Collection: Reagan, Ronald: 1980 Campaign Papers, 1965-80
Folder Title: Defense File (2 of 2)
Box: 860

Defense

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN TOWER (R-TX), JULY 31, 1980

AS PART OF A DETERMINED EFFORT TO GIVE RESPECTABILITY TO THE DOCTRINE OF APPEASEMENT, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IS NOW OUT ON THE HUSTINGS TRYING TO EXPLAIN TO AMERICANS WHY THEY SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE OUR CONDITION OF MILITARY INFERIORITY.

SECRETARY BROWN LABELS THE REPUBLICAN CALL FOR SUPERIORITY "UNREALISTIC, SIMPLISTIC, AND DANGEROUS", CONVENIENTLY IGNORING THAT FOR THE THIRTY YEARS BEFORE JIMMY CARTER'S ELECTION--YEARS IN WHICH WE ~~STILL HAD SUPERIORITY~~ were NOT inferior--THE WORLD WAS A LOT LESS DANGEROUS.

BEFORE JIMMY CARTER, WE DIDN'T HAVE AN "UNACCEPTABLE" RUSSIAN BRIGADE IN CUBA, "3rd rate" AMERICANS INCARCERATED BY A THIRD-RATE DICTATOR IN IRAN, AND SOVIET AND CUBAN TROOPS RUNNING AROUND ALL OVER AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

MR. BROWN ALSO LABELS THOSE WHO LAMENT OUR DECLINING STRENGTH AS PLAYING "FAST AND LOOSE WITH THE TRUTH", CONVENIENTLY IGNORING THAT THAT COMPANY INCLUDES ALL OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND A HEALTHY BIPARTISAN MAJORITY OF THE CONGRESS.

SAC cw

FURTHERMORE, SECRETARY BROWN CONVENIENTLY FORGETS THAT IT DIDN'T HAVE TO BE THIS WAY. IF PRESIDENT CARTER HAD HELD TO THE FORD FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PLAN, WE WOULDN'T BE IN THIS POSITION. OUR FIRMNESS TOWARD THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE BEEN BACKED BY SUCH SOLID EVIDENCE AS THE B-1, CRUISE MISSILES, AN AGGRESSIVE MX PROGRAM, ETC.--ALL OF WHICH ARE NOW CANCELLED OR DELAYED TO THE TUNE OF OVER $38 BILLION IN CARTER DEFENSE PROGRAM CUTS.

A SIMILAR AND EQUALLY UNCONSCIONABLE CAMPAIGN TO CONCEAL FROM THE PEOPLE THE RISKS OF WEAKNESS AND APPEASEMENT WAS PLAYED OUT IN ENGLAND DURING THE 1930S. WE ALL KNOW THE RESULTS.

REPUBLICANS TODAY ARE NOT CALLING FOR ITEM-FOR-ITEM SUPERIORITY BUT INSTEAD FOR A RESPONSIBLE RESTORATION OF OUR STRENGTH SO THAT OUR AGGREGATE MILITARY POSTURE IS SUFFICIENT TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION OR TO PREVAIL IF A CONFLICT OCCURS--NOTHING MORE, AND MR. BROWN KNOWS THAT.

HIS SHAMEFUL EFFORTS TO DECEIVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND REVISE THE HISTORY OF OUR DECLINE WILL BE RECOGNIZED FOR WHAT THEY ARE--PURE BALONEY.

put up job

Report Says Democrats Spend More on Defense

Wash Post 8/11·80

United Press International

Military spending has increased each year the Democrats have controlled the Pentagon, in sharp contrast to a decline in real defense spending during the Nixon-Ford years, a liberal defense research group said yesterday.

In fiscal 1979, the military spent $117.7 bilion, the report by the Center for Defense Information said. In fiscal 1981 it is estimated that defense spending will amount to $157.5 billion.

"This amounts to an increase of $40 billion," retired U.S. admiral Gene La Roque, director of the research center, said. "When you adjust for inflation, that comes to an increase of almost 7 percent per year, far higher than the 3 percent or 4 percent the public has been hearing about.

"In contrast, real military spending actually declined in every one of the Nixon-Ford years."

La Roque's comments were made as the center released a report titled "Military Overspending: A Real Present Danger." It criticizes both the Republican and Democratic defense postures.

La Roque said the calls for massive increases in military spending expected to be a part of both major political parties' platforms are "wasteful, inflationary and will not increase the security of the United States."

He said, "While it is customary for the federal government to spend more of the taxpayer's money in an election year to persuade the taxpayer to vote for an incumbent, the increased spending this year seems to be focused on the military."

He suggested that "it stems from the lack of awareness on the part of the taxpayers of the very formidable strength of the United States and the position of military superiority of the United States and allied military forces over those of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact."

The report says that plans for expanded Pentagon spending that are not geared to the economic problems of the private sector "will disrupt the economy and ultimately weaken the military."

It adds: "As the civilian economy continues to deteriorate with high inflation, mounting unemployment and high interest rates, declines in federal revenue and the need to do something to shore up the nation's basic industries will make fewer resources available for military purposes."

12

John P. Roche

The real 'lesson' of Afghanistan

It is hard to pick up a periodical without finding some heavy think about the Soviet mistake in Afghanistan. Some Englishman in a letter to the *Economist* even compared it with the Boer War, and various political astrologers are ruminating on the "lesson" Afghanistan will teach the Soviets.

Confessedly I overdose on history, but most of this is clap-trap, comparable to arguing that the lesson of the Battle of New Orleans was that General Pakenham should have turned on his radio and learned the war was over.

Let's take the Boer War between the British and the Afrikaners for starters. It was clearly a watershed in the fortunes of the British Empire, but why did about 30,000 Boers pin down almost 500,000 of Her Majesty's troops for three years? The British generals were, of course, incompetent — they were prepared to refight the Crimean War — but the clue to British impotence was a political decision.

The British high command suffered from what might be called the "Indian Mutiny Syndrome" and a policy decision was made at the highest level that the native regiments of the Indian army would not be employed in a war against whites. It could become habit-forming; bad show, you know. So the British sent the wrong troops to chase the Boers around their hills and kopjes: beefy garrison outfits who were trained to march in formations, form squares, and engage in the ballet required by the manual of arms.

The South African terrain was made for the Gurkhas, the Galwarioris, the Sikhs, the Punjabis, to say nothing of the native cavalry regiments. They loved climbing mountains and shooting people, and they didn't require the immense baggage train British regulars took for granted.

So what has the Boer War got to do with the Soviets in Afghanistan? That is precisely the point.

So what has the Boer War got to do with the Soviets in Afghanistan? That is precisely the point: the assumption of the man making the comparison was that Moscow would presumably ship its 450,000 KGB and MVD security troops off to Kabul. It's clear they initially underestimated the level of Afghan resistance and thought that a show of overwhelming force would cow those wild men — hence the T-62 tanks.

The comparison with the American experience in Vietnam is equally misleading. First of all, Moscow is not interested in building a viable Afghan state: it simply wants to eliminate a nuisance on its border. To paraphrase, their line is "the only good Afghan is a dead Afghan," and they have the capability to ruthlessly destroy any opposition.

The Soviet military does not play games: recall they put more men into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 than we put into Vietnam in 10 years.

Beyond that, the Soviet force level is currently estimated at about 85,000 most of whom are logistical forces setting up bases, prepositioning and guarding supply dumps, installing radar equipment at airports. When they throw in their first line forces, probably after the Olympics, the Vietnam analogy will be even more ludicrous: they won't install a PX in Kabul like the monstrosity we had in Cholon, their troops will not be engaged in community development programs comparable to Marine efforts in I Corps, they will not court-martial a pilot for violating the rules of engagement by shooting up an ambulance.

No, the concept of limited war does not exist in the Soviet military vocabulary. And anyone who assumes they are fools is sadly mistaken. I will risk a prediction: by now they have learned the AK-47 with its limited range is no match for the Kentucky-style rifles of the Afghans. The next Soviet wave will be equipped with long-range infantry equipment, Mi-24 helicopters with proper dust filters, and tracked armored personnel carriers.

The concept of limited war does not exist in the Soviet military vocabulary. And anyone who assumes they are fools is sadly mistaken.

In short, the Soviet expeditionary force will be long on teeth and short on tail, on amenities. Soviet "boys" do not get tender loving care: only recently have they gotten around to putting air conditioning in tanks! If they throw in 250,000 soldiers, probably 80 per cent will be directly involved in combat.

In contrast, when we had 550,000 in Vietnam only 90,000 were ground forces: the rest were installing wall to wall airstrips, building that idiot "barrier," and generally out of the combat picture. If you must find a historical model, look at the Roman campaigns against Carthage — not at the Boer War or Vietnam.

September 6, 1980

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

'MAD': An Issue Beyond Partisan Politics

Having been asked to address the Democratic convention on the subject of defense, it is perhaps appropriate for me to offer a partial reply to Gen. Edward Rowny's article of Aug. 25 ["That 'New' Nuclear Strategy." op-ed].

The general cites the passage in the Republican platform (p. 55) that states: "We reject the mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategy of the Carter administration which limits the president during crises to a Hobson's choice between mass mutual suicide and surrender." This seems to him a fair assessment.

May I say that with all the respect in which I hold Gen. Rowny, I do not share his approbation. For one thing, I suspect careless drafting in matters of high concern. Hobson, it will be recalled, was the innkeeper who rented horses but required customers to take the one nearest the door. Hence a Hobson's choice is no choice at all. Hence, you could say, the Republican plank does not exactly make sense.

Neither is it candid—on a subject where everyday slyness just won't do. "Assured destruction" has been the nuclear strategy of every administration since the time the Soviets achieved a nuclear capability of their own. Deterrence is easy to caricature—MAD—but it should be remembered that it was the work of men driven by the highest moral concerns, whose obsession was that the United States should never be the first to launch a nuclear attack.

Deterrence strategy argued in effect that there was a level of sufficiency in nuclear weapons beyond which no nation need go. And indeed, from the mid-'60s until just recently we added little to our forces. Of late, however, a massive increase has commenced. It came reluctantly, but it has begun. Unfortunately, the Republican platform (p. 62) accuses the Carter administration of having "in effect, practiced unilateral disarmament. . . ." This is not a subject well adapted to political rhetoric.

One would be more severe with the Republicans if the administration had acted more responsibly itself. In response to the Republican platform, administration officials leaked the highly classified Presidential Directive 59, evidently hoping to show that the administration is developing a counterforce capacity of the kind the Republicans call for. This was a contemptible act, and very possibly a criminal one. I have written the attorney general to inquire as to his views on this point.

Can we keep this profoundly serious subject out of partisan politics?

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,
U.S. Senator (D-N.Y.)

Washington

'Inverted' Logic

The Carter campaign's assertion that a vote for John Anderson is a vote for Ronald Reagan is patently false. A recent Harris poll clearly demonstrates that, assuming Mr. Anderson has a chance, the voters of the eight states with the greatest number of electoral votes overwhelmingly prefer John Anderson (39 percent) to either Ronald Reagan (31 percent) or Jimmy Carter (28 percent). Robert Strauss has inverted the logic: it is Jimmy Carter who is taking votes from Mr. Anderson, not vice versa. John Anderson has a chance; let the truth now be known: a vote for Jimmy Carter is a vote for Ronald Reagan.

BRUCE D. McCULLOUGH

Washington

President Gains Endorsement For MX Blockbuster Missile

Carter to Support New U.S. Bomber

WASH POST 8-14-80

By George C. Wilson A1

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter will commit himself to developing a new strategic bomber, perhaps as early as tonight when he accepts renomination at the Democratic National Convention, government sources said yesterday.

Such a commitment would steal a march on GOP standard-bearer Ronald Reagan and his adherents who have lambasted Carter for canceling the B1 bomber in 1977.

Breakthroughs in technology, sources said, will enable Carter to argue that his cancellation was a good move because the contemplated new bomber could foil Soviet defenses which are becoming lethal enough to down a B1.

One key breakthrough is a top-secret way to make a long-range bomber virtually invisible to enemy radar used to detect invading aircraft and aim guns and missiles at them.

Some Air Force enthusiasts have nicknamed this new bomber "Stealth" because of its ghost-like qualities. Technocrats explain Stealth presents a small, virtually undetectable "cross-section" to radar beams searching for it. They call it the High Technology Aircraft.

Presidential aides have drafted remarks about a new bomber for Carter to deliver to the convention tonight. But the president could decide to hold off. It depends in part on how he reads the mood of the convention, sources said.

"You're going to hear about these new bomber breakthroughs sooner or later in this campaign," one knowledgeable official said in discussing the administration's plan for combatting Reagan's claim that Carter has let down the nation's guard by canceling the B1 and other actions.

Although the Air Force is secretive about the breakthroughs for foiling enemy radar, Lt. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, Air Force research chief, has said publicly that "high on our list of hardware explorations" in looking for a new bomber "is radar-absorbing material to reduce radar cross-sections.

See BOMBER, A17, Col. 1

Heavy Lobbying Overwhelms Foes

WASH POST 8-14-80

By Helen Dewar A1

Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, Aug. 13—Rebounding from a serious domestic policy defeat only a day before, President Carter turned on the heat today and won a strong Democratic National Convention endorsement of the administration's planned MX mobile missile system.

By a vote of 1,874 to 1,277, the convention rejected a minority plank opposing the controversial new strategic weapon as introducing "new risks which outweigh apparent military advantage."

Stung by convention rebuffs Tuesday to administration positions on economic and women's issues, Carter forces—led by Defense Secretary Harold Brown—mounted a full-court press to win on the MX issue.

As signs reading "MX—Disaster on Wheels" and "Ban the X-Rated Missile" sprouted on the convention floor, wavering Carter delegates were summoned to Carter trailers outside the hall for heavy persuasion from Brown and others.

But the biggest gun was a personal, hand-scrawled letter on White House stationery from Carter to all convention delegates that read:

"As commander-in-chief of American armed forces, my responsibility to protect this nation is paramount. It is crucial that our strategic nuclear forces not be vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet attack. The MX missile system is our optimum means of meeting these vital goals.

"We Democrats must demonstrate to our nation and to the world that we are committed to defending our country, and to concluding a balanced nuclear arms control agreement. Therefore, it is very important for you to vote NO on Minority Reports 20 & 23 (the two dealing with the MX system)."

A letter was circulated on the convention floor citing support for the MX system by the high command of the AFL-CIO, which only the day before helped lead the successful fight to endorse, over strong administration objections, a $12 billion antirecession jobs program. However, an AFL-CIO

See MX, A15, Col. 1

SENATOR SAM NUNN
June 23, 1980

file under deff

THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE: A Massive Deception Campaign Is Launched

The significant shortfalls in the total number of active and reserve personnel needed to sustain the All-Volunteer Force have been widely publicized in recent months, both in terms of recruiting and retention. However, there is potentially a much more explosive problem simmering underneath which is the alarming deterioration in the quality of new personnel entering the Services, especially the Army.

However, in this area a campaign of deception has been launched by top leaders in the Department of the Army. Have these leaders forgotten why we maintain our armed forces? These leaders appear to want to keep the facts about the serious deterioration of quality cloaked from public scrutiny and to avoid Congressional actions to insist that quality be maintained in the Army.

Our military is not an armed WPA, and we must not permit the U.S. Army to become a job corps equipped with tanks and nuclear missiles. Yet that is the path we are moving towards.

Impact of Quality Deterioration

This quality deterioration is impacting on the readiness of our armed forces and the critical ability of our combat units to perform their wartime missions. Three years ago, then Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower, Paul Phillips,

summarized this important relationship by testifying: "The impetus and commitment to achieve a quality Army must be continued. Our key concern is that the impact on combat readiness varies in direct proportion to quality content (for example, losses from non-high school graduates run 2.8 times more than those for high school diploma graduates)."

Quality deterioration is a problem the sergeants and junior officers have been consistently complaining about, while top officials in the Army have just as consistently maintained that quality is no problem. TRUE

I would like to cite some of the evidence I have been receiving from the field--from those who are either part of or observe the Army on a day-to-day basis: one is a non-commissioned officer, one a mid-level Captain, and one a retired sergeant.

One letter in April, 1980, was from a female non-commissioned officer who was just leaving the Army:

> I would like to discuss a matter that disturbs me greatly. . . .During my three years on active duty, I notice a severe decline of the quality of the soldiers that were being recruited into our military forces. When speaking of a decline in quality, I speak of intelligence, attitude, and personal hygiene. Basic training is suppose to discipline and smooth out the rough edges but in some individuals this is impossible.
>
> The government is putting the defense of our country in jeopardy and is wasting money by keeping these persons in the armed forces. . . . (A) strict recruiting policy should begin immediately to ensure that future soldiers are capable in every way to defend our country.

Another letter was from an Army Captain. It was almost four pages typewritten and some of the highlights follow:

> I feel that you should hear part of the story from a 10-year middle-manager, someone at the grass roots level who will tell it like it is and won't let bias into the picture.
>
> My contemporaries are exiting the military at an increasing and alarming rate. Many officers separating are not doing so because of lucrative outside opportunities. A major factor in separation is low morale experience by these individuals because of the quality and inefficiency of our soldiers and our system. . . .
>
> Soldier quality has diminished markedly; I have witnessed this. . . Some recruits cannot comprehend how to operate present inventory equipment. Not only have we lowered induction standards, we have lowered school graduation standards at the Intelligence School so that more recruits can graduate school specialty training. When soldiers arrive in an active army unit, many still are not trained. . .
>
> Professionals find it difficult to work with a large number of untrainable inductees. I personally attest that it is very, very frustrating. One high official has pointed the finger at military supervisors and unit leaders to place blame for inefficiency. I have to return to a plea for common sense; is it the fault of the leaders and trainers when the material with which they are working is partially or totally untrainable? If the American people are not alerted to all the conditions which presently exist, this may end up becoming one of the biggest cons described in history books of the future, should a powerful adversary ever test the might and professionalism of our ground forces.
>
> Many of us are aware of the problems, statistics validate them. Officers at the troop level know of and try to expose problems, yet the cover-up continues, everyone works for someone else and doesn't want to make waves. Complacency is a monster that may devour us.

This letter was from a dedicated Army professional who has decided to leave the institution he loves in an effort to "show the massive cover-up which exists."

Just the other day I received a seven page hand-written letter from a retired Army Sergeant (E-7) who lives near a major Army base and currently has a son serving in the Army. His comments included the following: "I believe that you are beginning to get on the right track with your investigation for the first time (focusing on quality) but are only scratching the surface."

I am receiving letters similar to these at an increasing rate as I am sure many other Senators are.

When the sergeants and junior officers in the field first started complaining, the Army answered that the quality had never been better and the percent of high school graduates and the Mental Category scores were cited as evidence.

For example, according to former Army Deputy Chief for Personnel, General DeWitt Smith: "When you look at Category IV, the lowest acceptable mental category, they comprise 25% of new male recruits in Fiscal Year 1971, and now that figure is down to 10%. This is a turn in a better direction...the trend in current high school diploma graduates continues upward. The proportion of them is very important to the whole force in terms of its ability to perform, train, behave, and stay with the Army at least for the first reenlistment and thus is important in terms of cost effectiveness."

New Evidence Confirms Quality Deterioration

There is now substantial statistical evidence and public testimony to reconcile these differences -- in favor of the sergeants and the young officers who command the troops.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Robert Pirie, testified before the Senate Armed Services Manpower Subcommittee this year that mental test scores of many new recruits are much worse than previously reported. Many military recruits labeled as Mental Category Group III should have been labeled as Mental Category Group IV, indicating that compared to the draft of the early 1960s, many more recruits from the lower end of the scale are entering the service.

Mental Category Group IV corresponds to a mental ability between the lowest 10th and 30th percentile of the relevant population.

For Fiscal Year 1979, the Committee has been informed that 10% of Army recruits fell into this category. This indicator has been consistently cited by the Army as proof that the volunteer force is of higher quality than the draft era Army.

Revised estimates supplied by Secretary Pirie now indicate that up to 45% of Army recruits are in this low mental group. That means the proportion from the lowest mental group is four and one-half times what had previously been estimated.

The cause of this unacceptable situation is apparently the failure

to properly score the aptitude tests that were introduced in 1976. This is a most serious revelation and one that took real courage by Secretary Pirie to admit. Yet, the Department of the Army continues to issue press releases with optimistic numbers on mental ability which are clearly erroneous according to Department of Defense's own testimony.

In addition, this revelation comes accompanied by the fact that there are much fewer higher mental group personnel (34% of Army accessions in 1964 were in Mental Group I and II which correspond to the top 35% of the relevant population. By 1979, this had dropped to 16%). The many cases of recruiting irregularities that have included cheating on the entrance test may mean quality is even worse. In addition, we know that we face a declining number in the number of 18 year-olds in the population for at least the next decade so problems are likely to get worse.

Increasing Numbers of Personnel Who Are Not High School Graduates

As if the deterioration in mental ability is not disturbing enough, so far this Fiscal Year (October 1979 - March 1980) only 38% of Army male recruits are high school graduates, compared to 55% during this period a year ago. Fully 25% of the Army's non-high school graduates read at a sixth grade level or below.

These statistics on mental categories and high school diplomas have in the past been cited by the military as an important indicator in whether or not a recruit was trainable or could adapt to modern weapons and requirements. The Army testified that it "...desires the highest High School Diploma Graduate and mental

group level achievable."

Army Response to Mental Category Levels

What has been the response of those civilians in key leadership positions in the Army to this evidence that the quality measures that have been emphasized for so long are pointing toward disaster? When the information came out about the inflation in the Mental Category scores, the response from the Secretary of the Army was to deny these results as "just talk among testers." Army Manpower Assistant Secretary Peacock tried to recall a joint statement by Assistant Secretary of Defense Pirie and an Army General outlining the possible range of "test inflation."

As I have previously mentioned, Assistant Secretary of Defense Pirie testified that Category IV personnel in the Army were 45% in 1979. Shortly thereafter, Army General Price testified before the Appropriations Committee that 10% of Army accessions were Mental Category IV. At Senator Stennis' request, Assistant Secretary Pirie and General Price provided a joint statement which only conceded that Category IV personnel might be as high as Assistant Secretary of Defense Pirie testified to. The next day, Army Assistant Secretary Peacock phoned the Committee staff and then wrote to Senator Stennis asking that the statement be returned and stating, "the Army will not take any position." By this time, the Army had gotten to the point of trying to prevent policy statements by an Assistant Secretary of Defense from release.

This is not surprising since the official Army position, as always, is that there are no quality problems.

Actual Job Performance Confirms Quality Problem

Having now disavowed high school diploma and the Mental Category scores as valid indices of quality, the Army now says we must look to the field for the real test of capability.

Unfortunately, there is strong evidence that the Mental Category and high school diploma criteria are not just theoretical goals or arcane disputes among testing agencies. The fact that there is an increasingly large number of individuals with lower mental abilities who cannot perform their missions is supported by results and testimony from the field.

A major Army Training Study conducted by the Army to review training programs and their relationship to combat effectiveness tested the performance in combat units. This study found that 25% of the tank gunners did not know where to aim the battlesight when engaging a target. In testing automotive mechanics at graduation on the six tasks which had been taught to them, the average completion ability was only two tasks. This study also confirmed the extra time and large extra costs involved in training Category IV personnel. What was the Army's leadership response to this study by its own Generals? The Army decided to label the study "For Official Use Only" to prevent its public release.

Again, we are told this is only training. What counts is actual job performance. Another indication of the deteriorating quality is indeed the result of tests given to personnel in the field on how well they can do the jobs they would have to do in a combat situation. These are called Skill Qualification Tests.

Army Leadership Continues to Ignore Problem

However, the top Army civilian leadership continues to merrily whistle in the dark while the death knell of a combat ready Army is sounding all around them.

The Secretary of Defense is leaving these questions of quality versus quantity to the Army itself. The Joint Chiefs do not involve themselves in the Army's decisions on personnel. In a very few years, if the Army continues down its current path, it will be lost as an effective fighting force. I have no doubt that the vast majority of the members of the Army are fully prepared to sacrifice their lives to save this country in wartime. The essential question, now, is how many top ranking officials in the Army are willing to risk their careers to save the Army in peacetime. Courage is not measured on the battlefield alone. The time has come for candor. If the Army leaders cannot face the facts in peacetime, can they lead their troops successfully in battle. Who will save the Army? That is the essential question.

A basic institution of our country is floundering. Professional soldiers are leaving by the thousands because of poor quality and discipline in the ranks. They recognize that these problems will take years to correct and see no hope while the top leadership continues to ignore the problem and allows the ranks to be filled with unqualified personnel.

The purpose of the military is to fight successfully in time of war and to be prepared to fight successfully in time of peace. That is the sole reason for being and should be the sole standard governing decisions regarding its recruitment, organization and equipment.

Deliberately lowering the quality standards as the Army has done, ignoring the alarming information about the Mental Categories, being unwilling to pursue its own goals for high school graduates, invalidating Skill Qualification Tests with poor results, and overlooking the testimony of major combat commanders is applying these standards in reverse.

Because of these adverse trends in the Army and the unwillingness of the Army leadership to even acknowledge them, much less take corrective steps, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended several actions.

First, we recommend that an Army end strength of 775,300 be approved for Fiscal Year 1981 contingent on the Army's ability to achieve its own stated goal of 72 percent male high school graduates among new recruits. The approved end strength would be 750,300 if 52 percent or less of its male recruits were high school graduates. The Army's response has been a heightened campaign of deception. What is wrong with approving an Army end strength essentially as requested tied to the quality levels the Army says it intends to apply? Is the Army really saying that the stated quality goals presented to Congress are not really achievable? That the budget is deceiving? We do know that the Army claims that this reduction will result in base closures, in a reduction of two divisions and in other calamities. What the Army doesn't reveal is that its actual strength was in the 750,000 range for most of 1979 (and 749,000 in May 1979) and that somehow no base was closed, and 16 divisions were maintained.

The Army says a reduction of 25,000 means reducing two divisions. What the Army doesn't say is that at that rate, 16 divisions require 8 times 25,000 or 200,000 people. So that if we eliminated all 16 divisions, we would be left with an Army of 575,000 people. Perhaps basic arithmetic should be added to the Skill Qualification Test for top Army leadership. Why didn't we lose a division when the Army strength was below 750,000 last year?

The Army has 219 U.S. bases with 500,000 personnel at these bases (about 2,300 per installation). Why weren't bases closed with the Army's strength of 749,000 last May?

Why isn't the Army planning to open new bases with the additions to current strength permitted in the Committee recommendations?

The Army doesn't say these things. What it does say continues the campaign of deception about the very serious quality problems without any real commitment to meet its own stated goals. In opposing the Committee recommendations, the Army is asking Congress to condone a policy of lowering quality while pretending that everything is fine in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

The Committee recommendation is an attempt to force the Army to focus on quality instead of adhering blindly to the self-destructive "quantity at any cost" recruiting philosophy of today. Such a focus will pay real dividends to the Army and the nation's security. The Marine Corps had a similar experience with emphasizing quantity rather than quality. The results adversely affected the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. General McLennan reflecting on that experience has testified:

> "The record shows that in recent years the Corps has met its accession goals both in terms of quantity and quality. The Commandant was very explicit in his direction and if it came down to a choice, quantity was to be sacrificed for quality.
>
> Our commitment to manpower quality must be maintained to ensure ready, effective forces. This commitment to quality is measured by the increased accession of high school graduates including GED from 59.1 percent in Fiscal Year 1975 to...76.8 percent in 1978...we are proud of the improvement indicated in the following statistics which comare Fiscal Year 1975 and Fiscal Year 1978 experience. The unauthorized absence rate has been dramatically reduced, the desertion rate is down 60 percent and the average

confined population is 54 percent lower. Major Command Special Courts Martial case loads have experienced a 60 percent decrease. Losses prior to the expiration of enlistment are down 23 percent. Additionally, this quality improvement has had a positive affect on our retention rate, which has increased four percentage points.

The highest priority the USMC has is to maintain the quality level of the imput of individuals--both officers and enlisted--to the Corps. We have not and will not back away from that particualr priority."

But the Committee is not recommending that the Army reach its own stated quality goals without assistance. The Committee also provided $1.6 billion in new educational assistance benefits and other compensation increases that can be used to attract and retain high quality personnel. We are giving the Army new tools to attract quality personnel while demanding that the civilian leadership of our military forces recognize the seriousness of current quality problems.

The Constitution requires that the Congress raise and maintain Armies for the purpose of defending this nation's freedoms. I do not believe the Congress can shirk its responsibility to the American people while the Army leadership persists in shirking theirs.

I will not acquiesce to these attempts at deception that will harm the Army. I urge my colleagues to support the positive recommendations by the Armed Services Committee.

The vast majority of men and women in today's Army are dedicated, competent, and performing a great service to their Nation. They deserve to serve in a well-trained force of quality, and this will no longer be possible if the present trends continue.

###

pared to endorse Carter, although

potential to win them himself.

WASH STAR Sept. 16, 1980

Carter Tries Balancing Act On Tricky Defense Issue

By Jack W. Germond
Washington Star Political Editor

HOUSTON — Meeting with a group of fat cat Democrats here yesterday, President Carter was doing his usual number on the national defense issue.

He pointed out, as he often does, that he had been a naval officer himself, the implication being that this gives him some special insight into defense matters lacking Republican nominee Ronald Reagan. And he pointed out to his Southern audience, as he sometimes but not always does, that he is also a Southerner himself, the implication being that this gives him some special emotional commitment to a strong national defense.

Analysis

The president even suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "have spent more time" with him as president than with all other presidents put together since there was a Joint Chiefs of Staff, the implication being heaven knows what.

Carter's effort to depict himself as the symbol of resolution and strength on national defense is, of course, nothing new. After promising four years ago to cut the defense budget, he has made a 180-degree reversal to become a champion of higher spending for defense every year. Thus, he now boasts about a position he attacked four years ago.

What is important now, however, is that the president is feeling intensified political pressure on this issue early in the campaign. That, in turn, is leading him to take political risks in trying to balance his own priorities against the various constituencies he needs Nov. 4.

One reason for the increased pressure seems to be that Reagan and the Republicans are showing both persistence and effectiveness in pursuing their charge that Carter has politicized defense policy generally — and particularly that the White House compromised national security by disclosing the "Stealth" aircraft system for political gain.

A more basic reason for Carter's concern is the recognition of an axiom of American politics today — that national defense questions are always more volatile in the South and parts of the Far West then in the country as a whole. This is demonstrated repeatedly in opinion polling and in such subjective measures as the political rhetoric on issues as varied as the Panama Canal treaties and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

Further, what the politicians believe, whether or not it has any basis in fact, is that Southerners are more traditionally patriotic than other voters, more willing to fight the unpopular wars and less willing to make accommodations with the Soviet Union.

This is politically pertinent because Carter is concerned about his support in the South, which provided his essential base four years ago. There is reason for that concern because the polls suggest Carter is running behind or no better than even in several key Southern states, including Texas, Florida, Mississippi and perhaps Louisiana.

Local politicians believe defense is one of the reasons. John Hill, the former Texas attorney general who is one of the president's leading advocates here, said: "Carter is perceived as weaker on defense than his record shows."

The problem for the president, then, is that he must try to "correct" that perception in relation to Reagan without raising further suspicions among Democratic liberals elsewhere for whom the MX missile system is no substitute for social spending.

This balancing act is trickier than usual this year because of the presence of John B. Anderson, who is opposed to the MX among other things, as an alternative. Anderson is no big deal in Texas, but he is in New York and California.

In a more general sense what Carter must be concerned about is allowing his campaign to become preoccupied with an argument between himself and Reagan on whether, for example, we need military "equality" or "superiority" in relation to the Russians — in a campaign in which economic issues seem to dominate the national dialogue.

In pointing to the Reagan blunders, Carter sought to stimulate voter apprehension that the former California governor is a bit too loose-lipped and imprecise to conduct delicate foreign policy. Polls indicate that Reagan's miscues on Taiwan, the Ku Klux Klan and the theory of evolution exacerbated those fears but thus far haven't had a substantial impact on the race.

While lecturing Reagan on accuracy, the president had a couple of imprecise moments himself.

Carter mystified a Houston fundraiser by predicting that all will be fine as soon "as they get their timing down with Statler and his receivers." It later became apparent that he was thinking of Houston Oiler quarterback Ken Stabler. Carter also bragged that it was his 25th town meeting, when official White House records show it only to be his 20th.

The principal goals of this trip appear to be courting two traditional Democratic constituencies, Hispanics and blacks, and raising money for the Democratic National Committee. Carter spent last night in the Georgia governor's mansion after dedicating an elementary

Mexican independence d
dresses a Hispanic-Ame
nessman's luncheon in
He is then scheduled for
rally in Corpus Christi be
to Houston this afternoo

Tonight Reagan and
tional and Texas Repub
address a Texas GOP f
"Unity Dinner" that is
raise about $2.5 millio
Republican Party's pr
state and local campaign

The dinner, organized
lican Gov. William Cle
feature Reagan; George
running mate; former
Gerald R. Ford, and for
Gov. John B. Connally.

President Carter a
Democratic fund-raiser
that raised about $400,00

Carter narrowly wo
1976, but Reagan has be
strong in the state. The
cations that Mexican
voters, who voted about
for Carter four years ag
ferent to him this year
dent has enlisted suppo
Edward M. Kennedy to
these voters back.

—James R

WASH POST

ıe most disturb-
echnique is that
he evidence of
hat run counter
ow, as if he be-
uld believe any-
fore his racism-
Mr. Carter—the
of debates with
ho has reduced
ickle—was tell-
l-for-democracy
nat Mr. Reagan
as anyone who

l he baldly re-
er) and that of
he displays an
generosity and
course, the oth-
nd tossing bas-
either, and yes,
fouls and blur-
ter, as before,
n he will not go
truction of his-

t elected. But a
campaign can
ıbt on the pur-
s own govern-
an offend and
ate expects to
would support
ı seeking their
his reelection
ng.

For the Record

From a study of the defense budget by Lawrence J. Korb of the American Enterprise Institute:

On the surface the MX appears to be the most expensive and technologically risky project ever undertaken by DOD. . . . MX will probably wind up costing at least $50 billion before it is completed. . . . When adjusted for inflation, however, the cost of the MX will be no more than that of the Polaris program, which was started in 1955 and completed a decade later at a cost of $13.5 billion. . . . Measured in FY1980 dollars, that program cost $38.5 billion, or 16 percent more than the price of the MX program in FY1980 dollars. Moreover, when we began to pour large sums of money into the Polaris program, that system did not yet possess a workable fire control system or even an accurate navigational system. The program was so risky that it was opposed by Admiral Robert Carney, the chief of naval operations, on technological grounds and by the Rand Corporation on cost-effective grounds. Today Polaris is widely cited as the most successful weapons program in the history of DOD. There is no reason why MX cannot be just as successful.

Even at a cost of $50 billion, MX would not pose a severe burden on the defense budget or the economy. At present, strategic expenditures account for less than 8 percent of the overall DOD budget. Twenty years ago, they consumed 27 percent of the budget; a decade ago, 10 percent. Between FY1961 and FY1970, measured in FY1981 dollars, DOD spent an average of $23 billion a year on strategic programs. Over the last decade, the Pentagon has spent about half that amount, or $11.8 billion. Even with MX, expenditures on our strategic forces will consume less than 10 percent of the defense budget between now and FY1985.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Creationism and Science

In his column Sept. 2 [op-ed], Dick Dabney excuses Ronald Reagan's support for teaching creationism as science in the schools by directing a highly uninformed attack against "evolutionism." Mr. Dabney's piece provides eloquent testimony against his first claim that "evolutionism has traditionally been taught as axiomatic." The facts and mechanisms of evolution have been ignored almost totally in high school science classes, and it is little wonder that so much confusion exists about this important subject.

The big-bang theory of the origin of DNA molecules envisioned by Mr. Dabney is not part of any seriously held scientific view.

Mr. Dabney is correct in pointing out that few intermediate forms exist between successive species in the past, but he is misleading when he states that "evolutionism teaches that the existing creatures gradually evolved from previously existing unicellular forms." As the mechanisms of evolution become better understood, many scientists have come to realize that evolutionary transitions probably occur locally and in short bursts rather than

ronmental change, and if the characteristics of an organism vary genetically between individuals, the fate of that variation and the distribution of traits in the next generation can be predicted from a knowledge of the way in which traits and environment are related. Natural selection has been demonstrated empirically in organisms as different as snails, insects, plants and bacteria.

Educators at all levels of instruction have good reason to worry about proposals to give equal time to "creationism" in science courses where evolu-

WASH POST
September 19, 1980.

For the Record

HERBLOCK

From a speech by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), chairman of the Senate Budget Committee:

We anesthetized ourselves during the Vietnam era. We said that America had too much power, that America had abused her power and that America should disarm. We went with SALT I, and anything that disturbed the all-important relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was considered destabilizing and provocative. And so it was that at Diego Garcia you couldn't build a runway because it was destabilizing and provocative. . . . You couldn't beef up security at Tehran. . . . because [that] would have been provocative and destabilizing. And domestically and in international trade and technology and right on down the line, we went with that particular mumbo-jumbo of defeatism. . . .

Last year, the people exorcised themselves from defeatism and started demanding that we compete once again as a people. It wasn't Afghanistan and Iran. We increased the defense budget in September of last year by 5 percent because the people have kids that are in the Army and in the Navy and they can see that they are not equipped. . . . They demanded more international trade. The president sent a secretary and three assistants to open an office in Geneva and start trading. . . . Our people want us to use our technology. They want us to rebuild our intelligence. But more than anything else, they are keeping our feet to the fire with respect to the budget, the economy, government and its size and spending and the strength of that particular economy. They not only want a strong defense; they want a strengthened economy.

Unfortunately, the people are ahead of the leaders. . . . I wish our leaders would hurry up and catch up.

O THE EDITOR

e Breach of Faith' With India

tated to by the British, we see this sensitivity in per-

tell you, from talking to from Mrs. Gandhi to Kas- to Communists to people is that no one—no matter ıey care about an issue— a war, not between their

Let's try working on the Indian assumption that there can be unity in diversity. India needs us, but we also need India, the preponderant and ever-maturing power in South Asia. India isn't going to go to war with or for anyone. Let's help it light up its cities and villages.

JANE SCHISGALL

WASH STAR
September 18, 1980

does not show up for the debate at 10 p.m. Sunday in Baltimore.

"We do not intend to let the 'empty chair' controversy over-

the league to [illegible]

However, the aide said, "The league realizes that its greatest asset is being non-partisan, and having the empty chair there would be perceived as a symbol, being very critical of one candidate."

With or without Carter and his chair, the nationally televised debate is scheduled to go on Sunday night in Baltimore's Convention Center. Two of the three major television networks have announced plans to broadcast the debate live.

CBS News President William Leonard was first to annoint the event with televised legitimacy, declaring when the league disclosed its invitations that CBS would carry the confrontation "whether it is a two- or three-man debate."

NBC, after holding out for several days, announced this week that it, too, will broadcast live from Baltimore. But ABC still has not committed itself, and doesn't plan to until the last minute.

While ABC technicians will work the pool of cameras, allowing the network instant access if it chooses, an ABC spokesman said last night that no decision on coverage had been made.

"ABC's position remains what it was last week," said the spokesman, Kitty Halpin. "That is, given that the debate is not scheduled to include both major-party candidates, we will excercise our news judgment at the time of the debate."

ABC thus has reserved its options for either a live broadcast — partial or full — of the Reagan-Anderson debate, or taping excerpts for use on newscasts. In the meantime, ABC has scheduled its regular prime-time movie. This Sunday it is to be "Midnight Express."

Zumwalt Claims Called 'False,' 'Irresponsible'

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

The White House yesterday labeled as "false and irresponsible" charges by retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt that Carter administration officials leaked information about the "Stealth" airplane for political purposes.

"Admiral Zumwalt's partisan zeal on behalf of Governor Reagan can be no excuse for such rash action," said White House press secretary Jody Powell. "These charges are false in their entirety."

Powell said that Zumwalt, a supporter of Ronald Reagan, had made serious charges against President Carter, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and David Aaron, assistant to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Powell said Zumwalt claimed to have "impeccable sources" for his testimony before a House subcommittee that there was a political motivation for leaks about the reportedly invisible, radar-proof airplane. The spokeman said Carter and Brown have denied that they ordered such a leak by anyone to anyone and that a Washington Post reporter had denied his source was Aaron.

y forte. Still, his
d sound. Gover-
r is not at a dan-
we simply don't
ecially not with
: was left to Mr.
ons between na-
continuing need

comment as un-
: just brave talk
ed painfully, oh
llay it. He may
ıdvocate appeal-
ıcies to balance.
ohn Anderson is
ing, not even a

s for Mr. Ander-
ely: face to face.

ılations. But it is
Soviet Union, its
also make it the
Any disruption of
the West. An all-
rbate Iraq's rela-
and a wary Saudi

nd humiliated a
w halt the attack.
-fire, Americans
rties negotiate a
he importance of
d trade relations

conflict provides
rability. It should
only the Palestin-
ted States and se-
nstrate how little
over events in the
is excessive de-
.

this might be done
public and private
ze of New Jersey
r additional water
ated systems and
te reservoirs and

as a guide. State
ide one of the most
he costs to bring
s.
r four successive
n Association ob-
isis represented a
a growing popula-
ery Governor has
Conservation is es-
But New Jersey's
ands.

U.S. Guilt in the Failure Of Disarmament Talks

To the Editor:

The second review conference of the parties to the nonproliferation treaty, which ended on Sept. 7 at Geneva, was a tragic failure. Yet Paul Lewis's story in your Sept. 8 issue, "Some Progress Is Reported in Geneva Arms Talks," was different in tone from his story in the same day's International Herald Tribune, "Talks End in Failure."

The difference between "some progress" and "failure" is large. To some of us observers at the conference, the month-long meeting was — in the words of the Netherlands representative — a "serious setback" and one which could spark an increase in the spread of nuclear weapons.

What was especially disappointing was the hubris of the U.S. delegation. Ralph Earle, its head, returned to Geneva the morning the conference was scheduled to adjourn and offered a procedural concession that was both tiny and inadequate in face of the commitment made by the nuclear powers in signing the treaty in 1968 to negotiate a halt in the nuclear arms race "at an early date."

In his last speech, Earle expressed regret that a few nations present "took extreme positions insisting on an all-or-nothing approach which prevented consensus," warning that "this type of intransigence does not help to advance our common objectives."

Yet it was not Mexico, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sweden or Yugoslavia which was intransigent, indeed, not even the Soviet Union. Almost all the 75 states present wanted to recess the conference for one year in the hope that an improvement in the world political climate would produce positive results instead of the failure. Yet the U.S. was the principal opponent of this recess. U.S. tactics at the conference only increased the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons — certainly a disservice both to U.S. policy and world interests.

Perhaps the only positive outcome of the conference would be if the failure serves to shock the superpowers into a review of their disarmament policies.

WILLIAM EPSTEIN
HOMER A. JACK
New York, Sept. 11, 1980

The writers are, respectively, former director of the U.N. Disarmament Secretariat and chairman of the Non-Governmental Organization Committee on Disarmament at U.N. headquarters.

Reagan's Achilles Heel

N.Y. Times 9/23/80

To the Editor:

Ronald Reagan jokingly remarked in his Sept. 10 conversation with Walter Cronkite that his refusal to debate his opponents in the Iowa caucuses had taught him a lesson that Jimmy Carter has yet to learn. Let Reagan beware. The American people will overlook his contradictory pronouncements and misinformed accusations. They will never forgive him for having a sense of humor.

MAX M. MINTZ
Hamden, Conn., Sept. 10, 1980

have the city use the Federal guarantees instead. This turns the law on its head and makes the Federal Government the lender of first rather than last resort. This made it necessary for me to persuade the appropriations committee to adopt my amendment.

That amendment just addresses this one narrow case. It says that guarantees cannot be issued so that M.A.C. can borrow and put its money in the bank, because what is "credit elsewhere" if not money in the bank?

If the city genuinely cannot get credit elsewhere, if the interest rates would be too high or market conditions too unsettled, then, of course, the guarantees could be issued, and the Secretary of the Treasury has ample discretion to make this determination.

The effect of the city's proposal would be to get a three-year extension of the Loan Guarantee Act through the back door, and I am opposed to this end run around Congress. If the city needs such an extension, and if the Administration wants to propose the legislation, I assure you that the Banking Committee will give it full consideration.

(Senator) WILLIAM PROXMIRE
Chairman, Committee on Banking
Housing and Urban Affairs
Washington, Sept. 18, 1980

Toward a Practical Fusion Reactor System

To the Editor:

It is recognized by scientists all over the world that the fusion process represents a virtually unlimited source of energy with the potential for moderate costs, environmentally and economically.

Fusion requires that a gas be heated up to over 50 million degrees. That has been achieved. This hot gas must be adequately insulated from a cool wall. That, too, has been achieved. The Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (T.F.T.F.) device, now under construction at Princeton, is expected to demonstrate scientific feasibility (energy break-even) in the mid-80's; this is a culmination of over 25 years of worldwide research efforts.

To move from laboratory demonstration to a practical reactor system will require a great deal of additional research and development. In recognition of both the achievement and the expectations, the House and Senate recently moved to speed up the effort with the aim of demonstrating a practical system by the year 2000.

It is very difficult to reconcile these facts with the letter from J. C. Phillips published in The Times of Sept. 3 under the provocative headline "$20 Billion for Wishful Thinking on Energy."

The author claims that the technical issues are really straightforward and then proceeds to explain them incorrectly and, to me, incomprehensibly. For example, he speaks of a "first wall" at 10 million degrees, whereas the temperature of the first wall will probably be about a thousand degrees.

J. C. Phillips is sufficiently interested in energy supply and public policy to write a vigorous letter. I could hope he would continue to display that interest by accepting my invitation to visit the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory to see the work in progress for himself.

Fusion is indeed a challenging and difficult problem. But controlling it could be enormously valuable to mankind, and it now seems achievable.

MELVIN B. GOTTLIEB
Director, Plasma Physics Laboratory
Princeton University
Princeton, N.J., Sept. 10, 1980

When a Professor Must Stand Alone in Court

To the Editor:

The Times's account (Sept. 14) of Prof. James A. Dinnan's jailing on contempt-of-court charges for his refusal to disclose what he had thought was a confidential vote in a University of Georgia tenure case is at once a testament to courage and principle and a dismal and chilling example to the rest of us.

But The Times story missed a key point. Where is the University of Georgia in all of this? One reads of Professor Dinnan's lawyers filing briefs — vidual." The then-chancellor of the University of Massachusetts refused to intercede in my behalf with the acting president at Connecticut, later reversing this decision when I threatened to make the matter public in the midst of a faculty union organizing drive.

Lacking Professor Dinnan's stomach for a court fight over the issue of confidentiality, and on advice of my lawyer, I turned over my letter and was subjected to two depositions, two days of testimony in open court and a subpoena for my own confidential per-

threatened suit if they were not. A letter I wrote more than a year ago to the president of Temple requesting independent counsel in the event of litigation has gone unanswered, even after several follow-up telephone calls.

The lesson is clear. Professors who take part in the personnel process of their own or other universities are on their own in the courts, notwithstanding the long traditions of confidential external referees and peer review and evaluation of one's colleagues in academic preferment.

It is the plain obligation (and in the

A P CZCZYRIR CARTE

CARTER

PM-CARTER;410

CARTER CALLS ELECTION CHOICE BETWEEN PEACE OR WAR

BY WALTER R. MEARS

AP SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

LOS ANGELES (AP) - PRESIDENT CARTER IS HUNTING VOTES IN RONALD REAGAN'S HOME TERRITORY, TELLING CALIFORNIANS THAT THEY FACE A ''PEACE OR WAR'' CHOICE AT THE POLLS ON NOV. 4.

WITH THAT REFRAIN, CARTER CAMPAIGNED IN TORRANCE, AT A STATE AFL-CIO CONVENTION IN DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES, AND AT A DEMOCRATIC FUND-RAISING RECEPTION IN BEVERLY HILLS, WHERE SEN. EDWARD M. KENNEDY URGED HIS SUPPORTERS TO RALLY TO THE MAN WHO BEAT HIM.

CARTER WAS APPEARING TODAY IN SAN JOSE, PORTLAND, ORE., AND TACOMA, WASH., BEFORE HEADING BACK TO THE WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE IS DUE SHORTLY AFTER 3 A.M. ON WEDNESDAY.

AT A QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION MONDAY AT TORRANCE HIGH SCHOOL, CARTER SAID THE CURRENT FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN COULD SPEED THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

''IT COULD CONVINCE IRAN THAT THEY NEED PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, THAT THEY NEED TO BE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THEY NEED TO BE ABLE TO HAVE A STRONG AND VIABLE ECONOMY, THEY NEED TO GET SPARE PARTS FOR THEIR MILITARY WEAPONS AND SO FORTH, AND THEREFORE INDUCE THEM TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES,'' CARTER SAID.

''I'M NOT PREDICTING THAT, BUT IT'S A POSSIBILITY,'' CARTER SAID.

CARTER TOLD THE CALIFORNIA AFL-CIO CONVENTION THE STATE WILL BE VITAL IN DETERMINING WHO WINS THE WHITE HOUSE.

''I DON'T INTEND TO LOSE CALIFORNIA,'' HE SAID.

CARTER HAS LOST IT EVERY TIME HE'S RUN SO FAR, TO GERALD R. FORD BY FEWER THAN 140,000 VOTES IN THE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, TO KENNEDY IN THE PRIMARY ELECTION THIS YEAR, AND TO GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR. IN THE PRIMARY FOUR YEARS AGO.

REAGAN, TWICE ELECTED GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, HAS WON EASILY IN TWO STATEHOUSE ELECTIONS AND TWO PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES.

WITH 45 ELECTORAL VOTES AT STAKE, CARTER'S STRATEGISTS SAY THEY'RE NOT CONCEDING A THING IN CALIFORNIA, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY MUST CAMPAIGN UPHILL TO CATCH REAGAN.

''THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION COULD VERY WELL DEPEND ON THE ELECTORAL VOTES FROM CALIFORNIA,'' CARTER SAID MONDAY NIGHT AT A FUND-RAISING RECEPTION THAT PRODUCED ABOUT $350,000 FOR DEMOCRATS.

''THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK, TO BEAT RONALD REAGAN IN HIS HOME STATE. THAT IS A NOBLE GOAL, WHICH I'M SURE YOU SHARE WITH ME.''

CARTER SAID THE ELECTION CHOICE IS NOT JUST BETWEEN CANDIDATES AND PARTIES, BUT BETWEEN TWO FUTURES.

''WHAT YOU DECIDE ON THAT DAY, YOU AND THOSE WHO LISTEN TO YOUR VOICE, WILL DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF LIFE YOU AND YOUR FAMILIES WILL HAVE, WHETHER THIS NATION WILL MAKE PROGRESS OR GO BACKWARD AND WHETHER WE HAVE PEACE OR WAR,'' HE TOLD THE LABOR CONVENTION.

AP-NY-09-23 0228EDT

mes I wish I spoke Indian . . . Hey! . . .'

HARD REEVES

paign in South Texas

dates know about Felix a local infantryman Luzon in 1945, whose merican family was emorial service in a Cor-ti chapel because they American" enough or ugh. You have to know of Felix Longoria if you vin Mexican-American nd here — and the 1980 ould be won or lost in as. That's because of the lectoral College system

s 26 electoral votes. The of Mexican-American the state is 800,000, up 0 in 1976. Four years ago, e Democratic candidate, cent of the state's Hi-. If Reagan can get 20 per re of that vote this time, ost certainly win Texas 6 electoral votes.

tion could be decided by e that. There is a real t Reagan could win by electoral votes of large alifornia and Texas, for even while running be-in the national popular resident may just roll up lar pluralities in a few ates, but lose close con-orthern and Western

nfair? It is very fashion-able to say that the Electoral College serves no purpose. But it does serve the purpose of forcing Reagan and Carter to come to south Texas — to see and feel the place, to hear the voices and stories of these Mexican-Americans. It might be less than fair—and less than sensible — for presidential candidates in the future to travel a land seeing nothing but cities like Dallas and Houston.

Without the Electoral College, candidates would be sorely tempted to campaign only in "media centers," in the big cities with the big television stations and newspapers. Presidential politics then could become even more like prime time television — a contest for raw audience numbers. If we decide to choose presidents by nothing more than popular vote, then there might be no horses and caballeros, no retelling of the story of Felix Longoria, no reason to go to Harlingen — or to the Bronx, or South Dakota, or Nebraska or any place else off the beaten track.

(Also in N. Y. Times 9/23/80)

FLORA LEWIS

Jingoism Pervades The Debate On Defense

WASH STAR 9/23/80

ANN ARBOR, Mich. — John Anderson complained at the end of the generally bland debate with Ronald Reagan Sunday night that some of the most important problems before the country were never mentioned. He named three, which he said had been identified by historian Henry Steele Commager.

They were: the danger of atomic war and specifically the implications of Presidential Directive 59, codifying a strategy for limited but repeated nuclear exchanges with the Soviet Union; a policy for using the world's natural resources; and nationalism — the parochial, chauvinistic attitudes that are increasingly resonant here. "These are big issues," Anderson said.

And they are. They are the underlying and interrelated choices for the United States in a period of world transition and uncertainty. How we face them will play a large part in how the rest of the world decides to face us, and therefore what kind of world we will have to live in in the years ahead.

They are the questions President Carter has been trying to insinuate into the campaign, though with lamentable indirection and waffle, when he suggests that Reagan might be a dangerously short-sighted, narrow-minded leader. On this score, the president can be considered the loser in the debate on two counts.

In the first place, despite Carter's refusal to appear in order to deny Anderson visibility and importance, Anderson did succeed in presenting himself as a contender in the race. The second setback for the president was the lost opportunity to put directly to the country the question of where America really wants to go and what it now means by patriotism.

But maybe that was a deliberate loss and a deeper reason underlies the tacky tactical fuss about joining the debates. Maybe this basic and vital question is purposely being ignored, which would be even worse.

There is an extraordinary mood of jingoism in the nation now, far more intense than people abroad suspect. The argument about defense spending, for example, is steaming way out of sight from any sober examination of which new weapons are actually needed for what purposes, of how those billions of dollars being promised to increase the military force should be used to bring more security.

The defense issue has taken on undertones of the long-standing argument about domestic gun control, an emotionalism of fear and defiance as though the more people bristle with weapons, the safer our streets will be. Crime statistics belie that.

Defense improvements are needed, especially in what the Pentagon calls operations and maintenance in the conventional field and C3I in the nuclear arsenal. That means technical skills, readiness, repairs, spare parts, all the unglamorous military outlays for which there is no industrial or congressional constituency, no constituency but the field commanders, as Defense Secretary Harold Brown puts it.

And C3I — Command, Communications, Control and Intelligence — is what the nuclear arm needs to spend some billions on to make already existing and abuilding weapons work properly. That's more important than missile numbers games.

In fact, there is something strange, a gaping hole in the logic, to insist in general terms that the United States is weak and needs an overall arms buildup but doesn't need to think about drafting men to use them. This isn't reasoning what to do about the real dangers out there, out in the world as in the streets. It is frustration reacting, and while it may scare people elsewhere, it isn't likely to make them more reasonable.

The president of the United States for the next four years, whoever he is, will have the responsibility of explaining these facts to the people. However good he and his advisers may be at making decisions, he won't be able to make and carry out wise ones in an atmosphere of frenzy.

Anderson was right on the jingo issue and it does need discussing now, in the campaign. We can't be sure of events any American administration will have to face in the years ahead, but we can be sure that it will need cool heads and thoughtful, informed support from the nation. Voters deserve a chance to judge who can best provide that kind of leadership.

(Also in N. Y. Times 9/23/80)

OLIPHANT

'Hey! I said medicinal purposes only! . . . Hello! Drat, sometimes I wish I spoke Indian . . . Hey! . . .'

FLORA LEWIS

Jingoism Pervades The Debate On Defense

WASH STAR 9/23/80

ANN ARBOR, Mich. — John Anderson complained at the end of the generally bland debate with Ronald Reagan Sunday night that some of the most important problems before the country were never mentioned. He named three, which he said had been identified by historian Henry Steele Commager.

They were: the danger of atomic war and specifically the implications of Presidential Directive 59, codifying a strategy for limited but repeated nuclear exchanges with the Soviet Union; a policy for using the world's natural resources; and nationalism — the parochial, chauvinistic attitudes that are increasingly resonant here. "These are big issues," Anderson said.

And they are. They are the underlying and interrelated choices for the United States in a period of world transition and uncertainty. How we face them will play a large part in how the rest of the world decides to face us, and therefore what kind of world we will have to live in in the years ahead.

They are the questions President Carter has been trying to insinuate into the campaign, though with lamentable indirection and waffle, when he suggests that Reagan might be a dangerously short-sighted, narrow-minded leader. On this score, the president can be considered the loser in the debate on two counts.

In the first place, despite Carter's refusal to appear in order to deny Anderson visibility and importance, Anderson did succeed in presenting himself as a contender [illegible] The second setback for

lions of dollars being promised to increase the military force should be used to bring more security.

The defense issue has taken on undertones of the long-standing argument about domestic gun control, an emotionalism of fear and defiance as though the more people bristle with weapons, the safer our streets will be. Crime statistics belie that.

Defense improvements are needed, especially in what the Pentagon calls operations and maintenance in the conventional field and C3I in the nuclear arsenal. That means technical skills, readiness, repairs, spare parts, all the unglamorous military outlays for which there is no industrial or congressional constituency, no constituency but the field commanders, as Defense Secretary Harold Brown puts it.

And C3I — Command, Communications, Control and Intelligence — is what the nuclear arm needs to spend some billions on to make already existing and abuilding weapons work properly. That's more important than missile numbers games.

In fact, there is something strange, a gaping hole in the logic, to insist in general terms that the United States is weak and needs an overall arms buildup but doesn't need to think about drafting men to use them. This isn't reasoning what to do about the real dangers out there, out in the world as in the streets. It is frustration reacting, and while it may scare people elsewhere, it isn't likely to make them

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.

The Klan And the Candidates

RICHARD REEVES

Why They Campaign in South Texas

HARLINGEN, Texas — A horse, a big grey one being ridden by a man dressed as a caballero, lifted its tail and did what horses do — on my foot. What the hell am I doing here,

both candidates know about Felix Longoria, a local infantryman killed on Luzon in 1945, whose Mexican-American family was denied a memorial service in a Cor- [illegible] because they

able to say that the Electoral College serves no purpose. But it does serve the purpose of forcing Reagan and Carter to come to south Texas — to see and feel the place, to hear the voices and stories of these

tion

t Kills Five

– An explosion e and killed at esterday, scatter- vreckage over

odies were found e of four injured at a hospital. Lt. authorities were body in the rub-

e explosion was erson said there re following the of the dead and eleased.

l out anything," just don't know he origin was."

nds Ship

ch. — Divers steau's research discovered and -old wreck of a fect condition" ake Superior, a he Calypso said

nilda, is in per- vman Christian rine telephone s gold paint on the bow and on the stern where the name is written.

"The masts are still up and the rigging is still in not perfect but good condition because of the cold water. If it's not the most beautiful ship we've seen under water, it is one of the most beautiful."

The Gunilda, which went down in 1911, was found last week on the MacGarvey Shoal near Roscoff, Ontario. Goues said the luxury ship was "owned by a rich oil man" and sank in very clear water about 260 feet deep.

■ Recruiting Rules Urged

NEW YORK — A decline in the college age population has led some colleges to adopt unethical recruitment practices but several national education groups have issued guidelines to stop the practices, the head of The National Association of Secondary School Principals said yesterday.

"Last year there were 17 million 18-21 year olds, and that was the peak," Dr. Scott Thomson said. "That number will decline to 15.3 million by 1985 and could go as low as 13 million by 1995. The response of a few colleges has been to adopt questionable recruitment tactics.

U.S. Military May Be to Weak To Deter War, Laird Says

Former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird yesterday charged that America's military forces are so poorly trained, manned and equipped that it would be difficult for this country to use its armed might to deter a war.

In a bleak assessment, Laird said that even if the United States increases its defense spending by the amount projected by the Carter administration, the Soviet Union will still outspend it by nearly 2 to 1 over the next five years.

"If our armed forces have to go into combat in the immediate future, there must be considerable doubt about their ability to perform adequately," Laird said.

He proposed the country increase defense outlays by $30 billion, or almost 20 percent. That would mean earmarking 6 percent of the gross national product to national security instead of the slightly more than 5 percent now devoted.

Laird, a former Republican national chairman who ran the Pentagon under President Richard M. Nixon, spelled out his views in a report issued by the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative research house. Lawrence J. Korb, the institute's defense expert, was co-author.

"An ill-prepared, ill-equipped, under-manned U.S. military will make it difficult for the United States to deter war, to exercise leadership and to compete successfully" in the 1980s, they wrote.

Laird and Korb said the United States plans to spend $280 billion on research and development, weapons, equipment and construction through 1985. The Soviet Union's projected investment for the same purposes will be $520 billion, they said.

Laird and Korb charged:

• The Army has only 78 percent of the tanks it needs and is short 60,000 wheeled vehicles.

• The Marines, with only three ground divisions, have been given enough missions to keep 10 divisions busy.

• The Navy is being asked to maintain a presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, but lacks the ships to do so. It needs 600, but has only 400.

• If a war with the Soviet Union erupted, the Navy would have to withdraw its forces west of Hawaii to carry out its missions in the Atlantic, "thus abandoning the Western Pacific to the 200 ships in the Soviet Pacific Fleet."

view—while the
ans, stand fast. It
ow to the end of
inuously to close
them and their
severe leaps in

ves, are playing
ices, but they do
way. They do not
f dependence on
sky. The Saudis
nit to world oil
nthetic fuels be-
what that price
industry is about
l guarantees, in
he Saudis, excel-
probably prefer
little below that
hose uncomfort-
iability of a syn-
y for the oil-ex-
ir market power
logic is foreign
nning Iran and
EC are not likely

outlaw regime
merican values
l that somehow
was given to un-

For the Record

From a speech by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), chairman of the Senate Budget Committee:

We anesthetized ourselves during the Vietnam era. We said that America had too much power, that America had abused her power and that America should disarm. We went with SALT I, and anything that disturbed the all-important relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was considered destabilizing and provocative. And so it was that at Diego Garcia you couldn't build a runway because it was destabilizing and provocative. . . . You couldn't beef up security at Tehran . . . because [that] would have been provocative and destabilizing. And domestically and in international trade and technology and right on down the line, we went with that particular mumbo-jumbo of defeatism. . . .

Last year, the people exorcised themselves from defeatism and started demanding that we compete once again as a people. It wasn't Afghanistan and Iran. We increased the defense budget in September of last year by 5 percent because the people have kids that are in the Army and in the Navy and they can see that they are not equipped. . . . They demanded more international trade. The president sent a secretary and three assistants to open an office in Geneva and start trading. . . . Our people want us to use our technology. They want us to rebuild our intelligence. But more than anything else, they are keeping our feet to the fire with respect to the budget, the economy, government and its size and spending and the strength of that particular economy. They not only want a strong defense; they want a strengthened economy.

Unfortunately, the people are ahead of the leaders. . . . I wish our leaders would hurry up and catch up.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Avoiding 'A Very Grave Breach of Faith' With India

I don't much care whether the halt in the planned shipment of nuclear reactor fuel to India is a rebuff to the Carter administration or a point of personal pride to Secretary of State Muskie. What I do care about is how this refusal will affect India and, ultimately, our country.

Having just returned from a two-month study trip to India under the Fulbright program, I can testify that they surely need electricity in Bombay and other parts of India. The candles in every hotel and home are not for decoration! I don't fully understand the politics that keeps India from putting its

India was dictated to by the British, we can perhaps see this sensitivity in perspective.

What I can tell you, from talking to many people, from Mrs. Gandhi to Kasmiri leaders to Communists to people in the street, is that no one—no matter how much they care about an issue—will support a war, not between their own states, the major religions or countries. India's policies are as complex and confusing to us as the country itself, but one senses, among all the zigzaggy actions, contradictory statements and reported outbursts of violence, that the country is steering a course of

Let's try working on the Indian assumption that there can be unity in diversity. India needs us, but we also need India, the preponderant and ever-maturing power in South Asia. India isn't going to go to war with or for anyone. Let's help it light up its cities and villages.

JANE SCHISGALL

Washington

•

While believing myself to be as sensitive as any fellow citizen on the issue of nuclear weapons, arms control and the

view—while the
ans, stand fast. It
ow to the end of
inuously to close
them and their
severe leaps in

rves, are playing
ices, but they do
way. They do not
f dependence on
sky. The Saudis
nit to world oil
nthetic fuels be-
what that price
industry is about
l guarantees, in
he Saudis, excel-
probably prefer
little below that
hose uncomfort-
iability of a syn-
y for the oil-ex-
ir market power
logic is foreign
inning Iran and
EC are not likely

outlaw regime
merican values
d that somehow
was given to un-

For the Record

From a speech by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), chairman of the Senate Budget Committee:

We anesthetized ourselves during the Vietnam era. We said that America had too much power, that America had abused her power and that America should disarm. We went with SALT I, and anything that disturbed the all-important relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was considered destabilizing and provocative. And so it was that at Diego Garcia you couldn't build a runway because it was destabilizing and provocative. . . . You couldn't beef up security at Tehran . . . because [that] would have been provocative and destabilizing. And domestically and in international trade and technology and right on down the line, we went with that particular mumbo-jumbo of defeatism. . . .

Last year, the people exorcised themselves from defeatism and started demanding that we compete once again as a people. It wasn't Afghanistan and Iran. We increased the defense budget in September of last year by 5 percent because the people have kids that are in the Army and in the Navy and they can see that they are not equipped. . . . They demanded more international trade. The president sent a secretary and three assistants to open an office in Geneva and start trading. . . . Our people want us to use our technology. They want us to rebuild our intelligence. But more than anything else, they are keeping our feet to the fire with respect to the budget, the economy, government and its size and spending and the strength of that particular economy. They not only want a strong defense: they want a strengthened economy.

Unfortunately, the people are ahead of the leaders. . . . I wish our leaders would hurry up and catch up.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Avoiding 'A Very Grave Breach of Faith' With India

I don't much care whether the halt in the planned shipment of nuclear reactor fuel to India is a rebuff to the Carter administration or a point of personal pride to Secretary of State Muskie. What I do care about is how this refusal will affect India and, ultimately, our country.

Having just returned from a two-month study trip to India under the Fulbright program, I can testify that they surely need electricity in Bombay and other parts of India. The candles in every hotel and home are not for decoration! I don't fully understand the politics that keeps India from putting its India was dictated to by the British, we can perhaps see this sensitivity in perspective.

What I can tell you, from talking to many people, from Mrs. Gandhi to Kasmiri leaders to Communists to people in the street, is that no one—no matter how much they care about an issue—will support a war, not between their own states, the major religions or countries. India's policies are as complex and confusing to us as the country itself, but one senses, among all the zigzaggy actions, contradictory statements and reported outbursts of violence, that the country is steering a course of

Let's try working on the Indian assumption that there can be unity in diversity. India needs us, but we also need India, the preponderant and ever-maturing power in South Asia. India isn't going to go to war with or for anyone. Let's help it light up its cities and villages.

JANE SCHISGALL

Washington

•

While believing myself to be as sensitive as any fellow citizen on the issue of nuclear weapons, arms control and the

Y WALTER R. MEARS
P SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
LOS ANGELES (AP) - PRESIDENT CARTER IS HUNTING VOTES IN RONALD
EAGAN'S HOME TERRITORY, TELLING CALIFORNIANS THAT THEY FACE A ''PEACE
R WAR'' CHOICE AT THE POLLS ON NOV. 4.
WITH THAT REFRAIN, CARTER CAMPAIGNED IN TORRANCE, AT A STATE AFL-CIO
ONVENTION IN DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES, AND AT A DEMOCRATIC FUND-RAISING
ECEPTION IN BEVERLY HILLS, WHERE SEN. EDWARD M. KENNEDY URGED HIS
UPPORTERS TO RALLY TO THE MAN WHO BEAT HIM.
CARTER WAS APPEARING TODAY IN SAN JOSE, PORTLAND, ORE., AND TACOMA,
ASH., BEFORE HEADING BACK TO THE WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE IS DUE SHORTLY
FTER 3 A.M. ON WEDNESDAY.
AT A QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION MONDAY AT TORRANCE HIGH SCHOOL,
ARTER SAID THE CURRENT FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN COULD SPEED THE
ELEASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.
''IT COULD CONVINCE IRAN THAT THEY NEED PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS,
HAT THEY NEED TO BE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THEY NEED
O BE ABLE TO HAVE A STRONG AND VIABLE ECONOMY, THEY NEED TO GET SPARE
ARTS FOR THEIR MILITARY WEAPONS AND SO FORTH, AND THEREFORE INDUCE
HEM TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES,'' CARTER SAID.
''I'M NOT PREDICTING THAT, BUT IT'S A POSSIBILITY,'' CARTER SAID.
CARTER TOLD THE CALIFORNIA AFL-CIO CONVENTION THE STATE WILL BE
ITAL IN DETERMINING WHO WINS THE WHITE HOUSE.
''I DON'T INTEND TO LOSE CALIFORNIA,'' HE SAID.
CARTER HAS LOST IT EVERY TIME HE'S RUN SO FAR, TO GERALD R. FORD BY
EWER THAN 140,000 VOTES IN THE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, TO
ENNEDY IN THE PRIMARY ELECTION THIS YEAR, AND TO GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN
R. IN THE PRIMARY FOUR YEARS AGO.
REAGAN, THICE ELECTED GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, HAS WON EASILY IN TWO
TATEHOUSE ELECTIONS AND TWO PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES.
WITH 45 ELECTORAL VOTES AT STAKE, CARTER'S STRATEGISTS SAY THEY'RE
OT CONCEDING A THING IN CALIFORNIA, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY MUST
AMPAIGN UPHILL TO CATCH REAGAN.
''THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION COULD VERY WELL DEPEND ON THE
LECTORAL VOTES FROM CALIFORNIA,'' CARTER SAID MONDAY NIGHT AT A
UND-RAISING RECEPTION THAT PRODUCED ABOUT $350,000 FOR DEMOCRATS.
''THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK, TO BEAT RONALD REAGAN IN HIS HOME
TATE. THAT IS A NOBLE GOAL, WHICH I'M SURE YOU SHARE WITH ME.''
CARTER SAID THE ELECTION CHOICE IS NOT JUST BETWEEN CANDIDATES AND
ARTIES, BUT BETWEEN TWO FUTURES.
''WHAT YOU DECIDE ON THAT DAY, YOU AND THOSE WHO LISTEN TO YOUR
OICE, WILL DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF LIFE YOU AND YOUR FAMILIES WILL
AVE, WHETHER THIS NATION WILL MAKE PROGRESS OR GO BACKWARD AND
HETHER WE HAVE PEACE OR WAR,'' HE TOLD THE LABOR CONVENTION.
P-NT-09-23 0228EDT

Associated Press

: of Mariel.

rbor; its Say

undersirables and relatives, as an al- :haotic, dangerous d at least 27 lives.

als consistently re- ; at negotiating an t. After it became y of the refugees riel had been cho- ıorities, not by the ıoat captains who latives, Carter or- de and penalties ng refugees.

·urrently 15 Coast nine Navy ships, ıxpayers $700,000 a blockade-runners ıgh the patrols at rcuitous routes to were welcomed by

ıt no legal action nmediately against but that U.S. cus- ;eizing boats identi- ade the Cuba trip

ıusands of pending ›atlift-related viola- trial yet.

lp Finance settlements

ıted Press

ıment has agreed to ent of the several ·fugees living in Mi- a stopgap facility down at the end of ›fficials said yester-

ıman for the Cuban- Task Force, said let- ɔ several voluntary ·sday promising $2.- help them resettle gees.

agencies, including Conference, have a ɜgal obligation to re- s under terms of the ;aid.

the agencies are be- ttle the refugees out- ɜcause that state has oportionate share of ns who have arrived since the "Freedom ı April.

Jenrette was a partner.

Jenrette and Stowe, a former Richmond businessman, are charged with conspiracy to accept payoffs in exchange for Jenrette's promise to introduce private immigration legislation for fictitious Arab sheiks.

FBI videotapes presented during their trial in U.S. District Court showed Jenrette and Stowe at a house on W Street in Northwest Washington on Dec. 4, 1979, where they met with an FBI undercover agent and an informer and discussed whether Jenrette could come through with the private bill in exchange for a total of $100,000.

Jenrette told the jury yesterday that he was "intoxicated" and "scared" during that meeting and that he later thought "I was involved with something I couldn't handle." The defense contends that Jenrette believed that he had gotten mixed up with organized crime figures.

Jenrette said that 10 days before he went to the meeting at the W Street house he had received a demand from a bank for $51,524 that was due on his South Carolina real estate project, called Oristo Properties, a condominium resort about 40 miles south of Charleston.

Jenrette, under questioning from defense lawyer Kenneth Michael Robinson, said he had more than $300,000 in obligations stemming from the project.

"I could have saved Oristo with $50,000 or even less than $50,000," Jenrette testified in connection with the bank's demand for money.

"Did you ever get that money, the $50,000?" Robinson asked him.

"No sir," Jenrette testified.

"Did you ever pay that money at any time?" Robinson asked Jenrette later in his testimony.

"I haven't paid it," Jenrette said.

The defense contends that Jenrette's frequent bouts with alcoholism and his financial troubles made him a vulnerable target for the FBI undercover agents and their Abscam "sting."

Yesterday, during his testimony, Jenrette reluctantly described "several offices in the Capitol where there are alcoholic beverages available." When members of his staff cleared the liquor out of his office and replaced it with diet soda, Jenrette testified, he would retreat to those unidentified offices for a drink.

Jenrette also testified yesterday that he has been the subject of numerous criminal investigations, which began, he said, in 1974, when he won South Carolina's 6th Congressional District seat. Jenrette maintains that his Republican opponent's former campaign manager, who by then was the U.S. attorney, marshaled a series of politically motivated investigations against him involving another South Carolina real estate project in which Jenrette had been involved.

Jenrette said he has also been under investigation concerning employe kickbacks, misuse of the telephone, misuse of postage stamps from the congressional stamp office, illegal campaign contributions and alleged connections to drug smuggling. None of the cases ever resulted in indictments, he testified.

Jenrette is expected to continue his testimony Monday.

Associated Press

Jenrette, with his wife, Rita, talks with reporters during break in his trial.

3/27/80 WASH POST

Defector Sees Technology Push

'Stealth' Called Spur to Soviets

United Press International

A Russian electronic engineer who defected to the West said yesterday the Soviets have been working for 15 years on ways to make their war planes "invisible" to radar, and recent disclosure of the U.S. "Stealth" program would speed their efforts.

"Soviet scientists have very good ideas how to make planes invisible and how to take countermeasures," Anatoly Fedoseyev told reporters on Capitol Hill.

Fedoseyev said Soviet scientists would undoubtedly be spurred to renewed efforts by official U.S. confirmation of press leaks that the Pentagon has made a giant breakthrough in its "Stealth" program—testing piloted and unmanned aircraft that have been made practically invisible to radar and other detection methods.

"It will shorten the time," he said of Soviet countermeasures. He said he could not judge whether the United States or the Soviet Union is ahead in "Stealth" technology.

The trim, erect 70-year-old holder of the Lenin Prize and other high Soviet decorations for his inventions and work, defected in May 1971 while attending an international aviation exhibition in Paris. Sentenced to death in absentia for treason, he now lives in England.

Fedoseyev addressed a news conference in connection with a bill introduced earlier this year by Sen. Jake Garn (R-Utah) to establish an office of strategic trade that would strictly monitor what technology is allowed for export to the Soviet Union.

The Russian said the Soviet defense effort includes every conceivable approach to obtain the latest American technology, from buying to stealing and espionage.

Pentagon Releases a Confidential Study

gly frequent talks
al family, Saddam
hing the Saudis to
er of their choice
le reasons, but to
influence inside
in the Gulf.
kers in the Carter
ve frequently dis-
hood of the Saudis
us moves toward
he president's na-
adviser, Zbigniew
ticularly seems to
dis and ultimately
re no place tro go
States, despite the
at American policy
or Arab rulers.
thesis, as well as
on the line in the
been raging along

one vote
nt Howard
ned to his
8-vote vic-
on a con-
by a mere

one of the
kes an in-
make the
e time for
for what
support
l political
he secret

quire peo-
dmitted to
egistration
er parts of
on close.
he League
governing

en't really
the candi-
n. You're
omebody

ake them

administration may be increasingly tempted to abandon strict neutrality and help Iran keep its American military equipment operational by providing desperately needed spare parts. Such a temptation should be rigorously resisted if the United States is to retain any vestige of an overall Middle Eastern policy.

On the surface, the arguments for such a shift in position may seem plausible. Since the Iraqis are procuring spare parts for their Soviet-made equipment, should we not redress the balance by giving the Iranians an equivalent chance? In spite of the blandishments of the Moscow-orchestrated Tudeh Party, the ayatollah still makes anti-Russian noises; and, besides, an offer of spare parts might be useful in resolving the hostage issue. So, shouldn't we help the Iranians win?

In relation to an overall policy toward the Middle East, the answer is clearly no. Though Arab countries constantly quarrel among themselves, they tend to unite against common enemies. Thus they cannot be considered solely as discrete national entities, but must also be viewed in the larger context of Arab politics. By assisting Iran we would be ignoring the environmental facts of the area to the jeopardy of Western interests, for we would be taking the Persian side against an Arab nation.

The players in the Middle Eastern political game are singularly responsive to the cues of history, and enmity between Arabs and Persians is a thousand years old. Since a succession of Persian dynasties occupied Iraq and meddled in what is now the Arab world, atavistic hatreds still survive to fester just below the surface. In the current struggle, Arab governments—whether moderate or radical—will automatically side with Iraq not only as a conditioned reflex but also because they resent Khomeini's mischievous efforts to subvert and arouse their Shiite populations. So let us take on no new disabilities. Our political status in the area is already prejudiced by our identification as the champion of Israel, which most Arab states regard as their enemy. And the administration has further damaged our relations with Iraq by its recent refusal—under election-year congressional pressure—to sell planes for the Iraqi airline. If we should now send supplies to help the Persians fight the Arabs, we would make our Middle Eastern position untenable.

Admittedly the Carter administration faces anything but easy choices. Though by furnishing spare parts to Iran's soldiers and air force we might gain a short-term bargaining advantage with the ayatollah, that would, in the context of our larger interests, be disastrous. It would tend to extend the war, increase our involvement and associate us with a widely hated regime that is almost certainly on the way out.

Perhaps we need not rigidly foreclose all shipments to the Iranians. With slight political cost we could probably release those spare parts they have already purchased and that are in storage in America. But such a potpourri of bits and pieces would help only marginally to keep Iran's badly maintained American-made equipment operational.

Meanwhile, we should continue to communicate as best we can with both sides—though we have diplomatic relations with neither—while resolutely maintaining our neutrality. The current quarrel is not ours, and we should do everything possible to avoid becoming involved in it. At the same time, its implications are writ too large to be ignored: our vital oil supplies are frighteningly fragile—vulnerable at any moment to interruption as a result of political or military disturbances. So far the current fighting is costing the world some two million barrels of oil a day, and no one can tell how long the fighting will continue or how much long-term damage may be done to production facilities. Instead of continuing to fritter and temporize, as we have done for the past seven years, we should take those energy measures worthy of a great people not afraid to face reality. How many warnings do we need?

As we watch and wait, we should do all that is possible to stop the fighting, though recognizing that there is little we can do by ourselves. As peace-makers, the Soviets are far better positioned, since they not only have functioning relations with the Iraqis as their principal military supplier, but, through the Tudeh Party, have built up reservoirs of strength in Iran. Yet for the Soviets to assume the key role as mediator might well give them that permanent position of influence in the Middle East that American policy has long sought to prevent. There is a warning in past events. By settling a clash between India and Pakistan through the Tashkent mediation of 1966, Moscow forged a relationship with India it has since exploited to our disadvantage.

Though the spectacular ineptitude of the Khomeini government must ultimately bring about its fall, no one knows when or what will then emerge. Will the Iranian nation unravel as one ethnic area after another moves toward autonomy or independence? Will the current fighting give new confidence, unity and prestige to Iran's distraught and demoralized army, while discrediting the nation's Islamic leadership, thus shifting power to moderate or right-wing military leaders? Or will the Soviets stage-manage a left-wing coup as the present regime is weakened by the war and its own incompetence?

Not only is this a dark and dangerous time—certainly no moment for impetuous moves or short-term fixes—but it calls for a concerting of thought and action. Since the Western European countries and Japan depend even more than we on Middle Eastern oil, any initiative should represent a collective effort. Only by acting together can we finesse the disadvantages of a purely American initiative in that pathologically sensitive part of the world, while avoiding new and unsupportable strains on an already badly weakened Western alliance.

The writer was formerly undersecretary of state.

Jack Anderson 9/25/80 WASH POST

Overplaying the Wild Card

In the high-stakes foreign policy poker game Jimmy Carter is playing with the Kremlin, China is the wild card. But there is disturbing evidence that Carter may be overplaying his hand, a risky bluff that could, in the long run, escalate a spiraling world arms race.

Carter partially inherited his hand from Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, and is playing it out under the guidance of Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Brzezinski is so concerned with the Soviet threat to American security that he is willing to provide sophisticated arms and technology to the Chinese. The backfire potential of this strategy is causing concern on Capitol Hill and in the U.S. intelligence community.

The concern isn't that the China overtures don't have merit, but rather that Carter's lieutenants may be stumbling down a thorny path that hasn't yet been fully explored and that could have dire implications among the Big Three of East and West.

There's no doubt that the Carter administration is willing to back up its diplomatic friendship with China with expensive military hardware. The recent visits to Peking of Defense Secretary Harold Brown and his deputy, William Perry—each bearing a salesman's list of attractive technological items—make this clear.

Banning Garrett, of the University of California, recently told investigators for Rep. Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.) that U.S. plans for arming the Chinese have been one of the best-kept secrets in Washington. This is despite the fact that one expert, according to Garrett, estimated the ultimate cost of arming the Chinese at a minimum of $50 billion.

Not that the Chinese are helpless militarily, by any means. "China has only a limited ability to project force beyond its borders," according to a Joint Chiefs of Staff report. But "the People's Republic is developing increasingly capable strategic nuclear and general purpose forces. . . ."

Military strategists started eight years ago to assess the possibilities of future military relations with the Chinese. In a confidential study written in 1974 by an employee of the Rand Corporation, the author, Michael Pillsbury, now a Senate staffer, composed his analysis after private, unofficial meetings held with senior Chinese military officials at the United Nations. Pillsbury told my associate Jack Mitchell he was "astonished" to learn that the Pentagon had released the confidential report of his findings.

Carter administration officials have dismissed speculation about such secret plans for Chinese-American cooperation as nothing more than "think pieces" designed to cover any eventuality, however farfetched.

But despite official downplaying, the administration's actions indicate that many specific moves toward a close military relationship with China have been implemented piecemeal since 1978. These include the sale to China of high-technology items that could have military application as well as non-lethal military equipment.

By making the relationship so clear to Moscow, Kremlinologists fear Carter may have thrown away the advantage the United States gained by its overtures to the People's Republic. Instead of playing off the two communist rivals against each other, Carter may persuade the Kremlin that the United States is irrevocably committed to China.

If that view does indeed prevail in Moscow, the Soviet leaders would see nothing to be gained by wooing the United States away from Peking. Instead, they would take action to thwart what they perceive as a Sino-American effort to strategically encircle the Soviet Union.

Government sources admit that the "tilt" toward Peking risked offending the Soviets, and was a major concern of the secret policy planners. But the "China hands" won the argument, over the objections of senior State Department experts.

Beyond the implications for détente, of course, there are expert observers in Congress and the intelligence community who question the wisdom of supplying so much technological hardware and training to the Chinese that it would be impossible to retreat from the alliance if the Chinese suddenly decide to turn their backs on their American partners.

could turn out. They demur to the volunteer network in Philadelphia and its suburban counties were asked to start a "telephone chain" that theoretically could reach thousands of Anderson fans in their homes.

In the end, the only places that turned people out were the campuses—and only a few of them. When master of ceremonies John Buckley—a Middlesex County, Mass., sheriff, imported to a city where no local notable is supporting Anderson—called out the names of area campuses, there were cheers from the contingents from prestigious Penn and Temple and Bryn Mawr, but not from the more blue-collar St. Joseph's and Villanova.

The school cheers were reminiscent of an Anderson birthday party rally in Boxboro, Mass., last winter, when he was still seeking the Republican nomination. But the repetition of the device now, seven months later, seemed to measure the failure of the Anderson campaign to broaden its base or build organizational depth.

That is the main reason that strategists in both the Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter campaigns here now believe that serious attrition in the Anderson vote is bound to occur. His support grew after the debate and is relatively high here now, sustained so far by Anderson's skill in acquiring free media exposure. But the parity he has enjoyed with the major-party nominees in television news coverage is increasingly eroded as Carter and Reagan step up their advertising campaigns.

Without the kind of organizational activity that would tend to reinforce the marginally committed Anderson voters in their inclination to support the Independent, Anderson is likely to be whittled back to his hard-core supporters, his rivals believe.

The irony is that in a state like Pennsylvania, Anderson may suit the voters' natural inclinations better than either of his rivals. Pennsylvania likes to vote for progressive Republicans like Gov. Dick Thornburgh and Lt. Gov. William W. Scranton III.

But at a dinner here two nights after the Anderson fiasco, Thornburgh and Scranton were on hand to cheer—not Anderson, but George Bush, Reagan's running mate. The ties of party loyalty pulled the kind of crowd that Anderson might well envy, and if the $30,000 raised for the Pennsylvania GOP was small by the affluent standards of today's Republicans, it would have looked like a small fortune to Anderson.

The same force of party loyalty is operating to help Jimmy Carter whittle the Anderson vote from the other flank. A political loner by inclination, Carter has reached for help to the Democratic mayors of this state—including Philadelphia's Bill Green, who helped Ted Kennedy beat Carter last April in 68 of the 69 wards.

Carter's campaign is also tying in closely to one of the more obscure aspirants on the ballot, Al Benedict, the candidate for reelection as state auditor. Benedict is not a man of renown, but he has a built-in organization of some 800 patronage employees—an army more disciplined and reliable than the Anderson student volunteers.

On television, Anderson looks like a match for his rivals. But in the streets, as the Philadelphia fiasco showed, it is no contest.

George F. Will

Just My Type

I know Thoreau was right, that it is an art to saunter, and I intend to study the art tomorrow, or maybe the day after, but today after a reasonably restful

behavior modification can dramatically reduce the rate of heart



hind a car you think is moving too slowly."

"Measuring your own or others' success in terms of numbers (numbers of patients seen, articles written, etc.)."

indeed enhanced by not smoking, drinking only moderately, eating three proper meals, not eating between meals, keeping your weight down, exer-

One, for example, involves learning how to stand in line without succumbing to exasperation. When I'm in a line, all I can think about is this iron law: the other line always moves faster. A Type

Type A Americans are produced by what one psychologist calls "the Little League syndrome . . . the belief that everyone has to be No. 1." My Little League team labored under no such il-

The New York Times

Founded in 1851

ADOLPH S. OCHS, Publisher 1896-1935
ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER, Publisher 1935-1961
ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher 1961-1963

ARTHUR OCHS SULZBERGER
Publisher

A. M. ROSENTHAL, Executive Editor
SEYMOUR TOPPING, Managing Editor
ARTHUR GELB, Deputy Managing Editor
JAMES L. GREENFIELD, Assistant Managing Editor
LOUIS SILVERSTEIN, Assistant Managing Editor

MAX FRANKEL, Editorial Page Editor
JACK ROSENTHAL, Deputy Editorial Page Editor
CHARLOTTE CURTIS, Associate Editor

TOM WICKER, Associate Editor

The Political War Over Peace

Jimmy Carter says the choice in November is between peace and war. Ronald Reagan resents the implication; it is the Carter policies that invite war. John Anderson says atomic war strategy is the overriding issue. Well, at least the candidates are finally circling the main question. They are close, but not yet there.

The question is not whose finger would be more restrained on the nuclear button; these are civilized, responsible men. It is not whether ceding the Panama Canal or signing SALT is sellout or triumph; such deals always balance costs against benefits. It is not even whether America is wrong to think nuclear war might be confined to military targets; in holocaust strategy, any straw is worth clutching. The question of questions in 1980 is whether a President knows how to advance American interests without war.

•

There is no effective American foreign policy without adequate arms to deter nuclear attack. The three candidates may disagree about one or another weapon; all are committed to that proposition. They even agree to seek nuclear arms control. But Mr. Reagan opposes the SALT II treaty — which is useful to American defense — and Mr. Carter botched the job of getting it ratified. The President is right to want to save it, but there is doubt that he can. The threat of a more wasteful arms race already hangs over the next Presidency.

Besides power, a President needs to understand the limits on power. There is no safety, either, without accommodations with Moscow. The more clearly the superpowers define their vital interests — the kind they'd fight to protect — the greater the chances that they will respect them and avoid a fight. That job of definition has been accomplished in Europe, not satisfyingly, but workably; no candidate would upset the arrangement. The job will be much harder in the Middle East, the next President's major test.

No wartime conquests help to delineate the competition there. Moscow and Washington have only begun their rival military deployments, whose value will depend crucially on diplomatic and economic arrangements that are far from settled. The passage of oil through the Persian Gulf might be protected with naval power alone. But force cannot induce greater Saudi or Iranian oil production. Nor is it likely to protect the region's governments against domestic challenge or intramural Arab warfare. Force alone could not deter Soviet advances based on arms aid to Iraq, Libya or Yemen, or Communists in Iran.

To secure the oil and to deter the Russians will be a dangerous task. And the overriding danger is miscalculation — as demonstrated by Washington's shock at the invasion of Afghanistan, and Moscow's surprise at the shock. Hasty military preparations for undefined missions can only increase the risks. Yet no serious effort has been made to engage the Soviet leaders in discussions that would define our Middle East interests, and theirs. Indeed, the American reaction to Afghanistan was to reduce communication with them.

So unless the candidates define plausible political objectives, they promise nothing with their talk of military "superiority" or a "strength second to none." For Russia to be deterred, it needs to know from what. And Americans need to understand that they, too, will be deterred from many actions. A balance of power also implies a balance of weaknesses — a Russian weakness there, an American weakness here.

For two years, such mature calculation seemed to animate Mr. Carter's diplomacy; that is why he had the better side of the arguments about Panama and SALT. But as the campaign approached, the President seized on events in Afghanistan, and even non-events in Cuba, to strike a simplistic anti-Soviet pose. If the earlier period revealed his true view of the world, the latter exposed his failure to educate the public to it.

Mr. Reagan seems to have greater powers of articulation but no interest in diplomatic subtleties. In five years as a candidate, he has urged mainly strength and forceful action. He has given no sign of recognizing that the balance of military power with the Soviet Union, and also the balance of economic power with Germany, Japan and the OPEC nations, will not soon, if ever, be upset to overwhelming American advantage.

So Mr. Carter tries to cast Mr. Reagan as a reckless Barry Goldwater. Mr. Reagan aims to portray Mr. Carter as an irresolute George McGovern. And Mr. Anderson emulates Adlai Stevenson in speaking for the passengers of spaceship earth. Okay: all for peace and strength, none for war. Then what?

Threesies, Twosies and the Debates

The League of Women Voters could have been candidly subjective in deciding whether to invite independent John Anderson to participate in its televised debates. Though it strives for commendable neutrality, the league might nonetheless have conceded that, "*In our best judgment*, Mr. Anderson does (or does not) have a reasonable chance and therefore . . ."

But the league was determined to appear principled. So it chose a different standard. There would be no subjective judgment, only objective arithmetic. If, at the moment of decision, Mr. Anderson was drawing 15 percent or more in the polls, the league would, neutrally, invite him to participate. Everyone knows what happened next: He was, it did — and President Carter left Mr. Anderson and Ronald Reagan to debate each other last Sunday in Baltimore.

Now the question — which one official calls "twosies or threesies?" — has arisen again and this time the league does not look so principled. Objectivity, it appears, was just a bush to hide behind.

•

Two weeks ago, Ruth Hinerfeld, president of the League of Women Voters, was asked whether Mr. Anderson would also be invited to appear in subsequent debates. Her answer was clear and sensible: yes, depending on changing circumstances — like, presumably, a change in Mr. Anderson's standing in the polls.

What circumstances have changed since the first debate? Some polls find Mr. Anderson's standing remains low, but others find he is, if anything, going up. If it was right to invite him to participate in the first debate, despite the President's threat to pull out, then it is right to invite him to the second.

But the league did not invite him. President Carter remains adamant about debating Mr. Reagan alone before considering a three-way debate. So, rather than make him another offer he was sure to refuse, the league offered a package deal: Let Mr. Reagan agree to twosies next; then the President would be amenable, finally, to threesies.

Yet that is a package which Mr. Reagan, in turn, was likely to refuse. Where is the principle in it? And why is the league now willing to leave Mr. Anderson out? His poll standing, whether rising or falling, was not even considered. "My answer," Mrs. Hinerfeld said the other day, "is pragmatic."

The league may have been trying to salvage the most it could in the way of debates. And at worst, it is at least left looking bipartisan in its stiff treatment of both major party candidates. But these are not much in the way of virtues. Bad enough that the candidates deal with the debates as matters of political calculation. It's dismaying to find the league changing its own rules for tactical reasons.

At the moment, it looks as though the League of Women Voters will end up empty-handed, in more ways than one: no more debates, or principle.

Topics

Reorientations

Political Tigers

We read last week that the Bengal

rule, he replied with a remark that Jimmy Carter could now appreciate: "Why . . . found another party? That

dogwood will remind us next May of the drought. But some future climatologist, studying the growth rings in

Letters

Our Perilous N

To the Editor:

The recent accident involving a U.S. Air Force Titan II ICBM serves to hig light key problems relating to nucle weapons security and our aging force strategic missiles and bombers.

First of all, stories carried in Th Times and other sources indicate th the Titan II did indeed carry a nucle warhead at the time of the explosi and that the same warhead wa thrown some 200 yards from the silo b the force of the explosion.

It should be noted that the warhea was blown through the 750-ton rei forced concrete silo, which almost ce tainly caused some internal damage the warhead. And the Titan II wa head, which has a reported yield nine megatons (nine million tons TNT equivalent), is a rather substa tial object to be literally tossed 2 yards, ending up in a ditch next to nearby road.

Unclassified sources indicate th the Titan II re-entry vehicle stan some 14 feet high, is close to 10 feet diameter at its base and weighs sor 8,158 pounds. In short, given the bu of this warhead, it is amazing that suffered only a dent in its casing for travails.

Reports to the effect that the Tit II warhead could not have been tr gered by such an accident are substa tially correct, though there certain

The Reagan-Ander

To the Editor:

It is 11 P.M., Sunday, Sept. 21, anc have just finished watching t "Presidential" debate. I am appalle

Whatever happened to rhetoric? T Greeks held it to be the art of persu

Richmond J

sion of a crowd. They had a mediu language. Their debates were provc ative, and the participants had fuzzy buffers.

An objective winner of a free-for debate cannot be determined, but can detect who is telling the tru about which facts, for one participa will eventually back himself with irrational and undebatable appeal passion.

All this is lost with television. I stead we see Mr. Reagan and Mr. A derson quibbling over statistics, ov the missing debater and over h many programs, institutions and b reaucracies to add or subtract fre the Federal Government.

Mr. Anderson, in closing, mentio issues that would fuel an extended a gument, not a cosmetic panel sho such as the threat of nuclear war, t inherent problems of nationalism a the conflict between moral author (churches) and political authority.

Surely I am not alone in desiring political debate to be a confrontati not a video package. Not only sho this be encouraged, that is, to use te vision as a tool for free-form debat but it should be extended to all can dates. Adding men such as Ba Commoner and Ed Clark and t

A Baron's Fallacy

To the Editor:

Assisted by his Foreign Minist Baron Rüdiger von Wechmar has be very busy these past few months tr trying for the post of president of t U.N. General Assembly [Man in th News, Sept. 17]. His efforts having r cently been crowned by success, an e uberant von Wechmar exclaimed:

"It means the end of an era. We h we overcame it in 1949 [when the Bo Republic was founded], but this is t international stamp of approval, th *1933-45 is forgotten*" [my italics].

So much for this career diplomat

WASH. POST.
September 19, 1980
P. A16, col. 6

For the Record

From a speech by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), chairman of the Senate Budget Committee:

We anesthetized ourselves during the Vietnam era. We said that America had too much power, that America had abused her power and that America should disarm. We went with SALT I, and anything that disturbed the all-important relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was considered destabilizing and provocative. And so it was that at Diego Garcia you couldn't build a runway because it was destabilizing and provocative. . . . You couldn't beef up security at Tehran . . . because [that] would have been provocative and destabilizing. And domestically and in international trade and technology and right on down the line, we went with that particular mumbo-jumbo of defeatism. . . .

Last year, the people exorcised themselves from defeatism and started demanding that we compete once again as a people. It wasn't Afghanistan and Iran. We increased the defense budget in September of last year by 5 percent because the people have kids that are in the Army and in the Navy and they can see that they are not equipped. . . . They demanded more international trade. The president sent a secretary and three assistants to open an office in Geneva and start trading. . . . Our people want us to use our technology. They want us to rebuild our intelligence. But more than anything else, they are keeping our feet to the fire with respect to the budget, the economy, government and its size and spending and the strength of that particular economy. They not only want a strong defense; they want a strengthened economy. . . .

Unfortunately, the people are ahead of the leaders. . . . I wish our leaders would hurry up and catch up.

JAMES W. FULLER

9/15/80

To: Mr. Robert Garrick

Bob:

For your information.

Concluding the startling story of the Military Office and its huge secret spending to keep four Presidents comfortable

The case of the White House perks

By BILL GULLEY
with Mary Ellen Reese



AFTER 11 YEARS at the White House, my rose-colored glasses were long gone; in fact they broke right after I got to the LBJ White House.

It's just not possible to spend any length of time close to the presidency and have any illusions left, so I wasn't expecting a saint when Carter was elected or for a minute of the 10 months I worked in the Carter White House, even if he had won on a preacher's platform of "Trust Me."

The first time I went down to Plains to brief him on the military support available to the President, on Dec. 10, 1976, before Carter took office, I was aware, of course, that he hadn't any experience in Washington.

Hell, it was one of the things that got him elected.

So I was surprised at the way he got right into specifics in areas in which he couldn't, and didn't, have any knowledge.

Carter met me at the door of his house, and I was struck by his size; I was as surprised by how small he was as I had been at how big Johnson was.

We went into his study, and I hauled

out copies of the briefing papers I'd brought with me, and we got right into details.

Carter immediately started punctuating one item after another by saying, "I want that cut 70 per cent," and "That will be reduced by 30 per cent," and so on right down the list.

I was really taken aback, because here he was in Plains, Ga.; he hadn't set a foot inside the White House, didn't have the first idea of what it takes to run the Presidency.

Yet he was telling me by what specific percentage each thing was to be cut.

We weren't talking in generalities or symbols; we were talking numbers.

When we got to Camp David, for example, he said, "Camp David costs too much money. I want it closed."

When I asked him if he knew what all was at Camp David, he said, "Yes. Cabins."

I asked him if he was aware of the other facilities that were there, and he said, "I don't know anything about it. I don't even know anyone who's been there."

I explained about the bomb shelter, and the emergency communications center, and it was all news to him.

But without knowing anything about it, he'd been ready to order it closed.

It's especially ironic in view of what Camp David has come to be for Jimmy Carter, but it was the same with everything.

He had the answers before he'd added up the numbers. It wasn't too encouraging a start.

After my first trip to Plains it was agreed I would go back and talk to brother Billy about plans for putting a support compound for the President on his land.

We had to install a helicopter landing pad; trailers for the doctor, the military aides and other personnel; communications facilities; and a lot of other things.

So I went back to Georgia in January.

After Billy and I had talked for a while he suddenly said, "Look, we may as well go and see Rosalynn. She's the one who makes all the decisions nyway, so we might as well talk to her now. Whatever she says will go."

When we saw Rosalynn Carter, she wasn't so much concerned with what went onto Billy's land as she was that nobody do any damage to theirs.

We went back and forth on it for a good while until Billy broke in and said, "I tell you how we can settled the whole goddamn thing.

"Keep the bastard in Washington and we won't have to worry about any of it."

You could say, all in all, the Carters took some getting used to.

Carter's White House took some getting used to, too.

The formality level that was observed on *Air Force One* would rise and fall with the different administrations, largely owing to the personality of the Chief of Staff.

It was highest with Nixon and most comfortable under Ford when Dick Cheney was in charge of the President's staff, because he's a relaxed kind of guy who's easy to be with.

The level reached rock bottom on the first trip we made out of the country with Carter.

On a flight from London to Geneva the Georgians — Jody Powell and Hamilton Jordan and the others — were having such a fine old time that before long they started throwing fruit at each other and rolling beer cans down the aisles of *Air Force One*.

Carter was personally concerned with appearances, how his Administration was going to *look*, and when Jerry Rafshoon, his full-time image-maker, moved into the White House, it turned into an official concern.

But Carter worried about it from the outset.

A week after the inauguration I met with him in his inner offic and he had classical music playing. The music was loud, and his voice was soft, which created a problem for me, but we managed to communicate.

We were discussing how White House ceremonies were to be conducted, and he had some definite ideas.

There was to be no dancing, the herald trumpets were to go, and he said, "I think one reason the American people elected me is because they see me as a man who doesn't like to high-side things."

It was an expression I didn't understand, but I later found out it meant he believed the public liked him because they thought he wasn't a show-off.

Carter wasn't going to have his staff "high-siding things" either.

They were told, along with NBC, CBS, AP and anybody else who would listen, that there would be no chauffeured cars or other special privileges for those in the White House.

But Carter's people were no different from any other people; they knew a status symbol when they saw one.

The leader of the pack that was on the hunt for them was Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Georgians' answer to Henry Kissinger.

Before long, and quietly, he and then others began to taste the good life.

It seemed to me Carter had a double standard about who was allowed the perks of being near the President.

Family, or those close to it, were allowed advantages others weren't.

During the transition, before Carter was even inaugurated, his son Chip and wife Caron, and their dog, lived in a government-owned house in Lafayette Square, across from the White House.

The house had been renovated for use as a former President's residence, and with Ford's approval, Chip lived there and was working at the Democratic National Committee.

The American taxpayer not only paid his rent; he even paid a ticket Chip Carter got and handed over to Jack Marsh to take care of when Chip's car was towed away.

Of the incidents I was involved in that had to do with the Carter presidency, one that occurred during that first visit to see Billy in Plains stands out.

I met him at the peanut warehouse in the middle of the town, and since his office wasn't big enough for us to spread out the blueprints and plans I had, we went next door into a sort of lounge area.

It had a broken-down sofa and a couple of overstuffed chairs. Billy and I got down on the floor with our diagrams, and as we were looking at them the citizens of Plains began drifting in so that before long we'd assembled a pretty good crowd.

I thought it was strange, but, what the hell, if it didn't bother Billy, why should it bother me?

Suddenly Billy stood up and said, "Momma, this is Mr. Gulley from the White House. He's here to talk about the military putting a compound on my place."

He was talking to Miss Lillian Carter, of course, and as I got to my feet she said to Billy, and these are her exact words: "Get all you can, honey. If they'll give you a hundred thousand, take a hundred thousand. Get all you can, because you'll never get another chance like this."

I knew right then that at the White House it was going to be business as usual.

'Carter wasn't going to have any high living by his White House staff. They were told there would be no chauffeured cars or other special privileges. But Carter's people were no different from any other people; they knew a status symbol when they saw one. The leader of the pack was Zbigniew Brzezinski. Before long he and then others began to taste the good life.'

file under defense

The Army's Sad State

The problem with the Army is, in the main, the failure of high level civilian leadership to face up squarely to reality. The Congress has repeatedly asked the right questions - questions which open the door to an honest, forthright discussion of the problems which plague us. Yet, the leadership in the Army Secretariat, starting with the Secretary himself, has consistently insisted on painting an "up beat", rosy picture of the state of affairs - in line with the general picture painted by his political mentors.

The Army is literally the gang that can't shoot straight. We exist in that condition because we lack enough "qualified Non-Commissioned Officers to teach essential combat skills to our soldiers; we are beset by internal personnel turbulence and training distractors which hamper and erode the best efforts of training managers; we have too many women in too many skills requiring an unquantifiable amount of pure endurance ~~other~~ for which ~~they~~ most women are ill equipped and for which their male peers must pick up the slack; we lack the kind of skilled, committed maintainence professionals who can ~~a~~ keep our equipment running; we lack

adequate spare parts; and we lack sufficient ammunition and modern ranges to keep our crews qualified for the type of emergency we must be prepared for.

These problems are well known and fully recognized by the vast majority of Army officers and enlisted personnel, who are continually surprised that these conditions - according to the Secretary - are "myths." On this atmosphere of lawyer like disputation of factual data by disclaimer or ~~carefully contrived but unsupported~~ ~~misleading and manipulated logic manufactured~~ unmanufactured arguments, the public can only be confused about the true state of affairs. It should be known that Senator Nunn is largely correct in his assessment of the Army's disastrous condition. Although, the "perpetual optimists and "can-doers" will sign up to and support almost any theorem the Army hierarchy perpetuates, those ~~who work with soldiers~~ live with the problem know the difference. Although we say that all ~~men~~ recruits can be trained, it is an unquestioned fact that aptitude exists in degrees

any commodity. When the facts are not to our liking, we simply disclaim the measuring devices we ourselves devised.

just like ~~anything else~~. ~~Fewer~~ Recruits on the lower intelligence end of the spectrum are significantly more difficult to train and require more training to remain proficient and the Army is getting more than its share from the low end of the spectrum. In a showdown in which the U.S. Army is outnumbered and outgunned by an enemy now possessing superior equipment, we have put our money on people whose reaction times, ~~and ability to~~ ~~skill absorbability~~ ~~are slower~~ adaptability, skill, and ingenuity will be less than the enemy. We are guilty of fielding amateurs in a professional business.

Instead of a professional force, we've created an instrument of social experimentation. Numerous decisions are made to foster the objectives of special interest groups, such as those advancing women's rights, and who have no apparent regard for the impact of these decisions on readiness. Although most of us recognize the valuable role that many women play in the Army, we must not callously disrupt the fibers of a fighting force for the advancement of pure liberal ~~concepts~~ causes.

Women are not the only issue. The Army, because of its recruiting problems has whole career management fields (such as supply) heavily populated by personnel (minorities) who lack the education and literacy to do the job. The Army cannot cope with the magnitude of this literacy gap in a cost effective way.

The volunteer Army did not have to become a failure, but we have surely found ways to make it one. The qualities which attract high quality individuals to any organization are disappearing in the Army. Quality attracts quality but the opposite is also true; disease begets disease! The word is out on the Army. Don't join.

This situation can be reversed only by leadership which can face up to the truth and which places integrity to the nation above loyalty to party politics. We must build a team which speaks well of a world power or we ~~are doomed to a second place~~ will be dancing to someone else's tune.

Carter Says Reagan

WASH POST 10/1/80

A Combat Readiness Dispute

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

A two-star Army general who works for the Joint Chiefs of Staff says that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has decided not to forward a military report on the combat readiness of U.S. forces to Congress, and that Brown wants a new report format that "places greater emphasis on the positive factors of our readiness."

Pentagon spokesman Thomas Ross immediately denied the general's assessment, calling it a "complete garble and misinterpretation. . . of the secretary's views."

The assertions, which have escalated still further the bitter campaign debate over the state of U.S. military preparedness, are contained in a memo by Maj. Gen. James H. Johnson.

Johnson's memo, meant for internal staff distribution, was leaked to the press late Thursday. One of the two reporters who first reported on the memo says he found it on his desk at the Pentagon.

Yesterday afternoon, Ronald Reagan's top foreign policy adviser, Richard Allen, called a news conference and, on the basis of the news accounts, accused Brown of tampering with military professionalism and trying to lull Americans into a false sense of security.

In his memo, Johnson wrote that "the secretary of defense has decided not to forward our readiness report synopsis to Congress. He has expressed concern that our current readiness reporting formats only emphasize the negative aspects of our military readiness. The secretary has asked that we reexamine our readiness reporting system to develop a report format which places greater emphasis on the positive factors of our readiness."

See BROWN, A6, Col. 3

Schedule

ve Navy Since '67

e-equipped vessels already on duty
c.

administration, defense specialists
ess a sense of outrage with the con-
and problems in the submarine it-
t which is supposed to represent
ountry's future front line of defense.
press no confidence that the Pen-
en the last of these delays. There
en four delays since the contract
x years ago with the delivery date
vessel, the USS Ohio.

of this year, the prime contractor,
Boat Division of General Dynamics
London, Conn., told the Navy the
would be delivered in January 1981,
ave allowed sea trials in July 1980.
nber, the company told the Navy
ve-month delay, pushing delivery
29, 1981, and sea trials until next

of the 1972 SALT pact with Mos-
rpowers agreed to take old weapons
when new ones, such as submarines,
ls. Both sides, thus far, have been
h this provision even though the
T agreement has expired and no
pact has been ratified.

herefore, felt required by the treaty
ntling two old 16-missile Polaris
ensate for the Trident sea trials
posed to begin in July, according
mony before Congress. But when
rent that there would be further
, the Navy decided to go ahead
s dismantling anyway because the
's — the USS Theodore Roosevelt
Lincoln — were out of nuclear
e needed extensive and expensive
stay in service, and because ship-
had already been arranged.

delays in Trident are alternately
h the Navy and its contractors.
es the first two delays on internal
roblems at Electric Boat and a
ed workers there. The third delay
epairs needed to equipment fur-
vernment for the vessels. The lat-
, according to the Navy, a result
of government-supplied equip-
fications of the design.

Memo Asserts Brown Wants Positive Report

BROWN, From A1

Pentagon spokesman Ross says Brown never talked to Johnson, that the general got his information third-hand, that no instructions have been issued for a change in the basic combat readiness rating system and that no decision has been made to withhold anything from Congress.

According to Ross, a special quarterly report on overall U.S. combat readiness is prepared within the joint staff. This is an internal document and is never sent to Congress. Other combat readiness reports are prepared by the individual services, also for internal use, but Congress can, and sometimes does, get these reports from the services.

Defense officials said a staff member of the House Armed Services Committee requested a summary, or synopsis, of the joint staff report about a month ago. Then came a similar request by Rep. Robert Carr (D-Mich), chairman of the committee's readiness panel. It was decided initially to make the report available to Carr but not to send it to the staff member. Officials said no final decision has been made about sending the synopsis to the staff member.

The Johnson memo came to light in the midst of a growing debate over the nation's defenses and a flurry of leaked military documents that show generally low combat readiness in many units. While these reports show military concern, they also provide ammunition for Reagan's contention that Carter has let the nation's defenses slip.

Brown has tried to explain that the standards by which U.S. combat readiness is measured are really quite high and that the United States is much better prepared to fight under wartime conditions than some of the more ideal peacetime measurements suggest.

In a major speech in Texas Thursday, Brown tried to explain that these military reports — which indicate among other things that six out of 10 U.S.-based Army divisions are not fully combat-ready — are meant as internal guides to show where money should be spent and what equipment is needed. In that same speech, Brown tried to stress the positive, so Johnson's assessment of what he thought Brown meant does not appear to be wrong.

SECRETARY HAROLD BROWN
... readiness dispute escalates

Ross said yesterday that Brown "is not asking for any change whatsoever in the readiness reporting system. He is suggesting we think about having a parallel reporting system which would convey some of the other important factors that go into military capability."

Whatever the precise situation within the Pentagon on this matter, the issue has clearly created a dilemma for Brown and the White House, because stressing the positive frequently flies in the face of recent testimony on Capitol Hill that suggests a military less ready than the recruiting posters depict.

SALT Cutbacks Are on Schedule

Trident Delays Leave Navy With Fewest A-Subs Since '67

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Navy has fewer nuclear submarines and missiles at sea today than at any time since 1967, mainly because of delays in production of its costly and controversial new sub, the Trident.

The Navy had planned, under terms of the first strategic arms limitation treaty of five years ago, to start withdrawing its old Polaris submarines from sea duty and replace them with Tridents. It has now in fact withdrawn two Polaris subs on schedule. But it has no new Tridents with which to replace them.

For the first time since 1967, when the last submarine designed to carry first Polaris and later Poseidn missiles entered the fleet, the Navy's atomic-powered undersea force has dropped below 41 vessels.

The United States in August, without fanfare, began dismantling two of the oldest Polaris subs, essentially removing 32 nuclear-tipped missiles from the U.S. retaliatory force. It was originally intended that the first of some 14 Trident submarines, which are supposed to replace the bulk of the older force, would be undergoing sea trials at about the time the Polaris subs were coming out of service.

But the scheduled delivery of the first Trident is now 26 months behind the April 1979 date called for in the initial contract. That first vessel is now slated for delivery late in June 1981, and sea trials, during which the Navy first checks out the warship before it is officially delivered, have been pushed back until next spring at the earliest.

Navy officials say the target responsibilities of the missiles on the two retired Polaris subs have been shifted to some of the 1,053 U.S. land-based missiles. But they say that the time lag left by having to take them out of service without the Trident replacement is putting a strain on submarine operations in the Pacific. The first Trident sub will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean.

Trident is the biggest single U.S. weapons project to date, with the government spending $28.7 billion, according to Navy figures, to build the 14 new vessels plus 24 missiles to go on each of them, plus facilities to handle them. The Trident missiles are also being installed on some older Poseidon submarines — each carrying 16 missiles — and the missile portion of the program is proceeding on schedule, with about four such Trident missile-equipped vessels already on duty in the Atlantic.

Within the administration, defense specialists privately express a sense of outrage with the continuing delays and problems in the submarine itself, a project which is supposed to represent much of the country's future front line of defense. They also express no confidence that the Pentagon has seen the last of these delays. There have now been four delays since the contract was signed six years ago with the delivery date for the first vessel, the USS Ohio.

In March of this year, the prime contractor, the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corp. in New London, Conn., told the Navy the first Trident would be delivered in January 1981, which would have allowed sea trials in July 1980. But in September, the company told the Navy of another five-month delay, pushing delivery back to June 29, 1981, and sea trials until next spring.

Under terms of the 1972 SALT pact with Moscow, both superpowers agreed to take old weapons out of service when new ones, such as submarines, begin their trials. Both sides, thus far, have been complying with this provision even though the five-year SALT agreement has expired and no second SALT pact has been ratified.

The Navy, therefore, felt required by the treaty to begin dismantling two old 16-missile Polaris subs to compensate for the Trident sea trials that were supposed to begin in July, according to Navy testimony before Congress. But when it became apparent that there would be further sea trial delays, the Navy decided to go ahead with the Polaris dismantling anyway because the two older vessels — the USS Theodore Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln — were out of nuclear fuel, would have needed extensive and expensive repair work to stay in service, and because shipyard schedules had already been arranged.

The lengthy delays in Trident are alternately blamed on both the Navy and its contractors. The Navy blames the first two delays on internal management problems at Electric Boat and a shortage of skilled workers there. The third delay is blamed on repairs needed to equipment furnished by the government for the vessels. The latest delay is also, according to the Navy, a result of modification of government-supplied equipment and modifications of the design.

Memo A
Wants I

BROWN, From

Pentagon spokesman
Brown never talked to Jol
the general got his informa
hand, that no instructions ha
sued for a change in the ba
readiness rating system and
cision has been made to wit
thing from Congress.

According to Ross, a specia
report on overall U.S. combat
is prepared within the joint
is an internal document an
sent to Congress. Other con
ness reports are prepared by
vidual services, also for int
but Congress can, and somet
get these reports from the

Defense officials said a sta
of the House Armed Services
tee requested a summary, or
of the joint staff report abou
ago. Then came a similar r
Rep. Robert Carr (D-Mich),
of the committee's readiness
was decided initially to make
available to Carr but not to
the staff member. Officials sai
decision has been made abou
the synopsis to the staff me

The Johnson memo came
in the midst of a growing de
the nation's defenses and a
leaked military documents th
generally low combat readiness
units. While these reports show
concern, they also provide am
for Reagan's contention that C
let the nation's defenses slip.

Brown has tried to explain
standards by which U.S. combat
ness is measured are really q
and that the United States is m
ter prepared to fight under
conditions than some of the m
peacetime measurements sugg

In a major speech in Texas T
Brown tried to explain that th
itary reports — which indicate
other things that six out of
based Army divisions are not fu
bat-ready — are meant as
guides to show where money
be spent and what equipm
needed. In that same speech,
tried to stress the positive, so J

The Young Should Register — Twice

NYT 7/2

Americans over the age of 20 can only hope that the four million younger men who are about to be directed by President Carter to register this month for a nonexistent military draft will do so, and without asking why. If a significant number refuse to register, that would raise new doubts about the American people's dedication to public service and to the defense of vital interests abroad. And if they ask why they must make this demonstration of fealty, they would expose a hollow, even cynical political exercise.

Do we need this registration of 19- and 20-year-old men? Only if we also need a draft to fill the ranks of the armed forces. And do we now need a draft? Only if America needs a standing force of more than 2 million and balks at paying the $11 billion needed over five years to recruit and retain enough volunteers of the desired quality.

The President, Congress and the military chiefs have not in fact faced up to defining the right size of the armed forces except in relation to "traditional" numbers and what the budget traffic will bear. Even in those terms, they have not fully and fairly assessed the all-volunteer force. They have avoided debating the explosive issue of whether to revive a draft. And they have never bothered to ask what kind of draft would be fair and therefore acceptable to young Americans.

The four million postcards to be collected this month will not stimulate recruitment or prepare the nation for emergency. No one could be called to duty without a further act of Congress. And if the call ever came, the four million would have to be located again, examined, classified and summoned in some logical and equitable way. Since neither Congress nor the armed forces are ready for a draft, the postcards add nothing substantial to preparedness.

At best, this might have been a symbolic exercise — a symbol of American resolve to wash away the stains of disillusionment with Vietnam. If all citizens between the ages of, say, 18 and 30, male and female, were trooping to post offices this month to signify a readiness to serve, the world might have concluded that Americans were ready again to support a diplomacy that risks military action far from home.

But Mr. Carter and Congress plainly feared to ask for such a demonstration. Indeed, they rushed to diminish the potential symbolism by exempting, first, all women, and then all men over 21. Such obvious calculation, in an election year, proved the very opposite of the resolve the President vowed to show after the Soviet Union marched into Afghanistan last winter. Washington is stuck now with a registration that has neither practical nor symbolic value. Even if dutifully obeyed, it is futile.

•

So what can one tell an inquiring 20-year-old? First, that law, even bad and unfair law, should not be violated lightly. There is no more plausible moral ground for refusing to register than there is for refusing to pay a tax. There is also no practical reason to demur. Registration will have no real consequence; refusing to register risks punishment for no clear cause.

But there is a second step to be urged on registration-age youth. The armed forces do have serious problems in recruiting and retaining the quality of people they need. Young Americans belong in the discussion of how these problems are to be resolved. After registering at the post office, they ought to register again, at the Board of Elections.

REPORT BY THE U.S.

General Accounting Office

Use Of The Military Aircraft Storage And Disposition Center Could Be Improved

Departments of Defense
- Army
- Air Force
- Navy

The Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center is a source of aircraft and parts. By using the Center's resources when needed, the military services can avoid new procurements while maintaining aircraft readiness. But to fully obtain these benefits at the lowest cost, both the military services and the Center must effectively manage aircraft disposition.

LCD-78-425
SEPTEMBER 25, 1978

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS
DIVISION

B-157373

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report discusses the Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, and suggests ways to improve operations.

This review was made because of our continuing interest in helping the services to increase efficiency while reducing costs of operations.

We have discussed the report with Department officials and have incorporated their comments. Many improvements have occurred since the time of our review, and these changes have also been incorporated.

This report contains recommendations to you on pages 17 and 30. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairmen, House Committee on Government Operations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Sincerely yours,

R. W. Gutmann
Director

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

USE OF THE MILITARY AIRCRAFT STORAGE AND DISPOSITION CENTER COULD BE IMPROVED

D I G E S T

The Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center near Tucson, Arizona, stores, returns to service, recovers parts from, and disposes of surplus U.S. military aircraft. The military, public agencies, the American public, and other Governments all look to the Center for aircraft that are no longer needed. (See p. 1.)

Over the years, the use of the Center to return aircraft to active military use has decreased to the point where its role in providing parts is as important today as its role in providing aircraft. About 4,500 aircraft belonging to the military services (and the Coast Guard) are at the Center. An average of 1,120 leave each year, of which 120 are returned to service; 100 are sold to other countries; 180 are donated to public agencies; and 720 are declared surplus and sold, primarily as scrap. Aircraft at the Center are also reclaimed, being a source of scarce parts, thereby alleviating critical shortages and reducing future procurements. The value of parts removed and returned to the services' active inventory has recently averaged $102.8 million a year. (See p. 4.)

The Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center is intended to be a cost-effective source of aircraft and parts. Using the Center's resources as needed, the military services can avoid new procurements and maintain aircraft readiness. However, GAO tested the operation and concluded that to be actually cost effective--to obtain these benefits at the lowest cost--the Center must be more effectively managed. GAO identified these problems:

--The military services have not been timely in disposing of excess aircraft. (See p. 11.)

--They have not developed firm criteria sufficiently so that the Center's assets could be used effectively. (See p. 12.)

--Little or no attention has been paid to logistical needs for components and parts when making disposition decisions. (See p. 17.)

--The services were not taking full advantage of parts available on aircraft at the Center. In particular, the Navy could realize net savings of about $14 million with a more aggressive recovery program. (See p. 21 and 29.)

--The services were keeping too many aircraft in reserve status. (See p. 23.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve the use of the Center, the Secretary of Defense and the Military services should:

--Reassess the role of the Center and provide a better definition of the need for and use of its assets.

--Direct the services to develop firm criteria for determining aircraft dispositions, recognizing that early parts reclamation offers many benefits; that is, logistical needs as well as operational needs should be equally considered.

--Direct all services to make their disposition decisions before aircraft are sent to the Center.

--Direct all services to continue to reevaluate prior disposition decisions in light of current requirements for whole aircraft and parts.

--Reevaluate the parts reclamation methods used to assure that the most effective mix of methods is being used.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND ACTIONS

Since GAO's audit work was completed, both the Air Force and Navy have made changes in their disposition programs to better use the available assets and capabilities of the Center. Both services are pursuing programs to better apply logistical needs information to their decision processes.

The Navy has made major strides in reducing its aircraft inventory at the Center. It has also increased funding for its Center activities and has introduced new parts and components recovery programs which will improve its use of the Center's assets.

Army, Navy, and Air Force officials concurred with GAO's conclusions and recommendations, and, where appropriate, revisions to this report were made based on their oral comments. GAO is encouraged by the actions being taken and the responsiveness to the recommendations.

Contents

ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center in Arizona has the single largest concentration of aircraft in the world. All aircraft sent there are in excess to current military needs, and most are old and need major repairs. Nevertheless, many aircraft are eventually recovered from the Center for use by the military services, foreign countries, and public agencies. In addition, usable parts are reclaimed off aircraft and reintroduced into the military services' supply systems to avoid the cost of new procurements.

In the past, both the Air Force and the Navy had major aircraft storage facilities in Arizona. Then, in 1964, the Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center was established at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base near Tucson to simplify and consolidate the aircraft disposition process and to reduce costs. The Navy storage facility near Phoenix was closed. The Department of Defense (DOD) envisioned the Center as a ready source of aircraft which could be promptly returned to the military services when needed.

The Air Force, through the Air Force Logistics Command, acts as the single manager for the Center. The Center's operations are governed by an interservice support agreement that is updated annually at a multiservice conference. (See chart on p. 2.) The agreement requires that each service provide the Center with workload projections and lists of parts to be reclaimed. The agreement also covers the work to be done for each service, such as storage and withdrawal of aircraft, and billing procedures.

The Aircraft Center is a large outdoor storage facility covering 3,000 acres of desert and having a few large buildings to house administrative personnel and process aircraft and parts. The Center's fiscal year 1977 budget was $15 million, of which 90 percent was spent on salaries for its 840 civil service employees.

Because of the desert's weather and soil conditions, it provides an ideal and inexpensive storage location for large numbers of aircraft. To preserve the aircraft, engines and fuel systems are flushed with oil and a preservation mixture, and portions of the outer bodies are covered with a protective coating to reduce the temperature within the aircraft.

ORGANIZATION CHART



Once preserved, the aircraft are simply parked in rows on the desert floor where they receive periodic maintenance as necessary. Aircraft can be stored this way for 4 years before they must have their engines tested and represerved.

THE CENTER'S WORK

The Aircraft Center's workload can generally be assigned to the following:

--Aircraft storage, which includes preserving, sealing, and positioning the aircraft.

--Maintenance in storage, which consists of periodic inspections to maintain a proper level of preservation.

--Aircraft withdrawal, which prepares aircraft in storage for a one-time flight or surface shipment.

--Aircraft parts reclamation, which is the disassembly of aircraft to recover parts and components for further use.

--Miscellaneous work, which includes such things as special inspections, parts handling, and aircraft relocation.

Measured in terms of direct labor hours, the workload distribution for fiscal year 1977 is shown below.

Workload categories	Industrial workload for FY 1977
	(percent)
Aircraft storage	12
Maintenance	9
Aircraft withdrawal	10
Parts reclamation	49
Miscellaneous work	20
	100

Aircraft inventory at the Center

About 4,500 aircraft from the three services and the U.S. Coast Guard are located at the Center. An average of 55 percent of the aircraft are reserved for possible return to the services or for sale to foreign countries through the Security Assistance Program, 25 percent are in reclamation status awaiting possible donation or recovery of parts, and 20 percent are owned by the Defense Logistics Agency awaiting public sale. Aircraft status figures 1/ as of June 1977 are shown on the next page.

1/These figures reflect aircraft status at the time of our review. Since then, the services have taken actions to reduce the number of aircraft held.

	Air Force	Navy	Army	Coast Guard	Total
In storage	664	1,390	587	8	2,649
In reclamation status	499	491	142	14	1,146
Owned by Defense Logistics Agency	461	106	148	-	715
Total	1,624	1,987	877	22	4,510

The original acquisition cost of the aircraft on hand is about $6 billion. However, their current value is substantially less, due to age and parts removal. For example, sales of tactical and commercial aircraft to other countries under the Security Assistance Program return from 5 to 20 percent of the average $1.2 million acquisition cost per aircraft. In contrast, public sale of commercial-type aircraft in flyable condition through the Defense Logistics Agency usually returns about 1 percent of the acquisition cost. Tactical aircraft are sold publicly through the Defense Logistics Agency as scrap with a return value less than one-half of 1 percent. Tactical aircraft must be cut up into scrap before public sale can occur.

AIRCRAFT DISPOSITION

According to Air Force officials, approximately 1,100 aircraft leave the Center each year for one of four ultimate dispositions, as shown below for fiscal years 1976 and 1977.

Aircraft dispositions	Average number a year
Service reuse	120
Security Assistance	100
Donation	180
Public sale	720
Total	1,120

Once a service review board decides that aircraft are not needed in reserve for the services or the Security Assistance Program, the aircraft are placed in reclamation status, and a screening process begins. The aircraft are first offered to the other services for 30 days. After this screening, the distinction is made between tactical- and commercial-type aircraft.

AIRCRAFT IN STORAGE AT THE CENTER

ARMY AIRCRAFT IN STORAGE AT THE CENTER

Tactical aircraft are designed to attack military targets, and DOD policy prohibits their sale or donation to the public in flyable condition. Some tactical aircraft are used for displays, but most are sold for scrap. The disposition and screening process, in order of priority, are shown below for both tactical- and commercial-type aircraft.

Disposition/Screening Priorities

Tactical aircraft	Commercial-type aircraft
1. Owning service	1. Owning service
2. Other service	2. Other Services
3. Security Assistance Program	3. Security Assistance Program
4. Service parts reclamation	4. Federal agencies
5. Public sale by the Defense Logistics Agency (no reflight permitted)	5. State and local agencies
	6. Service parts reclamation
	7. Parts reclamation by other Government agencies
	8. Public sale by the Defense Logistics Agency (possible reflight permitted)

Once in reclamation status, a few aircraft of each type are designated as reclamation insurance types. These aircraft are held in reclamation status until the owning service is sure that parts or structural components will never be needed to support active aircraft.

FUNDING

The Aircraft Center is a quasi-industrial funded operation. The Air Force, as manager, receives funding from the services on a quarterly basis for work done. The services are billed for direct personnel and maintenance costs applicable to priority removals, special projects, and certain portions of routine reclamations directly attributable to the specific service and for a proportionate share of indirect and overhead costs.

Revenue from sales of aircraft through the Security Assistance Program is returned to the owning service if the aircraft needs to be replaced. Otherwise, the services recover costs of sale which include maintenance, storage, preservation, and withdrawal costs from the time the aircraft were made available for Security Assistance Program sales. Generally, aircraft sold from the Center will not be replaced by the owning service.

Sale of aircraft to the public, as scrap or whole aircraft, is done by the Defense Logistics Agency. Revenue from such sales is used by the Agency to first cover its costs of operations. Excess funds are turned over to the Air Force to defray costs of routine reclamation programs for all the services. The Air Force received $3.5 million in fiscal year 1975, $2.3 million in fiscal year 1976, and an estimated $1 million in fiscal year 1977. Future years' sales by the Defense Logistics Agency will probably not generate any additional funds because of increased costs of operations.

As shown below for fiscal year 1977, most of the Center's funds, as well as workload, have been provided by the Air Force.

	Direct-labor hours	Percent	Funds provided	Percent
Air Force	395,053	65.2	$11,020,619	73.4
Navy	155,947	25.8	2,828,387	18.8
Army	25,577	4.2	328,615	2.2
Coast Guard	506	.1	135,544	.9
Foreign military sales	25,871	4.3	654,180	4.3
Other	2,504	.4	54,755	.4
	605,458	100.0	$15,022,100	100.0

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed documents and interviewed agency officials at:

--Air Force, Navy, and Army Headquarters, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

--Defense Logistics Agency Headquarters, Cameron Station, Virginia.

--The Navy Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

--The Air Force Logistics Command, Dayton, Ohio.

--The Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.

--The Naval Air Rework Facility, San Diego, California.

--The Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona.

CHAPTER 2

AIRCRAFT STORAGE AND DISPOSITION: AN OVERVIEW

The Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center is conceptually a cost-effective source of aircraft and parts. By using the Center's resources when needed, the military services can avoid new procurements while maintaining aircraft readiness. In addition, public agencies can obtain Government equipment at a lower cost than that available commercially, so the equipment can be used over its full life. But to fully obtain these benefits at the lowest cost, both the military services and the Aircraft Center must effectively manage aircraft disposition. Effective management should include:

--Firm service criteria for determining when aircraft should be sent to the Center.

--Early service decisions, based on realistic projected requirements, on what status aircraft should be placed in when they arrive at the Center.

--Effective workload planning by the Center to insure good productivity. Accurate work projections by the services are essential to such planning.

--Easy access to the Center's resources for all potential customers and full use of these resources.

THE CENTER'S ROLE IN CHANGING TIMES

When first established, the envisioned role of the Center was as a ready source of aircraft which could be returned to service as needed in a relatively short time, such as for mobilization. As such, the Center's resources were included in the military services' mobilization plans.

Over the years, the complexity of aircraft systems has increased to the point where they now require a great deal of specialized skills and equipment to keep them operational. Trained aircrews, maintenance personnel, associated ground support equipment, and supply support are all essential to a viable aircraft system. But as aircraft are phased out of active service, so are all these essential elements. Thus, when aircraft are sent to the Center, they often lose their usefulness as an operational system.

The Secretary of Defense in 1977, recognizing that because of these factors the Center would not be able to fulfill the services' future mobilization needs, stated that in programing for full mobilization the services should not plan on using the Center's assets.

This then leaves the question of what role the Center should have in the future. We believe that, if a specific need for the aircraft has not been identified by the services, they or their parts should be fully used in peacetime to obtain the most benefits from already funded Government assets. The Aircraft Center's role of providing parts is now as important as its role of providing aircraft.

MATCHING NEEDS WITH RESOURCES

In deciding when aircraft should be sent to the Storage and Disposition Center, the military services must first determine their current and future aircraft needs. Aircraft are usually declared excess and sent to the Center for the following reasons.

--The service no longer has an active force need for the aircraft.

--The aircraft is too old to be safely operated.

--The aircraft is being replaced by new equipment.

--The aircraft has become too expensive to operate and additional modification is not cost effective.

In addition, a small number of aircraft are sent to the Center for temporary storage. Some of the reasons for doing this are awaiting conversion, modification, or overhaul.

Criteria for making disposition decisions

The services use similar criteria for making their disposition decisions, including budgetary allowances, assigned missions, production schedules, aircraft conditions, and force goals. A key variable is flying-hour plans, which are directly related to such resources as flight crews, maintenance personnel, replacement parts, and various other support personnel. These and other factors are examined by review committees established by the services to make recommendations on the disposition of aircraft in the active

fleet for up to 5 years in the future. The committees usually meet once or twice a year to determine aircraft disposition and to reevaluate past decisions in light of any recent changes.

Overall, this part of the disposition process appears to be adequate for meeting the services' needs. Problems appear to arise when decisions must be made about the excess aircraft. Should they be sold to meet Security Assistance Program needs? Should they be put in reserve status at the Center, and if so, for how many years? Or should they be put directly into reclamation status for use of their parts on active aircraft? Such decisions should be made as soon as the aircraft are declared excess and should be based on reasonable projections of the potential for whole aircraft sales and the services' repair parts requirements. In practice, however, the military services do not always make such projections before deciding on aircraft disposition. Instead, the services' headquarters, with assistance from the affected activities, use the following informal criteria.

--The owning service's needs for operational aircraft have priority over other needs, such as the Security Assistance Program.

--Requirements for whole aircraft have priority over requirements for parts when the removal of parts would make aircraft reuse infeasible.

--Sufficient reserves should be kept to meet the largest projected contingency need for operational aircraft.

Potential benefits from early parts reclamation

Because requirements for whole aircraft have priority over parts requirements, the services often put their excess aircraft in reserve storage at the Center. Aircraft held in reserve can serve several useful purposes: they can be reused when needed due to attrition or slippage of new aircraft procurement, or they can be stored for future missions or modifications. They can also be sold under the Security Assistance Program.

While held in reserve, however, aircraft cannot be used as a routine source of components and parts for supporting aircraft of the same or similar type; but can be used on a priority basis. The services generally keep aircraft in

reserve storage about 4 years before returning them to service or placing them in reclamation status.

Because of revised force goals, the modification and upgrading of individual aircraft, and the introduction of new aircraft, the active fleets are constantly changing. All three military services are currently introducing new aircraft into their active inventories, such as the Air Force's F-15s, A-10s, and F-16s; the Navy's F-14s and F-18s; and the Army's new attack and utility helicopters. As these aircraft become more prevalent in the active forces, older aircraft will be taken out of service. Thus, the number of active aircraft that could benefit from parts on the Center's aircraft will continue to be reduced as time goes on. The Center's older aircraft are also less likely to be recalled as whole aircraft when the active fleet consists of more advanced models. The longer aircraft remain in storage, the less valuable they become, both as whole aircraft and as a source of parts.

It may be more economical to place excess aircraft directly into parts reclamation status, when a large number of similar aircraft are still in active service. Doing so could save procurement costs by reintroducing still-usable parts and components. A 1975 Air Force audit, for example, estimated that $35 million could be saved from early parts reclamation. The Air Force began a program in October 1976 which removed selected parts and components from newly arrived aircraft. In its initial assessment of this program, the Air Force estimated a potential of $100 million in additional recoveries. An Air Force official stated that, as of mid-1978, the program had resulted in recoveries valued at about $116 million.

We are not advocating that all excess aircraft be placed immediately in reclamation status. We believe, however, that future requirements for excess aircraft and their parts should be more thoroughly examined before disposition decisions are made, and that the costs and benefits of disposition decisions which lead to aircraft being held in reserve for 4 years should be reassessed.

USING THE AIRCRAFT CENTER

The services' use of the Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center varied greatly. The Air Force looks to the Center first for needed parts and extensively reclaims parts to reduce procurement costs. The Navy, on the other

HELICOPTERS BEING PREPARED FOR STORAGE



AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT IN STORAGE

hand, uses the Center as a source of last resort for critically needed parts.

The Army uses the Center for limited reclamation and to dispose of excess helicopters and small fixed-wing aircraft. It contends that storing helicopters at the Center for future use is not economically sound and that it has few excess aircraft. As a result, the Army's workload at the Center is quite small.

The Center's total workload has been declining. From fiscal year 1976 to 1977, the workload (as shown by direct-labor hours) decreased by 26.4 percent. In October 1977, the Center was reorganized and its work force was reduced as a partial result of this reduction. The work force has been steadily declining since 1974, as shown below.

Assigned work force	Dec. 1974	Dec. 1975	Dec. 1976	Dec. 1977
Civilian	917	885	840	773
Military	109	107	83	86
Total	1,026	992	923	859

Although the work force has been reduced to better suit the workload, Center officials stated that labor productivity has been poor due to unanticipated workload fluctuations. The workloads for aircraft storage, withdrawals, and reclamations have been unstable, because of frequent decision changes, particularly for foreign military sales withdrawals. The services, for their part, have stated that such changes are driven by DOD-wide budgetary changes and executive branch decisions concerning foreign military sales, and not service decisions per se. As shown in the following chart, the actual workloads for fiscal year 1977 varied from the programed workload by 17 percent.

Although the reasons for the fluctuations put forward by the services certainly appear valid, it is apparent from the chart that when comparing the services' programs and their variances the driving force for stabilizing the workload is reclamation. This comparison would appear to support our case for earlier and decisive disposition decisions by the owning services.

Variance Between Actual and Programed
Workload During Fiscal Year 1977 in Direct Manhours

	Program (note a)	Actual	Variance	Percent
Air Force:				
Storage	41,133	29,667	11,466	28
Withdrawal	21,959	32,533	-10,574	48
Reclamation	222,552	219,384	3,168	1
Navy:				
Storage	58,961	44,105	14,856	25
Withdrawal	20,272	20,036	236	1
Reclamation	80,828	64,903	15,925	20
Army:				
Storage	12	3,103	-3,091	25
Withdrawal	16,074	3,121	12,953	81
Reclamation	10,377	16,495	-6,118	59
Total	472,168	433,347	78,387	17

a/As of the beginning of the fiscal year.

Changes in the workload mix, which cause workers to be transferred between functions, can adversely affect productivity. Such transfers reduce the advantages of specialization and disrupt work as personnel and equipment are transferred, even though much of the work force is cross-trained.

According to Center officials, the services' workload forecasts for the coming month are the only ones accurate enough for allocating the work force between activities. Although the services provide the Center with a 5-year forecast that is updated yearly, it is not accurate enough for work force scheduling. Both Air Force and Navy officials agreed that this was a continuing problem, for the services as well as the Center. Since the time of our review, however, both services have taken steps to improve their workload forecasting procedures. For example, the Air Force semi-annual review now includes quarterly projected storage availability data, by aircraft, for the next 2 fiscal years. The Navy has reevaluated its planning process and now includes a full 5-year projection with quarterly updating in its process. The Navy believes that the first 1- to 2-years projections are quite accurate. Further outyear data is not quite as good, being dependent on various factors which make it subject to varying degrees of change.

The Center's productivity problems, along with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, 1/ have prompted the Air Force to consider turning operations over to a private contractor. In June 1977, the Air Force initiated a study of the Center's costs and planned to solicit proposals from industry. The proposals are to be reviewed and compared with Air Force costs to do the work in-house. The Air Force estimated that, if the study favors a private contractor, a contract would be awarded as early as February 1979, and 48 military and 749 civil service positions would be eliminated.

We believe that, should the proposed changeover occur, the recommendations we have set down in this report would still be valid. In fact, under a contractor-operated system, the changes we have suggested would be more important than ever. A contractor, for example, would not permit the services to make the kind of last minute program changes that have occurred in the past without charge.

CONCLUSIONS

The military services have not done all that is possible to help make the Aircraft Center a successful and economical storage and distribution point. Although the services' criteria for sending aircraft to the Center appear to be adequate, they have not fully developed firm criteria for using the Center's resources. Because of this, these resources have not been used to their full extent.

Past decisions on what to do with the aircraft once they are excessed have been made with little regard for current and future logistics needs. What is needed is an aggressive, timely program of matching supply support requirements with the Center's available and anticipated assets. Once such a program is operating and the costs and benefits of disposition alternatives have been thoroughly assessed, the services should be in a better position to make accurate workload projections. Such projections are essential to efficient work force planning at the Center and to improved productivity--regardless of whether the Center is Government- or contractor-operated.

1/Circular A-76 affirms the Government's general policy of relying on the private enterprise system to supply its needs, except when the national interest compels the Government to provide its own products and services.

The services need to more closely match logistical needs with available assets at the Center. By pursuing a more aggressive program in this area, the services can provide the Center with a better defined workplan, as well as reduce their own needs for costly procurement of parts which could be retrieved from the Center's assets.

AGENCY COMMENTS

Both Air Force and Navy officials stated that major changes have been introduced into their aircraft disposition planning processes to better use the Center's capabilities. For example, the Air Force has improved its method of providing information on future dispositions of aircraft. The Navy has also changed its projection methods to include quarterly updates of dispositions. Both changes should improve the Center's ability to program its workload on a more consistent basis.

Both Services are also getting more information from their logistical support systems as to specific parts and components needs. The Navy in particular has instituted programs to improve the matching of this information to their disposition decision process. For example, improved save parts lists provided by the air logistics staff will aid in determining what types of aircraft should be reclaimed on arrival at the Center.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

--Reassess the role for the Aircraft Center in terms of his 1977 decision that programing for full mobilization should assume that the Center's assets will not be used.

--Having reassessed the role, direct the services to develop firm criteria for determining aircraft dispositions, recognizing that early parts reclamation offers many benefits, and that logistical needs as well as operational needs should be equally considered.

--Direct the services to make every effort to provide the Center with as accurate and timely a forecast of aircraft disposition decisions as possible, to aid in better workload planning.

CHAPTER 3

SAVINGS AVAILABLE FROM RESERVING FEWER AIRCRAFT AND RECLAIMING MORE PARTS

As stated in the previous chapter, the effective use of excess aircraft depends on early aircraft disposition planning based on expected needs. If more aircraft are placed in reserve storage than can be expected to be reused, unnecessary storage and preservation costs are incurred. And the longer aircraft are held in reserve, the lower their parts reclamation value and surplus sales values.

The Navy has held many aircraft in reserve for lengthy periods, and has reclaimed significantly fewer parts from its aircraft than the Air Force, primarily because of, according to the Navy, a lack of available funding and a reluctance to use the Center's parts.

NEED FOR BETTER NAVY PLANNING

The military services follow similar procedures in identifying aircraft to be sent to the Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center. In planning the aircraft's disposition at the Center, however, the services differ. While the Air Force and Army plan their reserve requirements and dispositions along with their active fleet requirements, the Navy plans its reserve requirements and dispositions separately--after the aircraft are in reserve storage.

As part of their disposition decisionmaking, the services must determine what level of preservation the aircraft are to receive when they arrive at the Center. Full preservation allows aircraft to be stored for 4 years with only occasional maintenance. Lesser degrees of preservation, which are less costly, can be used when aircraft are to be stored for shorter periods or have a low potential for reuse. Both the Air Force and the Army use lower levels of preservation on aircraft that they have decided will not be returned to service. But because the Navy does not make disposition decisions until after the aircraft have been sent to the Center, its aircraft have routinely been fully preserved.

For example, the Air Force programed 553 aircraft of various types to be withdrawn from active service during the last half of fiscal year 1977, and fiscal years 1978 and 1979. Of these aircraft, 245 were to go directly into reclamation. Conversely, for the same period, the Navy

programed 1,071 aircraft to be withdrawn from active service, all of which were to be fully preserved and placed in reserve storage. Since the time of our review, the Navy has made significant changes to its disposition program. Some aircraft are now being sent directly to reclamation, rather than having all placed in reserve.

The cost difference between fully preserving and partially preserving an aircraft placed in reclamation status is shown below.

Aircraft type	Initial cost of preservation		Difference
	Full	Partial	
F-4 fighter	$6,496	$5,516	$ 980
F-8 fighter	4,536	3,472	1,064
A-4 attack	3,668	3,080	588
P-2 patrol	7,224	6,132	1,092
S-2 patrol	3,864	3,612	252
C-118 cargo	7,420	6,300	1,120
H-1 helicopter	2,408	2,044	364

If the 1,071 Navy aircraft had been assigned to the Center in the same proportions as the Air Force's, about 44 percent, or 471 aircraft, would have been sent directly to reclamation. Assuming an even mix of aircraft, as shown in the chart, the average cost for full preservation (used on aircraft going directly to reclamation) would have been $5,088. The average cost for partial preservation (used on aircraft going directly to reclamation) would have been $4,308. The savings per aircraft would have been $780; and the savings for all 471 aircraft would have been $367,380.

It should be noted that the Navy has since taken several steps to change this situation, which include sending selected aircraft directly to reclamation.

The Navy uses an aircraft disposition committee, which meets once or twice a year, to determine the status and plan the disposition of aircraft held in reserve. Although the committee has broad Navy representation, its guidelines are not clearly defined enough to direct its decisions. As a result, most of its decisions on the number of aircraft to be held in reserve are not supported by reasonably certain projections or requirements.

NAVY AND AIRFORCE AIRCRAFT IN STORAGE

COAST GUARD AND NAVY AIRCRAFT IN STORAGE

EXCESSIVE NAVY RESERVES

Shown below is the number of reserved aircraft held by each of the services as of August 1977, and the ratio of their reserve to total operational aircraft.

	Navy	Air Force	Army (note a)
Aircraft reserves for:			
Potential future service use	821	744	544
Security Assistance Program	494	51	7
Other (note b)	26	2	6
Total	1,341	797	557
Operational aircraft (as of early 1977)	5,295	8,991	8,337
Ratio of reserves to operational	.25 to 1	.09 to 1	.07 to 1

a/Excludes aircraft stored at other locations.

b/Aircraft held for potential use by other Federal, State, and local agencies.

As can be seen, the Navy holds a much greater percentage of operational aircraft in reserve than either the Army or the Air Force. Additionally, the quantities reserved are large when compared with the total number of aircraft returned to service since 1965, particularly considering that the quantities being put in storage and returned to service have been on a general decline since the Aircraft Center opened in 1965. The following chart shows the number of aircraft which the Navy put in reserve and withdrew from reserve for fiscal years 1965-76.

NAVY RESERVE INPUTS AND WITHDRAWALS AT THE CENTER



The Navy also retains many aircraft in reserve beyond the time that the average stored aircraft is returned to service and beyond the 4-year preservation limit. As of May 1977, the Navy had 367 and the Air Force had 72 1/ aircraft in reserve beyond 5 years as shown.



1/Excludes B-52 heavy bombers so that similar aircraft can be compared.

Holding aircraft in reserve for excessive lengths of time adversely affects their (1) parts reclamation value, (2) donation value, and (3) surplus sales value as whole aircraft. The parts reclamation value is greatest when the aircraft first arrive at the Center, particularly when some aircraft of the same type are still in active use. The longer an aircraft is stored, the greater the likelihood that some parts will deteriorate beyond possible reuse. The donation and surplus sales value of aircraft is reduced because aircraft stored for long periods tend to require more extensive repairs to make them or their parts serviceable. Also, the older the aircraft, the less likely that necessary spare parts will be available at reasonable prices.

NEED TO MAKE GREATER USE OF THE CENTER'S PARTS

None of the services disputes that an aggressive parts salvage program can be very cost effective to meet valid requirements if the need for whole aircraft has been satisfied. Navy policy, as expressed in NAVAIR Instruction 4500.7A, is to reclaim parts and components from aircraft taken out of storage to the fullest extent practical to support operating aircraft or other logistics requirements. However, for the past several years, the Navy's parts reclamation program has fallen short of realizing its potential.

For example, the Navy programed 321 aircraft for reclamation projects starting in January 1977. A review of these projects in January 1978 showed:

	Program for 1977	
Status	Number of aircraft	Added during year
Completed	50	-
Work in process	30	7
Not started	217	232
Canceled	23	-
Return to storage	1	-
Total	321	239

This brings the total number of aircraft assigned to reclamation projects, but not being worked on, to 449 as of January 1978.

Navy officials stated that lack of funding was the reason that parts from these aircraft were not being recovered. Since the time of our review, the funding for work at the Center has been increased. For the remainder of fiscal year 1978, $660,000 has been provided. Funding for fiscal year 1979 is expected to amount to over $5 million. All unaccomplished reclamation projects are expected to be completed by fiscal year 1981. Amounts requested and actually funded for fiscal years 1977 to 1979 are shown below. Funding for 1979 has not been finalized as yet, but Navy officials expect it to be.

	Fiscal years		
	1977	1978	1979
	(in millions)		
Requested	$4.0	$5.71	$5.71
Funded	2.62	2.59	5.71

Parts reclamation methods

A key consideration in reclaiming parts is whether they can be obtained early enough to be useful on active aircraft. Accordingly, the timing for scheduled parts reclamation is critical to minimizing procurements while maintaining adequate reserves and reducing the number of more costly unscheduled parts removals. There are four methods of parts recovery used at the Center, three scheduled and one unscheduled.

The following are the scheduled parts reclamation methods.

--Group 1 removals are scheduled to systematically recover selected high-cost parts from the Center's newly received aircraft that are not expected to be returned to service in the near future. Such removals make large quantities of parts available for use early in the storage period; however, care must be taken to avoid removing so many parts that reflight of the aircraft becomes economically infeasible.

--Special project parts removals are used to recover large quantities of a few parts that are needed to meet requirements in the near future. These removals, when used instead of priority requisitions, can help the Center minimize workload disruptions.

--Routine reclamation is used to systematically recover remaining parts from aircraft in reclamation status before their final disposal. For each aircraft model, the services provided the Center with a "save list," based on several years' requirements, for large quantities of sometimes several hundred parts. However, the Center usually recovers only a fraction of the quantities needed from the aircraft's remaining parts.

Routine reclamation projects are initiated primarily when five or more aircraft of the same type are available for parts reclamation. By reclaiming several aircraft at a time, a production-line type of operation can be used and direct-labor costs are reduced about 22 percent. Requisition processing, shipping, and inspection costs are also reduced.

According to Air Force and Navy officials at the Center, routine reclamation costs are about 22 percent less than priority requisition costs and are somewhat less than for Group 1 removals. On the other hand, by the time aircraft are put through routine reclamation, the requirements for their parts may be minimal because of the increased likelihood that fewer aircraft that can use the parts will still be in operation.

The unscheduled method involves priority requisitions which are used to recover parts when there are urgent requirements which cannot be satisfied from other sources. These requisitions are generally for small numbers of low-volume parts that are unique to a particular aircraft model. These parts are invaluable to keep active aircraft fully operational, to minimize work stoppages at repair facilities, and to avoid the high cost of urgent procurement of out-of-production parts. Even so, priority removals are costly, and at times routine reclamation projects have been initiated to add parts to the supply systems in order to reduce the need for priority removals.

The owning service can use priority requisitions to recover parts from any of its aircraft in any status at the Center. However, in looking for requested parts, the Center normally looks first to those aircraft in reclamation status before going into aircraft in reserve status, undergoing screening, or belonging to the Defense Logistics Agency.

The following table shows the amount of time purchased by each service of the various categories described during February to May 1978.

Type recovery	Direct manhours by service		
	Air Force	Navy	Army
Group 1	21,498	-	-
Priority	22,499	6,321	553
Routine	8,865	8,073	-
Total	52,862	14,394	553

Note: There were no special projects done during this period.

This led to total parts recovery of:

Service	Parts value
Air Force	$22,125,233
Navy	9,984,712
Army	166,732
Total	$32,276,677

Comparison of Air Force and Navy practices

In both the Navy and the Air Force, spare parts requirements are calculated automatically by computer. Air Force parts managers at the various repair facilities, have direct access to local technical support which helps them to thoroughly validate the requirements and make any necessary corrections. Navy officials stated that, due to inaccurate information concerning specific aircraft configurations, Navy parts managers often request parts that are not on the aircraft.

The Air Force uses all the parts reclamation methods discussed on pages 25 and 26. When Air Force parts managers cannot conveniently schedule routine reclamation, they are authorized to use the other types of reclamation to obtain parts needed immediately or in the near future. Navy parts managers, in contrast, are only authorized to use high-priority requisitions to obtain parts from the Aircraft Center. Such requisitions do not allow the Aircraft Center to schedule its work, and therefore are more costly.

The Navy has not used the variety of parts reclamation methods that the Air Force uses because the Navy looks to the Aircraft Center only as a last resort for parts. Navy officials indicated that the Navy uses the Center's parts only if the parts are not available elsewhere in the supply system (including the repair process) and if they cannot be procured

within the needed time. The Navy also does not consider using the Center to fill requests for foreign military sales, although the Air Force regularly does so. The Navy's position is that (1) foreign countries are not interested in used parts and (2) the parts requested generally are not worth recovering.

Navy improvement plans

The Navy has told us that it plans to upgrade its parts reclamation programs. The following changes have been made or are in process. Shipping and handling costs are being reduced by inspecting recovered parts at the Center, when possible, rather than sending them to repair facilities for inspection. More funds are being allocated, as noted on page 25, for routine reclamation to help reduce procurement costs. Steps are being taken to start a Group 1 removal program (see p. 25) so that high-cost parts can be removed from aircraft when they first arrive at the Center. Since the time of our review, the Navy has begun a Group 1 program, using 10 S3A aircraft for its pilot program. Based on the success of this test, a larger program to include A7 and possibly some F4 aircraft will begin in October 1978.

If the increased funding for routine parts reclamation materializes, the Navy could recover many more parts and could substantially reduce costs. For example, during fiscal years 1976 and 1977, 1/ the Navy had about 17 percent more aircraft in reclamation status than the Air Force; however, the Air Force put six times as many aircraft through routine parts reclamation. Navy officials stated that funding limitations were the primary reason that their parts recoveries were less than the Air Force's and that the processing of routinely reclaimed parts has a low priority for funds.

Although increased parts recoveries would increase recovery costs, the savings from avoiding or delaying new procurements would outweigh these costs. Based on Navy and Center accounting records, we estimate that the Navy could achieve a net savings of about 60 percent from most increases in parts recoveries, as follows:

1/Projected based on the 12-month period from July 1976 to June 1977.

Estimated Savings From Navy Salvage of Spare Parts

Type of spare parts	Spare parts value	Cost for recovery	Net savings
	(millions)		
Engines	$10.0	$3.3	$ 6.7
Reparables	9.0	3.3	5.7
Consumables	4.5	3.0	1.5
Total	$23.5	$9.6	$13.9
Percent	100	41	59

CONCLUSIONS

The Navy could take better advantage of the Aircraft Center's potential if the Navy planned its aircraft dispositions in advance. Storage and preservation costs could be reduced, and unneeded aircraft could be used more effectively. By planning aircraft disposition on the basis of estimated needs, the Navy can substantially reduce the number of aircraft held in reserve and for potential foreign military sales. The Navy can also derive the benefits of putting some aircraft directly into reclamation status when they arrive at the Center.

Advance planning, however, does not necessarily produce a cost-effective program for meeting valid requirements; an aggressive parts reclamation program is also essential. The Navy's plans to improve its reclamation program by making the Aircraft Center's parts more accessible are a step in the right direction. If carried out, these plans should allow the Navy to greatly increase its parts recoveries and thereby reduce costs.

The services also need to reevaluate their reclamation methods. From the methods available, described on pages 25 and 26, the services should ascertain what is a proper mix of recovery methods to meet their particular needs. This would not only help the services in their disposition planning, it would also help the Center in its workload planning.

AGENCY COMMENTS

Since our review, the Navy has significantly reduced its inventory of aircraft held at the Center as indicated on the following page:

	August 1977	May 1978	Difference
Aircraft reserved for:			
Potential future use	821	456	365
Security Assistance Program	494	338	156
Other	26	26	-
Total	1,341	820	521

Navy officials stated this came about because of reordered criteria, start of a program sending aircraft directly to reclamation on arrival, better input on foreign military sales requirement, and reassessment of reserve needs.

The biggest single change occurred in the second half of fiscal year 1978, when an improved funding program was instituted. Severe funding shortfalls in the first half of the fiscal year caused restrictions on aircraft inputs and withdrawals, curtailment of routine reclamation, maintenance on stored aircraft, preservations and represervations, priority removals, and other important functions.

Both Air Force and Navy officials noted that the Center's operations costs for withdrawal of aircraft have increased substantially over the past year. These increases have led both services to reevaluate their reserve needs and planned aircraft assignments to temporary storage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that:

--All services make their disposition decisions before the aircraft are sent to the Center.

--All services continue to reevaluate prior disposition decisions in light of current requirements for whole aircraft and parts.

--All services reevaluate the parts reclamation methods used to assure that the most effective mix of reclamation methods is being used.

(947282)

Single copies of GAO reports are available free of charge. Requests (except by Members of Congress) for additional quantities should be accompanied by payment of $1.00 per copy.

Requests for single copies (without charge) should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office
Distribution Section, Room 1518
441 G Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20548

Requests for multiple copies should be sent with checks or money orders to:

U.S. General Accounting Office
Distribution Section
P.O. Box 1020
Washington, DC 20013

Checks or money orders should be made payable to the U.S. General Accounting Office. NOTE: Stamps or Superintendent of Documents coupons will not be accepted.

PLEASE DO NOT SEND CASH

To expedite filling your order, use the report number and date in the lower right corner of the front cover.

GAO reports are now available on microfiche. If such copies will meet your needs, be sure to specify that you want microfiche copies.

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

U.S. MAIL

THIRD CLASS