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Parity Lost

A defense bill in the Senate just before the Fourth of July recess has brought to light a secret Air Force report that the United States has fallen behind the Soviet Union in strategic power, with no prospect of catching up.

The admission that parity with Moscow had been lost, perhaps irretrievably, during the first three years of the Carter administration was made in late February in closed-door testimony to Congress by Gen. Richard H. Ellis, commander of the Strategic Air Command: "An adverse imbalance has developed and will continue for several years to come," said Ellis in testimony labeled "secret."

This account of dramatic Soviet arms progress amid U.S. "cancellations and slippages" constitutes an indictment of Carter defense policy. "If we have learned any lesson," Ellis declared, "it should be that the Soviets have not reciprocated U.S. restraint in any portion of their military power—conventional or nuclear."

Ellis' shocker compares with the revelation in 1935 that Britain had lost air parity with Germany, but his words have had slight distribution outside defense circles. Although a few members of Congress occasionally mention loss of strategic parity, nobody of stature has hammered home the reality as Winston Churchill did from the back bench 45 years ago.

The general's testimony was cited on June 27 by Sen. Gordon Humphrey, a freshman Republican from New Hampshire, in a letter to colleagues pushing his proposal to deploy 1,000 stockpiled Minuteman III intercontinental missiles. Humphrey cited "press reports" that the SAC commander "testified recently that, since 1977, the United States has lost strategic 'essential equivalence' with the Soviet Union."

The only apparent press report was in the Feb. 22 edition of Defense/Space Business Daily, which reported Ellis' disclosure of the sophisticated Air Force computer study. We obtained a full copy of Ellis' testimony from defense sources.

Ellis cited "a clear and unambiguous" goal for U.S. defense policy set in 1978 by Defense Secretary Harold Brown: "The maintenance of an overall military balance with the Soviet Union no less favorable than the one that now exists." Brown said that "a rough strategic nuclear equilibrium exists between the two superpowers" and pledged to continue it.

The Air Force computer studies revealed by Ellis did show equivalence in 1977. "In the short two-and-one-half years since then, the balance of strategic nuclear power has shifted," the general declared. The Soviet Union has taken the lead thanks to "changes in the rate of Soviet modernization, compounded with cancellations and slippages of major U.S. programs."

"Just to make clear Congress got the message, the SAC commander concluded: "I hope the preceding statement has conveyed an urgent and convincing message—our current and near-term strategic forces, while capable and ready, are unable to achieve the relative balance possessed just two years ago."

The clarity of Ellis' warning contrasts

with the usual hedging from Secretary Brown and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gen. David Jones, the JCS chairman, in his recent reconfirmation hearings declared that the United States has "moved from strategic superiority to the verge of strategic inferiority." The computer studies, showing inferiority well beyond the "verge," condemn Jones as Pollyanna.

Ellis' testimony also strayed from the Carter party line on remedies. While asserting that the MX mobile missile system is "this nation's top military priority" for the long run, he pleaded for a penetrating bomber in the short run. The B1, scrapped by President Carter, was called by Ellis "the finest strategic penetrator in the world today."

Ellis and other senior officers at SAC are believed privately to favor deploying 1,000 Minuteman III missiles, which was adopted by the Senate before the recess over administration protests. While defense experts might disagree about its military effectiveness, this move is at least a positive message to the Kremlin.

Demonstrations of resolve are needed now, before the loss of strategic parity wrecks the Western alliance. Gen. Jones, who has so often ruled out a Soviet attack, admitted under prodding in his reconfirmation hearings that Moscow "will try to intimidate us or our allies" under the new balance of power.

The question is not only how to remedy this weakness but to find out how it happened. "I am astounded at the indifference with which the press and public seem to view the fact that the government have been utterly wrong about the German air strength," said Churchill in 1935, adding: "We can never catch up." Gordon Humphrey is no Churchill, but he posed the parallel June 27. "U.S. intelligence has grossly underestimated" the Soviet threat, he said, adding: "We may never be able to regain parity."

April 28, 1980

To: Hopkins/Bandow - RFE
from - J

THE DEFENSE DEBATE: PROSPECTS AND ALTERNATIVES

INTRODUCTION

The Carter Administration's FY 1981 defense budget and five-year defense program have undergone intense scrutiny during the first two months of the current congressional session. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown defended the Carter Administration's FY 1981 budget in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in late January, declaring that it was "well-thought out" and a determined response to expansionist Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

However, during recent weeks, statements made by senior military officials and others have contradicted many of the underlying premises of Brown's testimony, and also the official defense policy of the Administration as outlined in the FY 1981 DOD Annual Report and other publications. This discrepancy gives credence to the proposition that the FY 1981 defense budget and five-year defense program may not be adequate relative to basic U.S. strategic and military requirements posed by the growing Soviet military threat. However, they should serve as a catalyst from which Congress can consider defense program alternatives for FY 1981 other than those submitted for congressional consideration by the Administration.

The presentation of an alternative defense program for FY 1981 will serve a number of purposes. First, it will provide a focal point from which Administration defense planning can be debated; for the Administration's revised FY 1981 budget (which has been adjusted due to inflation) represents a retreat from the 5.4 percent real growth commitment made in January, although Administration spokesmen contend that the real growth for defense in FY 1981 will be "at least 3 percent." That 3 percent pledge is a dubious one at best, for it has been achieved by an \$82 million reduction in FY 1980 defense outlays, as an April 8 memorandum

for the Secretary of Defense by Pentagon Deputy Comptroller John R. Quetsch indicated. This change in commitment should caution the Congress as to the willingness of the Administration to adhere to the 4.6 percent real growth commitment made in the "out-years" of the five-year program. Secondly, it can help Congress decide where additional procurement should be directed, since it approaches the defense budget problem from primarily a requirements perspective. And thirdly, it will show how much additional military funding would be needed to move toward an optional defense posture: one geared toward correcting the deficiencies in military strength adverted to by high-ranking U.S. military leaders.

CONFLICTING SIGNALS

Perhaps the most significant statement made in opposition to the premises upon which the Administration based its strategic programs was that of Strategic Air Commander-in-Chief Richard B. Ellis in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on January 25. It contrasts sharply with the inherent strategic assumptions of the Administration as stated in the FY 1981 DOD Annual Report:

Strategic Equivalence

DOD ANNUAL REPORT

"At present there are excellent grounds for confidence in the U.S. strategic deterrent."

"It can also be said with some confidence that a state of mutual strategic deterrence is currently in effect. It follows that nuclear stability would probably prevail in a crisis as well."¹

GEN. RICHARD B. ELLIS

"At the present time, however,... I can only state that by today's measurements, an adverse strategic imbalance has developed, and will continue ~~and~~ for several years to come. This imbalance exists not only when our forces are in a day-to-day alert posture (the worst case) but also when fully generated (the best case)."²

So also, recent comments by senior U.S. naval commanders seem to indicate that the U.S. shipbuilding program is inadequate relative to U.S. naval requirements. A comparison of the following statements indicates that a large gap exists between U.S. declaratory objectives and actual capabilities for executing naval policy.

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1. FY 1981 DOD Annual Report, p. 85.
 2. "U.S. 1980s SAC Plans, B-1," Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, January 30, 1980.

Naval Balance

ADMINISTRATION

Brown "The Navy will continue to be the most powerful on the Seas."³

DOD "A strong and balanced Navy is essential to our national defense....The planned Navy program will enhance current readiness and fund a program of modernization that will ensure the effectiveness of our forces in the future."⁵

NAVAL OFFICIALS

"We are trying to meet three-ocean requirements with a one-and-a-half-ocean navy."⁴

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward
Chief of Naval Operations

"Vice Admiral M.S. Holcomb, Director of Navy Program Planning, testified before the Seapower Subcommittee that the United States would have to spend \$10 to \$15 billion more than the Carter Administration has recommended for the 5-year period fiscal years 1981-85 in order to achieve a 550-ship fleet."⁶

Representative Paul Trible

Another area in which a decidedly large gap exists between Administration rhetoric and actual U.S. capabilities is the rapid deployment area. Compare the statements by President Carter with the answers Secretary of Defense Brown gave to Congress in testifying on the adequacy of U.S. rapid deployment capabilities:

Rapid Deployment

PRESIDENT CARTER

"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America - and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."⁷

SECRETARY BROWN

On U.S. ability to quickly deploy a 4500-man brigade to non-NATO areas:

"...it would have to be light-armed. To move a mechanized or an armored brigade an equivalent distance would tie up most of our airlift capability for a considerable time."⁸

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3. "U.S.: Brown Sets Budget Context," Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, January 31, 1980.
 4. Richard Halloran, "Capability of Ships for Navy Debated," New York Times, February 10, 1980, p. 21.
 5. FY 1981 DOD Annual Report, p. 167.
 6. Congressional Record, March 3, 1980, pp. H1493-1494.
 7. State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980.
 8. John Fialka, "Brown Says U.S. May Face 'Turning Point' in History," Washington Star, January 29, 1980, p. A6.

Carter "The rapid deployment forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible....Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance."

"Our existing mobility forces cannot meet the deployment objectives we have set for FY 1982 for NATO or for some non-NATO contingencies."¹⁰ *DOD*

ANALYSIS

The sharp contrast between the declared defense objectives of the Administration and the actual military capabilities the U.S. possesses to achieve them poses two serious questions that Congress must address as it considers the FY 1981 defense budget. If, indeed, the current state of U.S. military readiness is insufficient, then it must be asked: 1) What defense planning decisions contributed to this condition; and, 2) What would Congress have to do, in terms of additional military weapons procurement, to begin to reverse the adverse military trends that currently exist?

The decade-long neglect of U.S. military force modernization is attributable to a number of factors: the war in Southeast Asia, escalating personnel costs and rampant inflation. However, over the past three years in particular, the problem of modernizing U.S. military forces to meet increased requirements has been exacerbated due to unwise program stretchouts (Trident, MX, cruise missile programs) and unilateral weapons cancellations (B-1, CVN veto) by the Administration. These decisions have directly contributed to both additional cost growth in weapons procurement and an overall decline in U.S. military readiness.¹¹

Rumsfeld Last October, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld estimated that the three-year shortfall in defense budget authority that has collected from the projected budgets of the Ford Administration is \$38.6 billion - well over \$10 billion per year.¹²

Ford Former President Ford stated in a major defense policy address in January that the Carter Administration reduced the 1979-1983 proposed defense budgets of the Ford Administration by 26.9 percent in strategic programs; 7.3 percent in general purpose forces; 12.6 percent in research and development and 41 percent for Navy programs.¹³ These cutbacks have contributed to the decline in overall U.S. military readiness, and have reduced the ability of the U.S. to contest the Soviet drive toward across-the-board military superiority. This year, as the defense budget is being debated in Congress, it is just becoming apparent how

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9. White House Message to the Congress of the United States, January 21, 1980.
 10. FY 1981 DOD Annual Report, p. 208.
 11. See Lawrence J. Korb, "The FY 1980-1984 Defense Program: Issues and Trends," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. I, No. 4 (1979), pp. 11-14.
 12. Congressional Record, October 11, 1979, p. S14407.
 13. Congressional Record, January 28, 1980, p. E143.

difficult it will be for the U.S. to begin to make up for these shortfalls and procure additional weapons systems, given the competition of the non-defense sectors of the budget.

The "real growth" in the original FY 1981 budget amounts to \$8 billion (in constant FY 1981 dollars). The addition of another \$3.0 billion for higher fuel costs (the Administration has had to raise the cost estimate for military fuel from \$24 to \$42 per barrel) and \$5.2 billion overall does not do anything to make up for these shortfalls - it merely reflects an underestimation of the impact of inflation which is evident throughout the entire FY 1981 defense budget. The remaining "real growth" clearly does not even begin to make up for the shortfalls in defense budget authority that have accrued over the past three years.

Moreover, current studies by defense analyst Lawrence J. Korb (presented to an American Enterprise Institute press briefing on February 4) indicate that the current FY 1981-85 defense program is underpriced by at least \$75 billion. Therefore, the Carter Administration's FY 1981 defense budget and five-year defense program will not only fail to make up for previous budget shortfalls, but it will also compound the shortfall problem over the next five-years - a period of acknowledged U.S. strategic vulnerability.

Critics have been urging since last fall that significant additions be made to the defense program of the Carter Administration to redress the growing imbalance in U.S.-Soviet military capabilities. In September 1979, during the floor debate on the Second Concurrent Budget Resolution, Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) noted that even if the Senate accepted the Hollings Resolution, calling for five percent real growth in FY 1981 and FY 1982, "five percent only gives us half (\$40 billion) of what the Pentagon has asked for" in the out-years of the five-year plan - some \$80 billion.¹⁴ Hollings and his Democratic colleagues, Senators Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn, thereupon presented a list of suggested additions to the Carter Administration's defense program, primarily in the readiness and general purpose force category, that totaled well over \$20 billion.¹⁵

And Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld also alluded to the need to substantially increase U.S. defense expenditure in October, when, in testifying on SALT II before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he stated that if Congress decided to make up for the \$38.6 billion shortfall of the past three years, it would have had either to:

- 1) increase real growth in the FY 1980 defense budget by \$40 billion; or
- 2) "do so over two fiscal years (1980 and 1981) at 'roughly' \$20 billion per year."¹⁶

15. Ibid., p. S12833-12834.

16. Congressional Record, October 11, 1979, p. S14407.

Most recently, John Lehman, Chairman of the defense panel of the Republican National Committee, urged a real growth of 20 percent in defense spending for FY 1981, as a first step¹⁷ toward correcting the shortfall problem of the previous decade. Lehman testified before the Senate Budget Committee that an add-on of \$30 billion is needed in FY 1981 "if we are to move to close defense gaps." Therefore, significant bi-partisan agreement exists on the need to redress the deterioration of the Soviet-U.S. military balance through increased defense expenditure. X

However, due to the current economic crisis and the need to restrain the growth in federal spending and balance the budget, it is unlikely that major increases in defense will be made this year. Defense has already become a prime presidential target for budgetary restraint.

President Carter stated in his March 14 message to the Congress that "...the Defense Department will not be immune from budget austerity. In particular, I will require that department to make¹⁸ savings that do not affect adversely our military preparedness." Carter

All the President has promised is that he will not cut U.S. defense spending programs any further: he has not committed himself to redressing the impending U.S.-Soviet military imbalance through additional military procurement. Moreover, the recent actions taken by the congressional budget committees, unless corrected, make it unlikely that any attempt will be made up for this year to begin to compensate for the shortfalls that collected in previous years.

Budget Committee Action

The House Budget Committee has marked up the FY 1981 First Concurrent Budget Resolution, which is some \$1 billion lower in budget authority than the Administration's revised \$161.8 billion budget request. According to budgetary procedure, the House Armed Services Committee submitted a recommendation to the House Budget Committee that defense budget authority for FY 1981 be raised by \$13.5 billion.¹⁹ The Armed Services Committee's recommendations were presented based upon what it considered would be minimally acceptable to meet U.S. national security requirements. However, the House Budget Committee rejected efforts to increase the budget authority for FY 1981 to that level (see Table One), and also defeated two other relatively modest amendments to increase FY 1981 defense budget authority. Indeed, Budget Committee Chairman Giaimo's proposed defense mark-up was passed intact,

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17. William Kucewicz, "How 'Real' Is the Defense Increase?," Wall Street Journal, January 29, 1980.
 18. "Text of President Carter's Statement on the Nation's Economy," New York Times, March 15, 1980, p.34.
 19. Charles Cordrey, "\$13.5 Billion Boost Urged in Defense Budget," Baltimore Sun, March 8, 1980, p. 6.

as efforts by liberal Democrats to decrease the mark-up stage were also defeated.

TABLE I

House Budget Committee Votes - March 20
Amendments to Raise/Lower Defense Ceiling
(in billions FY 1981 \$)

Author	Increase, Budget Authority	Increase, Outlays	Vote
Holt	13.000	4.500	defeated, voice
Simon	-.465	-.325	defeated, 10-15
Rudd	1.500	.500	defeated, voice
Obey	-.300	-.150	defeated, 8-17
Obey	-.300	-.050	defeated, 8-17
Obey	-.220	-.150	defeated, voice
Obey	-.075	-.075	defeated, 7-16
Holtzman	-.150	-.150	defeated, voice
Holt	7.650	7.050	defeated, 8-17

Note: (-) before number means reduction was proposed.

On April 1, the Senate Budget Committee marked-up the defense function of the FY 1981 First Concurrent Budget Resolution. By a 10-8 vote, the committee surprisingly passed the ceiling proposed by Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), which called for a \$174.0 billion ceiling for defense budget authority and a \$156.3 billion ceiling in defense outlays. Earlier the committee defeated a ceiling proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) that would have accepted the defense budget ceilings recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee (\$176.5 billion in budget authority and \$157.0 billion in outlays). It also resoundingly rejected the ceiling proposed by Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) which would accept the revised defense budget ceiling proposed by the Administration of \$164.2 billion in budget authority and \$151.1 billion in outlays.

Senate Budget Committee Votes-April 1
Defense Marks for FY 1981
(in order of vote)

Author	Billions of \$		Vote
	Budget Authority	Outlays	
Hatch	\$176.5	\$157.0	defeated, 6-12
Chiles/Johnston	\$169.0	\$154.0	defeated, 4-14
Riegle	\$163.1	\$150.2	defeated, 2-16
Biden	\$164.2	\$151.1	defeated, 3-15
Hollings	\$174.0	\$156.3	approved, 10-8

Carter's revision.

Comparative Marks

<u>Body</u>	<u>Budget Authority</u>	<u>Outlays</u>
House	\$160.8	\$147.9
Senate	\$173.4*	\$155.7*
Difference	\$ 12.6	\$ 7.6

*less \$600 million in committee reductions made by decreasing operating and administrative expenses in the Department of Defense.

Analysis

The implications of the budget committees' actions are twofold. First, both committees did not accept the defense budget ceilings recommended by the Armed Services Committees (although the Hollings numbers come close) as necessary to meet U.S. national security requirements. In particular, the House mark is some \$13.5 billion short of what the House Armed Services Committee recommended. Secondly, the wide discrepancy between the House and Senate Budget Committee ceilings for defense creates the distinct possibility that, unless the House defense budget ceiling is significantly increased during floor debate on the First Concurrent Budget Resolution, the House-Senate conference report that must be adopted by May 15 will have defense budget ceilings substantially lower than the Hollings ceilings approved by the Senate Budget Committee. In point of fact, the House-Senate conference report may more closely resemble the defense budget ceiling proposed by the Administration (and offered by Senator Biden) if this does occur -- one that the Senate Budget Committee defeated by a 15-3 vote, and is deemed inadequate by both Armed Services committees in this Congress.

If such a scenario, or a similar one does come into being, it could set the stage for another Senate floor fight over the binding defense ceilings in the Second Concurrent Budget Resolution - similar to what happened last fall, when Senator Hollings proposed an amendment to raise the defense budget ceiling to provide for 3 percent real growth in FY 1980 and 5 percent real growth in FY 1981 and 1982. With the inevitable political infighting and horse-trading that certainly would accompany such a debate, Congress may lose sight of the important issue before it - how to gauge what is needed to correct deficiencies in the U.S. military posture and reverse the adverse military trends that have accrued in recent years, and may instead focus primarily on the numbers themselves, without relating them to our overall defense posture. For these reasons, it is appropriate that an outside assessment of how much additional defense spending is required to achieve these objectives be presented to Congress. While such an assessment may be neither politically feasible or acceptable at this time, it nonetheless will serve to educate Congress and the public as to the extent to which the U.S. military posture has eroded.

AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE PROGRAM

In the past two years, and more particularly in the past two months, numerous groups and individuals have focused attention on precisely what kind of alternative defense program is necessary to cope adequately with the growing military imbalance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.¹⁹ They have covered a variety of military areas: strategic programs, naval programs and personnel problems. This alternative defense program is presented in an effort to bring together many of the specific programs that have been recommended over this period into a single concise format.

The alternative programs recommended here for FY 1981 are suggested based upon an assumption that if Congress is serious about redressing the military imbalance, this is what it would have to consider in terms of additional defense programs to reverse current adverse military trends. Therefore, this program reflects an optimal defense posture - one geared toward reversing adverse military trends caused by the chronic neglect of U.S. military force modernization.

However, many in Congress will undoubtedly point to the need to maintain current levels of social spending as justification for refusing to adopt an optimal defense posture at this time. Politically, this appears to be the most likely outcome of the defense budget debate this year. For although alternative defense programs calling for major increases in defense investment have surfaced this session of Congress, it is unlikely - given presidential opposition - that increases of much more than those recommended by the Armed Services committees could be obtained this year, barring unforeseen international circumstances.

However, Congress should be alerted as to the potential consequences that such actions will have on the U.S. military posture. For while Congress can choose to delay the hard decisions that will have to be made concerning the need to make up for past budget shortfalls, it cannot delay that decision indefinitely. The uneasy choice of substantially increasing U.S. defense investment (as opposed to the marginal increases that may be granted in FY 1981) - and all that that implies for the structure of the non-defense portion of the federal budget, and perhaps even the condition of the economy, in years to come - must be consciously weighed against the very real possibility that without the

19. See "Defense Program Alternatives: FY 1981 and Beyond," National Security Record, March 1980, pp. 1-3; Senator Gordon Humphrey, "Minimum Acceptable American Defense Program," Congressional Record, January 23, 1980, p. S290; Hollings statement of September 18, 1979 in Congressional Record, September 19, 1979, pp. S12833-S12834; William R. Van Cleave and W. Scott Thompson, (eds.) Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can Be Done? (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1979). This paper incorporates many of the recommendations outlined in these proposals.

adoption of many of the strategic and conventional military modernization programs to be recommended here, the U.S. may slide into a position of irrevocable military inferiority relative to the Soviet Union by the latter half of the 1980s. This decision will continue to face the United States in the early 1980s: it cannot be avoided, but only postponed.

The imperative need to restrain federal spending and balance the budget must be addressed in its proper context - one in which U.S. defense investment has been cut back from 8.5 percent of the GNP in 1970 to a little over 5.0 percent in 1980 - and the decreasing share that defense has on total federal expenditure. Congress is faced with a crucial decision this year. The defense program alternatives presented here are meant to alert Congress to the military problems facing the nation, and provide an added perspective from which to analyze the FY 1981 budget, and make these decisions.

PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic

President Carter's strategic program planning has greatly contributed to the impending strategic "window of vulnerability" that the U.S. will experience in the early-to-mid 1980s. As the following table indicates, the Carter Administration's program planning in the strategic and theater nuclear area has both delayed the time at which essential strategic programs were due to come on-line, and also abandoned programs deemed necessary to maintain essential strategic equivalence.

TABLE II

Comparison Ford v. Carter Administration
Strategic Program Planning
Dates of Initial Operating Capability (IOC)

Program	Ford	Carter
MX	late FY 1983	July 1986
B-1	FY 1979	Cancelled
Trident Submarine	September 1979	August 1981
ALCM	1981	December 1982
GLCM	FY 1980	December 1983
SLCM	FY 1980	1982

Sources: DOD Annual Report, FY 1978, pp. 131, 134-136; Congressional Record, October 11, 1979, p. S14406; DOD Annual Report, FY 1981, pp. 130-131, 133, 147.

The continuing modernization of Soviet strategic forces, and their threat to U.S. strategic retaliatory capabilities is well known. Therefore, only new strategic programs initiated now could possibly close the strategic window of vulnerability. The programs recommended here are formulated to contribute to that end. They would include:

1. Program - Redeployment of up to 200 Minuteman III missiles in a multiple vertical protective structure (MVPS) mode.

Objective - Reduce U.S. ICBM vulnerability before the MX becomes operational.

Cost - \$1.5 billion for FY 1981.

2. Program - Acceleration of the initial operating capability of the MX missile from 1986 to 1985; 1984 if feasible. Redeploy at existing Minuteman fields in the 200 MVPS silos constructed earlier.

Objective - Reduce U.S. strategic "window of vulnerability."

Cost - \$200 million for FY 1981.

3. Program - Production of a penetrating bomber; either FB 111 "stretch" or preferably modified subsonic B-1 for use in a variety of roles (bomber, ALCM-carrier, etc.).

Objective - General Richard Ellis has stated that such a follow-on strategic penetrator to the B-52 would "help to correct the serious decline in U.S. retaliatory capability between now and 1985."

Cost - \$1.0 billion.

4. Program - Inland rebasing of U.S. bombers.

Objective - Improve U.S. bomber survivability from Soviet depressed trajectory SLBM attack.

Cost - \$200 million.

5. Program - Increase alert rates of bomber crews.

Objective - Improve U.S. bomber survivability.

Cost - \$600 million.

6. Program - Conversion of five Polaris SSBNs to sea-launched cruise missiles with missiles.

Objective - Extend lifetime of Polaris force (scheduled for phase-out after FY 1981); provide for increased theater nuclear capability.

Cost - \$300 million.

7. Program - Acceleration of initial operating capability of entire SLCM force by two to three months.

Objective - Early deployment of Polaris and U.S. surface ships as a response against Soviet theater nuclear threat in Europe.

Cost - \$200 million.

8. Program - Ballistic Missile Defense Program, including additional funding for hard-site (LOADS) low altitude air defense and homing-overlay interception.

Objective - Obtain an ABM breakout capability.

Cost - \$1.0 billion.

9. Program - High Energy Laser Programs

Objective - Provide production infrastructure for the high energy laser program for ballistic missile defense.

Cost - \$200 million

10. Program - Space Defense Programs

Objective - Eventual testing and development of an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability.

Cost - \$500 million.

11. Program - Civil Defense Program

Objective - Pass Skelton Civil Defense Bill providing for enhanced civil defense program for FY 1981-1985.

Cost - \$180 million in FY 1981.

12. Program - Trident Programs - Procure another Trident SSBN and another 24 Trident I missiles, and increase Trident II missile R and D; and maintain through FY 1982.

Objective - Prevent drawdown in U.S. SLBM force levels as Polaris force is being phased out as SSBNs.

Cost - Trident SSBN - \$1.25 billion; 24 Trident I missiles - \$300 million; increase in Trident II missile R & D by \$250 million. Total: \$1.8 billion.

13. Program - Command, Communications and Control Modernization Improvements

Objective - Improve U.S. early warning systems; procure additional TACAMO aircraft for SSBN communications; go to

full-scale development of extremely low frequency ELF/Seafarer system to prevent SSBN force from having to rise close to water surface to communicate. Increase present C³ budget to \$1.5 billion; incorporate Hollings program presented during FY 1980 Second Concurrent Budget Resolution floor debate.

Cost - \$1.0 billion.

Specific Funding - ECX TACAMO aircraft R&D - \$50-\$100 million; ELF/Seafarer -\$40 million in FY 1981; \$400 million through FY 1986.

TABLE III

II New Strategic Programs	Estimated Cost In billions
Minuteman III/MVPS	1.5
MX-IOC Acceleration	.2
Penetrating Bomber	1.0
Bomber Rebasing	.2
Bomber Alert Rates	.6
SLCM Conversion-5 Polaris	.3
SLCM IOC Acceleration	.2
BMD Programs	1.0
Space Defense	.5
Civil Defense	.2
HEL-LASER ABM System	.2
Trident Programs	1.8
C ³ -warning/TACAMO/ELF-Seafarer	1.0
<u>Estimated Additional Cost</u>	<u>8.7</u>

GENERAL PURPOSE/THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

Table IV contrasts the procurement program of the Carter Administration for selected, major general purpose and theater nuclear forces with that of the optimal alternative defense budget. (See p. 17) The approximate cost differential is \$14 billion. The five areas to be discussed here include naval forces, naval aircraft, air force aircraft, airlift and NATO conventional and theater nuclear forces.

NAVY - The U.S. should base future naval planning upon the objective of eventually obtaining a 600-700 ship navy. In FY 1981, the U.S. should procure:

1. One Nimitz class (CVN) nuclear aircraft carrier.

Objective - Provide for Indian Ocean deployment: U.S. currently has only 12 active carriers; large-deck carrier

also needed for increased power projection capability in high-intensity areas.

Cost - \$2.1 billion.

2. CVN Task Force

Objective - Provide close-in defense of CVN carriers.

<u>Cost</u> - 2 CG-47 cruisers	\$1.6 billion
2 DDG-963 destroyers	.7 billion
2 FFG- Frigates	.5 billion
Total	<u>\$2.8 billion</u>

3. 3 more SSN-688 Attack Submarines

Objective - 3 to 5 needed yearly to protect sea lanes and sea-based nuclear deterrent; only one in budget.

Cost - \$1.5 billion.

4. 2 more LSD-41 Landing Craft (from 1 to 3).

Objective - Increase amphibious landing capabilities; U.S. capability to successfully launch an amphibious assault has been badly eroded.

Cost - \$680 million.

AIRCRAFT - The naval and air force fighter aircraft procurement programs need to be increased. The slowdown in fighter procurement will delay the modernization of U.S. fighter aircraft, and also increase costs. The Navy Department needs 160-200 new fighter/attack aircraft just to make up for peacetime attrition - only 72 are requested in the FY 1981 budget.

NAVAL AIRCRAFT

1. F-14 - Increase procurement from 24 to 48.

Objective - Administration slowed rate from 3 to 2 per month in FY 1980; cost savings with higher production rate are approximately \$1.5 million per aircraft.

Cost - \$700 million.

2. F-18 - Increase procurement from 48 to 72.

Objective - Restore to original level; reduction adds \$4.5 million in aircraft cost.

Cost - \$850 million.

3. AV-8B - Begin R and D funding and advanced procurement.

Objective - USMC needs high-performance fighters. Begin major AV-8B procurement program in FY 1982. GAO says AV-8B cost growth is "attributable to inflation resulting delays in the AV-8B program."

Cost - \$333 million; \$243 million in R and D, \$90 million in advanced procurement.

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT

1. F-15 - Increase procurement from 30 to 60.

Objective - Faster replacement of 1950s vintage F-101s and F-106s. Keep production line open beyond 1982; add to Reserve units. Administration cut quantity originally projected to be procured.

Cost - \$870 million.

2. F-16s - Increase procurement from 180 to 240.

Objective - Faster replacement of F-101s and F-106s.

Cost - \$640 million.

3. A-10 - Increase procurement from 60 to 144.

Objective - Maintain procurement level of past two fiscal years.

Cost - \$700 million.

4. E-3A (AWACs) - Increase procurement from 2 to 5.

Objective - Five needed to improve U.S. warning and control capabilities.

Cost - \$400 million.

AIRLIFT

Programs - Uplift existing military transport aircraft and tankers.

Objective - Rapidly improve U.S. strategic cargo airlift capability for both NATO and non-NATO areas over the next few years; eliminate the proposed five-year, \$6 billion CX program from the FY 1981-85 plan.

Cost - 1) Procure 8 C-130 transports (none in FY 1981 budget) -\$80 million.

- 2) Procure another 7 CRAF (Civilian Reserve Air Fleet) transports - \$80 million.
- 3) Re-engine current C5-As - suggested initial cost -\$200 million; accelerate throughout five-year plan.
- 4) Increase KC-10 tankers procurement from 6 to 20 - \$800 million.
- 5) Increase procurement re-engined KC-135 tankers from 1 to 3 - \$90 million.

Reduction - 1) Eliminate \$80 million in R and D for the CX transport; CX will not be operational until 1985 - the U.S. military mobility problem is near-term. House Armed Services Committee has voted 22-17 not to fund CX.

Added Cost	\$1.150 billion
Less \$80 million CX R&D -	80 million

NATO: CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The military balance in central Europe has deteriorated so rapidly that many military experts believe that the Warsaw Pact could overrun NATO defenses within a few days. Across-the-board increases in procurement of additional tracked combat vehicles, anti-tank weapons, air defense missiles and theater nuclear forces are needed to restore some semblance of a military balance in central Europe.

Tracked Combat Vehicles

1. Program - Add 800-1,000 additional tracked combat vehicles to U.S. inventory.

Objective - Increase U.S. firepower and cross-country mobility in central Europe; U.S. currently outgunned by 4-5:1 in tanks and over 2:1 in armored fighting vehicles by U.S.S.R.

Estimated Cost - \$1.0 billion.

Major Systems

1. XM-1 tank: increase from 569 to 900; cost: \$550 million.
2. FVS fighting vehicle system: increase from 400 to 600; cost: \$262 million.

Other Systems

3. M548 ammo/logistics carrier: increase from 272 to 408; cost: \$18 million.
4. M113A2 armored personnel carrier: increase from 42 to 84; cost: \$4.7 million.

5. M109 A2/A3 howitzer: increase from 36 to 108; cost: \$40 million. (136 were procured in FY 79; 96 in FY 1980.)
6. M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle: increase from 0 to FY 1980 level of 56; cost: \$60 million.
7. M88A1 Medium Recovery Vehicle (only vehicle capable of limited, on-site battlefield repair): increase from 175 to 260; cost: \$65 million.

Anti-Tank Missiles

Program - TOW (BGM-71A, BTM-71A) anti-tank missile. Increase from 12,000 to 24,000.

Objective - Procurement amount for TOW severely underfunded compared to Soviet T-72 threat. It should be doubled.

Cost - \$100 million.

Air Defense Missiles

Programs - 1) Patriot - Increase from 183 to 240.
2) Roland - Increase from 600 to 800.

Objective - One of NATO's most acknowledged weaknesses is rear area missile defense. Need to increase procurement of both Patriot and Roland to obtain a credible, high-low altitude, all-weather air defense for NATO.

Cost - Patriot: \$180 million; Roland: \$140 million; Total - \$300-320 million.

Theater Nuclear Forces

Programs - 1) Ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM); Accelerate procurement from 11 to 60.

Objective - Improve U.S. SALT negotiating position; hedge against failure of SALT for early deployment in Western Europe.

Cost - \$800 million.

2) Pershing II - Research and Development; Increase R&D funding from \$146 to \$300 million.

Objective - Accelerate program for possible early deployment of Pershing II IRBM in Western Europe as part of U.S. theater nuclear force modernization program.

Cost - \$154 million.

TABLE IV
 MAJOR PROGRAMS
 ESTIMATED ITEMIZED COST COMPARISON
 CARTER, v. ALTERNATIVE FISCAL 1981 BUDGET
 (In billions of FY 1981 \$)

II GPF (General Purpose Forces) and TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) Line Item	Carter FY 1981		Alternative FY 1981 Estimated	
	Quantity	Cost*	Quantity	Cost
NAVY				
Nimitz Class CVN	-----	-----	1	2.100
CG-47 Aegis	2	1.630	4	3.200
DDG-963 Destroyer	-----	-----	2	.700
FFG Frigates	4	1.100	6	1,600
LSD-41	1	.342	3	1.020
SSN-688	1	.602	4	2.100
NAVAL AIRCRAFT				
F-14	24	.804	48	1.500
F-18	48	1.752	72	2.600
AV-8B (Marines) RDT&E, advanced procurement	-----	-----	-----	.333
AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT				
F-15	30	.870	60	1.740
F-16	180	1.920	240	2.560
E-3A	2	.326	5	.726
A-10	60	.507	144	1.200
AIRLIFT				
CRAF Conversions	7	.078	14	.160
KC-10	6	.310	20	1.100
CX R&D	-----	.080	-----	-----
re-engined KC-135	1	.060	3	.150
re-engine C5-A	-----	-----	-----	.100
C-130	-----	-----	8	.080
NATO				
XM-1 Tank	569	1.150	900	1.700
FVS armored vehicle	400	.538	600	.800
M 548 ammo carrier	272	.036	408	.054
M 113A2 armored personnel carrier	42	.005	84	.010
M 109 A2/A3 howitzer	36	.020	108	.060
M 728 Combat Engineer Vehicle	-----	-----	56	.060
M 88A1 Medium Recovery Vehicle	175	.130	260	.200
TOW anti-tank missile	12,000	.100	24,000	.200
Roland Air. Def.	600	.424	800	.560
Patriot Air Def. Msl	183	.541	240	.720

GLCM procurement	11	.188	60	1.000
Pershing II R&D	-----	.146	-----	.300
Total		14.659		28.633

Estimated Cost Differential: \$14-15 billion.

*includes procurement, spares, RDT&E and costs of military construction.

Other Categories

Table V charts the projected additional costs of the procurement add-ons recommended here plus additions in five other areas:

1. Pay and Personnel Costs: If Congress is likely to restrain budget growth in any one area of the defense budget, it is likely to be personnel compensation. However, as former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird noted, the present compensation for the All-Volunteer Force is nothing less than "deplorable." Laird has recommended ten military pay initiatives designed to provide U.S. military personnel "with a quality of life commensurate with the sacrifices we demand of them."²⁰ Unless Congress is serious about reconsidering the all-volunteer concept at this time, the Laird recommendations should be given keen consideration. It should also seriously consider reforms of the all-voluntary army, including longer terms of enlistment and multi-year training, to prevent many of the current AVF compensation and retention problems from occurring again. Ideally, most of the Laird recommendations should be one-time investments. The following four Laird recommendations are suggested here:

	Cost
A) Restoration of Compensation Comparability. Objective: Restore military pay to real income 1972 levels. Military pay has declined in real terms by 14 percent since 1972.	\$ 5 billion
B) Indexing military pay to CPI. Objective: Protect purchasing power of active duty personnel. (Laird gives \$750 million as 100 percent figure - some might prefer adjustment to 85 percent of CPI.)	\$500- \$750 million
C) Special Skill Pay. Objective: Retain enlisted and officers	\$ 2 billion

20. Melvin Laird, "People, Not Hardware: The Highest Defense Priority," American Enterprise Institute Special Analysis, No. 80-1, 1980, pp. 16-19.

ratings where "severe shortfalls" are experienced.

D) Variable Housing Allowance; Moving Expense \$ 2 billion Increase.

Objective: Key housing allowances to local area prices; reimburse military families for full cost of moving expenses.

Approximate Total \$9.75 billion

2. Ammunition Increase

Objective: Provide additional war stock to improve U.S. ability to fight 1½ war strategy.

Cost: \$5.0 billion.

3. Family Housing: Increase for repair and construction costs.

Objective: No new funds for housing construction were appropriated in FY 1980; earmark majority of increase for new housing construction.

Cost - \$300 million.

4. Other Military Construction

Objective: Reduce DOD backlog in property construction and repair work of some \$2 billion. Failure to increase above current level will cause continued deterioration of work not repaired. Increase could be held down by repealing prevailing wage requirements of Davis-Bacon Act for military construction and repair work. Actual decrease military construction from FY 1979 to 1980 of over \$200 million.

Cost - \$500 million.

5. Operations and Maintenance

Objective: Administration has already raised FY 1981 O&M account by \$3.0 billion, due to higher fuel costs. Another \$2.0-3.0 billion should be added for additional costs of material maintenance and spare parts.

Cost - \$2.0 - \$3.0 billion.

TABLE V
PROJECTED ADDITIONAL COST
DEFENSE FUNDING FOR FY1981
(in billions FY1981 \$)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Strategic Programs	8.75
General Purpose	14.00-15.00

Pay and Personnel	9.75
Ammunition, Spare Parts	5.00
Housing	.30
Other Military Construction	.50
Operations and Maintenance	2.00-3.00
Estimated Range of Add-ons	40.00-42.00

SUMMARY

Redressing the U.S.-Soviet military imbalance, alleviating the military compensation problem, replenishing U.S. war stocks and providing for increases in U.S. operational readiness will be an expensive undertaking. If Congress is serious about turning this untenable military situation around, it must take cognizance of the fact that unless a major modernization of U.S. military forces is made now, only two grim prospects exist: the time will come when national security will require that many of the additions recommended here will have to be made, at which time the cost of such military force modernization will be even higher; or the U.S. is prepared to accept this situation as is, and thereby risk the possibility of being the military inferior across-the-board of the Soviet Union for the remainder of the 1980s and suffer the adverse political and military consequences that inevitably will emerge from such a position.

Near-term political realities, based as they often are on what is feasible from a narrow domestic political perspective, should not obscure from congressional view the potential implications that failing to reverse current adverse military trends will have on the long-term U.S. posture in the world. Clearly, it does not now appear that this Congress or Administration will allow for the necessary defense investment required to accomplish this overhaul this year. That is not the sole important question, however. What is also important is that the effort be made to begin the process - and an analysis of the Administration's program and the probable outcome of the defense budget debate in Congress this year indicates that the prospects for initiating such action does not appear to be promising.

If Congress refuses to devote additional budgetary resources to defense this year - and also fails to make up for the large spending shortfalls that have accrued over the past in future years - it must accept the implications that such a decision will entail for the U.S. for the rest of the decade.

The responsibility for the current military procurement problem is shared by Democrats and Republicans alike. It can begin to be solved by them too, if a decision is made to base the U.S. defense program upon military requirements, rather than arbitrary budget ceilings. These are unusual times; this program is a response to these times. In ten short years, the U.S. strategic retaliatory force has become highly vulnerable, the U.S. Navy has been cut in half, the conventional balance has

significantly deteriorated in central Europe, and mobility forces that are severely constrained in their capabilities. The U.S. should heed the warnings of senior military officials referred to earlier in this exercise. For these reasons, the Congress should closely consider this, and all alternative defense programs, that it has before it this fiscal year.

Wayne A. Schroeder
Editor, National Security Record

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
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\$40 BILLION MORE NEEDED FOR FY 1981 DEFENSE BUDGET, EXPERT WARNS

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 2, 1980 -- A Heritage Foundation military analyst warns the U.S. risks "being militarily inferior, across the board, to the Soviet Union for the remainder of the 1980s" unless the Administration's FY 1981 defense budget is increased by about \$40 billion.

"If Congress refuses to devote additional budgetary resources to defense, and fails to make up for the large ... spending shortfalls that have accrued over the past three years, it must accept the implications that such a decision will entail for the U.S. in the years to come," says Wayne Schroeder, editor of Heritage's monthly defense and foreign policy newsletter National Security Record.

Although the Carter Administration maintains its new defense budget was "well thought out" and a determined response to Soviet aggression in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Schroeder argues that many senior military officials and other experts contradict the Administration's assumption and fear the proposed budget increases are not enough.

Much of President Carter's proposed defense increase is an attempt to keep up with inflation, rather than an effort to make up for the decade-long neglect of U.S. military capabilities, Schroeder says. The remaining "real growth" of the President's budget "does not even begin to make up for the shortfalls in defense budget authority that have accrued over the past three years."

(more)

Vote on the FY 1981 First Concurrent Budget Resolution is to come up in both the House and the Senate within the next two weeks. Defense is commonly acknowledged to be the biggest issue. One problem is that the House Budget Committee's mark-ups are substantially below that of the House Armed Services Committee recommendations.

Unless a major modernization of U.S. military forces takes place, Schroeder says, national security interests will dictate these additions be made in the future and at a much higher cost.

The Heritage Foundation is a Washington-based public policy think tank.

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ANALYSIS:

Jimmy Carter's record on defense and national security policies has been one of shameful neglect and blatant deception. He came to office calling the Pentagon one of the most wasteful bureaucracies in Washington and claiming that he could "reduce present defense expenditures by about \$5 to \$7 billion annually" without ~~damaging our national~~ undermining our national security.

(Address to the Democratic Platform Committee June 6, 1976)

Over the last three years the Administration's rhetoric has changed but his policies have not. They continue to be based on dangerous misperceptions about Soviet intentions and the motivations behind their unprecedented military buildup over the past decade. In reality, Jimmy Carter and his various spokesmen have glossed over the facts, passed the blame to previous Republican Administrations, misled the public, and committed out-and-out perjury. The truth is: 1) Little real growth in defense spending has occurred under the Carter Administration; 2) Carter Administration policies have seriously damaged previous initiatives set forth by former Republican Administrations; and 3) overall U.S. defense capabilities have been seriously weakened under Jimmy Carter, placing us in a dangerously vulnerable position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union during the early and mid-1980s.

NO REAL INCREASES IN DEFENSE SPENDING

~~Jimmy-Carter-~~

Shortly after taking office, Jimmy Carter proposed a 3 percent real annual increase in defense spending through 1984. When our NATO allies agreed in principle to cooperate in this effort Sec. Defense Sec. Brown said he hoped that "the decisions would convey to the Warsaw Pact countries... (that) the competition is not going to be one-sided." (Los Angeles Times May 19, 1977)

Mr. Carter has ~~consistently~~ consistently claimed to have ~~li-~~ lived up to his pledge. In fact these claims are based on a combination of wishful thinking

and questionable manipulation of figures. Inflation estimates have been ridiculously low. In Fiscal Year 1979 the actual growth rate, according to the House Armed Services Committee was only 0.7 percent. In FY 1980 real growth claims were based on a 6.4 percent inflation rate, despite a real inflation rate of _____. There was in fact no real growth for that budget year. (_____ Now, the Pentagon plans to cut \$82 million from its outlays for FY 1980 in order to show a 3 percent growth rate from 1980 to 1981. ~~In fact, it might cut an additional~~ According to ~~an internal~~ a memo circulated in the Defense Department, it might cut an additional \$83 million in order to reach a 3.1 percent growth rate. (Richard Burt New York Times _____).

But mere numbers manipulation is perhaps less disturbing than the outright deception of the American public. Mr. Carter's "tough" defense stand began when his SALT II treaty was jeopardized and hardened further when his pollsters became convinced that the American public's mood toward defense spending had changed.

~~FILE~~ POLLS

When the Senate voted last September to support the need for a five percent real growth in defense spending, Mr. Carter informed Senator Ernest Hollings in a letter ~~tha-t-~~ that he could not support that level of growth for 1981 or 1982. Three months later he changed his mind, saying that "events in Iran have been a ~~vivd-~~ vivid reminder of the need for a strong ~~d-~~ and united America" and that his five-year defense program "provides real funding increases that average more than 4 1/2 percent a year." (Televised Address December, 12, 1979) The Administration's January budget proposal called for 5.4 percent real growth in authorization. Mr. Carter said the increase was necessary ~~for--~~ because of imbalances caused by 20 years of increases in ~~Bef~~ Soviet military spending but did not indicate how he had suddenly become aware of this fact. Defense Sec. Brown claimed that the request was "~~calibrated-to-~~ carefully "calibrated" to meet our defense needs, that carrying out the program ~~completely-~~ "completely" was "the most elemental and important of all our responsibilities" and that if inflation estimates proved too low the Administration would take "appropriate action to preserve the integrity of the program." (DOD Annual Report - FY 1981 P. 13) Jimmy Carter said that it was "imperative that Congress approve this strong defense budget...without any reduction." (State of the Union Address January 23, 1980)

As the Congressional debate on the 1981 budget began, it became clear that Mr. Carter's estimates of 3.1 and 3.4 percent inflation were ridiculously below the real rate of _____ percent. Moreover, his proposals underestimated fuel costs by at least 40 percent and failed to take into account increased operations in the Indian Ocean prompted as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in Iran (House Armed Services Committee -- Minority Report _____)

But what proposals did Mr. Carter make to offset these underestimates and to

maintain the "integrity" of the proposed defense programs. In March he submitted revised budget proposals. He cited the need for an additional \$2.96 billion for increased fuel costs, \$1 billion to offset inflation and \$619 million to cover Indian Ocean Deployments, for a total of \$4.6 billion. Yet he asked only for an additional \$2.9 billion, saying that his defense budget would cut back on previously planned programs to make up the difference (_____). ~~Thus programs -- How programs -- considered essential before the -- "the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War" -- became less essential --~~ How programs considered essential before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became dispensable after that "most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War" is left to the imagination of anyone keeping up with Carter promises. But this is not even the worst of Carter's deceptions. After submitting the March request for an additional \$2.9 billion in spending, Jimmy Carter, in a letter to House Speaker Tip O'Neil, wrote that he "strongly favor(ed)" the adoption of an amendment offered by Congressman _____ Obey -- an amendment that proposed a cut of \$3.6 billion in defense spending.

And Jimmy Carter continues to oppose additional Congressional additions to the defense budget that would merely bring it closer in line with his promise for 5.4 percent real increase. In a letter to Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John Stennis, Jimmy Carter claimed that that the \$6.2 billion added by the House-Senate conference committee would "adversely affect today's military readiness." (George Wilson Washington Post May 23, 1980)

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES CUTBACK

It is apparent that Mr. Carter still fails to grasp the fundamental problem. America's increasingly urgent need for enhanced military capabilities

and the calls for real increases in defense spending are not based on assumptions that a growing defense budget is intrinsically good. The key issue is whether our defense capabilities are adequate to meet our military objectives and defend our legitimate national security interests. ~~Jimmy--~~ ~~Carter-lacks-any-coherent-world-picture,-~~ Shortly after taking office, President Ford initiated a wide-ranging review of U.S. military posture. Foreseeing the development of several adverse trends in the military balance, he rejected the posture of U.S. military ~~inferio--~~ inferiority that would result if those trends were allowed to continue. Accordingly, he proposed a set of expensive but necessary military programs. His plans called for modernization of all three legs of our strategic triad. But Jimmy Carter rejected all these initiatives.

President Ford approved plans for a new land-based intercontinental missile, the MX. Mr. Carter delayed full production of the MX, pushing its initial operational capability date back by at least three years. Because the MX will not be fully deployed until late in the 1980s, the United States' ICBM force has become vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

~~Jimmy Carter shut down the only existing ICBM production line,~~ leaving us ~~a--~~ 50 short of the number of ~~M-~~ Minuteman III missiles recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

President Ford approved ~~plans--~~ plans for the Trident submarine and for a new submarine-based missile, the Trident II. Mr. Carter ~~has delayed both of these programs,~~ despite an aggressive Soviet effort to advance their anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

President Ford ~~A--~~ approved a new manned strategic bomber, the B-1, with a complementary air-launched cruise missile system ~~....~~ capable of overwhelming Soviet air defenses. Mr. Carter cancelled this bomber altogether, leaving ~~eh-~~ the United States with only an aging fleet of B-52s, most of which are 25 years old. He also slowed down the air-launched cruise missile program.

Mr. Carter's record on correcting deficiencies in our conventional and tactical nuclear forces is equally dismal:

President Ford approved plans for extensive ~~production-and-~~ development and production of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. Mr. Carter slowed down development of these systems.

President Ford approved plans for a fleet of Advanced Tanker

~~Carter~~

~~Cargo Aircraft to enhance U.S. airlift capabilities. Mr. Carter cancelled this fleet shortly after taking office, dea- delaying by many years the necessary upgrading of our ability to move rapidly into trouble spots throughout the world.~~

President Ford approved plans for enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons to offset the three to one Soviet/Warsaw Pact advantage in tanks and armored personnel carriers in Europe. Mr. Carter badgered our European allies into making politically risky commitments to the neutron weapons and then pulled the rug out from under them by deferring any decision on production of the weapons.

President Ford approved plans for naval shipbuilding capable of producing an active fleet of 550 ships. Despite promises to v- favor an "aggressive" shipbuilding program, Mr. Carter cut this plan in half. (New York Times June 6, 1976)

ARMS CONTRDL

Jimmy Carter's approach to defense policies throughout his term in office has been dictated more by his moral commitment to disarmament than by concern for maintaining o-- legitimate United States' interests. His-firm-belief--CON- /c- Convinced that the Cold War is over and that we are free of our former "inordinate fear" of Communism (Address at Notre Dame _____) he has pursued arms control negotiations -- on strategic weapons, on forces in Central Europe, on anti-satellite weapons, on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, on a comprehensive-bas-e- ban on nuclear tests -- with a zeal unmatched in other areas of policy. Despite his promises to be "a tough negotiator with the Soviet Union (The Indianapolis Star April 7, 1976) and that he would not be "afraid of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union" (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Speech March 15, 1976) Jimmy Carter proceeded with the series of unilateral cutbacks and cancellations of weapons systems-- systems listed above. No attempt was made to gain comparable concessions from the Soviet Union, either in or outside the framework of ongoing negotiations, Jimmy-Carter-continues-to-believe-that--- Actions and decisions were based on the belief that the United States need only set a good example and the Kremlin would follow suit, relieved forever of their historical parahn paranoia.

*any day
and time*

Nor were limitations on our own vital weapons systems confined to unilateral moves. In his rush to conclude a SALT II treaty, Jimmy Carter authorized concession after concession. Some, such as the acceptance of limitations of cruise missile ranges -- limitations consistently rejected by Republican Administrations -- had the experts cringing. Others required no expertise to discern as incompetent and incomprehensible steps. For instance, the Administration excluded the new Soviet Backfire bomber from limitations on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles despite a general consensus that the bomber possessed intercontinental capabilities. Instead Jimmy Carter accepted an unsigned letter from Leonid Brezhnev during the final negotiations in Vienna. It essentially stated that the Soviets would not give the bomber capabilities that it already had. The unsigned letter graciously added that the bomber would not be deployed in a threatening mode during peaceful conditions. So much for Jimmy Carter the "tough negotiator."

The same pattern held for other arms control forums. The Administration continued to press for a total ban on nuclear tests although detection of all such explosions within Soviet territory was deemed impossible by the scientific community. It rushed into negotiations on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean -- negotiations that the former Republican administrations had turned down -- despite the fact that this would virtually exclude a meaningful U.S. military presence in the area while the Soviet Union, by virtue of its geographical locations- would retain easy access throughout the region.

SOVIET BUILDUP IGNORED

Jimmy Carter has shown particular ambivalence about the Soviet military buildup. During the campaign he acknowledged Soviet superiority in many aspects- military sectors (Speech to the American Legion Convention Seattle, Washington September 24, 1976) but maintained that in "the cumulative

strength of our own military forces, plus those of NATO and others, are still superior to the Soviet Union." (Washington Post March 21, 1976)

But his overall attitude toward the growing Soviet threat has been one of complacency, despite evidence that ~~the-Soviet-~~ their military buildup has only picked up momentum. Since 1970 the Soviet Union has outspent the United States in military investment by around \$240 billion. Last year alone such investment exceeded that of the U.S. by 85 percent. Soviet investments in strategic forces has outpaced the U.S. throughout the decade by two and one-half times. In 1979 this gap widened with the Soviets outspending us ~~two~~ by three times. The result has been frightening:

(insert graphs)

Nor were Mr. Carter's policies influenced by the Soviet Union's continued promotion and financing of Cuban activity throughout the Third World despite his campaign statement that "we should make it clear that detente requires that the Soviets, as well as the United States, refrain from irresponsible intervention in other countries." ^(Chicago Council on Foreign Relations March 15, 1976) Evidently when he said "the Russians have no more business in ~~A--~~ Angola than we have," he excluded proxy forces as irrelevant. As a result, the Cuban military presence throughout Africa has more than doubled, bring their total to over 40,000 throughout the continent. Nor has Mr. Carter learned anything from this expansion of proxy forces. Despite Cuban activity in support of guerrilla forces throughout the Caribbean and Central America, he continues to declare that he sees "no military threat to the integrity of the nations in the Caribbean from an outside force and therefore (doesn't) consider it ~~b-~~ to be necessary to define it as one of ~~ita--~~ vital interest where military action by our own country would be necessary to defend it." (Question and Answer session with Editors and News Directors January 29, 1980)

ALLIANCE DISARRAY

Jimmy Carter's vacillation and empty rhetoric has created deep concern among our military allies. This was already apparent during the campaign when at one time he said "we have too many troops overseas" (Boston Advertiser July 25, 1976) and then two months later said he "would intend to maintain our present level of troop deployment in Europe" and "would even be willing to increase ground forces...if that was what it took to give us equivalent strength." (AP September 19, 1976) He repeatedly cited the importance of our alliance relationships, asserting that they must "must know that we will keep our promises" and that they will "be reassured not by promises but by tangible actions and regular consultations." (Address to members of the American Chamber of Commerce Tokyo, Japan May 28, 1975) ~~But Mr. Carter has failed---~~ But Jimmy Carter has succeeded only in undermining U.S. credibility within our alliance system. He failed to ~~meet---~~ live up to increased defense spending commitments. He embarrassed West Germany with his vacillation on the neutron weapons issue. During the first year of his Administration a leaked NXC memorandum envisioning the loss of one-third of Germany should war break out in Europe caused a major uproar and necessitated a series of denials and explanations from Administration officials. Lack of consultation on SALT negotiations raised serious concerns among NATO allies, particularly concerning limitations on weapons systems of particular concern to them. General neglect of timely consultation was not limited to West European countries. ~~Neither Japan nor South Korea was consulted prior to his announcement that he planned to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea. He abruptly and unilaterally cancelled the our mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China.~~

MILITARY MANPOWER

The Administration's failure to fulfill even

MILITARY MANPOWER

During his campaign, Jimmy Carter said that "the number 1 priority of any president is to guarantee the security of our nation" and to provide "a strong, albe, tough, muscular, well organized fighting force." (Christian Science Monitor September 17, 1976) But under his leadership, the United States has has failed to fulfill even minimal military manpower requirements, further bringing into question our ability to maintain alliance commitments.

In 1979, for the first time since the creation of the all-volunteer force, all military services failed to fulfill recruitment goals:

Army	16,000 short of 158,700 goal
Navy	5,200 short of 84,830 goal
Marines	1,200 short of 41,800 goal
Air Force	1,400 short of 68,000 goal

(Washington Post October 20, 1979)

Moreover, the failure to stem the flow of trained, experienced personnel out of the military services into better paying civilian jobs threatens even more serious consequences. Potentially active ships are being taken out of service due to the lack of trained personnel to operate them. Naval aircraft is lost through attrition three times faster than new pñance-- pñanes are produced to replace them, largely due to lack of training time for pilots and lack of trained maintenance personnel.

Our military reserves are sadly inadequate. The Selective Reserves suffer a 13% manpower shortage under peacetime requirements and a 20% shortage for wartime requirements.

	Shortfall from Peacetime Need	Shortfall from Wartime Need
Army National Guard	62,228	85,637
Army Reserve	51,478	61,024
Air National Guard	1,993	10,123
Air Force Reserve	2,155	13,928
Marine Corps Reserve	1,153	6,909
Naval Reserve	2,557	19,207
Totals	121,564	196,829

Shortages of manpower in the Individual Ready Reserve that would provide trained men to replace active duty forces incapacitated in combat are even more critical. A-- The Administration's response to this has been to lower it's estimates ~~of~~ the number required:

	FY 1978	FY 1979	FY 1980
Numbers Required	729,000	710,000	694,000
Numbers Available	168,600	200,000	200,000
Manpower shortage	560,400	510,000	494,000

*about 500,000
my*

JIMMY CARTER'S FALSE CONVERSION

In light of these inescapable facts, it might be expected that Jimmy Carter would reevaluate his thinking on the question of Soviet goals and tactics and the appropriate response to them. But even after the brutal invasion of Afghanistan this is not the case. He tells us that this action "has made a more dramatic change" in his opinion "of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are--than--anything-- are

*977
4764*

manpower shortage

despite three years of cutbacks, delays and cancellations -- despite the fact that upgraded intelligence estimates of Soviet force modernization and expansion are even more alarming than those we on which President Ford based his proposals for the programs Mr. Carter cut. He tells us that we are stronger now despite the testimony of his own SAC commander that strategic equivalence ceased to exist in 1978 and that "by today's measurements, an adverse strategic imbalance has developed and will continue for several years to come...not only when our forces are in a day-to-day alert posture...but also when fully generated" for war (_____)

Jimmy Carter appears to have come full circle, belatedly resurrecting the Republican initiatives he originally cast aside as incompatible with arms control and the spirit of detente. But he supports cuts in the defense budget proposed before the invasion of Afghanistan.

§ In an effort to appear tough, Jimmy Carter announces the reinstatement of draft registration. But the measures he proposes were ones rejected by his own Defense Department studies as little more than symbolic. His plan cuts by only six days our ability to mobilize military manpower in the event of an emergency. It does nothing to curb the flow of trained personnel out of military service. Jimmy Carter tells us that this will demonstrate our resolve to the Soviet Union as if the leaders in the Kremlin were unaware of these facts.



Jimmy Carter announces to the world the obvious -- that any assault on the Persian Gulf region would be considered an assault on our "vital interests" and that we will repel such an assault "by any means necessary, including military force." (State of the Union January 23, 1980) He does not tell us that our ability to uphold that pledge is highly questionable. Then, six days

he falls into the familiar pattern of vacillating saying that he never "claimed to have the ability unilaterally to defeat any threat to that region with ease" and that what he called for "was an analysis by all those nations who are there who might be threatened" and cooperation "with them, as they request and as they desire, to strengthen their own defense capabilities." (Question and Answer session with Editors and News Directors January 29, 1980) Nor does he tell us why, if ~~we cant defend the region unilaterally~~ alliance cooperation would be necessary to defend the region, he failed to consult with our allies before publicly announcing this improvised "doctrine."

Jimmy Carter's tough rhetoric rings hollow. His conversion is artificial and tenuous. His understanding of the realities is shallow. His public announcements are designed more for domestic consumption and pacification than for maintaining the United States' ability to deter aggression and defend its legitimate national interests. Mr. Carter still appears to have no strategy save a re-election strategy.

The result is frightening:

Soviet Military Strength In Multiples Of U.S. Strength







United States



Soviet Union



Naval Forces



Strategic

5 #1

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

MIP

Joseph C. Harsch

Military service problems

If a vote could be taken among "the foreign policy community" (meaning government officials, journalists, and academics who specialize in foreign affairs) there probably would be a solid, perhaps even overwhelming, majority in favor of a return to some form of military conscription in the United States.

The case is a strong one that US military forces are not now sufficiently manned in numbers, quality, and experience to sustain the present and prospective commitments of the United States in world affairs.

The failure of the attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran is only the most visible indication that US armed forces are not up to peak readiness for emergency operations. Those who make a specialty of studying the state of the world and its inherent risks and dangers largely agree that improvement is desirable. And how else to improve than to revive the selective service system?

Republican candidate Ronald Reagan thinks raising the rate of pay would be preferable. Like most other politicians of today he opposes an actual revival of compulsory service for the obvious elemental reason that it is unpopular and would probably lead to a revival of the kind of draft resistance which

marred the American scene toward the end of the Vietnam experience. No politician wants to risk responsibility for launching another wave of student riots.

But the military payroll is already a major feature of the federal budget. It could not be raised substantially without either undermining the case for tax cutting or giving another boost to an unbalanced budget, hence to inflation. The best way to improve the military posture of the US without damaging the economy would be to revive conscription, which is precisely what the President and the Congress took a first step toward doing when they decided to revive registration.

That first step is now in trouble both on university campuses and in the courts, and for the same reason. It is obviously a move toward conscription, but not acknowledged so to be. The government contention in the public forum and in the legal case in the US District Court in Philadelphia which went unanimously against the government was that induction of any of the new registrants is not imminent. The government says registration is only a stand-by measure.

That contention does not impress either the student protesters or that Philadelphia court. The three judges who ruled that the

proposed registration is unconstitutional did so on the ground that registration imposes a burden on a single class of citizens. This, the three judges contended, can be done only if justification could be shown. "The justification here," they said, "should relate to the governmental need to raise military forces by conscription. Registration of a class of citizens with absolutely no purpose would be unconstitutional under any standard of review." In this case the court found discrimination against males because females were excluded from the registration. More importantly, no adequate justification had been presented to the court, it said.

In other words, (unless overturned by the Supreme Court) registration, whether it be of males only or of males and females, should not happen unless the government first makes a case that conscription may again be necessary. And this is precisely what the political leaders of the country have not yet done.

They have not come forward and asserted that the international situation is so grave that the United States must go back to conscription. They all say that the Soviet Union has done things it should not have done. They all talk about Soviet aggression in various

places, including Afghanistan. But they have not yet made to the American people or to the judges of the federal court in Philadelphia the case which most people in the foreign policy community think ought to be made.

President Carter has said that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constitutes the worst crisis since World War II. Ronald Reagan makes it sound even worse. But the President is not willing yet to say that conscription is necessary. And Mr. Reagan is not even willing to support the grain embargo as a means of letting the Soviets know how much he disapproves of what they are doing to the Afghans.

The United States was ready to go into World War I when the Lusitania was sunk with a passenger list of mostly Americans. It was ready to go into World War II when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. But the case for conscription now is so far largely an intellectual abstraction. It has not been sold to the American people, to the younger generation, or even to the federal courts. Until the case is made, persuasively, by the leadership of both parties, there will be difficulties about military manpower — even though Justice Brennan has stayed the Philadelphia decision.

Defense

^{D/sum} Moynihan Warns of Threat From New Soviet Expansion

NY Times 8.12.80

By FRANK LYNN

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned the Democratic National Convention last night in a prepared speech that "the Soviet empire has entered a new period of expansion" that threatens Afghanistan, Africa, Southeast Asia and even the Caribbean and Central America.

"Simultaneously, the mad but relentless expansion of Soviet nuclear forces has continued," the Senator declared, "bringing to the point of instability the one area of our relations in which we have most sought restraint."

To meet that threat, the New York Senator's text said, the Carter Administration has increased military spending in each of the last four years despite a 1976 Democratic platform pledge to reduce such expenditures. He noted that the proposed platform calls for a continuation of such spending with a pledge of "a massive return to strategic weapons development."

Struggle Over Rule

The Senator was one of several Democrats from New York, New Jersey and Connecticut who were cast in prominent roles at last night's session, which was dominated by the struggle over the proposed convention rule that would require delegates to abide by the results of Presidential primaries and caucuses.

Governors Carey of New York and Byrne of New Jersey were assigned to deliver welcoming addresses, along with Mayor Koch, who, in his prepared text, told the delegates that many of their ancestors "came through this port."

Mr. Carey, who took a leading role in the fight against the proposed delegate rule, spoke in last night's debate, urging the delegates to demonstrate that the convention is "more than a livestock arena in which sheep and cattle are listlessly herded about."

Defenders of the rule were Gov. Ella T. Grasso and Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff of Connecticut. The Senator also spoke in the debate.

Governor Carey was apparently unable to convince any of the Carter delegates, even in his home state, to follow his lead.

Even before the vote, President Carter apparently signaled his displeasure over Mr. Carey's role in the rules struggle by deciding to land at Newark International

Airport tomorrow, rather than at Kennedy or La Guardia.

Thus Governor Byrne, rather than Governor Carey, will greet the President and accompany him to the Sheraton Centre. White House reporters could not recall any other occasion on which Mr. Carter used Newark Airport to come to New York.

The President's apparent pique was not reflected in the delegations from New York, Connecticut and New Jersey, in each of which Kennedy delegates could draw some comfort from the fact that they were the majority.

Carter delegates, on the other hand, could look to "the big picture" — the President's national delegate majority — for their optimism.

Both Sides Cheer Carey

Governor Carey, who appeared before other delegations including the Connecticut Kennedy caucus, in his campaign against the proposed rule, was greeted enthusiastically by both Carter and Kennedy delegates at the New York delegation meeting before last night's session. Most of the Carter delegates cheered when the Governor told the New Yorkers, "Don't let the power brokers take your vote away from you."

Robert S. Strauss, the President's campaign chairman, was also conciliatory in his talk to the New York delegates. He touched off laughter when he said that he had been "on all sides of this issue" at previous conventions, depending on whether his candidate had a majority of the delegates.

One of the major irritants in all three delegations was not the rules struggle but the quest for guest passes to the convention. At the New York Kennedy caucus, which was closed to reporters, the State Senate minority leader, Manfred Ohrenstein, was overheard assuring the Kennedy delegates that he would make very effort to obtain more passes. The Carter caucus in New York was open to reporters.

Several New York Democratic county leaders threatened, perhaps facetiously, to keep their delegates off the floor for the crucial rules vote last night, unless ticket allocations were increased. They were increased early in the afternoon, only a few hours before the convention opened.

Harvard v. Carter: Platform Wars That Won't Die

By SUZANNE GARMENT

If you wanted to find Senator Edward Kennedy's platform staff on the eve of the Democratic convention, you had to maneuver your way through the hubbub of Kennedy headquarters at the Waldorf Astoria, where utility tables and supply cabinets and Kennedy posters and soft drink refrigerators were moving in to camouflage the pseudo-Persian splendor of the Starlight Roof ballroom. If you happened to walk in bearing the freight of a Harvard education of a certain era, you immediately recognized among the paraphernalia an old Harvard hand—then another one, and another.

This was no accident. One Kennedy staffer counted up and said that of the seven-man issues team, five were Harvard Law School graduates, and four of those five were law review editors. Which piece of minor social statistics may not be irrelevant in explaining why the Democratic platform fight has been so long, and why the Kennedy forces have pushed so hard to extract the concessions they've been getting.

From the time the platform committee first met to draft the document in Washington back in June, it was clear that the process of accommodation wasn't going to be easy. At one of the closed meetings where reporters weren't intended to be, the smoke-filled room did not exactly ring with the sound of secret deals being hammered out.

The delegates, fortified by a laden buffet table, were working themselves into a state of bug-eyed late night exhaustion. Stuart Eizenstat, holding the fort for President Carter's platform draft, sat even-voiced as they came to him repeatedly.

Sometimes he ceded voluntarily, occasionally he lost, more often he held the line. Did someone want to come out against mandatory retirement? Fine. But on the big debates of the evening, Peter Edelman would propose for the Kennedy forces and the Carter people would simply vote him down. There was not much quibbling; the whole exercise was less reminiscent of negotiation than of ballet.

Now, on the eve of the convention, a platform planner and Carter sympathizer remembered the drafting with some bitterness. "We closed the hearings to the press because we thought it would encourage people to work out their differences. In retrospect I would have opened them," the planner continued, in order to put some constraints on the Kennedy people's deliberate intransigence.

Over at the Waldorf, needless to say, you didn't hear it that way. The Kennedy aides there agreed that there had been little compromise: that whatever negotiations went on in Washington back in June had been more a shifting mix of stonewalling, coercion, playing to the galleries, and theft of delegates. But they complained

about how hard it was to get the Carter forces to accept even the most justifiable of positions: "They only gave up what they couldn't refuse."

It would be easy to dismiss this complaint as dissembling, since the continuing platform fight so clearly serves the interest of their candidate and since the Carter people on the committee did have the votes. Yet there was a real edge of grievance in the Kennedy voices, and in one way it was not hard to sympathize. The comprehensive platform proposal they had produced for their Senator had been, merits of the planks aside, a coherent and sophisticated document—just as their papers and law review articles must have been. The Carter product read like—well, the Carter administration itself, a little bit contradictory and flat-footed and uninspired. The Kennedy staffers on convention eve, when asked about this, still remembered the difference quite well.

The Carter performance had been so uneven, various of them explained, because Carter people "didn't give a damn" about the issues. Because their view of the world was so fragmented. And because "they're just not competent." Even the so-called move to the right in the country was an issue of skill more than ideology: "People want competence. It was Carter's incompetence that made the move to the right credible."

You listened to all this smart, articulate stuff and felt pinned in a time warp. Tonight these bright young men are going to try to put their economic plank in the Democratic platform, calling for wage and price controls and forbidding the government to take any action at all, ever, that may increase unemployment. This while everybody else is already arguing about the precise shape and size of the tax cut.

There are two possible outcomes to the fight: the Kennedy people will lose in the convention or they will somehow win and make their party more vulnerable to defeat by the Republicans in November. This is the end product of the proud preoccupation with issues and coherence and competence.

It must have been irresistibly tempting to these high-quality activists to look on Jimmy Carter's people and performance with contempt. Tempting to think that liberalism was basically alive and well, that only Jimmy Carter's presentation of it had gotten the doctrine into trouble, that things could be fixed by superior skill, that you could build the successful liberal political organization if only you had enough intelligence and class.

These are the convictions of people who somewhere inside think that they are the ones who have the right to be running the country instead of the motley crew now in office. They are the same convictions, you have to suspect, that animate Edward M. Kennedy himself. If in fact Jimmy Carter's decline has not been just a matter of technique, if we are looking at powerful currents carrying the country's opinion away from the Democratic Party's directions of the past 20 years, such people will be the last ones to see or admit it.

Defame

Heeding Carter, Delegates

President, in Personal Note, Asks Rejection of a Minority Plank

N.Y. Times 8.14.80

By WARREN WEAVER Jr.

The Democratic National Convention completed its 1980 platform yesterday, defeating, at President Carter's personal behest, a proposal to halt deployment of the MX missile system.

At the climax of a long afternoon of debate, the delegates rejected, by a vote of 1,874 to 1,276, a charge by critics of the Administration's military policies that the proposed \$60 billion mobile missile system would be "counterproductive" and would produce "new risks which outweigh apparent military advantage."

The victory for the President gave his backers a virtual clean sweep on the convention's second day of platform writing. The Carter forces failed to block only one relatively minor plank to which they objected.

Carter Resumes Control

On Tuesday, by contrast, supporters of Senator Edward M. Kennedy succeeded in defeating the President in three contests on the economic planks of the platform, and other Carter critics pushed through planks, against the President's wishes, on equal rights for women and abortion.

Mr. Carter resumed control of the platform process not only through efforts on the convention floor but also through submitting to the delegates his objections to provisions they approved yesterday. A new rule adopted only Monday required him to take this action.

In effect, the rule gave the President a kind of veto power over the platform, enabling him to decide which of its planks he would accept as the basis for his re-election campaign.

The Carter Administration rolled out its heavy artillery for the MX missile debate. The Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown; a former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Gen. George M. Seignious; and Representative Jim Wright of Texas, the House majority leader, all spoke against the proposal to change the platform.

Handwritten Message

In addition, the President's agents circulated on the floor copies of a handwritten letter on White House stationery dated yesterday and signed "Jimmy Carter." The author said he was communicating with the delegates "as Commander in Chief of the American armed forces."

"It is crucial," the President wrote, "that our strategic nuclear forces not be vulnerable to a pre-emptive Soviet attack. The MX missile system is our optimum means of meeting these vital goals."

"We Democrats must demonstrate to our nation and to the world that we are committed to defending our country, and to concluding a balanced nuclear arms control agreement. Therefore, it is very important for you to vote NO on minority report 20 + 23."

It was believed to be the first time

that a President had dispatched such a communication to individual delegates at a party convention in an effort to influence their decision on a single plank in the platform.

The MX system, which would be built in the Utah and Nevada desert, is designed to shift the missiles along a track of launching sites so that they would not provide a fixed target for the Russians.

Aside from the missile debate, the Carter floor managers moved successfully to reassert the President's control over the platform on which he will seek re-election in the fall campaign, seizing the initiative from backers of Senator Kennedy and other critics of the original draft who won several victories on Tuesday.

In an afternoon of sporadic debate, the delegates defeated minority planks that would have committed the party and its Presidential candidate:

¶Ending special tax treatment given the oil industry through allowances for depletion and intangible drilling and development expenses.

¶Opposing the levying of higher gasoline taxes or oil import fees — such as the one proposed by President Carter — "to artificially increase the price of gasoline."

¶Creating a new system of Federal supervision of oil companies to achieve what its authors called "energy accountability."

¶An immediate freeze on testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Carter Is Allowed a Rewrite

The delegates approved by voice vote a minority plank imposing "a moratorium on the acquisition of competing coal companies and solar energy companies by major oil companies." Some who were attending the convention in neutral roles were convinced that this proposal, too, had been voted down, but Senator John Glenn of Ohio, in the chair, ruled otherwise.

The new convention rule requiring President Carter to express his differences with the platform adopted by the convention originated as an effort by Kennedy strategists to weaken the President's chances for renomination.

As circumstances shifted, however, the rule enabled Mr. Carter, in effect, to rewrite the platform to his own specifications, eliminating any material that the delegates had added over his objections as long as he did not regard its retention as politically helpful to his campaign.

While Senator Kennedy was a candidate for the nomination, his supporters believed they could weaken the Carter cause by inserting planks in the platform on the floor that the President would feel required to repudiate before the delegates chose a nominee. Such a repudiation, according to the Kennedy strategy, would divert votes from Mr. Carter to Senator Kennedy.

Back MX Missile in Finishing Platform

10-2075

The New York Times

Founded in 1851

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D/Sm

8.14.80

As Humphrey, as Stevenson, as Kennedy

At first, he was the Kennedy of 1980. Echoes of his brothers resonated last November as he announced his candidacy: "Fear spreads that our leaders have resigned themselves to retreat. This country is not prepared to sound retreat." Time, in other words, to get the country moving again.

Later, the public came increasingly to see him as the Humphrey of 1980, champion of liberal orthodoxy's whole menu of programs. He urged wage and price controls, recontrolling oil and natural gas, a Marshall Plan for cities. Two young black men standing in the back of a crowded Methodist church in east Los Angeles made it explicit. As the Senator was saying, "If we could reconstruct bombed-out Europe after World War II, then . . .," one said to the other, "Sounds like Humphrey to me."

And then, Tuesday night, in the din of "We want Ted!" and the whirl of blue placards, Edward Kennedy became the Stevenson of 1980. It was one of the great emotional outpourings of convention history, a memorable speech, delivered with affecting intensity, in a losing cause. Recall Eugene McCarthy's stirring 1960 speech. Then, it was a Kennedy who wanted delegates to be bound by their pledges to the voters; then it was the challenger who wanted them freed, to vote their consciences. The faithful shouted their lungs out against the odds: "We want STE-ven-son!" That demonstration could not have seemed any longer to John Kennedy than Tuesday night's demonstration must have seemed to Jimmy Carter.

There is another parallel, and it is more important. Senator Kennedy's speech, however splendid, was not an acceptance speech; the Senator did not win the nomination; and the convention is not representative of the country. In this year of the Endless Campaign, Democrats had plenty of chance to cheer for and vote

for and nominate Edward Kennedy. They did not do so — just as, in 1960, they cheered, but turned away from Adlai Stevenson.

The reason this year is not, certainly, that Jimmy Carter is so strong. Nor is it only that people have doubts about the Senator concerning Chappaquiddick and the "character" issue. A big reason Senator Kennedy did not win is that many people feared his answers to social problems are too liberal, by which they mean, obsolete or too expensive or both.

One can regret the turn to conservatism in America; one can rail against it; one can work to reverse it. But through much of his campaign, the Senator pressed on as though it didn't exist. An undiluted gospel of social welfare may produce shouts of approval in black churches or at white senior centers. If it had wider appeal, Jimmy Carter would surely know how to preach it. The task of politics is not just to assert but to create that wider appeal, first within a party and then the electorate.

In recent days, Senator Kennedy's words have taken on a more realistic tone. Where he once urged wage and price controls, or new controls on petroleum, he has lately been saying that in the '80s, the nation needs "new combinations of answers" on energy and the economy. In his Tuesday speech, he pointedly said, "The commitment I seek is not to outworn views, but to old values that will never wear out. Programs may sometimes become obsolete, but the ideal of fairness always endures."

Thus Mr. Kennedy finally devised an honorable and effective end game. Whether or not he later stumps energetically for the Democratic ticket, he has already begun campaigning brilliantly against the Republicans; it will take Ronald Reagan some time to get the arrows out of his back. There is a measure of Democratic unity in that, and also an opening for a new political persona: the Kennedy of 1984.

Does the US want a 'welfare fleet?'

By Frederick J. Glaeser

The financial plight of United States military families is a subject frequently discussed in public forums of late. Even President Carter has belatedly acknowledged the need to increase the compensation due servicemen and women. Unfortunately, present proposals to increase various allowances and per diem rates will benefit only some military personnel, primarily under special conditions such as during travel between duty stations.

The real need is to restore the damage wrought by inflation and to provide money for food, utilities, and other basic essentials.

Understandably, there are economic and political realities with which the President and Congress must deal, no matter what their personal feelings toward the condition of military families. Additionally, most Americans, including those in uniform, want to see genuine fiscal restraint on the part of the government as a counter to debilitating inflation.

There is a potential solution to this seeming dilemma. As with most human answers, it is not perfect, it is not even new.

I propose legislation exempting all active duty military pay from federal income tax. The long hours, disrupted personal lives, and grinding family separations are an already heavy tax on military personnel.

What benefits should come from such legislation? First, it could be done quickly, with no requirement for increased appropriations for military pay. It need not be retroactive and should not extend to military pensions. There need not be any exemption from state or local taxes or social security taxes. Only income from military compensation should be exempted; all other income should be taxed normally.

The increase in monthly salary from this proposal would not be large for very junior personnel, but all services are currently managing to recruit adequate numbers at existing pay scales. The increase would be significant for mid-career personnel, precisely the highly skilled group the services are losing by the thousands.

Undeniably, senior enlisted and officer grades would benefit substantially. Far from being a detractor, this factor would be a positive incentive toward longer careers, harder work, and increased competition for promo-

Commander Frederick J. Glaeser is currently serving aboard the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga in the Mediterranean Sea.

tion (i.e. reduced training and retirement costs, higher productivity, and more competent individuals rising to the top).

An equally significant benefit for the military would be the strong boost in morale such a step would produce. Few military members or their families now have a firm conviction that their labors and uncommon sacrifices are recognized and appreciated by the people and government they serve.

What does the long-suffering US taxpayer derive from this solution? The immediate result would almost certainly be a marked decrease in the number of discharges and resignations by the skilled uniformed personnel the US obviously needs given recent trends in the international balance and use of blunt military force.

The overall federal expenditure for this action would be the smallest the government could make for the desired result. No additional pay appropriations would be needed. There would be no increase in downstream

retirement costs.

There would be a loss of revenue to the US Treasury and realignments in the federal budget would be required. Increased compensation for the military will have a price; I am simply suggesting the lowest price.

Nobody should think that this would forever end all military pay and retention problems. It would help and would create a breathing space to permit detailed study of a wide range of compensation alternatives and provide the time for the legislative and fiscal give and take necessary to bring them into being.

The US Navy is currently short more than 20,000 key skilled personnel. An additional 20,000 individuals are serving on voluntary one-year extensions of their obligated service. Those on extensions include some reacting to the downturn in the economy and many others who are waiting in good faith for a much promised sign of understanding and commitment on the part of the Congress and

the President.

Recently the crew of the ship on which I serve was briefed on procedures for applying for food stamps and for obtaining rent subsidies under local welfare programs. This was in preparation for our imminent return home after six months at sea.

If there is no rapid and significant response to the obvious disparity between unusual self-sacrifice and abysmal compensation, the months ahead may well bring more news of ships unable to sail for lack of crews. Those less-than-proud ships which do get underway would comprise our first "welfare fleet," hardly an instrument to effectively represent and defend US interests around the world.

65

oscoe Drummond

Moscow settles down for a long stay

Washington

There is no evidence that the Russians will be pushed out of Afghanistan or negotiated out of Afghanistan as far as one can see ahead.

It is well to pay close attention to what the Soviets say to their allies and to be wary of what they say to their adversaries.

You can take it for granted that, when Moscow reassures the East Europeans that it has no intention whatsoever of abandoning Afghanistan, it means exactly what it says.

But it is also well to realize that when Moscow lets the United States and its European allies think or hope or guess that there might be some give if we would turn our attention to détente, the diplomatic road may contain pitfalls.

When Mr. Brezhnev talked with Helmut Schmidt recently he told the German Chancellor that a political solution might be possible, but he had already informed his allies in Eastern Europe that there would be no abandoning of Afghanistan.

Chancellor Schmidt was representing the views of the West when he made the plea to

the Soviet president that he "could contribute significantly to reducing the dangerous crisis if you could state that the announced withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Afghanistan is the beginning of a continuous process which will go on to complete withdrawal."

It is at this point that Mr. Brezhnev said yes in words but not in substance. He did this by asserting that any settlement which would permit Soviet withdrawal would have to be "based on the proposals of the present Afghanistan government."

Here is the catch. Compare the two positions:

What the allies — at President Carter's initiative and at Chancellor Schmidt's initiative in his talks in Moscow — are proposing is that they would guarantee the neutrality of Afghanistan and help establish a transition arrangement during the process of staged withdrawal.

What Mr. Brezhnev in his reply to Mr. Schmidt is proposing is that the West play a part in guaranteeing the continued existence of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul which Moscow has installed by force of arms; and that

we help to conquer Afghanistan by preventing the rebels from obtaining weapons with which to carry on their resistance to the presence of the Russian troops.

Can it mean other than that the West would be keeping in power in Kabul a regime taking orders from Moscow and, in effect, doing Moscow's work by demobilizing the Afghan freedom fighters?

This is why it is wise to believe that the Soviets are telling the truth when they inform their East European satellites that they are not abandoning Afghanistan.

This is why it is wise to be wary when Mr. Brezhnev wants us to believe that the prospect of a negotiated withdrawal could be just around the corner.

It isn't. The evidence is that the Soviets want to resurrect détente and eat Afghanistan too.

Because the Russians avow they will not "abandon Afghanistan" and are prepared to negotiate "withdrawal" only under terms which would leave them there in control — this does not mean that the time will never

Senate Votes Measure That Bars Surprise Searches of Newsrooms

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5 (AP)— A bill to prohibit surprise searches of newsrooms by law-enforcement officials has been approved by the Senate and awaits action by the House.

The Senate passed the measure by voice vote yesterday. It would require the police to obtain a subpoena when they seek from the news media information that might be related to a crime. The bill would prevent the authorities from getting a warrant to search the news offices without advance warning.

The measure pending in the House is broader. It would extend the protection against surprise searches to anyone who was not a suspect in a criminal investigation but was believed to have evidence.

come when they may decide that the price of occupying their Afghan neighbor is too high.

Politically, diplomatically, and militarily, the attempted conquest is costing the Soviets dearly. The Afghan freedom fighters, poorly organized and poorly equipped, are bravely forcing the Soviet Union to pay a very high price for trying to bring this fiercely independent people to heel. To date they are not succeeding. The cost in casualties is considerable and the price in enmity throughout the Islamic world is high.

The Russians are uncomfortably aware that some of the East European communist government leaders have been criticizing the Afghan invasion. The Soviets know that during the recent Vienna meeting of Secretary of State Muskie and Foreign Secretary Gromyko, one East-bloc official remarked not sotto voce: "Call it what you like, when you put troops across someone else's frontier, it is invasion, whether it is Russia in Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan, the Chinese in Vietnam, or the Vietnamese in Cambodia."

The end of the tunnel in Afghanistan is not yet visible.

The New Strategy for Nuclear War: How It Ev

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 12 — Just before Jimmy Carter moved into the White House in January 1977, he asked Harold Brown, who was to be the Secretary of Defense, to study the feasibility of reducing the nation's strategic arsenal from 1,800 long-range missiles to about 200.

Three and a half years later, the Pentagon is embarked on several weapons programs designed not to reduce, but to bolster strategic power. Two weeks ago Mr. Carter approved a nuclear targeting strategy that gives priority to being able to strike at military and political targets in the Soviet Union rather than cities.

The new policy, contained in a document known as Presidential Directive 59, has aroused controversy in part because Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie was evidently excluded from its formulation. The few officials familiar with the decision say that it provides insight into how the military posture has changed over the years and how Secretary Brown and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, have become intellectual companions on security matters.

Policy Evolved From 1976 Plan

The new policy evolved from a war plan, known as National Security Decision Memorandum 242, formulated in the final months of the Ford Administration. That memorandum called for missiles capable of threatening civilian and military targets in the Soviet Union.

But during the 1976 Presidential campaign, Mr. Carter voiced skepticism over the idea of being able to undertake selective nuclear strikes. As late as December 1978, he said at a news conference that his approach to deterrence was based on the principle "that any attack on us would result in devastating destruction by the nation which launched an attack."

According to officials, both Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Brown, by the end of 1977, had started to express reservations about basing deterrence on the threat of massive retaliation. A major factor behind the re-evaluation, the officials said, was a study of the military balance, prepared by Samuel P. Huntington, then an associate of Mr. Brzezinski, which concluded that the Soviet Union did not accept that theory of mutual deterrence.

Pinpoint Strategy Led to MX

On the basis of the study, Mr. Brzezinski is said to have asked Mr. Brown to re-examine nuclear war plans. Aides said Mr. Brown asked Leon Sloss, a State Department aide, in early 1978 to study the issue. Working with a small team, Mr. Sloss is said to have developed many of the concepts associated with the recent directive, including the importance of selected political and military targets.

These conclusions are said to have impressed Mr. Brown and Mr. Brzezinski for different reasons. According to his aides, Mr. Brown was interested in convincing the Soviet Union that it could not

gain an advantage by striking at American military targets. He was therefore attracted by the idea that the best way to do this was to threaten the survival of Soviet leaders and military forces.

Mr. Brzezinski, according to his aides, was more concerned about the Soviet Union's possible use of its nuclear power to blackmail the United States in political crises. Thus he is said to have emerged as a strong advocate of programs that might enhance American bargaining.

Officials said that support for the United States' capacity to make pinpoint strikes led Mr. Brown and Mr. Brzezinski to persuade the President, in early 1979, to approve the proposal for a new mobile missile, the MX. The missile, scheduled for deployment in the late 1980's, not only is designed to escape a first strike, but has the accuracy needed for such strikes.

Following Mr. Carter's decision, in May 1979, to approve the MX, Mr. Brzezinski pressed in several interagency meetings for a Presidential directive that would incorporate the new strategy. According to officials, Mr. Brown, at that point, was not convinced that such an order was needed, and the State Department was also skeptical.

According to some officials, it was this lack of support that led Mr. Brzezinski to shelve the idea. An aide to Mr. Brzezinski, however, asserted that attention was diverted by the Iranian hostage crisis in November and then the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Revived by a Narrower Group

The strategy issue did not again receive attention until June, in discussions that now involved only a handful of Pentagon and White House aides. In addition to Mr. Brown and Mr. Brzezinski, they included Walter Slocombe, a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense; Gen. Jasper A. Welch of the Air Force, who coordinate military policy at the White House, and Gen. William E. Odom of the Army, who is Mr. Brzezinski's military assistant.

Officials said General Welch and General Odom submitted a draft of the proposed directive to Mr. Brzezinski, who then sent it to Mr. Brown for comment. In late July, Mr. Brown and Mr. Brzezinski are said to have met with Mr. Carter and the directive was approved.

Plans were set in motion for informing allied governments of the change and for having Mr. Brown announce the strategy in a speech later this month. But the Government was caught off guard when reports on the policy appeared in the press.

Officials acknowledge that questions concerning the strategy remain to be answered. One is why the study, after being shelved, was revived in June.

Timing Criticized by Kissinger

Henry A. Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, said here in a speech today: "I do not believe that the middle of an election campaign is the appropriate moment to announce a new strategy for con-


ducting nuclear operations, a subject of extraordinary delicacy and profound consequence to the Soviet Union, to our allies and our own people."

A participant in the earlier phase of the study noted the Republican platform called for a nuclear strategy of the sort

now approved, and Carter might have been reflecting conservative White House aides merely reflected the Brzezinski nor Mr. time to focus on the is

now approved, and suggested that Mr. Carter might have been interested in deflecting conservative criticism.

White House aides said the timing merely reflected the fact that neither Mr. Brzezinski nor Mr. Brown had had the time to focus on the issue.



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J. Warn Against Sanctions on Israel

New York Times 8/13/80

Aiming Missiles, and Dodging Them

Unanswered Worries About Nuclear Targeting

The Carter Administration's new nuclear war strategy hasn't even been formally announced yet but already it is creating political fall-out. The Soviet Union berates "nuclear adventurism." Defense Secretary Brown hastily reassures the allies that the United States has "no desire to fight a nuclear war." And the White House failure to consult Secretary of State Muskie leaves the impression that hawks in the Defense Department and National Security Council have somehow sneaked a dangerous policy past the President. We'd like to think there is less here than meets the eye. But from what is known so far, the new strategy carries implicit dangers. The Administration has a lot to explain.

The heart of the new policy is apparently a new targeting plan that places less emphasis on massive destruction of cities and industries and more on military targets, command posts and political headquarters. The goal is to allow a more flexible nuclear response to potential Soviet aggression, something short of the all-out spasm of destruction that is usually relied on to deter war. Indeed, there is an implication that limited nuclear war could be fought for a prolonged period. But until more is known, it is hard to judge how substantial a change the new policy represents.

For many years the United States has had an abundance of nuclear warheads aimed at a variety of Soviet

targets, including many military facilities and command posts. The targeting lists have been continuously revised as the number of warheads available has soared past 10,000, and accuracy has improved. Thus the new strategy may simply represent an evolutionary development from the past, not a major shift.

But there are dangers. Is the United States now seeking a "first strike" capability that would enable it to eliminate the Soviet intercontinental missile force in a surprise attack? That seems to be the Soviet interpretation. If so, extensive debate is in order. Such a strategy could lead the Soviets to place their missile forces on hair-trigger alert, increasing the possibility of a catastrophic misunderstanding.

The flexible response strategy — allowing retaliation short of all-out destruction of Soviet society — also raises problems. It could deter some kinds of aggression and, should war break out, limit the damage. But the notion that nuclear war can be kept limited and, in some sense, "won" is not only dubious; to adopt it may actually increase the risk of nuclear suicide.

Finally, what will the new strategy do to arms control? Already, some strategists are arguing that the new targeting policy makes it imperative for the United States to produce the MX missile plus other advanced weapons and command and control systems. President Carter has a duty to explain how he will achieve the flexibility and deterrent effect he seeks without turning the arms race into a marathon.

Unanswerable Questions About Whom to Shelter

Nuclear strategy aside, there is now the matter of Presidential Directive 58, ordering more effective protection for Government leaders in case of enemy attack. With a peculiar sense of timing, Administration officials were disclosing it, clumsily, just as Jimmy Carter was busy fighting off Senator Kennedy's last convention attack.

The motive cited by unnamed officials, "continuity of government," is surely worthy. So long as a nuclear war remains a grim possibility, prudence requires Washington to develop evacuation and shelter plans. Cavernous hideaways have existed since the Eisenhower years. Some officials were dispatched to one, inside a Virginia mountain, during the Cuban missile crisis. And these contingency measures should be periodically reviewed.

What is troubling about the anonymously disclosed information about Directive 58 is how callous it looks to the public. People who know little of the strategic chess games that the Pentagon plays with the Soviets are left

to mutter about generals interested in saving themselves.

Who shall be saved if there is nuclear war? It is an imponderable question, a terrible question. Consider a story about the late Chief Justice Earl Warren. Given a special pass admitting him to a secret relocation site of Government, he asked what arrangements had been made for Mrs. Warren. Answer: no wives; there was room for only 2,000 in the shelter. It is said that Mr. Warren replied, "If she's not important enough to save, neither am I." And he returned the pass.

Why raise such moral complexity, especially amid the clamor of a political campaign? Disclosing evacuation directives cannot add much to the credibility of the American deterrent. But it inevitably raises questions about which officials and which generals are judged important enough to be saved, by whom, and at whose expense. The Administration may have to think about the unthinkable, but if it's going to think out loud, then let it be with better grace.


Mr. Koch's Best Bet

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Wrong Year For U.S. A



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Carte
Moscow Says U.S. Seeks Supremacy
8-15-80

By ANTHONY AUSTIN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 14 — The Communist Party paper, Pravda, accused the United States today of intending to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union and blackmail it with a "nuclear club."

The charge, made by Pravda's senior foreign-affairs commentator, Yuri Zhukov, capped a rising chorus of Soviet condemnations of the new American nuclear war strategy, which favors pinpoint strikes on military and political targets rather than mass attacks on cities.

The commentary was coupled with a new appeal for negotiations limiting nuclear weapons in Europe, including the so-called forward-based American systems. The idea was first broached in June by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, to Helmut Schmidt, the visiting West German Chancellor.

Realistic Basis for Solution Seen

Such talks, Mr. Zhukov said, could provide a basis for solutions to the overall problem of nuclear arms limitation.

On the new nuclear doctrine, Mr. Zhukov said: "The aim is to assure military superiority for the United States, and, on that basis, to exercise world domination, blackmailing all and sundry with the help of a nuclear club."

His article intensified a press campaign portraying the United States as ignoring pleas for rescuing détente and pressing for global dominion with its shift in strategy. This campaign has been

closely followed by Western diplomats here.

To judge by the criticism of American policy, the Soviet leadership is in a state of alarm. But the consensus among the diplomats is that the expressions of shocked surprise are largely feigned.

Soviet Thinking Is Interpreted

The reasoning goes as follows: The disclosure of the new policy cannot have been a bolt out of the blue. The move was foreshadowed in Defense Secretary Harold Brown's defense-posture report to Congress in January. Even earlier, Soviet experts noted greater American priority being given to military targets together with the nuclear threat to cities. What the Russians see now is a predictable shift of emphasis in targets.

That this evolution in American strategic doctrine is a cause of some concern here is entirely possible, even probable.

Those in the military establishment who believe it is possible to fight and win a nuclear war must think that American emphasis on disarming the Soviet Union rather than destroying its urban centers could limit its ability to wage such a war.

How many hold such views in the political leadership is a matter of dispute. Going by recent military writing and the private assurances of Soviet civilian experts, the Western diplomats believe that few Soviet leaders think nuclear war can be stopped from getting out of control.

Though Soviet press comments are not regarded in Western circles as necessarily a faithful reflection of official thinking, it was noted that Tass, in one polemic, denied that the Soviet Union had a "pre-emptive nuclear strike" doctrine.

"It is well known that all the efforts of the Soviet Union in the international arena are aimed at insuring that there should be neither a first nor a second nuclear strike, that there should be no nuclear war," Tass said.

Passages in Russian military literature that contend that the Soviet Union can defeat the United States in a nuclear war while remaining a viable society stem, according to the Western analysts, from three considerations:

First, ideological commitment to the Leninist dictum that a war between capitalist and socialist states is certain to be won by the socialists; second, fear for the morale of the Soviet armed forces, should it be admitted by the high command that victory in nuclear war was meaningless, and, third, the necessity for military contingency planning, no matter how skeptical many of the planners are about the realism of their scenarios.

Spread of Limited War Feared

The concern that the new American doctrine would reduce the Soviet Union's fighting ability by increasing the danger to its missile arsenal may, therefore, take second place here to another concern. This is the fear that in some regional military conflict, say, in Europe, American leaders, putting faith in their own "limited nuclear war" scenarios, might be more willing to strike at military targets in the Soviet Union.

If the Soviet reaction to the new American policy is, indeed, taking these forms, then the shift could be said to be having its intended effect of enhancing the deterrent. On the other hand, it could also be argued that it would put more pressure on the Soviet Union, in some future crisis, to use its missiles in a first strike, on the theory that "if they don't use them, they'll lose them."

"We're in a circular argument," one Western analyst said. "A move by one side that can be said to increase the credibility of its deterrent can also be said to undermine that deterrent. Moreover, we don't really know what the Soviets are thinking or what their own doctrine is. We're in the realm of mythology."

Henry Brandon: Nuclear strategy and Mr.

However much the allies at times complain about the lack of consultation between them and the United States, they do not seem to be as surprised as was Secretary of State Edmund Muskie when he lamented the failure of the Department of Defense and the White House to keep him abreast of a new presidential directive shifting the emphasis of targeting American intercontinental missiles from cities to military objectives, from all-out nuclear war to the possibility, at least in theory, of a limited nuclear war.

It may be difficult to understand why the allies were better briefed — and

hence less surprised — than the American secretary of state, but the shift of strategy had been in the making gradually over about five years. Discussions about the so-called "countervailing strategy" among allied governments and their experts in this field had been going on within NATO and outside it ever since it became obvious that the Soviet Union, with its powerful heavy ICBMs, was acquiring a first-strike capability as American nuclear superiority dwindled to rough equality.

Doubts among the allies about the credibility of the U.S. deterrent and U.S.

readiness to risk its own cities in defense of a limited Soviet attack against NATO in Europe also contributed to this shift. So did the enormous progress both sides were making in improving the accuracy of their missiles.

With American forces spread thin around the globe and with the need to maintain American credibility about containing a serious Soviet threat against, say, the Persian Gulf, high American officials began to say that the United States, in case of such a thrust, would counter-attack at a point of its own choosing.

As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown put it: The

Soviet leadership "must understand that if they choose some intermediate level of escalation, the United States could, by more limited responses, impose on the Soviets an unacceptably high cost in terms of what the Soviet leadership values most — political and military control, military power both nuclear and conventional and the industrial capacity to sustain military operations."

A number of earlier decisions pointed in the direction of this shift in American strategic thinking. The new directive, therefore, was more a confirmation of a trend than a

Muskie

THE WASHINGTON STAR Friday, August 15, 1980. A-11

major break with the past. The shift began in 1974 when James Schlesinger, then secretary of defense, set in motion a first partial shift by including a greater number of military objectives in his target list.

Presidential Directive 18 and the defense posture statements by the secretary of defense in 1979 and 1980 also were part of a continuing evolution of the rethinking of American strategy.

President Carter's decision to go ahead with the mobile MX missile was perhaps the strongest indication that the United States was adopting a counterforce strategy, for better or worse. The only puzzling

aspect is why this gradual strategic shift, which did not represent a sudden change in policy, had to be codified in a new directive — and at this particular time, when it is bound to appear to be a ploy to silence Republican criticism of the Carter defense policy.

What will be important is to restrict the number of American warheads targeted on the Soviet Union to about 3,500 high-quality warheads. This number would allow each of the essential targets — between 1,600 and 1,800 — to be covered by two warheads. If, however, the United States were to go be-

yond this number, it not only would inject a serious strategic instability but also would create the suspicion that the United States was aiming at a first-strike capability. An uneasy situation could then develop in which either side might be tempted into a first strike.

What surprised the allies — and even many in the Carter administration — about the new directive was not the directive itself but the timing by calculated leak, and the lack of communication that seems to continue within the national security policy machinery despite all sorts of

expert studies on how to improve it.

We now have it on Secretary Muskie's authority that he had not been briefed about this new and important policy directive and that the State Department had not been able to make its voice adequately heard in the policy deliberations. Muskie's revelations are politically damaging and may further embarrass the American national security processes before the world. There is good reason to assume that President Carter is exceedingly unhappy about having been asked to sign Presidential Directive 59 before it had been shown to the secretary of state.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily

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Wednesday, January 30, 1980

US: New Arms Transfers

THE US HAS announced the following Letters of Offer for defense equipment within the past week.

Country	Item	Value (\$-million)
Denmark	62 M220A1 TOW launchers, 840 BGM-71A TOWs.	\$8.7
Israel	100 GBU-15 glide bomb units (Rockwell)	\$35.1
Israel	25 M60A1 bridge layers with bridges	\$22.7
Jordan	29 M110A2 SP howitzers	\$19.9
Jordan	78 M109A2 155mm SP howitzers	\$46.8
Morocco	24 Hughes 500MD <i>Defender</i> helicopters plus logistic support, training, ammunition, etc. 12 to be equipped with TOW, 12 in gunship configuration.	\$45.0
Morocco	20 F-5E/F aircraft (Northrop) plus infrastructure and training.	\$170.0
Morocco	6 OV-10A <i>Bravo</i> COIN aircraft (Rockwell) plus support services.	\$17.5
Saudi Arabia	Construction services, King Abdulaziz Mil. Academy	\$437.0
Saudi Arabia	50 M220A1 TOW launchers, 1,000 BGM-71A TOW missiles (Hughes) plus ancillary equipment	\$12.7
Saudi Arabia	1,000 GBU-58 munitions, 518 GBU-71 munitions, 3,435 GBU laser guided bombs, 660 AIM-9P <i>Sidewinder</i> AAMS, 916 AGM-65A <i>Alaverick</i> .	\$120.0

The US Defense Department supplied the following notes with the released LoAs, which are expected to win Congressional approval.

Israel: The GBU-15s are to be added to reserves of that weapon already in the Israeli inventory. GBU-15 is a 2,000 lb bomb fitted with glide and guidance devices, to be used against high value targets.

Morocco: The supply of this equipment "does not mean the US favors a military solution to the Sahara dispute. We do, however, believe Morocco must be able to defend itself while efforts continue to find a way for negotiated settlement in the dispute".

Jordan: The howitzers will be used to modernize and complete the equipping of existing field artillery battalions of the Jordanian armed forces. Jordan has 73 M110 series howitzers on hand or on order, and this order will complete acquisition. "This is a necessary part of its conversion to the present four division armored/mechanized force structure." Jordan has 156 M109 howitzers on order or on hand. The M109 purchase will complete acquisition of the type.

Saudi Arabia: The TOW systems will be used as part of the equipment for two mechanized brigades now being formed by the Saudi Arabian ground forces. With the *Dragon* missile they will provide the main AT defense for these units. ■

US: 1980s SAC Plans, B-1

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND Commander General Richard Ellis told the US House of Represent-

tatives Armed Services Committee in late January that "an adverse strategic imbalance has developed" *vis-a-vis* the USSR, "and will continue for some years to come".

To overcome that imbalance, he added, the US should begin development of the General Dynamics FB-111B/C rather than the discontinued Rockwell B-1.

In detailing how he came to "this gloomy assessment" of the declining US strategic strength, General Ellis said his analysis was based on complicated computer surveys of US-Soviet strategic strengths in 1977 (the base point of "rough equivalence"); the current time; 1985; and 1989. The specific details of the computer analyses, contained in a lengthy statement given to the Committee, were not divulged.

General Ellis noted that the 1977 early-1978 base point was a time of "rough strategic equivalence". At the present time, however, General Ellis added that "I can only state that, by today's measurements, an adverse strategic imbalance has developed, and will continue for several years to come".

"This imbalance," he added, "exists not only when our forces are in a day-to-day alert posture (the worst case) but also when fully generated (the best case)."

"This gloomy assessment", he continued, "does not mean that strategic nuclear war is imminent. SAC can and will continue to have the war fighting ability to inflict massive destruction on Soviet economic and military targets under any condition of war initiation. However, it does mean the Soviets can undertake peripheral political and military actions without considering the nuclear consequences to the same degree that was necessary in the early and middle years of the last decade".

"Programs approved in the FY 80 budget," he said, "will begin to ease the imbalance after 1985. To ensure this trend continues and to improve our posture in the early Eighties, SAC believes certain actions are required."

► First, the MX, Air Launched Cruise Missile, and *Trident* programs must not be allowed to slip further and, where possible and practical, should be accelerated.

► Second, immediate steps are required to bring an improved or new manned strategic penetrator on-line as soon as possible. "According to our analysis," the General said, "such a bomber would not only help to correct the serious

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decline in US retaliatory capability between now and 1985, but also close the gap earlier than current programs in both the alert and generated case.

The General noted that two options had been considered: the B-1, and the McDonnell Douglas "stretched" FB-111 B/C. He said that to modify FB-111A and F-111D aircraft with new engines (probably General Electric F-101s developed for the B-1), enlarged weapons capacity, and greatly increased range, would allow the US to regain strategic balance by 1986.

A start-up of the B-1 program would give a force of 100 B-1s by 1987, were the go-ahead to be given in October of 1980.

General Ellis said that based on the operability dates, and on the secondary factor of cost (FB-111B/C would have a favorable cost factor relative to the B-1 of 2.5 to 1 for an "equally capable" force), SAC was recommending the stretched FB-111 "as the best near-term fix".

In additional testimony, General Ellis sought to draw emphasis to the conventional capability of the US manned bomber force, a capability, he said, "often overshadowed by our traditional association with nuclear deterrence". He said that in response to recent Soviet activities, SAC "has developed and made available to the national command authorities new conventional options for use in peripheral crises and contingencies".

The General said that the "many unique capabilities" of the manned bomber make it "ideal" for supporting contingency operations like aerial minelaying, sea-surveillance and reconnaissance, psychological warfare, and rapid force projection. The Boeing B-52 can be delivering "massive firepower on the battlefield in support of theater commanders" in as little as 48 hours of notification. "It can fly such a mission," he said, "from bases thousands of miles from the target area, although it is more effective to operate from forward area bases which have been upgraded for bomber use and have prepositioned war reserve materials. This is particularly true in the Middle East and Indian Ocean area, where we are at the end of our supply lines."

In closing, the General said he supported the Carter Administration's efforts to find base facilities in the Indian Ocean area, calling for bases "capable of accepting the entire spectrum of US military aircraft".

Of related Congressional interest, Rep Robert Dornan on January 24 introduced a resolution before the House calling for the accelerated production and deployment of the B-1. ■

South Africa: Air Force Chief 'Confident'

IN HIS FIRST formal speech as Chief of the South African Air Force, Lieutenant General A M Muller recently expressed his great confidence in that fighting arm.

Gen Muller, who took his appointment on December 1, 1979, has indicated to the Air Force that he will be focusing his attention on teamwork within the service and with the Army and Navy. He pointed out that the Republic has done well in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations within and outside its borders.

He pointed out that (aside from Rhodesia) "... we are the only country in the world that is successfully combatting this type of guerilla warfare." Gen Muller attributes this success to the tough training in all three fighting arms, an innate ability to learn quickly from combat experience, and the technical expertise and self-sufficiency to keep ahead of the enemy.

But, he stressed that in the end there is no substitute for fighting experience, "simulator training notwithstanding. He also pointed out that COIN warfare calls for increasing cooperation among all parts of the Air Force, and especially among the three services. "We mustn't see our role as an isolated one," he said.

Gen Muller also indicated that there is a shortage of pilots in the SAAF which is being closely watched. Pilot training in South Africa is known to be intense and exacting, and it is unlikely that standards will be reduced. Presumably, say observers, wider recruitment and greater efforts at retention will be made.

Meanwhile, there is continuing talk of the possibility of a new basic trainer for the SAAF. Currently, the ancient US-designed *Harvard* is used in this role. But while the SAAF could probably go on rebuilding its fleet of these aircraft indefinitely, it is likely that a newer, more fuel-efficient aircraft is being sought. A possible candidate is the Italian SIAI/Marchetti SF. 260, which also has a light COIN role. But there is some speculation that the Republic is planning to unveil its own indigenous trainer aircraft sometime in 1981. Such an aircraft would probably be similar to the SF. 260, with a turbo engine and COIN capability.

Finally, Brigadier L H Robertson, SM, has been appointed Deputy Director-General Resources, SADF. He is replaced as Commanding Officer Western Province Command by Brigadier S J van der Spuy, former CO of Eastern Province Command. ■

"Vice Admiral M. S. Holcomb, Director of Navy Program Planning, testified before the Seapower Subcommittee that the United States would have to spend \$10 to \$15 billion more than the Carter Administration has recommended for the 5-year period fiscal years 1981-85 in order to achieve a 550-ship fleet." (Source: Rep. Paul Trible, Congressional Record, 3/3/80, pp. H1493-4.)

On U.S. ability to quickly deploy a 4500-man brigade to non-NATO areas: ". . . it would have to be light-armed. To move a mechanized or an armored brigade an equivalent distance would tie up most of our airlift capability for a considerable time." (Source: John Fialka, "Brown Says U.S. May Face 'Turning Point' in History," Washington Star, 1/29/80, p. A6.)

"Our existing mobility forces cannot meet the deployment objectives we have set for FY 1982 for NATO or for some non-NATO contingencies." (Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981, p. 208.)

President Carter stated in his March 14 message to the Congress that ". . . the Defense Department will not be immune from budget austerity. In particular, I will require that department to make savings that do not affect adversely our military preparedness." (Source: "Text of President Carter's Statement on the Nation's Economy," New York Times, 3/15/80, p. 34.)

John Lehman, Chairman of the defense panel of the Republican National Committee, urged a real growth of 20 percent in defense spending for FY 1981, as a first step toward correcting the shortfall problem of the previous decade. Lehman testified before the Senate Budget Committee that an add-on of \$30 billion is needed in FY 1981 "if we are to move to close defense gaps." (Source: William Kuowicz, "How 'Real' Is the Defense Increase?," Wall Street Journal, 1/29/80.)

"Vice Admiral M. S. Holcomb, Director of Navy Program Planning, testified before the Seapower Subcommittee that the United States would have to spend \$10 to \$15 billion more than the Carter Administration has recommended for the 5-year period fiscal years 1981-85 in order to achieve a 550-ship fleet." (Source: Rep. Paul Trible, Congressional Record, 3/3/80, pp. H1493-4.)

On U.S. ability to quickly deploy a 4500-man brigade to non-NATO areas: ". . . it would have to be light-armed. To move a mechanized or an armored brigade an equivalent distance would tie up most of our airlift capability for a considerable time." (Source: John Fialka, "Brown Says U.S. May Face 'Turning Point' in History," Washington Star, 1/29/80, p. A6.)

"Our existing mobility forces cannot meet the deployment objectives we have set for FY 1982 for NATO or for some non-NATO contingencies." (Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981, p. 208.)

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DEFENSE:MR. CARTER AND HIS ADMINISTRATION VS. MILITARY OFFICIAL AND ADVISORS

I. Seriousness of our Defense Shortcomings:

- A) Troop Deployment: We lack adequate airlift capability (See Brown quote of 1/29/80 below)
- B) Shipbuilding Program: Mr. Carter has under-funded Navy shipbuilding if he really hoped to attain an adequate three-ocean fleet (See quotes by Admiral Hayward and Vice Admiral Holcolm below)
- C) Strategic Programs: Mr. Carter has allowed an adverse strategic balance to become unprecedented (See quote by SAC Commander-in-Chief Ellis below)

II. Discrepancies in American Defense Evaluations:

"At present there are excellent grounds for confidence in the U.S. strategic deterrent." (Source: Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981, p. 85.)

"It can also be said with some confidence that a state of mutual strategic deterrence is currently in effect. It follows that nuclear stability would probably prevail in a crisis as well." (Source: Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981, p. 85.)

"The Navy will continue to be the most powerful on the Seas." (Source: "U.S.: Brown Sets Budget Context," Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, 1/31/80.)

"A strong and balanced Navy is essential to our national defense The planned Navy program will enhance current readiness and fund a program of modernization that will ensure the effectiveness of our forces in the future." (Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981, p. 85.)

"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America -- and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." (Source: State of the Union Address, 1/23/80.)

"The rapid deployment forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance." (Source: White House Message to Congress, 1/21/80.)

"At the present time, however, . . . I can only state that by today's measurements, an adverse strategic imbalance has developed, and will continue for several years to come. (Source: Gen. Richard B. Ellis, "U.S. 1980s SAC Plans, B-1," Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, 1/30/80.)

"We are trying to meet three-ocean requirements with a one-and-a-half^{ocean} navy." (Source: Richard Halloran, "Capability of Ships for Navy Debated," New York Times, 2/10/80, p. 21 quoting Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations.)