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NSC: Country File, Asia [Far East]
Folder Title: Japan
(04/04/1984-04/28/1984)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (04/04/84 - 04/28/84)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 02/09/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Jacqueline Tillman/Constantine Menges to Robert McFarlane re Nicaragua, 2p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #583</i>	4/9/84	B1
2. Memo	Gaston Sigur to McFarlane re US-Japan Relations, 1p <i>PART " " #584</i>	4/4/84	B1, B3
3. Memo	McFarlane to the President re US-Japan Relations, 1p <i>R " " #585</i>	nd	B1
4. Memo	George Shultz to the President re US-Japan Relations, 3p <i>R " " #586</i>	4/3/84	B1
5. Memo	Sigur to McFarlane re Beef and Citrus Negotiations, 1p <i>R " " #587</i>	4/6/84	B1
6. Memo	Same as Item #5, 1p <i>R " " #588</i>	4/6/84	B1
7. Memo	Sigur to McFarlane re Mansfield Message to Vice President, 1p <i>R " " #589</i>	4/20/84	B1
8. Cable	201325Z APR 84, 2p <i>R " " #590</i>	4/20/84	B1
9. Cable	272034Z APR 84, 3p <i>R " " #591</i>	4/27/84	B1
10. Cable	Page One of Item # 9, 1p <i>R " " #592</i>	4/27/84	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 7/20/2007

File Folder JAPAN (04/04/1984-04/28/1984)

FOIA

F00-037 (F1539)

Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date		
1	MEMO	TILLMAN/MENGENS TO MCFARLANE RE NICARAGUA (F00-037/1#583)	2	4/9/1984	MVH	5/21/08
4	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT (F00- 037/1#586)	3	4/3/1984	MVH	5/21/08
8	CABLE	201325Z APR 84 (F00-037/1#590)	2	4/20/1984	MVH	5/21/08
9	CABLE	272034Z APR 84 (F00-037/1#591)	3	4/20/1984	MVH	5/21/08
10	CABLE	PAGE 1 FROM ITEM #9 (F00-037/1#592)	1	4/20/1984	MVH	5/21/08

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 APR 84 10

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

*mm
2/3/84*

DOCDATE 03 APR 84

KEYWORDS . JAPAN

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: US - JAPAN RELATIONS & FOLLOWUP

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 05 APR 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

LAUX

MCMINN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(C *93*)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*Mcfarlane
Pres*

*X APR 04 1984
IP APR 09 1984
C APR 09 1984*

*Pres for info
memo with PDB
Pres noted*

SV ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

1105 91F

ED System # II
Package # 90455

8 APR 9 P7:32

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>N - SIT</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Tillman</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP

COMMENT

by: _____
(Date/Time)

NSC/S
Close
out per
JT
12/5 J.

Jac with Ty to
develop consolidated package --
even with disagreements.
BLS

RONALD REAGAN LIBRARY
TRANSFER/PARALLEL/OVERSIZE FILE SHEET

Please circle "preservation" (put in AV, etc.), "classified" (parallel filed in vault/annex), "collection" (misfile, provenance), "RD/FRD" (parallel file), "NATO" (parallel file), "SAP" (parallel file).

PRESERVATION CLASSIFICATION COLLECTION RD/FRD NATO SAP

FROM:

Collection Exec. Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Series _____

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # JAPAN (4/4/84-4/28/84)

Box Number 9

Description of Material:

Memo, Jacqueline Tillman/Constantine Menges to
Robert M. Farlane, 4/9/84, 2p.

TO:

Collection: Exec. Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Series: _____

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # Nicaragua (4/9/84-5/14/84)

[Too Late to File]

Box Number: _____

Transferred by: K. Barton

Date: 12/20/07

NEED ONE COPY IN ORIGINAL LOCATION
SECOND COPY WITH ITEM PARALLEL FILED OR TRANSFERRED
THIRD/FOURTH* COPY FOR COLLECTION FOLDERS - * IF TRANSFERRING TO/FROM TWO
COLLECTIONS

National Security Council 1045 vml
The White House

System # II
Package # 90435

APR 4 P 3:45

Dep. Exec. Sec.
Bill Martin

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>6</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>R</u>
Situation Room	<u>8</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>"N"</u>
Tom Shull			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: [Signature]
(Date/Time) 4/9 PDB

Bud,
The President's handling of the
question last night was just
right. [initials] 4/9

Contains
0930
Steve for
4/9

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: Memorandum from Secretary of State to the President on U.S.-Japan Relations

Just put Tab A in Monday

Secretary Shultz has written a memorandum to the President, after discussions with the Vice President, which attempts to put U.S.-Japanese relations in perspective (Tab A). It is a good memorandum and deserves careful reading by both you and the President. I agree with the major thrust of the Secretary's thinking.

not available
Laux and McMinn concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President (Tab I) forwarding Secretary Shultz's memorandum to him.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I McFarlane memo to President
- Tab A Shultz memorandum to President

lets don't forget we have a \$27.6 budget deficit with them.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS FOO-037/1 #584

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

FOIA(b) (1)
FOIA(b) (3)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR



~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Memorandum For You From Secretary Shultz on
U.S.-Japan Relations

George Shultz has written you a very important memorandum, putting into perspective the current state of U.S.-Japanese relations (Tab A). He points out that in spite of the significant differences we have in the trade area, we should not forget just how strong the ties are between our two countries in so many areas. He shows clearly the cooperation that exists between our two countries in almost every area and how necessary it is to us that this cooperation continue and grow.

I agree with George's thinking and recommend that you give his memorandum a careful reading.

Attachment:
Tab A Shultz memo to President

Prepared by:
Gaston Sigur

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/L#585
BY HJI, NARA, ATE 7/24/06



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

84 APR 4 A 1 26

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 3, 1984

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: U.S.-Japan Relations and the Follow-Up

The following are some thoughts the Vice President and I thought that I should share with you.

I know that you will agree with me that our overall relationship with Japan is the best that it has ever been as far as our broad, global interests are concerned. You know from your own experience over the past year how supportive Prime Minister Nakasone has been of our interests across the board and how closely he wants to work with us. There are many examples that show how Nakasone is leading Japan into a new international role in partnership with the U.S.:

-- The support he gave you at Williamsburg, and the statement he inserted there that Japan's security is linked to that of Europe -- the first time any Japanese Prime Minister has dared to say this.

-- Support of our approach to East-West relations across the board -- taking the same policy line toward the Soviets, supporting us on arms control, enhancing Japan's own defense capability and cooperation with U.S. forces, and stemming the flow of high technology goods to the Soviets.

-- The increased foreign aid that Japan is giving to countries of strategic importance to us -- such as Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and the Philippines. Japan has agreed to participate in your African economic initiative and to help implement the aid recommendations of the Kissinger Commission on Central America and the Caribbean.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1-#586

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-2-

-- Japan's impressive cooperation with us at the time of the KAL shutdown -- sharing and publicizing intelligence information that proved Soviet guilt, combined search and recovery operations with our Navy, and working together in the U.N. and ICAO to condemn the Soviet action.

-- Japan's support of South Korea after the Rangoon bombing, imposing sanctions on the North, and Nakasone's support during his recent China visit of the South's position on peace talks with the North.

-- On defense, he is working to change public attitudes in Japan toward defense. He is the first Japanese Prime Minister to say that an enhanced self-defense effort is in Japan's national interest, rather than taking the easy way out and saying that Japan has to succumb to U.S. pressure. After your trip last November, he worked to achieve substantial increases in Japan's defense and foreign aid spending in the middle of a no-growth budget.

-- He cut through bureaucratic and political opposition and authorized the export of Japanese defense technology to the U.S.

-- When the Europeans criticized our action in Grenada, he supported it.

-- Japan has been working actively to prevent escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and has warned Iran of the consequences if it moves to block Gulf shipping.

-- In international economic affairs, he has been out front in calling for a new international trade round.

The various trade and financial negotiations with Japan, constituting a major part of the follow-up process to your November trip, are beginning to reach important deadlines. Progress on all issues has been slow and nothing is as yet "in the bag" - but progress there has been. As time grows shorter, I believe that it is vital that we maintain our perspective and not precipitate a public breakdown in negotiations, thereby endangering our broader interests with Japan.

We know that Nakasone, Abe, and other Japanese officials are working hard against strong bureaucratic and political resistance to achieve significant results in the follow-up:

-- We have achieved renewal of the NTT agreement on terms favorable to us.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

-- Don Regan is right that we must keep the pressure on the Japanese on the all-important issue of opening their capital markets. Japan has already taken action on six of the eight provisions of the Regan-Takeshita agreement concluded while you were in Tokyo. Nakasone is putting strong pressure on his bureaucracy to move ahead on the new agenda we introduced in February.

-- The gap has narrowed on the sensitive beef and citrus issues, but it is very important that we get a satisfactory agreement.

-- Both the value-added telecommunications network and software protection issues are moving in a favorable direction. The firm positions Commerce and USTR took in explaining our attitude had favorable impact, but we will have to monitor implementation closely.

-- Finally, we understand that the Japanese Government is planning a market access package to be announced toward the end of April, which will deal with the other issues in the follow-up, including tariffs, where the Japanese have promised action also. We will promote a strong '85 package to compensate for the thin '84 package.

The approach that we have pursued during your November trip and now during the follow-up reflects the importance that we attach to Japan as we enter a new era in our relationship. It also is designed to demonstrate American maturity and sophistication in handling any problems we have with Japan.

While we firmly share your opposition to protectionist policies, the issues involved with Japan are extremely complex and pressures from the Hill could force us to take action. This makes it all the more important that we succeed in our negotiations with the Japanese. As I said earlier, nothing is yet "in the bag", but I am confident that if we handle the situation right, we will achieve what we seek without damaging our relations with Japan or Nakasone, and that we can justifiably describe our efforts to Congress and the public as successful.

Nakasone is running into strong resistance within his bureaucracy and party. We need to remain tough, although not insulting, and we need to keep in perspective the importance of our overall relations with Japan.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~SECRET~~

*mm
2/3/04*

ID 8402855

RECEIVED 06 APR 84 19

TO MCFARLANE FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 06 APR 84

KEYWORDS . JAPAN

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: BEEF & CITRUS NEGOTIATIONS W/ JAPAN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 10 APR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION
MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C APR 07 1984</i>	<i>Mcfarlane approved</i>		<i>su</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~

2855

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1984

*I called
Brock
Monday
night*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT: Beef and Citrus Negotiations with Japan

The beef and citrus negotiations with the Japanese have been recessed with no agreement and Agriculture Minister Yamamura will be returning to Tokyo. Don Gregg reports to me that the Japanese would like to have Bill Brock go to Tokyo later this month and that it looks as though our tough stance may be achieving results. It would be useful, I believe, to have you call Bill and get a personal reading from him on where things sit. Also, you could congratulate him on the job he is doing and reaffirm your view that it is essential to hold firm with the Japanese, without being insulting. This is key, I think, to successful negotiations with them.

To give you a few facts for your conversation, the Japanese, in accordance with the old agreement which lapsed on March 31, were buying 30,800 tons of beef a year from us. They initially agreed to increase this by 4.2, then by 5.6 thousand tons a year for 5 years. They have now gone up to 6.4 thousand tons. We want 7.5. The gap narrows.

I understand from Paul Wolfowitz that George Shultz has already called Bill Brock on the matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you call Bill Brock to receive from him his views on the current state of beef and citrus negotiations with the Japanese and that you urge a continuing tough stance, without rancor.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#587

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

To: Bud McParlan 4/7/84
From: ~~John S. ...~~ 5:40 P.M.

Bud,

Further, to my
memo on beef and
citrus (2855*), I

understand that the
Tajmen have gone up
to 6.9 thousand -

*Copy attached ~~John S. ...~~

~~Blanco~~
NSC/S

Add to file
closed 4/07

~~SECRET~~

2855

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1984

Pls get Brock on phone

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT: Beef and Citrus Negotiations with Japan

The beef and citrus negotiations with the Japanese have been recessed with no agreement and Agriculture Minister Yamamura will be returning to Tokyo. Don Gregg reports to me that the Japanese would like to have Bill Brock go to Tokyo later this month and that it looks as though our tough stance may be achieving results. It would be useful, I believe, to have you call Bill and get a personal reading from him on where things sit. Also, you could congratulate him on the job he is doing and reaffirm your view that it is essential to hold firm with the Japanese, without being insulting. This is key, I think, to successful negotiations with them.

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I understand from Paul Wolfowitz that George Shultz has already called Bill Brock on the matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you call Bill Brock to receive from him his views on the current state of beef and citrus negotiations with the Japanese and that you urge a continuing tough stance, without rancor.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1 #588

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

Completed call 4/6 7:30 PM

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

MON 2/3/04

ID 8403301

RECEIVED 21 APR 84 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 20 APR 84

KEYWORDS JAPAN

SUBJECT MANSFIELD MSG TO VP RECOMMENDING VP GO TO JAPAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (V)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>c 4/21</i>	<i>Noted by McFarlane</i>		<i>Sigur/Robinson</i> ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

1127 wpl

System #

I

Package #

3301

ED

8 APR 20 P 4: 25

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	←	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	2	J	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	m	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	6	Good	N
Situation Room	5	RCM HAS	A

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bud,
Will need to make a decision next week on whether VP should go. As usual he will want Pres. approval. Will get you a memo middle of the week.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 20, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT: Mansfield Message to Vice President

Ambassador Mansfield has sent a message to the Vice President strongly recommending that he come to Japan (Tab A). I think the key sentence in Mike's cable is the following: "A decision not to come would not only seriously undercut the Prime Minister's political base, but might actually slow down the current momentum in our favor."

Attachment:

Tab A Mansfield cable

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1 #589BY LAI, N A, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6414
EOB103 AN004988

DTG: 201325Z APR 84 PSN: 056452
TOR: 111/1332Z CSN: EHA419

DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 SIGU-01 LAUX-01 /003 A1
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: KIMM VP SIT EOB
EOB:

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #6414 1111333
O 201325Z APR 84 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 9905

~~SECRET~~ STATE 116414

NODIS
FOR THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
FOLLOWING TOKYO 7929 DTD 4/20/84 SENT ACTION SECSTATE BEING
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO

QUOTE
~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 07929

NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, JA, US
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VICE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO JAPAN

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PASSING THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE TO THE VICE PRESIDENT:
"I KNOW THE FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER YOU WILL VISIT
JAPAN NEXT MONTH WILL HAVE TO BE BASED ON POLITICAL
REALITIES AT HOME. NEVERTHELESS, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER
MY VIEWS ON A VISIT IN THE HOPE THAT THEY MAY PROVE OF
SOME USE TO YOU IN MAKING THAT DECISION.
"IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE WE ARE OUTLINING HOW FAR THE
JAPANESE HAVE COME DOWN THE ROAD TOWARDS A MUTUALLY
SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF OUR BILATERAL TRADE IRRITANTS.
THERE IS STILL SOME DISTANCE LEFT TO TRAVEL. A VICE
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT IN EARLY MAY WOULD NOT ONLY DEMON-
STRATE HIGH LEVEL RECOGNITION OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS, BUT WOULD ALSO INDICATE OUR
VIEW, AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL, THAT FURTHER MOVEMENT IS
STILL REQUIRED. THE VISIT WOULD THUS SERVE AS A BENCH-
MARK, ENDING YOUR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT, RATHER THAN AS THE
FINISH LINE. GIVEN THE ASSUMPTION HERE THAT THE VISIT
WILL TAKE PLACE AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL
INTEREST IN MEETING WITH YOU (HE MENTIONED IT TO HOWARD
BAKER EARLIER THIS WEEK), A DECISION NOT TO COME WOULD
NOT ONLY SERIOUSLY UNDERCUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S POLITICAL
BASE BUT MIGHT ACTUALLY SLOW DOWN THE CURRENT MOMENTUM
IN OUR FAVOR.

"SHOULD YOU DECIDE TO GO THROUGH WITH THE VISIT, AND
I HOPE YOU WILL, I WOULD CAUTION AGAINST ADVISING THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT OF THIS UNTIL AFTER IT UNVEILS ITS
NEXT TRADE PACKAGE ON APRIL 27. KEEPING THE GOJ ON
TENTERHOOKS WILL SERVE TO INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF
THOSE WHO ARE WORKING FOR MAXIMUM PROGRESS. I ALSO
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR BILL BROCK AND DON
GREGG SEPARATELY TO MAKE AMBASSADOR OKAWARA AWARE THAT
A FINAL DECISION ON THE VISIT WILL NOT BE MADE UNTIL
AFTER THE APRIL 27 PACKAGE IS COMPLETE. WHILE THIS MAY
COMPLICATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOUR VISIT, IT WILL HELP
TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT ON THE

NODIS
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NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F20-0371/#590
BY LOT NARA. DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6414

DTG: 201325Z APR 84 PSN: 056452

PART OF THE GOJ. "
MANSFIELD UNQUOTE DAM
BT

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~~SECRET~~

*MAN
2/3/04*

RECEIVED 25 APR 84 08

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 24 APR 84

KEYWORDS JAPAN

LONDON SUMMIT

NAKASONE, YASUHIRO

SUBJECT: PRES BILATERAL W/ PM NAKASONE 7 JUN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 30 APR 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

MCMINN

ROBINSON

CHILDRESS

SOMMER

LAUX

MARTIN

COBB

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8412249

LOG

NSCIFID

(CL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Secretariat C 5/3 No further action necessary

PA

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)



S/S 8412249
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 24, 1984

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84 APR 24 P11: 27

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: President's Bilateral with Japanese Prime
Minister Nakasone at London Summit

Because the Japanese Diet session has been extended, Prime Minister Nakasone has delayed his departure for the London Summit and will not arrive in London until June 7 at 8:00 a.m.

The Department therefore recommends that the President hold his bilateral meeting with Nakasone late in the morning or during the afternoon of the 7th.

Charles Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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2/3/04

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OO WTE16

DE WTE #3660 1182027

O 272034Z APR 84

FM THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO MR. MCFARLANE FOR THE PRESIDENT //SITTO 204

ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WH03660

SITTO 204

V.P. George go to Japan as scheduled
Bush should
RR

APRIL 27, 1984

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASH., D.C.

SUBJECT: OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

THE JAPANESE HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR TRADE PACKAGE, DESIGNED TO MORE OR LESS COMPLETE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS I HAVE BEEN IN CHARGE OF. WHILE ALL THE CABINET OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS RECOGNIZE THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, WE DO NOT HAVE UNANIMITY AS TO WHETHER OUR JOINT ACHIEVEMENTS ARE GOOD ENOUGH TO WARRANT MY GOING TO JAPAN. GEORGE SHULTZ, CAP WEINBERGER, MARTY FELDSTEIN, AND JOHN BLOCK ARE IN FAVOR. BILL BROCK IS IN FAVOR, BUT BY A NARROW MARGIN. DON REGAN AND MAC BALDRIDGE ARE OPPOSED. BILL CASEY HAS SUBMITTED A COORDINATED ANALYSIS INDICATING THAT NAKASONE IS COUNTING ON MY GOING, THAT A FAILURE WOULD BE A STRONG POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR HIM, AND THAT HARDLINERS IN JAPAN, WHO ARE OPPOSED TO FURTHER OPENING OF JAPAN'S MARKET, WOULD BE STRENGTHENED BY MY NOT GOING.

MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT I SHOULD MAKE THE TRIP. WHILE I PLAN TO CONGRATULATE NAKASONE AND HIS KEY ASSISTANTS FOR WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, I ALSO PLAN TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE. THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST MY GOING TO JAPAN BELIEVE THAT A TRIP WOULD SERVE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF THE JAPANESE. I BELIEVE THAT BY GOING I CAN NOT ONLY THANK NAKASONE FOR WHAT HE HAS DONE, THEREBY STRENGTHENING HIM POLITICALLY, BUT I CAN ALSO STATE CLEARLY THE NEED FOR MORE COOPERATIVE WORK BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. (SUCH AS IN THE AREA OF WOOD PRODUCTS) TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT TRADE BETWEEN US IS BOTH FAIR AND BALANCED. IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO HAVE NAKASONE DRIVEN FROM OFFICE BY CRITICS WHO, IF MY VISIT DID NOT COME OFF, WOULD SEE THAT AS A SIGN OF OVERALL FAILURE. ALSO THE HARDLINERS WOULD REVERT BACK TO MORE, NOT LESS BUT MORE PROTECTIONISM.

END OF PAGE 01

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NLS #00-037/1#591

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BY 101 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE BENEFITS TO HAVING A COORDINATED AND CENTRALLY DIRECTED APPROACH TO OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN SINCE THEY ARE SO COMPLEX AND BROAD RANGING. FOR THIS REASON, I FEEL IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO ANNOUNCE IN JAPAN THAT ALTHOUGH MY FOLLOW-UP STINT IS COMPLETED, THAT A SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION, PREFERABLY CHAIRED BY GEORGE SHULTZ, WILL BE INSTITUTED TO CONTINUE TO COORDINATE AND DIRECT OUR ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. THE CREATION OF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION WOULD, BY ITS VERY NATURE, SHOW THE JAPANESE HOW SERIOUS WE ARE ABOUT THE NEED FOR MORE PROGRESS. I HAVE READ A DEPARTMENT OF STATE THINK PIECE ON THE CREATION OF A SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION WHICH I ASSUME BUD AND GEORGE HAVE SEEN BY NOW. SEVERAL OPTIONS WERE PRESENTED, BUT MY PREFERENCE IS FOR SOMETHING UNDER THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S DIRECTION.

MY MISSION BEGAN AFTER YOUR MEETING WITH NAKASONE. IT SHOULD END NOW, PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT. THE FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM WILL KEEP THE PRESSURE ON, WILL REMOVE ME FROM THIS UNUSUAL ONE-TIME ASSIGNMENT, AND WILL HAVE NAKASONE BACK DEALING WITH YOU ALONE.

I FEEL THAT MY TRIP TO JAPAN SHOULD RESULT FROM A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION. MY REASONS FOR FAVORING THE TRIP ARE:

- PROGRESS MADE SO FAR ON THE WIDE ARRAY OF TRADE ISSUES.
- YOUR CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NAKASONE.
- THE VALUE TO THE VITAL U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP OF KEEPING NAKASONE, WHO IS SO SYMPATHETIC TO THE NEED FOR A MORE OPEN JAPANESE MARKET, IN OFFICE.

IF YOU AGREE WITH MY THINKING, I WOULD PROPOSE LEAVING WASHINGTON ON MAY 7 TO SPEND A WORKING DAY IN TOKYO ON MAY 9. I WOULD THEN MOVE ON TOWARD INDIA, PAKISTAN AND OMAN, A TRIP WHICH YOU HAVE PRESIOUSLY APPROVED.

PLEASE ASK BUD OR GEORGE TO LET ME KNOW HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS TRIP. IF POSSIBLE, I WOULD LIKE TO, LET NAKASONE KNOW PRIVATELY ON APRIL 29 OUR TIME BEFORE HE LEAVES ON HIS OWN TRIP TO SOUTH ASIA.

THE TELEVISION COVERAGE OF YOUR TRIP HAS BEEN TERRIFIC BUT I WONDER HOW YOU ARE ENJOYING SEA SLUGS.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

END OF PAGE 02

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GEORGE BUSH

P.S. AMBASSADOR OKAWARA STOPPED ME IN THE HALL THIS MORNING FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH JAPANESE FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS. HE SAID THAT MY NOT GOING TO JAPAN NOW WOULD BE SEEN AS "A SLAP IN THE FACE" TO NAKASONE. HE WAS AS AGITATED AS I HAVE EVER SEEN HIM. I TOLD OKAWARA THAT WE WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH PROGRESS ACROSS THE BOARD. HE THEN SAID THAT NOT TO GO WOULD EMPOWER THE HARD LINERS IN JAPAN, WHO DON'T WANT TO OPEN THE JAPANESE MARKET FURTHER. (THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT BILL CASEY'S ANALYSIS POINTS OUT.) I TOLD OKAWARA THAT WE WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE POINTS HE HAD MADE, AND THAT WE WOULD GET BACK TO HIM WITH A DECISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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JAPAN

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CLASSIFICATION

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MODE

PAGES 1

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 04

RELEASER _____

PRIORITY

DEX # _____

DTG 280402Z APR 84

ROUTINE

TTY # _____

FROM/LOCATION/

1. COMCEN BEIJING

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM TOR: 280424Z Apr 84

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

84 APR 27 11:33

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

M77
2/3/01

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BY LOT NARA DATE 7/24/86