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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File
File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. III 9/1/81 – 12/31/81 (6)

Archivist: smf
FOIA ID: F97-030 (Friedrich)
Date: 05/24/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Nance to Thomas re Crane Proposal 1p R 6/20/01 NLS F97-030/2 #71	12/17/81	P1/F1
2. memo	Bremer to Nance re German Unification 2p R 4/27/01 F97-030/2 #72	12/10/81	P1/F1
3. note	Jim R to RVA 1p R 6/20/01 " #73	11/27/81	P1/F1
4. memo	Allen to RR 2p R " " #74	11/28/81	P1/F1
5. memcon	telephone call 4p D 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #75	11/25/81	P1/F1
6. memo	Rentschler to Allen 1p R 6/20/01 " #76	11/27/81	P1/F1
7. statement	translation 1p R 4/27/01 F97-030/2 #77	n.d.	P1/F1
8. memo	Allen to RR 1p R 6/20/01 " #78	11/27/81	P1/F1
9. NSC/S Profile	1p R " " #79	11/27/81	P1/F1
10. memo	Allen to Meese re Meeting Between Schmidt and RR 1p P " " #80 R 12/7/05 M1460 #10	10/8/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 5/15/2007

File Folder GERMANY, FRG 9/1/81-12/31/81 (6)

FOIA

F97-030/2

Box Number

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1 MEMO	NANCE TO THOMAS RE CRANE PROPOSAL	1 <i>MVH 3/19/08</i>	12/17/1981

17 1981

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6217

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

December 17, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ED THOMAS

FROM: BUD NANCE *BN*

SUBJECT: State Follow-Up To Crane Proposal on
German Reunification

As a follow-up to the November 20 response which Mr. Meese sent Phil Crane concerning the latter's proposal for a U.S. initiative on German reunification (see copy at Tab B), we asked State to provide more detailed analysis on the Crane suggestion. The memo at Tab A summarizes State's position and expresses the view that 1) a Soviet proposal of the kind Crane foresaw is unlikely at the present time; and 2) it would not be in our interest for the U.S. to launch a major reunification initiative now. State confirms, in other words, our own disinclination to proceed with the Crane idea.

Accordingly, I see no need for Mr. Meese to be involved any further with this matter at the present time; this is particularly true since the Polish crisis would be likely in any case to change the terms of the situation which initially prompted Congressman Crane's suggestion.

Tab A State Memo
Tab B November 20 Response to Mr. Crane

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

Review on 12/15/87

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2 #71

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/29/01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8134843

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. NANCE
THE WHITE HOUSE

81 DEC 10 PIO: 41

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: German Reunification

SUMMARY: With reference to the Lenz/Bremer memorandum of November 30, 1981, the Department has considered Congressman Crane's suggestion of a U.S. initiative calling for German reunification and has concluded that the idea has merit if undertaken in the form of a restatement by the President of the long-standing commitment of the United States to the eventual peaceful reunification of Germany.

The Congressman has suggested such an initiative as a means of preempting a possible Soviet move calling for reunification of Germany during the Brezhnev visit. Since his letter was written, Brezhnev visited Bonn and put forward no such proposal. In fact, we are aware of only one example in post-war history of such a Soviet proposal. This occurred in 1952 in the form of a letter to then Chancellor Adenauer. The Soviet proposal was vague and was clearly designed to prevent the integration of West Germany into the Western security system. It came at a time when FRG participation in the European Defense Community (EDC) was at a particularly delicate stage. Adenauer gave the Soviet proposal short shrift, and "revisionist" FRG observers today claim that in so doing, Adenauer missed an historic opportunity.

Our analysis is that it is extremely unlikely that the Soviets would now make such a proposal for two reasons: (1) the Soviets appear to have genuine fears of a reunified Germany, as reflected in over three decades of propaganda about German militarism and revanchism, and (2) the Soviets appear to have no current interest in introducing a major destabilizing factor in central Europe--and it is clear that a proposal for German reunification would be such a factor in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps in the Soviet Union itself. One circumstance in which we believe the Soviets might be induced to make such a proposal today would be to frighten sufficiently an unresponsive Polish Government so as to make that government more concerned about a Soviet security guarantee against a reunited Germany. At this point, however, we do not see this as a likely possibility.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 12/8/87

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030/2 # 72
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

The Department further believes that it would not be in U.S. interest for the United States now to launch a major initiative calling for reunification. Such an initiative would not be welcomed by other key allies, including the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries. It would also be highly unsettling in the Federal Republic, adding to and complicating the difficult situation which the government of the Federal Republic now faces. Such an initiative would also be viewed as aggressive and threatening in, at a minimum, East Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow.

The Department believes, however, that a Presidential statement reaffirming the United States commitment to the eventual peaceful reunification of Germany would be useful. Such a statement should be along the lines of that made by former President Carter in Berlin in 1978; e.g.:

"The constant commitment of the Western Allies, ever since the NATO organization was formed, ever since the Second World War was over, is for the reunification of Germany, based upon the self-determination of the German people yourselves. And this is a commitment that I believe ought to be maintained and an ultimate hope that should be carefully preserved.

We are not trying to impose our will upon the German people. But when the German people approach the time of making a decision for yourselves that Germany should be reunited and Berlin again be the capital of unified Germany, we would certainly welcome that time and we look forward to it with our prayers and our constant hope."

With regard to Congressman Crane's suggestion of an expression of support for reunification from the Congress, such an expression exists in Section 4, S. Con. Res. 36, 83d Congress of August 3, 1953. This could be restated perhaps in conjunction with, and in support of, a statement by the President.

Katherine Shibley for
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

20 November 1981

Dear Phil:

Warm thanks for your 15 September note and the thoughtful letter to the President which accompanied it.

The initiative you propose -- calling for German reunification as a means of preempting another Brezhnev propaganda offensive -- is indeed an interesting idea and deserves thorough consideration. With that in mind, I have asked Al Haig and Dick Allen to review it and determine what further steps, if any, might be in order.

There is no doubt that we must be increasingly alert to Soviet propaganda efforts and counter them as effectively as possible. As you probably know, Charlie Wick's International Communication Agency is already addressing this problem through "Project Truth," and the State Department, in collaboration with our embassies, is also mounting a public affairs program geared especially to European audiences. Any initiative involving the Federal Republic -- particularly one as far-reaching as German reunification -- would, of course, need to be carefully prepared and coordinated not only with the present German leadership but also the major political parties.

Your views are always welcome here, and I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sharing them with us.

Sincerely,

151

EDWIN MEESE III
Counsellor to the President

The Honorable Philip M. Crane
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

RVAllen:chd 11/20/81

cc: Ed Meese chron. file
~~Dick Allen~~
Secretary Al Haig, State Department



Hand Delivered

16 SEP 1981

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

PHILIP M. CRANE
ILLINOIS

9/15/81

Dear Ed -

Would you be so kind
as to bring this to the
attention of the President?
Your views on this problem
would be appreciated, too.

Best regards,
Phil

PHILIP M. CRANE
MEMBER OF CONGRESS
12TH DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS



WAYS AND MEANS
COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEES:
OVERSIGHT
HEALTH
SOCIAL SECURITY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

OFFICE:
SUITE 1033
LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
202/225-3711

DAVID J. ALLEN
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SUITE 101
1450 SOUTH NEW WILKE ROAD
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS, ILLINOIS 60005
312/394-0790

September 16, 1981

The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have returned recently from a series of meetings with private citizens and government officials in West Germany in which the growing influence of pacifist, terrorist, and pro-Soviet groups was assessed.

Although you are better informed than I about the deteriorating situation in West Germany, I am increasingly alarmed at both the depth and breadth of pro-Soviet and anti-American sentiment which has recently manifested itself in a number of ugly incidents.

Rather than comment on these issues, I would like to address one possible near-term development and suggest a prospective general strategy for your consideration.

During my trip it was reported that President Brezhnev, in his November visit to West Germany, would launch a new propaganda initiative to capitalize on the growing anti-American mood and stimulate dissolution of Allied resolve with a call for the reunification of Germany.

Although devoid of practical potential, such a move may exacerbate the already disquieting trends toward so called "Creative Solutions" including independent negotiations and agreements with the Communists detrimental to the interests of the United States.

Among both conservatives and some officials in West Germany there is concern that such a Brezhnev proposal will not only command more legitimacy than may otherwise be the case, but that it could serve as a wedge between America and one of its most strategically significant allies. Based

on my observations, the prospect of a "neutralist" or anti-American West Germany within the very near future is not as incredible as one may at first imagine.


I would like to suggest a course of action which might possibly preclude or at least blunt such an initiative if in fact it should materialize. That proposal is simply one of preemption.

By taking the initiative in calling for German reunification under certain well-specified preconditions -- ie., freedom of speech, press and association, as well as free elections and withdrawal of forces from both Germanies prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty, you could direct the argument both in the United States and abroad along lines which would make it difficult for the Soviets to put us in a reactionary or defensive position to their version of such a proposal. By highlighting and making indispensable these stipulations, the Soviets would be forced to publically assent to the legitimacy of conditions they would in fact never be disposed to accept -- a truly free and independent Germany with guaranteed borders.

Although you are better able than I to weigh the pros and cons of such a strategy, I wanted to convey to you the sense of anxiety which the evolving West German situation has aroused, as well as a possible preemptive move against a potential Soviet ploy.

In the event you do not feel this would be an appropriate course of action for your administration to initiate, I would be most appreciative if you would apprise me of your feelings with respect to such a proposal arising from the Congress.

Respectfully yours,



Philip M. Crane, M.C.

PMC/api

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

051105

FO

ACTION


November 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: German Reunification

Attached for the Department's information and appropriate follow-up action is an exchange of correspondence between Representative Philip M. Crane and Counselor to the President Edwin Meese III.

In line with Counselor Meese's reply to the Congressman's proposal concerning German reunification, the NSC would specifically welcome receiving the Department's assessment of this idea, with emphasis on its implications for Alliance security and East-West relations.



Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

Attachment:

Exchange of Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Tasker to State on German Reunification

Your memo to Bremer (Tab I) tasks State with providing a substantive follow-up to the exchange of correspondence between Ed Meese and Congressman Phil Crane on the subject of German reunification (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Bremer at Tab I.

Approve _____ As Amended _____

- Tab I Memo to Bremer
- A - Background Information & Exchange of Correspondence Between Meese and Phil Crane

62 11

RECEIVED

81 NOV 21 P 1: 15

JANET COLSON _____

BUD NANCE _____

DICK ALLEN _____

IRENE DERUS _____

JANET COLSON _____

BUD NANCE _____

PETER _____

CY TO VP _____

SHOW CC _____

CY TO MEESE _____

SHOW CC _____

CY TO BAKER _____

SHOW CC _____

CY TO DEEVER _____

SHOW CC _____

CY TO BRADY _____

SHOW CC _____

Comments:

20 November 1981

051105-

1240

FO

CO 165

Dear Phil:

Warm thanks for your 15 September note and the thoughtful letter to the President which accompanied it.

The initiative you propose -- calling for German reunification as a means of preempting another Brezhnev propaganda offensive -- is indeed an interesting idea and deserves thorough consideration. With that in mind, I have asked Al Haig and Dick Allen to review it and determine what further steps, if any, might be in order.

There is no doubt that we must be increasingly alert to Soviet propaganda efforts and counter them as effectively as possible. As you probably know, Charlie Wick's International Communication Agency is already addressing this problem through "Project Truth," and the State Department, in collaboration with our embassies, is also mounting a public affairs program geared especially to European audiences. Any initiative involving the Federal Republic -- particularly one as far-reaching as German reunification -- would, of course, need to be carefully prepared and coordinated not only with the present German leadership but also the major political parties.

Your views are always welcome here, and I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sharing them with us.

Sincerely,

151

EDWIN MEESE III
Counsellor to the President

X
The Honorable Philip M. Crane
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

RVAllen:chd 11/20/81

cc: Ed Meese chron. file
Dick Allen
Secretary Al Haig, State Department

to file

NSC # 6217

12 NOV 1981

7

MEMORANDUM

6217

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

November 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE

FROM:

DICK ALLEN *DA*

SUBJECT:

Phil Crane and German Reunification

Phil Crane's German reunification proposal is an interesting idea, but one whose time has not yet come. Public discussion of such an eventuality would generate lively controversy, not only among our allies but inside our own government. Unmanaged, it could have a particularly devastating effect on German public opinion at the present time (at a minimum such an idea would require the most careful kind of discussion and consultation with the FRG leadership and the opposition).

While we develop a more detailed analysis of the implications and consequences of the idea Phil recommends (particularly on the security effects in Central Europe flowing from removal of the 250,000-man Bundeswehr forces from NATO defenses), I suggest you send him a polite note along the lines of the attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Phil Crane at Tab A.

Approve *DA* As Amended

Tab A Letter to Phil Crane

Tab B Incoming Letter from Phil Crane

RECEIVED 22 OCT 81 13

TO PRES

FROM CRANE, PHILIP M

DOCDATE 16 SEP 81

MEESE, E

21 OCT 81

RENTSCHLER

30 OCT 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

CO

SUBJECT: PROPOSED REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ALLEN TO MEESE DUE: 23 OCT 81 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

STEARMAN

COMMENTS RECD WW 11/03 0712 HR

REF#

LOG

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(H / D)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 123 Reid by Meese Reply RE

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *wg* (C)

con



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

PHILIP M. CRANE
ILLINOIS

9/15/81

Hand Delivered

16 SEP 1981

Dear Ed -

Would you be so kind
as to bring this to the
attention of the President?
Your views on this problem
would be appreciated, too.

Best regards,

Phil

PHILIP M. CRANE

MEMBER OF CONGRESS
12TH DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

**WAYS AND MEANS
COMMITTEE**

SUBCOMMITTEES:
OVERSIGHT
HEALTH
SOCIAL SECURITY



OFFICES:
SUITE 1035
LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
202/225-3711

DAVID J. ALLEN
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SUITE 101
1450 SOUTH NEW WILKE ROAD
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS, ILLINOIS 60003
312/394-0790

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

September 16, 1981

The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have returned recently from a series of meetings with private citizens and government officials in West Germany in which the growing influence of pacifist, terrorist, and pro-Soviet groups was assessed.

Although you are better informed than I about the deteriorating situation in West Germany, I am increasingly alarmed at both the depth and breadth of pro-Soviet and anti-American sentiment which has recently manifested itself in a number of ugly incidents.

Rather than comment on these issues, I would like to address one possible near-term development and suggest a prospective general strategy for your consideration.

During my trip it was reported that President Brezhnev, in his November visit to West Germany, would launch a new propaganda initiative to capitalize on the growing anti-American mood and stimulate dissolution of Allied resolve with a call for the reunification of Germany.

Although devoid of practical potential, such a move may exacerbate the already disquieting trends toward so called "Creative Solutions" including independent negotiations and agreements with the Communists detrimental to the interests of the United States.

Among both conservatives and some officials in West Germany there is concern that such a Brezhnev proposal will not only command more legitimacy than may otherwise be the case, but that it could serve as a wedge between America and one of its most strategically significant allies. Based

on my observations, the prospect of a "neutralist" or anti-American West Germany within the very near future is not as incredible as one may at first imagine.

I would like to suggest a course of action which might possibly preclude or at least blunt such an initiative if in fact it should materialize. That proposal is simply one of preemption.

By taking the initiative in calling for German reunification under certain well-specified preconditions -- ie., freedom of speech, press and association, as well as free elections and withdrawal of forces from both Germanies prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty, you could direct the argument both in the United States and abroad along lines which would make it difficult for the Soviets to put us in a reactionary or defensive position to their version of such a proposal. By highlighting and making indispensable these stipulations, the Soviets would be forced to publically assent to the legitimacy of conditions they would in fact never be disposed to accept -- a truly free and independent Germany with guaranteed borders.

Although you are better able than I to weigh the pros and cons of such a strategy, I wanted to convey to you the sense of anxiety which the evolving West German situation has aroused, as well as a possible preemptive move against a potential Soviet ploy.

In the event you do not feel this would be an appropriate course of action for your administration to initiate, I would be most appreciative if you would apprise me of your feelings with respect to such a proposal arising from the Congress.

Respectfully yours,



Philip M. Crane, M.C.

PMC/api

Bus,
This action
has been completed

NSC/S
already closed
12/17 - WH

BTM

Close out.
H

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Donna, this is to substantive to
put in WH, pls try to get the original
back, marry the two and transfer to
PA. Thanks L.

RECEIVED 22 OCT 81 13

TO PRES FROM CRANE, PHILIP M DOCDATE 16 SEP 81
 MEESE, E 21 OCT 81
 RENTSCHLER 30 OCT 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R CO

DECLASSIFIED
 White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
 By smf NARA, Date 5/22/00

SUBJECT: PROPOSED REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ALLEN TO MEESE DUE: 14 DEC 81 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
 RENTSCHLER STEARMAN

COMMENT'S RECD WW 11/03 0712 HR / ADDON RECD WW 12/15 2047 HR

REF# LOG NSCIFID (H / D)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	2/101	file changed per 4B		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

Jim L.

These two items
came from our
conversation w/
Von Staden.

Jim

11/27

BACK FM (P)

6730

RECEIVED

81 DEC 3 AIO: 59

JANET COLSON _____

BUD NANCE _____

DICK ALLEN _____

IRENE DERUS _____

JANET COLSON _____

BUD NANCE _____

PETER _____

CY TO VP _____

SHOW CC _____

CY TO MEESE _____

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CY TO BAKER _____

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SHOW CC _____

CY TO BRADY _____

SHOW CC _____

Comments:

RECEIVED

81 NOV 27 P 1: 14

JANET COLSON _____

BUD NANCE _____

DICK ALLEN _____

IRENE DERUS 12/11

JANET COLSON _____

BUD NANCE _____

PETER _____

CY TO VP ✓ SHOW CC ✓

CY TO MEESE ✓ SHOW CC ✓

CY TO BAKER ✓ SHOW CC ✓

CY TO DEEVER ✓ SHOW CC ✓

CY TO BRADY _____ SHOW CC _____

Comments:

Do you want this to
go up?
Bud
~~to~~ file
forward. cc memo
Baker.

~~Secret w/ attachment~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: RVA

27N081

SUBJ: Transcript of Schmidt's Weds. Call to Pres.

Wick, before meeting with von Staden this morning you might want to skim very quickly the follow-up phone call which Schmidt made to the President on Weds.

J

Jim R.

NB. Corrected typescript
still in the non-overflowing
machine

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030/2 #73
BY LOS, NARA, DATE 6/29/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen 12/3/81

~~6896~~ 6830

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 28, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Jack*

ML

SUBJECT: German Debrief of Brezhnev Visit to Bonn ~~(S)~~

As prefigured in your recent phone conversations with Chancellor Schmidt, senior diplomatic envoy Berndt von Staden was in town on Friday to brief us on the Brezhnev visit. I spent an hour and a half with him, and later he saw Al Haig. A quick summary of von Staden's presentation includes the following key points:

-- Von Staden confirmed that your speech made a very positive contribution to the visit; in addition to the usefulness of the timing (Margaret Thatcher's presence in Bonn directly preceding Brezhnev's enhanced the positive impact of Allied reaction), the speech contents put the Soviets on the defensive and made it easier for the Germans to discuss strategic matters with them.

-- The Chancellor, according to von Staden, repeatedly made it clear that the U.S. means business in the proposals you have advanced and that there is a firm determination on the German side to proceed with full INF deployments if progress is not achieved in the Geneva talks.

-- Von Staden clarified the Soviet-German arms control "consultations" commitment which came out of the Brezhnev visit and emphasized that the word "consultations" was never used by the German side. What the Germans have in mind are exchanges at the Ambassadorial level which will be used to "interpret" and "impress upon" the Soviets the common Western position vis-a-vis Geneva and our determination to stick with the two-track NATO decision on INF.

-- Von Staden reviewed the essence of Soviet proposals in Bonn, highlighting German rejection of both the old moratorium idea and the "goodwill" offer to remove unilaterally some weapons from the Western part of the Soviet Union (which, because of the range problem, would have no meaningful effect on the present threat). He also identified several new elements in the Soviet position, in particular 1) apparent Soviet willingness to proceed step-by-step on arms control matters; and 2) willingness to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on 11/28/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030/2#74
BY WOT NARA, DATE 6/29/01

negotiate "significant" reductions of intermediate range weaponry, by which the Soviets mean "hundreds" rather than "tens" or "scores" of systems.

-- The Germans were impressed by apparently genuine Soviet concern over the capacity of modernized INF systems to reach Soviet territory - a concern which von Staden asserted the Germans did nothing to diminish.

-- On START, von Staden said that the Soviets wanted to continue negotiations in such a way as to preserve the "benefits" of past arms limitation agreements but expressed concern that we were ready to write off SALT II. (S)

Von Staden briefly reviewed a number of other issues which came up during the Brezhnev visit, including the Madrid Conference (the Soviets persist in asking for extension of the geographical area "into parts of the Atlantic"); Poland (Brezhnev seemed relatively moderate on the subject though emphasizing that the Soviets could tolerate no change from the "post-war configuration"); China (a very negative Soviet attitude); and bilateral problems (the Germans pushed for a more benevolent Soviet attitude on the two million ethnic Germans within the Soviet Union and brought up some specific hardship cases). (S)

Von Staden concluded with a few remarks concerning Brezhnev's general health and appearance along the lines Schmidt mentioned to you in his Wednesday phone call (see transcript at Tab A for quick skim). (S)

Attachment:

Tab A Telephone conversation btw Schmidt and Reagan

cc: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 27, 1981

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JIM RENTSCHLER 

SUBJECT: Von Staden Debrief on Brezhnev Visit

As per our exchange earlier this morning, your memo to the President (Tab I) provides a summary of your meeting with Berndt von Staden on the Brezhnev visit to Bonn. I have also included a clean copy of the transcript covering the November 25 Schmidt-Reagan telcon (Tab A) which may help the President put von Staden's visit in perspective (and in one fell swoop take care of including the Secretary of State and other principals on distribution for that material).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve  _____ ; As amended _____

Attachments:

Tab I RVA memo to President
A Telcon btw President and Schmidt

cc: Dennis Blair
Dick Pipes
Bill Stearman
Sven Kraemer

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F97-030/2 #76
BY WJS, NARA, DATE 6/29/01

Translation
105-3513/81

Anlage 2

In the course of the actual negotiations with the United States, we shall strongly urge extensive reductions on both sides in the number of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It is obvious that the actual figures will have to be established during the negotiations themselves. As far as our side is concerned, we would be prepared to effect reductions involving not just dozens but hundreds of weapons of this category. I repeat: hundreds of these weapons. This is our standpoint.

And if our negotiating partners show that they are willing to agree on the complete renunciation by both sides - the East and the West - of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe, we shall support this.

Indeed, we advocate that Europe ultimately be free from nuclear weapons - both medium-range and tactical weapons. This would be true fulfilment of a zero option in the true sense of the word - a just solution for all sides.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F97-030/2 #77
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

DER SOZIALDEMOKRATISCHEN
BUNDESTAGSFRAKTION

Datum: 24. November 1981
KT/Ka

Betr.: Fraktionssitzung

In der heutigen Sitzung der Sozialdemokratischen Bundestagsfraktion führte Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt zum Besuch des sowjetischen Generalsekretärs Leonid Breschnew u.a. folgendes aus:

Die Gespräche sind in der Atmosphäre sehr angenehm, in der Sache nicht einfach. Das letztere hat auch niemand anders erwartet. Sie sind übrigens noch nicht abgeschlossen - über bilaterale Beziehungen haben zum Beispiel Leonid Breschnew und ich noch nicht sehr viel geredet. Aber ich kann jetzt schon sagen, daß mich diese Gespräche voll befriedigt haben. Es gibt dafür eine Reihe von Gründen, über die ich sprechen will.

Zum ersten: Wir haben nicht nur öffentlich, sondern auch hinter verschlossenen Türen sehr klar und sehr ehrlich miteinander sprechen können. Und dies geschah - und ich wäge meine Worte - auf der Grundlage eines gegenseitigen Vertrauens in die Stetigkeit der Politik und die persönliche Redlichkeit der jeweils anderen Seite, einer Grundlage, wie sie sich im Laufe der Jahre sowohl zwischen den beiden Außenministern als auch zwischen dem Generalsekretär und mir gebildet hat. Und vielleicht darf ich hinzufügen, daß ich mich persönlich sehr gefreut habe über das Wiedersehen, über den Verlauf der Gespräche und insbesondere über das freundschaftliche Klima.

Was die Sache angeht, so verlaufen diese Gespräche im deutlichen Vertrauen auf den gegenseitigen Willen zur Partnerschaft, zur Sicherheitspartnerschaft, würde ich es formulieren. Wir wissen voneinander, daß dem anderen es ebenso

um die Stabilität des Friedens geht. Deswegen hört man zu und überlegt, auch jenseits aller öffentlichen Geräusche, die sicherlich sich noch verstärken können oder noch variiert werden, welche Folgerungen für die eigene Politik zu ziehen sind. Wir haben dabei keinen Zweifel daran gelassen, daß hier zwei Ungleiche miteinander reden, auf der einen Seite eine nukleare Weltmacht und auf der anderen Seite des Tisches ein nicht nuklearer Staat mittlerer Bedeutung, der allerdings nach seiner geographischen Lage und nach seiner Geschichte an der Sicherheit in Europa, am Frieden in Europa ein besonders hohes nationales Interesse hat.

Breschnew und ich haben sehr bewußt als Vertreter jener Generationen gesprochen, die den letzten Krieg voll miterlebt haben, mit erlitten haben, mitgemacht haben.

Wir Deutschen hatten und haben weiterhin bei alledem eine ganz wichtige- und das haben wir so erwartet, das ist so eingetroffen - Dolmetscherfunktion zu erfüllen. Es ist überdeutlich, daß die sowjetische Führung die Absichten der amerikanischen Führung und ihrer Führer noch nicht richtig einschätzen kann.

Ein wesentlicher Teil der Gespräche galt also unserem Bemühen, unseren Gesprächspartnern, die ernste Verhandlungsabsicht und den Willen der Amerikaner plausibel zu machen, zu wirklichen Reduzierungen zu gelangen. Ein Mißverständnis wird sicherlich in den Kreisen von Berufspolitikern, die wir fast ja alle sind, nicht eingetreten sein, was von einigen in der Presse kultiviert werden mag, das Mißverständnis, als ob hier über Fragen verhandelt würde, über die erst ab nächsten Montag in Genf verhandelt wird.

Niemand konnte erwarten, und jedenfalls haben wir nicht erwartet, daß die Sowjetunion sieben Tage vor dem eigentlichen Verhandlungsbeginn in Genf bereit sein würde, ihre ja schon öffentlich vorgetragene Verhandlungsposition noch zu korrigieren, zu verändern oder Zugeständnisse auch nur anzudeuten.

Ebenso wenig at die sowjetische Führung erwartet, daß wir
etwas anderes als die westliche Verhandlungsposition erläu-
tern würden, die wir ja sehr aktiv mitgestaltet hatten. Unsere
Gespräche sind aber für beide Seiten so wesentlich, daß wir
in dieser zentralen Frage der Verhandlungsgegenstände in Genf
und der Verhandlungen, die in Genf geführt werden müssen - und
ich habe sehr unterstrichen, daß dazu weniger als zwei Jahre
zur Verfügung stehen, um zu einem wesentlichen Ergebnis zu
kommen-, daß wir während dieser Verhandlungen in Genf in die-
ser zentralen Frage auch bilateral miteinander im Gespräch
bleiben werden. Wir Deutschen verhandeln nicht, wir können aber
hilfreich sein und wir müssen das auch im eigenen nationalen
Interesse immer wieder versuchen, zu sein. Natürlich war das
zentrale Thema von Herrn Breschnew eingeführt: Die Rüstungskon-
trollproblematik.

Ich habe nach all diesen Gesprächen keinen Zweifel an dem ernst-
haften Willen der sowjetischen Führung über die Genfer Ver-
handlungen zu wesentlichen Reduzierungen im Bereich der Mittel-
streckenwaffen zu kommen. Wir haben uns, ich wiederhole das,
unsererseits bemüht, ernste sowjetische Zweifel an der Glaubwür-
digkeit der amerikanischen Position und an der ernststen Verhand-
lungsbereitschaft der amerikanischen Führung auszuräumen.

Ich will hier hinzufügen, daß die Sowjetunion ernste Sorge vor
der Stationierung amerikanischer Mittelstreckenwaffen auf europäischem Boden
hat (zuletzt hatte es bis 1963 in drei Ländern Europas am Boden stationier-
te amerikanische Mittelstreckenwaffen gegeben, die sowjetische Ziele er-
reichen konnten). Das macht der Sowjetführung ernste Sorgen.

Ich habe ihr diese Sorgen weder nehmen können noch nehmen wol-
len. Vielmehr habe ich betont, daß ihre Sorgen
unseren Sorgen entsprechen, unseren eigenen Sorgen vor der
wachsenden sowjetischen Raketenkapazität, die auf Westeuropa
gerichtet ist.

Und ich habe deshalb die beiderseitige Null-Lösung für landge-
stützte Raketen in den Vordergrund unserer Argumentation ge-
stellt. Ich habe nicht verschwiegen, daß das politische Schick-
sal dieser Bundesregierung mit dem Doppelbeschluß in seinen
beiden Teilen verknüpft ist.

Die sowjetische Bereitschaft, wenn auch gegenwärtig mit vielen
Bedingungen verknüpft, zu einer einseitigen Vorleistung in der
Reduzierung ihrer Mittelstreckenwaffen deutet darauf hin, daß
die sowjetische Führung sehr deutlich die Notwendigkeit von
Kompensationsmaßnahmen erkennt

Es zeigte sich in den Gesprächen auch bei aller Unterschiedlichkeit in der Beurteilung der tatsächlichen Gewichte, bei aller Unterschiedlichkeit in der Präsentation der tatsächlichen Gewichte beiderseits, es zeigte sich auch, daß die Sowjets ebenso wie wir eine etappenweise, eine phasenweise Lösung ins Auge fassen.

Zu den sowjetischen Moratoriumsvorschlägen habe ich daran erinnert, daß die Sowjetunion 1978 ein annäherndes Gleichgewicht als gegeben ansah und dies öffentlich so erklärt hat, daß aber seitdem die Zahl der SS 20-Sprengköpfe von damals 150 auf gegenwärtig 750 erhöht worden ist.

Ich möchte vor dem Ende der Gespräche noch nicht über die übrigen Themen berichten, über die der Bundesaußenminister und ich mit den Herren Gromyko und Breschnew gesprochen haben. Aber ich möchte einen Satz aus dem gestrigen eröffnenden Delegationsgespräch hier wiederholen dürfen, den ich gesprochen habe, zu Herrn Breschnew und zu Herrn Gromyko und der ganzen sowjetischen Delegation gewandt:

"Ich spüre Ihren Willen zum Frieden, und ich hoffe, daß auch Sie unseren Willen zum Frieden spüren."

Und ich kann heute hinzufügen, daß ich überzeugt bin, daß das letztere auch tatsächlich der Fall ist. Auch die sowjetische Führung spürt unseren Willen zum Frieden und unsere ernsthafte konkrete Entschlossenheit, zu Lösungen beizutragen.

Vorletztes Wort: Als ich gestern in einem privaten Gespräch im kleinsten Kreise mit Herrn Breschnew, um die Bedeutung eines Arguments, das ich vortrug, zu unterstreichen, gesagt habe: "Ich habe Sie, Herr Generalsekretär, in den letzten acht Jahren, in denen wir sechs oder sieben Mal ausführliche Gespräche hatten, ich habe Sie in den letzten acht Jahren unserer Gespräche niemals irre geführt" - und ich wollte dann den Satz fortsetzen - ist er mir ins Wort gefallen und hat sehr demonstrativ gesagt: "Das ist wahr."

Ich bin mal so indiskret, das hier zu erzählen, um auf

diese Weise zu illustrieren, daß das Vertrauen in die Partnerschaftlichkeit der anderen Seite wirklich echt ist.

Und hier sprechen in der Tat - ich wiederhole einen Gedanken, den ich gestern abend in einer Tischrede schon ausgesprochen hatte - zwei Angehörige einer Generation, die den letzten Krieg aus eigener soldatischer Erfahrung kennen, die Europa von Calais bis Moskau zerstört gesehen haben, von Rotterdam und Köln und Dresden bis Warschau und Leningrad zerstört gesehen haben. Und die wissen, was Krieg und was Tod und was Flucht und Zerstörung und Verlust von Heimat bedeuten.

Es wird morgen ein Kommuniqué geben; das ist fertig. Ich will dem nicht vorgreifen. Das werdet Ihr sicher sorgfältig lesen und in Eure Rede-Unterlagen für die nächsten drei Wochen aufnehmen. Ich bitte ebenso in die Rede-Unterlagen aufzunehmen, das, was im Kommuniqué nicht steht, was aber in den beiden Tischreden von gestern abend sehr klar zum Ausdruck gekommen ist. Beides gehört zu den Materialien, die man für die nächsten Wochen braucht.

Abschließend möchte ich mich bedanken für mancherlei Argumentationshilfen, die wir in den letzten drei Wochen der Vorbereitung sowohl aus Kreisen der Bundestagsfraktion wie aus der Parteiführung bekommen haben.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

6896

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 27, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: German Debrief of Brezhnev Visit to Bonn (C)

As prefigured in your recent phone conversations with Chancellor Schmidt, senior diplomatic envoy Berndt von Staden ^{was} in town ^{on Friday} ~~today~~ to brief us on the Brezhnev visit. I spent an hour-and-half with him ~~this morning~~, and he will be seeing Al Haig ^{later this afternoon} ~~this afternoon~~. A quick summary of von Staden's presentation includes the following key points:

-- Von Staden confirmed that your speech made a very positive contribution to the visit; in addition to the usefulness of the timing (Margaret Thatcher's presence in Bonn directly preceding Brezhnev's enhanced the positive impact of Allied reaction), the speech contents put the Soviets on the defensive and made it easier for the Germans to discuss strategic matters with them.

-- The Chancellor, according to von Staden, repeatedly made it clear that the U.S. means business in the proposals you have advanced and that there is a firm determination on the German side to proceed with full INF deployments if progress is not achieved in the Geneva talks.

-- Von Staden clarified the Soviet-German arms control "consultations" commitment which came out of the Brezhnev visit and emphasized that the word "consultations" was never used by the German side. What the Germans have in mind are exchanges at the Ambassadorial level which will be used to "interpret" and "impress upon" the Soviets the common Western position vis-à-vis Geneva and our determination to stick with the two-track NATO decision on INF.

-- Von Staden reviewed the essence of Soviet proposals in Bonn, highlighting German rejection of both the old moratorium idea and the "goodwill" offer to remove unilaterally some weapons from the Western part of the Soviet Union (which, because of the range problem, would have no meaningful effect on the present threat). He also identified several new elements in the Soviet position, in particular 1) apparent Soviet willingness to proceed step-by-step on arms control matters; and 2) willingness to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 11/27/87

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NLS F97-030/2 #78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 6/29/01

RECEIVED 27 NOV 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 27 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

USSR

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

VON STADEN, BERNDT

SUBJECT: VON STADEN DEBRIEF ON BREZHNEV VISIT

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 28 NOV 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

BLAIR

PIPES

STEARMAN

KRAEMER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	11/30	noted by RVA		
	12/1	jp did relay of memo to Pres.		
Pres	IP (11/28)	for info		
	C 12/3	noted by Pres.		RCV

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2 #79

BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/29/01

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) 4

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6844

INFORMATION

November 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Bundestag Defense Committee Delegation
(Tuesday, November 24 - 11 a.m.)

You really need no specific guidance for dealing with tomorrow's visit by seven members of the FRG Bundestag Defense Committee (see attached list). At the risk of telling grandmother how to suck eggs, however, I suggest you open the meeting with a few preliminary remarks which would stress the following points:

- Importance of the President's INF proposal and the need for continuing Alliance solidarity on the two-track NATO decision if that proposal is to have any hope for success;
- Integrity of the President's strategic-decision package and the signal this sends to the Soviets concerning our seriousness about maintaining Western security;
- Necessity of persevering along the Camp David track in the Middle East and our hope that no EC-10 initiative will compromise the prospects of that delicate effort.

You could then throw the session open to questions and elicit German views on the status of the "peace" movement in Europe, the atmosphere in Bonn now that Brezhnev has arrived, the likely effect of the Yamal pipeline deal in inner-German relations, etc. Incidentally, in line with the first tick above, you might note (more in sorrow than anger) that Egon Bahr's widely quoted remarks about concern that the President's proposal did not go far enough cannot be helpful in preserving the Allied unity which successful negotiations with the Soviets will require.

Tab A List for Meeting

cc: Dick Pipes

RECEIVED 24 NOV 81 14

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 23 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

NATO

AA

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR ALLEN 24 NOV MTC W/ BUNDESTAG DEFENSE COMM DELEGATION

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

PIPES

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COMMENTS

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(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 11/27</i>	<i>noted by RVA</i>		<i>RLV</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(7A)

(C) *4.*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

30 October 1981

FOR: ED MEESE
FROM: ED THOMAS
SUBJECT: Meeting with President and Chancellor Schmidt

Director Lahnstein, Foreign Secretariat, Bonn, Germany called to inquire of the feasibility of a meeting between President Reagan and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. As the Chancellor was ill at Cancun and did not have an opportunity to meet with President Reagan, Lahnstein is calling to inquire if Chancellor Schmidt took his vacation on December 26 - January 10, would there be an opportunity for a meeting to be put together between the President and Chancellor Schmidt.

If the likelihood of such a meeting exists, a more formal request will be made. It will also be necessary to know whether Chancellor Schmidt need to take his vacation in Florida or California, depending on where the President will be during that time. Director Lahnstein will be in his office for the next two hours and would very much appreciate an indication as to the receptivity to this request before next Tuesday.

cc: Dick Allen

Will Meet: _____

Will Not Meet: _____

RECEIVED

81 OCT 30 P 4: 32

JANET COLSON

X *JS*

BUD NANCE

h

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

Done

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

08 OCT 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

5939

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

October 8, 1981

gbe
per CPT gfm

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE

FROM: DICK ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Message from Lahnstein Requesting Meeting
Between Schmidt and President

Manfred Lahnstein has sent you a personal message (Tab B) reiterating Chancellor Schmidt's request for a meeting with the President on the way to Cancun. Schmidt has made this same request in a letter to the President at the end of last week, and he had earlier lobbied Al Haig on the subject in Bonn. (c)

Although we are not sure, our best estimate is that Schmidt wants to give the President advice on the correct tack to take in Cancun. He will probably advise that we not oppose Global Negotiations, emphasize the importance of aid programs, etc. In addition, he wishes to discuss the November visit of Brezhnev to Bonn. (c)

We have turned down this meeting previously when Al Haig raised the idea, and still think it should be rejected; the President's time will be extremely short and he will gain little from this meeting. Schmidt may be mildly offended by our refusal, but he can live with it. (c)

Accordingly, we have prepared for your approval a reply to Lahnstein (Tab A), which we will send from the Situation Room. (u)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Lahnstein at Tab A, informing him that the President will not be able to receive Chancellor Schmidt. (c)

Approve *Allen* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Proposed message to Manfred Lahnstein
- Tab B Incoming message to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review October 7, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M1460 #10
BY CIS NARA, DATE 12/7/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED ANNEX CHARLIE MESSAGE FOR MANFRED LAHNSTEIN, HEAD OF THE CHANCELLERY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FROM EDWIN MEESE, III, COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT

Dear Manfred:

Thank you for your personal message requesting to know if there will be a chance for Chancellor Schmidt to meet with President Reagan before Cancun. The President has received the same request from the Chancellor himself in a letter of several days ago, and of course Al Haig discussed the subject with the Chancellor in Bonn.

As you can well appreciate, between President Mitterrand's visit on the 18th and 19th, and the President's departure for Cancun on the 21st, the schedule is extremely tight. I am afraid that we simply cannot fit a meeting with the Chancellor into the President's schedule during that time. I know the President is looking forward to seeing Chancellor Schmidt at Cancun and we are reviewing his schedule there to see what can be arranged in the way of separate bilateral meetings. If there are specific recommendations that the Chancellor wishes to convey to the President before the meeting, the President would be happy to receive them.

Sincerely, Ed Meese

FROM HEAD OF THE CHANCELLERY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
TO MR. EDWIN MEESE

October 7, 1981

Dear Ed:

I am on my way to an informal meeting between the Chancellor and President Mitterrand and I will return to Bonn only tomorrow night. Before leaving I would like to raise with you the question of a meeting between the Chancellor and your President before or on the occasion of Cancun. I would be grateful if you could let me know whether there is a chance for a meeting in Washington before the President leaves for Cancun, of course after the Yorktown celebrations and possibly on the evening of the 20th.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY: The Chancellor will spend a few days of rest on the Bermudas from Sunday, 18 October, until his departure for Cancun, via Washington if it suits you.

Looking forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

Manfred Lahnstein

PM-SCHMIDT-LEAD (R009)

BONN, OCT 14, REUTER -- CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT, FITTED WITH A HEART PACEMAKER YESTERDAY, COULD LEAVE THE HOSPITAL AS EARLY AS SATURDAY, WEST GERMANY'S CHIEF GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN KURT BECKER SAID TODAY.

MR SCHMIDT SPENT A PEACEFUL NIGHT AFTER THE OPERATION IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL IN KOBLENZ, SOUTH OF BONN, AND DOCTORS WERE VERY PLEASED WITH HIS CONDITION, MR BECKER TOLD RADIO INTERVIEWERS.

VICE CHANCELLOR HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER RETURNED EARLY FROM A MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET FOREIGN MINISTERS IN LONDON LAST NIGHT AND WAS CHAIRING THE WEEKLY CABINET MEETING THIS MORNING, OFFICIALS SAID.

MR SCHMIDT, 62, HAD THE PACEMAKER INSTALLED UNDER LOCAL ANESTHESIA IN AN OPERATION WHICH LASTED LESS THAN AN HOUR. DOCTORS SAID THE PACEMAKER WAS NEEDED TO PREVENT HEARTBEAT IRREGULARITIES.

MR BECKER SAID DOCTORS HAD ADVISED THE CHANCELLOR AGAINST TRAVELING TO CANCUN, MEXICO, NEXT WEEK TO ATTEND THE NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT AND HE WOULD PROBABLY NOT GO.

BUT HE SHOULD BE BACK AT HIS DESK IN THE BONN CHANCELLERY DEALING WITH PAPERWORK NEXT WEEK, THE SPOKESMAN ADDED.

MR BECKER SAID THE SURGERY...PICKING UP 4TH GRAF
REUTER 0459 JP

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 7, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR/JAMES RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Lahnstein Message to Meese on Schmidt
Meeting with the President

Manfred Lahnstein has sent Meese an Annex Charlie message about a Schmidt meeting with the President on the way to Cancun. Schmidt has made the same request twice previously. We still think that this is not a good use of the President's time. (C)

Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memorandum to Meese giving him the background on the request and forwarding for his approval a reply to Lahnstein refusing the request. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Ed Meese at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to Ed Meese
Tab A	Proposed message to Manfred Lahnstein
Tab B	Incoming message to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review October 7, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 5/22/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/7

Tab B

JIM RENTSCHLER

Help. Could you or Dennis prepare a package for Meese which includes a typed version of the incoming Annex Charlie message and a proposed response from Meese to Lahnstein.

[REDACTED]

Meese is out today, for whatever that difference makes to your timing.

Thanks.

Janet Colson

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JIM RENTSCHLER
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED THE RESPONSE TO THE ANNEX CHARLIE MESSAGE. THE RESPONSE IS BEING FORWARDED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION. THE RESPONSE IS BEING FORWARDED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

From am pt of me not indybl (u was
S/HG p over me
— @Lantern; not just to

[REDACTED]

RECEIVED 07 OCT 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 07 OCT 81

RENTSCHLER

07 OCT 81

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 5/22/00

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

CANCUN SUMMIT

LAHNSTEIN, MANFRED

AP

SCHMIDT, HELMUT

SUBJECT: SCHMIDT REQUEST FOR MTG W/ PRES ON THE WAY TO CANCUN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 09 OCT 81 STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

TYSON

COMMENTS RECD WW 10/7 1711 HRS / REDO RECD 10/8 1047 HRS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 10/15 013E per Tyson

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE _____

(C)