would have to be characterized as the "wait and see period". Many labor leaders are watching the early days of the Reagan Administration to see what its basic attitudes and policies are toward labor unions. They are also carefully watching the Republicans on Capitol Hill to see if legislation they perceive as anti-union begins to move and how much influence their perceived enemies (Sen. Hatch, Sen. Thurmond and others) actually exert.

These labor leaders are also exploring ways to better their communications with the rank and file in the hope that if members are better-educated on issues and candidates, they will be more responsive to the recommendations of the national union.

It should be noted that the more liberal-oriented labor leaders (such as Jerry Wurf, Bill Winpingsinger and Glenn Watts) are concentrating their reassessment efforts on ways to strengthen discipline in the Democratic Party and to wrest control of the Party apparatus so that labor can have a stronger impact on the nominating process. Some of these labor leaders feel that a major reason for labor defections to Republican candidates in recent years is the shift to the right by the Democratic Party.

SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON LABOR

1. While any number of labor leaders might show signs of pragmatism, there is still a strong identification with the Democratic Party. In general, labor leaders feel that Democrats have usually championed their causes and Republicans have fought them.

2. There is general suspicion and skepticism about the Reagan Administration. Campaign statements advocating repeal of Davis-Bacon and the application of anti-trust laws to unions scared the daylights out of many union leaders. Subsequent clarification of those views relaxed some of their fears but has led many labor leaders to wonder whether this was done to merely "win votes" in a close campaign.
3. While there are more than 60,000 union locals and many thousands of individuals involved in the local, state and regional leadership structure of unions, almost all unions are personally run and dominated by the national union president. They control the staff and the communications, and they usually set the policy, especially when it comes to political activities and positions on issues. Except for the occasional maverick local or state leader, most people in the leadership structure of a union usually "go along" with the elected national union leaders. It should also be pointed out that the leader of a large or powerful local union can often be a strong influence on the national union president if he is well-informed and decides to flex his political muscle. The endorsement of President Reagan by the Teamsters is a case in point.
4. The AFL-CIO is still the dominant force in labor's political actions. While none of the 108 unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO is bound by its policies on issues and candidates, the unwritten rule is that you don't "buck" AFL-CIO Headquarters. If an individual union wants to depart from the AFL-CIO policy, it is usually done in a relatively quiet or low-key manner. Discipline was much stronger during the Meany reign, but shows signs of weakness under the newly-elected Kirkland.
5. Many union leaders have expressed covert support for the President and several have indicated a desire to develop a friendly relationship with the Administration. At this point, they are reluctant to publicly voice their support because of the negative signals emanating from AFL-CIO Headquarters and their fear that the Reagan economic plan may turn out to be a failure. It is unclear whether some new realignment is in the making or whether these leaders are merely being very pragmatic.
6. Symbolism is very important in the labor movement. The handshake and the promise are the stock in trade. One's word sometimes seems to have more impact than one's deed. Positive moves by an Administration in terms of public posture and public relations always have great impact on the total labor community. Reasonable appointments to the NLRB, labor leaders being included in visible new events, labor leaders conferring with the President and Administration officials "reaching out" to labor will be interpreted positively.

7. The leadership of the labor movement starts out with very low expectations of a Republican/Reagan Administration. They don't expect to be consulted, they don't expect to be "included", so whatever positive steps are taken will have disproportionate impact.
8. Union leaders are accustomed to dealing on a "quid pro quo" basis. If the Administration does something for a union, they will fully expect to be called upon to reciprocate.
9. In previous Administrations, relations with organized labor were usually channelled through the AFL-CIO and the Washington labor establishment. The labor establishment consists of about 25 unions of varying sizes that have high visibility in terms of political, lobbying and public relations activities. Few efforts have been made to reach out to labor organizations which didn't have a Washington presence or to deal with powerful state and local union officials.
10. All labor leaders are politicians within their own union. They have to stand for reelection and tend to be receptive to the usual activities that enhance their elected positions with their members. All of them like to portray themselves as being important enough (in the eyes of their members) to be consulted by the White House, invited by the White House and appointed to key advisory commissions, boards, etc.
11. Like all politicians, labor leaders don't like surprises. If a policy affecting them, their industry, or their members is announced and they are caught off guard, the reaction is likely to be negative. Even if the policy pronouncement might adversely affect their members, being forewarned of such an announcement can help to soften the blow and makes the union leader appear to his membership to be more knowledgeable about what's going on in Washington.
12. Most unions do not have very extensive research or policy analysis units within their organizations. They are frequently not well-equipped to analyze issues and will follow the lead provided by either the AFL-CIO, another union in their industry, or the management position in their industry if the issue directly affects that industry. Currently one will find the building and construction unions relying on the nuclear power industry for nuclear power issue analysis, and the maritime unions on the shipping industry for programs to improve their economic health.

13. Coalitions are often formed within the labor movement on an industry-by-industry basis. It is not uncommon to find high degrees of cooperation today between labor and management on political issues that directly affect their members such as trade policy, tax policy and regulatory matters. These ad hoc coalitions usually operate outside the AFL-CIO structure and are usually initiated by management operatives who try to enlist the support of employees for the "good of the industry."

IMPACTING THE RANK AND FILE

While the proposition of seizing upon the restiveness in the rank and file of union members may be tempting, directly communicating with an organized work force of approximately 24 million is a difficult proposition unless we build a vast communications network to deal with them. In addition, labor union members do not vote merely as labor union members unless they feel their rights as union members are threatened or under attack. Recent internal AFL-CIO studies show that union members (in general) are affected by issues and candidates much like any other group of citizens except that there has been a long identification with the Democratic Party as the party of the "working man."

In dealing with the rank and file union members, the Administration should accept the premise that the union members' attitudes about President Reagan, the Administration and the Republican Party are shaped by the news media, by other pressure groups, and by the communication (meetings, publications) he receives from his union. The more a union member identifies with his union, the more susceptible he will be to his union communications. In recent years, labor leaders have just begun to recognize that the rank and file member is losing his identification with his union and has become more susceptible to other social, economic and political pressures that may be exerted upon him. This is especially true of the middle income union member.

In general our efforts to impact the rank and file must be geared to dispelling the notion that the President and/or the Administration is anti-labor, and that the President's policies are in the best interests of working men and women.

This can probably be best accomplished through the news media, through symbolism, through direct communications with union leadership below the national level, and by successfully governing the nation.

In trying to directly affect the rank and file union members, the following suggestions are offered:

1. The Administration and its key spokesmen (in particular the Dept. of Labor) should appear in the news media to be friendly to unions and their leaders. Much of this can be accomplished in symbolic ways by appearances and meetings with union members and leaders, visits to work sites and an interest in the problems of workers. Well publicized visits and meetings with workers in troubled industries can deliver a strong message to union members.
2. The Administration and its key spokesmen (in particular the Dept. of Labor) should be publicly portrayed as being "open and accessible" to organized labor and desirous of labor support and participation in the development of policy.
3. Emphasis should be given to the job-producing/economic growth aspects of the economic package. President Reagan's pledge "to put America back to work again" was a strong selling point to workers during the 1980 campaign and needs to be reinforced as the program is implemented.
4. The Administration should try to avoid the public impression of being locked in combat with the AFL-CIO and other major union spokesmen on labor issues (job protection, workers rights, job safety standards). In particular it would be wise to avoid situations where it appears that the Administration is helping big business at the expense of the workers.
5. A major effort to get Administration spokesmen to address large state and local labor meetings where a positive reaction can be reasonably forecast. For too many years, Republicans have passed up opportunities to address labor audiences.
7. The Administration should develop a program to systematically communicate with selected rank and file union members through its own newsletter-style publication. Such a publication (A Report From the President) wouldn't be identified as labor-targetted but in actuality it would be mailed to a list composed primarily of labor union members. Such a publication could get the Administration message out to union members and help to counter some of the union house organs who tend to rewrite AFL-CIO press releases.
8. A special effort should be made by our media liaison office to impact the house organs of labor unions. There are thousands of local, state and national publications that are mailed to union members' homes each week and month that the Administration should be impacting in a positive way.

9. An effort must be made to identify supportive local and state union leaders and bring them to the White House for briefings, meetings and special treatment.
10. Our communications efforts need to be expanded from the normal pattern of only communicating with the elected national leaders of unions to state, local and regional union officials. At a minimum, these local, state and regional officials should receive regular direct communications through the mail so they do not have to depend on their national unions for information concerning the Administration and its policies.
11. Public opinion surveys that depict rank and file union sentiments at variance with the views of the national elected union leadership need to be widely disseminated and publicized by sources outside the Administration.
12. A special effort must be made by the Republican National Committee to "open the doors" to labor. The RNC should be portrayed as seeking labor input and support. This "invitation" to labor must be carried through at the state and local level.
13. Special efforts should be made by the White House and by the Departments and Agencies to bring together leaders of labor and management to solve industry problems and to promote a spirit of labor-management co-operation.

IMPACTING THE AFL-CIO

Like it or not, the AFL-CIO continues to be the focal point for championing the causes of organized labor. Like many institutions, it is run by the professional staff who have strong liberal/Democratic/anti-business biases. The principal spokesmen for the AFL-CIO, Lane Kirkland and Tom Donahue (the Secretary-Treasurer) can usually be expected to use whatever materials are placed in front of them by the professional staff. The AFL-CIO does little actual union organizing and collective bargaining but does consider its principal mission to be impacting public policy.

Ostensibly the AFL-CIO is governed by a 33-member Executive Council of union presidents which meets quarterly to shape policy of the Federation, but in actuality this group usually rubberstamps what the professional staff produces and Kirkland and Donahue advance.

In recent years (especially since Lane Kirkland became President) some members of the Executive Council have become disenchanted with the quality and direction of the staff work and have begun to question the lobbying and campaign operations of the Federation as well as the issues being emphasized. Most of this stems from the basic restiveness in the labor movement. While there is increasing dissent in the Executive Council, most of their actions are by unanimous vote. This stems from the perceived need for unity in the labor movement.

While some doubts about the AFL-CIO political agenda exist, it is difficult to conceive of any immediate major shift in the outlook of the AFL-CIO leadership toward Republicans or President Reagan. At the same time though, both Kirkland and Donahue have expressed interest in developing a "working" relationship with the Administration. What form or structure they might have in mind is unclear. Both of them sincerely believe that they have been reasonable, dignified and moderate in their criticism of the Administration and the President. That notion clearly is a matter of some conjecture by the media, by political observers and by many union leaders within the AFL-CIO.

The most likely assessment is that these two leaders of the AFL-CIO don't "know how" to establish a "working relationship" with the Reagan Administration. Because of the traditional orientation of the institution, the campaign rhetoric portraying Reagan as anti-labor, and the radical nature of the Economic Renewal package (which severely impacts programs they have fought for), the institution has been forced to react instinctively -- by lashing out.

Nonetheless, the AFL-CIO and its presence in our national political life and the attention it receives from the news media is a fact of life and must be dealt with.

Recognizing that the AFL-CIO is not likely to ever offer eventual political support to President Reagan, our basic objectives in dealing with the AFL-CIO leadership (Kirkland, Donahue and key staff) should be:

1. To provide few, if any, opportunities for critics to claim the Administration isn't listening to or working with organized labor.
2. To lessen the current atmosphere of hostility, so that individual unions will not feel constrained to "work with" or support the Administration.

3. To minimize their public criticisms of the Administration.
4. To emphasize and publicize those areas of policy agreement (national defense, foreign policy, trade) that potentially exist so that the AFL-CIO is portrayed as supporting parts of the Administration's program.

The following suggestions are offered in hopes of implementing these objectives.

1. At this stage of the Administration, no attempt should be made to "write off" or to "shut them out". Any effort to ignore Kirkland, Donahue and the institution of the AFL-CIO will only serve as a rallying point to those who want to believe that the Administration is anti-labor and will make it more difficult to work with individual unions.
2. For the first year, the Administration and its key figures should be open and accessible to the leadership of the AFL-CIO and willing to discuss their problems and issues. This openness and accessibility should be reassessed in early 1982 to see if it has had any impact on decreasing the current hostility emanating from the AFL-CIO Headquarters.
3. The Administration, in a quiet informal way, must communicate to the AFL-CIO leadership directly and indirectly that continued hostility and confrontation makes the Administration's efforts to develop a relationship with organized labor increasingly difficult.
4. Key figures in the AFL-CIO hierarchy should be invited to the White House for social events, briefings, meetings, etc. and an effort should be made to have the President, Vice President and key Administration officials pictured with AFL-CIO leaders in the news media.
5. The Administration should try to avoid confrontation on highly emotional labor issues or appointments (like Davis-Bacon, NLRB appointments, sub-minimum wage, the Hobbs Act) that can be used as a rallying point by the AFL-CIO to unify its affiliate unions against us.
6. A conscientious effort should be made to educate AFL-CIO leaders on Administration programs and objectives and to win their support on selected issues. Trade issues, national defense and foreign policy issues are likely prospects for agreement.

7. Key figures in the Administration should seize the initiative in reaching out to the AFL-CIO leaders for advice and consultations. Such behavior is not expected of a Republican Administration and will serve to throw everyone off balance. Basically, the Administration should be perceived by the media and by the member unions of the AFL-CIO as trying diligently to build a working relationship with the AFL-CIO. If it fails, they must take the blame.
8. In developing some form of relationship with Kirkland and Donahue, the Administration must be cautious about strengthening them in their positions. While we should work with them, we do not want to bestow any new power on them. We must be able to be sensitive to the needs of the Teamsters who will be most unhappy if the Administration does not share its visible labor relationship with them.

IMPACTING NATIONAL LABOR LEADERS

In trying to expand the group of labor unions supporting the President, our first priority must be to see that our friends (those four unions who supported the President) are treated well and that their good treatment is communicated to the rest of the labor community. Taking care of your friends is a well-established concept among labor politicians, and most are currently watching to see if the Teamsters, MEBA, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers and the National Maritime Union receive special treatment from the Administration. If other labor leaders see it is worthwhile to align with the Administration they will begin to follow suit.

A second priority must be to clearly send the message that the Administration wants to communicate with the leaders of organized labor, that we want to work with them and that we want their political support. In these early days, the Administration should also send a clear message that we don't believe communication is facilitated by street marches, shouting and inflammatory rhetoric.

A third priority is to identify "targets of opportunity" in the labor movement. Certain unions and their leaders are more susceptible to President Reagan and Republican philosophies and they should be singled out for cultivation and special treatment. The maritime unions, transportation unions and the building and construction unions appear to be a logical starting point.

In trying to expand our group of labor supporters, the following recommendations are offered:

1. Cabinet members and key Administration officials should be open and accessible to labor union leaders. No one should feel they are not being heard or consulted.
2. Key Administration figures need to make some symbolic outreach gestures to convey the message that we seek labor input and support. Speeches at union conventions, visits to union headquarters, and taking the initiative to reach out to labor leaders will not go unnoticed. Cabinet members should try to develop a personal relationship with those union presidents directly impacted by their Departments or Agencies and mechanisms should be established for regular communication.
3. National labor leaders should regularly be included on invitation lists for White House social events, important news events, bill-signing ceremonies, and high-level briefings. These officials should also be appointed to boards, commissions and advisory bodies. Special attention must first be devoted to our supporters and more friendly union leaders. Those who are inclined to excessive negative rhetoric and those who are publicly fighting the Administration should receive little or no attention.
4. While it is important to establish good communications and to practice all of the normal stroking operations available to the White House, the Administration must be prepared to "deliver" on substantive issues that concern individual unions. Establishing friendly relations with a union leader will normally not be enough to sustain a relationship. Eventually, we must be prepared to negotiate or make concessions on policy if we are to achieve continued support.
5. Special emphasis should be given throughout the Administration to keeping selected union leaders aware of possible policy changes affecting their union membership. None of them like surprises and advance consultation can often blunt criticism and sometimes win support. The transfer of the Maritime Administration from the Commerce Department to DOT is a case in point. Upon learning of the proposal, the maritime unions were initially opposed. Given some time and adequate discussion about the ramifications of such a move, the unions are now accepting and supportive of such a move.

6. The White House should develop a device for regular high level consultations with selected groups of national union leaders. This will assure them of having input into the White House on a regular basis and can serve to blunt any criticism that we aren't consulting with them.
7. The Republican National Committee needs to begin reaching out to the leaders of organized labor and should begin serving as a focal point for bringing together labor leaders and Congressional Republicans to listen to each other. The Chairman of the RNC can make some symbolic speeches, appoint a Special Assistant to "communicate" with labor and can begin to serve as a contact point for labor leaders' political concerns and requests.
8. The White House Legislative Liaison Office and the Legislative Liaison Offices of the Departments and Agencies should develop a relationship with the political legislative operatives of some of the unions with strong political operations so that issue-by-issue coalitions can be developed to assist the Administration in achieving its legislative objectives. These political operatives are key players in the structure of a national union and continued contact can eventually develop into long-term relationships.
9. The Administration must try to reach beyond the Washington labor establishment and begin to work with labor union leaders who do not have a strong Washington presence. These unions could be more responsive to Administration overtures and tend to be more susceptible to the traditional stroking operations.
10. A special effort should be made to work with unions on an industry-by-industry basis, bringing together labor and management leaders to work on problems unique to their industry. Such a system provides an opportunity to avoid the AFL-CIO framework, develop better labor/management relationships, and lends itself to developing industry coalitions to support Administration policies.

LABOR DEMOGRAPHICS

The most authoritative source of information on union membership is the Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations published by the Department of Labor. The most recent Directory was issued in September 1980. It is based on data for the year ending 1978.

Membership in the nation's 208 labor unions and professional and state employee associations totaled 24.4 million in 1978. Included in this count are 1.7 million union members outside the United States (all but 120,000 are in Canada). Not included in these totals are members of single firm or local unaffiliated unions in the United States and members of municipal employee associations.

Of this total, 108 unions are affiliated with the AFL-CIO. These unions have a membership of approximately 17 million.

Union membership accounts for 19.7 of the total labor force. When employee associations are included, this percentage of the total labor force is increased to 22.2%. Approximately 56% of union and employee association members are blue collar, 34% white collar, and 10% service workers.

State membership data for all unions in the United States show that three states account for nearly 1 out of every 3 members - New York, California and Pennsylvania. These three states, coupled with Illinois, Ohio and Michigan, account for 52 percent of the total.

The states listed below have at least 30% of the non-agricultural workforce holding membership in unions or employee associations:

<u>State</u>	<u>Percent of Work Force in unions</u>
New York	41.0
West Virginia	40.4
Michigan	38.5
Pennsylvania	37.3
Washington	36.5
Hawaii	35.9
Ohio	33.6
Illinois	33.4
Alaska	32.3
Indiana	32.0
Missouri	31.0
Wisconsin	30.5

Historically, union membership has been concentrated in a small number of unions. Sixteen unions represent 61% of the total union membership. Over 64% of all employee association members belong to one organization, the National Education Association. Twenty-five associations, or 74% of the total, have fewer than 25,000 members. Most employee associations are state organizations and limited in potential membership.

LABOR VOTING BEHAVIOR

The sources of information for study and analysis of union member voting patterns is extremely limited and not recent. Little research has been done in analyzing the union vote in elections other than Presidential races.

The research does show that persons from labor union households are more likely to turn out at the polls than persons from non-union households. The research also indicates that labor union members do not vote as a cohesive bloc in support of either party, despite the near unanimous effort on the part of labor union leaders in support of Democratic presidential candidates. The actual Democratic presidential vote since 1952 by persons living in a union household varies from a high of 73% in 1964 to a low of 46% in 1972. Available data on voting behavior of union members in congressional races yields similar patterns.

The following table presents the percentage of the union vote received by the major Presidential candidates for 1952 through 1980. The source of this information is the Gallup index.

	1952	
	<u>Stevenson (D)</u>	<u>Ike (R)</u>
Union household	61.0%	39.0%
National total	44.6%	55.4%
	1956	
	<u>Stevenson (D)</u>	<u>Ike (R)</u>
Union household	57.0%	43.0%
National total	42.2%	57.8%
	1960	
	<u>John Kennedy (D)</u>	<u>Nixon (R)</u>
Union household	65.0%	35.0%
National total	50.1%	49.9%
	1964	
	<u>Johnson (D)</u>	<u>Goldwater (R)</u>
Union household	73.0%	27.0%
National total	61.3%	38.7%

	1968		
	<u>Humphrey (D)</u>	<u>Nixon (R)</u>	<u>Wallace (I)</u>
Union household	56.0%	29.0%	15.0%
National total	43.0%	43.4%	3.6%

	1972	
	<u>McGovern (D)</u>	<u>Nixon (R)</u>
Union household	46.0%	54.0%
National total	38.0%	62.0%

	1976	
	<u>Carter (D)</u>	<u>Ford (R)</u>
Union household	63.0%	36.0%
National total	51.0%	48.0%

	1980		
	<u>Carter (D)</u>	<u>Reagan (R)</u>	<u>Anderson (I)</u>
Union household	50.0%	43.0%	5.0%
National total	41.0%	51.0%	7.0%

Almost all of the available research shows that union membership does seem to make a significant difference in the electoral decisions of union members. Data available from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (1948-1968) shows that union members were from 82% to 34% more likely to vote for the Democratic presidential candidates than non-union voters.

In the mid-sixties, though, the research begins to show a significant decline in the Democratic preference of union voters. Although the basic partisan leanings of union voters have not changed greatly since 1952 (2 to 1 Democratic), union members have become more affluent, less working-class conscious, and less closely attached to their unions.

While political scientists will debate the relative value of a labor endorsement, there is little disagreement that the actions taken by organized labor can fundamentally affect the size of urban pluralities for Democratic candidates and that their activity or inactivity is an important factor in determining who wins statewide elections.

In a considerable break with precedent, the leadership of the AFL-CIO has abandoned its traditional role of trying to work with an incumbent President and has launched an early political and media offensive designed to rid the Congress of several Republicans (in 1982) and the White House of Ronald Reagan in 1984.

This political offensive has taken the form of harsh and frequent public attacks on the Administration culminating in Solidarity Day on September 19. While the rhetoric is very rich, the basic purpose of the campaign appears to be to convince union members (and working people) that President Reagan is working against their interests.

At present this offensive does not appear to have ^{significantly} seriously impacted rank and file support for the President (as expressed in opinion polls), but the cumulative effect of three more years of continued attacks in the news media and union publications is likely to have a negative impact at the grassroots level.

Two very clear effects of the AFL-CIO offensive are now being experienced: 1) The news media portrays the Administration as ignoring labor and 2) Many union leaders who want to "work with" the Administration are bowing to peer group pressure and maintaining their distance from us.

While this AFL-CIO political offensive is seriously questioned by a number of labor leaders (within the AFL-CIO), institutional tradition dictates that you don't "buck" the leadership. The message being sent out by the AFL-CIO to individual unions is loud and clear - "don't give any aid or comfort to the enemy."

Our problems in developing relationships with individual unions is further compounded by the fact that ^{most} of the Administration's policymakers do not appear to be sensitive to labor ^{politics} questions and in some cases appear to be hostile to labor ^{concerns} interests.

Unless one can see some political gain to be derived from continued hostility, there appears to be an immediate need to better our relationship with the labor community.

While it is possible to stage a media campaign to show how the Administration is consulting with and working with labor (AFL-CIO and others), any relationships we might develop with labor will hinge on our willingness to be accommodating in the policy and appointments arena. That is the bottom line for any relationship with a union, any group of unions, or the AFL-CIO.

In developing a ^{strategy} framework for bettering our relationship with organized labor, our ^{immediate} objective^s should be:

- A) To provide few, if any, opportunities for critics to claim the Administration isn't listening to or working with organized labor.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

VIA: JACK BURGESS/RED CAVANEY
FROM: BOB BONITATI *B*
SUBJECT: Relations with organized labor

I thought it might be useful to pass on some of the general observations I have gathered in the last few weeks concerning our efforts to "make peace" with organized labor.

1. In general, most business, media and labor politicians think our "olive branch" initiatives were politically very smart and played well with the general public.
2. The AFL-CIO leadership has been exhibiting a good faith effort to improve relations and communications. I know this from personal conversations with Kirkland and Donahue. It was further exhibited by the restrained behavior during the recent Hobbs Act episode and by their mild reaction to the controllers announcement of last week.
3. In general, the AFL-CIO leadership seems to be content with our decision on the controllers for it removes this issue (which had become an albatross to them) from the arena of public debate.
4. The President's performance in the meeting with the AFL-CIO Executive Council truly impressed most of the union presidents present. Many were touched by his remarks on how he never expected to be estranged from labor and his desire to start over again.
5. Communications between the White House and union leaders, in particular the AFL-CIO Headquarters, have increased significantly in the last month.

6. The Teamsters were very pleased to have been invited to meet with the President and particularly pleased that their meeting was used as the vehicle for some announcement on the air traffic controllers.

In general, I believe our most important achievements in implementing our labor strategy have been: (1) We have dispelled the media myth that we are ignoring labor and (2) We have achieved (for the time being, at least) a form of rapprochement with the AFL-CIO Headquarters.

October 20, 1981

PORTFOLIO REVIEW ACTION ITEMS

Robert Bonitati (Labor)

- Bob to provide background material to EHD re trial basis for monthly meeting with Ray Dennison and labor leaders in Room 132 EOB.

EHD asked Bob to check transition files for Friedersdorf's and Baker's objections to regularizing meetings with labor.

- Bob to provide EHD memorandum to Deaver recommending Bob Georgine for White House dinner.
- Bob to track on labor strategy meeting.
- EHD to continue working to schedule labor strategy meeting for last week in October. Meanwhile, effort will be made to pull together a deputy-level meeting to float the idea of how the President should respond to AFL-CIO invitation to attend Centennial Conference.

Note: This action pre-empted when word was received that the President will be the first President not invited to the AFL-CIO Annual Convention. This should be kept quiet and strategy developed on how to handle.

- Bob to send talking points memorandum to the group prior to meeting with EHD on labor.

Copies to: Mrs. Dole
~~Jack Burgess~~
Bob Bonitati *Bob's copy*
Red Cavaney
Labor Portfolio

Reagan as President of the United States

Will work towards:

- A job for every American
- A better future for our children
- Policies and programs to strengthen the family
- A strong national defense
- Making America again respected as a World Leader
- A policy of fair trade to protect American jobs

Elect a former Union President, President.

Paid for and authorized by Reagan Bush Committee.
United States Senator Paul Laxalt, Chairman.
Bay Buchanan, Treasurer.

file

Carter and his Washington supporters are trying to scare union members by saying Governor Reagan is anti-union.

- Why is Governor Reagan being subjected to false charges of anti-unionism?
- Do the charges come from the working, union members of California? Or from the professional elitists in Washington?
- Why all the charges now? Little was heard during Reagan's 8 years as Governor. How come he was re-elected Governor by half a million votes, including many union members?
- You don't have to be a politician to figure it out.

Carter doesn't have a record which can be defended!

**So let's set the record straight.
Governor Reagan is NOT
Anti-Union.**



Reagan as a Labor Leader

- Ronald Reagan has been a member of the Screen Actors Guild since 1938.
- He was elected President of that union and served in that capacity for 6 years.
- He led the Screen Actors Guild in its first strike and he won it!
- He understands unions and he knows the problems of working people, collective bargaining and earning a living, and settling grievances.
- He was honored by his fellow actors/actresses by being awarded a lifetime membership in the Screen Actors Guild.

Reagan's Actions as Governor of California

While consistently attempting to hold down the size of Government and to limit the number of state employees, he always believed in treating employees of the state with the utmost fairness possible, and HE . . .

- Provided pay raises for state employees in seven of his eight years as Governor.
- Sponsored and supported the following for California State Employees
 - 1—increased retirement benefits
 - 2—overtime pay
 - 3—night differential
 - 4—unemployment compensation
 - 5—improved health benefits
 - 6—extension of workmens' compensation to volunteer fire departments

LET'S SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON THE ISSUES

1. Would Governor Reagan seek the repeal of OSHA?

NO.

Nor would he support its repeal. Rather, he would work to reform OSHA to strengthen its ability to reduce job-related accidents and to eliminate unnecessary regulations which decrease health and productivity, and hamper the economy. His record as California's chief executive in strong support of Cal-OSHA demonstrates his continuing commitment to insuring safety in the workplace.

2. Would Governor Reagan seek a national right-to-work law and would he seek repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act?

NO.

He believes this issue should be left to the states. He opposes a national right-to-work law and he opposes repeal of Section 14(b).

3. Would Governor Reagan extend anti-trust laws to labor unions?

NO.

4. Would Governor Reagan seek the repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act?

NO.

Governor Reagan would not seek repeal of the Act. He supports construction worker's right to fair conditions. However, he would insist on tightening up the administration of the Act so that the true prevailing wage rate in an area would apply to any project affected by the Act.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: ELIZABETH H. DOLE
VIA: RED CAVANEY/JACK BURGESS
FROM: BOB BONITATI *B*
SUBJECT: Labor Strategy Meeting

In preparing for our Labor Strategy meeting on Wednesday, November 4 I have reviewed the list of attendees provided to us by Meese's office when the meeting was arranged.

The list provided by Ed Meese's office includes:

Jim Baker
Ed Meese
Mike Deaver
Elizabeth Dole
Ray Donovan
Bob Bonitati

Conspicuously absent from that list is Lyn Nofziger. I don't know whether this is an oversight or intentional, but I thought I should call it to your attention.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

EDWIN MEESE III
JAMES A. BAKER III
MIKE DEEVER

FROM:

ELIZABETH H. DOLE

SUBJECT:

Developing a Labor Strategy

Since the outset of the Administration, our relationship with organized labor has been rather ill-defined. Consequently, the Administration has initiated several actions which have not been sensitive to the politics or concerns of the labor movement.

In November of our first year of this Administration, we now find our relationship with organized labor characterized by many media, business, labor and political observers as the worst of any modern Republican President. I can see little merit in the continuation of that characterization. In fact, I can see considerable long range political damage.

If we want to hold and expand the 44% of the union vote received by the President in 1980, we will have to adopt an Administration strategy/policy that is sensitive to the politics of organized labor and that conveys a positive image to the millions of rank and file union voters throughout the country.

While a host of specific program ideas can be offered, our Administration labor efforts should have the following objectives:

- a) to dispel the notion that the President and his Administration are anti-labor and to convey the impression that he is interested in the problems of the American worker;
- b) to publicly communicate the message that we seek the support and the input of labor -- we have an Open Door;
- c) to avoid public confrontation on symbolic labor issues;
- d) to reach beyond the national labor leaders to identify supportive and potentially supportive state and local labor leaders

- e) to see that unions that have been supportive of the President are well-treated as our actions will be closely watched;
- f) to actively cultivate potentially supportive unions (such as the building & construction unions);
- g) to restrain public criticism of the Administration.

In order to accomplish these objectives, we will need an Administration policy that encompasses the following components:

- 1) We must be willing to make some policy concessions in order to neutralize opposition or to gain support.
- 2) We must take the initiative at the White House and in the Departments at reaching out for consultation and in developing an ongoing dialogue with labor representatives.
- 3) We must be prepared to periodically dispense political perks such as White House social invitations, meetings with the President, appointments to important Commissions and Task Forces.
- 4) The White House and the Departments must be sensitive to policy proposals that impact labor and take the initiative with advance consultation to avoid surprises.
- 5) We should be prepared to consult with labor leaders about labor-sensitive appointments.

In order to implement such a strategy we will need to:

- 1. Develop a labor sensitivity within each Department;
- 2. Develop a labor sensitivity within the White House;
- 3. Develop an interdepartmental organization mechanism to deal with labor issues at the Departmental level;
- 4. Develop a White House organizational mechanism to evaluate and make recommendations concerning the political and media impact of policy and appointments affecting labor;
- 5. Assign additional resources to the White House labor liaison function.

Listed below are several specific suggestions for improving our relationship with organized labor:

- 1) The White House should take the initiative in scheduling regularized consultation sessions with labor leadership (including the AFL-CIO). Participation should be high level (chaired by the Vice President) and such sessions should receive media attention.
- 2) The President should meet or lunch periodically with groups of labor leaders to seek their opinions and advice.
- 3) The White House and pertinent Departments should develop a regularized program to brief and educate AFL-CIO and union leaders on major issues (not just labor issues) facing the country. Every effort should be made to solicit labor input and to maintain a continuing dialogue.
- 4) A high-visibility program should be established by the White House and key Departments to bring together leaders of labor and management on an industry-by-industry basis to solve industry problems and to promote a spirit of labor-management cooperation.
- 5) Continued emphasis should be given to the job-producing/economic growth aspects of the economic package. President Reagan's pledge "to put America back to work again" was a strong selling point to workers during the 1980 campaign and needs to be reinforced as the program is implemented.
- 6) The President, Cabinet members and White House staff need to be portrayed in the media as open, accessible and willing to listen to labor views.
- 7) Targetted unions and groups of unions (maritime, building & construction trades, Teamsters) should be singled out for receiving special attention and treatment on issues, appointments and White House stroking operations.
- 8) The Administration should try to avoid the public impression of being locked in combat with the AFL-CIO and other major union spokesmen on labor issues (job protection, workers rights, job safety standards). In particular it would be wise to avoid situations where it appears that the Administration is helping big business at the expense of the workers.

- 9) The President and key Administration spokesmen should appear in the news media to be friendly to unions and their leaders. Much of this can be accomplished in symbolic ways by appearances and meetings with union members and leaders, visits to work sites and an interest in the problems of workers. Well-publicized visits and meetings with workers in troubled industries can deliver a strong message to union members.
- 10) The Republican National Committee should be perceived as "opening the doors" to labor. It should seek labor input and serve as a focal point to bring together labor leaders and Congressional Republicans to listen to each other. This "invitation" to labor must be carried through at the state and local level.
- 11) A special effort must be made to identify supportive state and local union leaders for inclusion in coalition building and political activities.
- 12) A special effort should be made by the Administration to impact the house organs of labor unions. There are thousands of local, state and national publications that are mailed to union members' homes each week and month that the Administration should attempt to impact in a positive way.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: ELIZABETH H. DOLE

VIA: RED CAVANEY/JACK BURGESS

FROM: BOB BONITATI

SUBJECT: Labor Strategy

In preparing for our labor strategy meeting on Wednesday, November 4 with Meese, Baker, Deaver and Donovan, I think it is important to sensitize each of the participants and try to get basic agreement on our objectives prior to the meeting time. In order to do that I would suggest the following:

- Wednesday, October 28 - EHD sends memo (see attached) to Canzeri, Fuller & Darman suggesting that Bonitati meet individually with them to discuss proposed labor strategy prior to the November 4 meeting time.
- Thursday, October 29 & Friday, October 30 - EHD schedules mini labor strategy meeting with Canzeri, Fuller, Darman, Bonitati & Dole for Saturday, October 31 or Monday, November 2. (Hopefully Bonitati will have visited with each by the time of the mini strategy meeting).
- Saturday, October 31 - Possible mini strategy meeting with EHD, Canzeri, Darman, Fuller & Bonitati.
- Monday, November 2 - EHD sends labor strategy paper to meeting participants.
- EHD & Bonitati meet at lunch with Labor Under Secretary Lovell (already scheduled).
- EHD & Bonitati meet with Jim Baker to get his support.
- Possible mini strategy meeting with Canzeri, Darman & Fuller.
- Tuesday, November 3 - Hold for any last minute lobbying.
- Wednesday, November 4 - Strategy meeting at 2:00 p.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: CRAIG FULLER
FROM: ELIZABETH H. DOLE
SUBJECT: Labor Strategy Meeting

As you probably know, Ed Meese is scheduled to participate in a Labor Strategy meeting on Wednesday, November 4 at 2:00 p.m.

In order to assist Ed in preparing to discuss a proposed labor strategy, I am asking Bob Bonitati of my staff to brief you in the next couple of days.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK DARMAN
FROM: ELIZABETH H. DOLE
SUBJECT: Labor Strategy Meeting

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

*Bob to do critical
paper agenda book of up
to deal meeting!*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Oct. 23

Red

1. FYI - Mrs. Dole is invited to a meeting in Meese's Office - Labor Strategy - Wed. Nov. 4 at 2:00 p.m.
2. You are invited to a meeting this Tuesday - at 4:00 in Beal's office re "Advance Schedule" Also invited are Baroody, Karna Small & Gregg Newell. It is on your schedule.

Nancy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/20/81

MEMORANDUM TO: RED CAVANEY
VIA: JACK BURGESS
FROM: BOB BONITATI

I'd like to move on this as soon as possible.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

VIA: Red Cavaney/Jack Burgess
FM: Bob Bonitati *JB*
RE: Dialogue with labor

During my luncheon with Ray Denison (AFL-CIO Legislative Director) last week, we talked about the need to set up a regularized "dialogue" with union leaders and Administration officials to discuss national issues.

Ray and I talked about the possibility of setting up a once-a-month session here in the White House complex to discuss topics of mutual interest. We both agreed that these sessions would be "off the record" and should include top people from labor and from the Administration.

Ray pledged the AFL-CIO's support in helping to arrange these sessions and to getting the program off the ground.

If it is agreeable with you, I would like to initiate such a program on a trial basis, conducting such sessions over the next three months. At the end of three months we can evaluate our results.

I believe such a program lends itself to our outreach objectives, provides a regular structured forum for discussions on a single topic and will help to counter the claim that we have no communication with organized labor.

Both Ray and I agreed that initially we should avoid the emotional topics until the program has had an opportunity to develop.

I would like to schedule our first session in early November using "immigration policy" as the topic. While the AFL-CIO has voiced criticism of our basic policy, they agree with the general thrust and structure of our proposal.

Please let me know if it is agreeable for me to proceed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

VIA: Red Cavaney/Jack Burgess

FM: Bob Bonitati *B*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CRAIG FULLER

VIA: Red Cavaney
FM: Bob Bonitati *B*
RE: Labor Strategy

Per our conversation of yesterday (October 6), I am attaching a copy of a proposed Administration labor strategy which was prepared sometime in May of this year.

In addition to outlining a proposed strategy for dealing with the many components of organized labor, this paper was designed to provide a brief overview of some of the changes taking place in organized labor as well as better understanding the organizational dynamics of the labor movement.

Based on what has taken place since this study was written, I would make some modifications to the strategy, but I still subscribe to nearly all of the concepts enumerated.

It is my understanding that Elizabeth Dole has been trying to arrange a meeting with both Ed Meese and Jim Baker on this subject since sometime in June, but such a session still has not taken place.



If after taking a look at this strategy paper you'd like to discuss the subject further, I'd be delighted to do so. We need a high level commitment to some form of strategy or our relationship with labor will continue to worsen.

I would appreciate your using some discretion in duplicating this document as there are some rather candid remarks and observations contained in it.

Bob B

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CRAIG FULLER

VIA: Red Cavaney 
✓ FM: Bob Bonitati 
RE: Labor Strategy

Per our conversation of yesterday (October 6), I am attaching a copy of a proposed Administration labor strategy which was prepared sometime in May of this year.

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- can call her
for more info

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER III

VIA: Elizabeth H. Dole
FROM: Bob Bonitati
RE: Relations with Organized Labor

Jim - Our discussion has overtaken this memo - I'll call Margaret to set up meeting on labor strategy

As a follow up to our conversation at the Carpenters' Convention in Chicago, I would hope that we can get together at an early date to discuss the precarious state of our relations with organized labor and to develop an effective strategy to deal with it.

I am convinced that the AFL-CIO leadership has committed its full resources to making the President look as bad as possible in an attempt to reverse the November 1980 election support from rank and file union members and to provide a "running start" for the 1984 Democratic Presidential nominee.

Frankly, if they continue their propoganda barrage through the news media and their own publications over the next three years, they will have an impact on rank and file attitudes.

Dealing with the continued opposition of organized labor will require some major political/media decisions for the Administration. I don't think we can continue to devote only minimal attention to dealing with this major political/media force as we have since January.

Sat - Sept 12

Red Jim agrees we need labor strategy session - with Donovan - Please pursue with Margaret

Shirley -
Please let me know when we get this set up. So, I can get Bob working on some materials.
Shirley

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Labor's War With Reagan

Warnings to President Reagan by political aide Lyn Nofziger that AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland intends to lead a labor-dominated Democratic Party to victory over Reaganism were given substance the past week in deteriorating relations between organized labor and the White House.

Kirkland and two lieutenants refused to fill spots on the president's Productivity Commission that had been offered them against Nofziger's advice. Simultaneously, both Reagan and Labor Secretary Ray Donovan were disinclined from speaking before next month's bricklayers' convention. Meanwhile, the AFL-CIO's principal pursuit is a massive anti-Reagan rally in Washington Sept. 19 ("Solidarity Day"), with the Democratic National Committee an eager helper.

Not since labor's emancipation by the 1935 Wagner Act has its high command been so estranged from the White House. Unlike 16 previous years of post-war Republican rule when a strained congeniality usually prevailed, political war has been waged since Jan. 20.

Superficially, the roots of war lie in labor's unusually harsh attack (especially Kirkland's personal assaults) on the Reagan candidacy. The president's men have not been eager for intimate embrace with erstwhile tormentors.

Their coolness, in turn, is cited by labor chiefs as cause for deepening hostility.

But such explanations avoid transcendent political change that made a labor-Reagan confrontation inevitable. Reagan's goal is to dismantle the liberal settlement effected by the New Deal a half-century ago. As the settlement's defender, Kirkland is ahead of Democratic politicians in envisioning a broad-based coalition built on anti-communist foreign policy and liberal social welfare policy.

Nevertheless, presidential counselor Edwin Meese did not want to break relations. He recommended Kirkland to serve on the Productivity Commission headed by former Treasury secretary William Simon. Two other seats were offered Glenn Watts of the communications workers, a close Kirkland ally, and Bob Georgine of the construction workers, a rising labor light.

Nofziger was appalled. He argued Kirkland had two goals: take over the Democratic Party and destroy Ronald Reagan. Why invite your enemy into the bosom of your family? As usual, Meese won the argument, and the AFL-CIO three were invited.

But Kirkland was not happy. He informed Republican friends that previous presidents, from both parties, consulted the AFL-CIO

president before naming such commissions. There was grumbling about having to serve on a commission headed by the reactionary likes of Bill Simon and controlled by right-wing businessmen and leaders of pro-Reagan unions (including the despised Teamsters).

Besides, it might be a trifle embarrassing for Kirkland to sit on a government commission while mobilizing opposition to Reagan on "Solidarity Day" at the Washington Monument. While the AFL-CIO contends there is no political partisan flavor to the demonstration, staffers at Democratic national headquarters wear "Solidarity Day" badges. They also provide more substantial backing.

"I have pledged our support for Solidarity Day to President Kirkland," Democratic National Chairman Charles T. Manatt wrote on Aug. 12 to national committee members. He urged them "to show your backing" for the anti-Reagan demonstration—if possible by joining in themselves.

The air controllers' strike provided a welcome escape hatch. It enabled Kirkland and Watts to send identical two-sentence letters to Reagan declining to serve on the Productivity Commission (giving Georgine no choice other than to follow suit). Jack Joyce of the bricklay-

ers also seized on Reagan's treatment of the air controllers' union (the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization) to disinvite both the president and secretary of labor from his union's convention.

But the source of deepening conflict is surely not PATCO. Nor is it AFL-CIO complaints of insufficient contact with the administration; labor's high command has a standing invitation to call the White House with any problem, and union leaders from Kirkland on down attended a recent get-acquainted party with the president, vice president and Cabinet members. Nor is it really even the more serious (and accurate) complaint that the AFL-CIO is not consulted about personnel or policy affecting labor.

Even if union officials had been present, health and safety regulations for workers would have been softened as part of Reagan's transformation of how the government works. The policy gap cannot be bridged. Lane Kirkland appreciated that reality when he savaged Ronald Reagan last fall, when he opened fire on the administration Jan. 20 and when he declined to serve on the president's commission—giving Lyn Nofziger some new believers in the White House.

GOOD ASSESSMENT!