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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. II (7/1/81-8/31/81) (1)
Box 91325 14

Date: 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	281446Z AUG 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #148	8/28/81	P1/F1
2. cable	251416Z AUG 81, 1p R 7/28/00 " #149	8/25/81	P1/F1
3. cable	241700Z AUG 81, 2p R 7/28/00 " #150	8/24/81	P1/F1
4. cable	191720Z AUG 81, 4p R 7/28/00 " #151	8/19/81	P1/F1
5. cable	181534Z AUG 81, 4p R 7/28/00 " #152	8/18/81	P1/F1
6. cable	181459Z AUG 81, 2p D 7/28/00 " #153	8/18/81	P1/F1
7. cable	141619Z AUG 81, 2p D 7/28/00 " #154	8/14/81	P1/F1
8. cable	111612Z AUG 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #155	8/11/81	P1/F1
9. cable	100911Z AUG 81, 1p R 7/28/00 " #156	8/10/81	P1/F1
10. cable	081102Z AUG 81, 2p R 7/28/00 " #157	8/2/81	P1/F1
11. cable	301738Z JUL 81, 9p D 7/28/00 " #158	7/30/81	P1/F1
12. cable	291438Z JUL 81, 2p R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #159	7/29/81	P1/F1
13. cable	201623Z JUL 81, 2p D 7/28/00 " #160	7/20/81	P1/F1
14. cable	171254Z JUL 81, 6p D 7/28/00 " #161	7/17/81	P1/F1
15. cable	171248Z JUL 81, 1p D 7/28/00 " #162	7/17/81	P1/F1
16. cable	151639Z JUL 81, 2p D 7/28/00 " #163	8/15/81	P1/F1
17. cable	201623Z JUL 81, 2p D 7/28/00 " #164	7/20/81	P1/F1
18. cable	101549Z JUL 81, 1p D 7/28/00 " #165	7/10/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. II (7/1/81-8/31/81) (1)
Box 91325 4

Date: 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
19. cable	091905Z JUL 81, 17p <i>R 7/28/00 NLSF97-030 #166</i>	7/9/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SENSITIVE

PAGE 120

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

P 281446Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

NLS F97-038 #148

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9715

BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BONN 16726~~
DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR DENNIS BLAIR
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: OVIP

SUBJ: VISIT OF RICHARD ALLEN

REFS: A) BONN 15688 (USICA), B) WHITE HOUSE 4931

1. EMBASSY WELCOMES VISIT OF RICHARD ALLEN WHO WILL PARTICIPATE IN SEPTEMBER 3-6 KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION CONFERENCE.

2. WE UNDERSTAND AMBASSADOR BURNS' OFFER OF THE USE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED. THE KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION HAS RESERVED ROOMS FOR THE OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AT THE DREESEN HOTEL, SITE OF THE CONFERENCE.

3. PER REFTEL B, THE KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION HAS PURCHASED THE REQUESTED PLANE TICKETS AND IS ARRANGING TO HAVE LUFTHANSA'S WASHINGTON OFFICE DELIVER THEM TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

4. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED PRESS INQUIRIES (DIE WELT AND DIE ZEIT) RE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS. WE HAVE INFORMED THEM THAT INTERVIEWS WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE DURING THE TRIP.

5. PLEASE ADVISE IF APPOINTMENTS WITH FRG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE DESIRED.

6. CHARGE WOESSNER PLANS TO MEET ALLEN AT COLOGNE AIRPORT ON SEPTEMBER 3 AND ALSO HOST BUFFET RECEPTION FOR CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS ON SEPTEMBER 4.

7. CONTROL OFFICER FOR THE VISIT WILL BE ERIC KUNSMAN,

SIT: RVA JP COL
EOB: PIPES, RENT
WHSR COMMENTS: FOR NOON?

PSN:026910

DTG:281446

TOR:2401455

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 121

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OFFICE TELEPHONE: 339-2263, HOME TELEPHONE: 37 34 78.
WOLFSNER

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 97

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE305
STU9419
RR RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #6398 2371416
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 251416Z AUG 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9612
BT

~~SECRET~~ BONN 16398

NODIS

E.O. 12065; RDS-1 8/25/88 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M

TAGS: PARM, TECH, MNUC, ENRG, GE

SUBJECT: SWISS REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE
SHIPMENT OF PRC URANIUM TO SOUTH AFRICA

REF: A) STATE 224110, B) BONN 15847, C) BONN 15696

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. MESSAGE GIVEN IN PARAS 2 AND 3 OF REF. A WAS PASSED TO DAHLHOFF OF FONMIN ON 25 AUGUST.

3. DAHLHOFF REITERATED POSITION EXPRESSED BY ROUGET AND FISCHER IN EARLIER MEETINGS (REFS. B AND C) THAT THE FRG EMBASSY IN BEIJING WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE PRC AND THAT THIS WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH A DEMARCHE BY THE SWISS. IN THE FRG DEMARCHE THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES, SANS TITRE, WERE TO BE HANDED OVER TO THE PRC AS A MODEL FOR THE "INTERNATIONAL NORM" IN CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

4. DAHLHOFF COMMENTED THAT SUCH DEMARCHES BY TWO NON-WEAPON STATES MAY BE EFFECTIVE. HOWEVER, HE ALSO ADDED THAT THE SWISS WERE WAITING FOR THE RETURN OF THE "PROPER LEVEL INDIVIDUAL" ON THE PRC SIDE BEFORE MAKING THEIR DEMARCHE. (COMMENT: THIS MAY PROVE TO BE TOO LATE.) DAHLHOFF ALSO RESTATED THE POSITION GIVEN IN REF. B, NAMELY THAT UNLESS SHIPMENT TRANSITS SWITZERLAND OR GERMANY OR THERE IS PROOF OF INVOLVEMENT OF FRG FIRM, THERE IS LITTLE THAT THEY CAN DO TO BLOCK SHIPMENT TO SOUTH AFRICA. WOESSNER

BT

#6398

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #149

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 277

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

NLS F97-030 #150

O 241700Z AUG 81 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

BY L2J, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9590

~~SECRET~~ BONN 16333

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 08-24-2001 (WDESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, NU, ES, GE
SUBJECT: U.S.-NICARAGUA RELATIONS

REFS: (A) STATE 224142
- (B) STATE 225113
-

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: THE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR LATIN AMERICA RESPONDED TO OUR DEMARCHE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTELS WITH A COMBINATION OF INTEREST IN OUR APPROACH TO NICARAGUA AND RELATIVE PESSIMISM REGARDING THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS THERE. THE FRG WILL CONTINUE ITS AID PROGRAM FOR THE TIME BEING, BUT WILL DISCONTINUE ASSISTANCE IF THE SANDINISTAS ELIMINATE ALL OPPOSITION. END SUMMARY.
3. IN THE ABSENCE ON VACATION OF FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN, AND POLITICAL DIRECTOR FOR THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS GORENFLOS, ACTING POL COUNSELOR DELIVERED DEMARCHE CALLED FOR IN REFTELS AUGUST 24 TO LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR LIMMER, WHO IS FILLING IN FOR GORENFLOS.
4. LIMMER, WHO HAD MET A FEW DAYS BEFORE WITH AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO, SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS' MEETINGS WITH SANDINISTA LEADERS. HE INDICATED HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHY WE WE REGARDED OUR APPROACH TO THE SANDINISTAS

* * * * *

SIT: (RVA) JP COL VP
EOB: FONTAINE, PIPES
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:021661

DTG:241700

TOR:2361828

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 278

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AS A LONG SHOT, I.E., WHY WE WERE BASICALLY PESSIMISTIC, WAS IT BECAUSE THE LATTER WERE NOT FURTHCOMING TO ENDERS ON THE SUBJECT OF ARMS TRAFFICKING, OR DUE TO WHAT WE PERCEIVED TO BE GROWING CUBAN ASCENDANCY IN NICARAGUA, OR THE SANDINISTAS' INCREASING INTOLERANCE OF OPPOSITION?

5. LIMMER INDICATED THAT HE FELT ALL OF THESE SUBJECTS COULD LEGITIMATELY BE A SOURCE OF CONCERN. THE FRG INTENDED TO CONTINUE ITS AID PROGRAM TO NICARAGUA FOR THE TIME BEING, SINCE IT STILL HOPED THE POLITICAL SITUATION JUST MIGHT IMPROVE. BUT, HE SAID, IF THE SANDINISTAS DEFINITELY ELIMINATED PLURALISM, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE FRG TO CONTINUE GIVING ASSISTANCE.

6. AS FOR NICARAGUA'S MEDDLING IN EL SALVADOR, LIMMER WAS LIKEWISE RELATIVELY PESSIMISTIC. HE SAID HE COULD IMAGINE THAT THE SANDINISTAS, OR EVEN THE CUBANS, MIGHT AT PRESENT WISH TO AVOID PROVOKING THE UNITED STATES UNDULY. BUT "OTHERS FAR AWAY" WOULD WANT TO CONTINUE STIRRING UP AS MUCH TROUBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES AS POSSIBLE. LIMMER INDICATED THAT HE FELT THE SANDINISTAS WOULD CONTINUE TO SEE THE SUCCESS OF MODERATION IN EL SALVADOR AS INIMICAL TO THEIR INTERESTS. THEIR PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A LEFTIST TRIUMPH IN EL SALVADOR, OR FAILING THAT, A REPRESSIVE RIGHT-WING MILITARY DICTATORSHIP WHICH THEY COULD USE AS PROOF THAT LEFTIST REVOLUTION OFFERED THE ONLY POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CHANGE.

7. COMMENT: LIMMER'S REACTION TO THE TALKING POINTS AND THE LETTER TO GENSCHER -- WHICH HE PROMISED TO BRING TO THE LATTER'S ATTENTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE -- WAS CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS FOREIGN OFFICE STATEMENTS ABOUT NICARAGUA: THAT THE SITUATION THERE IS DISCOURAGING BUT NOT COMPLETELY HOPELESS, AND THAT THE BEST THING FOR THE FRG TO DO IS TO KEEP TRYING TO CONVINCE THE SANDINISTAS OF THE BENEFITS THEY WILL OBTAIN IF THEY COOPERATE WITH THE WEST INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING THE CUBAN MODEL. WOESSNER

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 364

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #151

P 191720Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

BY WOS, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9473

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5118
AMEMBASSY LONDON 9357
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0832
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0610
USMISSION USNATO 6357
USMISSION USBERLIN 4778
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4231

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 15998

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/19/01 (WDESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M
TAGS: PGDV, BQG, GE, GC
SUBJ ~~TO~~ SCHMIDT-HONECKER LETTER
REF: (A) BONN 15148, (B) BONN 12929, (C) BERLIN 3642,
(D) BERLIN 4099, (E) 80 BONN 22997

1. (~~C~~-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE LETTER WHICH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT SENT TO GDR CHAIRMAN HONECKER AT THE END OF JULY WAS DESIGNED TO OVERCOME THE PRESENT STAGNATION IN INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. IT DID NOT CONTAIN A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR A GERMAN SUMMIT NOR ANY SUGGESTIONS ON NEW STEPS TO BE TAKEN. THE LETTER IS INDICATIVE OF THE FRG'S DESIRE TO PREVENT THE EXISTING FREEZE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE GDR FROM CONTINUING INDEFINITELY. END SUMMARY.
3. FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICAL RESPONSIBLE FOR INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS (DERIX) BRIEFED THE THREE ALLIED BONN GROUP REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 18 ON THE LETTER WHICH

* * * * *

SIT: RVA NAN JP VP
EOB: PIPES, STEARMAN
WHSR COMMENTS: CHECKLIST

PSN:015801

DTG:191720

TOR:2312045

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 365

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT SENT RECENTLY TO GDR CHAIRMAN HONECKER. DERIX ASKED THAT THE INFORMATION BE CLOSELY HELD SINCE ONLY A FEW PERSONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INCLUDING MOST MINISTERS, HAD BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THE LETTER. OTHER GOVERNMENTS WERE NOT RECEIVING SIMILAR BRIEFINGS, HE SAID.

4. THE SCHMIDT LETTER WAS SENT AT THE END OF JULY AND WAS INTENDED TO OVERCOME THE STAGNATION IN INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. IT DID NOT REPRESENT A MAJOR STEP OR A BREATHROUGH NOR DID IT CONTAIN ANY NEW OR SIGNIFICANT PROPOSALS. IT ADDRESSED PRIMARILY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES, BUT ALSO TOOK NOTE OF THE BROADER CONTEXT IN WHICH THESE RELATIONS TOOK PLACE.

5. ACCORDING TO DERIX, SCHMIDT REFERRED TO THE WISH OF BOTH SIDES FOR A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING AS SOON AS THE OVERALL POLITICAL SITUATION PERMITTED. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, PROPOSE A SPECIFIC DATE OR TIME FRAME FOR THE MEETING NOR DID HE SUGGEST ANY SPECIFIC SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED. HE RESTATED THE FRG POSITION ON THE MINIMUM EXCHANGE REQUIREMENT IMPOSED BY THE GDR BUT DID NOT MAKE A REDUCTION IN THE REQUIREMENT A PRE-CONDITION FOR A SUMMIT MEETING. IN BROAD TERMS, THE LETTER CONVEYED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE FRG TO CONTINUE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE GDR DURING A TIME OF TENSION, INCLUDING TALKS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES (REFS C&D).

6. BEYOND INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, SCHMIDT CAUTIONED HONECKER THAT POLEMICS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WERE DETRIMENTAL TO THE AIM OF SECURING PEACE IN EUROPE. HE ALSO MADE A REFERENCE IN GENERAL TERMS TO POLAND TO THE EFFECT THAT EACH STATE SHOULD DETERMINE ITS OWN AFFAIRS.

7. DURING THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED, DERIX STATED THAT THE LETTER HAD BEEN SENT BEFORE HONECKER'S MEETING IN THE CRIMEA WITH BREZHNEV AND WAS NOT, AS THE PRESS HAD SPECULATED, A RESPONSE TO THE PASSAGE ON HIGH-LEVEL EAST-WEST MEETINGS CONTAINED IN THE CRIMEAN COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID THAT THE CHANCELLERY DID NOT INTERPRET THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE AS A BREAKTHROUGH FOR INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. IT WAS RATHER A GENERAL SANCTIONING OF CONTACTS WITH THE WEST INCLUDING HONECKER'S TRIP TO JAPAN AND BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 366

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

8. COMMENT: THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION ON WHEN SCHMIDT AND HONECKER WILL HOLD THEIR LONG POSTPONED MEETING IN THE GDR. AS REPORTED IN REF A, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS FELT IT NECESSARY TO RESPOND TO THIS SPECULATION BY REITERATING ITS GENERAL INTEREST IN A SUMMIT, BUT DENYING THAT ANYTHING SPECIFIC IS IN THE WORKS. THESE STATEMENTS AND THE CHANCELLOR'S LETTER CONFIRM A REAL CONCERN IN THE FRG THAT INNER-

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 363

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
PRIORITY

P 191720Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9474

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5119
AMEMBASSY LONDON 9358
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0833
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0611
USMISSION USNATO 6358
USMISSION USBERLIN 4779
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4232

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 15998

EXDIS
GERMAN RELATIONS NOT BE ALLOWED TO LANGUISH INDEFINITELY
DESPITE GDR ACTIONS ON THE MINIMUM EXCHANGE REQUIREMENT
OR TENSIONS OVER POLAND. THERE IS NO EXPECTATION OF
ANY MAJOR NEW STEPS OR ANY SIGNIFICANT GDR CONCESSIONS
ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. THE FRG DOES WISH, HOWEVER,
TO CONTINUE THE WORK OF RESOLVING PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE PRESENT
FREEZE.
WOESSNER

BT

* * * * *

SIT: * , @P
EOB:
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:016340

DTG:191720

TOR:2312046

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 383

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 181534Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9426

INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
NATO COLLECTIVE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
USNMR SHAPE

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030#152

BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 15861

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12065: RDS-1/3 08-18-2011 (YORK, CHARLES T.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MPOL, NATO, US, TNF, GE
SUBJECT: (S) ERW: ADVISORCLOSE TO SCHMIDT FEARS
POLITICAL FALLOUT IN FRG

SECRET

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR VON DER GABLENTZ OUTLINED ON AUGUST 17 TO CHARLES YORK THE SEVERE POLITICAL PROBLEMS HE BELIEVES THE ERW DECISION WILL CAUSE THE GOVERNMENT. VON DER GABLENTZ SPOKE OF THE "ENORMOUS PRESSURES" WHICH SPD LEADERS WILL BE SUBJECTED TO BY THE GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT AS A RESULT OF THE DECISION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE RESULTING "COLLATERAL DAMAGE" COULD BE LIMITED BY REMOVING FROM EUROPE SOME OF THE OLD WARHEADS WHICH ERW WOULD REPLACE IN A COMBAT SITUATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT VON DER GABLENTZ PERSONALLY HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO ERW AS SUCH. BUT HE BELIEVES THE U.S. HAS HANDED THE SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT A VERY HOT POTATO, AND DOES NOT WANT THE FRG'S MEASURED OFFICIAL REACTION TO OBSCURE THAT FACT FROM ITS MAJOR ALLY. END SUMMARY.

* * * * *

SIT: (RVA) NAN JP VP
EOB: PIPES, RENT, SCHWEITZER
WHSR COMMENTS: CHECKLIST

PSN:014023

DTG:181534

TOR:2301952

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-
3. VON DER GABLENTZ, WHO IS CHIEF OF THE CHANCELLERY'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECTION AND THUS A KEY SCHMIDT AIDE, SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY OF AN AUGUST 17 VISIT BY CHARGE YORK ON AN UNRELATED MATTER (REPORTED SEPTEL) TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE POLITICAL FALLOUT IN THE FRG OF THE DECISION TO ASSEMBLE THE ERW.
-

4. THE DECISION, VON DER GABLENTZ SAID, HAD FRANKLY COME AT WHAT HE REGARDED AS "THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME" IN TERMS OF ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON TNF AND OTHER FRG DEFENSE ISSUES. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUERY AS TO WHAT TIME VON DER GABLENTZ BELIEVED WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROPITIOUS, VON DER GABLENTZ CONCEDED THAT IT WAS HARD TO IDENTIFY SUCH A TIME. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID, THE RESTRAINED OFFICIAL FRG REACTION TO THE DECISION SHOULD NOT PREVENT THE U.S. FROM REALIZING THE "ENDORMOUS PRESSURES" TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SUBJECTED FROM THE PEACE MOVEMENT -- WHICH HE DESCRIBED IRONICALLY AS THE "SEVERAL THOUSAND EXPERTS ON DISARM-AMENT WHOM WE HAVE RUNNING AROUND OUT OF CONTROL." VON DER GABLENTZ SUGGESTED THAT THIS PRESSURE MIGHT LEAD SOME POLITICIANS WHO PERSONALLY HAD NO TROUBLE WITH ERW TO "MAKE STATEMENTS THEY WOULD NOT LIKE TO MAKE."
-

5. VON DER GABLENTZ INDICATED THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY AFRAID BOTH THAT THE ERW DECISION WOULD MAKE TNF DEPLOY-
MENT ALL THE HARDER, AND THAT PRESSURE WOULD BE APPLIED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO DECLARE THAT NEVER, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD THE ERW BE DEPLOYED ON GERMAN SOIL.
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6. VON DER GABLENTZ THEN TURNED TO THE THEME OF HOW, IN HIS OPINION, THE "COLLATERAL DAMAGE" CAUSED THE GOVERNMENT ON ARMS ISSUES BY ERW COULD BEST BE CONTAINED. HE AGREED EAGERLY WITH THE CHARGE'S POINT THAT IT WAS VITAL FOR THE PUBLIC TO UNDERSTAND THAT ERW WAS SIMPLY PART OF A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM -- THE WARHEADS AND SHELLS WERE MERELY TO REPLACE EXISTING ONES WHICH WERE DIRTIER AND MORE DESTRUCTIVE. FOR THIS REASON, VON DER GABLENTZ SUGGESTED, IT MIGHT BE APOLITICALLY USEFUL STEP TO WITHDRAW SOME OF THE OLDER WARHEADS AND SHELLS AS STOCKPILING OF ERW IN THE U.S. MADE THEM SUPERFLOUS.
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SENSITIVE

PAGE 382

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

Q 181534Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9427

INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
NATO COLLECTIVE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
USNMR SHAPE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 15861

EXDIS
A JOB THE BONN GOVERNMENT HAD CUT OUT FOR IT IN HANDLING
THE ISSUE WITH THE PUBLIC IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.
WE BELIEVE VON DER GABLENTZ'S VIEWS ARE SIGNIFICANT AS
THEY REPRESENT THE STRONGEST CRITICISM OF THE ERW DECISION
WE HAVE HEARD TO DATE FROM SOMEONE CLOSE TO CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDT. ALTHOUGH VON DER GABLENTZ NEVER DIRECTLY IMPLIED
THAT SUCH WAS THE CASE, THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE
DISCOUNTED THAT SCHMIDT'S OWN VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT ARE
NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF HIS CLOSE AND
WELL-INFORMED ADVISOR, WOESSNER

BT

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SIT: * , <P
EOB:
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:014024

DTG:181534

TOR:2301952

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 385

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

7. COMMENT: VON DER GABLENTZ'S PRESENTATION WAS EXTREMELY POLITE. BUT IT WAS CLEAR HE FELT HE HAD SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT TO COMMUNICATE TO US. FROM HIS REACTION TO THE CHARGE'S EXPOSITION OF THE CASE FOR ERW, IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO THE WEAPON ASSUCH AND HEAPPEARED TO IMPLY THAT THE SAME WAS TRUE OF THEGOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WAS VERY WORRIED THAT THE ERW DECISION WOULD STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT, AND THEREBY HINDER THE TNF MODERNIZATION OF WHICH HE AND THE GOVERNMENT APPROVE. VON DER GABLENTZ CLEARLY WAS ALSO CONCERNED THAT BY TAKING ONLY THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE ERW DECISION INTO ACCOUNT, THE U.S. MIGHT FAIL TO APPRECIATE JUST HOW TOUGH

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 504

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 111612Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9249

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ BONN 15425

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #155

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/11/01 (YORK, CHARLES) DR-M

TAGS: MNUC, NATO, GE

SUBJECT: FRG STATEMENTS REGARDING ERW DECISION

REF: STATE 211799

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBOFF MET WITH FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH AUGUST 11 AND MADE POINTS (CONTAINED PARA 2 REFTEL) THAT:

- A. USG BELIEVES ANY CONSIDERATION OF ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES COVERING ERW IS HIGHLY PREMATURE;

- B. USG ASKS THAT FRG SPOKESMAN AND OFFICIALS AVOID ANY FURTHER PUBLIC COMMENT ON POSSIBILITIES OF ERW ARMS CONTROL;

- C. ANY SUCH FURTHER COMMENT COULD FORCE USG TO INDICATE PUBLICLY ITS VIEW THAT ANY SUCH CONSIDERATION IS PREMATURE.

RUTH SAID HE WOULD INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, AND HE ASKED THAT EMBASSY PERMIT HIM TO KEEP THE MATTER IN A SINGLE CHANNEL (I.E., NO SEPARATE NOTIFICATION OF CHANCELLERY) SINCE HE, RUTH, WOULD ENSURE THAT THE

* * * * *

SIT: RA NAN COL VP JP
EOB: PIPES, RENT, SCHWEITZER
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:005240

DTG:111612

TOR:2231934

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 505

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CHANCELLOR WAS INFORMED. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED EMBASSY INTENDS TO HONOR RUTH'S REQUEST.

3. RUTH SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT THE USG IS MAKING, AND HE BELIEVES IT WOULD BE IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES IF THE FRG AND THE USG CAN HOLD PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE QUESTION OF NEUTRON WEAPON ARMS CONTROL TO A MINIMUM. RUTH THEN MADE THE POINT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN AN AWKWARD POSITION IF QUESTIONS WERE ASKED PUBLICLY ABOUT THE NEUTRON WEAPON ASPECT OF THE FRG'S DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT, AND THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO SAY ANYTHING. (COMMENT: RUTH CLEARLY DID NOT WISH TO ELABORATE OR SPECULATE FURTHER. END COMMENT.)

4. RUTH SAID HE HOPED THE USG UNDERSTANDS THAT THE ARMS CONTROL ASPECT OF SECURITY IS OF VERY GREAT POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN GERMANY. BECAUSE OF THIS SIGNIFICANCE, IT WOULD COME AS A SURPRISE TO THE GERMAN PUBLIC IF HE, RUTH, WERE NOT TO LOOK INTO THE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF A WEAPONS SYSTEM, SUCH AS THE NEUTRON WEAPON, JUST AS HE HAD BEEN CHARGED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER TO ANALYZE THE IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER SYSTEMS. THE FRG IS ONLY AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF ITS ANALYSIS. IF ANY CONCLUSIONS WERE REACHED ON ANY WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT AFFECT THE USG, THE FRG'S FIRST ACTION WOULD BE TO CONDUCT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF THOSE POINTS WITH THE USG.

5. APART FROM THE INTENT TO RESPOND TO THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL ON THE GERMAN DOMESTIC SCENE, SAID RUTH, MINISTER GENSCHER IS ALSO ATTEMPTING TO KEEP DISCUSSION OF THE NEUTRON WEAPON FROM ENCUMBERING OR BURDENING THE TNF DISCUSSIONS. THE FRG BELIEVES THAT ONE WAY TO SEPARATE NEUTRON WEAPON DISCUSSION IS BY DEMONSTRATING THAT THE NEUTRON WEAPON IS BEING THOUGHTFULLY AND RESPONSIBLY CONSIDERED ON ITS OWN. YORK

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SENSITIVE

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #5238 2220912
O 100911Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9187

~~SECRET~~ BONN 15238

NODIA
REF: STATE 209877
E.O. 120651 GDS 08/10/87 (YORK, CHARLES T.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, GE
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO CONTACT GROUP
FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. & - ENTIRE TEXT

2. GENSCHER IS ON VACATION AWAY FROM BONN AND WE UNABLE TO ARRANGE APPOINTMENT WITH HIM. HIS DATE OF RETURN TO BONN UNCERTAIN, BUT IT MAY NOT BE UNTIL END OF AUGUST.

3. DO YOU WISH ME MAKE POINTS IN REPTEL TO STATE SECRETARY LAUTENSCHLAGER WHO ACTING IN GENSCHER'S ABSENCE? YORK

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F97-030 #156
BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

BONN 5238

DTG: 100911Z AUG 81 P0N: 003302
TOR: 222/1040Z

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

BIT: NAN COL JP VP
MOB: PIPES, SCHWEITZER, RENT, STEARMAN
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFHOL #5232 2201103
Z 081102Z AUG 81 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0185

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 15232

INFO: 120651 RDS-1 8/8/11 (YORK, CHARLES T.) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, MNUC, GE
SUBJ: ERW STATUS UPDATE: NOTIFICATION TO FRG
REF: (A) STATE 210407
(B) STATE 210411

1: (R - ENTIRE TEXT)

2: BEGIN SUMMARY: ON AUGUST 8 I CONVEYED THE ADVANCE INFORMATION OF U.S. DECISION TO ASSEMBLE COMPONENTS FOR PRODUCTION AND STOCKPIILING OF ERW WEAPONS ON US TERRITORY TO FRG CHANCELLERY AND FONOFF OFFICIALS. THEY STATED THAT THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT (WHO IS AWAY FROM BONN ON VACATION) AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER. END SUMMARY.

3: ON MORNING OF AUGUST 8 I INFORMED THE CHANCELLERY OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTH AMERICA AND NATO MATTERS (HOEYNCK) OF THE US DECISION TO MOVE TOWARD PRODUCTION AND ASSEMBLY OF ERW WARHEADS FOR THE LANCE MISSILE AND 8-INCH ARTILLERY SHELL. AFTER GIVING HOEYNCK MY TALKING POINTS (CONTAINED IN STATE 210407) IN NON-PAPER FORMAT, I EMPHASIZED THAT NO DEPLOYMENT DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, AND THAT SUCH A DECISION, IF IT WERE TO BE MADE, WOULD COME ONLY AFTER CLOSE CON-

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NLS F97-030 #157

BY HOI, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

BONN 0232

DTG:081102Z AUG 81 PSNI 001600
TOR: 220/1223Z

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONSULTATIONS WITH ANY COUNTRY WHERE SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE BASED. I EXPLAINED TO HOEYNCK THAT THE URGENCY IN THIS CASE CENTERED AROUND OUR BELIEF THAT THE US PRESS WOULD PRINT THE STORY ON AUGUST 9. FOR THAT REASON, THE US WAS IN THE PROCESS OF INFORMING ALL NATO GOVERNMENTS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS TODAY OF THE US DECISION (STATE 210411).

4. HOEYNCK REPLIED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE ADVANCE INFORMATION, AND WOULD SEE THAT THE CHANCELLOR WAS IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED. (THERE IS NOW A SECURE LINE FROM THE CHANCELLERY TO SCHMIDT'S VACATION COTTAGE) HE SPECULATED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT THE FRG PRESS SPOKESMAN WOULD RECEIVE QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT AT THE MONDAY PRESS CONFERENCE, IF STORY APPEARED IN US PRESS. HE THOUGHT THE FRG RESPONSE, IF ASKED, WOULD BE THAT THE ERW DECISION IS PURELY A US RESPONSIBILITY AT THIS POINT, THAT THE NATO ALLIES HAVE NOT YET BEEN "SEIZED" WITH THE PROBLEM; AND THAT THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT, WHEN RAISED, WOULD BE ONE FOR THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE TO CONSIDER.

5. I SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THE FONOFF COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS (SCHENK) OF THE ERW COMPONENT ASSEMBLY DECISION, LEAVING HIM THE TALKING POINTS CONTAINED IN STATE 210411 AS A NON-PAPER. SCHENK SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, WHO HAD RETURNED FROM CENTRAL AMERICA, AND WOULD ALSO NOTIFY THE FONOFF'S PRESS DIVISION. HE HAD NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT TO MAKE. YORK

80NN 5232

DTG:081102Z AUG 81 PSNI 001600
TOR: 220/1223Z

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

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MESSAGE:

NLS F97-030#159

HCE716
STU2320
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #4425 2101438
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291438Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8961
INFO RUFHBB/EC COLLECTIVE
BT

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BONN 14425
E.O. 12065: GDS 7/19/87 (YORK, CHARLES T.) DR-DM
TAGS: PGDV, ECON, GW
SUBJECT: OTTAWA SUMMIT GERMAN REACTIONS
REF: LONDON 14109

1. & = ENTIRE TEXT
2. OTTAWA SUMMIT WAS VERY MUCH THE CENTER OF ATTENTION FOR GERMAN PRESS AND VISUAL MEDIA. SIGNIFICANT PRESS COMMENTS WERE REPORTED IN DETAIL IN EMBASSY'S DAILY PRESS SUMMARIES. IN GENERAL MEDIA COMMENT WAS UPBEAT AND POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH IT ALSO STRESSED AREAS OF (PRESUMED) DISAGREEMENT WITH US OVER SUCH ISSUES AS INTEREST RATE POLICY AND SOVIET PIPELINE.
3. OFFICIAL REACTION WAS SUMMED UP BY ONE HIGHLY PLACED SOURCE WHO QUOTED REMARK BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ON PLANE COMING HOME: "NO TREES WERE RIPPED UP AND MANY WERE PLANTED." WHILE THIS LOSES A LOT IN TRANSLATION, THE MEANING WAS CLEAR. THE GERMANS HAD NOT GONE TO OTTAWA WITH HIGH EXPECTATIONS THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO CHANGE ANYONE'S MIND. THEY WERE NOT DISAPPOINTED ON THAT SCORE, BUT THEY WERE PLEASANTLY SURPRISED OVER THE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS THAT HAD EMERGED AMONG THE SEVEN. THEY FOUND A GREAT COMMONALITY OF VIEWS AMONG THE LEADERS; AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE WORLD SITUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS WERE ALONG PARALLEL TRACKS.
4. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED THAT SCHMIDT MENTIONED TO HIM THE "GENUINE AFFECTION" WHICH HE BELIEVED WAS DEVELOPING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE PRESIDENT WHICH HE WELCOMED. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH EVERY OTHER REPORT WE'VE HEARD. APPARENTLY SCHMIDT FOUND THE PERSONAL CHEMISTRY EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD. HE LIKES THE PRESIDENT AS A PERSON, UNDERSTANDS WHAT HE IS TRYING TO DO AND IS SYMPATHETIC TO HIM.

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY LIST

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5. A HIGH CHANCELLERY SOURCE TOLD US THAT PART OF THE REASON FOR THE CHANCELLOR'S EBULLIENCE COULD BE TRACED TO SEVERAL PRE-SUMMIT USG ACTIONS WHICH HE FOUND PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH ON ARMS CONTROL STRUCK THE RIGHT NOTE AND WAS TIMELY. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ALSO STRUCK A RESPONSIVE CHORD. SCHMIDT STILL REMEMBERS AND RESENTS EVENTS OF THREE OR FOUR YEARS AGO (BY WHICH SOURCE OBVIOUSLY MEANT BRAZIL), BUT HE APPROVES OF PRESIDENT'S NEW POLICY AND FEELS ITS BALANCE AMONG OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS IN THIS FIELD IS PROPER. FINALLY PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON TNF WAS SUPERB, AND ITS TIMING COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER. THIS WAS JUST WHAT THE CHANCELLOR NEEDED AS A SEND-OFF FOR OTTAWA.

6. COMMENT: WHILE THE MOOD IN BONN IS NOT AS EUPHORIC AS THAT PREVAILING IN LONDON (REFTEL), IT IS NONETHELESS SOLIDLY POSITIVE. PROBLEMS REMAIN--OUR INITIAL SOURCE TOLD US THAT CHANCELLOR WILL KEEP HAMMERING AWAY IN PUBLIC ABOUT HIGH INTEREST RATES--BUT FRG AND NOTABLY THE CHANCELLOR FEEL THAT A VERY GOOD COMMON UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED, LINES OF COMMUNICATION ARE OPEN, AND THAT PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED AS ALLIES AND FRIENDS.

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FOB: PIPES
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #3214/01 1901925
O 091905Z JUL 81 ZFF=4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0619
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 BONN 13214
MODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS=1 07/09/2001 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR=M
TAGS: PINT, GE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BURNS' CALL ON WILLY BRANDT

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. I CALLED ON WILLY BRANDT, THURSDAY, JULY 9. HE OFFERED SOME INTERESTING AND PERCEPTIVE COMMENTS ON BREZHNEV'S STATUS AND THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT PLANNING TO TAKE ANY IMMEDIATE ACTION IN POLAND (PARAGRAPH 10). ON AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIETS OUTLINED CONDITIONS FOR A TROOP WITHDRAWAL WHICH BRANDT INTERPRETED AS SIGNS OF A SOFTENING IN THEIR POSITION (PARAGRAPHS 12 AND 13). ON TNF, BRANDT DESCRIBED WHAT HE CALLED A "SLIGHTLY CHANGED MORATORIUMPROPOSAL" (PARAGRAPH 16). HE EXPRESSED GREAT RETICENCE WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT ANYTHING OF REAL SIGNIFICANCE HAD EMERGED IN THE COURSE OF HIS MOSCOW VISIT, BUT HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE STILL TO PROVIDE

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020870
TOR: 190/1933Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-030 #166

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/30/00

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTERPRETATIONS THAT THEY PROMISED WITHIN TWO WEEKS. MY OVERALL IMPRESSION OF THE MAN AND HIS MOTIVES WAS POSITIVE. END SUMMARY.

3. I TOLD BRANDT I WAS DELIGHTED TO BE IN HIS COUNTRY, AND NOTED THAT I HAD RECENTLY VISITED HIS FAVORITE CITY OF BERLIN; IT REMAINED A BEAUTIFUL PLACE. BRANDT AGREED, BUT SAID THERE WERE PROBLEMS WITH YOUNG PEOPLE AND FOREIGNERS, ESPECIALLY TURKS. INTEGRATION WAS PROVIDING DIFFICULTIES DUE TO TURKISH CULTURE AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD ONE GROUP WAS IN FAVOR OF THE PRESENT TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND ANOTHER WAS OPPOSED, AND THAT THEY WERE FIGHTING IT OUT ON GERMAN SOIL. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN GREAT BRITAIN, I SAID I WAS TERRIBLY DISTURBED OVER EVENTS THERE. WE IN THE U.S. HAD HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN THE LATE 1960'S AND EARLY 1970'S. WE HAD OVERCOME THEM AND HOPED THEY WOULD NOT RETURN. IN SPITE OF THE EXAGGERATIONS OF RHETORIC, WE NOW HAVE SOCIAL EQUALITY. BRANDT AGREED.

4. I EXPLAINED THAT I WAS ABOUT TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON. I HAD BECOME AN AMBASSADOR VERY SUDDENLY. IT WAS NOT THE KIND OF CAREER I HAD ANTICIPATED. I NOW HAD TO PUT MY PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL AFFAIRS IN ORDER AND COMPLETE SOME WRITING. I NOTED THAT MY GOVERNMENT WAS VERY INTERESTED IN A FIRSTHAND REPORT ON BRANDT'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. THERE WERE ALL KINDS OF REPORTS IN THE PRESS, BUT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY HAIG WOULD LIKE THE INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM BRANDT. IT WOULD GIVE ME PLEASURE TO PASS IT ALONG, WHEN I RETURN TO WASHINGTON. I ADDED THAT IT ALSO GAVE ME PLEASURE TO MEET BRANDT. I HAD BEEN ONE OF BRANDT'S ADMIRERS OVER THE PAST YEARS. HE HAD PLAYED AN HISTORIC ROLE IN BERLIN. I TOLD HIM HE HAD MANY FRIENDS IN OUR COUNTRY. BRANDT RESPONDED THAT HE HAD VISITED THE U.S. MORE OFTEN THAN THE SOVIET UNION. I ASKED HIM HIS IMPRESSIONS OF MOSCOW ON HIS LAST TRIP. HE SAID HE SAW A GOOD DEAL OF

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020870
TOR: 190/1433Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HOUSING CONSTRUCTION. HE HAD SPOKEN WITH THE CITY'S MAYOR; THERE HAD BEEN PLANS TO STOP THE POPULATION INFLUX, WHICH HAD NOT SUCCEEDED DUE TO THE CONSTANT NEED FOR WORKERS, MARRIAGES WITH PEOPLE FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND THE LIKE. MOSCOW'S POPULATION, BRANDT SAID, HAS NOW REACHED EIGHT MILLION.

5. I TOLD BRANDT I HAD VISITED MOSCOW TWICE, FIRST IN 1963 AS AN EXCHANGE PROFESSOR AND THEN AGAIN IN 1974. BRANDT AND I CHATTED FOR A WHILE ABOUT SOVIET ART AND SCULPTURE, THEN HE TURNED TO HIS IMPRESSIONS OF BREZHNEV.

6. BRANDT SAID HE HAD FOUND BREZHNEV IN SLIGHTLY BETTER PHYSICAL CONDITION THAN DURING HIS 1978 BONN VISIT. BREZHNEV WAS NOW 74. I OBSERVED THAT BY MY STANDARDS HE WAS A YOUNG MAN. BRANDT SAID THAT BREZHNEV STUCK TO HIS PAPERS THIS TIME MORE CLOSELY THAN HE USED TO. AT THEIR FIRST MEETING DURING THE RECENT VISIT, IN THE KREMLIN, BREZHNEV READ FOR ONE HOUR. BRANDT THEN RESPONDED FOR ONE HOUR, FOLLOWING WHICH BREZHNEV IMMEDIATELY

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DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020870
TOR: 190/1933Z

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #3214/02 190192Z
O 091905Z JUL 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8520
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 BONN 13214

NODIS

READ ANOTHER PREPARED TEXT THANKING BRANDT FOR HIS STATEMENT. I ASKED BRANDT HOW BREZHNEV COULD KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT BRANDT WAS GOING TO SAY. BRANDT REPLIED THAT BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT OF THANKS HAD BEEN PREPARED WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT BRANDT WOULD SAY. RELATIVELY INFORMAL DISCUSSION ONLY BEGAN THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH SOME OF BREZHNEV'S ADVISERS AND COLLEAGUES. SOME EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WAS POSSIBLE THEN.

7. BRANDT SAID HE GAINED THE IMPRESSION AT THE DINNER THE FIRST EVENING THAT BREZHNEV NOW DISLIKED THIS KIND OF OBLIGATION. BRANDT RECALLED THAT BREZHNEV PREVIOUSLY ENJOYED SUCH FUNCTIONS. I AGREED. I RECALLED HAVING SEEN BREZHNEV AT A WASHINGTON DINNER, WHERE HE HAD CLEARLY ENJOYED HIMSELF. BRANDT SAID THAT THIS WAS NO LONGER THE CASE. NOW BREZHNEV ONLY TOOK A SYMBOLIC VODKA AND A LITTLE SOUP. TOWARD THE END OF DINNER, BREZHNEV TOOK SOME COFFEE AND MADE A FEW BRIEF REMARKS.

8. BRANDT SAID HE SAW BREZHNEV AGAIN FOR FORTY-FIVE

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020871
TOR: 190/1935Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MINUTES ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT. THEY THEN EXCHANGED A FEW REMARKS ON POLAND AND FRANCE.

9. I ASKED WHETHER THAT SUGGESTED TO BRANDT THAT BREZHNEV WAS NO LONGER THE ARCHITECT OF SOVIET POLICY. BRANDT REPLIED, YES AND NO. IN 1974, WHEN HE AND BRANDT HAD SIGNED A TREATY, BREZHNEV ALSO HAD A PREPARED STATEMENT BUT WOULD OCCASIONALLY PARAPHRASE IT. NOW HE JUST READ IT. BRANDT SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT SINCE 1975 OR 1978 AT THE LATEST, A "KIND OF FIRM" WAS FUNCTIONING IN MOSCOW WHICH USED THE NAME BREZHNEV AND PREPARED HIS TEXTS. WE SIMPLY DO NOT KNOW WHAT RESULTS FROM POLITBURO DECISIONS AND WHAT RESULTS FROM BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL APPARATUS.

10. BRANDT SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE THREE "PERIPHERAL OBSERVATIONS:"

-- POLAND: FIRST, HE HAD THE FEELING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT IN A MOOD TO TAKE ANY IMMEDIATE ACTION VIS-A-VIS POLAND. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A LATENT CRISIS THERE, AND IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INVASION LATER ON. AT THE DINNER, BRANDT HAD ASKED BREZHNEV WHETHER "HIS FRIEND SUSLOV" -- WHO WAS SITTING NEARBY -- WOULD GO TO THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS. THE WAY BREZHNEV AND SUSLOV JOKED IN RESPONSE GAVE BRANDT THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE NO PREPARATIONS TO INVADE POLAND. ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT BRANDT HAD ASKED BREZHNEV WHETHER HE KNEW KANIA. BREZHNEV RESPONDED, "NO, BUT I KNOW JARUSELSKI AND LIKE HIM." BRANDT RECALLED THAT BREZHNEV HAD KNOWN JARUSELSKI AS DEFENSE MINISTER, A PORTFOLIO WHICH AS PRIME MINISTER JARUSELSKI CONTINUES TO HOLD.

-- NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES: BRANDT NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN DISAGREEMENT WITH HIS OWN GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUE OF ASKING THE SOVIETS TO PARTICIPATE IN CONFERENCES ON NORTH-SOUTH MATTERS. HE BELIEVED A NEGATIVE STANCE WAS OVERHASTY. THE INTERESTS OF THE HUNGARIANS AND BULGARIANS, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. BRANDT BELIEVED THAT THE FUTURE OF TRADE, ENERGY AND THE WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM MUST BE

BUNN 0214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020871
TOR: 190/1935Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF INTEREST TO THEM. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT MOVED THAT FAR. SOME EXPERTS HAD, BUT NOT THE LEADERS. AT A MOSCOW CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE SOVIET INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (IMEMO) WHICH BRANDT HAD ATTENDED PREVIOUSLY, SOME OF THE SOVIET PARTICIPANTS HAD RAISED INTELLIGENT ISSUES AND HAD AGREED WITH BRANDT'S OBSERVATION THAT "WORLD-BRIDGING PROBLEMS," SUCH AS THE POPULATION EXPLOSION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, WENT BEYOND THE SOCIAL ORDER UNDER WHICH ONE LIVED. BRANDT SAID THAT TO HIS SURPRISE, BREZHNEV HAD RAISED THE NORTH-SOUTH ISSUE. BREZHNEV SAID HE WANTED TO REPEAT THE SOVIET "POSITION OF PRINCIPLE:" THEY DID NOT FEEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLONIALISM." (BRANDT SAID HE HAD NOT RESPONDED, BUT IF HE HAD, HE WOULD HAVE SAID THIS WAS A QUESTION BETTER LEFT TO HISTORIANS.) APART FROM THAT, BREZHNEV CONTINUED, THE WEST WAS WORKING WITH THE WRONG FIGURES; BREZHNEV WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE AID TO CUBA, VIET NAM AND OTHER COUNTRIES. BUT, BREZHNEV SAID, "WE DON'T EXCLUDE THAT WE WILL FIND A WAY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EFFORTS OF THE MEXICO SUMMIT." BRANDT DREW THE CONCLUSION THAT

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020871
TOR: 190/1935Z*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 BONN 13214

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BREZHNEV WOULD NOT PLAN TO GO, BUT WOULD PERHAPS SEND SOME HIGH-LEVEL OBSERVER. THIS WAS AGAINST THE RULES, AND THE MEXICANS WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE. BREZHNEV CRITICIZED "THE NORTH-SOUTH" TERMINOLOGY. BRANDT IN TURN REPLIED THAT HE HAD PROBLEMS WITH IT TOO. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, DID NOT SUGGEST ANY ALTERNATIVE TERMINOLOGY.

-- AFGHANISTAN: BRANDT SAID THAT BREZHNEV, IN HIS FIRST PRESENTATION, HAD SOME REMARKS ABOUT MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. BRANDT LISTENED, THEN SAID, "SINCE WE ARE DISCUSSING THAT PART OF THE WORLD, WHAT ABOUT AFGHANISTAN?" BRANDT RECALLED TO BREZHNEV THE CONTINUING DISPLEASURE WITH SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE PART OF "HIS THIRD WORLD FRIENDS." BREZHNEV RESPONDED RATHER DEFENSIVELY THAT IF THE AMERICANS HAD THOUSANDS OF ADVISERS IN IRAN, NO ONE WOULD THINK ANYTHING WAS WRONG; BUT WHEN THE SOVIETS SENT FORCES INTO AFGHANISTAN, THERE WAS A WORLDWIDE OUTCRY.

11. THE FOLLOWING DAY, BRANDT SAID, HE HAD TALKED WITH

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020873
TOR: 190/1937Z

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ZAGLADIN, WHO WAS "VERY ABLE." BRANDT IDENTIFIED FOUR PEOPLE IN THE "MAFIA" SURROUNDING BREZHNEV:

- FALIN, THE FORMER SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BONN;
- ZAGLADIN, PARTY EXPERT ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS;
- ARBATOV, THE HEAD OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA;
- INOZEMTSOV, HEAD OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (IMEMO).

THE FOUR MEMBERS OF BREZHNEV'S "MAFIA," BRANDT SAID, HAD ALL BEEN AT UNIVERSITY TOGETHER AND TOOK THEIR DEGREES THE SAME YEAR.

12. BRANDT HAD ALSO SPOKEN WITH PONOMAREV, ACCOMPANIED BY ZAGLADIN. HE CHARACTERIZED PONOMAREV AS OLD-FASHIONED AND A LONG-TIME POLITBURO CANDIDATE. PONOMAREV MADE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN:

- IF GUARANTEES COULD BE OFFERED AGAINST INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN, AND IF SECURITY COULD BE ESTABLISHED ALONG THE 2,400-KILOMETER-LONG BORDER, AND IF AFGHANISTAN'S NON-ALIGNED STATUS COULD BE CONFIRMED (BRANDT SAID HE HAD INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT THAT STATUS HAD NEVER CHANGED), THEN THE SOVIETS WOULD "WITH PLEASURE" BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS. BRANDT SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO DISCUSS THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE AFGHANISTAN GOVERNMENT, AND WERE OBVIOUSLY NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF MILLIONS OF REFUGEES RETURNING WITHOUT BEING PUNISHED. BUT THE SETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE GUARANTEED BY THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES.

13. I ASKED BRANDT IF HE COULD CLARIFY THE WORD "GUARANTEE." HE RESPONDED THAT IT MEANT A TREATY PLUS "PERHAPS SOMETHING ALONG THE TWO BORDERS." HE CONTINUED THAT THIS WAS A DIFFERENT SOVIET APPROACH FROM THAT OF SIX MONTHS AGO. THEY WERE NOT EXCLUDING DISCUSSIONS NOW. SIX MONTHS AGO, BRANDT OBSERVED, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE SAID, "THIS IS OUR BUSINESS; YOU ARE FAR AWAY." THIS WAS ALSO TRUE OF THE CARRINGTON VISIT. GROMYKO HAD SAID THAT THE EC PROPOSAL WAS

BONN 3214

DTG:091945Z JUL 81 PSN: 020873
TOR: 190/1937Z

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

"NOT REALISTIC," BUT HE HAD NOT TOLD CARRINGTON TO "GO TO HELL," AND HE INDICATED THEY COULD MEET IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER. BRANDT SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW FAR THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO GO, BUT THEY WERE AWARE THAT THEIR POSITION WAS NOT STRONG.

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14. THESE WERE THE PERIPHERAL THINGS, BRANDT SAID. NOW HE WISHED TO TURN TO SERIOUS THINGS. HE HAD HEARD A GOOD DEAL OF TALK IN MOSCOW THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO NEGOTIATE, BUT THAT THEY DOUBTED THE UNITED STATES WANTED TO. IN RESPONSE, BRANDT HAD POINTED TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S STATEMENT ON RETURNING FROM THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE NATO COUNCIL'S ROME STATEMENT. THERE WAS SOME POLEMIC ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS DURING THE MOSCOW TALKS, BUT NOT VERY MUCH.

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BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020873
TOR: 190/1937Z*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 BONN 13214

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15. BRANDT SAID HE ASKED THE SOVIETS, "IF YOU DO NOT LIKE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST PART OF THE DOUBLE DECISION, WHAT ARE YOU PREPARED TO DO?" SUBSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO HAVE HAD A DISCUSSION. THEY HAD SENT AN ADVISOR TO THE GUEST HOUSE TO ASK WHAT BRANDT HAD MEANT BY A "ZERO SOLUTION." BRANDT RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD LOOK AGAIN AT THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION AND THE DECISION TAKEN AT THE DECEMBER 1979 SPD BERLIN CONVENTION, WHICH INDICATED PREPAREDNESS TO DEPLOY NATO TNF IF NEGOTIATIONS PROVED UNSATISFACTORY. THE SOVIETS HAD ANOTHER INTERPRETATION, BRANDT SAID. FOR THEM, THE ZERO SOLUTION MUST INCLUDE ALL REPEAT ALL MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE. AT THE FIRST BRANDT-BREZHNEV MEETING, THEY ALREADY INSISTED THAT FBS BE INCLUDED. (IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, BRANDT CLARIFIED "FBS" TO MEAN PRINCIPALLY U.S. AIRCRAFT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.) THE SOVIETS POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE GERMANS SHOULD KNOW THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS PRESENTED FIGURES, THEY WOULD INCLUDE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, WHATEVER THESE SYSTEMS' STATUS WAS.

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020876
TOR: 190/1939Z

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

16. BRANDT RECALLED THAT IN HIS DINNER SPEECH HE SAID THAT HE WHO WISHES TO PREVENT ARMS MODERNIZATION (NACHRUESTUNG) MUST DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF ARMS DEPLOYMENT TO WHICH THAT MODERNIZATION IS A RESPONSE (VORRUESTUNG). IN HIS DINNER REMARKS, BREZHNEV RESPONDED WITH A SLIGHTLY CHANGED MORATORIUM PROPOSAL, OF WHICH BRANDT SAID HE THOUGHT THE UNITED STATES WAS ALREADY AWARE:

- THE PROPOSAL CONCENTRATED PURELY ON DEPLOYMENT AND DID NOT INCLUDE PRODUCTION OF TNF WEAPONS OR INFRASTRUCTURE PREPARATION;
- THE PROPOSAL ALSO STIPULATED THAT SS-20 DEPLOYMENT WOULD STOP "AS SOON AS NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN." THIS WOULD MEAN MORE THAN PERIPHERAL TALKS IN NEW YORK. THE SOVIETS WOULD EXPECT THE AMERICANS TO LET THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT THEY AGREED WITH THE SOVIET CONCEPT. IN OTHER WORDS, BRANDT SAID, IF THE UNITED STATES FOUND THE CONCEPT AGREEABLE, WE WOULD MERELY HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE TO CARRY THE MESSAGE.

17. BRANDT AND HIS COLLEAGUES POSED OTHER QUESTIONS RELATED TO TNF, E.G.,: HOW MANY SS-20'S WOULD BE DISMANTLED; THE NUMBER OF AND PLANS FOR THE SS-4'S AND SS-5'S; HOW MANY SS-20'S WERE TARGETED ON CHINA; WHAT PLANS THE SOVIETS HAD TO CONTINUE THEIR BUILD-UP OF WEAPONS. SUBSEQUENTLY, A RESPONSE ARRIVED. THERE HAD BEEN A POLITBURO MEETING AT WHICH THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE A REPLY TO BRANDT'S QUESTION. THE SOVIETS WOULD LET US KNOW, BRANDT WAS TOLD.

18. I ASKED BRANDT WHETHER BREZHNEV HAD FURNISHED COPIES OF THE TWO MEMOS HE HAD READ FROM. BRANDT SAID THAT HE HAD NOT. THOSE WERE PAPERS PREPARED FOR BREZHNEV'S DELIVERY.

19. BRANDT WAS ASTONISHED BY THE "FANTASTIC DIFFERENCE" BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIGURES BREZHNEV CITED AND WESTERN FIGURES. AT BRANDT'S REQUEST, WISCHNEWSKI PRODUCED THE WESTERN FIGURES AND OBSERVED THAT "THEY WERE SO FAR FROM EACH OTHER THAT IT WOULD

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020876
TOR: 190/1939Z

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE WORTHWHILE TO HAVE NEGOTIATIONS IF ONLY FOR THIS REASON." THE SOVIETS, BRANDT ADDED, HAD A RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF THE GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTRY'S PUBLICATION ON TNF, AND CLAIMED THAT THE FACTS CONTAINED THEREIN WERE NOT CORRECT.

20. BRANDT SAID THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN THE FRENCH SITUATION. THEY FELT INSUFFICIENTLY INFORMED AND ASKED HIM FOR HIS VIEWS, SINCE HE "WAS A FRIEND OF MITTERRAND." BRANDT SAID HE RESPONDED FRANKLY THAT MITTERRAND WAS RATHER GAULLIST, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD FIND HIM A SOLID PARTNER. BRANDT OPINED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED BECAUSE THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR BEFORE THE ELECTION THAT THEY PREFERRED GISCARD.

21. BRANDT CONFIRMED THAT BREZHNEV WANTED TO COME TO BONN IN NOVEMBER. BRANDT SAID HE ASKED SCHMIDT BEFORE LEAVING FOR MOSCOW, AND THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD BEEN IN FAVOR OF A BREZHNEV VISIT. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES OUTSTANDING,

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020876
TOR: 190/1939Z

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DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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AND A SCHMIDT-BREZHNEV DISCUSSION WOULD ALSO PROVIDE
USEFUL INFORMATION TO SHARE WITH THE ALLIES.

22. BRANDT SAID HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD TOUGH
WORDS IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET ATTACKS ON THE FRG.
BRANDT TOLD THE SOVIETS HE APPRECIATED THE SIGNIFI-
CANCE OF JUNE 22 AS THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
GERMAN INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THAT SOME
SOVIET ATTACKS ON THE FRG WERE UNACCEPTABLE. AS AN
ILLUSTRATION, BRANDT NOTED THAT IN A TELEVISED
DISCUSSION WITH A POLISH POLITBURO HARDLINER, THE
ALLEGATION HAD BEEN MADE THAT WEST GERMAN "REVANCHISTS"
WERE INVOLVED IN POLAND. BRANDT SAID HE ALSO TOLD THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BONN THAT IT WAS BETTER TO HAVE
FACTS THAN ACCUSATIONS.

23. I SAID I FOUND BRANDT'S REMARKS FASCINATING.
NOTING THAT MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020884
TUR: 190/1946Z

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTERESTED IN HIS GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONVERSATIONS, I ASKED BRANDT IF HE HAD CARRIED AWAY THE IMPRESSION THAT SOMETHING OF REAL SIGNIFICANCE HAD EMERGED IN THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT.

24. BRANDT SAID THAT THAT WAS A DIFFICULT QUESTION. IF HE ATTEMPTED TO ANALYZE HIMSELF, HE WOULD HAVE TO ADMIT THAT HE TRIED TO "RUN AWAY" FROM ANSWERING THAT QUESTION. THE SOVIETS HAD SAID THEY WOULD PROVIDE INTERPRETATIONS; THEY STILL HAD TWO WEEKS TO DO THAT. HIS PRESENT FEELING WAS THAT THERE WERE SHADES OF DIFFERING OPINIONS WITHIN THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP "WHICH YOU CAN SMELL," ALTHOUGH AS YET NO PROOF OF THIS EXISTED.

25. COMPARED WITH HIS EARLIER VISITS, BRANDT OBSERVED, THE RECEPTION THIS TIME WAS EXTREMELY COOL AND FORMAL. THE FIFTEEN ACCOMPANYING JOURNALISTS WERE PRACTICALLY ISOLATED FROM THE TIME OF THE GROUP'S ARRIVAL MONDAY MORNING UNTIL WEDNESDAY. NORMALLY THE SOVIETS CONTACTED JOURNALISTS; THEY DID NOT DO SO THIS TIME. WHEN THE SOVIETS ASKED BRANDT WHOM HE WISHED TO SEE, HE HAD REPLIED GROMYKO AND FALIN. HE WAS NOT ABLE TO SEE FALIN PRIVATELY, HE MET HIM ONLY AT THE GERMAN EMBASSY RECEPTION WEDNESDAY EVENING.

26. BRANDT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME CHANGE IN THE CLIMATE AT THAT POINT. THAT NIGHT, THE SOVIET COURIER SAID TO HIM, "THE POLITBURO WILL MEET TOMORROW MORNING. YOU CAN TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT BREZHNEV WILL SEE YOU BEFORE YOU LEAVE." THE COURIER ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD "COME TO A POSITIVE CONCLUSION" ON BRANDT'S VISIT. IT WAS REMARKABLE, BRANDT OBSERVED, THAT THEY NEEDED A MEETING TO DO SOMETHING AS SIMPLE AS THAT. THEY HAD OBVIOUSLY DECIDED THAT "THE OLD MAN" WOULD COME TO THE AIRPORT. GROMYKO AND PONOMAREV WERE WAITING THERE.

27. SUSLOV ALSO PARTICIPATED AT THE DINNER, BUT

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DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020884
TOR: 190/1946Z

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE TALKS. HE WAS FRIENDLY. ALTHOUGH HE IS OLDER THAN BREZHNEV, HE LOOKED YOUNGER. A HARDLINER IN THE PAST, HE WAS RELAXED ON THIS OCCASION.

28. BRANDT SAID HE WAS ALMOST SURE THAT THERE WAS A LINE OF THINKING WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO THE EFFECT THAT "WHATEVER THE SOVIETS DO, CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II WILL BE DEPLOYED. THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS HAD BETTER START PREPARING THEIR RESPONSE." PERHAPS, BRANDT SPECULATED, THERE WERE ALSO THOSE WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WHO WOULD NOT AGREE WITH THIS LINE, AND WHO STILL EXPECTED SOMETHING POSITIVE FROM NEGOTIATIONS. BREZHNEV SAID THAT IF THE UNITED STATES THOUGHT IT COULD FORCE THE SOVIETS INTO SUBMISSION BY FURTHER ARMING, IT WOULD FAIL. BREZHNEV TRACED IN THIS CONNECTION HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE EXPLOSION OF THE FIRST NUCLEAR BOMB.

29. BRANDT EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT ACCEPT THE THESIS THAT, AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, TECHNOLOGY MIGHT DRIVE POLICY. THEY GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT EVERYTHING WAS THE RESULT OF POLICY DECISIONS -- WHICH, BRANDT SAID, HE DID NOT BELIEVE. TO ILLUSTRATE, BRANDT SAID HE DOUBTED THAT THE LEADERSHIP KNEW TEN YEARS AGO WHAT THE SS-20 WOULD

BONN 3214

DTG:091905Z JUL 81 PSN: 020884
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PAGE 01

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 BONN 13214
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MEAN, "BUT THEIR GENERALS KNEW."

30. AS AN ASIDE, BRANDT SAID HE HAD SEEN IN THE NEWS THAT HIS FRIEND HORST EHMKE WAS IN WASHINGTON. BRANDT SAID THERE WERE REPORTS THAT HE HAD ASKED EHMKE TO TRANSMIT INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT. THIS WAS "A MISUNDERSTANDING." BRANDT AND EHMKE HAD HAD A VERY SHORT CONVERSATION, BEFORE BRANDT HAD PRODUCED A WRITTEN REPORT. HOWEVER, BRANDT ADDED, HE HAD GIVEN EHMKE SOME OF HIS GENERAL IMPRESSIONS.

31. I EXPRESSED MY GRATITUDE TO BRANDT FOR HIS THOROUGHNESS AND GREAT CANDOR. BRANDT SAID THAT HE AND HIS STAFF STOOD READY TO SUPPLY FURTHER INFORMATION, "EVEN THE EXACT WORDING." I ASKED WHETHER BRANDT WOULD BE VISITING THE UNITED STATES. BRANDT SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC PLANS APART FROM A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT BEFORE THE B'NAI BRITH IN NEW YORK EARLY IN OCTOBER, WHICH HE WOULD BE COMBINING WITH U.N. NORTH-SOUTH ACTIVITIES. THE GERMANS HAD THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH ISRAEL, BRANDT

BONN 3214

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