

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat,
NSC: Country File, Asia [Far East]

Folder Title: Japan
(05/04/1984)

Box: RAC Box 9

To see more digitized collections visit: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (05/04/84)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 02/09/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Robert McFarlane to the President re Japan Follow-up Process, 2p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #593</i>	5/7/84	B1
2. Memo	Roger Robinson to McFarlane re Japan Follow-up Process, 1p <i>R " " #594</i>	5/4/84	B1
3. Cable	272034Z APR 94, 4p <i>R " " #595</i>	4/27/84	B1
4. Cable	Page one of Item # 3, 1p <i>R " " #596</i>	4/27/84	B1
5. Draft Memo	Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary re USG Coordination of Japan Policy, 8p <i>R " " #597</i>	nd	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 7/20/2007

File Folder JAPAN (05/04/1984)

FOIA

F00-037 (F1539)

Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date		
1	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE JAPAN FOLLOW UP PROCESS (F00-037/1#593)	2	5/7/1984	MVH	5/21/08
2	MEMO	ROBINSON TO MCFARLANE, RE JAPAN FOLLOW UP PROCESS (F00-037/1#594)	1	5/4/1984	MVH	5/21/08
3	CABLE	272034Z APR 84 (F00-037/1#595)	4	4/27/1984	MVH	5/21/08
4	CABLE	PAGE 1 OF ITEM #3 (F00-037/1#596)	1	4/27/1984	MVH	5/21/08
5	DRAFT MEMO	WOLFOWITZ TO THE SECRETARY, RE USG COORDINATION OF JAPAN POLICY (F00-037/1#597)	8	ND	MVH	5/21/08

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

M77
2/9/04

ID 8403600

RECEIVED 04 MAY 84 19

TO MCFARLANE FROM ROBINSON

DOCDATE 04 MAY 84

KEYWORDS ECONOMICS

JAPAN

SIG

SUBJECT JAPAN FOLLOW-UP PROCESS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION DUE: 07 MAY 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8403524 NSCIFID (MD)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
President	P 5/7	For decision		
	5/7	Pres Approved		DF, SU, WM, MC
Robinson	S 5/7	Prepare memo Kimmitt to Hill	5/8	
Kimmitt	X 5/8	For Signature		
	C	MAY 11 1984		RO

RECEIVED

84 MAY 11 P 6: 50

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. 858 CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS PAGES 1

FROM R. KIMMITT _____
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION JAPAN Follow-up Process

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>CHARLES HILL</u>	_____	_____
<u>KILO 1</u>	<u>CHRISTOPHER HICKS</u>	_____	_____
<u>- LIMA</u>	<u>HELEN ROBBINS</u>	_____	_____
<u>- INDIA</u>	<u>WILLIAM VITALE</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


VIA LDX

May 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Japan Follow-Up Process

The Vice President's trip to Japan marks the end of his tenure as coordinator of the Japan follow-up process undertaken after the President's visit to Japan in November 1983. The President has designated the Secretary of State to take over the coordinating role for the next phases of this important on-going effort, which encompasses the entire spectrum of U.S.-Japan relations. I believe it is important that you, we, and the other departments and agencies involved continue to maintain close liaison in order to perpetuate the effective working relationship established by Don Gregg and the Vice President's staff.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

cc: Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Mr. Christopher Hicks
Mr. Raymond Lett
Mrs. Helen Robbins
Mr. William Vitale
Mr. Dennis Whitfield

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 8, 1984

~~SECRET~~ACTION**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: Japan Follow-up Process

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Charles Hill informing State of the President's decision (Tab II) to have Secretary Shultz take over from the Vice President management of the Japan follow-up process.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to Hill at Tab I.

Approve K Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to Hill
Tab II	Memo to President

cc: Fortier
 Sigur
 Martin
 McMinn

DECLASSIFIED
 White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
 By MJA NARA, Date 2/9/04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

3600

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1984

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Japan Follow-up Process

Issue

Should Secretary Shultz take over from the Vice President leadership of the interagency process for follow-up on our bilateral initiatives with Japan?

Facts

After your highly successful visit to Japan in November 1983, Vice President Bush took charge of the Administration's efforts to vigorously follow up and implement as many as possible of the bilateral initiatives raised during your visit prior to the London Summit. The issues covered by this complex follow-up process basically encompass the spectrum of U.S.-Japan relations and include the trade, finance, energy, security assistance and defense policy areas. The Japanese have recently announced their trade package and, in addition to a number of positive concrete developments, prospects for further opening Japan's capital markets and the "internationalization" of the yen have improved substantially. The Vice President will be departing Monday for meetings with Prime Minister Nakasone, Foreign Minister Abe and other senior Japanese government and party officials at which time the level of our overall progress will be reviewed as well as the identification of specific areas that will require further work.

Discussion

The Vice President believes that there are benefits to the U.S. continuing to have a coordinated and centrally directed approach to our bilateral relations with Japan, given the scope and complexity of the issues. As the Vice President's successful "kick-off" efforts are concluding with his visit to Japan, he believes it would be very helpful to announce the establishment of a successor organization and who will lead the next phases of this on-going effort. In this connection, the Vice President has stated his preference

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F80-0371 #593

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

that Secretary of State Shultz take over the helm of this important bilateral coordinating role. I agree that George and the State Department represent the appropriate focus for the next phases of this process with my staff assisting this multi-sided process at proper junctures.

Recommendation

OK No

✓AR _____

That you approve of Secretary of State Shultz taking over management of the Japan follow-up process to be announced by Vice President Bush in the course of his upcoming talks in Japan.

Prepared by:
Roger W. Robinson

~~SECRET~~

3600

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 4, 1984

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: Japan Follow-up Process

Attached (Tab I) is a memo from you to the President recommending that Secretary Shultz take over management of the follow-up process to be announced by the Vice President in the course of his upcoming talks with Prime Minister Nakasone and others next week. The cable from the Vice President to the President stating his preference that George and State assume this role is attached (Tab II). Also attached is a bootleg copy (received from the Vice President's office) (Tab III) of a memo from Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary on this subject. The only other viable option referenced in his paper is Don Regan taking over the helm of the follow-up process as chairman of the SIG-IEP. In my judgment, the SIG-IEP offers less opportunity for "hands on" management for tracking these highly complex and diverse issues. I do believe, however, that on select occasions the SIG can and must supplement State leadership on this effort, particularly if Cabinet-level arbitration is required.

I would recommend that you give Secretary Shultz a call prior to sending up this package, merely to confirm his "in principle" willingness to assume this responsibility.

Don Fortier, Gaston *GF* Sigur, Bill *WFM* Martin and Doug McMinn *DM* concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to President
- Tab II Cable
- Tab III Bootleg Memo from VP's Office

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F90-037/1 #594

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 THE VICE PRESIDENT 3660 DTG: 272034Z APR 84 PSN: 007097
SIT985 AN002522 TOR: 118/2027Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

OP IMMED
DE WTE #3660 1182027
O 272034Z APR 84
FM THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO MR. MCFARLANE FOR THE PRESIDENT //SITTO 204//

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ WH03660

SITTO 204

APRIL 27, 1984

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASH., D.C.
SUBJECT: OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

THE JAPANESE HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR TRADE PACKAGE, DESIGNED TO MORE OR LESS COMPLETE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS I HAVE BEEN IN CHARGE OF. WHILE ALL THE CABINET OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS RECOGNIZE THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, WE DO NOT HAVE UNANIMITY AS TO WHETHER OUR JOINT ACHIEVEMENTS ARE GOOD ENOUGH TO WARRANT MY GOING TO JAPAN. GEORGE SHULTZ, CAP WEINBERGER, MARTY FELDSTEIN, AND JOHN BLOCK ARE IN FAVOR. BILL BROCK IS IN FAVOR, BUT BY A NARROW MARGIN. DON REGAN AND MAC BALDRIDGE ARE OPPOSED. BILL CASEY HAS SUBMITTED A COORDINATED ANALYSIS INDICATING THAT NAKASONE IS COUNTING ON MY GOING, THAT A FAILURE WOULD BE A

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 100-0371 #595
BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 04 THE VICE PRESIDENT 3660 DTG: 272034Z APR 84 PSN: 007097

STRONG POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR HIM, AND THAT HARDLINERS IN JAPAN, WHO ARE OPPOSED TO FURTHER OPENING OF JAPAN'S MARKET, WOULD BE STRENGTHENED BY MY NOT GOING.

MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT I SHOULD MAKE THE TRIP. WHILE I PLAN TO CONGRATULATE NAKASONE AND HIS KEY ASSISTANTS FOR WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, I ALSO PLAN TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE. THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST MY GOING TO JAPAN BELIEVE THAT A TRIP WOULD SERVE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF THE JAPANESE. I BELIEVE THAT BY GOING I CAN NOT ONLY THANK NAKASONE FOR WHAT HE HAS DONE, THEREBY STRENGTHENING HIM POLITICALLY, BUT I CAN ALSO STATE CLEARLY THE NEED FOR MORE COOPERATIVE WORK BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. (SUCH AS IN THE AREA OF WOOD PRODUCTS) TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT TRADE BETWEEN US IS BOTH FAIR AND BALANCED. IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO HAVE NAKASONE DRIVEN FROM OFFICE BY CRITICS WHO, IF MY VISIT DID NOT COME OFF, WOULD SEE THAT AS A SIGN OF OVERALL FAILURE. ALSO THE HARDLINERS WOULD REVERT BACK TO MORE, NOT LESS BUT MORE PROTECTIONISM.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE BENEFITS TO HAVING A COORDINATED AND CENTRALLY DIRECTED APPROACH TO OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN SINCE THEY ARE SO COMPLEX AND BROAD RANGING. FOR THIS REASON, I FEEL IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO ANNOUNCE IN JAPAN THAT ALTHOUGH MY FOLLOW-UP STINT IS COMPLETED, THAT A SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION, PREFERABLY CHAIRED BY GEORGE SHULTZ, WILL BE INSTITUTED TO CONTINUE TO COORDINATE AND DIRECT OUR ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. THE CREATION OF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION WOULD, BY ITS VERY NATURE, SHOW THE JAPANESE HOW SERIOUS WE ARE ABOUT THE NEED FOR MORE PROGRESS. I HAVE READ A DEPARTMENT OF STATE THINK PIECE ON THE CREATION OF A SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION WHICH I ASSUME BUD AND GEORGE HAVE SEEN BY NOW. SEVERAL OPTIONS WERE PRESENTED, BUT MY PREFERENCE IS FOR SOMETHING UNDER THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S DIRECTION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 03 OF 04 THE VICE PRESIDENT 3660 DTG: 272034Z APR 84 PSN: 007097

MY MISSION BEGAN AFTER YOUR MEETING WITH NAKASONE. IT SHOULD END NOW, PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT. THE FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM WILL KEEP THE PRESSURE ON, WILL REMOVE ME FROM THIS UNUSUAL ONE-TIME ASSIGNMENT, AND WILL HAVE NAKASONE BACK DEALING WITH YOU ALONE.

I FEEL THAT MY TRIP TO JAPAN SHOULD RESULT FROM A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION. MY REASONS FOR FAVORING THE TRIP ARE:

- PROGRESS MADE SO FAR ON THE WIDE ARRAY OF TRADE ISSUES.
- YOUR CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NAKASONE.
- THE VALUE TO THE VITAL U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP OF KEEPING NAKASONE, WHO IS SO SYMPATHETIC TO THE NEED FOR A MORE OPEN JAPANESE MARKET, IN OFFICE.

IF YOU AGREE WITH MY THINKING, I WOULD PROPOSE LEAVING WASHINGTON ON MAY 7 TO SPEND A WORKING DAY IN TOKYO ON MAY 9. I WOULD THEN MOVE ON TOWARD INDIA, PAKISTAN AND OMAN, A TRIP WHICH YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED.

PLEASE ASK BUD OR GEORGE TO LET ME KNOW HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS TRIP. IF POSSIBLE, I WOULD LIKE TO LET NAKASONE KNOW PRIVATELY ON APRIL 29 OUR TIME BEFORE HE LEAVES ON HIS OWN TRIP TO SOUTH ASIA.

THE TELEVISION COVERAGE OF YOUR TRIP HAS BEEN TERRIFIC BUT I WONDER HOW YOU ARE ENJOYING SEA SLUGS.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

GEORGE BUSH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 04 OF 04 THE VICE PRESIDENT 3660 DTG: 272034Z APR 84 PSN: 007097

P. S. AMBASSADOR OKAWARA STOPPED ME IN THE HALL THIS MORNING FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH JAPANESE FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS. HE SAID THAT MY NOT GOING TO JAPAN NOW WOULD BE SEEN AS "A SLAP IN THE FACE" TO NAKASONE. HE WAS AS AGITATED AS I HAVE EVER SEEN HIM. I TOLD OKAWARA THAT WE WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH PROGRESS ACROSS THE BOARD. HE THEN SAID THAT NOT TO GO WOULD EMPOWER THE HARD LINERS IN JAPAN, WHO DON'T WANT TO OPEN THE JAPANESE MARKET FURTHER. (THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT BILL CASEY'S ANALYSIS POINTS OUT.) I TOLD OKAWARA THAT WE WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE POINTS HE HAD MADE, AND THAT WE WOULD GET BACK TO HIM WITH A DECISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

0849

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCWHE265
OO WTE16
DE WTE #3660 1182027
O 272034Z APR 84
FM THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO MR. MCFARLANE FOR THE PRESIDENT //SITTO 204
ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WH03660
SITTO 204

George Bush should go to Japan as scheduled
V.P.
George Bush should go to Japan as scheduled

APRIL 27, 1984

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASH., D.C.
SUBJECT: OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

THE JAPANESE HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR TRADE PACKAGE, DESIGNED TO MORE OR LESS COMPLETE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS I HAVE BEEN IN CHARGE OF. WHILE ALL THE CABINET OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS RECOGNIZE THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, WE DO NOT HAVE UNANIMITY AS TO WHETHER OUR JOINT ACHIEVEMENTS ARE GOOD ENOUGH TO WARRANT MY GOING TO JAPAN. GEORGE SHULTZ, CAP WEINBERGER, MARTY FELDSTEIN, AND JOHN BLOCK ARE IN FAVOR. BILL BROCK IS IN FAVOR, BUT BY A NARROW MARGIN. DON REGAN AND MAC BALDRIDGE ARE OPPOSED. BILL CASEY HAS SUBMITTED A COORDINATED ANALYSIS INDICATING THAT NAKASONE IS COUNTING ON MY GOING, THAT A FAILURE WOULD BE A STRONG POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR HIM, AND THAT HARDLINERS IN JAPAN, WHO ARE OPPOSED TO FURTHER OPENING OF JAPAN'S MARKET, WOULD BE STRENGTHENED BY MY NOT GOING.

MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT I SHOULD MAKE THE TRIP. WHILE I PLAN TO CONGRATULATE NAKASONE AND HIS KEY ASSISTANTS FOR WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, I ALSO PLAN TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE. THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST MY GOING TO JAPAN BELIEVE THAT A TRIP WOULD SERVE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF THE JAPANESE. I BELIEVE THAT BY GOING I CAN NOT ONLY THANK NAKASONE FOR WHAT HE HAS DONE, THEREBY STRENGTHENING HIM POLITICALLY, BUT I CAN ALSO STATE CLEARLY THE NEED FOR MORE COOPERATIVE WORK BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. (SUCH AS IN THE AREA OF WOOD PRODUCTS) TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT TRADE BETWEEN US IS BOTH FAIR AND BALANCED. IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO HAVE NAKASONE DRIVEN FROM OFFICE BY CRITICS WHO, IF MY VISIT DID NOT COME OFF, WOULD SEE THAT AS A SIGN OF OVERALL FAILURE. ALSO THE HARDLINERS WOULD REVERT BACK TO MORE, NOT LESS BUT MORE PROTECTIONISM.

END OF PAGE 01

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1#596
BY LOT NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

DI M Sam
thanks

fy
good to meet. I / was
favor con. Sam

Big
key up

April 20, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Don
From: EAP/J - Desaix Anderson
Subject: USG Coordination of Japan Policy

This is a revised version of Bill Sherman's memo on which we would appreciate your comments. Paul has seen this version and is generally sympathetic. Bureaucratic reasons at this point, we would appreciate you holding this very closely.

Attachment:
Draft memorandum to the Secretary

Scott
File:
JAPAN
Follow up

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By won NARA, Date 2/9/04

Wall

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Roger Robinson

365

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

①

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EAP - Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: USG Coordination of Japan Policy

Question: How to organize interagency monitoring of U.S. policy toward Japan after current negotiations are concluded.

Background: By midyear, before the Summit convenes in London, we expect to conclude our current round of negotiations of outstanding trade issues with Japan being conducted by the Vice President's follow-up group. The contentiousness evident during the course of these negotiations reflected deep frustration in our economic departments and agencies in dealing in Japanese trade issues against a background of a soaring overall trade deficit. The negotiations generated high levels of emotion and recrimination in Washington

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#597

BY hjt N

7/24/06

despite the personal involvement of Prime Minister Nakasone in an effort to produce forthcoming Japanese positions. There is a general sentiment among the various participants in the Vice President's follow-up group that there should be some institutionalized "follow-up to the follow-up" -- a mechanism which would continue to look at U.S.-Japan issues and policies, ensure Japanese compliance with its commitments, and provide early warning about new issues or problems between us.

Discussion

Over the years our relations with Japan have always been unique. Given the legacy of the war and subsequent occupation, we have a special role that almost dominates Japan's foreign policy spectrum. As their economic strength and political importance increase, Japan occupies an increasingly large portion of ours. The apparent gaps between us in culture, language and tradition are perhaps less and less significant, but enough real differences remain to require a large amount of specialized Japan expertise in order to manage the relationship successfully on a day to day basis. By and large over the years we have done rather well in solving problems, in

expanding mutually profitable commercial and diplomatic relations and in strengthening both the operation and the philosophical underpinning of the alliance.

The frictions and disputes that trouble our relationship are almost invariably trade related. The magnitude of the deficits makes them serious and the frequent perception of unfairness and lack of reciprocity intensify the emotional level of the U.S. response. Together, these factors engage the attention of the press and the higher levels of the U.S. Government. These views are not shared, however, by many of our biggest industrial and financial captains outside Washington. At this point, attempts to use Japan expertise are frequently rejected as "coddling" or "clientilism" and rejected by both the Congress and the Executive Branch. The prevailing belief in Washington is that the only thing that works is heavy, public pressure and it is willingly, sometimes indiscriminately applied. What we could loosely call the "Pearl Harbor syndrome" is activated and visceral antipathies take time to cool.

We are approaching the culmination of such a process, and tempers and patience are frayed. We believe that a successful conclusion will be reached -- indeed, in Japan it is politically impossible for Nakasone to allow himself to be

perceived as failing to manage the U.S. connection. But the experience has been a very trying one for some of the principal negotiators on our side. They are wary and edgy and they insist that some institution be created to keep a continuous review of Japan policy in operation.

From the Department's point of view we have one major policy concern: that Japan policy be managed in an overall and global context. Our stake in maintaining this important bilateral relationship is enormous and has major security implications as well as economic and political ones. Though stable and enduring, it also has an intrinsic friability. Japanese public opinion cannot take for very long what it perceives as anti-Japanese feeling on the part of U.S. leaders. What we discount as campaign rhetoric or posturing for negotiating effect can be permanently damaging to the reservoir of goodwill we now have in Japan. The rough and tumble of world politics is not congenial to them and they will react -- politically and economically. A more nationalistic, insular, less cooperative government is not outside the realm of possibility.

An interagency group established to continue "monitoring" after the current problems are supposedly settled can, if carefully organized, signal to the Japanese the importance we

attach to the relationship, and can also sustain momentum in resolving discrete issues in the context of the overall relationship. We need to guard against merely creating a mechanism to keep the heat on, to cast public doubt on the Japanese commitment, or to provide a forum for whomever wants to find something new to attack. Whatever mechanism we might decide upon should provide a broad perspective, should not be publicized as a policing mechanism, and its terms of reference should be clearly delineated.

Bureaucratically, we also have interests. We have a superbly effective Ambassador and a highly professional and competent Embassy in Japan. They can be fully relied on and we should be conducting the bulk of our business through them. Their effectiveness is eroded if other agencies carry on separate negotiations over their heads or behind their backs. We need generally to put things back into normal diplomatic channels.

The split responsibility of the various agencies involved in economic negotiations with Japan has for some time made necessary and customary some form of interagency policy and decision making mechanism in Washington. However, some of the major players in the forum (e.g., Agriculture, STR, Commerce, Treasury) are single issue constituencies and they are rarely

impressed by State's arguments for dealing with individual issues in the broad context of U.S.-Japanese relations. Someone said in a recent meeting "whenever I hear the words 'big picture', I know they're setting us up for a sell out".

The follow-up mechanism chaired by Vice Presidential Assistant Don Gregg has provided an invaluable means for coordinating priorities and limiting the damage caused by frustrations in the single issue constituencies. It has generally modulated the highs and lows of our rhetoric. A subsequent framework for coordination can maintain consideration of issues within the overall context of our relations without becoming a policing mechanism. If we do not establish a satisfactory mechanism for continuing this approach, whatever temporary truce is achieved by the Vice President's process will be short-lived. I, with the concurrence of Don Gregg and Gaston Sigur believe that we need a strong leadership role to monitor coordination of our Japan policy and that State should provide that leadership.

Several suggestions for follow-up have been advanced:

- a. Continuation of the present group of Vice President and Cabinet level representatives of all agencies, with day to day liaison and planning at working (Deputy Assistant

Secretary) level.

b. Handling of Japan issue in SIG/IEP context, with Secretary Regan chairing.

c. Establishment of a new SIG-Japan, which you would chair, to follow and make recommendations on overall Japan policy. State's political undersecretary could substitute in your absence.

d. Establish a Japan-coordination group at the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level, headed by State, charged with meeting on a regular basis to discuss significant pending issues in U.S.-Japan relations, as well as any innovative ideas that might have floated to the surface.

Both C and D would not be geared to respond to a "crisis" agenda nor would either replace the regular coordination that goes on normally. They could bring perspective to our deliberations and might bring an overall focus to Japan issues. Since no such group exists for another single country, we would want to make clear that we have established such a mechanism because of the importance and multifaceted nature of our relationship with Japan, not because US-Japan relations are

so serious a problem that they require constant attention.

I would very much favor option C or, as a second option, D of the above. This would return leadership to the State Department, and, in effect, normalize our relations with Japan.

EAP:WCSherman:lz

revised 4-19-84

(W3815B)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Japan Follow-Up Process

The Vice President's trip to Japan marks the end of his tenure as coordinator of the Japan follow-up process undertaken the President's visit to Japan in November 1983. The President has designated the Secretary of State to take over the coordinating role for the next phases of this important on-going effort, which encompasses the entire spectrum of U.S.-Japan relations. I believe it is important that you, we, and the other departments and agencies involved continue to maintain close liaison in order to perpetuate the effective working relationship established by Don Gregg and the Vice President's staff.

after

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

cc: Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Mr. Christopher Hicks
Mr. Raymond Lett
Mrs. Helen Robbins
Mr. William Vitale
Mr. Dennis Whitfield

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Japan Follow-up Process (\$)

The Vice President's trip to Japan ~~currently underway~~ marks the end of his tenure as coordinator of the Japan follow-up process undertaken following the President's visit to Japan in November 1983. The President has designated the Secretary of State to take over the coordinating role for the next phases of this important on-going effort, which encompasses the entire spectrum of U.S.-Japan relations. I believe it is important that ~~we~~ maintain close liaison in order to perpetuate the effective working relationship ~~we have enjoyed with Don Gregg and the Vice President's Staff.~~

you, we, and the other departments and agencies involved continue to

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

established by Don Gregg and the Vice President's staff.
RHH
ES

- cc: The Vice President
 - The Secretary of the Treasury
 - The Secretary of Agriculture
 - The Secretary of Commerce
 - The Secretary of Energy
 - The United States Trade Representative
- Gregg
Hicks
Lett
..
..

SECRET
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Classification 275597
By _____ NARA, Date _____
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By 145A NARA, Date 2/10/04

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Japan Follow-Up Process

OK
Nov or Dec

The Vice President's trip to Japan marks the end of his tenure as coordinator of the Japan follow-up process undertaken ~~following~~ *after* the President's visit to Japan in November 1983. The President has designated the Secretary of State to take over the coordinating role for the next phases of this important on-going effort, which encompasses the entire spectrum of U.S.-Japan relations. I believe it is important that you, we, and the other departments and agencies involved continue to maintain close liaison in order to perpetuate the effective working relationship established by Don Gregg and the Vice President's staff.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

cc: The Vice President
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Energy
The United States Trade Representative
Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Mr. Christopher Hicks
Mr. Raymond Lett

*Exec Sec or
counterpart on
each.*