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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
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**Archivist:** smf  
**FOIA ID:** F97-030 (Friedrich)  
**Date:** 06/01/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	030331Z FEB 82 2p Part 4/27/01 F97-030/2 #118	2/3/82	P1/F1
2. cable	020010Z FEB 82 2p	2/2/82	P1/F1
3. cable	<del>271451Z JAN 82 8p R 4/27/01 F97-030/2# 120</del>	<del>1/27/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
4. cable	<del>251856Z JAN 82 4p R u u #121</del>	<del>1/25/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
5. cable	<del>210505Z JAN 82 3p R u u #122</del>	<del>1/21/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
6. cable	<del>151003Z JAN 82 2p R u u #123</del>	<del>1/15/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
7. cable	141107Z JAN 82 2p Part u u #124	1/14/82	P1/F1
8. cable	131655Z JAN 82 2p Part. u u #125	1/13/82	P1/F1
9. cable	<del>100226Z JAN 82 8p R u u #126</del>	<del>1/10/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
10. cable	<del>301253Z SEP 82 1p R u u #127</del>	<del>9/30/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
11. cable	<del>230223Z SEP 82 1p R u u #128</del>	<del>9/23/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
12. cable	<del>161625Z SEP 82 1p R u u #129</del>	<del>9/16/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
13. cable	<del>011511Z SEP 82 1p R u u #130</del>	<del>9/1/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
14. cable	201635Z JUL 82 7p R u u #131	7/20/82	P1/F1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
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F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USICA/BONN GE 0536  
SIT165 DATE 02/16/82

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHINA #0536 0391120  
O 081120Z FEB 82  
FM USICA/BONN GE

TO USICA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE  
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NIACT IMMEDIATE FOR OPS CENTER AND EU;  
WHITE HOUSE FOR SPEAKES; SECSTATE FOR PR; MADRID FOR SECSTATE  
PARTY; VIENNA FOR ICA DIRECTOR WICK  
SUBJECT: ALLEGED INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN  
REF.: GUSS-KOHL TELCON, 2/7/82; STATE 33004

1. AS INSTRUCTED, USICA BONN IS TRANSMITTING BELOW VERBATIM  
TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT OF Q'S AND A'S, IDENTIFIED ONLY AS  
"THE INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN," AS PRINTED ON PAGE 7  
OF THE HAMBURG-BASED SUNDAY PAPER "WELT AM SONNTAG," 2/7/82,  
TOGETHER WITH A FOUR-COLUMN KENNERLY COLOR PHOTO OF THE  
PRESIDENT SEATED AT HIS OVAL OFFICE DESK:

2. Q: "WHOM DO YOU SEE WHEN LOOKING INTO THE MIRROR, THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE U. S., OR RONALD REAGAN FROM DIXON, ILL.?"  
REAGAN: RONALD REAGAN FROM DIXON, ILL.. I HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT  
THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE IS AN INSTITUTION WHICH ONE PERSONIFIES  
ONLY FOR A LIMITED TIME -- ONE ADMINISTERS IT, AND THE TASKS  
OF THE PRESIDENT INCLUDE THE TASK OF OMITTING ANYTHING THAT  
MIGHT REDUCE THE VALUE AND PRESTIGE OF THIS INSTITUTION."  
Q: "A FORMER PRESS OFFICER OF THE WHITE HOUSE, GEORGE REEDY,  
ONCE SAID THIS: 'THE PRESIDENT IS SOMEWHAT LIKE A KING, AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOBODY ARGUES WITH MAJESTY.' DOES ANYBODY TELL YOU, MR. PRESIDENT,  
'YOU ARE ENTIRELY WRONG ON THIS POINT?'"  
REAGAN: "ALMOST EVERYBODY DARES TO DO SO."  
Q: "DO YOU TELL YOUR MOST IMPORTANT ADVISERS AS JIM BAKER, ED  
MEESE AND MIKE DEEVER THAT THEY SHOULD TELL YOU IF THEY BELIEVE  
THAT YOU ARE REALLY WRONG?"  
R: "LOOK HERE, TWO OF THE THREE HAVE ACCOMPANIED ME DURING MY  
EIGHT YEARS IN CALIFORNIA, AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ME TO TELL  
THEM THIS. THEY KNOW IT THEMSELVES. AND THE CABINET WE HAVE  
PUT TOGETHER REALLY INCLUDES THE BEST PEOPLE, EVERY SINGLE OF  
THEM HAS BEEN AMAZINGLY SUCCESSFUL IN HIS LIFE AND HAD TO  
GIVE UP QUITE A FEW THINGS IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER  
AN OFFICE IN THE CABINET. NONE OF THEM HESITATES TO SPEAK.  
I MYSELF MUST MAKE THE DECISIONS WHICH ARE BASED ON WHAT I  
HEAR FROM THEM ALL. BUT I HAVE NEVER CAUGHT ANYBODY IN AN  
ATTEMPT TO SAY JUST WHAT HE THINKS I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR."

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Q: "WHAT DOES THE PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING LOOK TO YOU?"

R: "MINISTERS AND ADVISERS DISCUSS AT A ROUND TABLE, AND OCCASIONALLY VIOLENT DEBATES RESULT. IF I DO NOT HEAR ENOUGH FROM THEM THAT WOULD ENABLE ME TO MAKE A WELL-FOUNDED DECISION, THEN I SIMPLY TELL THEM THAT I COULD NOT YET TAKE A DECISION. THEY HAVE TO MEET AGAIN.

"BUT IN MANY CASES I CAN REACH A DECISION IMMEDIATELY DURING THE CONFERENCES. THUS, I TAKE A DECISION AND TELL THEM WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT WE ARE GOING TO DO.

"BUT OCCASIONALLY I HAVE HEARD ENOUGH WITHOUT, HOWEVER, BEING ABLE TO DIGEST EVERYTHING. AND THEN I TELL THEM 'OKAY, I HAVE HEARD EVERYTHING THAT WAS NECESSARY.' AFTERWARDS I USUALLY RETURN TO MY OWN OFFICE AND TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE FACTS BETTER. OR I GO HOME AND RETURN NEXT DAY WITH A CLEAR REPLY.

"IF A QUESTION IS PARTICULARLY COMPLICATED, AND IF THE PROS AND THE CONS WERE BOTH ACCEPTABLE, I RETURN THE QUESTION SO TO ENABLE THEM TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM AGAIN AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO PUT DOWN IN WRITING THE POSSIBLE DECISIONS WITH THEIR PRO'S AND CON'S. THIS IS THE BASIS ON WHICH I THEN TAKE A DECISION."

Q: "DO YOU DISCUSS MANY OF YOUR DECISIONS, OR PENDING DECISIONS, WITH MRS. REAGAN?"

R: "WE ALWAYS DISCUSS THINGS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, AND I DO NOT KEEP ANYTHING SECRET FROM HER. YES, I DISCUSS IT WITH HER, AND VERY FREQUENTLY SHE SAYS WHAT SHE THINKS OF IT. SHE DOES NOT TRY TO PERSUADE ME, BUT SHE SAYS HOW SHE SEES THIS THING. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS IT IS FOR ME TO TAKE THE DECISION."

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

Q: "TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE VOICE OF YOUR WIFE COUNT?"

R: "I WOULD NOT SAY THAT SHE INTERVENES IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. SHE IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE CABINET AND HAS NEVER BEEN ONE. SHE IS INTERESTED IN MANY THINGS -- IN THE DRUG PROGRAM, THE PROJECT FOR OLD CITIZENS AND OTHER THINGS. IN THIS WAY SHE IS MUCH ENGAGED HERSELF."

Q: "PRESIDENT GROVER CLEVELAND ONCE SAID THIS ABOUT THE PRESIDENCY: 'THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES SADDLES A MAN AWARE OF HIS DUTIES WITH A RESPONSIBILITY THAT EXCEEDS HUMAN STRENGTH.'"

R: "NO, ACTUALLY I DO NOT THINK SO. THERE ARE PROPOSALS FOR FILLING THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE WITH SEVERAL MEN, WITH SOME TYPE OF TROIKA, OR SIMILAR. BUT THE TASKS OF THE PRESIDENT ARE SO INTERLOCKED THAT SEVERAL MEN WOULD MERELY CREATE CONFUSION. I RATHER BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE IS OVERLOADED WITH TASKS. ONE OF OUR PRESENT AIMS IS TO UNBURDEN THE POSITION BY RETURNING AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES..."

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X X X X THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES... " X X X

Q: "I HAVE THE IMPRESSION, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU ARE  
MORE RESOLUTE THAN YOUR PREDECESSOR JIMMY CARTER. THIS  
APPLIES, FOR INSTANCE, TO YOUR STANCE VIS-A-VIS THE AIR  
CONTROLLERS STRIKE. IS THIS IMPRESSION CORRECT?"

R: "I HAVE FIRM CONVICTIONS. AND REGARDING THE AIR CONTROLLERS  
STRIKE, THESE PEOPLE HAD BEEN WARNED IN ADVANCE. I HAD  
INSISTED ON THAT. AFTERWARDS I WAS VERY RESOLUTE.

"F. D. ROOSEVELT SAID 'ONE CANNOT TOLERATE A STRIKE OF PUBLIC  
SERVICE WORKERS.' I AGREE. PEOPLE EXPECT THE SERVICES OF  
THEIR ADMINISTRATION TO FUNCTION CONTINUOUSLY."

Q: "MR. PRESIDENT. IN YOUR STATEMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY AND  
ON THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION YOU USE  
THE WORD 'PEACE' ONLY RARELY."

R: "I HAVE AVOIDED THE WORD 'PEACE' NOT INTENTIONALLY. I  
DISCUSSED PEACE ON MANY OCCASIONS, AND WHENEVER I REFER TO  
THIS WORD I MEAN THAT OUR AIM SHOULD BE PEACE. OUR AIM  
SHOULD BE THAT, IF EVER POSSIBLE, THERE WILL NEVER BE  
ANOTHER GENERATION OF YOUNG MEN WHO HAVE TO SACRIFICE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THEIR LIFE ON A FOREIGN BATTLEFIELD IN ORDER TO WIN A  
VICTORY FOR US. BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT SHOULD BE CLEAR  
THAT CIVILIZATION IS BASED ON THOSE THINGS FOR WHICH TO  
DIE PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN READY. AND NOBODY SHOULD EVER  
IMAGINE THAT WE WOULD WITHDRAW WITHOUT THINKING IN ORDER  
TO WIN PEACE AT ANY PRICE."

Q: "HOW HAVE YOU AND MRS. REAGAN GET USED TO LIVING WITH THE  
DANGER CONNECTED WITH YOUR OFFICE?"

R: "I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR NANCY  
THAN IT IS FOR MYSELF -- FOR INSTANCE, WHEN I LEAVE FOR SOME  
PUBLIC APPEARANCE AND SHE IS NOT WITH ME. BUT YOU CANNOT  
ALWAYS CAST AN ANXIOUS LOOK BACKWARD. I HAVE BEEN VERY  
LUCKY, AND (AT THE ATTEMPT ON MY LIFE) ON MARCH 30 A FEW  
MINOR MIRACLES OCCURRED FOR WHICH I AM EXTREMELY GRATEFUL."

Q: "MR. PRESIDENT. I HAVE SEEN PHOTOS WHICH SHOW HOW QUICKLY  
A PRESIDENT CAN AGE WITHIN HIS TERM."

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R: "I HAVE NEVER IN MY LIFE FELT BETTER: I CONTINUE EVERYTHING I DID IN THE PAST, RIDING AND SO ON. I NEVER HAD A GYM OF MY OWN LIKE THE ONE WE HAVE NOW. I NEVER HAD THIS EQUIPMENT, AND I USE IT REGULARLY. AND ALL MY SUITS STILL FIT."

Q: "DO YOU SLEEP WELL AT NIGHT?"

R: "OH YES, YES."

Q: "MR. PRESIDENT, HOW DO YOU MANAGE ALL THOSE FORMAL DINNERS?"

R: "NOW I WILL TELL YOU HOW I DO IT: THESE DINNERS ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTING, THEY CAN EVEN BE AMUSING. THUS THEY ARE NOT AS BIG A BURDEN AS YOU MIGHT THINK."

Q: "IS THERE ANYTHING, MR. PRESIDENT, IN YOUR LIFE AS A PRIVATE PERSON WHAT YOU DO MISS?"

R: "THERE ARE SUCH THINGS. THERE ARE THINGS I MISS. MINOR THINGS. FOR INSTANCE, I CAN NO LONGER SPONTANEOUSLY CALL NANCY AND TELL HER: 'GO AND GET US THEATER TICKETS FOR TO-NIGHT.' THIS IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE."

Q: "NOW AS TO THE REVERSE OF THE MEDAL -- WHAT WILL YOU MISS WHEN YOU WILL HAVE TO LEAVE YOUR PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE? WILL IT BE THE POWER, THE GLAMOR, THE HELICOPTERS?"

R: "NOW, I BELIEVE EVERYBODY WOULD MISS SUCH AMENITIES."

Q: "IF YOU HAD TO GIVE UP YOUR OFFICE TOMORROW, WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE THE HISTORY BOOKS TO SAY ABOUT YOU?"

R: "I WISH THEY COULD SAY I HAD STRENGTHENED THE FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL. I HOPE PEOPLE WILL SAY THAT I DID MY BEST."

Q: "MANY PRESIDENTS SAID THIS OFFICE WAS A LONELY POST. HOW LONELY IS IT?"

R: "ONE IS VERY LONELY AT THE MOMENT WHEN ONE HAS THOUGHT THINGS OVER AND CONSIDERED THEM. WHEN ONE GOES THROUGH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EVERYTHING IN ONE'S THOUGHTS, AND IF ONE SITS AND THINKS I HAVE TO GO DOWN IMMEDIATELY; IF ONE KNOWS 'SOMEBODY IS WAITING FOR ME' AND IF ONE THEN HAS TO SAY 'THIS IS WHAT WE WILL DO.' THESE ARE LONELY MOMENTS. AND, YES, THERE IS THE MOMENT -- I HOPE I WILL NEVER FACE IT DURING MY TIME OF OFFICE. BUT IT IS IMAGINABLE. AS GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA I HAD TO FACE IT, AND I SAID AT THAT TIME THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT AND THE HARDEST OF ALL DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN BY A GOVERNOR IS THE DECISION ON LIFE AND DEATH -- THE POWER TO COMMUTE DEATH PENALTY INTO LIFELONG IMPRISONMENT. THEN ONE IS SUDDENLY QUITE ALONE, THEN ONE IS BESET BY DOUBT WHETHER ONE OR ANYBODY ELSE HAS THE RIGHT TO TAKE THIS DECISION."

Q: "AND NOW NOTHING IS AS DIFFICULT?"

R: "I ASSUME IT WOULD BE AS DIFFICULT IF A DECISION WERE INVOLVED WITH WHICH OUR GENERALS AND ADMIRALS ARE CONFRONTED, AND WHEN THE LIFE OR DEATH OF OUR YOUNG SOLDIERS WERE INVOLVED. OUR AIM IS PEACE. BUT AS I SAID: THIS CANNOT BE A PEACE AT ANY PRICE."

3. AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE, SET BETWEEN BIG QUOTATION MARKS, ARE SIX QUOTES ATTRIBUTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, EACH ONE UNDER A SEPERATE HEADING. NONE IS IDENTIFIED AS TO WHEN OR WHAT OCCASION THE STATEMENT WAS MADE. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TRANSLATION:

(A) REAGAN ON STRENGTH

"THOSE SHRILL VOICES TELLING US THAT THE DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM ARE FOES OF PEACE ARE WRONG. A PHILOSOPHER FROM THE ORIENT SAID CENTURIES AGO THAT THE REALLY SUCCESSFULL ARMY IS THAT WHICH, BECAUSE OF ITS STRENGTH AND CAPACITY, IS NOT CALLED UPON TO FIGHT BECAUSE NO ONE DARES PROVOKING IT. I HAVE WITNESSED FOUR WARS IN MY LIFETIME, AND NONE OF THEM BROKE OUT BECAUSE WE WERE TOO STRONG. I ACCEPT WITHOUT RESTRICTION THE WORDS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: 'TO BE PREPARED FOR WAP IS ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF MAINTAINING PEACE.' THAT DOES NOT MEAN WE ARE NOT STRIVING FOR TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS. THE SEARCH FOR PEACE MUST CONTINUE. BUT WE HAVE A BETTER CHANCE IF WE MAINTAIN OUR STRENGTH IN THAT SEARCH."

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(B) REAGAN AND FREEDOM

"WE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTED TO THE CONCEPT THAT  
BROUGHT OUR PEOPLE FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY. ALL PEOPLE WHO ARE  
LONGING FOR PEACE ARE OUR FELLOW CITIZENS. IT IS THIS LOVE FOR  
-- (MORE) --

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X X X FELLOW CITIZENS. IT IS THIS LOVE FOR X X X X  
FREEDOM THAT BROUGHT US AND OUR FOREBEARS INTO THIS COUNTRY. IN  
MY LIFETIME, I HAVE WITNESSED THE RISE OF FACISM AND COMMUNISM.  
BOTH OF THESE POLITICAL THEORIES HAVE GLORIFIED THE UNRESTRICTED  
POWER OF THE STATE. BOTH HAVE FAILED. BOTH DENY THE GOD-GIVEN FREE-  
DOMS, WHICH ARE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF EVERY HUMAN BEING ON THIS  
PLANET. AND THEY DENY THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. BECAUSE OF THIS BASIC  
MISTAKE, FASCISM HAS ALREADY BEEN DESTROYED, AND THE BANKRUPTCY  
OF COMMUNISM IS OBVIOUS TO ANYONE, A SYSTEM THAT CAN PRODUCE WAR  
MACHINERY BUT CANNOT FEED ITS PEOPLE."

(C) REAGAN ON ISRAEL

"ISRAEL IS A STRATEGIC FORTUNE. AFTER THE FALL OF THE SHAH,  
ISRAEL REMAINED AMERICA'S ONLY RELIABLE ALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.  
IN CONTRAST TO SUCH OTHER PRO-WESTERN COUNTRIES AS SAUDI ARABIA  
AND THE GULF EMIRATES, ISRAEL IS STRONG. ISRAEL DOES NOT DEPEND  
ON THE EXISTENCE OF SOME AUTOCRATIC RULER. IT IS GUIDED BY DEMO-  
CRATIC WILL. BY NATIONAL UNITY, IT POSSESSES THE TECHNOLOGICAL  
AND MILITARY FUNDAMENTALS THAT ENABLE IT TO BE A FAITHFUL ALLY  
OF AMERICA. IN TIMES OF CRISIS, ITS RESOURCES CAN BE USED AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IT CAN HELP THE U. S. IN DEFENDING THE MEDITERRANEAN. ISRAEL  
IS A FUNCTIONING ALLY IN OUR CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET  
CHALLENGE. ISRAEL MUST BE HELPED BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS THE ONLY  
BULWARK AGAINST SOVIET SUBVERSION."

(D) REAGAN ON THE MARKET

"A HANDFUL OF INDUSTRIALIZED STATES, WHICH HAVE COMBINED  
PERSONAL INITIATIVE WITH ECONOMIC REWARD FOR A LONG TIME, ARE  
PRODUCING MORE THAN HALF OF THE WORLD'S WEALTH TODAY.  
THESE SOCIETIES, WHICH HAVE ACHIEVED THE MOST SPECTACULAR AND  
MOST BROADLY BASED ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE SHORTEST PERIOD  
OF TIME, ARE NOT THE MOST RIGIDLY CONTROLLED, NOT NECESSARILY  
EVEN THE GREATEST, NOR THOSE ENDOWED BEST WITH RAW MATERIALS.  
NO, WHAT THEY HAVE IN COMMON IS THEIR READINESS TO BELIEVE IN  
THE MIRACLE OF THE MARKET. THUS, LET ME TELL YOU FRANKLY: WE  
CANNOT HAVE PROSPERITY AND SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT ECONO-  
MIC FREEDOM. AND WITHOUT ECONOMIC FREEDOM, WE CANNOT MAINTAIN

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OUR PERSONAL AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS EITHER."

(E) REAGAN ON AMERICA

"I AM PROUD OF ONE THING THAT EMERGED IN RECENT MONTHS, THROUGHOUT AMERICA, THERE IS A NEW ATTITUDE. IN SPITE OF RECESSION, THERE IS CONFIDENCE THAT THINGS WILL GET BETTER. WHILE PEOPLE SAID AS RECENTLY AS ONE OR TWO YEARS AGO THAT THEY DO NOT EXPECT ANYTHING TO GET BETTER, THEY NOW SAY THEY BELIEVE THINGS WILL GET ALL RIGHT. IN AMERICA, THERE IS A PATRIOTISM, A SPIRIT, THAT WAS NOT PRESENT BEFORE. IT IS GRATIFYING TO SEE THAT PEOPLE ARE READY TO TAKE IN THEIR OWN HANDS THE SLACK SAILS OF THEIR COMMUNITY. WRITING TO ME, THEY MAKE THIS POINT: 'WHY DID WE EVER BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE GOVERNMENT'S JOB? IT IS OUR JOB. LET'S TACKLE IT.' AND IF PEOPLE ROLL UP THEIR SLEEVES IN THIS TRADITIONAL SPIRIT, THINGS WILL REALLY GET ALL RIGHT."

(F) REAGAN ON EDUCATION

"THERE IS A GROWING TENDENCY IN THE SCHOOLS AND EVEN IN SOME RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES TO CRITICIZE THE BEHAVIOR AND THE VALUE STANDARDS OF THE PARENTS AND TO ENCOURAGE THE YOUTHS TO SHAPE IDEAS AND VALUE STANDARDS OF THEIR OWN. THAT IS REASONABLE ONLY IF THE YOUNGSTER HAS ALREADY ACQUIRED A CERTAIN DEGREE OF MATURITY, AND IF HE HAS DEVELOPED VALUE COMMITMENTS IN HIS FAMILY. OTHERWISE, HE WILL FALL VICTIM TO ANY INDOCTRINATING TEACHER OR CLERGYMAN JUST TO OBTAIN A FEELING OF SECURITY: ANY CHILD SHOULD BE RAISED IN THE CERTAINTY THAT ITS PARENTS APPRECIATE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFINING RIGHT AND WRONG ON ITS BEHALF. THE FOREMOST DUTY OF PARENTS IS TO FURNISH THEIR CHILDREN WITH VALUE COMMITMENTS TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THEY MAY LEAVE THEM WITH GOOD CONSCIENCE TO THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY."

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. "THE INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN" WAS ADVERTISED BY "WELT AM SONNTAG" IN ADVANCE BY PLACING PROMOS IN THE WEEKLY "DIE ZEIT" AND IN THE MUNICH DAILY "SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG." "WELT AM SONNTAG" ITSELF CARRIES ON PAGE ONE OF ITS 2/7/82 ISSUE A PREFACE TO THE "INTERVIEW" UNDER THE HEADLINE "REAGAN REACHED AGE OF 71: INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT." (VERBATIM TRANSLATION OF TEXT FOLLOWS): CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ON SATURDAY CONGRATULATED U. S. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN ON HIS 71ST BIRTHDAY. HE CABLED: "UNDER YOUR PRESIDENCY, THE AMERICAN NATION WILL, ALSO IN THE COMING YEAR, FACE IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH SELF-ASSURANCE THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1980'S." IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED TODAY BY WELT AM SONNTAG TO MARK HIS BIRTHDAY, THE PRESIDENT DECLARED: "OUR GOAL MUST BE THAT, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, NEVER AGAIN A GENERATION OF YOUNG MEN WILL HAVE TO LOSE THEIR LIVES ON FOREIGN BATTLEFIELDS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT THAT CIVILIZATION IS BASED ON THOSE THINGS MEN ALWAYS WERE PREPARED TO DIE FOR. AND NO ONE SHOULD EVER ASSUME THAT WE WOULD CARELESSLY WITHDRAW TO ACHIEVE PEACE AT ANY PRICE." THAT IS WHY REAGAN TOMORROW, ON MONDAY, WILL PUT BEFORE CONGRESS A NEW RECORD BUDGET OF 758 BILLION DOLLARS PROVIDING FOR ANOTHER INCREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING. RONALD REAGAN IS THE OLDEST INCUMBENT OF THE PRESIDENCY THE WHITE HOUSE HAS EVER SEEN. HE CAME INTO THE NEW WORLD FEBRUARY 6, 1911, AS THE SON OF A SHOE SALESMAN IN TAMPICO, ILLINOIS. HE STUDIED SOCIOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND THEATER SCIENCE, WORKED AS A SPORT COMMENTATOR AND WAS AN ACTOR IN 53 MOVIES. THEN HE BECAME GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA AND THE 40TH PRESIDENT OF THE U. S. TO CELEBRATE HIS BIRTHDAY. REAGAN YESTERDAY HAD DINNER WITH CLOSE FRIENDS IN THE WHITE HOUSE. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVENT, AN ALMOND CAKE ORNAMENTED WITH A SINGLE CANDLE WAS SERVED. IT (THE CANDLE) WAS TO SYMBOLIZE THAT REAGAN IS THE FIRST INCUMBENT OF THE PRESIDENCY, REACHING THE AGE OF 71, IN OFFICE.

5. END OF TRANSLATED MATERIALS. EXPLANATIONS OF THE GENESIS OF THE INTERVIEW AND THE ORIGINS OF THE QUOTES ARE NOW BEING SOUGHT IN CONTACTS WITH THE AXEL SPRINGER PUBLISHING ENTERPRISE IN HAMBURG AND IN BERLIN. POST WILL REPORT RESULTS OF THE INQUIRY BY SEPTEL AS SOON AS THEY ARE AVAILABLE.

-- (ENDALL) --

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USICA/BONN GE 0536

DTG: 081120Z FEB 82 PSN: 006727

USICA/BONN GE 0536

DTG: 081120Z FEB 82 PSN: 006727

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                      BONN 2796  
SIT160                      DATE 02/16/82

DTG: 081224Z FEB 82 PSN: 006731  
TOR: 039/1232Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: SPEAKES

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOLA #2796 0391225  
O 081224Z FEB 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO USICA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0823  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3944  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 3882  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 6806  
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USICA

FOR OPS CENTER AND EU: WHITE HOUSE FOR SPEAKES;  
SECSTATE FOR PR; MAADRID FOR SECSTATE PARTY; VIENNA  
FOR ICA DIRECTOR WICK

E. O. 12065: N/A

SUBJECT: ALLEGED "WELT-AM-SONNTAG" INTERVIEW WITH  
PRESIDENT REAGAN

REF: STATE 33004; GUSS-KOHL TELCON 2/7/82

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTEL PARA 3, WE HAVE  
SOUGHT AN EXPLANATION FROM SPRINGER PUBLISHING  
COMPANY IN BERLIN AND "WELT-AM-SONNTAG" EDITORIAL  
STAFF IN HAMBURG REGARDING THE GENESIS OF AND  
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE PUBLICATION ON  
2/7/82 OF AN ALLEGED INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT  
REAGAN.

2. THE RESPONSES GIVEN BY DR. HANS-JOACHIM MAITRE,  
SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PUBLISHER ON INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- A. THE "INTERVIEW" -- Q'S AND A'S -- WERE ACQUIRED  
BY THE SPRINGER PUBLISHING COMPANY FROM WESTINGHOUSE  
BROADCASTING, APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS AGO.

- B. THE SIX SEPARATE QUOTATIONS AT THE BOTTOM OF  
THE PAGE -- INCLUDING THE ONE ON ISRAEL -- WERE NOT  
PART OF THE WESTINGHOUSE INTERVIEW; THEY WERE  
ASSEMBLED BY "WELT-AM-SONNTAG" FROM VARIOUS PUBLISHED  
STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE PAST.

3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE REPORTED  
AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. THE FULL TEXTS OF THE  
INTERVIEW AND OTHER QUOTES (IN RE-TRANSLATION FROM  
THE GERMAN) WERE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY. TUCH

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By SM NARA, Date 5/25/00

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 2863  
SIT153 DATE 02/16/82

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TOR: 039/1727Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: SPEAKES

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOLA #2863 0391715  
O 081713Z FEB 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0826  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3988  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 3886  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 6811  
BT

UNCLAS BONN 02863  
USICA

FOR OPS CENTER AND EU: WHITE HOUSE FOR SPEAKES;  
SECSTATE FOR PR AND EUR/CE; MADRID FOR SECSTATE PARTY;  
VIENNA FOR ICA DIRECTOR WICK  
E. O. 12065: N/A  
SUBJECT: ALLEGED "WELT-AM-SONNTAG" INTERVIEW WITH  
PRESIDENT REAGAN  
REF: STATE 33004; GUSS-KOHL TELCON 2/7/82; BONN 2736-C

1. GERMAN NEWS AGENCY "DPA" IS NOW RUNNING AN ITEM  
HEADED "WELT-AM-SONNTAG REGRETS." UNDER A HAMBURG  
DATELINE, THE ITEM READS AS FOLLOWS:

2. BT  
THE INTERVIEW WITH U.S. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN  
PUBLISHED IN LAST SUNDAY'S "WELT-AM-SONNTAG" WAS  
-- ACCORDING TO THE NEWSPAPER -- AN INTERVIEW WHICH  
THE PRESIDENT HAD GRANTED AN AMERICAN BROADCASTING  
CORPORATION AND FOR WHICH "WELT-AM-SONNTAG" HAD  
ACQUIRED REPRINT RIGHTS FOR GERMANY.  
THE REAGAN QUOTE IN QUESTION (REAGAN ON ISRAEL) WAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOT -- AS "WELT-AM-SONNTAG" TOLD DPA IN RESPONSE TO  
A QUERY -- PART OF THAT INTERVIEW. IT WAS ONE OF SIX  
REAGAN POLICY STATEMENTS MADE IN VARIOUS PUBLICATIONS  
IN THE PAST, BEFORE AND AFTER HIS ELECTION. THOSE  
STATEMENTS WERE PLACED BY "WELT-AM-SONNTAG"  
BELOW THE PICTURE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN BUT WERE  
NOT PART OF THE INTERVIEW TEXT. "WELT-AM-SONNTAG"  
REGRETS IF THIS DID NOT BECOME CLEAR FROM THE  
PUBLICATION ITSELF, IT SAID IN THE STATEMENT. BT  
TUCH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 3009 DTG: 080114Z FEB 82 PSN: 006249  
SIT166 DATE 02/16/82 TOR: 039/0116Z

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WHSR COMMENT: FYI

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #3009 0390115  
O 080114Z FEB 82 ZEX  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE  
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7101  
USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
BT

UNCLAS STATE 033009  
ALL NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE  
E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE PRESS GUIDANCE

1. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE USED BY WHITE HOUSE IN RESPONSE  
TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING WEST GERMAN PUBLICATION  
"WELT AM SOONTAG" "INTERVIEW" WITH PRES. REAGAN.  
(UPI REPORT OF INTERVIEW BEING SENT USINFO IMMEDIATE)

2. QUOTE: THE QUOTATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRESIDENT  
ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS VIEWS OR OF THE VIEWS  
OF THE USG. WE HAVE MANY FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
WHO SHARE COMMON INTERESTS REGARDING SOVIET INTENTIONS  
IN THE REGION. UNQUOTE. STOESSEL

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7984  
SIT305 DATE 02/17/82

DTG: 030331Z FEB 82 PSN: 056918  
TOR: 034/0732Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST/POLAND

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7984 0340650  
O 030331Z FEB 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5962  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 7220  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7329  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 027984  
EXDIS, BRUSSELS AND USNATO FOR H. ALLEN HOLMES  
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 2/2/02 (KORNBLUM, JOHN C.)

TAGS: PDIP, GE  
SUBJECT LETTER FROM HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER TO  
SECRETARY HAIG

1. THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER TO  
SECRETARY HAIG IS TRANSMITTED HERewith FOR YOUR  
INFORMATION. DATE OF LETTER IS FEBRUARY 2, 1982.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR AL,

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NLS

FN-030/2 #118

By

C/S

NARA, Date

4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7984

DTG: 030331Z FEB 82 PSN: 056918

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YOURS SINCERELY,

(SGD.) HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER

END TEXT.

HAIG

~~SECRET~~

# RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_ LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 1895  
SIT854 RECALLED

DTG: 271451Z JAN 82 PSN: 048102  
TOR: 027/1719Z

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OP IMMED  
STU5324  
DE RUFHOL #1895/01 0271502  
O 271451Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3540

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 5673  
AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 4213  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 6773  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1502  
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 6202  
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 3871  
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 8674  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE  
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
USLO SACLANT IMMEDIATE  
USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF PRIORITY 2967  
AMCONSUL HAMBURG PRIORITY 5419  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY 2386  
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 01895

USINF  
E.O. 12065: GDS 01-27-88 (BARKLEY, R) OR-P  
TAGS: PINT, MARR, GE  
SUBJECT: SPD PROPOSED RESOLUTION ON SECURITY POLICY -  
- HIGHLIGHTS AND COMMENTARY  
REFS: A. BONN 01841 DTG 261945Z JAN 82  
- B. HAMBURG 163 DTG 261050Z JAN 82  
-  
-

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SPD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON JANUARY 25 ADOPTED A BASIC RESOLUTION ("LEITANTRAG") ON SECURITY POLICY, WHICH WILL BE PROPOSED AT THE PARTY CONGRESS IN MUNICH IN APRIL. THE TEXT IS ALSO INTENDED TO SERVE AS A GUIDELINE FOR LOCAL AND STATE-LEVEL SPD MEETINGS THROUGHOUT THE FRG BETWEEN NOW AND APRIL. REFTEL A PROVIDES A TRANSLATION OF THE ENTIRE TEXT. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS AND SOME INITIAL COMMENT.

3. THE RESOLUTION FIRST STRONGLY RESTATES FUNDAMENTAL SPD PRINCIPLES ON THE BROAD RANGE OF WORLD AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY ISSUES, INCLUDING ARMS BUILDUPS AND ARMS CONTROL, ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMIC AND POPULATION GROWTH. IT ALSO INCLUDES A STRONG ENDORSEMENT OF THE NATO ALLIANCE, A STATEMENT THAT FINANCIAL MEANS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AS NECESSARY AND STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE BUNDESWEHR.

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BY CJS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 1895

DTG: 271451Z JAN 82 PSN: 048102

4. THE RESOLUTION THEN GOES INTO SOME DETAIL ON MATTERS OF ARMS CONTROL, RELATIONS WITH THE EAST, THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND CONCLUDES WITH A WORD ON POLAND. CLEARLY, THE INTENT OF THE AUTHORS IS TO UPHOLD THE ESTABLISHED SPD POSITIONS ON WORLD AND SECURITY ISSUES OF THE LAST TWENTY-THREE YEARS (SINCE THE GODESBERGER PROGRAM), WITH A SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE SPD'S DETERMINED COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL. THERE IS SOME IMPLIED CRITICISM OF PUTATIVE U.S. POSITIONS. THERE APPEARS TO BE NOTHING WITH WHICH THE SCHMIDT-GENSCHER COALITION GOVERNMENT CANNOT LIVE. THE DOOR IS LEFT OPEN, HOWEVER, FOR FUTURE CONTROVERSIES WITHIN THE PARTY ON DEFENSE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE ATTITUDE IT WILL TAKE IN 1983 WHEN AND IF THE TIME ARRIVES TO BEGIN INF DEPLOYMENT.

END SUMMARY.

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### 5. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

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THE RESOLUTION AT THE OUTSET RESTATES FUNDAMENTAL SPD PRINCIPLES ON THE WORLD SITUATION AND SECURITY POLICY AND REFLECTS THE SPD'S CONCEPT OF ITSELF ON THESE ISSUES:

- INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE "REMAINS THE INDISPENSABLE BASIS" OF SPD POLICY.

-

-- THE "FATE OF MANKIND" WILL BE DETERMINED BY "STOPPING REARMAMENT," AND SOLVING WORLD ECONOMIC AND POPULATION PROBLEMS. THE WORLD SITUATION IS BECOMING MORE DANGEROUS.

-- THE SPD IS THE "DECISIVE POLITICAL FORCE" WHICH WILL ASSURE THAT WAR IS NEVER STARTED AGAIN FROM GERMANY.

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-- "SECURITY AND DETENTE," AS LAID OUT IN THE NATO  
BT

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REGALLED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02      BONN 1895  
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INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 5674  
AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 4214  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 6774  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1503  
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 6203  
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 3872  
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 8675  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE  
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
USLO SACLANT IMMEDIATE  
USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF PRIORITY 2968  
AMCONSUL HAMBURG PRIORITY 5420  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY 2387  
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 01895

1967 HARMEL REPORT IS SPECIFICALLY REARRIRMED. AN  
IMPORTANT PART OF PEACE POLICY IS "SECURITY THROUGH  
AN APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES."

-- THE NATO ALLIANCE AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE  
IN EUROPE ARE ESSENTIAL FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY. THE  
TASK OF THE BUNDESWEHR IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTENANCE  
OF THE BALANCE AND THE FINANCIAL MEANS REQUIRED "WILL  
BE MADE AVAILABLE."

-- A "MODERNLY EQUIPPED AND TRAINED BUNDESWEHR" IS AN  
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE FRG'S PROPER ROLE IN NATO.

-- MILITARY BALANCE ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. THERE MUST  
ALSO BE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS ON  
"WHAT IS CONSIDERED A VERIFIABLE BALANCE."

-- MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF FORCE IS "THE CORE" OF  
"OUR POLICY OF DETENTE" AND THERE IS "NO REASONABLE  
ALTERNATIVE" TO DETENTE POLICY. THE FUTURE OF THIS  
POLICY WILL DEPEND DECISIVELY ON APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE  
OF RENUNCIATION OF FORCE TO THE MILITARY BALANCE AND  
"ESPECIALLY BY THE RENUNCIATION OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY."

-- THE SPD SUPPORTS "NATIONAL AND SOCIAL LIBERATION  
MOVEMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD" AND STRENGTHENING OF THE  
SITUATION OF AUTHENTICALLY NONALIGNED STATES.

6. ARMS CONTROL POLICY

-----  
FOR THE SPD, "ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT RATHER THAN

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 1895

DTG: 271451Z JAN 82 PSN: 048104

ARMAMENT CONTINUE TO HAVE PRIORITY IN BRINGING ABOUT A BALANCE. THERE MUST BE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS AS TO WHAT IS CONSIDERED A VERIFIABLE BALANCE IN CONCRETE CASES." THE SPD BELIEVES THAT DETENTE POLICY, IN SPITE OF DIFFICULTIES AND SETBACKS, REQUIRES "BLOC-TRANSCENDING AGREEMENTS." THERE IS "NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE" TO DETENTE POLICY. THEREFORE, "IT FOLLOWS THAT A POLICY OF MODERATION, DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION MUST BE CONTINUED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTRASTS AND DIFFERENCES EXISTING BETWEEN THE BLOCKS."

## 7. RELATIONS WITH THE EAST

-----  
THE SPD CALLS FOR A "POLICY OF PARTNESHIP FOR SECURITY" BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AS WILLY BRANDT AND HELMUT SCHMIDT HAVE PURSUED.

## 8. THE GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS

-----  
THE SPD CALLS ON MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON TO CONDUCT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, "ON ALL LEVELS CONSTRUCTIVELY IN A SPIRIT OF PARTNERSHIP FOR THE SAKE OF SECURITY." THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE "DISMANTLEMENT ("ABBAUEN") OF SOVIET INTERMEDIATE-RANGE ROCKETS, IN ORDER TO MAKE SUPERFLUOUS THE INTRODUCTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF NEW INTERMEDIATE-RANGE WEAPONS."

## 9. IN ADDITION, THE SPD CALLS FOR "A DEPLOYMENT ("STATIONIERUNG") MORATORIUM FOR SHORTER RANGE NEW

ROCKET SYSTEMS, THAT IS, FOR ROCKETS BELOW THE RANGE OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE ROCKETS IN EAST AND WEST, FOR THE DURATION OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS."

10. THE SPD CALLS FOR BRINGING INTO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON A GRADUAL BASIS, "ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATIONED IN  
BT

RECALLED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 1895  
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TOR: 027/1722Z

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DE RUFHOL #1895/03 0271505  
O 271451Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3542

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 5675  
AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 4215  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 6775  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1504  
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 6204  
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 3873  
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 8676  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE  
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
USLO SAACLANT IMMEDIATE  
USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF PRIORITY 2969  
AMCONSUL HAMBURG PRIORITY 5421  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY 2388  
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 01895

USINF  
EUROPE AND TARGETED ON EUROPE, INCLUDING THE AIRCRAFT OF  
BOTH SIDES THAT ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

-

11. THE SPD REAFFIRMS THE POSITION OF ITS DECEMBER, 1979,  
BERLIN PARTY CONGRESS, AGAINST ANY AUTOMATIC DEPLOYMENT  
OF INF ("AUTOMATISMUS"). IN ADDITION, CITING THE 1979  
RESOLUTION, THE SPD CALLS FOR EXAMINATION OF THE  
QUESTION, "WHETHER, IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATING  
PROCESS, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS (MORATORIA) ON A  
PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT HALT OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
SYSTEMS WOULD IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF  
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT."

-

12. AT A REGULAR PARTY CONVENTION IN THE FALL OF 1983,  
"THE SPD WILL DECIDE ON ITS CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE  
DEPLOYMENT, DRAWN FROM THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
THEN ACHIEVED. THERE MUST BE NO DEPLOYMENT ON GERMAN  
TERRITORY BEFORE THE SPD HAS FORMULATED ITS OPINION  
CONCERNING THE THEN AVAILABLE RESULTS."

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13. "FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL HAVE TO  
BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR THE BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND  
WEST."

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OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

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RECALLED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 1895

DTG: 271451Z JAN 82 PSN: 048106

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14. THE SPD URGES "THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AT LAST TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS (SALT/START)."  
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-

15. ABM: THE SPD IS OPPOSED TO PUTTING INTO QUESTION THE EXISTING SELF-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON ABM SYSTEMS.

16. ERW: THE SPD CONTINUES TO SAY NO TO ERW. "WE INSIST THAT IT BE BANNED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD."

17. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THE SPD CALLS FOR THE "SPEEDY RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE TREATY PROHIBITING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

18. CHEMICAL WEAPONS: THE "PRODUCTION, STORAGE AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS" MUST BE PROSCRIBED "ON THE BASIS OF A SUFFICIENTLY VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT."  
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-

19. MBFR: THE SPD CALLS FOR A PRELIMINARY RESULT FROM THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH "A NEW POLITICAL IMPETUS."

20. CBM: IN ORDER TO ALLAY FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK, AS A SOURCE OF EAST-WEST MISTRUST, THE SPD CALLS FOR AN EXPANSION OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, THROUGH VIGOROUS NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE FOR DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

21. POLAND  
-----

IN CLOSING, THE RESOLUTION DECLARES THAT PEACE POLICY AND MARTIAL LAW ARE INCOMPATIBLE. THEREFORE, TH SPD "URGES THAT THE COURSE OF REFORM BE CONTINUED IN POLAND", AND NOTES THAT POLAND WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE RESOLUTION AT THE CONGRESS.  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 1895  
SIT857 RECALLED

DTG: 271451Z JAN 82 PSN: 048110  
TOR: 027/1724Z

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OP IMMED  
STU5205  
DE RUFHOL #1895/04 0271506  
O 271451Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3543

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 5676  
AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 4216  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 6776  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1505  
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 6205  
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 3874  
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 8677  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
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CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE  
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
USLO SAACLANT IMMEDIATE  
USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF PRIORITY 2970  
AMCONSUL HAMBURG PRIORITY 5422  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY 2389  
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 01895

USINF  
COMMENT  
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22. BEGIN COMMENT. ON A FIRST READING, THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION CAN BE READ AS IN LINE WITH ESTABLISHED SPD ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE ISSUES. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE, THE NECESSITY OF MILITARY BALANCE, AND THE FRG'S CONTRIBUTION TO IT THROUGH THE BUNDESWEHR ARE ALL POINTED OUT AT THE OUTSET. THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENTS CONCERN ARMS CONTROL AND ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS AND PROPOSALS. CLEARLY THE SPD IS ATTEMPTING TO PROJECT ITSELF SIMULTANEOUSLY AS THE PARTY OF "PEACE" AND OF STEADFASTNESS WITH ALLIANCE POSITIONS.

23. THERE ARE ALSO ENDORSEMENTS OF SOME CONCEPTS, SUCH AS THE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, WHICH COULD BE USED AGAINST US BY THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA AS WELL AS DIGS AT CONCEPTS WHICH MANY IN THE SPD ATTRIBUTE TO THE CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AS "MILITARY SUPERIORITY." THE CALL FOR CONTINUATION OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE AGREEMENT IS ALSO OBVIOUSLY A RESPONSE TO SOME REPORTS OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS.

24. REFTEL B, ON THE HAMBURG SPD CONFERENCE OF LAST WEEK-END, REPORTS THAT MAYOR VON DOHNANYI SPOKE OF A "BREAK-DOWN" IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A HAMBURG SPD POSITION ON INF. WE NOTE THAT PARA 10 OF THE NATIONAL SPD RESOLUTION (PARA 9 ABOVE) CALLS FOR A "DEPLOYMENT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 271451Z JAN 82 PSN: 048110

MORATORIUM," BUT EXPLICITLY LIMITED TO "SHORTER RANGE" NEW MISSILE SYSTEMS. THE RESOLUTION THUS SAYS NOTHING ABOUT AN INF MORATORIUM. WE SURMISE THAT THIS IS THE CORRECTION WHICH VON DOHNANYI HAD IN MIND.

25. IN SUM, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE RESOLUTION AMOUNTS TO A BROAD REAFFIRMATION OF SCHMIDT-GENSCHER GOVERNMENT POLICY ON DEFENSE ISSUES, AND A REAFFIRMATION OF BASIC FRG COMMITMENT TO A UNITED WESTERN FRONT. THE "PEACE" MOVEMENT, WITH ITS CENTRAL OBJECTIVE OF ENDING THE FRG COMMITMENT TO THE ARMS MODERNIZATION HALF OF THE NATO 1979 DECISION, HAS NOT BEEN SATISFIED.

-

26. THIS RESOLUTION REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL VICTORY FOR THE PARTY ESTABLISHMENT ON SPD POSITIONS ON DEFENSE, AND INCREASES THE CHANCES THAT THE SPD PARTY CONGRESS IN APRIL WILL LEAVE SCHMIDT WITH SUFFICIENT MANDATE TO CONTINUE HIS ESTABLISHED POLICY COURSE, AT LEAST UNTIL A POSSIBLE DAY OF RECKONING AT THE FALL 1983 SPD CONVENTION. THERE WILL, HOWEVER, BE A BATTLE BEFORE THE APRIL 1982 CONVENTION IN THE MEDIA, THROUGH THE PEACE MOVEMENT, WITH THE YOUNG SOCIALISTS THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE CONGRESS, AND ON THE CONVENTION FLOOR ITSELF. END COMMENT.  
BURNS  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 1709  
SIT810 DATE 01/29/82

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3469

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0592  
AMEMBASSY MADRID 3842  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1489  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6503  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 6761  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4484  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 01709

EXDIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-3 1/25/91 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M  
TAGS: PL, GE  
SUBJ: POLAND UPDATING MEASURES -- THE FRG (III)  
REF: BONN 820

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. OVERVIEW. SINCE OUR LAST REPORT (REFTEL) THE FRG HAS MADE ANOVIOUS EFFORT BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO AVOID OR MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES WITH THE U. S. OVER POLAND. IT HAS WORKED ENERGETICALLY ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, BOTH WITHIN THE EC AND NATO, AND IN COMMUNICATIONS AND A DEMARCHE TO THE POLISH AUTHORITIES. IT CLEARLY SEEKS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN KEEPING UP POLITICAL PRESSURE ON POLAND TO FULFILL THE 3 KEY NATO-APPROVED DEMANDS AND IN WORKING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OUT A COMMON WESTERN POSITION ON THE CRISIS. THE FRG REMAINS RESERVED, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE WISDOM OR EFFICACY OF STRINGENT ECONOMIC MEASURES. MOREOVER, FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS ARE BEGINNING TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT OUR NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE, IF MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES IN POLAND REMAIN UNRESPONSIVE TO WESTERN DEMANDS. SOME HAVE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED DOUBT ABOUT WHETHER WE SHOULD SQUEEZE THE POLES SO TIGHTLY AND WONDER IF INSTEAD WE SHOULD DIRECT OUR MAJOR EFFORT AT THE SOVIETS.

3. TRENDS. WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY ONE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT DURING THE PAST WEEK. THESE POINTS SEEM PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY:

- A. IN THE BUNDESTAG, THE NEAR UNANIMITY OF

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FRG-030/2#121

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NARA, DATE

4/27/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SUPPORT FOR WHAT BECAME IN EFFECT THE FRG POSITION THAT HAD CHARACTERIZED THE VOTE FOR THE DECEMBER 18 RESOLUTION DISSOLVED WITH THE DEBATE ON JANUARY 14. COMPETING RESOLUTIONS WERE OFFERED THEN. THE SPD/FDP-SPONSORED ONE ESSENTIALLY REAFFIRMING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WAS PASSED; ONE SPONSORED BY THE OPPOSITION WHICH CALLED FOR IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IF THE 3 WESTERN DEMANDS ARE NOT MET SOON BY THE POLISH REGIME WAS DEFEATED. IN THE DEBATE THE OPPOSITION LAMBASTED THE GOVERNMENT FOR, AMONG OTHER THINGS, CONTRIBUTING TO WESTERN DISUNITY OVER POLAND. THOUGH CLEARLY ON THE DEFENSIVE, THE COALITION FORCES RALLIED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT. THE CONTROVERSY SEEMED TO KILL CHANCES FOR A "BIPARTISAN" FOREIGN POLICY, HOWEVER, DESPITE FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A RECONCILIATION WITH THE OPPOSITION. THE OPPOSITION ITSELF SEEMS DIVIDED ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE. ALTHOUGH IT TENDS TOWARD A TOUGHER POSITION, SOME CDU DEPUTIES CONTINUE TO QUESTION THAT APPROACH.

- B. THE FRG HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN A RECENT DEMARCHE TO THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO IN EFFECT REBUFFED FRG HOPES FOR "SIGNALS" OF RELAXATION. THERE IS MOREOVER A GROWING FEELING IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN POLAND IS DETERIORATING AND THAT RELAXATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND A RETURN TO THE COURSE OF DIALOGUE AND REFORM IS NOT SOON TO BE

BONN 1709

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXPECTED.

- C. A SENSITIVE BILATERAL ISSUE IN RELATIONS WITH POLAND MAY BE DEVELOPING. THE FRG IS REPORTEDLY CONCERNED THAT ONLY ETHNIC GERMANS WHOSE DOCUMENTS WERE APPROVED BEFORE DECEMBER 13 ARE BEING ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE FROM POLAND. APPARENTLY, NEW EXIT PERMISSIONS ARE NOT FORTHCOMING.

- D. PUBLIC CONCERN FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CONTINUES HIGH. THE FEDERAL CABINET IS REPORTED TO BE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE THE POSTAGE ON PACKAGES SENT TO POLAND.

- E. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY GERMANS APPARENTLY REMAIN UNSYMPATHETIC. THE ARCH-LIBERALS SO VOCAL DURING LAST FALL'S PEACE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE WITH SOME NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS BEEN RELATIVELY SILENT.

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 1709  
SIT809 DATE 01/29/82

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O 251856Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3470

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0593  
AMEMBASSY MADRID 3843  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1490  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6504  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 6762  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4485  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 01709

EXDIS

DER SPIEGEL (JANUARY 18) RAN FOUR AND  
A HALF COLUMNS OF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR THAT WERE  
MOSTLY ANTI-POLISH, SOME VENOMOUSLY SO, AND WE HAVE  
HEARD ECHOS OF SUCH BIAS IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS.

4. CONCLUSIONS. THE FRG SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN TO HEART  
THE LESSONS OF THE FIRST FEW WEEKS OF THE POLISH CRISIS,  
WHEN IT WAS BADLY OUT OF STEP WITH THE REST OF THE AL-  
LIANCE. MUCH EFFORT THIS PAST WEEK HAS GONE TO IMPROVING  
THE PUBLIC IMAGE. EVEN THE LIKES OF EGON BAHR AND WILLY  
BRANDT HAVE IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTED THE NEED FOR  
ALLIANCE UNITY IN THE FACE OF THE POLISH CRISIS. THE  
QUESTION OF WESTERN UNITY HAS THUS EMERGED IN DISCUSSION  
IN THE FRG AS A POSSIBLY DECISIVE ONE, AT LEAST IN THE  
MINDS OF A PROBABLE MAJORITY OF OPINION-MAKERS AND  
POLITICIANS. THEIR CONCERN TO PRESERVE WESTERN UNITY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND AN EVIDENT RELUCTANCE FOR THE FRG TO APPEAR THE ODD  
MAN OUT SHOULD WORK TO KEEP FRG POLICY GENERALLY SUP-  
PORTIVE OF OUR EFFORTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AT LEAST AS  
FAR AS A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE IS CONCERNED.

5. REGARDING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, FRG LEADERS WILL BE  
GUIDED BY WHAT THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE IS PREPARED TO  
DO. THEY WILL STOP SHORT, HOWEVER, OF TAKING STEPS  
THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY HINDER THEIR EXPORTS TO THE  
USSR, IN PARTICULAR THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GAS PIPE-  
LINE. IN ANY EVENT, MUCH WILL ALSO DEPEND ON FUTURE  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLISH CRISIS, AND THE ALLIANCE  
RESPONSE THERETO. THE FRG, AS A FOREIGN OFFICE PLANNING  
STUDY LEAKED TO DER SPIEGEL IMPLIED, IS LIKELY "TO BE  
SAILING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NATO CONVOY AND NOT AT  
ITS END" FOR SOME WEEKS TO COME. BURNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 251856Z JAN 82 PSN: 045835

CONFIDENTIAL

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT740 DATE 01/25/82

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TOR: 021/0940Z

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DE RUEHC #5204 0210521  
O 210505Z JAN 82 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT/IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT/IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT/IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 015204  
EXDIS  
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 01/19/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: NATO, PL

SUBJECT: POLAND: JANUARY 23 REINFORCED NAC

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOU SHOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE  
SECRETARY TO GENSCHER, CHEYSSON, CARRINGTON AND-COLOMBO  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR (NAME):,

4. AS WE APPROACH THE JANUARY 23 REINFORCED MEETING OF  
THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, TO TAKE MEASURES IN  
RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND, I BELIEVE IT IS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IMPORTANT FOR US TO RECOGNIZE THAT CONDITIONS IN POLAND  
HAVE ACTUALLY DETERIORATED SINCE WE GATHERED IN  
BRUSSELS ON JANUARY 11. MARTIAL LAW APPEARS NOW TO BE  
A REALITY FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. LARGE NUMBERS OF  
POLITICAL PRISONERS CONTINUE TO BE HELD. IF ANYTHING,  
THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IS CONSIDERABLY WORSE, WITH  
HEIGHTENED SECRET POLICE ACTIVITY, LARGE SCALE ARRESTS  
AND FIRINGS, AND INTENSE PRESSURE ON WORKERS TO

RENOUNCE SOLIDARITY AND, IN EFFECT, THEIR OWN  
ASPIRATIONS FOR A MORE OPEN, JUST AND PRODUCTIVE  
SOCIETY.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE SAYING THAT  
THE RESTORATION OF DIALOGUE IN POLAND IS OUT OF THE  
QUESTION, BECAUSE THAT WOULD MEAN PLACING SOLIDARITY ON

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #122

~~SECRET~~

BY CH, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 210505Z JAN 82 PSN: 039772

THE SAME LEVEL AS THE GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE ATTEMPTING POLITICALLY TO DECAPITATE SOLIDARITY BY RELEGATING WALESA TO THE STATUS OF A POLITICAL NON-PERSON, AND SOME ARE EVEN INSISTING THAT WHILE A UNION IN SOME FORM MAY BE ABLE TO SURVIVE, IT COULD NOT USE THE NAME "SOLIDARITY." THIS NOT ONLY AGAIN GIVES THE LIE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF NON-INTERVENTION; IT IS A TRAGIC COMMENTARY ON THE LIKELY FUTURE DIRECTION OF EVENTS IN POLAND IF WE STAND IDLY BY.

6. IT IS THEREFORE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE EMERGE FROM THE JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH DECISIONS IN HAND ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES WHICH CAN HELP TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES IN POLAND. THAT WILL BE POSSIBLE IF THOSE OF US WHO SHARE SIMILAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLISH SITUATION CONTINUE TO EXERCISE FIRM LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE A DISSERVICE TO THE POLISH PEOPLE AND TO WHAT WE STAND FOR AS ALLIES. IT WOULD FRANKLY RAISE THE PROSPECT FOR MY GOVERNMENT OF BEING FORCED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE OVERALL MESSAGE SENT BY THE WEST IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND FORCEFUL TO HAVE A CHANCE OF INFLUENCING EVENTS.

7. WE HAVE OF COURSE SET OUT IN OUR DECLARATION THE MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GENERAL AREAS IN WHICH WE WILL BE WORKING TO EFFECT THESE MEASURES. WHAT WE NEED NOW IS TO TRANSLATE THOSE GENERAL PRINCIPLES INTO SPECIFIC ACTIONS. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, I WOULD HOPE THAT THESE WOULD INCLUDE SUCH NATIONAL DECISIONS AS ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE SIZE AND MOVEMENTS OF SOVIET AND POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND ON REDUCTION/NON-RENEWAL OF EXCHANGES. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, I HOPE WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON VISIBLE, SIGNIFICANT AND DEMONSTRATIVE MEASURES. IN MY VIEW, THIS SHOULD INCLUDE AT A MINIMUM THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT NOTICE IS BEING GIVEN THAT CERTAIN STEPS WILL BE TAKEN OR THAT CERTAIN AGREEMENTS WILL BE SUSPENDED OR ALLOWED TO LAPSE. THE CRUCIAL POINT IS THAT THESE NATIONAL DECISIONS HAVE IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON SOVIET AND POLISH DECISIONMAKING AND MAINTAIN A MAXIMUM OF ALLIED UNITY AND CREDIBILITY.

8. WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY THE JANUARY 23 MEETING TO BEGIN A LONGER TERM DISCUSSION OF WHERE WE ARE GOING IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE NEW POLISH REALITY AND CONTINUING SOVIET CONDUCT. THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD DEAL WITH SUCH DIFFICULT ISSUES AS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO AND ENERGY DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND FINANCIAL DEALINGS WITH THE EAST.

9. IT IS CRUCIAL THAT WE ACT NOW IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM AND THE CREDIBILITY THAT WE ESTABLISHED WITH OUR DECLARATION ON JANUARY 11. I HOPE YOU WILL ARRIVE BEFORE JANUARY 23 AT DECISIONS ON NATIONAL MEASURES WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT YOU WILL INSTRUCT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE NATO MEETING TO TAKE LEAD IN ENCOURAGING MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTIONS BY ALL TO AN ALLIANCE RESPONSE. THE POLISH PEOPLE AND OUR OWN PUBLICS LOOK TO US TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE EARNEST OF GOOD INTENTIONS CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION. I THINK YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT WE CAN ONLY DETER THE SOVIET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 210505Z JAN 82 PSN: 039772

AND POLISH AUTHORITIES, AND BRING ABOUT A RETURN TO  
DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN POLAND, IF WE ARE WILLING TO ACT  
ON THOSE INTENTIONS.

SECSTATE WASHDC 5204

DTG: 210505Z JAN 82 PSN: 039772

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG. END TEXT. HAIG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 0879  
SIT994 DATE 01/18/82

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DE RUFHOL #0879 0151004  
O 151003Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3182

~~SECRET~~ BONN 00879  
EXDIS

EBMO. 1"065: RDS-1 1/15/01 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PL. GE  
SUBJ: CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND SANCTIONS

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING A LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH SCHMIDT JAN 14, I PRESSED HIM TO TAKE SOME VISIBLE STEPS TO FOLLOW-UP THE NATO DECLARATION ON POLAND. HE WAS CLEARLY RELUCTANT TO UNDERTAKE ANY ACTION WITHOUT SOME ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ALONE, EMPHASIZING, AS HE DID IN WASHINGTON, THAT IN VIEW OF THE FRG'S EXPOSED GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION "IT WOULD NOT STICK ITS NECK OUT FIRST" ON SANCTIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT I FEARED FOR THE INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF OF THE ALLIANCE IF WE WERE UNABLE TO GIVE CONCRETE FORM TO OUR DECLARATIONS. ADDING THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THE FRG. WHICH WAS THE STRONGEST EUROPEAN MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE. TO BE SEEN TO FOLLOW THE UNITED STATES LEAD AT LEAST IN SOME RESPECTS. FOLLOWING A LENGTHY REVIEW OF POSSIBILITIES, SCHMIDT FINALLY AGREED TO TIGHTER CONTROLS OVER SPECIFIC HIGH MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND WOULD WRITE A LETTER TO THE PRASQDENT TO THAT EFFECT. I TOLD SCHMIDT THAT SUCH A LETTER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL.

3. I ALSO ASKED SCHMIDT IF HE HAD DISCUSSED THE PIPELINE WITH MITTERRAND, NOTING THAT I HAD HEARD RUMORS THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE CONSIDERING DROPPING, OR AT LEAST SCALING DOWN, THEIR PARTICIPATION. HMIDT SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FRENCH WERE HOLDING FIRMLY TO PARTICIPATION IN THE PIPELINE AND INDEED HE HAD QUOTED CHEYSSON TO THAT EFFECT DURING THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE EARLIER THAT DAY. HE ADDED, HGWEVER, THAT FRANCE MIGHT VERY WELL SCALE DOWN ITS PARTICIPATION IN VIEW OF A CURRENT "GAS GLUT" IN FRANCE, AND HE DID NOT RULE OUT THAT MITTERRAND MIGHT TRY TO EXTRACT SOME POLITICAL MILEAGE OUT OF A REDUCTION SHOULD IT OCCUR. HE HESITATED TO COMMENT FURTHER NOTING THAT HE WAS CLEARLY NOT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F97-030/2 #123

~~SECRET~~

BY

CAS

NARA, DATE

4/27/01



~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 0879

DTG: 151003Z JAN 82 PSN: 032523

IN A POSITION TO ADDRESS FRENCH POLICY.

4. A FULL ACCOUNTING OF MY MEETING WITH THE  
CHANCELLOR FOLLOWS SEPTEL. BURNS

BONN 0879

DTG: 151003Z JAN 82 PSN: 032523

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 0798  
SIT009 DATE 01/18/82

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3149

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1458  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4462  
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~~SECRET~~ BONN 00798  
EXDIS  
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 1/14/02 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PL, GE, FR  
SUBJECT: SCHMIDT-MITERRAND TALKS JANUARY 14

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ACCORDING TO FRG PARTICIPANT IN FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT MEETING IN PARIS JANUARY 14, THE TWO SIDES REACHED FULL AGREEMENT ON ASSESSMENT OF POLISH SITUATION AND EXTENT OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. THEY AGREED ON NEED TO BRING THEIR OWN PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS CLOSER INTO LINE IN INTEREST OF WESTERN UNITY. THEY AGREED TOO TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON JARUZELSKI TO FULFILL HIS PROMISES. THE APPROACH TO SOVIETS SHOULD BE CARROT AND STICK. SANCTIONS WERE USEFUL FOR SENDING A POLITICAL SIGNAL BUT HAD TO BE CREDIBLE. THE GAS PIPELINE WOULD GO AHEAD, ALTHOUGH FRENCH, FOR COMMERCIAL REASONS, MIGHT REDUCE SCALE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. [REDACTED] GAVE DCM A PRELIMINARY BRIEFING THIS MORNING ON JANUARY 14 MEETING BETWEEN SCHMIDT AND MITERRAND. THE TWO LEADERS WERE ALONE FOR ONE HOUR AND WERE JOINED BY MAUROY, CHEYSSON, BEREGOVY, LAHNSTEIN, VON STADEN AND VON DER GABLENTZ FOR AN ADDITIONAL TWO AND A HALF HOURS.

4. REGARDING POLAND, THE TWO SIDES COMPARED THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 18 AND MAUROY'S STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 23 AND FOUND THEMSELVES IN "COMPLETE AGREEMENT" ON SUBSTANCE. THEY CONCEDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN DIFFERENCES IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THEIR POSITIONS DUE TO THE DIFFERING "PUBLIC EMOTION" AND "HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE" OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN PEOPLES VIS A VIS POLAND, BUT AGREED ON THE NEED

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS # 97-030/2-4/24

By GS NARA, Date 4/30/01

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DTG: 141107Z JAN 82 PSN: 031342

TO BRING PUBLIC AND PUBLISHED OPINION IN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES CLOSER TOGETHER. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF THE WEST. FOR THAT REASON, CLOSE CONSULTATIONS SUCH AS THE NATO MEETING OF JANUARY 12 AND THEIR OWN MEETING WERE NECESSARY.

5. THE TWO SIDES ALSO REACHED FULL AGREEMENT ON THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE EXTENT OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. THE SOVIETS HAD OF COURSE EXERTED HEAVY PRESSURE ON JARUZELSKI, BUT THIS WAS DIFFERENT FROM FULL-SCALE INTERVENTION. THE WEST, THEREFORE, SHOULD TAKE JARUZELSKI AT HIS WORD AND KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON HIM TO FULFILL HIS PROMISES. A FULL-SCALE SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD "CHANGE THE WORLD." MEANWHILE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE GENEVA, MADRID, AND TOP-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS.

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6. ON SANCTIONS, THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO "DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO SEND A POLITICAL SIGNAL," BUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR "CREDIBILITY." IN RESPONSE TO DCM'S QUESTION, ██████████ ASSERTED THAT NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON SPECIFIC MEASURES, BUT HE HAD THE "CLEAR IMPRESSION" THAT THE GAS PIPELINE DEAL WOULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED. WHEN PRESSED, ██████████ CONCEDED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT GO SLOW FOR THEIR "OWN REASONS," I. E., A COMMERCIAL NEED FOR LESS GAS THAN THEY HAD ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED, AND HE DID NOT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

"RULE OUT" THAT THEY MIGHT PRESENT THIS PUBLICLY AS A RESPONSE TO POLAND.

7. REGARDING THE CHANCELLOR'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON, MITTERRAND REPORTEDLY REMARKED THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD GOTTEN THE REPROACHES AND HEAVY WEATHER MEANT FOR ALL EUROPEANS, TO WHICH SCHMIDT RESPONDED THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN ALL THAT HEAVY AND THAT IN FACT HE HAD HAD VERY GOOD MEETINGS. HE THEN BRIEFED MITTERRAND ON THOSE MEETINGS. BURNS

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SIT028 DATE 01/18/82

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3139

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EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/13/02 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, GE  
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED]  
JANUARY 12

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON HIS INITIATIVE, [REDACTED] CAME OVER TO SEE ME YESTERDAY EVENING. WE HAD A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE RECENT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND BRUSSELS. VON STADEN EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT SECRETARY HAIG'S CALL FOR "PROMPT ACTION" TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISIONS JUST TAKEN BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS.

3. [REDACTED] AND I AGREED THAT THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS HAD GONE WELL. AND WE BOTH EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE HAD UNDONE THE HARM ORIGINALLY CAUSED BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S INTERVIEW PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN FLORIDA.

4. [REDACTED] WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SOME VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SECRETARY HAIG AFTER THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN BRUSSELS. WHILE HE WAS PLEASED BY THE SECRETARY'S STRONG ENDORSEMENT OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN THERE. HE WAS TROUBLED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BY WHAT HE REGARDED AS THE SECRETARY'S CALL FOR PROMPT ACTION. [REDACTED] MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE SOME ACTIONS IN LINE WITH THE DECLARATION OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS. WHAT TROUBLED HIM WAS THE AMERICAN URGE FOR "MOMENTUM." HE FELT THAT TIME WAS NEEDED TO DELIBERATE ON WHAT ACTION COULD WISELY BE TAKEN, AND HE WAS FEARFUL THAT AMERICANS WOULD CONFUSE EUROPEAN PATIENCE AND DELIBERATION WITH OUTRIGHT INDIFFERENCE. HE SHOWED SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN DYNAMISM IN GENERAL, AND HE EVEN ATTRIBUTED AMERICA'S GREATNESS LARGELY TO IT. BUT HE ALSO FELT THAT THE POLISH SITUATION REQUIRED MORE CAREFUL ANALYSIS THAN HAD YET BEEN ACCORDED IT BY THE AMERICAN OR OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING HIS OWN.

5. I AGREED WITH [REDACTED] PLEA FOR THOUGHTFUL AND

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By CLS NLS F97-030/2 #125 Date 4/30/01

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DELIBERATE HANDLING OF THE POLISH CRISIS. INDEED, I INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR TO ME WHETHER THE POLISH PEOPLE WOULD BE HELPED MORE BY SEVERE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OR BY GENEROUS FINANCIAL REWARDS ONCE MARTIAL LAW AND SOME OF ITS ACCOMPANYING REPRESSIONS WERE LIFTED. AT THE SAME TIME, I EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AT BRUSSELS HAD GONE AS FAR, IF NOT FURTHER, THAN THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAD EXPECTED, THAT WE REALIZED THAT CAREFUL CONSULTATIONS ON FURTHER STEPS WERE NOW NEEDED, THAT WE WOULD NOT PRESS THE EUROPEANS FOR PROMPT ACTIONS IN LINE WITH THE BRUSSELS DECISIONS, BUT THAT SOME SUCH ACTIONS WOULD NEVERTHELESS NEED TO BE TAKEN WITHOUT EXCESSIVE DELAY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS ALIVE AND FUNCTIONING. INDEED, IF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS FAILED TO FOLLOW UP THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, THE MEDIA WOULD EXPLOIT SUCH A FAILURE TO THE SERIOUS DETRIMENT OF THE ALLIANCE. ██████████ CONCURRED.

6. I ALSO TOLD ██████████ THAT I WAS INTERESTED IN OPENING UP A FRANK DISCUSSION WITH HIM ON THE ISSUES THAT OF LATE HAVE BEEN TROUBLING AND APPARENTLY WEAKENING THE ALLIANCE. I WENT INTO SOME DETAIL ON THE GERMAN POSITION WITH REGARD TO FINANCING OF NATO INFRASTRUCTURE; I INDICATED THAT THE GERMAN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE HAS HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS, AND THAT I FELT THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN ITS HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE. ██████████ EXPRESSED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE VIEW THAT THIS WOULD BE "WORKED OUT," AND HE QUOTED THE CHANCELLOR'S SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS COMMENT DURING THE WEINBERGER MEETING IN SUPPORT OF HIS OPINION.

7. AT THE END OF THE MEETING I TOLD ██████████ THAT GENSCHER'S STAND AT THE BRUSSELS MEETING WAS VERY GRATIFYING TO US. ██████████ WAS TRULY DELIGHTED TO HEAR THIS.

8. IN COMING WEEKS, I INTEND TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES TROUBLING THE ALLIANCE IN SOME DEPTH WITH ██████████ AND THE CHANCELLOR, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE ADVICE FROM THE DEPARTMENT. BURNS

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT892 DATE 01/12/82

DTG: 100226Z JAN 82 PSN: 025894  
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EXDIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 1/8/92

TAGS: PEPR, GE, US

SUBJECT: FRG STATE SECRETRY VON STADEN MEETING WITH  
UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL

1. *C* - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN MET ON JANUARY 8 WITH UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL FOR A DISCUSSION ON ISSUES RELATED TO POLAND, INCLUDING OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE POLISH SITUATION, SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN POLAND, THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON JANUARY 11 AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF POLISH DEFAULT; CHINA; AFRICAN ISSUES; GREECE; CENTRAL AMERICA; BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES; AND, THE MEDIA, BOTH IN THE U. S. AND THE FRG. OTHERS ATTENDING INCLUDED FRG EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR BAING, AMBASSADOR BURNS,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EUR DAS NILES, EUR/CE OFFICER WESTON, AND, JOINING THE GROUP FOR A WORKING LUNCH, EUR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLMES AND FRG CHARGE DANWENBRING. OTHER VON STADEN MEETINGS WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

POLAND

3. THE UNDER SECRETARY OUTLINED OUR MINIMUM GOALS FOR THE JANUARY 11 FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING. OUR KEY CONCERN WAS TO ACHIEVE A UNITY OF VIEWS BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE POLISH SITUATION, ON THE THREE POINTS WE WANT TO ACHIEVE IN POLAND, AND ON SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVENTS IN POLAND IN VIOLATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT--IN GENERAL, THOSE THINGS AGREED TO IN THE JOINT U. S. -FRG STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE SCHMIDT VISIT. WE WOULD ALSO HOPE TO

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NARA, DATE

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REACH AGREEMENT UPON WHAT THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ALLIANCE ARE PREPARED TO DO IF THE SITUATION IN POLAND DOES NOT IMPROVE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, IF PROGRESS IS MADE ON THE THREE POINTS.

4. THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED THAT, IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CANADIANS EARLIER IN THE DAY, THE LATTER WANTED TO STRENGTHEN THE STATEMENT OF POSITIVE POSSIBILITIES IF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT RELENTED. THAT WAS IN OUR VIEW POSSIBLE. THE U. S. DID NOT BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT ON SPECIFICS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD ON MONDAY WAS A REALISTIC GOAL, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME SUCH AGREEMENT. WE HAVE MADE SUGGESTIONS AS TO AN AGENDA, INCLUDING A CUTBACK ON OFFICIAL EXPORT CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND, REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND POLISH FISHING RIGHTS, CUTS IN AIR/MARITIME CONTACTS, REDIRECTION OF COMMODITY ASSISTANCE FROM THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE POLISH PEOPLE, REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND POLISH COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATION, SUSPENSION OF ISSUANCE OF LICENSES FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND ENERGY, AND SUSPENSION OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. WE DO NOT EXPECT AGREEMENT ON ALL THESE POINTS. BUT WE MUST IMPOSE COSTS ON SOVIET ACTIVITY SUCH AS THAT IN POLAND. WE FORESEE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AS TO WHAT MEASURES INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES WOULD TAKE. WE DID NOT HAVE FIXED IDEAS ON

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXACT FORA FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS, BUT WERE EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR AN ONGOING PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS. UNLIKE ECONOMIC MEASURES, THERE WERE SPECIFIC DIPLOMATIC STEPS CONTAINED IN OUR DRAFT DECLARATION.

5. NILES ADDED THAT OUR INTENTION WAS TO SEND A STRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE POLES AND THE SOVIETS, MAKING CLEAR TO THEM THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES THEY MIGHT TAKE. WE HOPE THERE CAN BE DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS WAYS THE ALLIES COULD TAKE ACTIONS PARALLEL TO THOSE OF THE U. S.

6. THE UNDER SECRETARY STRESSED THAT, OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE, WAS THE PRESERVATION OF ALLIED UNITY. THE

JANUARY 11 MEETING MUST NOT BE SEEN AS THE U. S. PROPOSING MEASURES WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD NOT ACCEPT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE NATO SECRETARIAT STAFF HAD ALSO DEVELOPED A DRAFT DECLARATION AND THAT AN EFFORT WAS UNDERWAY IN BRUSSELS TO BLEND THAT STATEMENT WITH OURS.

7. VON STADEN SUGGESTED THAT THE DRAFT DECLARATION CONTAIN A PARAGRAPH ON THE INABILITY OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM TO MEET THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF ITS PEOPLE, AND THAT IT ALSO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OTHER THAN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT (E. G., THE UN CHARTER AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS) SO AS TO PLACE THE DOCUMENT IN A WORLDWIDE CONTEXT.

8. THE UNDER SECRETARY AGREED THAT BOTH THESE POINTS WOULD BE USEFUL ADDITIONS. IN RESPONSE TO VON STADEN'S QUESTION, THE UNDER SECRETARY DESCRIBED OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND. THE MILITARY

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GOVERNMENT HAD SUCCEEDED IN STOPPING STRIKES AND THE SITUATION, AS FAR AS WE KNEW IT, IN THE COUNTRY WAS CALM. WORKERS HAD RETURNED TO THE FACTORIES. IT WAS UNCLEAR HOW HARD THEY WERE WORKING AND WE ASSUMED THERE WERE SLOWDOWNS AND A DECLINE IN PRODUCTIVITY. THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MILITARY REGIME HAD ANNOUNCED CERTAIN ECONOMIC STEPS (PRICE REFORMS) TO BE IMPLEMENTED FOLLOWING DISCUSSION. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS FROM CHURCH SOURCES THAT ABOUT 500 DETAINEES WERE RELEASED. THIS TRACKED WITH THE FIGURE GIVEN TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT BY VICE PREMIER RAKOWSKI OF 588. THERE WERE APPARENTLY SOME CONTACTS BETWEEN THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE CHURCH AND BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND SOLIDARITY REPRESENTATIVES, WHICH, ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY NOT VERY SUBSTANTIVE, ARE SIGNIFICANT. WALESZA REMAINS IN ISOLATION, INSISTING ON THE PARTICIPATION OF SOLIDARITY ADVISERS OR THE SOLIDARITY BOARD IN ANY TALKS HE HAS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. THE CHURCH APPEARS MOST CONCERNED WITH ITS OWN POSITION, LESS INTERESTED IN THE REFORM PROCESS THAN IN PRESERVING THAT POSITION AND ITS ABILITY TO FUNCTION OVER THE LONG TERM. ALTHOUGH THE FOOD SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE BAD, SO FAR THERE HAVE BEEN NO FOOD RIOTS. AS FAR AS WE KNOW THE DETAINEES ARE NOT BEING SEVERELY MISTRATED. THERE IS A PURIFICATION CAMPAIGN UNDERWAY, APPARENTLY CONSISTING OF FORCED LOYALTY OATHS. THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND/OR COMMUNIST PARTY ARE TRYING, THROUGH CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CHURCH, TO LEGITIMIZE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER AND TO REDUCE SOLIDARITY TO PLAYING A PURELY SOCIAL, NOT ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL, ROLE, EXCLUDING SOLIDARITY "EXTREMISTS" FROM THAT PROCESS. THE PARTY IS VERY WEAK AND THERE ARE APPARENTLY EFFORTS UNDERWAY TO RESTRUCTURE IT. THERE ARE REPORTS OF SOME RELAXATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE RESTORATION OF SOME TELEPHONE AND TELEX LINKS. TRAVEL IS STILL TIGHTLY CONTROLLED. OUR AMBASSADOR IS HAVING CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CZYREK, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WIEJAC AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHURCH.

9. VON STADEN NOTED THAT JARUZELSKI DOES NOT APPEAR READY TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO ANY PRECISE COURSE. THE UNDER SECRETARY AGREED, NOTING THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT SEVERAL GROUPS WERE WORKING ON PLANS FOR THE FUTURE. JARUZELSKI MAY SEE THE NEED FOR REFORM BUT BE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT WHERE THAT PROCESS COULD LEAD. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, PRESSURES ON HIM TO CONTINUE TO BE VERY TOUGH, BUT HE MAINTAINS THAT HE WANTS TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW. THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

JARUZELSKI'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER, WHICH WAS IN CONTENT VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT JARUZELSKI HAD SAID TO THE EC AMBASSADORS IN WARSAW. THE POLES HAVE NOT RAISED THE IMMIGRATION QUESTION WITH US. VON STADEN NOTED THAT THE QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN RAISED WITH THE FRG AFTER RAKOWSKI'S MENTION OF IT JANUARY 4.

10. STOESSEL REPORTED THAT HE HAD SEEN SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON JANUARY 7 TO PROTEST THE JAMMING OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA AND THE BBC AS A VIOLATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT. BAZING CONFIRMED THAT DEUTSCHE WELLE WAS ALSO BEING JAMMED.

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11. REPORTING ON THE SECRETARY'S EXCHANGES WITH GROMYKO, ON WHICH THE ALLIES HAD BEEN BRIEFED, THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED THAT GROMYKO WAS INFORMED OF THE U. S. MEASURES ON DECEMBER 29, BEFORE THEIR IMPOSITION. GROMYKO'S RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ON DELIVERY OF THE LETTER HAD BEEN VERY SHARP, A COUNTERATTACK WITH ACCUSATIONS OF U. S. INTERFERENCE IN POLAND AND PROTESTATIONS OF SOVIET INNOCENCE. GROMYKO'S RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY HAD REPEATED THESE POINTS BUT WAS LESS SHARP IN TONE THAN BREZHNEV'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. THE SHARPNESS OF BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE, IN THE UNDER SECRETARY'S VIEW, WAS PROBABLY DUE TO THE SOVIETS' PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR SINGULAR ROLE IN EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH BROOKS NO INTERFERENCE FROM THE U. S. OR ANYONE ELSE. IT WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN OPERATION. OF COURSE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO

BREZHNEV WAS VERY FIRM AND BREZHNEV WAS REACTING TO THAT. WITH REGARD TO THE DIFFERENCE IN TONE BETWEEN BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE TO SCHMIDT AND HIS RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT, VON STADEN BELIEVED IT WAS DUE TO THE DIFFERENCE IN TONE IN THE LETTERS HE HAD RECEIVED. ALTHOUGH VON STADEN HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE U. S. VON STADEN EMPHASIZED THAT BREZHNEV'S ASSERTION THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT OF POLAND COULD NOT BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS MUST NOT GO UNANSWERED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARTY RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST STATES ARE BY DEFINITION OFFICIAL RELATIONS.

12. IN RESPONSE TO THE UNDER SECRETARY'S EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT WE COULD ON MONDAY REACH A CONSENSUS ON A LONG TERM FRAMEWORK OF WHERE WE WANT TO GO, VON STADEN NOTED THAT IT COULD NOT BE DONE WITH 15 GOVERNMENTS IN ONE DAY. WE WOULD HAVE TO USE THE EXISTING MACHINERY FOR FOLLOW-UP, INCLUDING THE NAC AND OTHER MECHANISMS. AS PART OF THAT FOLLOW-UP, IF THE SITUATION WORSENS, THE UNDER SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT THE U. S. INCLINATION WOULD BE TO TIGHTEN THE SCREWS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. MORE WORK WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE ON DEVELOPING INCENTIVES FOR RESTORATION OF THE REFORM PROCESS AS AGREED BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND THE CHANCELLOR ON JANUARY 6.

13. VON STADEN DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IMF CREDITS COULD BE SUCH AN INSTRUMENT, ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION OF IMF MEMBERSHIP COULD CERTAINLY BE BASED ON POLITICAL CONDITIONS. SINCE POLITICAL CONDITIONS COULD NOT BE INSERTED INTO DECISIONS ON IMF CREDITS, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SEPARATE THE QUESTIONS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING AND, AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, NEW IMF MONEY. THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE IMF QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED IN OUR LIST OF SANCTIONS. STATING THAT HE WAS OPERATING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, VON STADEN NOTED THAT, EXCEPT FOR GRAIN, THE QUESTION OF DEBT RESCHEDULING WAS THE ONLY FORMIDABLE LEVER WE HAD. WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO BE LED INTO ENDLESS DEBATE ON LESSER MEASURES, FORGETTING THIS MUCH LARGER ECONOMIC QUESTION. ALTHOUGH UNABLE TO PREDICT THE FRG'S ATTITUDE ON POLISH DEBT, VON STADEN HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS VERY MUCH ON THE CHANCELLOR'S

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14. THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED THE STRONG PRESSURES TO PRESS FOR DEFAULT ON POLISH DEBTS, AN ACTION WHICH A BANK COULD TAKE BY ITSELF. IF ONE BANK DID SO, THROUGH CROSS-DEFAULT AGREEMENTS, OTHER BANKS WOULD FOLLOW.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

VON STADEN BELIEVED THAT THE BANKS WERE IN EXCEPTIONALLY CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS QUESTION AND WOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS. THE PERIOD OF GRACE FOR THE DEBTS DUE ON DECEMBER 31 WAS CONTINUING, AND ANY DECISION ON DEFAULT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXAMINED IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT ON WESTERN BANKS.

15. AMBASSADOR BURNS EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT GERMAN, INCLUDING BANK FUER GEMEINWIRTSCHAFT, AND U.S. BANKS COULD ABSORB POLISH DEFAULT. HOWEVER, HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE RIPPLE EFFECT OF A DECLARATION OF DEFAULT THROUGHOUT THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM. ALL THAT WAS CERTAIN WAS THAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE FAR-REACHING AND UNPREDICTABLE. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THIS QUESTION REQUIRED URGENT EXAMINATION.

16. NILES NOTED THAT WE APPEARED TO BE MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARDS A COMMON STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF POLAND. WE WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE POLES AND THE SOVIETS THE ALTERNATIVES AND COSTS AVAILABLE TO THEM. WE COULD, HOWEVER, FACE DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH OUR THREE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MET. AMBASSADOR BURNS AGREED THE FURTHER DANGER THAT WE COULD BE PUT IN THE POSITION, BY ENDORSEMENT OF LESS THAN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE THREE CONDITIONS, OF ENDORSING AT THE SAME TIME REPRESSION.

17. VON STADEN AGREED THAT THESE DANGERS CALLED FOR MORE STRATEGIC THINKING ON OUR APPROACH. HE FOUND THE CURRENT APPROACH TOO PRAGMATIC AND WISHED WE COULD DO MORE TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY WHERE THE PATH WE HAD CHOSEN MIGHT LEAD. HE WAS IN FAVOR OF FLEXIBLE MEASURES WHICH WERE GRADUAL AND COULD BE UNDONE IF WARRANTED. HE PREFERRED "IN STRATEGIC TERMS, AIRCRAFT TO MISSILES" AND WANTED TO AVOID THE WEST MANEUVERING ITSELF INTO A CORNER.

18. AMBASSADOR BURNS URGED CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF OUR GOALS. IF WE WANTED TO HELP THE POLES, HOW DO WE DO IT? IS OUR INTENTION TO PUNISH THE SOVIET UNION? WHAT

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IS THE EFFECT OF OUR POLICIES ON THE ALLIANCE? UNLESS THERE IS A SEMBLANCE OF UNITY, ASSERTIONS IN THE MEDIA OF ALLIED DISAGREEMENT COULD ENDANGER THE ALLIANCE

SERIOUSLY. AT A MINIMUM, WE MUST CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE SHARE A COMMON ANALYSIS AND APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY POLAND. NILES ADDED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL, NOT ONLY TO REACH AGREEMENT IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, BUT TO ASSURE THAT PRESS BACKGROUNDING BY THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS FOLLOWING OUR MEETINGS BE CONSISTENT. VON STADEN URGED THAT WE BE VERY CAUTIOUS IN OUR CHOICE OF WORDS. FOR EXAMPLE, EUROPEANS BELIEVE

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DTG: 100226Z JAN 82 PSN: 025894

THAT YOU CAN'T "PUNISH" A GREAT POWER.

19. THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ON JANUARY 11. THIS, ALTHOUGH UNFORTUNATE, WOULD NOT UNDUE ALLIANCE EFFORTS. VON STADEN SAID THAT PAPANDREOU HAD NOT DISASSOCIATED GREECE FROM THE EC-10 COMMUNIQUE. HOLMES ADDED THAT WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE GREEKS WILL NOT AGREE TO A COMMUNIQUE ON JANUARY 11 EVEN AS STRONG AS THAT ISSUED BY THE EC-10. WE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE CONTROVERSY IN ATHENS OVER THE EC-10 DOCUMENT WAS DUE MORE TO INTERNAL GREEK POLITICS THAN TO THE DOCUMENT'S CONTENT. WE FEARED THAT THE GREEKS COULD ON JANUARY 11 DENY THE LEGITIMACY OF A NATO DISCUSSION ON POLAND AND WOULD BRING UP MARTIAL LAW IN TURKEY.

AFRICAN ISSUES

20. THE UNDER SECRETARY ASKED IF ANY FRG SUPPORT FOR THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION FOR CHAD WAS POSSIBLE. VON STADEN RESPONDED ONLY THAT OUR REQUEST HAD BEEN REPORTED TO BONN. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION OF THE REPORT THAT THE GHANIAN HEAD OF GOVERNMENT WAS IN TRIPOLI THE DAY OF THE COUP, THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT HE COULD NOT CONFIRM THE REPORT BUT KNEW THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY CONTACTS BETWEEN HE AND THE LIBYANS IN THE PAST.

CHINA

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DTG: 100226Z JAN 82 PSN: 025894

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

21. VON STADEN REPORTED THAT GDR CHIEF HONECKER HAD TOLD THE CHANCELLOR AT WERBELLINSEE NOT TO TAKE THE ANTAGONISM IN THE CHINESE-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP FOR GRANTED. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID WE HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT CHINA AND THE USSR WERE MOVING CLOSER TOGETHER AND THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE VERY HARD FOR US TO BELIEVE, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CHINESE HAD EQUIVOCATED ON THE SOVIET OFFER ON BORDER TALKS. THE GDR COULD OF COURSE HAVE AN INTEREST IN CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION OF CHINESE-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT TO THE FRG AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, TO THE U. S.

22. THE UNDER SECRETARY DID NOT MINIMIZE THE SERIOUS PROBLEM WE HAD OF ADJUSTING THE U. S. -TAIWANESE AND THE U. S. -CHINESE BALANCE. HOLMES ADDED THAT IN THE U. S. -CHINESE RELATIONSHIP SYMBOLISM WAS ALL IMPORTANT. CHINA UNDERSTOOD THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN WOULD CONTINUE. THE QUESTION OF A U. S. SALE OF ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO TAIWAN WOULD BE CRUCIAL, AND THE CHINESE HAVE MADE THEIR POSITION ON SUCH A SALE VERY CLEAR. THE U. S. HAD DISCUSSED POLAND WITH CHINA AND THE LATTER WERE VERY RELUCTANT TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES.

CENTRAL AMERICA

23. THE UNDER SECRETARY ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN EARLY RETURN OF A GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO SAN SALVADOR AND OF FRG OBSERVERS OF THE SALVADORAN ELECTIONS. VON STADEN ASSERTED THAT THE DECISION TO REMOVE THE LAST GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE (EMPHASIZING THAT HE WAS NOT AN AMBASSADOR SINCE HE HAD BEEN RECALLED)

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 100226Z JAN 82 PSN: 025894

WAS DUE SOLELY TO SECURITY REASONS. HIS RETURN TO SAN SALVADOR HAD PROMPTED SUCH MEDIA ATTENTION IN EL SALVADOR THAT HE CLEARLY HAD BECOME A TARGET OF THE LEFT. FOR THE TIME BEING THE RETURN OF AN AMBASSADOR TO THAT COUNTRY WAS IN SUSPENSE.

23. IN RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF THE FRG'S VOTE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE EL SALVADOR RESOLUTION, VON STADEN, ASKING THAT NO NOTES BE TAKEN, OUTLINED THE

SECSTATE WASHDC 6632  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 100226Z JAN 82 PSN: 025894

DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM OF THE FRG IN DEALING WITH THAT COUNTRY. THERE WAS A STRONG STRAIN OF ROMANTICISM ON THE PART OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS WHEN DEALING WITH THE LATIN WORLD, INCLUDING CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. THAT ROMANTICISM HAD BEEN INTENSIFIED BY EVENTS IN SPAIN AND THE ALLENDE AFFAIR. MOST SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC OBSERVERS REALIZE THAT UNGO AND HIS PARTY HAVE NO CHANCE, BUT FEEL THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO SUPPORT HIM. VON STADEN ADDED THAT IN RECENT MEETINGS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA AND FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COSTA RICAN OPPOSITION, ALL AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. DESPITE THESE ASSESSMENTS, BECAUSE OF THE GERMAN DOMESTIC PROBLEM, VON STADEN WAS NOT AT ALL SURE THAT THE FRG COULD SEND ELECTION OBSERVERS.

24. VON STADEN RAISED THE SUBJECT OF FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES TO NICARAGUA. HOLMES SAID WE HAD EXPRESSED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT TO THE FRENCH AND INTENDED

TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING NICARAGUA WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON. IN DEALING WITH THIS MATTER, WE WILL BE CAUTIOUS AND SEEK TO AVOID A PUBLIC CONFLICT WITH FRANCE. VON STADEN REPORTED THAT HE BELIEVED MOST EUROPEANS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE SPD AND OFFICIALS OF THE FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION, WERE SOBER AND REALISTIC IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA. HOLMES ADDED THAT SPANISH SOCIALIST LEADER FELIPE GONZALEZ WOULD BE PRESENTING WHAT WE ASSUMED WOULD BE A GLOOMY ASSESSMENT OF THE NICARAGUAN SITUATION SOON TO THE SECRETARY AND PROMISED TO BREF THE FRG ON THIS REPORT.

25. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U.S. EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE SPECIFICS ON THE CARIBBEAN BASIW INITIATIVE VERY SOON.

POLITICAL/MILITARY ISSUES

26. NATO INFRASTRUCTURE: IN RESPONSE TO THE UNDER SECRETARY'S QUESTION, VON STADEN REPEATED THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CHANCELLOR'S STATEMENT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAT "THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED."

27. MASTER RESTATIONING PLAN: VON STADEN SAW NO CHANCE OF FRG SUPPORT WITH FUNDING OF THE MASTER RESTATIONING PLAN, ADDING THAT THE FRG WOULD NOT COME NEAR TO ITS THREE PERCENT COMMITMENT ON ITS DEFENSE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BUDGET THIS YEAR. THE FEELING OF THE GERMAN MILITARY WAS THAT THE MRP WAS NOT COST-EFFECTIVE. THE FRG WAS WILLING TO GIVE ADMINISTRATIVE HELP ONLY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY AMBASSADOR BURNS WHETHER THIS POSITION APPLIED ONLY FOR CALENDAR YEAR (GERMAN FISCAL YEAR) 82, VON STADEN REPLIED THAT IT APPLIED FOR AS LONG AS HE COULD FORESEE. THE UNDER SECRETARY ASKED THAT WE CONTINUE TO DISCUSS MRP ON A CONTINUING BASIS INCLUDING THE PROVISION BY THE U. S. OF DETAIL ESTIMATES OF COSTS. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR BURNS' EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES IF THE FRG WERE NOT FORTHCOMING, VON STADEN SUGGESTED THAT THE RELEVANT COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS BE INVITED TO A BRIEFING BY FINANCE MINISTER MATTHOEFER. BOTH SIDES WELCOMED THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED ON WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT.

THE MEDIA

28. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE VISIT OF THE CHANCELLOR, INCLUDING THE PREPARATION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT AND THE PRESS CONFERENCES AND BACKGROUND

BRIEFINGS. HAD BEEN VERY SMOOTHLY AND SKILLFULLY HANDLED. IT WAS, HOWEVER, UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE MEDIA WOULD STOP LOOKING FOR FISSURES IN THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. IT WAS REASSURING THAT, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE CHANCELLOR'S VISIT, BOTH SIDES WERE AWARE OF THE OVERRIDING INTEREST TO CLOSE RANKS AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. VON STADEN BELIEVED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE PRESS WOULD BE OVERCOME WITH AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, THE LATTER MAKING POSSIBLE THE REMOVAL OF MANY POINTS OF IRRITATION IN THE U. S. -FRG RELATIONSHIP. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 6632  
END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                      BONN 1696                      DTG: 301253Z SEP 82 PSN: 053824  
SIT824                      DATE 10/12/82                      TOR: 273/1736Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #1696 2731254  
O 301253Z SEP 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0622

~~SECRET~~ BONN 21696  
NODIS  
E. O. 12356: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)  
SUBJECT: ECONOMIC SUMMIT  
REF: STATE 273801

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. ECONMIN DELIVERED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO FINANCE MINISTRY STATE SECRETARY SCHULMANN AT OPENING OF BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 30.
3. SCHULMANN HIMSELF SAW NO PROBLEM WITH WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE AND TO THE OFFICE OF HELMUT KOHL - WHO COULD BE CHANCELLOR BY THE TIME THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE. HE WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS.
4. WE STRESSED TO SCHULMANN THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING THIS MESSAGE IN THE UTMOST CONFIDENCE. BURNS

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #127  
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CECSTATE WASHDC 7908 DTG: 230223Z SEP 82 PSN: 043572  
SIT052 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 266/0450Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

SECSTATE WASHDC 7908 DTG: 230223Z SEP 82 PSN: 043572

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7908 2660228  
O 230223Z SEP 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5478

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 8471  
USMISSION USNATO 2258  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 267908  
NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL 9/22/02  
TAGS: NATO, US, SP, GE  
SUBJECT: THE PSOE AND NATO  
REF: (A) BONN 20363 (B) STATE 257358

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE RESPECT FOREIGN MINISTRY'S AND EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT REGARDING UTILITY OF PURSUING ISSUE OF SPANISH INTEGRATION WITH THE SPD AT THIS TIME. WE FURTHER RECOGNIZE THAT SPD CHAIRMAN BRANDT WAS PERSONALLY UNSUPPORTIVE OF SPANISH ENTRY. WE CONTINUE TO FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT POSSIBILITY OF A POSITIVE SPD ROLE WITH THE PSOE SHOULD BE EXPLORED FURTHER. PSOE/SPD TIES ARE PARTICULARLY CLOSE AND GERMAN POLITICAL LEADERS ARE IN GENERAL PARTICULARLY AWARE OF IMPORTANCE OF NATO'S INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THE VIABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE DEFENSE OF GERMANY. ADDITIONALLY, IT WOULD SEEM THAT BRANDT'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR SPANISH ENTRY STEMMED IN PART FROM FEAR OF LIKELY SOVIET REACTION, E.G., TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA. THIS CONCERN WOULD NOT SEEM PAR-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TICULARLY APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUE OF INTEGRATION, AS THE SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO MAKE MUCH OF A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP AND INTEGRATION UNLESS PUBLIC DEBATE IN SPAIN GIVES THEM OPENING TO DO SO.

3. DEPARTMENT LEAVES IT TO EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT WHETHER AND HOW MOST EFFECTIVELY TO APPROACH SPD ON THIS ISSUE. DEPARTMENT CONTINUES TO FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT QUIET ENCOURAGEMENT FROM SPD, PARTICULARLY FROM BRANDT PERSONALLY, FOR FULL SPANISH INTEGRATION COULD BE HELPFUL IN PERSUADING PSOE LEADERS OF WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY TOLD THEM, THAT SPANISH INTEGRATION IS DESIRED BY ALL OF SPAIN'S EUROPEAN ALLIES. IF, THEREFORE, EMBASSY PERCEIVES OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THIS ISSUE DISCREETLY AND USEFULLY WITH BRANDT OR OTHER SPD LEADERS, IT IS ENCOURAGED TO DO SO.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-0301-2 #128  
BY CH, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 0383 DTG: 161625Z SEP 82 PSN: 034511  
SIT157 DATE 09/17/82 TOR: 259/1906Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #0383 2591626  
O 161625Z SEP 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0183

~~SECRET~~ BONN 0383  
NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: NATO, SP, US, GE  
SUBJECT: THE PSOE AND NATO  
REFS: (A STATE 257356  
-- (B STATE 250320

1. ~~(RE - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. PER INSTRUCTIONS REF A, EMBOFFS SAW HOFMANN (FOREIGN MINISTRY'S DIRECTOR, NATO AFFAIRS) TO MAKE POINTS CONTAINED REF B. HOFMANN SAID BONN SHARES OUR CONCERN FULLY AND IS WORKING TO MINIMIZE HARM THAT COULD BE DONE TO OUR COMMON INTERESTS BY PSOE IF, AS EXPECTED, IT EMERGED VICTORIOUS FROM THE OCTOBER 26 ELECTIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID, US DEMARCHE IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL FOR HIM, FOR HE CAN USE IT AS "PEG" ON WHICH TO HANG HIS DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE IN TALKING PAPERS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS CURRENTLY PREPARING FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GENCHER'S LATE SEPTEMBER MEETING WITH HIS SPANISH COUNTERPART IN NEW YORK.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. HOFMANN SAID THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS PRESSING THE SPANISH TO MAKE THEIR FULL PARTICIPATION IN NATO AS MUCH A FAIT ACCOMPLI AS POSSIBLE BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. HE SAID THAT LUNS OBVIOUSLY IS TAKING THIS TACK, AS WELL, AND NOTED THAT MADRID HAD ALREADY GONE FAR BEYOND THE FRENCH IN THE SCOPE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION AT EVERE, WHERE INTEGRATION ON THE CIVIL AND DPC/DRC AREAS IS NOW VIRTUALLY COMPLETE. HE WAS LESS SANGUINE OVER THE EARLY INTEGRATION OF SPAIN'S MILITARY FORCES INTO THE ALLIANCE, FEARING THAT RESOLUTION OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WILL TAKE SOME TIME AND PERHAPS CAN ONLY BE DONE EITHER ON THE GREEK MODEL OR BY EXTENDING CINCSOUTH'S COMMAND AREA WELL OUT INTO THE ATLANTIC.

4. AS TO CONTACTS WITH THE PSOE BEFORE THE ELECTIONS,

HOFMANN WAS LESS CLEAR. THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING THE MATTER, BUT HE SUSPECTS IT WILL DECIDE NOT TO PRESS THE NATO ISSUE WITH THE SOCIALISTS UNTIL IT IS CERTAIN THEY WILL ORGANIZE THE NEW GOVERNMENT. BONN BELIEVES EVEN THE PSOE WOULD NOT BUCK THE SPANISH MILITARY ON INTEGRATION, IF THAT IS ITS DESIRE, BUT THE PARTY LEADERSHIP CERTAINLY WOULD NOT PRESS IT TO DO SO AGAINST THE MILITARY'S WISHES. (BONN BELIEVES THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE ARE FIRMLY BEHIND INTEGRATION BUT IT IS UNCERTAIN OVER THE ARMY'S POSITION.) HE AGREED FULLY THAT IT IS IN THE PSOE'S OWN BEST INTEREST THAT THE SPANISH ARMY'S FOCUS BE SHIFTED FROM INTERNAL SECURITY TO NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE DEFENSE.

5. THE GERMANS PLAN TO CONTINUE PRESSING FOR SPEEDY SPANISH INTEGRATION IN BILATERAL CONTACTS AND MORE BROADLY THROUGH THEIR AMBASSADOR IN MADRID, WHO IS SPANISH BORN AND EDUCATED AND WHO HAS A WIDE RANGE OF INTIMATES ACROSS THE SPANISH POLITICAL SPECTRUM. HE WAS LESS CERTAIN THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TRY, AT THIS POINT, TO ENLIST THE AID OF GERMAN SPD LEADERS IN BONN. THEY ALSO SEE PAPANDEOU AS A KEY INFLUENCE ON GONZALEZ, BOTH THROUGH THE EVOLVING ATTITUDES/ACTIONS OF HIS GOVERNMENT TOWARD NATO AND MORE DIRECTLY THROUGH HIS PERSONAL ADVICE. HOFMANN SAID THAT BONN HAD READ AS A HOPEFUL SIGN THE CAREFULLY HEDGED ANSWER GONZALEZ

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GAVE WHEN HE WAS ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE POST-OCTOBER 26 NATO REFERENDUM DURING AN EARLY-SEPTEMBER POLITICAL RALLY IN WIESBADEN.

6. EMBASSY COMMENT: IN LIGHT OF OUR CONVERSATION WITH HOFMANN, WE HAVE RECONSIDERED OUR ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION THAT WE APPROACH SELECTED SPD MEMBERS TO SOLICIT THEIR ASSISTANCE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE GAMEPLAN HE OUTLINED REPRESENTS MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION THE FRG CAN MAKE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR OBJECTIVES (EMBOFF WHO KNOWS HIM CONFIRMS HOFMANN ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN MADRID) AND THAT FOLLOWING UP WITH INDIVIDUAL SPD MEMBERS WOULD ADD LITTLE AND COULD POSSIBLY BACKFIRE. ACCORDINGLY, UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, WE WILL HOLD IN ABEYANCE ANY SUCH APPROACHS AT THIS TIME. WOESSNER

BONN 0383

DTG: 161625Z SEP 82 PSN: 034511

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NLS  
NLS F97-036/2 #129  
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

SECRET



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 9028 DTG: 011511Z SEP 82 PSN: 014476  
SIT189 DATE 09/17/82 TOR: 244/2126Z

SHIPPING ITS TURBINES AT A LATER DATE.  
WOESSNER

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

BONN 9028

DTG: 011511Z SEP 82 PSN: 014476

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #9028 244151Z  
O 011511Z SEP 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9754

~~SECRET~~ BONN 19028

NODIS  
USEC  
DEPARTMENT PASS INFO TO LONDON, PARIS, ROME AND BRUSSELS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: ETRD, UR  
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MEETING ON PIPELINE SANCTIONS  
REF: A) BONN 18429

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. DURING A COURTESY CALL BY ECONMIN, FOREIGN MINISTRY  
ECONOMIC DIRECTOR PER FISCHER SAID THAT THE FRG WOULD LIKE  
TO SEE A US-EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING FIND A  
SOLUTION TO THE PIPELINE SANCTIONS PROBLEM AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE. THE BRITISH AND ITALIAN TURBINES WILL BE  
LOADED THIS WEEK; NEW DENIAL ORDERS WILL PRESUMABLY  
BE ISSUED; THE WHOLE PROBLEM IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE  
DIFFICULT TO UNRAVEL.

3. FISCHER SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD EXPRESSED THESE VIEWS  
TO UK FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM IN BONN ON MONDAY. THE  
PREPARATORY MEETING OF THE ECONOMIC DIRECTORS OF THE  
UK, FRANCE, FRG AND ITALY, WHICH HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO  
TAKE PLACE IN LONDON SEPTEMBER 1 WAS POSTPONED BY THE  
FRENCH WHO WANT TO KNOW WHY CREUSOT-LOIRE WAS HIT WITH  
A DENIAL ORDER BEFORE THEY BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING.

4. FISCHER SAID THAT THE FRG BELIEVES A FOREIGN  
MINISTERS' MEETING COULD PRODUCE THE KIND OF "SOLUTION"  
HE DESCRIBED TO THE CHARGE LAST WEEK (REFTEL), I.E. LET  
EQUIPMENT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY IN 1982 GO FORWARD, AND  
THEN SUSPEND FURTHER DELIVERIES. THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE  
LOOKING FOR ALTERNATIVES FOR EQUIPMENT SCHEDULED FOR  
DELIVERY AFTER THIS YEAR ANYWAY, COULD PROBABLY LIVE WITH  
SUCH A SOLUTION. AND, ACCORDING TO FISCHER, IT WOULD  
MEET THE US OBJECTIVE OF SLOWING DOWN CONSTRUCTION OF THE  
EXPORT PIPELINE.

5. FISCHER SAID THAT AEG WOULD MAKE AN INITIAL  
SHIPMENT OF TURBINES IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO -- "CERTAINLY  
BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER." MANNESMAN (DEMAG) WILL BE

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #130  
BY CS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 5593  
SIT652 DATE 08/10/82

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TOR: 201/1903Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #5593/01 2011722  
O 201635Z JUL 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8635

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 07 BONN 15593

NODIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 07-20-1992 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, ECON, EAID, PL, GE  
SUBJECT: POLISH ECONOMIC PROPOSALS: SECOND ATTACHMENT  
TO CARDINAL HOFFNER'S LETTER

REF: BONN 15376

1. (C) HERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF SECOND ATTACHMENT TO JOSEPH CARDINAL HOFFNER'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. IT IS ENTITLED "ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE AGRICULTURE AND THE PRIVATE-ENTERPRISE SECTORS THEREWITH IN HANDICRAFT, TRADE AND SERVICE." THIS COMPLETES OUR TELEGRAPHIC TRANSMISSION OF MATERIAL POUCHED TO THE DEPARTMENT (EUR/EEY) ON JULY 20, ETA JULY 25.

2. (B) BEGIN TEXT:  
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
FOR AGRICULTURE AND THE PRIVATE-ENTERPRISE SECTORS THEREWITH IN HANDICRAFT, TRADE AND SERVICE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- 1. CONCEPT
- 1.1 ON THE SITUATION OF PRIVATE AGRICULTURE AND THE PRIVATE-ENTERPRISE SECTORS CONNECTED THEREWITH
- 1.2 AIMS OF THE PLANNED ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
- 1.3 WHAT KIND OF AID IS ENVISAGED?
- 1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN POLAND
- 1.5 WHERE SHALL THE MEANS COME FROM?

2. PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE AGRICULTURE IN POLAND

2.1 SURVEY OF THE CHANGES IN THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURES IN POLAND SINCE 1946

2.2 BASIC INFORMATION ON POLISH AGRICULTURE

2.3 MAIN BARRIERS OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

2.4 OUTLINES OF AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

3. STRATEGY OF THE PROGRAM INCLUDING A COST ESTIMATE FOR

A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM

3.1 ACTIVATION OF APPROPRIATE ENTERPRISES

3.2 EXTERNAL ACCOMPANYING MEASURES

3.3 TRAINING OF SKILLED WORKERS

3.4 COST ESTIMATE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE AGRICULTURE AND THE PRIVATE-ENTERPRISE SECTORS CONNECTED THEREWITH IN HANDICRAFT TRADE AND SERVICES

1. CONCEPT

1.1 ON THE SITUATION OF PRIVATE AGRICULTURE AND THE PRIVATE-ENTERPRISE SECTORS CONNECTED THEREWITH

80 PER CENT OF POLAND'S AGRICULTURAL ACREAGE ARE PRIVATELY-OWNED.

JUST SO, THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE FIELDS OF PRIVATE HANDICRAFT, PRIVATE TRADE AND A PRIVATE FIELD OF SERVICES.

YET THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS HAVE DREADFULLY NEGLECTED POLAND'S PRIVATE-SECTOR ECONOMY, SO THAT DUE TO A TOTAL UNDERCAPITALIZATION NEITHER MECHANIZATION NOR RATIONALIZATION HAD BEEN REALIZED, A FACT THAT HAS LED TO AN EXTREMELY LOW AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY. THIS LACKING

BONN 5593

DTG: 201635Z JUL 82 PSN: 011585

DECLASSIFIED  
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BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/27/11

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01            BONN 5593            DTG: 201635Z JUL 82 PSN: 011587  
SIT651            DATE 08/10/82            TOR: 201/1905Z

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHOL #5593/02 2011723  
O 201635Z JUL 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8636

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 07 BONN 15593  
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PRODUCTIVITY HAS BEEN RIGIFIED EVEN MORE BY REFUSING ANY KIND OF STRUCTURAL PROMOTIONAL MEASURES. THE HECTIC AND ONE-SIDED INDUSTRIALIZATION TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF AGRICULTURE, HANDICRAFT, TRADE AS WELL AS TO THE ENTIRE RURAL AREAS ADDITIONALLY SUPPORT URBANIZATION AND AGGRAVATE THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND THE RURAL AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE AVERAGE SIZE OF THE AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES IN POLAND AMOUNTS TO 5 HA.

1.2 AIMS OF THE PLANNED ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
-----

(1) BY MEANS OF 'HELP FOR SELF-HELP' INITIATING A DEVELOPING PROCESS THAT HAS ITS OWN DYNAMICS.

(2) ABOVE ALL, THE FOLLOWING SHALL BE REACHED:

- TO OVERCOME THE TIGHT SUPPLY SITUATION
- TO INCREASE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PRIVATE AGRICULTURE BY IMPROVING THE NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURES
- TO INITIATE THEREBY A REHABILITATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMY FROM ITS ROOTS
- TO ENCOURAGE AND AROUSE SELF-INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO OVERCOME DE-MOTIVATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(3) THE EPISCOPACY IS PREPARED FOR A RESPONSIBLE CO-OPERATION UNDER THIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM,  
- SINCE THE STATE AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS FOR VARIOUS REASONS WILL BE UNSUITABLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
- BECAUSE CHURCH FEELS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PEOPLE AND CONSIDERS THE REALIZATION OF THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AS ITS TASK  
- AND BECAUSE THERE IS A DIRECT PASTORAL INTEREST: WHEN STRIVING FOR THE NECESSARY ADAPTIVE PROCESS OF PRIVATE ECONOMY THE WAY OF THINKING NECESSARILY WILL HAVE TO CHANGE (MORE ECONOMIC AND RATIONAL THINKING), WHICH SHALL NOT, HOWEVER, LEAD TO A LOSS OF RELIGIOUSNESS AND OF THE CLOSE TIES WITH CHURCH.

1.3 WHAT KIND OF AID IS ENVISAGED  
-----

- (1) PROCUREMENT OF MONEY
- (2) PROCUREMENT OF THE NECESSARY MEANS OF PRODUCTION, SUCH AS SEEDS, CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS, PESTICIDES, EQUIPMENT - AND ABOVE ALL SPARE PARTS - VETERINARIAN AID AND NOT LEAST PROCUREMENT OF MODERN METHODS OF RATIONALIZATION

NB: HERE, IT HAS TO BE EXAMINED WHETHER THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION WILL HAVE TO BE IMPORTED FROM THE WEST OR WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A PRODUCTION OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION IN POLAND ITSELF.

(3) PROCUREMENT AND EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCE ("TO KNOW HOW"). ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONAL ESTIMATES SET UP BY EXPERTS OF THE POLISH EPISCOPACY THIS AID SHOULD COVER ABOUT 10 PER CENT OF THE PRESENT INPUT IN ALL SECTORS OF THE POLISH ECONOMY. THIS WOULD MEAN ABOUT 1 THOUSAND MILLION GERMAN MARKS. ACCORDINGLY A FIVE-YEAR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WOULD REQUIRE ABOUT 5 THOUSAND MILLION GERMAN MARKS.

1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN POLAND  
-----

(1) FOR THIS PROGRAM A NEW ORGANIZATION SHALL BE CREATED WHICH WORKS FOR THE VARIOUS PROFESSIONAL GROUPS AND IS BORN BY THE FARMERS THEMSELVES IN CONSULTATION WITH PROFESSORS AND OTHER CONSULTANTS AND IT SHALL WORK UNDER THE RESPONSIBLE CO-OPERATION OF THE EPISCOPACY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(2) THE ALLOCATION OF MONEY AND MEANS OF PRODUCTION WOULD BE ATTACHED TO CONDITIONS WHICH GUARANTEE THE SETTING UP OF AN OWN DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

(3) ALL AID WHICH IN THE FORM OF CREDITS IS GIVEN DIRECTLY TO THE ENTERPRISES, THOUGH AT A REASONABLE PRICE, HAS TO BE PAID FOR, IN ORDER TO USE THE PROCEEDS FOR THE CREATION OF AN INVESTMENT FUND, WHICH WILL ALLOW NEW INVESTMENTS OF STRUCTURAL PROMOTION.

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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1.5 WHERE SHALL THESE MEANS COME FROM?  
-----

(1) ONE HAS THOUGHT OF THREE POSSIBLE SOURCES IN THE  
WESTERN COUNTRIES, NAMELY:

1. CHURCH FUNDS (AS FOR EXAMPLE, OFFERTORY, CONTRI-  
BUTIONS, COLLECTIONS OF THE CHURCH ASSOCIATIONS)

2. PRIVATE ECONOMY (SINGLE COMPANIES, ASSOCIATIONS  
OF PROFESSIONAL GROUPS, BANKING HOUSES)

3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE EC-COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED  
STATES:

NB: PERHAPS IT IS A REALISTIC PROPOSAL TO THINK  
- ABOUT A QUARTER OF THE FUNDS TO COME FROM  
- CHURCH FUNDS, ANOTHER QUARTER FROM PRIVATE  
- ECONOMY AND THE REMAINING 50 PER CENT FROM  
- THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
- AND THE UNITED STATES.

(2) THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO A FAR EXTENT SHALL CONSIST  
OF LOST CONTRIBUTIONS BUT ALSO OF CREDITS.

(3) RESULTING FROM HITHERTO CONSIDERATIONS IT HAS BECOME  
OBVIOUS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO SET UP A SPECIAL  
ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF  
THIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, I.E.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1. AT CHURCH LEVEL (CERTAINLY WITH THE CO-OPERATION  
OF THE CATHOLIC ASSOCIATIONS)

2. AT WESTERN EUROPEAN LEVEL WITH THE INCLUSION OF THE  
USA

NB: THIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SHALL BECOME A MODEL,  
- SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH HAS PROVED SUCCESSFUL  
- IN THE "EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM" (ERP, MARSHALL-  
- PLAN), I.E. A KIND OF CHURCH-ORGANIZED "POLAND  
- RECOVERY PROGRAM (PRP)".  
-

2. PROBLEMS OF THE PRIVATE AGRICULTURE IN POLAND  
-----

2.1 SURVEY ON THE CHANGES OF THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE SINCE  
-----

THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE OF POLISH AGRICULTURE UNDERWENT  
VERY DEEP PROCESSES OF CHANGES. IN 1945/46, AFTER THE  
AGRARIAN REFORM ACT ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL  
LAND WHICH WAS BELONGING TO LAND-LORDS AND HAD AN AREA OVER  
50 AND 100 HECTARS HAVE BEEN DIVIDED BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL  
LABORERS OR SMALL HOLDERS. THUS, OVER ONE MILLION OF  
FAMILIES BENEFITTED FROM THIS REFORM. AT THAT TIME OVER  
50 PERCENT OF THE PROFESSIONALLY ACTIVE POPULATION HAVE  
BEEN ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE. THEN A LONGER PROCESS OF  
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND A LARGE RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION TOOK  
PLACE, PARTICULARLY OF WE MENTION ALSO HIGH RATES OF  
POPULATION GROWTH. THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION WAS  
MAINLY BASED ON THE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN EXPLOITATION OF THE  
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. AS A RESULT OF THIS THE ECONOMIC AND  
SOCIAL GAP BETWEEN THE RURAL AND URBAN AREA HAS BEEN  
RELATIVELY INCREASED. IF WE ADD THE DIFFERENT EFFORTS FOR  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIALIST SECTOR IN AGRICULTURE LIKE  
PROGRESSIVE TAXES AND OBLIGATORY MARKETING, LIMITED  
INVESTMENT AND LACK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES  
THERE WERE NO EFFECTIVE INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVING THE  
AGRARIAN STRUCTURE. THUS, DURING THIS LONG PERIOD OF OVER  
35 YEARS THERE WERE NO INTENSIVE CHANGES IN THE AGRARIAN  
STRUCTURE EXCEPT AN INCREASING NUMBER OF SMALL FARMS WITH  
AN AREA TO 2 HECTARS AND A DECREASING NUMBER OF MEDIUM SIZE  
FARMS OF 2 TO 7 HECTARS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2.2 BASIC INFORMATIONS ON POLISH AGRICULTURE  
-----

(1) IN THE TOTAL AREA OF THE COUNTRY OF 31.267 THOUSAND  
HECTARS THE LAND USED AGRICULTURALLY REPRESENTS 19.151  
THOUSAND HECTARS (61.2 PERCENT). FORESTS TAKE 8.631  
THOUSAND HECTARS (27.6 PERCENT), THE REMAINING 11.2 PER-  
CENT CONSIST OF WATERS, UNUSED AREAS OR USED FOR OTHER  
PURPOSES. THE AREA USED AGRICULTURALLY IS COMPOSED OF  
14.700 THOUSAND HECTARS (76.9 PERCENT) OF ARABLE LAND,  
4,000 THOUSAND HECTARS (20.9 PERCENT) MEADOWS AND PASTURES  
AND 250 THOUSAND HECTARS (1.3 PERCENT) ORCHARDS.  
CALCULATED PER ONE INHABITANT THE AREA OF AGRICULTURALLY  
USED LAND IS 0.56 HECTAR AND 0.45 HECTAR LAND PER PERSON.  
THIS IS THREE TIMES MORE THAN IN THE NETHERLANDS, NEARLY  
THE SAME AS IN DENMARK AND THREE TIMES LESS THAN IN THE  
UNITED STATES AND IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE CLIMATIC

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CONDITIONS CAN BE DESCRIBED AS A TYPICAL TEMPERATURE CLIMATIC ZONE. THE SOILS ARE RELATIVELY POOR, ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL LAND ARE LIGHT AND SUNDRY SOILS WHICH REQUIRE GOOD AGRO-TECHNICS AND INTENSIVE FERTILIZATION. THE MAIN GROUP OF CROPS CULTIVATED ARE GRAINS WHICH COVER ROUGHLY 52.6 PERCENT, POTATOES 17 PERCENT AND SUGAR BEET 3.8 PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND. DURING THE LAST THREE YEARS THE AVERAGE YIELDS WERE AS FOLLOWS: GRAINS 26 Q PER HECTAR, POTATOES 170 AND SUGAR BEET 280. THUS, THE AVERAGE YIELDS ARE ROUGHLY ONE THIRD LOWER THAN IN THE MOST WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. RESPECTIVELY IN ANIMAL PRODUCTION, THE NUMBER OF ANIMAL HEADS PER HUNDRED HECTARS OF AGRICULTURALLY USED LAND ARE AS FOLLOWS: CATTLE 67, PORKS 110 AND HORSES 10. THE AVERAGE MILK PRODUCTION PER COW IS ONLY 2750 LITERS PER YEAR.

IN SUMMARY IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL FEATURES OF POLISH AGRICULTURE REPRESENT VERY HIGH POTENTIALS WHICH ARE PRESENTLY NOT FULLY USED.

(2) IN POLISH AGRICULTURE THERE ARE THREE FORMS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE PRODUCTION MEANS, NAMELY PRIVATE, STATE AND COOPERATIVE OWNERSHIP. AT PRESENT CA. 80 PERCENT OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE AGRICULTURAL LAND IS USED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 18.5 PERCENT BY THE STATE AND 1.5 PERCENT BY COOPERATIVE FARMS.

(3) THE PRIVATE SECTOR AMOUNTS 2.9 MILLION FARMS (OVER 0.5 HECTAR) WITH AN AVERAGE SIZE OF 4.8 HECTARS OR 6.7 HECTARS IF THE FARMS OF 2 HECTARS ARE EXCLUDED. THE FARMS FROM 0.5 TO 2 HECTARS AMOUNT CA. 1.5 MILLION AND MOST OF THEM ARE KEPT BY PART-TIME FARMERS. ONLY LESS THAN 0.5 MILLION FARMS (15 PERCENT) HAVE MORE THAN 10 HECTARS OF LAND; THIS IS AN AREA WHICH IN POLISH CONDITIONS SECURES FULL EMPLOYMENT FOR THE AVERAGE FAMILIES LABOR FORCE AS WELL AS THE PROPER-LEVEL OF INCOME.

(4) THE POPULATION OF POLAND INCREASED FROM 23.6 MILLION IN 1946 TO 35.5 MILLION IN 1980. THAT IS A GROWTH OF TWELVE MILLION OR 50 PERCENT. SUCH LARGE GROWTH WAS THE

RESULT OF A HIGH BIRTH RATE AND A DECREASE OF INFANT MORTALITY. DURING THIS PERIOD LARGE INTERNAL MIGRATIONS TOOK PLACE. IN 1966 THE URBAN POPULATION FOR THE FIRST TIME EQUALLED THE RURAL POPULATION. PRESENTLY 58 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IS URBAN. THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION AMOUNTS TO ABOUT 16.5 MILLION PEOPLE AND 4.3 MILLION PEOPLE OR 26 PERCENT WORK IN AGRICULTURE. (5) THE MAIN SOCIAL ECONOMIC FEATURES OF POLISH AGRICULTURE MENTIONED ABOVE INDICATE THE TREMENDOUS NEEDS FOR RATIONALIZATION BUT ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY. THIS SECTOR OF ECONOMY AND THE RURAL SOCIETY COULD BE THE MAIN FORCES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECOVERY.

-----  
2.3 MAIN BARRIERS OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT  
-----

IN SPITE OF THE GREAT NATIONAL AND HUMAN POTENTIALITY POLISH AGRICULTURE DID NOT ACHIEVE THE LEVEL WHICH COULD SATISFY THE COUNTRY NEEDS.

THE MAIN BARRIERS OF ITS DEVELOPMENT WERE AS FOLLOWS:  
(1) INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF NECESSARY MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND PARTICULARLY SUCH AS PESTICIDES, AGRICULTURE MACHINES AND TOOLS, FERTILIZERS, QUALIFIED SEEDS, VETERINARY MEDICINES AND OTHERS.  
(2) EVEN THESE AVAILABLE MEANS WERE OFTEN USED INEFFECTIVELY BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE LIKE ROADS, DRAINAGE AND SUPPLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF WATER, TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE AND FOOD PROCESSING, BUT ALSO FARMERS' ORGANIZATION AND EXTENSION SERVICE.

(3) THE LACK OF PROSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY FARMS CAUSED NEGATIVE SELECTION OF YOUNG, BETTER EDUCATED AND ACTIVE PEOPLE.

(4) UNRATIONAL AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND LACK OF LAND CONSOLIDATION PROGRAM, WHERE EMOTIONAL RESERVATIONS AGAINST THE CONSOLIDATION OF ARABLE LAND ETC, ALSO PLAYED A ROLE.

(5) THE LOW RENTABILITY OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION CAUSED A LACK OF INITIATIVES FOR INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY.

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WHEN STARTING WITH ABOUT 10 PER CENT OF THE ENTERPRISES  
A CAPITAL OF 500 MILL. GERMAN MARKS WILL BE REQUIRED  
WHICH WILL BE ALLOCATED AS GRADED MEDIUM-TERM CREDITS.  
LATER ON FURTHER ENTERPRISES WILL BE ACTIVATED WITH  
THE HELP OF THE REFLUXES.

(3) DUE TO THE FACT THAT THESE REFLUXES WILL START AFTER  
THREE YEARS AT THE EARLIEST, A CONTINUATION OF THE  
CREDIT GRANTING OF THE INITIAL AMOUNT WILL BE NECESSARY  
ALSO IN THE SECOND AND THIRD YEAR. ACCORDINGLY, DURING  
THE FIRST THREE YEARS ABOUT 1.5 THOUSAND MILLION MARKS  
SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THESE ACTIVATION MEASURES.  
THERewith ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF THE FARMS COMING INTO  
CONSIDERATION WOULD BE REACHED. BEGINNING WITH THE  
FOURTH YEAR THE FURTHER ACTIVATION OF ADDITIONAL FARMS  
SHOULD BE POSSIBLE WITH THE HELP OF THE REFLUXES OF THE  
REVOLVING-FUND TO BE CREATED.

(4) IT IS EASILY POSSIBLE THAT A MORE MODEST BEGINNING  
(ABOUT 2 OR 3 PER CENT OF THE ENTERPRISES INSTEAD OF  
10 PER CENT IN THE FIRST YEAR) AND LATER ON A MORE  
RAPID INCREASE OF THE QUOTA WOULD BE BETTER. (CAPACITY  
OF THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED.) IN THIS CONNECTION  
IT MAY NOT, HOWEVER, BE OVERLOOKED THAT THIS ACTIVATION  
MUST HAVE A CERTAIN MINIMUM SIZE ALSO IN THE BEGINNING,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN ORDER TO CALL FORTH A DISTINCT MOTIVATION EFFECT.  
THAT IS TO SAY, ALSO A MORE MODEST BEGINNING WOULD NOT  
ALTER THE NECESSARY TOTAL AMOUNT.

-----  
3.2 EXTERNAL ACCOMPANYING MEASURES  
-----

- (1) IT WILL BE PROBABLY NECESSARY TO COMBINE THE  
ACTIVATION OF THE ENTERPRISES WITH AN IMPROVEMENT  
OF THE EXTERNAL INFRASTRUCTURE.
- (2) WHAT SEEMS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IS THE IMPROVEMENT  
OF THE STORAGE CAPACITY, I.E. FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE  
WORKING MEANS AS WELL AS FOR AN IMPROVED MARKETING  
HANDLING.
- (3) DUE TO THE FACT THAT AT THE MOMENT THE ENTIRE SERVICE  
SECTOR IN THE RURAL AREAS IS INEXISTENT, IT WILL BE

NECESSARY TO RE-ESTABLISH THE CORRESPONDING PLANTS  
(WORKSHOPS ETC.) AND TO STAFF THEM.  
(4) ON THE WHOLE A TOTAL SUM OF 50 PER CENT OF THE  
ACTIVATION COSTS AT LEAST WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE  
EXTERNAL MEASURES, I.E. ABOUT 750 MILL. GERMAN MARKS  
DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS.

-----  
3.3 TRAINING OF SKILLED WORKERS  
-----

(1) THE INTERNAL MEASURES AS WELL AS THE INFRASTRUCTURAL  
ONES REQUIRE THE TRAINING OF THE CORRESPONDING SKILLED  
WORKERS. IN THE PRESENT STATE OF CONSIDERATIONS IT WILL  
BE DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE MEANS BEING NECESSARY  
FOR THIS SECTOR. THEY SURELY WILL, HOWEVER, AMOUNT  
TO ABOUT 500 MILL. GERMAN MARKS FOR A FIVE-YEAR  
PROGRAM.

(2) IT IS A PRECONDITION FOR THIS RELATIVELY LOW AMOUNT  
FOR CONSULTING AND TRAINING, THAT INFORMAL EDUCATION  
MEASURES WILL BE EXECUTED FOR WHICH NO EXTRA INFRA-  
STRUCTURES HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED. BESIDES, IN THE  
PRESENT SITUATION IN POLAND NON-FORMAL CONSULTING AND  
TRAINING PROGRAMS WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE.

(3) WHAT WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT FURTHERMORE IS THE  
TRAINING OF THE SKILLED WORKERS OF THE COOPERATIVE  
SOCIETIES-A NECESSITY FOR A PROGRAM THAT IS CONCEIVED  
AS 'HELP FOR SELF-HELP'.  
-----

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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3.4 COST ESTIMATE  
-----

IF BEGINNING WITH THE FOURTH YEAR THE ACTIVATION OF THE  
APPROPRIATE FIELDS CAN BE MET OUT OF A REVOLVING FUND  
TO BE ESTABLISHED UNTIL THEN AND IF, HOWEVER, THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE TRAINING  
MEASURES HAVE TO BE MET DURING THE ENTIRE FIVE YEARS  
BY LOST CONTRIBUTIONS, THEORETICALLY FINANCIAL REQUIRE-  
MENTS OF 3.25 THOUSAND MILLION GERMAN MARKS HAVE TO BE  
EXTENDED (SIC). DE FACTO, HOWEVER, THE FINANCIAL  
REQUIREMENTS WILL BE HIGHER, SINCE IN ADDITION THERETO

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ONE HAS TO RECKEN WITH CONSIDERABLE COSTS FOR ADVANCE  
FINANCING, ALLOCATION OF WORKING FUNDS, TRANSPORT,  
PLANNING, ETC. MOREOVER, A CERTAIN RESERVE HAS TO BE  
GUARANTEED WHEN DOING THE FINANCIAL PLANNING.  
FOR A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM ONE PROBABLY CAN START OUT FROM  
FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF ABOUT 5 THOUSAND MILLION GERMAN  
MARKS. END TEXT.  
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