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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
Country File  
**File Folder:** Germany, FRG Vol. IV 1/1/82 – 9/30/82 (3)

**Archivist:** smf  
**FOIA ID:** F97-030 (Friedrich)  
**Date:** 06/01/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. cable</del>	<del>201628Z JUL 82 (Sections 1 and 2 of 3 Bonn 15592) 5p</del> R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #132	<del>7/20/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>2. cable</del>	<del>201632Z JUL 82 (Section 3 of 3 Bonn 15592) 3p</del> R " " #133	<del>7/20/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
3. cable	171209Z JUL 82 1p D " " #134	7/17/82	P1/F1
<del>4. cable</del>	<del>170926Z JUL 82 2p</del> R " " #135	<del>7/17/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>5. cable</del>	<del>151935Z JUL 82 2p</del> R " " #136	<del>7/15/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>6. cable</del>	<del>100356Z JUL 82 2p</del> R " " #137	<del>7/10/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>7. cable</del>	<del>301657Z JUN 82 1p</del> R " " #138	<del>6/30/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>8. cable</del>	<del>251551Z JUN 82 (Section 1 of 2 Bonn 13754) 3p</del> R " " #139	<del>6/25/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>9. cable</del>	<del>251554Z JUN 82 (Section 2 of 2 Bonn 13754) 2p</del> R " " #140	<del>6/25/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>10. cable</del>	<del>241153Z JUN 82 1p</del> R " " #141	<del>6/24/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>11. cable</del>	<del>231543Z JUN 82 1p</del> R " " #142	<del>6/23/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>12. cable</del>	<del>181556Z JUN 82 1p</del> R " " #143	<del>6/18/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>13. cable</del>	<del>141445Z JUN 82 1p</del> R " " #144	<del>6/14/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
14. cable	101146Z JUN 82 2p D " " #145	6/10/82	P1/F1
15. cable	101152Z JUN 82 1p D " " #146	6/10/82	P1/F1
16. cable	101146Z JUN 82 (Sections 1 and 2 of 3 Bonn 12587) 6p D " " #147	6/10/82	P1/F1
17. cable	text same as document 15 (Section 3 of 3 Bonn 12587) 1p D " " #148	6/10/82	P1/F1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>18. cable</del>	<del>29169Z MAY 82 3p R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 # 149</del>	<del>5/29/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>19. cable</del>	<del>261019Z MAY 82 1p R u " # 150</del>	<del>5/26/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>20. cable</del>	<del>222005Z MAY 82 1p R u " # 151</del>	<del>5/22/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>21. cable</del>	<del>220214Z MAY 82 1p R u " # 152</del>	<del>5/22/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>22. cable</del>	<del>200358Z MAY 82 1p R u " # 153</del>	<del>5/20/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>23. cable</del>	<del>171101Z MAY 82 2p R u " # 154</del>	<del>5/17/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>24. cable</del>	<del>150943Z MAY 82 1p R u " # 155</del>	<del>5/15/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>

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F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 15592  
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 07-20-1992 (WUESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, ECON, AID, PL, GE  
SUBJECT: POLISH EPISCOPATE ECONOMIC PROPOSALS; ATTACHMENT  
- ONE TO CARDINAL HUEFFNER'S LETTER  
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REF: BONN 15376  
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1. (C) HERE FOLLOWS THE FIRST ATTACHMENT TO JOSEPH  
CARDINAL HUEFFNER'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ENTITLED  
"ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND AND REFLECTIONS OF THE  
POLISH EPISCOPACY (SIC) CONCERNING AN ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE AGRICULTURE AND THE ECONOMIC FIELDS  
CONNECTED THEREWITH (HANDICRAFT, TRADE AND SERVICES)."

2. (S) BEGIN TEXT:  
- ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND  
AND REFLECTIONS OF THE POLISH EPISCOPACY CONCERNING AN  
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE AGRICULTURE AND THE  
ECONOMIC FIELDS CONNECTED THEREWITH (HANDICRAFT, TRADE  
AND SERVICES)

- 1. GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION
- 2. THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH
- 3. THE ATTITUDE OF THE POLISH EPISCOPACY TOWARDS THE  
- SANCTIONS OF THE WEST
- 4. AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE-SECTOR AGRICULTURE  
- IS NECESSARY.

1. GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION  
THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW ON DECEMBER 13, 1981  
HAS BEEN A SHOCK FOR ALL POLES.  
THE POLISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT MEETS WITH THE GENERAL DIS-

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BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

THE CHURCH, AND ABOVE ALL THE EPISCOPACY, FEELS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FUTURE AND THE FATE OF THE POLISH PEOPLE. IT HAS BEEN LIKE THIS UNDER CARDINAL WYSZYNSKI AND IT IS STILL LIKE THAT UNDER THE PRESENT PRIMATE ARCHBISHOP GLEMP. JUST AS HIS PREDECESSOR PRIMATE GLEMP IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE ENTIRE EPISCOPACY PARTICULARLY STRIVES FOR THE FOLLOWING AIMS:

(1) AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PRESENT RULERS WITHIN PARTY AND STATE AND ALL SOCIAL GROUPS. ALREADY IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THAT GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARCH 1982, THE POLISH EPISCOPACY HAS LAID DOWN THE MAIN ASPECTS OF A PRACTICAL PROGRAM FOR "SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING"; LATER ON THESE ASPECTS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE "THESES" OF THE PRIMATE'S SOCIAL COUNCIL.

BEFORE BEING PUBLISHED THEY HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ENTIRE EPISCOPACY; THEY HAVE BEEN ENCLOSED HEREIN. THE INTERNED LEADERS OF 'SOLIDARITY' HAVE DECLARED THEIR EXPLICIT CONSENT TO THESE "THESES", EVEN TO THE CRITICAL PARTS CONCERNING 'SOLIDARITY'. THE BASIC CONCERN OF THESE "THESES" IS THE EMPHATICAL DEMAND FOR PERSONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE.

(2) DIALOGUE INSTEAD OF VIOLENCE. THE BISHOPS CONSTANTLY WARN THE MILITARY LEADERS AS WELL AS THE VARIOUS SOCIAL GROUPS OF VIOLENCE AND ALL STEPS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CIVIL WAR AND THEREBY TO AN INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE. THEY AVOID ALL PUBLIC CONTROVERSY AND PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE RULERS IN ORDER NOT TO GIVE THE "DOCTRINARIAN FORCES" WITHIN THE PARTY ANY REASON FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WOULD AGGRAVATE AND WORSEN THE SITUATION WHICH IS SO EXTREMELY CRITICAL ANYHOW.

THE BISHOPS ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE INTERNED UNION LEADERS, ESPECIALLY WITH WALESZA. THE JUDGEMENT OF THE SITUATION AS WELL AS THE DECISION ON THE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AS A RESULT IS MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. THE PROMINENT LEADERS OF 'SOLIDARITY' WHO ARE STILL IN INTERNMENT CAMPS ON THE WHOLE SUPPORT THE COURSE OF THE EPISCOPACY.

ALTHOUGH THE CHURCH TAKES A CRITICAL VIEW OF CERTAIN EXTREME STATEMENTS AND INITIATIVES OF 'SOLIDARITY' IT STILL STRIVES TO SAVE THE SUBSTANTIAL CONCERNS AND VALUES OF 'SOLIDARITY'; THEREFORE IT ASKS FOR THE RESTORATION OF 'SOLIDARITY' ON THE BASIS OF THE VALID STATUS.

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APPROVAL OF ALL SOCIAL STRATA. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE FOR THE WORKERS. AND THE POLISH YOUTH, IN PARTICULAR, IN ALL ITS SOCIAL STRATA IS FULL OF DEEP ANGER AND RADICALLY DENIES ITSELF TO THE REGIME. THE YOUTH LOOKS FORWARD TO THE FUTURE WITHOUT HOPE AND DOES NOT SEE, ABOVE ALL, ANY CHANCE TO SOLVE THE PRESENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AS IT WAS BEFORE AUGUST 1980. THE INFLUENTIAL CIRCLES OF THE INTELLIGENTIA TEND TO REFUSE TO COOPERATE WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

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IN THE EYES OF THE POPULATION POLAND'S COMMUNIST PARTY HAS DISCREDITED AND TOTALLY COMPROMISED ITSELF. AT PRESENT IT PRESUMABLY PASSES THROUGH THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS OF ITS HISTORY.

• IT HAS BEEN THE DECLARED AIM OF DECEMBER 13, 1981 TO RESTORE THE PARTY AS THE 'LEADING FORCE' WITHIN STATE AND SOCIETY AND TO PUT THROUGH A 'SOCIALIST RENEWAL', I.E. 'A CONSEQUENT REALIZATION OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM'. WHILE WITH REGARD TO THIS GOAL ALL GROUPS WITHIN THE PARTY ARE AGREED, THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT GROUPS TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW CONCERNING THE WAY OF REACHING THIS AIM:

• (1) IN THE EYES OF THE PRESENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT ONLY BY RESTORING AT LEAST A CERTAIN RELIABILITY OF THE PARTY THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM CAN FIND GENERAL ACCEPTANCE. THEREFORE THE PRESENT RULERS STILL DECLARE TO CARRY OUT ECONOMIC REFORMS AND TO AIM AT A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION STYLE - I.E. A LOT OF WHAT THE TRADE UNION "SOLIDARITY" HAS BEEN STRIVING FOR. THERE ARE CERTAIN FIRST SIGNS TO BE OBSERVED: SUCH AS THE RAISING OF PRICES AND WAGES; SOME FEW DECISIONS RELATING TO PERSONNEL POLICY; ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN THE FIELD OF THE SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (E.G. CLASSICAL STRUCTURES OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY REDUCED); SOME OF THE LAWS WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED UPON WITH "SOLIDARITY" HAVE BEEN RATIFIED IN PARLIAMENT AFTER DECEMBER 13, 1981, THOUGH NOT FULLY.

(2) THE UNCOMPROMISING GROUP - THE SO-CALLED "DOCTRINARIAN FORCES" WITHIN THE PARTY PRESS FOR A RECANTATION OF ALL LIBERTIES WHICH HAD BEEN GRANTED SINCE AUGUST 1980 AND WANT TO PUT THROUGH THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM CONSEQUENTLY AND MERCILESSLY, INCLUDING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE CHURCH.

• AT PRESENT A LOT POINTS TO A RECOVERY OF THE "DOCTRINARIAN FORCES"; A DOWNFALL OF THE PRESENT LEADERS BY NO MEANS

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UNTIL TODAY, THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE CHURCH AND THE  
INTERNED LEADERS OF 'SOLIDARITY' STILL HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL  
IN CONVINCING THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION  
OF THE NECESSITY OF AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT  
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SEEMS TO BE IMPOSSIBLE. IT IS A COMMON BELIEF THAT A SUCCESSOR WILL BELONG TO THE "DOCTRINARIAN FORCES" AND WILL BE SUCCESSFUL ONLY "WITH THE HELP OF A FOREIGN POWER", I.E. BY MEANS OF AN INVASION OF THE WARSAW PACT. WE WERE REMINDED OF THE FACT THAT ALSO THE 13TH OF DECEMBER 1981 HAD SURPRISED EVERYONE, AND AS FAR AS THIS IS KNOWN, EVEN THE WESTERN SECRET SERVICES.

WHAT SPEAKS AGAINST A VICTORY OF THE "DOCTRINARIAN FORCES" ARE THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO PROTECT ITS ESSENTIAL INTERESTS - THAT POLAND REMAINS A MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT, TO SAFEGUARD THE STRATEGIC LINES TOWARDS THE WEST, TO SECURE THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM WITHIN THE COUNTRY - IN A WAY WHICH BURDENS MOSCOW ONLY WITH A SLIGHT ODIUM IN POLAND AND IN THE WEST. IN SUCH A CASE THE PRESENT LEADERS WITHIN THE PARTY GRADUALLY WOULD FIND GENERAL ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY AND BRING ABOUT AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE VARIOUS SOCIAL GROUPS, INCLUDING "SOLIDARITY". THIS VIEW STARTS OUT FROM THE FACT THAT MOSCOW RECONCILES ITSELF TO POLAND'S SPECIAL FEATURES AND ACCEPTS A CERTAIN SPECIAL POSITION AS LONG AS THE THREE MENTIONED "ESSENTIALS" SEEM TO BE GUARANTEED.

2. THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH

AS IN THE PAST THE CHURCH ALSO TODAY UNRESERVEDLY ENJOYS THE PEOPLE'S COMPLETE CONFIDENCE. ITS EPISCOPACY HAS ADHERED TO FULL INDEPENDENCE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. AND UNTIL NOW THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS NOT TRIED TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE CHURCH. TO THIS VERY DAY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN NO WAY HAS RESTRICTED THE SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CHURCH. IT CONSIDERS THE CHURCH AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR THE INTERNAL PEACE OF SOCIETY.

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AND THE VARIOUS SOCIAL GROUPS; I.E. THAT THIS CANNOT BE  
REACHED BY VIOLENCE BUT ONLY BY MEANS OF TALKS AND  
NEGOTIATIONS.

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3. THE ATTITUDE OF THE POLISH EPISCOPACY TOWARDS THE  
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- SANCTIONS OF THE WEST  
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(1) IF AT ALL, THESE SANCTIONS SHOULD BE FOR THOSE MEMBER  
STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT WHICH SINCE AUGUST 1980 IN A  
VERY BRUTAL WAY HAVE INTERFERED IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OF THE POLISH PEOPLE AND HAVE EVEN THREATENED WITH  
INVASION UNDER THE PRETEXT OF SAVING SOCIALISM. IT IS  
WELL-KNOWN WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE EXERTED THE HEAVIEST  
PRESSURE ON POLAND.

(2) SANCTIONS, THEREFORE, SHOULD ESPECIALLY BE FOR THESE  
COUNTRIES AND NOT FOR THE POLISH POPULATION. THAT IS WHY  
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLISH EPISCOPACY IN THE JOINT  
COMMISSION OF EPISCOPACY AND GOVERNMENT AFTER DETAILED  
DISCUSSIONS AND A UNANIMOUS DECISION WITHIN THE GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY OF THE EPISCOPACY HAVE DECLARED TWICE BEFORE THE  
SAID COMMISSION: THESE SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND STRIKE  
THE POLISH PEOPLE, THEY DELAY AND AGGRAVATE THE SOLUTION  
OF THE CRISIS.

(3) DUE TO THE DECADES OF STATE-CONTROLLED MALADMINISTRATION  
POLAND'S ECONOMIC SITUATION - WHICH TODAY IS ON THE BRINK  
OF AN ECONOMIC DISASTER - ABOVE ALL HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED  
BY THE CREDIT DIFFICULTIES CONDITIONED BY THIS MALAD-  
MINISTRATION AND FINALLY AND EVEN MORE DRAMATICALLY, DUE  
TO THE SANCTIONS HAS BEEN TURNED INTO A RATHER HOPELESS  
SITUATION. THIS HAS HAD A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON THE  
ENTIRE ECONOMY; THEY CAN BE DIRECTLY FELT IN THE UNEM-

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BY CHS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

PLOYMENT OF SO MANY YOUNG PEOPLE AND IN THE SUPPLY SITUATION THAT STILL BECOMES EVEN MORE PRECARIOUS.

THE GOVERNMENT AGAIN AND AGAIN DECLARED IN PUBLIC AND ALSO IN THE JOINT COMMISSION: "WE WON'T ROW TO A POLITICAL DICTATE OF THE WEST". ACCORDING TO THE VIEW OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT THE WESTERN ENTREPRENEURS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE TRADE WITH THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ANYHOW, SO THAT THEY SOON WILL FORCE THE LIFTING OF THE RESTRICTIONS OR WILL BYPASS THEM MORE AND MORE; IT IS SAID THAT ALREADY NOW THERE WERE SIGNS POINTING TO THIS.

4. AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE-SECTOR AGRICULTURE IS  
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THE POLISH BISHOPS DO NOT FAIL TO SEE THE DIFFICULTIES WITH WHICH THOSE POLITICAL FORCES IN THE WEST ARE CONFRONTED WHICH ADVOCATE A TOTAL LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND. ON THE OTHER HAND THE BISHOPS, BEING CONSCIOUS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE, CONSIDER IT THEIR DUTY TO ADVOCATE EMPHATICALLY THE LIFTING OF THOSE SANCTIONS WHICH STRIKE POLAND'S PRIVATE ECONOMY, I.E. ABOVE ALL, AGRICULTURE, 80 PER CENT OF WHICH ARE STILL PRIVATELY OWNED, BUT ALSO THOSE SANCTIONS, WHICH STRIKE THE FIRMS WORKING FOR AGRICULTURE IN THE FIELDS OF HANDICRAFT, TRADE AND SERVICES. THE WEST RATHER SHOULD RESTORE AND STRENGTHEN THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THESE FIELDS IN PARTICULAR BY MEANS OF A COMPREHENSIVE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. AFTER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH SEVERAL EXPERTS THE BISHOPS HAVE COME TO THE CONVICTION THAT SUCH AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WILL RELIEVE IMMEDIATE DISTRESS, STRENGTHEN SELF-INITIATIVE BY HELP FOR SELF-HELP, INTRODUCE A RECOVERY OF ECONOMY FROM ITS ROOTS, ENCOURAGE THE POPULATION AND PROMOTE NOT LEAST POLAND'S INDEPENDENCY.

TALKS BETWEEN EPISCOPACY AND GOVERNMENT AT TOP LEVEL AS WELL AS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL HAVE LED TO THE FOLLOWING RESULT: THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT IMPEDE SUCH A CHURCH-INITIATED AND -SUPPORTED ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR THE SAID PRIVATE-ENTERPRISE SECTOR. THE POLISH BISHOPS HAVE CAUSE FOR BEING CONVINCED THAT EVEN IN THE CASE OF A TAKE-OVER BY THE "DOCTRINARIAN FORCES" PRIVATE AGRICULTURE WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST AND THE PLANNED ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WILL BE CARRIED ON. ALONG WITH EXPERTS THE BISHOPS HAVE PLANNED THE OUTLINES OF SUCH AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, WHICH SEEMS TO BE APPROPRIATE TO GIVE IMMEDIATE IMPULSE TO THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PRIVATE ECONOMY IN POLAND; A PROGRAM THAT AT THE MOST CAN BE UNDERSTOOD AS AN INDIRECT AID TO THE

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SYSTEM, FOR WHICH, HOWEVER, DUE TO THE NOBLER GOAL AIMED AT,  
THE POLISH EPISCOPACY CONSIDERS ITSELF ABLE TO ASSUME  
RESPONSIBILITY. END TEXT.

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 5376 DTG: 170926Z JUL 82 PSN: 007794  
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TAGS: PEPR, PINT, ECON, EAID, GE  
SUBJECT: POLISH EPISCOPATE ECONOMIC PROPOSALS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE AMBASSADOR HAS RECEIVED AN ADVANCE COPY OF A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM JOSEPH CARDINAL HOFFNER, PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN BISHOPS' CONFERENCE. IT RECALLS HOFFNER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT AT THE PRE-NATO SUMMIT DINNER IN BRUEHL JUNE 9 ABOUT THE CARDINAL'S VISIT TO POLAND IN MAY AND THE CONCERNS OF THE POLISH PRIMATE, ARCHBISHOP GLEMP, ABOUT THE SITUATION THERE. IT CONVEYS A REQUEST FROM THE PRIMATE AND THE POLISH EPISCOPATE FOR A LIFTING OF SANCTIONS THAT IMPINGE ON THE PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN POLAND AND FOR A FIVE-YEAR "POLAND RECOVERY PLAN" TO AID PRIVATE AGRICULTURE. THE MATERIAL WAS PRESENTED TO THE AMBASSADOR JULY 15 PREPARATORY TO A MEETING THE NEXT AFTERNOON ARRANGED BY CDU BUNDESTAG FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN MERTES FOR DR. HOMEYER OF THE GERMAN BISHOPS' CONFERENCE AND FATHER ALOJZY ORSZULIK OF THE POLISH EPISCOPATE INFOR-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MATION OFFICE. ORSZULIK IS CURRENTLY ON A MISSION FOR THE PRIMATE TO SOUND OUT EC COUNTRIES AND THE U.S. CONCERNING THE PRIMATE'S REQUEST. DR. HOMEYER REQUESTED THAT WE TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT CARDINAL HOFFNER'S LETTER AND THE MATERIAL FROM THE POLISH EPISCOPATE. WE EXPECT THE SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THE CARDINAL'S LETTER ON MONDAY AND WILL POUCH IT AND THE ACCOMPANYING MATERIAL TO THE DEPARTMENT WITH COPIES TO EMBASSY WARSAW. MEANWHILE, WE SUMMARIZE BELOW THE EPISCOPATE PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.

3. FATHER ORSZULIK, CHIEF OF THE POLISH EPISCOPATE INFORMATION OFFICE, HAS PROVIDED TO THE GERMAN BISHOPS TWO PAPERS SEVEN AND TWELVE PAGES LONG, RESPECTIVELY, FROM THE EPISCOPATE. THEY ARE ENTITLED "ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND-AND REFLECTIONS OF THE POLISH EPISCOPATE

CONCERNING AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE AGRICULTURE AND THE ECONOMIC FIELDS CONNECTED THEREWITH (HANDICRAFT, TRADE AND SERVICES)"AND "ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE AGRICULTURE AND THE PRIVATE-ENTERPRISE SECTORS THEREWITH IN HANDICRAFT, TRADE AND SERVICE." THEY HAVE BEEN RENDERED INTO ADEQUATE ENGLISH.

4. ESSENTIALLY, ORSZULIK'S MISSION IS TO SOUND OUT THE EC COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES, PRESUMABLY THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DISPENSING WITH SANCTIONS THAT IMPINGE ON PRIVATE AGRICULTURE IN POLAND AND PARTICIPATING IN A LONG-TERM RELIEF PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION THERE.

5. THE FIRST PAPER DESCRIBES THE SITUATION IN POLAND IN FAMILIAR TERMS, EMPHASIZING THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH AS SET FORTH IN AN EPISCOPATE COMMUNIQUE IN MARCH 1982 AND ELABORATED IN "THESES" OF THE PRIMATE'S SOCIAL COUNCIL. CLAIMING SUPPORT FROM SOLIDARITY AND CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS LEADERS INCLUDING WALESZA, BUT NOTING THE EPISCOPATE'S "CRITICAL" VIEW OF EXTREMISM IN SOME SOLIDARITY QUARTERS, THE PAPER CALLS FOR DIALOGUE INSTEAD OF VIOLENCE AND RESTORATION OF SOLIDARITY ON THE BASIS OF ITS "VALID STATUS."

6. OUTLINING IN SOME DETAIL THE POLISH EPISCOPATE'S ATTITUDE ON WESTERN SANCTIONS, THE PAPER STRESSES

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT, IF AT ALL, THESE SANCTIONS SHOULD BE AIMED AT THOSE WARSAW PACT STATES WHICH INTERFERED MOST "HEAVILY" IN POLISH INTERNAL AFFAIRS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE POLISH REGIME. THE PAPER ALSO EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON THE POLISH PEOPLE AND ASSERTS THAT THE SANCTIONS "DELAY AND AGGRAVATE" THE SOLUTION OF THE POLISH CRISIS. CONCLUDING WITH AN EXPRESSION OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE "POLITICAL FORCES" IN THE WEST OPPOSING LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, THE PAPER EMPHASIZES THE BISHOPS' RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE AND THEIR DUTY "TO ADVOCATE EMPHATICALLY" THE LIFTING OF THOSE SANCTIONS WHICH "STRIKE POLAND'S PRIVATE ECONOMY," ESPECIALLY AGRICULTURE. IT THEN ASSERTS THE NEED FOR AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE-SECTOR AGRICULTURE,

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BY CHS, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 7/19 5376  
SIT522 DATE 07/19/82

DTG: 170931Z JUL 82 PSN: 008223  
TOR: 198/1955Z

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHOL #5376/02 1980932  
O 170931Z JUL 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8558

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DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS TO EMBASSY WARSAW AND  
EC COLLECTIVEO  
NOTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY INDICATED IT  
WOULD NOT IMPEDE SUCH A CHURCH-INITIATED AND-SUPPORTED  
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

7. THE SECOND PAPER OUTLINES THE CONCEPT AND AIMS  
OF THE PROPOSED ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, THE HISTORICAL  
PROBLEMS OF AGRICULTURE IN POLAND, AND THE STRATEGY  
ENVISAGED IN THE PROPOSED PROGRAM. IT INCLUDES A  
COST ESTIMATE FOR A FIVE-YEAR EFFORT.

-

8. NOTING THAT 80 PERCENT OF POLAND'S FARMLAND IS  
PRIVATELY OWNED, THE PAPER DISCUSSES THE NEED FOR  
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND OUTLINES THE WAYS IN WHICH  
FINANCIAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE COULD BE USED TO  
REFORM THE AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM. ON THE SUBJECT OF  
MONEY, THE PAPER ENVISAGES A REQUIREMENT FOR ABOUT  
5 BILLION GERMAN MARKS FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. IT  
PROPOSES THREE SOURCES IN THE WEST: THE CHURCHES,  
THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE EC  
COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES, NOTING THAT PERHAPS  
ONE-QUARTER OF THE NECESSARY FUNDS COULD COME FROM  
THE CHURCH, ANOTHER QUARTER FROM PRIVATE SOURCES,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND THE REMAINING HALF FROM THE GOVERNMENTS.  
CONCERNING THE LAST, THE PAPER RECALLS AS A POSSIBLE  
MODEL THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM, AND SPECIFICALLY  
CALLS FOR A KIND OF CHURCH-ORGANIZED "POLAND RECOVERY  
PROGRAM."

9. THE BALANCE OF THIS PAPER ADDRESSES DETAILS  
CONCERNING THE PROBLEMS OF POLISH AGRICULTURE AND  
THE WAYS IN WHICH REFORMS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

10. COMMENT: THIS OFFICIAL REQUEST FROM THE POLISH  
EPISCOPATE FOR EVEN A LIMITED LIFTING OF SANCTIONS  
AGAINST POLAND SEEMS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT. IT COULD  
BE DIFFICULT TO IGNORE, AND WE SUSPECT IT WILL TEND TO  
ENCOURAGE PRESSURE FROM THE FRG AND ELSEWHERE FOR A  
RELAXATION IN U.S. AND WESTERN POLICY. BURNS

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8514

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WPC HAS SEEN

NODIS

FOR ACTING SECRETARY STDESSEL FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 7/15/12 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M  
TAGS: GE, EEWT, ENRG, US  
SUBJECT: RELAXATION IN POLAND AND THE SANCTIONS QUESTION

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)  
2. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS RECENTLY THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT MAY ANNOUNCE SOME LIBERALIZATION OF ITS REPRESSIVE MEASURES, TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE JULY 22ND ANNIVERSARY. SOME, PARTICULARLY IN THE PRESS, HAVE GONE ON TO SPECULATE THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD THE U.S. TO RECONSIDER ITS PIPELINE SANCTIONS AND THAT A TOTAL OR PARTIAL RELAXATION OF THESE MEASURES MIGHT ENSUE.

3. ANY SUCH RESPONSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH THE UTMOST CARE. THERE IS THE OBVIOUS DANGER THAT POLISH LIBERALIZATION, IF INDEED IT COMES, WILL CONSIST ONLY OF A FEW COSMETIC IMPROVEMENTS, INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF A HANDFUL OF PROMINENT INTERNEES, WHILE BEHIND IT THE REPRESSIVE MECHANISM REMAINS ESSENTIALLY INTACT. MY REAL CONCERN, HOWEVER, GOES BEYOND THIS OBVIOUS

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BY CJS, NARA, DATE 4/30/01



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PAGE 02

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PITFALL AND PRESUPPOSES THAT THERE MAY BE SOME GENUINE LIGHTENING OF THE BURDEN THE POLISH PEOPLE MUST BEAR, FALLING SHORT, HOWEVER, OF THE THREE PRE-REQUISITES THE ALLIES HAVE AGREED ON FOR A RESUMPTION OF NORMAL RELATIONS. IN SUCH A CASE, OUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO RESPOND BY RELAXING THE SANCTIONS DECISIONS.

4. IF WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH SUCH A SITUATION, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY. MY POINT IS MORAL AND POLITICAL. WE HAVE THUS FAR INSISTED THAT WE WILL RETAIN THE SANCTIONS UNTIL THE POLISH GOVERNMENT RESTORES A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE IT PURPORTS TO GOVERN. IF WE NOW SETTLED FOR MUCH LESS THAN FULL RESTORATION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, WE WOULD BE CONDONING THOSE ELEMENTS OF REPRESSION THAT STILL REMAIN. SUCH A COURSE WOULD UNDERMINE OUR MORAL POSITION AND IT MIGHT WEAKEN OUR POLITICAL POSITION, BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD AS WELL.

5. AS YOU KNOW, THE SANCTIONS DECISION HAS TROUBLED OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES GREATLY AND I AM HOPEFUL THAT WITH TIME WE WILL BE ABLE TO PUT IT BEHIND US. I HAVE ALREADY HAD SOMETHING TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT, AND I EXPECT TO SAY MORE WHEN I RETURN HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS. FOR THE PRESENT, MY POINT IS SOLELY THAT WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS AND AVOID FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF CONDONING, OR APPEARING TO CONDONE, THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT MAY STILL RETAIN.

6. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH JUDGE CLARK. BURNS

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 # 157  
BY DTS  
NARA, DATE 4/31/11

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0943  
SIT799 DATE 07/19/82

DTG: 100356Z JUL 82 PSN: 054929  
TOR: 191/0619Z

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/9/2002 (EAGLEBURGER, L. S.)

TAGS: PEPR, LE, IS, GE, EG, JO

TO HIS VISIT TO AMMAN AND CAIRO

REF: (A) BONN 14438

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FRG AMBASSADOR PETER HERMES CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER JULY 8 TO OBTAIN BRIEFING ON LEBANON. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER OUTLINED US OBJECTIVES IN BEIRUT AND LEBANON AND DISCUSSED AMBASSADOR HABIB'S EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE THE PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. FRG AMBASSADOR HERMES INFORMED UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER PLANNED TO VISIT AMMAN AND CAIRO JULY 12-15 AND HAD REQUESTED A SPECIAL BRIEFING ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER EXPLAINED THAT US POLICY REMAINS THE SAME; THAT IS, WE REGRET THE ISRAELI INVASION, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE

LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. IT ALSO OFFERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. IN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST POLICY THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM REMAINS TO BE SOLVED. THE US IS COMMITTED TO PURSUING THIS THROUGH THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AS QUICKLY AS

4. EAGLEBURGER TOLD HERMES THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB MEETS WITH PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN JULY 9 TO CONTINUE HIS NEGOTIATIONS. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT THE CROSSING POINTS WHICH HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR FIVE DAYS WOULD, ON JULY 9, ONCE AGAIN BE OPEN. PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS SIGNALLED BY ARAFAT'S SIGNING A DOCUMENT TO PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN SAYING THAT THE PLO AGREES TO LEAVE BEIRUT. SINCE THE SIGNING OF THIS DOCUMENT THE LEBANESE AND PLO REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN MEETING TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF SUCH A WITHDRAWAL.

5. EAGLEBURGER ALSO NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS APPEAR TO HAVE AGREED TO ACCEPT ALL PLO FORCES NOW IN BEIRUT. IT IS UNCLEAR HOW ANY SECONDARY MOVEMENTS FROM SYRIA WOULD UNFOLD NOR IS IT CLEAR HOW THE PLO WOULD MOVE FROM BEIRUT TO SYRIA. FOR THE MOVE FROM BEIRUT TO SYRIA THERE ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES--ONE BY SEA TO LATAKIA OR BY LAND DIRECTLY INTO SYRIA. THE LEBANESE HAVE INFORMED THE US THAT THEY WANTED OUTSIDE MILITARY FORCES TO ASSIST IN THIS EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT (ESPECIALLY IN TURNING OVER HEAVY WEAPONS) AND TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN TAKING OVER CONTROL OF THE CITY. THE GOL SPECIFIED TO US THAT IT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WANT A UN FORCE, BUT WOULD ACCEPT A

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MULTINATIONAL FORCE INCLUDING US MILITARY.

6. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE FRENCH THEIR PARTICIPATION IN A BI-NATIONAL FORCE TO ASSIST IN THE EVACUATION OF BEIRUT. HE NOTED THAT CHEYSSON TOLD SECRETARY HAIG LAST FRIDAY THAT FRANCE WOULD CONTRIBUTE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT SINCE THEN THE FRENCH HAVE NOT MOVED FORWARD WITH ANY SPECIFIC AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE INSTEAD RAISED DEMANDS TRADING OFF THE REDUCTION IN PLO MILITARY FORCE FOR PLO POLITICAL POWER WHICH THE US CANNOT ACCEPT. EAGLEBURGER WAS HOPEFUL THAT POSSIBILITIES EXIST TO ASSIST THE PLO IN WITHDRAWING FROM BEIRUT. THE FRENCH CAN DRAW A BATTALION FROM THEIR UNIFIL FORCES STILL IN LEBANON OR MAY MOVE A RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE FROM FRANCE. HOWEVER, WE STILL HAVE NO FRENCH COMMITMENT. FURTHERMORE, THE FRENCH WANT A UN BLESSING WHICH WE

BELIEVE IS UNATTAINABLE BECAUSE OF CERTAIN SOVIET OPPOSITION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE DO, HOWEVER, PLAN TO INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF OUR PLANS AND INVITE UN OBSERVERS.

7. IN RESPONSE TO HERMES' QUESTION ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS IN THE NORTH OF LEBANON, EAGLEBURGER SAID THIS WAS A DISCUSSION TOPIC FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB. EAGLEBURGER STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE US FOCUS IS ON THE EVACUATION OF PLO FROM BEIRUT AND NOT ON THE PALESTINIANS IN THE NORTH.

8. EAGLEBURGER EXPLAINED THAT FOLLOWING THE BEIRUT OPERATION, ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL SHOULD FOLLOW IN A SEPARATE, SECOND PHASE. THIS PHASE WOULD INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. WE WILL BE WORKING WITH THE GOL ON THIS ASPECT OF THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL.

9. AS REGARDS BREZHNEV'S LETTER, EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE RICHARD BURT NOTED THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WAS Milder THAN PREVIOUS RESPONSES AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONTAINED NO SPECIFIC THREATS OF COUNTERACTIONS. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT IN COMPARISON TO THE 1973 CONFRONTATION, THE SOVIETS' RESPONSE WAS INDEED VERY MILD.

10. HERMES ENDED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHEK HAD ASKED THAT HE STRESS THAT THE FRG SUPPORTS THE US INITIATIVE IN LEBANON. EAGLEBURGER RESPONDED THAT WE APPRECIATED THIS FIRST SIGN OF EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR OUR ENDEAVOR IN LEBANON AND ASKED THAT OUR THANKS BE CONVEYED TO GENSCHEK.

11. BURT WILL CONTACT HERMES MORNING OF SATURDAY, JULY 10 TO GIVE HIM ANY LAST MINUTE INFORMATION WHICH WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHEK TO HAVE AS HE SETS OUT ON HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP. STOESEL

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
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DATE 07/19/82

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TOR: 181/1912Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #4131 1811657  
R 301657Z JUN 82 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8150

~~SECRET~~ BONN 14131

NODIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY  
PLEASE PASS JUDGE CLARK  
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 6/30/12 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M  
TAGS: ENRG, EEWT, ETRD, EEC, US  
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO U. S. TRADE SANCTIONS  
REF: LONDON 13959

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE~~ TEXT).
2. AS I HAVE INDICATED IN A PREVIOUS COMMUNICATION, I SHARE AMBASSADOR LOUIS' CONCERN (REFTEL). I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE EUROPEANS TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MIGHT LEAD US TO LIFT THE EMBARGO ON PIPE LINE EQUIPMENT. I HAVE SOME REASON FOR HOPING THAT THE GERMANS AT LEAST WILL DO THAT.
3. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO EMBASSY LONDON AND OTHER EMBASSIES AS APPROPRIATE. BURNS

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BY CTS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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BY CAJ NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7999

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NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

PLEASE PASS SECRETARY REGAN AND JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 6/25/12 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) DR-M  
TAGS: GE, EEAT, ENRG, US  
SUBJECT: PIPELINE SANCTIONS AND SOVIET CREDITS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH TO THE BUNDESTAG IN WHICH HE REACTED TO THE EXTENSION OF SANCTIONS RELATED TO THE SOVIET PIPELINE, I MET WITH ECONOMICS MINISTER COUNT LAMBSDORFF TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND FUTURE ACTION THAT WE AND THE EUROPEANS MIGHT TAKE. I BEGAN OUR TALK BY OUTLINING WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE FACTORS THAT LED TO THE DECISION TO EXTEND THE SANCTIONS ON PIPELINE EQUIPMENT. I DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN MY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE DECISION AND MY INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MOTIVATIONS.

3. I REVIEWED WITH LAMBSDORFF WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE PRESIDENT'S IMPRESSION OF THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT. ON ONE

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HAND, A U.S. WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE SOME EUROPEAN CONCERNS ON TECHNOLOGY, NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, AND INTERVENTION IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS; AND ON THE OTHER HAND, USEFUL BUT QUITE LIMITED ACCOMMODATION, ON THE PART OF THE EUROPEANS WITH REGARD TO CREDITS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. I STRESSED THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG INTEREST IN THE CREDIT ISSUE AND HIS BELIEF THAT THE EUROPEANS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREDIT RESTRAINTS AND THE VARIOUS SANCTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE PIPELINE EQUIPMENT EMBARGO. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT, AND NOT HE ALONE, MUST HAVE BEEN DISMAYED BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S RECKLESS REMARKS AFTER THE SUMMIT, STRESSING THAT THOSE REMARKS NOT ONLY MISINTERPRETED AMERICAN OBJECTIVES BUT ALSO REPUDIATED THE LIMITED PROMISE OF THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE ON RESTRAINTS OF SOVIET CREDIT. I ALSO INFORMED LAMBSUORFF THAT, WHILE IN BONN, THE PRESIDENT EXPLICITLY ASKED BOTH GENSCHER AND SCHMIDT TO HELP HIM FIND A POLITICAL HANDLE THAT HE COULD USE TO RESCIND THE PIPELINE SANCTIONS ADOPTED LAST DECEMBER. IN VIEW OF THIS BACKGROUND, I SAID THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED HE HAD NOT RECEIVED THE HELP FROM EUROPEANS, PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH, TO WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED. IN HIS MIND, THE EUROPEANS HAD VIRTUALLY IGNORED HIS NEED FOR THE POLITICAL HANDLE HE NEEDED ON THE CREDITS ISSUE TO JUSTIFY ACCOMMODATING THEIR CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO EQUIPMENT FOR THE PIPELINE.

4. I SAID I HAD REVIEWED THOSE PORTIONS OF THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH (WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS REPORTED SEPARATELY) DEALING WITH THE SANCTIONS ISSUE AND THAT I FOUND THEM TO BE "COOL" AND RESPONSIBLE. I URGED LAMBSUORFF TO IMPRESS ON HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE GOVERNMENT THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THIS TONE AND TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS. I SAID I PARTICULARLY HOPED THE GERMANS WOULD TAKE THIS LINE AT

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THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL NEXT WEEK, AND TRY TO PERSUADE OTHER EC MEMBERS (FRANCE IN PARTICULAR) TO TEMPER THEIR RHETORIC AS WELL. I STRESSED THAT RETALIATORY ACTION, OR EVEN HINTS OF SUCH ACTION, MUST BE AVOIDED. I CONCLUDED THAT THE PIPELINE PROBLEM MUST AND CAN ONLY BE WORKED OUT AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL, AND THAT I HOPED HE WOULD SHARE THESE VIEWS.

5. LAMBSDORFF THANKED ME FOR MY ANALYSIS AND FOR COMING TO HIM. HE SUGGESTED I NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE PRESIDENT'S IMAGE IN EUROPE BY THE PIPELINE DECISION, COMING AS IT DID IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MASTERFUL SPEECHES IN THE BUNDESTAG AND BERLIN. HE BELIEVED THAT THE PIPELINE DECISION HAD REKINDLED EARLIER CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST-WEST TRADE.

6. HE FURTHER NOTED THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FOLLOWING PRESS AND OTHER REPORTS COMING FROM WASHINGTON ON THE PIPELINE DEBATE. HE SAID BONN HAD FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT ANTI-PIPELINE SENTIMENT HAD MODERATED IN RECENT WEEKS AND THEREFORE WAS SURPRISED BY THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. HE DEPLORED THE LACK OF CONSULTATION OR EVEN OF ADVANCE WARNING. THE LACK OF CONSULTATIONS ASIDE, HE BELIEVED THE EUROPEANS HAD MADE AN EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE U.S. CONCERNS ON CREDITS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE EFFORT HAD PERHAPS BEEN INSUFFICIENT, BUT IT WAS AT LEAST A BEGINNING, WHICH WE SHOULD NOT DISCOUNT, AND HE EXPLICITLY DEPLORED MITTERRAND'S POST-SUMMIT BLAST ON THE CREDIT ISSUE.

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BY CAI, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 80NN 13754

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

PLEASE PASS SECRETARY REGAN AND JUDGE CLARK

7. LAMBSDORFF OBSERVED THAT HE FELT THE IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN FIRMS RESULTING FROM THE SANCTIONS COULD BE SOLVED, BUT THAT HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. LAW, INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING CONTRACTS, AND THE EFFECT OF SUCH ACTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR WERE OF SERIOUS CONCERN. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SANCTIONS WOULD STOP THE PIPELINE, OR ALTER THE SITUATION IN POLAND.

8. LAMBSDORFF AGREED WITH ME THAT ONLY VERY HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS OFFERED A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. HE SAID THE FIRST AREA OF CONSIDERATION OUGHT TO BE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SANCTIONS TO THOSE TURBINE PARTS WHICH HAD BEEN EXPORTED TO EUROPE PRIOR TO THE DECEMBER 29 DECISION. PERMITTING THE EXPORT TO THE SOVIET UNION OF TURBINES USING THESE PARTS WOULD HELP TO ALLEVIATE THE HARDSHIP CAUSED BY THE SANCTIONS DECISION, AND WOULD GIVE US TIME TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE ON BOTH CREDITS AND THE PIPELINE.

SECRET



Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

BONN 13754 02 OF 02 251602Z

9. LAMBSDORFF SAID HE WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON ON JULY 20 AND 21 AND WOULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE AT THAT TIME. I URGED HIM TO DO THIS AND IN THE INTERIM TO TRY AND SECURE THE AGREEMENT OF THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT THE POLITICAL HANDLE HE NEEDS TO RECONSIDER THE PIPELINE DECISION. I ADDED THAT SOME POSITIVE MOVEMENT ON THE CREDIT ISSUE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. FINALLY, I INFORMED LAMBSDORFF THAT I WOULD BE BACK IN WASHINGTON ON JULY 21, AND WE AGREED TO TRY TO MEET FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AT THAT TIME.

10. LATER IN THE DAY, OTTO VON DER GABLENTZ CALLED AT MY OFFICE, AND I REPEATED WHAT I HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD LAMBSDORFF.  
BURNS

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 5324 DTG: 241153Z JUN 82 PSN: 032891  
SIT660 DATE 06/26/82 TOR: 175/1329Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WNSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #5324 1751204  
O P 241153Z JUN 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2142

INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 7337  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0710  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175324

NODIS  
GENEVA FOR USINF, BONN ALSO FOR BURT/WARD  
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/23/92 (NILES, THOMAS M. T.)  
TAGS: PARM, INF  
SUBJECT: INF: FRG ALTERNATIVES TO "ZERO/ZERO"

REF: GENEVA 5812 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON FRINGES OF DIRECTOR ROSTOW'S JUNE 4 NAC BRIEFING, AMBASSADOR NITZE SPOKE WITH FRED RUTH ON INF. RUTH'S MAIN POINT WAS THAT WE SHOULD NOT SHOW OURSELVES TO BE LOCKED IN TO THE "ZERO/ZERO" PROPOSAL; WHILE IT WAS AN OPTIMUM OUTCOME, A SOVIET PROPOSAL OF 100 LRINF SYSTEMS ON EACH SIDE WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE.

3. WE WANT TO DISCOURAGE RUTH FROM RAISING THIS IDEA IN THE SCG. ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY BONN SHOULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONTACT RUTH, NOTE THAT HE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH SCG CHAIRMAN BURT BEFORE THE JUNE 30 MEETING, AND ASK THAT RUTH ENSURE THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE NOT AIRED MORE WIDELY IN THE SCG, WITH OTHER ALLIES OR IN PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS.

4. EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS TO RUTH AND APPROPRIATE CHANCELLERY OFFICIALS OUR CONCERN OVER REMARK ATTRIBUTED TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT BY JOSEPH KRAFT IN COLUMN ENTITLED "THE FRUITS OF THE GRAND TOUR" WHICH APPEARED IN JJNE 17 WASHINGTON POST (WE UNDERSTAND IT ALSO APPEARED IN INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE). RELEVANT PORTION OF COLUMN FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, WHOM I SAW IN NEW YORK AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT IN BONN, WAS AS MITTERRAND PREDICTED "ON THE SAME WAVE LENGTH." SCHMIDT REFERRED TO THE AMERICAN PREFERENCE FOR ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER AS AN "OPENING POSITION." THE CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT, IN TIME, THE WEST GERMANS WOULD RENOUNCE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES, IF THE RUSSIANS AGREED TO CUT DOWN THE NUMBER OF SS-20S IN EUROPE TO ABOUT 75. SCHMIDT SUGGESTED THAT EVENTUALLY THE UNITED STATES WOULD WANT TO MERGE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WITH THOSE ON INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES.

END TEXT.

S. EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT SUCH PUBLIC COMMENTS -- IF TRUE -- TEND TO UNDERMINE US NEGOTIATING POSITION CALLING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, A POSITION WHICH WAS DEVELOPED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH AND AGREED TO BY THE ALLIES.

HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 5324

DTG: 241153Z JUN 82 PSN: 032891

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON FRINGES OF DIRECTOR ROSTOW'S JUNE 4 NAC BRIEFING, AMBASSADOR NITZE SPOKE WITH FRED RUTH ON INF. RUTH'S MAIN POINT WAS THAT WE SHOULD NOT SHOW OURSELVES TO BE LOCKED IN TO THE "ZERO/ZERO" PROPOSAL; WHILE IT WAS AN OPTIMUM OUTCOME, A SOVIET PROPOSAL OF 100 LRINF SYSTEMS ON EACH SIDE WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE.

3. WE WANT TO DISCOURAGE RUTH FROM RAISING THIS IDEA IN THE SCG. ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY BONN SHOULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONTACT RUTH, NOTE THAT HE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH SCG CHAIRMAN BURT BEFORE THE JUNE 30 MEETING, AND ASK THAT RUTH ENSURE THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE NOT AIRED MORE WIDELY IN THE SCG, WITH OTHER ALLIES OR IN PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS.

4. EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS TO RUTH AND APPROPRIATE CHANCELLERY OFFICIALS OUR CONCERN OVER REMARK ATTRIBUTED TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT BY JOSEPH KRAFT IN COLUMN ENTITLED "THE FRUITS OF THE GRAND TOUR" WHICH APPEARED IN JJNE 17 WASHINGTON POST (WE UNDERSTAND IT ALSO APPEARED IN INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE). RELEVANT PORTION OF COLUMN FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #141  
BY CAJ, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                      BONN 3519                      DTG: 231543Z JUN 82 PSN: 031552  
SIT661                      DATE 06/28/82                      TOR: 174/1707Z

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #3519 1741544  
O 231543Z JUN 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7905

~~SECRET~~ BONN 13519  
NODIS  
DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE  
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 6/23/02 (WOESSNER, W. M.) OR-M  
TAGS: MNUC, MPOL, GE  
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY  
REF: STATE 163092 (DTG 141445Z JUN 82)

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. DCM MADE POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL TO VON DER GABLENTZ, THE PRINCIPAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, JUNE 22 STRESSING THE SENSITIVITY OF OUR APPROACH. VON DER GABLENTZ REPLIED THAT HE WOULD INFORM THE CHANCELLOR OF OUR CONCERNS AND ENSURE THAT THERE WAS FOLLOWUP BY THE RESPONSIBLE FRG MINISTRIES. HE SAID THAT AT LAST WEEK'S CABINET MEETING THE CHANCELLOR HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT AFTER ITS DEBACLE IN LEBANON THE PLO WOULD RESORT TO TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EUROPE, AND THAT GERMAN TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE REVOLUNTIONARY CELLS AND THE RED ARMY FACTION, WHICH HAD CLOSE TIES TO THE PLO, WOULD AGAIN BECOME ACTIVE. VON DER GABLENTZ SAID THAT THE FRG WOULD, OF COURSE, SHARE WITH US ANY INFORMATION IT ACQUIRES WITH REGARD TO THREATS TO US NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS. BURNS

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #142  
BY O/S, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 3207 DTG: 181556Z JUN 82 PSN: 024813  
SIT664 DATE 06/28/82 TOR: 169/16512

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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BONN 3207

DTG: 181556Z JUN 82 PSN: 024813

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #3207 1691557  
O 181556Z JUN 82 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7787

~~SECRET~~ BONN 13207

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 6/18/02 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, AF, UR, US

SUBJ: BRIEFING ALLIES ON U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON

AFGHANISTAN--THE FRG

REF: (A) STATE 166452

1. ~~(8)~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE BRIEFED DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS  
BUERGER ON JUNE 18. HE EXPRESSED THANKS AND SAID HIS  
OFFICE WOULD INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER BUT WILL  
WAIT UNTIL NEXT WEEK WHEN IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO INCLUDE  
A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE SECRETARY'S  
JUNE 18 DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN WITH FOREIGN MINISTER  
GROMYKO. BUERGER ASKED THAT WE PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION  
IF WE CAN.

3. BUERGER FURTHER OBSERVED THAT IT IS GOOD THAT THE  
U.S.-SOVIET TALKS WOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. IF OTHERS  
GOT WIND OF THE TALKS, THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO RELAX  
THEIR OWN EFFORTS. BUERGER REFERRED TO ISLAMIC COUNTRIES  
SOME OF WHICH, HE BELIEVES, HAVE ALREADY SHOWN A TENDENCY  
TO SIT BACK AND DO NOTHING BECAUSE OF THE TALKS JUST  
BEGUN IN GENEVA. BUERGER EXPRESSED A NEED TO FIND  
WAYS TO ENCOURAGE SUCH COUNTRIES TO CONTINUE THE PRESSURE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. HE POINTED IN THIS CONTEXT TO THE  
RECENT RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE BUNDESTAG (REPORTED SEPAR-  
ATELY), NOTING THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD SENT IT TO FRG  
POSTS ABROAD TO USE AS THEY COULD IN ENCOURAGING OTHER  
COUNTRIES.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE PROVIDE RESULTS OF SECRETARY'S  
MEETING WITH GROMYKO THAT WE CAN CONVEY TO FOREIGN  
OFFICE.

BURNS

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F97-030/2-#143

BY GAJ

NARA, DATE

4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 3092 DTG:141445Z JUN 82 PSN: 017706  
SIT901 DATE 07/19/82 TOR: 165/1527Z

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SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUEHC #3092 1651525

P R 141445Z JUN 82 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 1667

INFO USMISSION USNATO 0489

WHITE HOUSE RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE 7724

USMR SHAPE

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 163092

NODIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065 RDS-01 06-11-02 (HOWE, JONATHAN T.)

TAGS: MNUC, MPOL, GE

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY

REF: (A) STATE 126375 (B) BONN 10708

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AS RECOMMENDED IN REFTEL B, EMBASSY SHOULD APPROACH APPROPRIATE FRG OFFICIALS AT YOUR DISCRETION TO UNDERScore US CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS OR TERRORIST INCIDENTS AT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SITES IN THE FRG AND THE NEED TO UNDERTAKE ALL REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS TO DEAL WITH THESE THREATS.

3. IN THE CONTEXT OF CONCERNS AND CAUTIONS EXPRESSED IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REFTEL A, EMBASSY SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE MOST RECENT ATTACKS ON US FACILITIES COULD BE A PRELUDE TO ANTI-NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE THIS SUMMER.

-- OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT A DISSIDENT/TERRORIST GROUP MIGHT INSPIRE OR USE AN ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION AT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS SITE AS A COVER FOR A

PREPLANNED ATTACK. EVEN IF THE ATTACK SUBSEQUENTLY FAILED OR WAS ABANDONED, THE ADVERSE PUBLIC AND POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM THE DEMONSTRATION ALONE COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE FUTURE OF THE NATO NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

-- YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT SHOULD WE OBTAIN ANY

EVIDENCE OF A SPECIFIC THREAT TO THE NUCLEAR SITES, YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY.

-- FOR OUR PART, THE US HAS THOROUGHLY REVIEWED ITS CONTINGENCY PLANS AND HAS, WHERE NECESSARY, TAKEN APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY AT NUCLEAR SITES.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO ENSURE THAT JOINT PLANS AND PROGRAMS FOR RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS AT NUCLEAR SITES, INCLUDING THOSE DEALING WITH PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ARE FULLY IN ORDER.

-- ALSO IN THIS REGARD, WE ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE TIMELY DISSEMINATION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT STEPS WE CAN UNDERTAKE JOINTLY TO ENSURE NUCLEAR SITE PERSONNEL ARE AS PREPARED AS POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH POTENTIAL TERRORIST THREATS.

4. EMBASSY COULD ALSO OFFER TO ARRANGE BRIEFINGS FOR APPROPRIATE SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED US CONTINGENCY PLANNING. THE US EUROPEAN COMMAND, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR SECURITY ISSUES WITH INTERESTED FRG OFFICIALS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S VIEWS REGARDING FRG OFFICIALS' REACTIONS NOTED DURING THE DISCUSSION, TO INCLUDE ANY ACTIONS WHICH HOST GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE MOVED TO UNDERTAKE AS A RESULT.

6. THIS CABLE WAS PREPARED JOINTLY BY STATE AND DEFENSE. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 3092

DTG:141445Z JUN 82 PSN: 017706

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NLS F97-030/2 # 144  
BY GKJ → NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



Department of State

**INCOMING TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ N00428

PAGE 01 BONN 11766 201633Z WPC MCF WLL JP LP EOB

ACTION N003-00

INFO OCT-00 /000 W

-----135733 201634Z /41

O 201620Z MAY 62 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 7234

COPY 1 OF 5 COPIES

~~SECRET~~ BONN 11766

N0018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O. 12865: XDS-1 5/29/12 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M

TAGS: PPDC 06

**UBJECT: LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS**

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS HAS WRITTEN THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. PLEASE BE GOOD ENOUGH TO TRANSMIT IT TO THE PRESIDENT AND INFORM MR. WICK OF ITS CONTENTS. SIGNED ORIGINAL, DATED MAY 26, 1962, WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH.

3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

-- MY POLITICAL FRIENDS AND I ARE LOOKING FORWARD WITH PLEASURE AND SATISFACTION TO YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. THE MAJORITY OF THE GERMAN POPULATION CONSIDERS YOUR VISIT TO BONN TO BE A SPECIAL TOKEN OF THE CLOSE TIES OF FRIENDSHIP

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 197-030/2 # 147

BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

N0018  
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N0018  
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N0018  
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Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

BONN 11766 201633Z

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OUR COUNTRY.

-- AS I HAVE ALREADY INFORMED YOU ON THE OCCASION OF MY LAST VISIT TO WASHINGTON, THE CHRISTIAN-SOCIAL UNION AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION WILL CALL UPON THE PUBLIC TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACEFUL AND POWERFUL MANIFESTATIONS ALREADY BEFORE YOUR ARRIVAL ON JUNE 5, 1982. THESE MANIFESTATIONS ARE INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE UNMISTAKABLY THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE UNERRINGLY ADHERES TO THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, AS WELL AS OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR PERMANENT PARTNERSHIP WITHIN NATO.

-- IT IS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE THAT THESE DEMONSTRATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP IN BONN AND MUNICH WILL NOT ONLY BE COVERED BY THE GERMAN MASS MEDIA BUT THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL BECOME AWARE OF HOW SERIOUSLY WE TAKE OUR OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

-- AS I HAVE BEEN INFORMED TODAY, SEVERAL AMERICAN TELEVISION NETWORKS HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR STAFF TO REPORT ON THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST YOUR PRESENCE IN GERMANY ORGANIZED BY LEFTIST FRINGE GROUPS, BUT TO COMPLETELY DISREGARD THE EVENTS ORGANIZED BY CSU AND CDU IN BONN AND MUNICH. THEREFORE I WOULD LIKE TO URGE YOU TO BRING YOUR INFLUENCE TO BEAR -- AS FAR AS YOU CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE AND EXPEDIENT -- THAT ALSO THE PRO-AMERICAN MANIFESTATIONS IN BONN AND MUNICH WILL FIND ADEQUATE COVERAGE IN THE U.S. PRINTED AND BROADCAST MEDIA.

-- WE SHALL CERTAINLY NOT FAIL TO DO OUR UTMOST

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

BONN 11766 291633Z

ALREADY BEFORE YOUR ARRIVAL IN GERMANY TO MAKE YOUR VISIT A POWERFUL AND CONVINCING DEMONSTRATION OF LOYAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS AND OUR DEDICATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

-- LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION AND KEEN INTEREST, I REMAIN, MR, PRESIDENT.

-- YOURS FAITHFULLY,

-- FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS.           END TEXT.   BURNS

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 1423 DTG: 261019Z MAY 82 PSN: 044775  
SIT371 DATE 06/02/82 TOR: 146/1201Z

DURING THEIR VISIT TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS WEEK.  
BURNS

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SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

BONN 1423

DTG: 261019Z MAY 82 PSN: 044775

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #1423 1461019  
O 261019Z MAY 82 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7123

~~SECRET~~ BONN 11423

NODIS  
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS MADRID AND USNATO  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/26/02 (WOESSNER, W.M.) OR-M  
TAGS: NATO, SP, GE  
SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT: SPANISH ACCESSION CEREMONY  
REFS: (A) STATE 137576  
-- (B) STATE 140980  
-- (C) USNATO 03464

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DCM DISCUSSED QUESTION OF SPANISH ACCESSION CEREMONY AT SUMMIT WITH PFEFFER MAY 25 MAKING POINTS CONTAINED REF A. PFEFFER SAID THE GERMANS DID NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF HAVING MITTERRAND STAY OVER FOR A CEREMONY ON JUNE 10 AND THEN LEAVE JUST AS THE SUMMIT MEETING CONVENED. THAT WOULD NOT BE GOOD. THE EVENING OF JUNE 9 WAS ALREADY SO TIGHTLY SCHEDULED THAT A CEREMONY THEN APPEARED TO BE A LOGISTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. IN ANY CASE THERE WOULD BE EXTENSIVE REFERENCES TO SPANISH ACCESSION IN THE SPEECHES SUCH AS THAT OF THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT.

-  
-

3. PFEFFER WENT ON TO SUGGEST, ON A PERSONAL BASIS,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT THE OPENING SUMMIT CEREMONY ON JUNE 10 COULD BE BEEFED UP IN SOME WAY SO AS TO GIVE MORE PROMINENCE TO THE SPANISH. HE WASN'T SURE PRECISELY HOW THIS COULD BE DONE. WE WOULD NEED CONCRETE PROPOSALS WHICH COULD THEN BE DISCUSSED IN NATO CHANNELS.

-  
-  
-

4. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF SEPARATE SUMMIT DOCUMENT ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE PFEFFER SAID THAT PERHAPS SOME OF THE LANGUAGE COULD BE TAKEN UP IN THE COMMUNIQUE ITSELF. HE EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT THE SPANISH MIGHT JOIN THE FRENCH IN ABSTAINING FROM A SEPARATE DOCUMENT. 14 TO 2 WOULD NOT BE GOOD. AMBASSADOR RUTH AND GENERAL TANDESKI WOULD BE ADDRESSING THIS SUBJECT

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #150  
BY CS, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 1664 DTG: 222005Z MAY 82 PSN: 039888  
SIT249 DATE 06/02/82 TOR: 142/2138Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #1664 1422029  
O 222005Z MAY 82 ZFFE  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0629  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9938  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4985  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 7555  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4886  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4266  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6738  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 141664  
NODIS  
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY, USEEC ONLY  
E.O. 12065: RDS 5/22/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)  
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE)  
SUBJECT: SHULTZ MISSION

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GEORGE SHULTZ WAS BACK IN WASHINGTON ON THURSDAY AND I HAD A CHANCE TO HAVE A FEW WORDS WITH HIM ABOUT HIS TRIP. AS YOU MAY KNOW, GEORGE SPENT OVER AN HOUR WITH THE PRESIDENT LAST SATURDAY (THE 15TH), GIVING HIM A VERY COMPLETE REPORT ON THE TRIP.

3. THE CONVERSATIONS GEORGE HAD WITH THE VERSAILLES PARTICIPANTS AND WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY VALUABLE TO THE PRESIDENT AS HE PREPARES FOR HIS EUROPEAN TRIP. I AM CERTAIN THAT GEORGE WAS ALSO ABLE TO PROJECT THE PRESIDENT'S SENSITIVITY AND CONCERN ABOUT THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL HEALTH OF THE ALLIANCE TO HIS INTERLOCUTORS ON YOUR SIDE.

4. GEORGE'S MISSION WAS, IN MY OPINION, HANDLED JUST RIGHT. IT RECEIVED SOME PRESS ATTENTION, BUT WAS NOT PLAYED AS A HIGH-PROFILE ITEM. GEORGE TELLS ME THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ALONG THE WAY WERE PERFECT.

5. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AND YOUR STAFFS FOR AN OUTSTANDING JOB WELL DONE. HAIG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #151  
BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 0980 DTG: 220214Z MAY 82 PSN: 038965  
SIT256 DATE 06/02/82 TOR: 142/0230Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #0980 1420228  
O 220214Z MAY 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0586  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6375

INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9981  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7577  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 140980  
NODIS  
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 05/21/02 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN)  
TAGS: NATO, SP, GE  
SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT: SPANISH ACCESSION CEREMONY

REF: (A) BONN 11112; (B) STATE 137576

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN VIEW OF HIGH LEVEL INTEREST IN USG IN SPANISH ACCESSION CEREMONY AT THE SUMMIT, AND BEARING IN MIND ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLMES' CONVERSATION WITH PFEFFER AT LUXEMBOURG (REF B), REQUEST EMBASSY GO IN AT MORE SENIOR LEVEL (E. G., PFEFFER) TO REINFORCE THE VIEWS CONTAINED REF (A). YOU MAY ALSO ADD AS APPROPRIATE THAT WE DOUBT PORTUGUESE WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS WITH IDEA OF CELEBRATING A NEW NATO MEMBERSHIP AND THAT A SYMBOLIC SEPARATION BETWEEN CEREMONY MARKING SPANISH ENTRY AND FORMAL OPENING OF SUMMIT NEED NOT ADD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SIGNIFICANTLY MORE TIME TO EVENTS OF JUNE 10.

3. FOR MADRID: YOU SHOULD AS APPROPRIATE EMPHASIZE TO THE GOS THAT WE SEE SPANISH ACCESSION CEREMONY AS CENTRAL SUMMIT EVENT, AND ONE THAT WOULD NOT BE

OVERSHADOWED BY OTHER PROCEEDINGS BUT WOULD RATHER DOMINATE THEM. IN LIGHT OF COMMENTS BY AMBASSADOR AGUIRRE CONCERNING JUNE 5 CEREMONY AT EVERE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLEARER READING FROM GOS ON IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THIS CEREMONY. IN THIS DISCUSSION YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE DO NOT WANT ANYTHING TO DETRACT FROM THE IMPACT OF THE SUMMIT EVENT. HAIG

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #152  
BY GTS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 7576 DTG: 200358Z MAY 82 PSN: 036069  
SIT273 DATE 06/02/82 TOR: 140/0642Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7576 1400517  
O 200358Z MAY 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0475  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9926

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4639  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6325  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 137576  
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 05/19/02 (HOLMES H. ALLEN)  
TAGS: NATO, SP  
SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT: SPANISH ACCESSION CEREMONY

REF: (A) USNATO 2774; (B) PARIS 14638

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE IS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SPANISH ACCESSION WILL BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE SUMMIT; THUS IT IS TIME TO BEGIN TO PLAN FOR THE FORMAL CEREMONY WELCOMING SPAIN INTO THE ALLIANCE WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE AT BONN. WE ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THIS CEREMONY, SINCE IT WILL BE A CENTERPIECE OF THE BONN MEETING, SYMBOLIZING THE HEALTH AND VITALITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES WHICH NATO WAS CREATED TO DEFEND.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. FOR BONN: ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLMES RAISED ISSUE OF SPANISH ACCESSION CEREMONY WITH FRG POLITICAL DIRECTOR PFEFFER ON THE MARGINS OF THE LUXEMBOURG MINISTERIAL, DRAWING ON POINTS BELOW. PFEFFER'S INITIAL REACTION WAS POSITIVE. EMBASSY SHOULD NOW FOLLOW UP WITH FRG AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO REITERATE OUR INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION AND OUR VIEW

THAT THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD BE ONE WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE GREATEST POSSIBLE INTEGRATION OF THE SPANISH CEREMONY INTO THE SUMMIT PROCEEDINGS AND THE FULLEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION BY NATO HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT -- INCLUDING FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. YOU SHOULD ALSO REITERATE HOLMES' SUGGESTION THAT THE FRG, AS HOST, APPROACH MITTERRAND TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE WOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE

IN THIS CEREMONY. AS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE IN YOUR FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE POINTS CONTAINED IN PARA 2 ABOVE AND ON THE FOLLOWING:

. -- WE CONSIDER A MEANINGFUL AND EFFECTIVE SPANISH ACCESSION CEREMONY TO BE VITAL TO THE OVERALL SUCCESS OF THE SUMMIT.

. -- WITH PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT UNDER WAY IN EARNEST FOLLOWING THE MINISTERIAL, WE WANT TO GIVE EARLY ATTENTION TO THE WELCOMING CEREMONY FOR SPAIN. WE SEE THREE BASIC ALTERNATIVES WITH RESPECT TO TIMING:

. (1) THE EVENING OF JUNE 9. THIS WOULD PERMIT FULL PARTICIPATION BY ATTENDING HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT BY ALLOWING FOR THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. BUT IT ALSO WOULD SEPARATE THE CEREMONY FROM THE JUNE 10 SUMMIT PROCEEDINGS THEMSELVES, THEREBY DETRACTING FROM BOTH THE CEREMONY AND THE SUMMIT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE DRAWBACKS OF A SUMMIT-EVE CEREMONY THEREFORE SIGNIFICANTLY OUTWEIGH ITS POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES.

. (2) IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FORMAL OPENING OF THE SUMMIT ON JUNE 10. THIS ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD RULE OUT MITTERRAND'S ATTENDANCE.

. (3) CLEARLY THE BEST TIME, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD BE THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MORNING OF JUNE 10, IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE FORMAL OPENING OF THE SUMMIT ITSELF. THIS WOULD RETAIN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CEREMONY AND THE SUMMIT PROCEEDINGS WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE MITTERRAND'S ATTENDANCE. WE HOPE THE GERMANS AGREE AND THAT THEY WILL, IN APPROACHING MITTERRAND, OFFER TO SCHEDULE THE CEREMONY IN THIS MANNER.

4. FOR USNATO: YOU SHOULD, AS YOU DEEM MOST APPROPRIATE, CONVEY OUR THINKING ON THIS QUESTION TO LUNS. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 7576

DTG: 200358Z MAY 82 PSN: 036069

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F97-030/2 #153

BY

CH

NARA, DATE

4/30/01

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 0728  
SIT676 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 171101Z MAY 82 PSN: 031996  
TOR: 137/1246Z

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SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT ECB  
ECB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
LE 171101Z 1015 1371101  
O 171101Z 1015 1371101  
FM THE EMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6880

~~SECRET~~ BONN 10708

NODIS

E.O. 12065; GDS: 5/14/88 (WOESSNEE, WILLIAM W.) OR-M  
TAGS: MNUC, MPOL, XG, GE  
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY IN THE FRG  
REF: STATE 126375

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE EMBASSY REVIEWED NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT/ INCIDENT PLANS AT A MEETING WITH EUCCM REPRESENTATIVES IN BONN ON MAY 13. AS A RESULT WE ARE REVISING OUR PROCEDURES SOMEWHAT TO PROVIDE A MORE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH SUCH PROBLEMS SHOULD THEY ARISE.

3. WITH REGARD TO A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE FRG AUTHORITIES ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED IN PARA 2 REFTEL, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FOCUS HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION ON OUR CONCERNS REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE TERRORIST INCIDENTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY TIMELY TO DO SO AT THIS TIME IN VIEW OF REPORTS THAT TERRORISTS MAY TAKE ACTION AGAINST US INSTALLATIONS HERE AROUND THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE VISIT. AS FOR SOME OF THE OTHER POINTS MENTIONED IN PARA 2, DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT EUCCM IS ALREADY ENGAGED IN WORKING OUT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH THE FMOD PLANS FOR DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXISTING US-FRG AGREEMENT ON DEALING WITH NUCLEAR INCIDENTS.

4. WE BELIEVE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE FRG POLICYMAKERS WOULD BE FOR THE DCM TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE SENIOR CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS. BURNS

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #154  
BY GAJ NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 EONN 0708

DTG: 171101Z MAY 82 PSN: 031996

EONN 0708

DTG: 171101Z MAY 82 PSN: 031996

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 EONN 2684  
SITE88 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 150943Z MAY 82 PSN: 029780  
TCR: 135/1017Z

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SIT: MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHL 10684 100948  
O 15 043Z MAY 82 DEFFA  
FM AMEMBASSY BORN

TO DROSTATE WYS-DO NIACT IMMEDIATE 6873

~~SECRET~~ EONN 10684

NODIS

DEPT ALSO PASS TO FOLG POSTS AS INDICATED:

ACTION COMMISSION USNATO

INFO: USDEL SECRETARY

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY BRIDJAN (FOR BROOKER)

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 2 (RS 18.02) (BURNS, ARTHUR F.)

TAGS: OVIP (AIG. ALEXANDER M., JR.)

SUBJECT: SCHEDULING A CONTACT GROUP ON THE MARGINS OF

- THE MAC MINISTERIAL

REF: SECDEF 07026

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S OFFICE HAD THOUGHT CONTACT GROUP MEETING WAS SET FOR 2230 SUNDAY, MAY 16. GENSCHER'S SCHEDULE IS OPEN FOR A BREAKFAST MEETING 0800 - 0900 TUESDAY, MAY 18, HOWEVER, AND HIS OFFICE ACCEPTS THAT TIME, IF THIS IS WHAT THE U.S. PREFERS. BURNS

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NLS F97-030/2 #155  
BY CW NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~