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MAX HUGEL

The Carter Record



Prepared by the Public Affairs Department
Republican National Committee
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August 1980

In 1976, Jimmy Carter asked the question: "Why not the best?" In 1980, it's still a good question.

But he's not asking it anymore. Mr. Carter, instead, is asserting that what he's done during three and one-half years in the White House is the best he can do. It's clear -- Mr. Carter's best just isn't good enough by far.

The Carter Record is intended to catalogue Mr. Carter's performance in 19 key policy areas. It is intended to help answer the question of Mr. Carter's record, "What is the worst?" in each key issue area.

The 19 issue sections each contain three sub-sections:

- a summary page recounting the worst aspects of Carter performance;
- an analysis of from 5 to 15 pages in length, discussing Carter performance; and
- an appendix setting out the quotations employed in the analysis for ready reference.

The last section, "On" Carter, is a collection of comments by various leaders and political figures, among others, on Jimmy Carter's performance.

A supplementary Carter quote file is now in preparation and will be sent to recipients of The Carter Record as soon as it is printed. This supplement, designed for inclusion in this book, will take the form of a fourth sub-section for each issue section and will consist of a more comprehensive set of Carter quotes on the issues.

The Carter Record is intended to be a research resource. Supplementary information can be obtained from the Republican National Committee's Public Affairs Department on request.

THE CARTER RECORD

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AGRICULTURE -- THE RECORD

Despite his 1976 campaign promise to:

Insure stable prices to the consumer and a fair profit for farmers (Jimmy Carter's Presentation to the Democratic Platform Committee, June 16, 1976),

- Net farm income, per farm, after inventory adjustment, fell from \$13,690 in the first quarter of 1979 to \$10,602 for the first quarter of 1980, a drop of 22.6 percent. (Department of Agriculture, June 1980)
- Since 1976, food prices have risen by 39.3 percent.

Between May 1979 and May 1980:

- Farm production costs rose by almost 10.5 percent (Department of Agriculture, June 1980)
- Prices received by farmers for all products fell by 8.1 percent. (Department of Agriculture, June 1980)
- Livestock and other related product prices have fallen by more than 14 percent. (Department of Agriculture, June 1980)
- The parity ratio fell to 60 percent, a drop of 17.8 percent in the past year. This is the lowest level since the Great Depression. (Department of Agriculture, June 1980)
- Three billion dollars will be lost to farmers in grain exports to the Soviet Union as a result of the ineffective Carter grain embargo.

AGRICULTURE: ANALYSIS

Despite Mr. Carter's promise of *"a coherent, predictable, stable, coordinated food and fiber policy,"* (1976 Carter Platform Presentation) his agricultural policy has been anything but consistent. In the areas of farm income and prices, expenses, credit, parity, government interference, and embargoes and exports, the Carter record has fared poorly -- especially when compared to the Carter rhetoric. He has abandoned the marketplace in favor of government intervention and regulation.

HIGH PRICES TO CONSUMERS, NO PROFIT FOR FARMERS

On June 16, 1976, candidate Jimmy Carter promised to *"insure stable prices to the consumer and a fair profit for farmers."* (1976 Carter Platform Presentation)

The American consumer has had to pay rapidly and steadily increasing prices for food under Mr. Carter. Within ten months of Carter's inauguration, food prices to consumers rose seven percent, and by 1979 they were increasing at an annual rate of nearly 11 percent. (Bureau of Labor Statistics) Carter's economic policies have further escalated this increase: an 18 percent inflation rate, coupled with Carter's ineffective policies on the farm front, had already by July 1980 produced an overall increase of 39.3 percent in consumer food prices since President Gerald Ford left office. (Bureau of Labor Statistics)

Meanwhile, the Department of Agriculture predicts that farm income will drop between 22 and 37 percent during 1980 -- the sharpest drop in over 50 years -- (Washington Post, Clayton Fritchey, July 28, 1980) and that farm costs will rise an estimated nine to 15 percent during the same period. (Agricultural Outlook, June 1980, published by the USDA) Even before Carter's grain embargo, farm income had been expected to drop by 20 percent. (Congressional Quarterly, January 12, 1980) According to a statement by Senator Roger Jepsen on June 2, if "inflation and devalued dollars" are figured in, "the income drop is close to 40 percent." (Statement Released by Senator Roger Jepsen, June 2, 1980) By the end of this year's second quarter, farm expenses had already risen 10.5 percent above the level of a year ago, and the prices received by farmers were down by 5.7 percent. (Agricultural Outlook, June 1980) Senator Bob Dole said on May 30 that "the latest figures from the Department of Agriculture show that farm income is down 39 percent during the second quarter of 1980." (Dole newsletter, May 30, 1980) Last winter, a West Texas farmer translated these figures into practical terms: "Diesel fuel last year was 45 cents, now it's 95 cents. Fertilizer last year was \$125 a ton, now it's \$265 a ton." (Washington Post, February 29, 1980) Since then, those expenses have risen still further and faster; in all, during Mr. Carter's first four years, the Department of Agriculture estimates increases in farm expenses of between 49 and 57 percent. (Agricultural Outlook, June 1980)

At the same time that Candidate Jimmy Carter promised *"a fair profit for farmers"* he promised that *"If I am elected we will make sure that our support prices are at least equal to the cost of production."* (Carter Statement on Farm Policy, August 25, 1976) But consider, as one example, the Administration's record on wheat price supports. During the campaign Vice Presidential candidate Walter Mondale pointed out that the production costs "are at least \$3.00 (per bushel)...," (KFRM interview, Wichita, Kansas, October 1976) yet Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland proposed a target-price for wheat of \$2.47 per bushel, and Carter subsequently threatened to veto any higher target. During 1979, farm production costs were at least 36 percent higher than when Mr. Carter took office.

Yet in August of that year, Bergland announced a plan to lower target prices for wheat, resulting in a target price drop from \$3.40 to \$3.07 per bushel. (Promises, Promises, vol. 3, August 1, 1979)

Candidate Carter also promised "...a parity level that assures farmers a reasonable return on their investments," (1976 Carter Platform Presentation) but Mr. Carter's idea of parity is questionable. During the Carter Administration, parity fell to its lowest levels since March 1933 (H.R. Rep. 96-880, Part I, Appendix A, prepared by CRS) -- the depths of the Great Depression. This April, when it fell, it stayed there through April, through May, through June....(USDA as cited in Economic Indicators, July 1980)

CARTER'S BUREAUCRACY VS. THE FARMER

"A fair profit for farmers" has been further hampered by Mr. Carter's failure to control and manage his own government agencies.

"[Farmers] are in danger of being destroyed economically because of an insensitive government," (Carter Speech on Southern Heritage, September 17, 1976) candidate Jimmy Carter said in 1976. Yet Mr. Carter ironically has managed to juxtapose government over-regulation with government neglect to compound this insensitivity and further endanger the farm, especially the family farm.

Farmers, for example, have been over-regulated by a renegade Food and Drug Administration, Departments of Agriculture and Interior, and Environmental Protection Agency. The latter has failed to strike an intelligent balance for pesticide use, predator control and (along with Interior and the Forest Service) land development. This hurts not only farmers but also consumers, who must pay the higher prices which come from unnecessary and unwise regulation. The USDA's Assistant Secretary for Food and Consumer Services Carol Tucker Foreman and the FDA have similarly failed to recognize that there is a point at which additional regulation strangles the farmer while providing the consumer with little or nothing in the short run, and with higher prices in the long run.

The Carter Administration recently made an attempt, which the Supreme Court eventually held illegal, to limit eligibility for irrigation. (Washington Star, June 21, 1980) This step was to be taken despite the fact that even the Administration's own Department of Interior admitted that it would force thousands of farmers to stop irrigating or sell 1.3 million acres of land. (Washington Post, April 11, 1980) Mr. Carter's water and federal lands policies have been unwise and burdensome for all states, but particularly for the West.

Through neglect and mismanagement, Mr. Carter's Department of Agriculture itself has also victimized the American farmer. The food stamp program, for example, constitutes more and more of USDA's budget. Moreover, this program is indexed for inflation while the other farm related programs are not, and this compounds the abuse. As inflation skyrockets under Mr. Carter, USDA becomes less and less involved with the farmer. In fact, Congressman J. Kenneth Robinson said on June 20 that the latest USDA appropriation bill channeled "67 percent of all funds...to the domestic and international feeding programs of the USDA -- not the farmer." (Robinson newsletter, June 20, 1980) Waste is rampant in these programs. One hundred and thirteen thousand dollars was spent on a study of children's clothes, a major finding of which was that mothers don't like to iron them. (U.S. News and World Report, September 18, 1978) Moreover, Carter's Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland has demonstrated his own insensitivity by announcing that he favored federal withdrawal from further research and development for mechanization helpful

to the American farmer. (Washington Post, February 28, 1980, as quoted by Colman McCarthy) Finally, the Carter Administration has opposed tax reform designed to correct the current inheritance tax laws which are destroying the family farm. (Congressional Quarterly, September 15, 1979)

THE SOVIET GRAIN EMBARGO: ANOTHER CARTER DISASTER

One of the greatest agricultural blunders of the Carter Presidency, however, was the imposition of the Soviet grain embargo.

"...I prefer to go from my farm to the White House and stop embargoes once and for all!" declared Mr. Carter in 1976. (Carter Speech on Farm Policy, August 25, 1976) Unlike many of his campaign promises, Mr. Carter continued to repeat this pledge when he assumed office:

One of the promises I made to the farmers of this state [Iowa] and others during my campaign was there would be no more grain embargoes -- and you can depend on that. There won't be as long as I am in the White House. (Presidential Documents, October 31, 1977)

Yet, on January 4, 1980, Carter announced an 18 million ton embargo of wheat, corn, and soybeans. He then quickly made another promise which he also quickly broke:

I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action. (Presidential Documents, January 4, 1980)

Yet, the Administration opposed implementing a paid acreage diversion to adjust next year's supply consistent with the reduced demand, waited until late March before purchasing wheat and corn embargoed on January 4, and opposed efforts in Congress to increase commodity loan rates. (1980 Republican Platform Committee Issue Brief, Agricultural Task Force: "Soviet Grain Embargo." See also Dole newsletter, April 2, 1980; GOP AgriNews; and Washington Post, March 1, 1980) Grain prices dropped sharply and stayed there; (Washington Post, March 1, 1980) the cost to the American farmer and taxpayer "may top \$4 billion." (Time, January 21, 1980) This figure, moreover, does not include the long-term damage which embargoes do to American trade. Following an embargo, potential trading partners will of course look askance at relying on the United States.

Nor has the embargo seriously inconvenienced the Russians. (New York Times, April 14, 1980; The Economist, July 19, 1980) Misguided though he was in conceiving it in the first place, Carter neglected even the most important aspect of its implementation. For a grain embargo to work, it is essential that the targeted nation be unable to buy its grain elsewhere. Though Administration officials initially announced that Argentina and Brazil would cooperate, these countries later said they would not. Similar miscalculations occurred for other countries, notably Australia and Canada. Mr. Carter also failed to foresee the problem of leakage from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. A recent UPI wire quotes a Tokyo newspaper, for instance, as reporting "that the Russians are procuring U.S. grain in its satellite countries." (UPI, May 2, 1980) The USDA admits that Eastern European grain imports from the U.S. reached an all-time high in the post-embargo months. Moreover, the USDA itself raises the possibility that

"Argentina grain exports may have been diverted from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union" -- which makes Carter's failure to secure Argentine cooperation even more disastrous. (USDA/ESCS report: "U.S. Grain, Soybean and Oilmeal Exports to Eastern Europe, January-March 1980," May 7, 1980)

Without the cooperation of key grain-exporting countries, the inevitable happened. The Department of Agriculture increased its initial three million tons estimate of "leakage" to five million tons, and then quickly to "from five to nine million tons." (Jerry King of the New York Times, telephone interview) Ultimately, United Nations spokesman Edouard Saouma stated flatly that the embargo would have "no effect on the Soviet Union." (New York Times, March 13, 1980)

Other aspects of the grain embargo also smacked of bungling and incompetence. The Administration only belatedly realized that it was pointless to embargo grain without also embargoing the fertilizers used to enhance grain production. Moreover, the phosphate embargo was ultimately implemented in the same haphazard and ineffective manner as the grain embargo. Furthermore, some grain was embargoed, and some was not, and many foodstuffs escaped the embargo altogether. The Administration has recently announced that American grain trading companies would not be asked to refrain from selling foreign grain to the USSR, as long as they did not sell grain grown by American farmers to them. (UPI, June 20, 1980)

A final facet of the embargo is worth noting. After years of foot-dragging and outright opposition to gasohol development, the Carter Administration suddenly announced that five million tons of embargoed corn would be used to produce 500 million gallons of ethanol for use in making gasohol. (Time, January 21, 1980) Yet, after three years of delay, the U.S. is now completely unprepared to meet such an unrealistic goal. U.S. present annual distilling capacity is only 80 million gallons. (Time, January 21, 1980) Moreover, according to Senator Larry Pressler, the Administration did not even have plans for interested farmers on how to make gasohol. (Testimony of Republican Platform Regional Hearings, Washington, D.C., May 8, 1980)

OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAILURES

The grain embargo, however, is only one of Carter's failings on the international agricultural front. Though Carter promised to promote free and fair agricultural trade with foreign countries, he has allowed the dumping of foreign agricultural goods -- including, for instance, Mexican tomatoes, foreign dairy products, and imported beef -- onto the U.S. market. (UPI, March 24, 1980, National Milk Producers News Letter, November 1977; Washington Post, April 19, 1980; RNC's Promises, Promises, volume 2 and 3, #199, 201-203) Additionally, he has failed to put adequate pressure on the Japanese and Europeans to remove their restrictions on importing American farm products into their countries, even though the U.S. continues to welcome the importation of their own goods -- again at the expense of the American farmer. Since 1979, Mr. Carter has continually reduced funding for the Commodity Credit Corporation's short-term and intermediate export loan programs, dealing a final blow to these important market development tools in his proposed 1981 budget by refusing to allocate any funds whatsoever to them. ("New Markets Needed to Offset Carter Grain Embargo," GOP Agriculture Task Force, May 1980)

AMERICA'S GREATEST RESOURCE

Carter's failed promises and mistakes, coupled with his lack of a cohesive agricultural policy, have proved to be a disaster for the country's greatest resource -- the

American farm. Agriculture is the nation's largest industry. Total assets of U.S. agricultural holdings amount to \$790 billion -- over three-fourths of the capital assets of all American manufacturing corporations. One out of every five Americans employed in private enterprise works in some phase of growing or marketing food and fiber. This makes the agricultural sector of our economy the nation's largest employer. (Fact Book of U.S. Agriculture, published by USDA, November 1979) Despite Mr. Carter, the American farmer will sell more than \$38 billion worth of farm products abroad in 1980, double the amount which will be imported. (UPI, May 14, 1980) The American farmer is unmatched for productivity; he feeds, clothes, and houses not only America, but much of the rest of the world as well.

"We need a President...who understand[s] the problems of the family farmer..." candidate Jimmy Carter said in August of 1976. (Carter Speech on Farm Policy, August 25, 1976) That President is not Jimmy Carter.

A P P E N D I X

"It is time that we developed a coherent, predictable, stable, coordinated food and fiber policy."

--1976 Carter Platform Presentation

"This policy should insure stable prices to the consumer and a fair profit for farmers."

--1976 Carter Platform Presentation

"If I am elected we will make sure that our support prices are at least equal to the cost of production."

--Statement on Farm Policy
August 25, 1976

"[This policy should] guarantee adequate price supports and a parity level that assures farmers a reasonable return on their investments."

--1976 Carter Platform Presentation

"[Farmers] are in danger of being destroyed economically because of an insensitive government."

--Speech on Southern Heritage
September 17, 1976

"...I prefer to go from my farm to the White House and stop embargoes once and for all!"

--Statement on Farm Policy
August 25, 1976

"One of the promises I made to the farmers of this state [Iowa] and others during my campaign was there would be no more grain embargoes -- and you can depend on that. There won't be as long as I am in the White House."

--Presidential Documents
October 31, 1977

"I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action."

--Presidential Documents
January 4, 1980

"We need a President and a Secretary of Agriculture who understand the problems of the family farmer and the American consumer and if I am elected, we are going to have both."

--Statement on Farm Policy
August 25, 1976

BUDGET

THE CARTER BUDGET -- THE RECORD

During his campaign, Mr. Carter promised to deliver a balanced budget to the American people before he left office. He has, in fact, delivered four fiscal year budget deficits instead.

- In Fiscal Year 1977, the budget deficit stood at \$45 billion.
- In Fiscal Year 1978, the budget deficit rose to \$48.8 billion.
- In Fiscal Year 1979, a non-recessionary boom year, the budget went into the red by \$27.7 billion.
- In Fiscal Year 1980, although the budget deficit has not yet been determined, the Carter Administration conceded a \$60.9 billion deficit in July.
- At the same time, the declining incomes and tax revenues resulting from the Carter recession have turned the Administration's March forecast of a \$16.5 billion surplus into a \$29.8 billion deficit for Fiscal Year 1981.

(Source: Office of Management and Budget Mid-session Review of the 1981 Budget, July 21, 1980)

- Mr. Carter's plan to harness the federal budget by means of zero-based budgeting has not only proven to be an Administration failure, but has also received much criticism from the originator of the concept, Peter Pyhrr.
- Since Mr. Carter has come into office the rate of growth in taxes has exceeded spending by 69 to 57 percent.

Three and one-half years of Carter's imprudent and irresponsible budgetary policies have resulted in:

- A federal spending increase of \$231.1 billion.
- A federal tax increase of \$246.2 billion.
- A National Debt increase of \$300.9 billion.

(Source for above figures are from Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1981: March Revisions)

THE CARTER BUDGET: ANALYSIS

As a candidate, Mr. Carter promised that:

There's no doubt in my mind that before I go out of office the budget will be balanced. (Los Angeles Times, June 16, 1976)

After three and one-half years in office, this promise, like so many others Mr. Carter made, has been broken.

LARGE DEFICITS

Each budget the Carter Administration has submitted to the Congress from Fiscal Years 1977 to 1980 has been in deficit. In Fiscal Year 1977, the budget deficit stood at \$45 billion, a year later it rose to \$48.8 billion and in 1979, a non-recessionary boom year, the budget went into the red by \$27.7 billion. The final judgement is not in for the 1980 Fiscal Year, but the Administration which in March conceded a \$36.5 billion deficit, conceded a \$60.9 billion deficit in July. Moreover, the declining incomes and tax revenues resulting from the Carter recession have turned the Administration's March forecast of a \$16.5 billion surplus into a \$29.8 billion deficit for Fiscal Year 1981. (Office of Management and Budget Mid-session Review of the 1981 Budget, July 21, 1980)

ZERO-BASED BUDGETING

Mr. Carter, during his 1976 campaign, stated that he wanted to bring the budget under control by a mechanism called "zero-based budgeting," a management tool that was supposed to review the way in which each and every federal dollar was spent.

But, from its inception, zero-based budgeting has proven to be an Administration failure. In a letter to the then director of the Office of Management and Budget, Bert Lance, Peter A. Pyhrr, the originator of zero-based budgeting, noted that the Carter plan was too broad and was so "screwed up" from unworkable concepts that even he did not understand them. (St. Louis Dispatch, June 30, 1977)

Furthermore, a study by the Brookings Institution suggested that zero-based budgeting was ill-suited for dealing with most of the federal budget and actually reduces the chances for large cutbacks in old programs. (New York Times, July 14, 1977)

The failure to bring spending under control and institute managerial reforms has led to much fraud, waste, and abuse. A report prepared by the staff of the Joint Economic Committee stated that the Justice Department estimated that fraud and abuse account for one to 10 percent of total federal expenditures or \$5 to \$50 billion. The report further noted that:

This figure excludes waste -- including it would give a much higher figure, as Justice (Department) estimated that fraud, abuse, and waste ranged between \$6.3 billion and \$7.4 billion in H.E.W.'s programs alone. (Productivity in the Federal Government, Joint Economic Committee, May 31, 1979)

In the opinion of Comptroller General Elmer Staats, the reasons that fraud waste, and abuse continue in the federal government are a lack of adequate management information systems, the low priorities given to fraud detection and referral for investigation, and inadequacy of agency investigators. (Productivity in the Federal Government, Joint Economic Committee, May 31, 1979)

INCREASED TAXES

Yet, in a perverse way, Carter has tried to balance the budget, not by cutting back on programs, not by eliminating waste and fraud, nor by even holding the lid on the rate of growth in spending. Instead, Mr. Carter has done so by raising taxes. Since Mr. Carter has come into office the rate of growth in taxes has outstripped even spending. Between Fiscal Year 1977 and Fiscal Year 1981, spending has grown by 57 percent while taxes have grown by 69 percent. (The Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1981 and Midsession Review of the 1981 Budget, July 21, 1980)

THE FISCAL YEAR 1981 BUDGET

The Fiscal Year 1981 budget represents a case study around which three years of budgetary failures have coalesced.

In January 1980, President Carter proposed his election year, Fiscal Year 1981 budget calling it "*prudent and responsible.*" He further noted that his budgetary proposals "*...reflect the maturing of the Administration's basic, consistent, underlying policy themes: restraint in budgeting the taxpayer's dollars...*"

Mr. Carter concluded:

I believe that this budget...supports the fundamental policies that will prepare America for the future.
(Text of Mr. Carter's Budget Message for Fiscal Year 1981 to Congress, January 28, 1980)

The Fiscal Year 1981 budget called for \$600 billion in taxes, \$615.8 billion in spending with a deficit of \$16 billion. In times of double digit inflation, the proposed Fiscal Year 1981 budget was hardly "*prudent and responsible.*" It was, however, characterized by the Wall Street Journal (1/29/80) as "imprudent and irresponsible," and..."inflationary." The Journal also concluded that "it is larded with election year pork. It makes no attempt to bring runaway programs....under control."

By March 31 the Administration was forced to, in effect, concede that their once "*prudent and responsible*" budget was neither. Indeed the earlier claim that Jimmy Carter's budgetary policy would "*prepare America for the future,*" became a threat and not a hopeful promise. In response to higher inflation and explosive interest rates, the Administration revised its January budget to include \$628 billion in taxes, \$611.5 billion in spending and a proposed surplus of \$16.5 billion.

The surplus in the revised 1981 Budget would be achieved by a rise in taxes. Mr. Carter proposed a 10 cents per gallon gasoline tax, a withholding tax on interest and dividend income, and a withholding tax on the earnings of independent contractors. In all, the revised Carter budget called for \$104.2 billion in

higher taxes above his January 1979 budget proposal. This was the largest, single year, peacetime tax increase in U.S. history. (Fiscal Year Budget Revisions, March 1980)

On July 21, 1980 the Administration released its Mid-Session Review of the 1980 Federal Budget and Americans finally got a clear view of *"the fundamental policies that will prepare America for the future."* The report conceded that for the next two years inflation would continue in the double-digit range and that unemployment would rise to 8.5 percent in Fiscal Year 1980 and remain at that annual level through Fiscal Year 1981. The once touted \$16.5 billion Fiscal Year 1981 surplus, the political pearl of the March budget, now turned into a \$29.8 billion deficit. While the Administration called the July analysis a "policy of stringency...", spending and deficits continued to rise. The report projected spending levels for 1980 rising from \$563.6 billion in January to \$578.8 billion in July -- an increase of \$15.2 billion. Its revisions took note that the recession reduced tax revenues by \$5.9 billion falling from \$523.8 in January to \$517.9 in July. With rising unemployment shrinking the revenue base, the federal deficit soared from the January level of \$39.8 billion to \$60.9 in July. The budgetary projections for Fiscal Year 1981 were even worse. The March through July revisions indicated that spending levels would grow from \$611.5 billion to \$633.8 billion, an increase of \$22 billion. A deepening recession along with congressional and judicial rejection of some of Carter's earlier taxing schemes caused projected revenues to fall from \$628 billion to \$604 billion while the \$16.5 billion surplus turned into a \$29.8 billion deficit.

The final judgement is still not in for the Fiscal Year 1980 and Fiscal Year 1981 budgets. As deficits deepen so does inflation, setting off even higher levels of unemployment.

CONCLUSION

The legacy of three and one-half years of Carter budgetary policy is the highest rates of inflation in the post-War period, the highest interest rates since the Civil War, the highest tax increases in history and a recession which may put more than nine million people out of work by the end of this year.

In short, Carter's most recent budget proposal was a continuation of his inflationary tax and spend policies which have, in turn, forced the economy into a recession. Three and one-half years of Carter's imprudent and irresponsible budgetary policies have resulted in:

- Federal spending increase by \$231.1 billion, rising from \$402.7 billion in Fiscal Year 1977 to \$633.8 billion in Fiscal Year 1981; an increase of 57 percent.
- Federal taxes rising by \$246.2 billion, rising from \$357.8 in Fiscal Year 1977 to \$628 billion for Fiscal Year 1981; an increase of 69 percent.
- The National Debt rising by \$300.9 billion, rising from \$709.1 billion in Fiscal Year 1977 to \$1.01 trillion in Fiscal Year 1981; an increase of 42 percent.
- A \$212 billion cumulative increase in spending deficits.

(Source for above figures are from Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1981, March revisions unless otherwise indicated.)

A P P E N D I X

"There's no doubt in my mind that before I go out of office the budget will be balanced."

*--Los Angeles Times
June 16, 1976*

"This budget for 1981 is prudent and responsible."

*--Text of Mr. Carter's Budget Message
for Fiscal Year 1981 to Congress
January 28, 1980*

"They [policy decisions] reflect the maturing of the administration's basic, consistent underlying policy themes: restraint in budgeting the taxpayers' dollars; the strengthening of our defense; providing energy for the future; improving opportunities for the Nation's youth; and making Government work better."

*--Text of Mr. Carter's Budget Message
for Fiscal Year 1981 to Congress
January 28, 1980*

"I believe that this budget...supports the fundamental policies that will prepare America for the future."

*--Text of Mr. Carter's Budget Message
for Fiscal Year 1981 to Congress
January 28, 1980*

CRIME—JUSTICE

CRIME AND JUSTICE -- THE RECORD

Although Mr. Carter said,

There is no excuse for crime...The time has come to declare that crime is unacceptable in our nation, (Carter speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, October 15, 1976)

Crime Index offenses soared eight percent in 1979. (Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 30, 1980)

- In 1979, one household in five was hit by crime at least once, with either property stolen or a member of the household a victim of physical assault. (Gallup Poll, December 2, 1979)
- Violent crime has increased by nearly 20 percent during Mr. Carter's term of office. (Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
- Mr. Carter has systematically undermined the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency.
- Mr. Carter dismantled the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy. Congressional Quarterly, October 7, 1978)

And, despite proclaiming

We can no longer afford to treat the administration of justice as political patronage, (Carter Position Paper, Criminal Justice, 1976)

Mr. Carter's "independent" judicial selection commissions included 162 commissioners through April 1979, of which 82 percent were Democrats, nine percent Republicans, and nine percent independents. ("A Study of the U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commissions," Judicature, September 1979)

--Of the first 84 commissioners appointed, 46 percent had participated in Mr. Carter's presidential campaign. (Judicature, September 1979)

--Of the first 28 Commission selections nominated by Mr. Carter, 24 were Democrats. (Judicature, September 1979)

- Although Mr. Carter stated,

The Attorney General of this nation must be removed from politics, (Carter Position Paper, Criminal Justice, 1976)

his then-Attorney General, Griffin Bell, fired Philadelphia U.S. Attorney David Marston "solely because of political considerations" after Mr. Carter received a phone call from Congressman Joshua Eilberg, D-Pa., who was under investigation, that Marston's dismissal be "expedited." (Washington Post, February 4, 1978)

CRIME AND JUSTICE: ANALYSIS

When campaigning for the presidency, Mr. Carter said,

Restoring order to our society is...a question of leadership.
(Carter speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, October 15, 1976)

The facts show clearly that Mr. Carter has failed to provide the leadership necessary to combat crime in our nation. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was moved recently to say, "Crime remains one of our nation's most serious problems... Every American should be troubled." (Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 30, 1980)

CRIME RATES UP SHARPLY

Although Mr. Carter stated emphatically,

There is no excuse for crime...The time has come to declare that crime is unacceptable in our nation...
(Carter speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, October 15, 1976)

crime is rising at an alarming rate nationwide.

Crime Index offenses soared eight percent in 1979. All city and county population groups, areas, and regions shared in the increase. (Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 30, 1980) During 1979, one household in five was hit by crime at least once, with either property stolen or a member of the household a victim of physical assault. (Gallup Poll, December 2, 1979)

Violent crimes as a group rose 11 percent nationwide in 1979. Forcible rape and robbery each jumped 12 percent, while murder and aggravated assault each rose nine percent. Property crimes rose eight percent, with gains of ten percent for motor vehicle theft, nine percent for larceny-theft, and six percent for burglary. (Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 30, 1980)

Violent crime has increased by nearly 20 percent during Mr. Carter's term of office. In 1976, the number of violent crimes reported was 986,578. In 1979, the figure was 1,178,627, the third straight year of seven-digit violent crime figures. (Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation)

Yet, not only has Mr. Carter failed to propose significant legislation in the area of law enforcement, he has moved to undercut successful programs that were in operation when he took office.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AGENCY UNDERMINED

Congress created the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency in 1968 to bolster state and local criminal justice and law enforcement programs. The legislation creating the agency employed a then-new concept, block grants. Under the block grant procedure, funds are given to the states. The money is then allocated to the local governments by state planning agencies.

The LEAA has proved to be one of the most popular and successful law enforcement programs, enjoying particularly strong support from those who shoulder the day-to-day responsibility for the protection of our citizens -- state and local law enforcement,

judicial, and correction officials. Even the LEAA's critics acknowledge that the agency has had a positive impact. Senator Joseph Biden, D-Del., believes the agency "has promoted inter-agency planning and been a major force for innovation in law enforcement and the courts." (Congressional Quarterly, March 3, 1979)

But Mr. Carter has continually sought to undermine the LEAA during his term of office. In 1977, then-Attorney General Griffin Bell recommended to Mr. Carter that the LEAA be abolished altogether. In 1978, Mr. Carter proposed a plan whereby the LEAA would remain, but two new sister agencies would be created to assume some of the LEAA's functions. No congressional action was taken on the proposal.

During the final fiscal year of the Ford Administration, the budget for the LEAA was approximately \$770 million. Mr. Carter has systematically reduced the amount allocated to the LEAA to the point where, in his Fiscal Year 1981 Budget Revisions, he requested only \$177 million for the LEAA, only 23 percent of its 1976 budget. (Fiscal Year Budget Revisions, March 1980)

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY DISMANTLED

Illicit drug trafficking is one of our nation's major crime problems. Income from retail heroin sales in Chicago alone has been estimated to total between \$300 million and \$1 billion each year. (National Republican Congressional Committee brief, "A New Look at Drug Laws," December 15, 1979)

In 1976, Mr. Carter promised to

coordinate and escalate our efforts to control the illicit traffic in drugs, (Carter speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, October 15, 1976)

but has undermined, rather than escalated, the federal fight against drug abuse.

Widely credited with effectively coordinating the federal government's far-flung drug abuse enforcement and treatment agencies, the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) was also applauded for reducing the availability of heroin to a seven-year low in 1976. (Congressional Quarterly, October 7, 1978) But, in Mr. Carter's 1977 reorganization of the executive office, the ODAP was abolished. The ODAP staff, reduced from ten to six, was transferred to the White House Domestic Policy Staff. The White House drug abuse effort was further diminished by the resignation, in 1978, of Drug Abuse Adviser Dr. Peter Bourne, after he was reported to have written a fraudulent prescription for Quaalude, a frequently-abused sedative.

Not content, Mr. Carter tried to dilute federal drug abuse efforts further, in 1979, by proposing to consolidate them with alcoholism and mental health programs. He was subsequently given a warning by Senate leaders not to tamper with the independent status of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). (Congressional Quarterly, May 19, 1979)

POLITICIZATION OF JUSTICE

On the issue of criminal justice, Mr. Carter piously proclaimed,

We can no longer afford to treat the administration of justice as political patronage...The Attorney General of this nation must be removed from politics...All federal judges and prosecutors should be appointed strictly on the basis of merit without any consideration of political aspect or influence...Independent, blue ribbon judicial selection committees should be established to give recommendations to the President of the most qualified persons available for positions when vacancies occur.
(Carter Position Paper, Criminal Justice, 1976)

Mr. Carter's performance has fallen far short of his rhetoric. He did establish judicial selection commissions for U.S. Circuit Court judges, but they can hardly be referred to as independent. According to a 1979 report, of the 162 commissioners chosen from February 1977 through April 1979, 82 percent were Democrats, nine percent Republicans, and nine percent independents. Forty-six percent of the 84 commissioners appointed between February 1977 and October 1978 who responded to a survey conducted by Judicature stated that they had participated in Mr. Carter's presidential campaign. Thirty-four percent of these has "held an office in the Democratic Party or had been elected to public office as Democrats. (There was only one Republican office holder.)" ("A Study of the U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commissions," Judicature, September 1979)

As of May 1979, Mr. Carter had nominated 28 of the Commission's judicial selections. Twenty-four of these were Democrats, three were independents, and only one was a Republican. (Judicature, September 1979)

Federal District Court judges in many states are still appointed by the President after being recommended by the Senators from that state in which the district is located. (Congressional Quarterly, October 27, 1979) No arrangement has been made for the merit appointment of U.S. Attorneys. As of June 1979, "67 of the 94 U.S. Attorneys [had been] replaced, all by Democrats." (Wall and Ceiling News and Views, June 1979)

David Marston, a U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia appointed by President Ford, was fired by then-Attorney General Griffin Bell on January 20, 1978. Mr. Bell made it clear that Marston was being removed "not because of lack of merit qualification, but solely because of political consideration." (Washington Post, February 4, 1978) Mr. Carter admitted in a press conference on January 12, 1978 that he had received a call from Congressman Joshua Eilberg, D-Pa., asking that Marston's dismissal be "expedited." Eilberg's activities had been under investigation by Marston. Both Mr. Carter and Mr. Bell were officially cleared by the Justice Department of any obstruction of justice but questions remain. Time magazine suggested that Mr. Carter had lied four times in his press conference with respect to the Marston affair. (Time, February 6, 1978)

More evidence of Mr. Carter's political interference in the activities of the Attorney General surfaced when Mr. Bell admitted in testimony before the House Administration Committee that he "had nothing to do with drawing" the Universal Voter Registration Bill and a Department of Justice memo indicated Mr. Bell's testimony was drafted for him by the White House. (House testimony cited by Sen. Griffin in Senate Rules Committee Hearings on Universal Voter Registration)

In the words of David Cohen, President of Common Cause, "...[O]ne overriding weakness [of the Carter Administration] is that the Justice Department has been heavily poltiicized." (Washington Post, May 11, 1977)

A P P E N D I X

"There is no excuse for crime...The time has come to declare that crime is unacceptable in our nation."

--Carter Speech to the Economic
Club of Detroit
October 15, 1976

"Restoring order to our society is...a question of leadership."

--Carter Speech to the Economic
Club of Detroit
October 15, 1976

"We must coordinate and escalate our efforts to control the illicit traffic in drugs."

--Carter Speech to the Economic
Club of Detroit
October 15, 1976

"We can no longer afford to treat the administration of justice as political patronage...The Attorney General of this nation must be removed from politics... All Federal judges and prosecutors should be appointed strictly on the basis of merit without any consideration of political aspect or influence...Independent, blue ribbon judicial selection committees should be established to give recommendations to the President of the most qualified persons available for positions when vacancies occur."

--Carter Position Paper
Criminal Justice, 1976

DEFENSE

DEFENSE -- THE RECORD

Despite his promise to maintain "*a strong national defense, a defense second to none,*" Jimmy Carter has followed a course of unilateral disarmament. He:

- Cut \$38 billion in three years from President Ford's projected defense budget.
- Delayed the MX missile by at least three years.
- Shut down our Minuteman III ICBM production line.
- Cancelled the B-1 bomber.
- Slowed down the Trident submarine and the Trident II ballistic missile programs.
- Slowed down all three cruise missile programs (air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles).
- Deferred any decision on enhanced radiation weapons (neutron bomb).
- Cut naval ship-building programs in half.
- Vetoed a nuclear aircraft carrier.
- Allowed our armed forces to fall far below their recruitment goals and our military reserves to fall 20 percent below necessary war-time preparedness levels.
- Cancelled a fleet of Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft.
- Jeopardized alliance cohesion and credibility with his vacillating policy stands and his failure to meet commitments or to consult in a timely and meaningful manner.
- Promised to adhere to the terms of an unratified and inequitable strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II).

(Source: "An Evaluation of the Carter Administration's Defense Policies," prepared by the Defense Subcommittee, Republican National Committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International Affairs.)

DEFENSE: ANALYSIS

Mr. Carter's record on defense and national security policies has been one of shameful neglect and blatant deception. He came to office calling the Pentagon one of the most wasteful bureaucracies in Washington and claiming that he could "*reduce present defense expenditures by about \$5 to \$7 billion annually*" without undermining our national security. (Letter to the Democratic Platform Committee, January 17, 1976)

Over the last three years, the Administration's rhetoric has changed but its policies have not. They continue to be based on dangerous misperceptions about Soviet intentions and the motivations behind their unprecedented military buildup over the past decade.

NO REAL INCREASES IN DEFENSE SPENDING

In recent months Mr. Carter has loudly proclaimed his commitment to a strong national defense and increased spending to reverse the adverse military balance that has emerged vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. But his conversion is shallow. In reality, he and his various spokesmen have glossed over the facts, performed continual flip-flops on the issue, misled the public and made out-and-out misrepresentation of the facts.

Shortly after taking office, Mr. Carter proposed a three percent real annual increase in defense spending through 1984. When our NATO allies agreed in principle to cooperate in this effort Defense Secretary Brown said he hoped that "the decisions would convey to the Warsaw Pact countries...(that) the competition is not going to be one-sided." (Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1977) Mr. Carter has consistently claimed to have lived up to his pledge. Yet, his record on this is erratic. His claims have repeatedly been based on ridiculously low inflation estimates, requiring last-minute and confusing supplemental requests. Moreover, the Administration has indulged in questionable manipulation of figures. For instance, the Pentagon plans to cut \$82 million from its outlays for Fiscal Year 1980 in order to show a three percent growth rate from 1980 to 1981. According to a memo circulated in the Defense Department, it might cut an additional \$83 million in order to reach a 3.1 percent growth rate. (Richard Burt, New York Times, April 17, 1980)

But mere numbers manipulation is perhaps less disturbing than the outright deception of the American public. Mr. Carter's "tough" defense stand began when his SALT II treaty was jeopardized and hardened further when his pollsters became convinced that the American public's mood toward defense spending had changed.

For instance, an AP-NBC poll of January 23, 1980 found that 63 percent of the American public supports an increase in the defense budget while 21 percent wants to maintain current levels and eight percent wants a reduction. This compares to a poll taken in September 1979 that found sentiment divided over defense spending with 38 percent favoring an increase, 36 percent favoring the current level of spending and 16 percent favoring a decrease. Similarly, a New York Times-CBS poll of January 16, 1980 found that 46 percent of the public thought we were spending too little on defense, 23 percent thought we were spending the right amount and 14 percent thought too much was being spent. This was a complete turnaround from 1979 when 52 percent said too much, 31 percent said right amount and eight percent said too little. (Public Opinion Report, January 27, 1980, Issue No. 76)

Mr. Carter's newly proclaimed commitment to a strong national defense is not matched by his actions:

- In September 1979 the President rejected the Senate's overwhelming call for a five percent real growth in defense spending for 1981 and 1982, saying in a letter to Senator Ernest Hollings that he could not support that level of growth for either of those years. (Washington Post, September 12, 1980)
- In December, he changed his mind, saying that *"events in Iran have been a vivid reminder of the need for a strong and united America"* and that his five-year defense program *"provides real funding increases that average more than four and one-half percent a year."* (Televised Address, December 12, 1979)
- In January, the defense budget proposal called for a 5.4 percent real growth in authorization for Fiscal Year 1981. Defense Secretary Brown claimed that the request was carefully "calibrated" to meet our defense needs, that carrying out the program "completely" was "the most elemental and important of all our responsibilities" and that if inflation estimates proved too low the Administration would take "appropriate action to preserve the integrity of the program." (DOD Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981, p. 13) Mr. Carter said that it was *"imperative that Congress approve this strong defense budget...without any reduction."* (State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980)

As the Congressional debate on the 1981 budget began, it became clear that Mr. Carter's estimates of 8.1 and 8.4 percent inflation were ridiculously below the real rate of 18 percent. Moreover, his proposals underestimated fuel costs by at least 40 percent and failed to take into account increased operations in the Indian Ocean prompted as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in Iran. (First Concurrent Resolution of the Budget, Fiscal Year 1981, Report of the House Committee on the Budget, Supplemental views, p. 299)

But what proposals did Mr. Carter make to offset these underestimates and to maintain the "integrity" of the proposed defense programs:

- In March, 1980, Mr. Carter submitted revised budget proposals. He cited the need for an additional \$2.96 billion for increased fuel costs, \$1 billion to offset inflation and \$619 million to cover Indian Ocean deployments, for a total of \$4.6 billion. Yet he asked only for an additional \$2.9 billion, saying that his defense budget would cut back on previously planned programs to make up the difference. (Charles Corddry, Baltimore Sun, April 1, 1980)

How programs considered essential before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became dispensible after that *"most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War"* is left to the imagination of anyone keeping up with Carter promises. But this is not even the worst of Carter's deceptions.

- After submitting the March request for an additional \$2.9 billion in spending, Mr. Carter, in a letter to House Speaker Tip O'Neil, stated that he *"strongly favor(ed)"* the adoption of an amendment offered by Congressman David Obey -- an amendment that proposed a cut of \$3.6 billion in defense spending.

And Mr. Carter continues to oppose Congressional additions to the defense budget that would bring it closer in line with his promise of 5.4 percent real increase.

- In May he sent a letter to Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John Stennis, claiming that the \$6.2 billion added to the defense budget by the House-Senate conference committee would *"adversely affect today's military readiness."* (George Wilson, Washington Post, May 23, 1980)

In the midst of these flip-flops on defense spending, Mr. Carter added yet a new twist. Receiving the Nimitz aircraft carrier on its return from the Persian Gulf he promised support for greater military compensation in such areas as housing, re-enlistment bonuses, sea duty pay and flight pay. Two months before, the Administration had lobbied against just such legislation when, despite Administration opposition, the Nunn-Warner sponsored legislation passed the Senate by an overwhelming margin. (Bernard Weinraub, New York Times, May 27, 1980)

Mr. Carter has come under heavy fire from members of his own party for these flip-flops. Senator Ernest Hollings called Mr. Carter's opposition to the conference committee's defense budget the "height of hypocrisy" and "outrageous, deplorable conduct." Senator Hollings said that Mr. Carter was trying to have it both ways and that "he doesn't want a balanced budget; he wants a campaign budget." (Helen Dewar, Washington Post, May 29, 1980) Senator Sam Nunn accused Mr. Carter of having "reversed his own course on national defense at least four times since last November" and termed his call for increased military compensation aboard the Nimitz "one of the most imaginative uses of mathematics in my time on the Hill." (George Wilson, Washington Post, June 3, 1980)

Mr. Carter's own Joint Chiefs of Staff have declared the current budget to be inadequate to meet the Soviet threat. Army Chief of Staff, General E.C. Meyer, said that we now "have a hollow Army" and that he didn't believe that "the current budget responds to the Army's needs for the 1980s." Marine Corps Commandant General Robert Barrow, asked if the budget was adequate, responded to the House Armed Services Committee that the answer was, "in a word, no." Deputy to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, said that the budget "fell short of Navy requirements." And Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General David C. Jones, said that if he were a member of Congress he would not vote against the conference committee's compromise budget, the budget that Mr. Carter called detrimental to "today's military readiness." (George C. Wilson, Washington Post, May 30, 1980)

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES CUTBACK

It is apparent that Mr. Carter still fails to grasp the fundamental problem. America's increasingly urgent need for enhanced military capabilities and the calls for real increases in defense spending are not based on assumptions that a growing defense budget is intrinsically good. The key issue is whether our defense capabilities are adequate to meet our military objectives and defend our legitimate national security interests. Shortly after taking office, President Ford initiated a wide-ranging review of U.S. military posture. Foreseeing the development of several adverse trends in the military balance, he rejected the posture of U.S. military inferiority that would result if those trends were allowed to continue. Accordingly, he proposed a set of expensive but necessary military programs. His plans called for modernization of all three legs of our strategic triad. But Mr. Carter rejected all these initiatives.

- President Ford approved plans for a new land-based intercontinental missile, the MX. Mr. Carter delayed full production of the MX, pushing its initial operational capability date back by at least three years. Because the MX will not be fully deployed until late in the 1980s, the United States' ICBM force has become vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

- Mr. Carter shut down the only existing ICBM production line, leaving us 50 short of the number of Minuteman III missiles recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Armed Forces Journal International, March 1978)
- President Ford approved plans for the Trident submarine and for a new submarine-based missile, the Trident II. Mr. Carter has delayed both of these programs, despite an aggressive Soviet effort to advance their anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
- President Ford approved a new manned strategic bomber, the B-1, with a complementary air-launched cruise missile system capable of overwhelming Soviet air defenses. Mr. Carter cancelled this bomber altogether, leaving the United States with only an aging fleet of B-52s, most of which are 25 years old. He also slowed down the air-launched cruise missile program.

Mr. Carter's record on correcting deficiencies in our conventional and tactical nuclear forces is equally dismal:

- President Ford approved plans for extensive development and production of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. Mr. Carter slowed down development of these systems.
- President Ford approved plans for a fleet of Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft to enhance U.S. airlift capabilities. Mr. Carter cancelled this fleet shortly after taking office, delaying by many years the necessary upgrading of our ability to move rapidly into trouble spots throughout the world.
- President Ford approved plans for enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons to offset the three to one Soviet/Warsaw Pact advantage in tanks and armored personnel carriers in Europe. Mr. Carter badgered our European allies into making politically risky commitments to the neutron weapons and then pulled the rug out from under them by deferring any decision on production of the weapons.
- President Ford approved plans for naval ship-building capable of producing an active fleet of 550 ships. Despite promises to favor an **"aggressive"** ship-building program, (New York Times, June 6, 1976) Mr. Carter cut this plan in half.

ARMS CONTROL


Mr. Carter's approach to defense policies throughout his term in office has been dictated more by his moral commitment to disarmament than by concern for maintaining legitimate United States' interests. Convinced that the Cold War is over and that we are free of our former *"inordinate fear"* of Communism (Address at Notre Dame, May 22, 1977), he has pursued arms control negotiations -- on strategic weapons, on forces in Central Europe, on anti-satellite weapons, on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests -- with a zeal unmatched in other areas of policy. Despite his promises to be *"a tough negotiator with the Soviet Union"* (The Indianapolis Star, April 7, 1976) and that he would not be *"afraid of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union,"* (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Speech, March 15, 1976) Mr. Carter proceeded with the series of unilateral cutbacks and cancellations of weapons systems listed above. No attempt was made to gain comparable concessions from the Soviet Union, either in or outside the framework of ongoing negotiations. Actions and decisions were based on the belief that the United States need only set a good example and the Kremlin would follow suit, relieved forever of their historical paranoia.

Nor were limitations on our own vital weapons systems confined to unilateral moves. In his rush to conclude a SALT II treaty, Mr. Carter authorized concession after concession. Some, such as the acceptance of limitations of cruise missile ranges -- limitations consistently rejected by Republican Administrations -- had the experts cringing. Others required no expertise to discern as incompetent and incomprehensible steps. For instance, the Administration excluded the new Soviet Backfire bomber from limitations on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles despite a general consensus that the bomber possessed intercontinental capabilities. Instead, Mr. Carter accepted an unsigned letter from Leonid Brezhnev during the final negotiations in Vienna which essentially stated that the Soviets would not give up the bomber capabilities that it already had. The unsigned letter graciously added that the bomber would not be deployed in a threatening mode during peaceful conditions. (Hedrick Smith, "Brezhnev Letter on Soviet Bomber Said to Lack Desired Assurance," New York Times, June 17, 1979) So much for Mr. Carter the "tough negotiator."

SOVIET BUILDUP IGNORED




Mr. Carter has shown particular ambivalence about the Soviet military buildup. During the campaign he acknowledged Soviet superiority in many military sectors (Speech to the American Legion Convention, Seattle, Washington, September 24, 1976) but maintained that in "the cumulative strength of our own military forces, plus those of NATO and others, are still superior to the Soviet Union." (Washington Post, March 21, 1976) But his overall attitude toward the growing Soviet threat has been one of complacency, despite evidence that their military buildup has only picked up momentum. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has outspent the United States in military investment by around \$240 billion. Last year alone such investment exceeded that of the U.S. by 85 percent. Soviet investments in strategic forces has outpaced the U.S. throughout the decade by two and one-half times. In 1979 this gap widened with the Soviets outspending us by three times. (Fiscal Year 1981 Posture Statement, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, William Perry, p. 3) The result has been frightening:

Soviet Military Strength In Multiples Of U.S. Strength



Soviet Military Strength In Multiples Of U.S. Strength

continued



Nor were Mr. Carter's policies influenced by the Soviet Union's continued promotion and financing of Cuban activity throughout the Third World despite his campaign statement that

we should make it clear that detente requires that the Soviets, as well as the United States, refrain from irresponsible intervention in other countries. (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1976)

Evidently when he said "*the Russians have no more business in Angola than we have,*" he excluded proxy forces as irrelevant. As a result, the Cuban military presence throughout Africa has more than doubled, bringing their total to over 40,000 throughout the continent. Nor has Mr. Carter learned anything from this expansion of proxy forces. Despite Cuban activity in support of guerrilla forces throughout the Caribbean and Central America, he continues to declare that he sees

no military threat to the integrity of the nations in the Caribbean from an outside force and therefore (doesn't) consider it to be necessary to define it as one of vital interest where military action by our own country would be necessary to defend it. (Question and Answer session with Editors and News Directors, January 29, 1980)

ALLIANCE DISARRAY

Mr. Carter's vacillation and empty rhetoric have created deep concern among our military allies. This was already apparent during the campaign when at one time he said "*we have too many troops overseas*" (Boston Advertiser, July 25, 1976) and then two months later said he "*would intend to maintain our present level of troop deployment in Europe*" and "*would even be willing to increase ground forces...if that was what it took to give us equivalent strength.*" (Associated Press, September 19, 1976) He repeatedly cited the importance of our alliance relationships, asserting that they "*must know that we will keep our promises*" and that they will "*be reassured not by promises but by tangible actions and regular consultations.*" (Address to members of the American Chamber of Commerce, Tokyo, Japan, May 28, 1975) But Mr. Carter has succeeded only in undermining U.S. credibility within our alliance system. He failed to live up to increased defense spending commitments. He embarrassed West Germany with his vacillation on the neutron weapons issue. During the first year of his Administration a leaked National Security Council memorandum envisioning the loss of one-third of Germany should war break out in Europe caused a major uproar and necessitated a series of denials and explanations from Administration officials. (Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The U.S. Commitment to Defend Europe (Amended)," Washington Post, August 8, 1977) Lack of consultation on SALT negotiations raised serious concerns among NATO allies, particularly concerning limitations on weapons systems of particular concern to them. General neglect of timely consultation was not limited to West European countries. Neither Japan nor South Korea was consulted prior to his announcement that he planned to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea. He abruptly and unilaterally cancelled our mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China.

MILITARY MANPOWER

During his campaign, Mr. Carter said that "the number one priority of any president is to guarantee the security of our nation" and to provide "a strong, able, tough, muscular, well organized fighting force." (Christian Science Monitor, September 17, 1976) But under his leadership, the United States has failed to fulfill even minimal military manpower requirements, further bringing into question our ability to maintain alliance commitments. In 1979, for the first time since the creation of the all-volunteer force, all military services failed to fulfill recruitment goals:

Army	16,000 short of 158,700 goal
Navy	5,200 short of 84,830 goal
Marines	1,200 short of 41,800 goal
Air Force	1,400 short of 68,000 goal

(Washington Post, October 20, 1979)

Moreover, the failure to stem the flow of trained, experienced personnel out of the military services into better paying civilian jobs threatens even more serious consequences. Potentially active ships are being taken out of service due to the lack of trained personnel to operate them. Naval aircraft are lost through attrition three times faster than new planes are produced to replace them, largely due to lack of training time for pilots and lack of trained maintenance personnel.

Our military reserves are sadly inadequate. The Selective Reserves suffer a 13 percent manpower shortage under peacetime requirements and a 20 percent shortage for wartime requirements.

	<u>Shortfall from Peacetime Need</u>	<u>Shortfall from Wartime Need</u>
Army National Guard	62,228	85,637
Army Reserve	51,478	61,024
Air National Guard	1,993	10,123
Air Force Reserve	2,155	13,928
Marine Corps Reserve	1,153	6,909
Naval Reserve	2,557	19,207
Totals	121,564	196,828

(General Accounting Office, July 1979)

Shortages of manpower in the Individual Ready Reserve that would provide trained men to replace active duty forces incapacitated in combat are even more critical. The Administration's response to this has been to lower its estimates of the number required:

	<u>Fiscal Year 1978</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1979</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1980</u>
Nos. required	729,000	710,000	694,000
Nos. available	168,600	200,000	200,000
Manpower shortage	560,400	510,000	494,000

(The Army Budget, Fiscal Year 1980, p. 10)

MR. CARTER'S FALSE CONVERSION

In light of these inescapable facts, it might be expected that Mr. Carter would reevaluate his thinking on Soviet goals and tactics and the appropriate response to them. But even after the brutal invasion of Afghanistan this is not the case. First he tells us that the action

has made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviet's ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time that I've been in office. (Interview with Frank Reynolds, ABC, December 31, 1979)

Then he disavows this transformation saying that he *"didn't insinuate or say that my assessment of the Soviet policy or ultimate goals had been changed at all."* (Interview with Meg Greenfield, Washington Post, March 29, 1980)

He continues to reveal his ambivalence toward Soviet motives, saying that it *"is going to have to answer some basic questions"* as to whether it will *"help promote a more stable international environment"* or *"continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest?"* (State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980)

It appears that only Mr. Carter is unaware of the fact that the Soviet Union has been answering that question throughout the world for the last three and one half years.

Mr. Carter tells us that he will impose stiff costs on the Soviet Union to ensure that the price of its expansionist policies will be too great to pursue. Then in virtually the same breath he says that *"observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms"* of the unratified SALT II treaty will be in our *"best interest"* despite the fact that the Soviet Union makes no similar promise. (State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980)

Mr. Carter tells us that we are *"[militarily] stronger now than we were three years ago"* (interview with Meg Greenfield, Washington Post, March 29, 1980) despite three years of cutbacks, delays and cancellations -- despite the fact that upgraded intelligence estimates of Soviet force modernization and expansion are even more alarming than those on which President Ford based his proposals for the programs Mr. Carter cut. He tells us that we are stronger now despite the testimony of his own Strategic Air Command commander that strategic equivalence ceased to exist in 1978 and that

by today's measurements, an adverse strategic imbalance has developed and will continue for several years to come...not only when our forces are in a day-to-day alert posture...but also when fully generated

for war. (Testimony by General Richard H. Ellis before the House Armed Services Committee, February 20, 1980)

Mr. Carter appears to have come full circle, belatedly resurrecting the Republican initiatives he originally cast aside as incompatible with arms control and the spirit of detente. But he supports cuts in the defense budget proposed before the invasion of Afghanistan.

In an effort to appear tough, Mr. Carter announces the reinstatement of draft registration. But the measures he proposes are ones rejected by his own Defense Department studies as little more than symbolic. His plan cuts by only six days our ability to mobilize military manpower in the event of an emergency. It does nothing to curb the flow of trained personnel out of military service. Mr. Carter tells us that this will demonstrate our resolve to the Soviet Union as if the leaders in the Kremlin were unaware of these facts.

Mr. Carter announces to the world the obvious -- that any assault on the Persian Gulf region would be considered an assault on our *"vital interests"* and that the U.S. will repel such an assault *"by any means necessary, including military force."* (State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980) He does not tell us that our ability to uphold that pledge is highly questionable. Then, six days later he falls into the familiar pattern of vacillating saying that he never *"claimed to have the ability unilaterally to defeat any threat to that region with ease"* and that what he called for *"was an analysis by all those nations who are there who might be threatened"* and cooperation *"with them, as they request and as they desire, to strengthen their own defense capabilities."* (Question and Answer session with Editors and News Directors, January 29, 1980) Nor does he tell us why, if alliance cooperation would be necessary to defend the region, he failed to consult with our allies before publicly announcing this improvised "doctrine."

Mr. Carter's rough rhetoric rings hollow. His conversion is artificial and tenuous. His understanding of the realities is shallow. His public announcements are designed more for domestic consumption and pacification than for maintaining the United States' ability to deter aggression and defend its legitimate national interests. Mr. Carter still appears to have no strategy save a re-election strategy.

A P P E N D I X

"When I become President we'll have a strong national defense, a defense second to none...militarily we are as strong as any nation on earth."

--San Francisco Debate
October 6, 1976

"Without endangering the defense of our nation or our commitments to our allies, we can reduce present defense expenditures by about \$5 billion to \$7 billion annually."

--Letter to the Democratic Platform Committee
Washington Post
January 17, 1976

"Recent events in Iran have been a vivid reminder of the need for a strong and United America, a nation which is supported by its allies and which need not bluff or posture in the quiet exercise of our strength and in our continued commitment to international law and the preservation of peace."

"My 5-year defense program provides a real funding increase that will average more than four and one-half percent each year."

--Televised Address
December 12, 1979

"We have increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the Five Year Defense Program. It is imperative that Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981, encompassing a five percent real growth in authorizations, without any reduction."

--State of the Union Address
January 23, 1980

"In my own opinion, shared by many of the world's leaders with whom I have discussed this matter, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War."

--Remarks at a White House Briefing for
Members of Congress
January 8, 1980

The Senate Armed Services committee's additions to the defense budget, he said *"could adversely affect today's military readiness by forcing offsetting reductions in the operations and personnel accounts in the defense budget and to the nation's overall budgetary objectives."*

--Washington Post
May 23, 1980

"Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear."

--Speech at Notre Dame
May 22, 1977

"Henry Kissinger does not trust the American people. I would be a tough negotiator with the Soviet Union. Detente under Henry Kissinger has meant we have yielded too much. We have neglected our friends and our natural allies."

--Indianapolis Star
April 7, 1976

"I am not afraid of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union."

--Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Speech
March 15, 1976

"I think the cumulative strength of our own military forces, plus those of NATO and others, are still superior to the Soviet Union."

--Washington Post
March 21, 1976

"We should make it clear that detente requires that the Soviets, as well as the United States, refrain from irresponsible intervention in other countries."

--Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Speech
March 15, 1976

"No military threat to the integrity of the nations in the Caribbean from an outside force and therefore [doesn't] consider it to be necessary to define it as one of vital interest where military action by our own country would be necessary to defend it."

--Questions and Answers
Editors and News Directors
January 29, 1980

"I think we have too many different military bases overseas, about 2000; [and we have] too many troops overseas in some areas of the world."

--Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976

"I would intend to maintain our present level of troop deployment in Europe for the foreseeable future...I would even be willing to increase ground forces, or conventional forces if that was what it took to give us equivalent strength."

--Associated Press
September 19, 1979

"We understand the vital importance of our relationship with our allies. Our friends in Japan, Western Europe and Israel must know that we will keep our promises; yet, they will be reassured not by promises but by tangible actions and regular consultations."

--Address to Members of the American
Chamber of Commerce
Tokyo, Japan
May 28, 1975

"The number one priority of any president is to guarantee the security of our nation. A strong, able, tough muscular, well organized fighting force."

*--Christian Science Monitor
September 17, 1976*

"...The action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time that I've been in office."

*--Interview with Frank Reynolds
ABC
December 31, 1979*

"It would be good to go back and read the quote to see if you have it accurate. I didn't insinuate or say that my assessment of the Soviet policy or ultimate goals had been changed at all."

*--Interview with Meg Greenfield
Washington Post
March 29, 1980*

"The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest?"

*--State of the Union Address
January 23, 1980*

"Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That is why we have negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties -- SALT I and SALT II. Especially now, in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries, and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort to control nuclear weapons will not be abandoned."

*--State of the Union Address
January 23, 1980*

"Our nation is stronger now than it was three years ago militarily."

*--Interview with Meg Greenfield
Washington Post
March 29, 1980*

"The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance....Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America -- and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

*--State of the Union Address
January 23, 1980*

"Obviously we don't intend and never have claimed to have the ability unilaterally to defeat any threat to that region with ease. What we called for was an analysis by all those nations who are there who might be threatened. We'll cooperate with them, as they request and as they desire, to strengthen their own defense capabilities."

--Questions and Answers
Editors and News Directors
January 29, 1980

EDUCATION

EDUCATION -- THE RECORD

- Public confidence in our schools is at an all-time low. Fifty percent of the American people believe that the quality of education is worse now than 10 years ago.
- Scholastic Aptitude Test scores have declined steadily during Mr. Carter's term of office. (Educational Testing Service)
- Despite Carter Administration promises that the creation of a separate Department of Education would require no new employees and cost no more than was formerly devoted to education programs...

--The Department of Education, by September 30, 1980, will include 157 more people than a year ago and 1,121 more people than two years ago in the **agencies** that now make up the new Department.

--Department of Education personnel compensation costs will rise \$50 million or 44 percent between fiscal years 1979 and 1981, contractual service costs will go up \$176 million or 51 percent and the budget for capital assets will rise \$298 million or 47 percent. (Press Release, Senator William Proxmire, May 20, 1980)

- Federal paperwork will require educators to spend over nine million man-hours or 50,000 man-years filling out forms during the 1980-81 academic year, creating a cost of more than \$700 million. (Statement of Congressman John Ashbrook, R-Ohio, in the House of Representatives, February 28, 1980)
- Although Mr. Carter promised tax relief for parents who send their children to private schools and colleges, he threatened to veto such legislation after becoming President, and his opposition killed the Comprehensive Tuition Tax Credit Bill of 1978.
- Despite Mr. Carter's promises of expanded vocational and career opportunities, increased education for the elderly, and a nationwide consumer education program in schools, no initiatives in these areas have been taken by the Carter Administration.

EDUCATION: ANALYSIS

Mr. Carter is presenting himself as the most pro-education president in our nation's history. If that means that Mr. Carter has spent more tax dollars and employed more bureaucrats in federal education programs, it is true. But if it means that teachers are teaching more or students learning more than they were before Mr. Carter took office, it is most definitely false.

In fact, Representative John Ashbrook, R-Ohio, shared the following dismal facts with his fellow members of Congress:

The annual Gallup education poll shows that public confidence in the schools is at an all-time low, surveys by the education community show that the most talented teachers and principals are quitting their jobs out of sheer frustration, and test scores show that the academic achievement of high school seniors has fallen steadily ever since the mid-1960's. If a private corporation had the kind of track record that the Federal Government has in education, it would be sued for consumer fraud. (Congressional Record, May 7, 1980)

MORE SPENDING -- LESS PERFORMANCE

When campaigning in 1976, Mr. Carter complained that,

we...do not provide all citizens with the education necessary to develop their natural potential and participate meaningfully in the decisions of their government. (Carter Position Paper, Education, 1976)

His remedy:

As President I will be committed to an increase in the proportion of education costs to be financed by the federal government. (American Teacher, October 1976)

Between fiscal years 1979 and 1980 alone, budget authority for federal education programs will go up by \$1 billion and outlays will rise by \$2 billion. If the present spending trend continues, by 1983 budget authority for federal education programs will have risen \$5 billion and outlays will have gone up nearly \$6 billion. (Fiscal Year 1981 Budget Revisions, March 1980, pages 67,69)

Yet, despite Mr. Carter's promise to

initiate a full-scale review of all federal education programs with an eye to making them meet the goals they had when they were envisioned. (American Teacher, October 1976),

he has made no systematic effort to find out whether these extensive programs have actually helped teachers to teach or students to learn. Judging from reliable measurements of educational achievement, they have not.

This year's crop of high school graduates is likely not to know as much as last year's, and even less than those who graduated before Mr. Carter took office. In 1976, high school students who took the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scored an average of 431 on the verbal part and 472 on the math part. During Mr. Carter's term of office, scores have declined steadily to an average, in 1979, of 427 on the verbal part and 467 on the math part. By way of comparison, the average scores in 1963 were 478 on the verbal part and 502 on the math part. (Educational Testing Service)

Recently, the Rand Corporation finished a four-year study of federal programs designed to encourage "innovative" practices in the schools. It found the results "inconsistent and generally disappointing," and concluded that "project outcomes reflected not the amount of funds available, but the quality and behavior of local staff." (House Oversight Committee)

Clearly, Mr. Carter's remedy of simply spending more federal dollars to provide quality education is not working.

Neither is more bureaucracy...

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

The cornerstone of Mr. Carter's education platform was the creation of a separate Department of Education. The promise was to

consolidate the grant programs...and many other functions currently scattered throughout the government" (Carter Position Paper, Education, 1976),

with no new jobs and no new spending.

In March of 1979, Mr. Carter's Director of the Office of Management and Budget testified: "The Department of Education will include no more people and will cost no more than is now devoted to education programs. In fact 350 to 450 positions will be eliminated, saving \$15 to \$19 million. Creation of the Department will require no new funds." (Press Release, Senator William Proxmire, May 20, 1980)

The facts are that by September 30, 1980, on a comparable basis, the Department of Education will include 157 more people than a year ago and 1,121 more people than two years ago in the agencies that make up the new Department. (Press Release, Senator William Proxmire, May 20, 1980)

Concerning costs, the OMB estimates that between fiscal years 1979 and 1981:

- Personnel compensation will rise from \$113 to \$163 million, or by \$50 million or 44 percent.
- Contractual services, including travel, utilities, printing and supplies will rise from \$342 to \$518 million, or by \$176 million or 51 percent.
- The budget for capital assets will rise from \$634 to \$932 million, or by \$298 million or 47 percent. (Press Release, Senator William Proxmire, May 20, 1980)

EDUCATORS BURIED IN FEDERAL PAPERWORK

Under the tangle of federal programs and regulations fortified by Mr. Carter, it has become harder and harder for educators to educate.

The Federal Education Data Acquisition Council (FEDAC) recently issued its annual estimate of federal paperwork burdens on educational institutions at the state and local levels.

Representative John Ashbrook, R-Ohio, speculates:

Data collections already approved by FEDAC and the Office of Management and Budget for the 1980-81 academic year are estimated to impose a burden of 7,627,963 man-hours next year. Proposed data collections, which have not yet been cleared by FEDAC and OMB, would entail an additional 1,868,004 man-hours. Then there are another 24 Federal forms, mostly from the National Institute of Education, whose 1980-81 man-hour burden has not yet been calculated.

If FEDAC's estimates are accurate, this gives us a minimum total of 9,495,967 man-hours spent in a single academic year to fill out pieces of paper mailed from Washington. That's nearly 50,000 man-years.

If you value that time at \$15,000 per man-year, Federal forms are creating an annual cost of more than \$700 million. And that does not include the time or the salaries of the Federal officials who design the forms and read the responses. (Congressional Record, February 28, 1980)

All this, despite Mr. Carter's promise of

simplification of laws and regulations to substitute education for paper-shuffling grantsmanship. (Carter response to National Education Association questionnaire, February 6, 1976)

TUITION TAX CREDITS

One of Mr. Carter's most flagrant broken promises was that of refusing to support tuition tax credits to parents who choose to send their children to private and parochial schools and colleges. In a telegram to Catholic educators, Mr. Carter said,

...Indeed, in many areas of the country, parochial schools provide the best education available...Therefore, I am firmly committed to finding constitutionally acceptable methods of providing aid to parents whose children attend parochial schools. (Telegram to Catholic Educators, October 1976)

Mr. Carter also said,

...parents whose children go to private colleges understandably complain of unfair treatment. They must support public colleges and universities through taxation

as well as pay high tuition fees. During my years as Governor of Georgia, voters authorized grants of \$400 per year for each student attending private college, still a smaller cost to taxpayers than if students enrolled in public institutions. Such legislation should be encouraged... (Carter response to National Education Association questionnaire, February 6, 1976)

Yet, after his election, Mr. Carter threatened to veto any legislation which contained a provision for tuition tax credits. In 1978, the House of Representatives passed a comprehensive tuition tax credit bill by a wide margin. Because of pressure from the White House, the bill died in Senate committee.

REVENUE SHARING GRANTS

When campaigning in 1976, Mr. Carter said,

My early predictions that revenue sharing would be used as an excuse to steal funds from a wide range of social programs, including education, have proven true. (Carter Position Paper, Education, 1976)

Mr. Carter should have checked his facts. Fully thirteen states use all of their revenue-sharing grant money for education. Most other states use a large chunk of their revenue-sharing funds for education. Ohio, for example, uses 75 percent of its revenue sharing for education. Pennsylvania uses half of its revenue sharing for education of the handicapped alone. ("A Whisper for Education," Washington Post, April 25, 1980)

It would appear that Mr. Carter simply does not trust state and local officials to make their own decisions, opting, instead, for greater control by the federal government over our education system. As we have observed spending for the Department of Education and its programs skyrocket, the latest Carter budget takes a huge bite from revenue-sharing funds.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HARASSMENT OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS

In August 1978, Mr. Carter's Internal Revenue Service Commissioner issued a draft text of "revenue procedures" which were ostensibly designed to allow the IRS to revoke the tax-exempt status of private schools which allegedly practice racial discrimination. These proposed revenue procedures caused an immediate storm of controversy, which the IRS unsuccessfully tried to quell by issuing a revised draft in February 1979. Tens of thousands of private-school officials and parents filed formal protests against the IRS proposals, citing violation of their First Amendment rights of religious freedom and violation of basic standards of fairness, as the IRS was treating schools as guilty unless they proved themselves innocent by arbitrarily requiring schools to take various expensive and burdensome actions in order to clear themselves of suspicion.

Congress temporarily resolved the controversy by passing two Republican-sponsored amendments to an appropriations bill. These amendments blocked the IRS from putting the proposed revenue procedures into effect during fiscal year 1980. But since these amendments lose their force at the end of the fiscal year, Congress must act every year to block the IRS until Mr. Carter leaves office.

MORE BROKEN PROMISES

I will not hesitate to propose and support... Expanded vocational and career education opportunities. (Carter Position Paper, Education, 1976)

If education for the elderly were increased, schools and universities could employ more teachers, utilize facilities more fully, and also provide an invaluable service to the community. (Carter Position Paper, Education, 1976)

...We should establish a strong nationwide program of consumer education to give the consumer the knowledge to protect himself in the market place. (Carter Consumer Affairs Statement, Preconvention, No. 62)

The truth of the matter is that no action has been taken in any of these areas by the Carter Administration. In fact, Mr. Carter's budgets have called for decreases in funding for vocational and occupational education.

A P P E N D I X

"We still do not provide all citizens with the education necessary to develop their natural potential and participate meaningfully in the decisions of their government."

--Carter Position Paper
Education, 1976

"I have already stated that as President I will be committed to an increase in the proportion of education costs to be financed by the federal government."

--American Teacher
October 1976

"As one of my early, major priorities in the White House, I will initiate a full-scale review of all federal education programs with an eye to making them meet the goals they had when they were envisioned."

--American Teacher
October 1976

"But a Department of Education would consolidate the grant programs, job training, early childhood education, literacy training, and many other functions currently scattered throughout the government."

--Carter Position Paper
Education, 1976

"The return from federal expenditures can be greatly enhanced by simplification of laws and regulations to substitute education for paper-shuffling grantsmanship."

--Carter Response to National
Education Association questionnaire
February 6, 1976

"...Indeed, in many areas of the country, parochial schools provide the best education available...Therefore, I am firmly committed to finding constitutionally acceptable methods of providing aid to parents whose children attend parochial schools."

--Telegram to Catholic Educators
October 1976

"For example, parents whose children go to private colleges understandably complain of unfair treatment. They must support public colleges and universities through taxation as well as pay high tuition fees. During my years as Governor of Georgia, voters authorized grants of \$400 per year for each student attending private college, still a smaller cost to taxpayers than if students enrolled in public institutions. Such legislation should be encouraged..."

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"...We should establish a strong nationwide program of consumer education to give the consumer the knowledge to protect himself in the market place."

--Carter Consumer Affairs Statement
Preconvention, No. 62

ENERGY

ENERGY -- THE RECORD

Mr. Carter's ineffective energy policies have only served to exacerbate our current energy situation.

- From 1976 to 1979 foreign oil imports increased by over one million barrels a day. (Monthly Energy Review, May 1980) Reducing our dependence on foreign oil was one of Mr. Carter's prime issues in his energy program.
- Mr. Carter's policies of delaying decontrol, advocating taxes on domestic production, and refusing to lease huge tracts of potentially productive federal lands, have all discouraged domestic production and made us more reliant on OPEC oil.
- Mr. Carter has severely mismanaged the Gerald Ford-initiated Strategic Petroleum Reserve. (Washington Post, June 17, 1980)
- Although Mr. Carter pledged in 1976 to deregulate natural gas prices, marketed domestic production of natural gas has increased by barely two percent in Mr. Carter's first three years in office while imports have increased by 30 percent. (Monthly Energy Review, June 1980)
- During the Carter Administration, there have been 66.1 percent fewer operating licenses granted per year for nuclear power plants than during the preceding Republican Administration and no license has been granted since September 1978. (Program Summary Report, May 23, 1980, published by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
- Domestic coal production has increased by an average of less than five percent a year in Mr. Carter's first three years, while coal imports have increased by 71 percent. (Monthly Energy Review, May 1980)

CARTER'S ENERGY POLICIES: ANALYSIS

When Mr. Carter campaigned for the Presidency in 1976, he declared,

The energy problem is not insoluble if we meet it with the vision, determination, and competence that will come about only with a change of leadership.
(The Presidential Campaign, 1976: Jimmy Carter)

Mr. Carter's prescription was:

...a national, unified, long-range and comprehensible energy policy. (The Presidential Campaign, 1976: Jimmy Carter)

However, during the years of the Carter Administration the energy situation has grown substantially worse, rather than better. Mr. Carter's energy policies have not been long-range, unified, or comprehensible. Far from delivering the "*predictable and certain*" government policies in each area of energy supply, Mr. Carter has given us policies which have magnified already existing problems.

OIL

One of the keystones of Mr. Carter's energy program has been to decrease our dependence on foreign oil. However, from 1976 to 1979 foreign oil imports increased by over one million barrels a day. (Monthly Energy Review, May 1980)

In 1979, when Mr. Carter finally realized his error and decided to endorse the decontrol of domestic oil prices, he and his Congress imposed a so-called windfall profits tax. This revenue producing device is misnamed because it is not a tax on profits but a tax on production, which is a further disincentive for American oil companies to produce domestic oil.

Domestic oil supplies remain substantial but, as Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman points out, domestic oil producers are "asked to engage in a heads-you-win, tails-I-lose gamble...if the price (of oil) rises, controls and 'windfall taxes' loom; if the price falls, they hold the bag." (Newsweek, July 30, 1979)

THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

President Ford initiated the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to protect the United States from OPEC oil embargoes. Mr. Carter apparently thought this was a good idea and even went as far as to criticize the then-incumbent administration's record in this regard when he said on July 11, 1975:

No substantial increase in stockpiling facilities is underway...oil from...domestic and foreign sources should...be channeled into permanent storage facilities until we have accumulated at least an additional 30-day reserve supply. (Address by Jimmy Carter on Energy to the Washington Press Club, July 11, 1975)

However, once in office, Mr. Carter severely mismanaged the SPR. In May 1978, the Administration set an unrealistic goal of having one billion barrels in storage by the end of 1985. (Congressional Quarterly, February 3, 1979) Mr. Carter charged ahead with this plan only to discover that extraction pumps were not being installed at the reserve sites so that the stored petroleum could not be removed from

storage. (Congressional Quarterly, February 3, 1979) The Administration promised a 250 million barrel reserve by the end of 1978 and 500 million barrels by the end of 1980. (GAO Report EMD-80-19) But as of June 1980, the SPR had only a 91.7 million barrel reserve (Washington Post, June 17, 1980), less than a two-week supply. No new oil has been added since the summer of 1979, and the Administration did not intend to add further reserves until the summer of 1981. (Washington Post, June 17, 1980)

However, the situation became so ludicrous that on June 16, 1980, a House-Senate Conference Committee directed Mr. Carter to "commence crude oil acquisition immediately." (Washington Post, June 17, 1980) The apparent reason for Mr. Carter's failure to add to the reserve was opposition from OPEC oil ministers who viewed the SPR as a threat to their "oil weapon." (Washington Post, June 17, 1980)

OPEC

Besides his abandonment of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Mr. Carter has been singularly unaggressive in dealing with OPEC in other ways, too. He has failed to encourage the development of non-OPEC sources abroad. For instance, he has failed to encourage production in non-OPEC developing nations, though the potential petroleum supply there is staggering: greater than the proven reserves of all OPEC nations combined (492 billion barrels versus 480 billion barrels). (A. Safer, International Oil, 1979, citing Business Week, July 10, 1978, page 64. Cited from Bernardo F. Grossling, U.S. Geological Survey. Proven reserves data from American Petroleum Institute.) At home, his policies of delaying decontrol, advocating taxes on domestic production, and refusing to lease huge tracts of potentially productive federal lands, have all discouraged domestic production and made us more reliant on OPEC oil.

NATURAL GAS

During the 1976 campaign, Mr. Carter promised that he would deregulate natural gas prices. On October 19, 1976, he said,

First, I will work with Congress, as the Ford Administration has been unable to do, to deregulate new natural gas. (1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac)

But less than a year later, on September 29, 1977, he changed his mind:

I do not support complete deregulation of natural gas prices. (1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac)

But a month later, on October 28, 1977, he switched positions again:

As I said in my campaign and also as I said to Congress when I made my energy speech last April, we are working toward deregulation of natural gas. (1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac)

He tried to reconcile these conflicting positions when he said on March 9, 1978:

I don't believe that I've changed my position. I don't interpret it that way. My position was that I would work with Congress, as had President Ford, for deregulation of natural gas. (1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac)

Mr. Carter finally ended up supporting the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which ostensibly decontrolled the fuel. But the bill actually extends control to previously

unregulated, well-functioning markets, and creates and perpetuates an incredibly complicated system of regulations, including 23 different pricing categories. (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Fact Sheet on the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978) Controls are to be phased out so slowly that it is questionable whether the market will ever become free.

Marketed domestic production of natural gas has increased by barely two percent in Mr. Carter's first three years in office while imports have increased by 30 percent.

MARKETED DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

1976	19,952 billion cubic feet
1979	20,373 billion cubic feet*

IMPORTS

1976	964 billion cubic feet
1979	1,253 billion cubic feet

SOURCE: Monthly Energy Review, June 1980 (published by the Department of Energy.)

NUCLEAR POWER

Nuclear power is currently meeting 11.5 percent of America's electricity needs. (Monthly Energy Review, May 1980, published by the Department of Energy) Yet, despite the importance of this significant energy source, the Carter Administration's nuclear energy policy has been as inconsistent as his policies in other energy areas.

When campaigning in 1976, Mr. Carter said:

I will redirect our energy research and development efforts to correct the disproportionate emphasis which we placed on nuclear power. (The Presidential Campaign, 1976)

But less than three years later he declared:

It (nuclear power) must play an important role in our energy future. We cannot simply shut down all our nuclear power plants. (New York Times, July 17, 1979)

Four months later he stated:

We believe that the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) should proceed with issuing operating and construction licenses. (Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1979)

The facts are that during the Carter Administration there have been 66.1 percent fewer operating licenses granted per year than during the immediately preceding Republican Administration and no license has been granted since September 1978.

According to the Washington Post (July 2, 1980), former NRC commissioner Richard T. Kennedy called the NRC "the most politicized agency in town." He said in an interview that the five-member panel spends "far too much time... debating in one guise or another whether nuclear power is a reasonable approach

*It is interesting to note that the DOE in May claimed only 19,721 billion cubic feet of domestic natural gas production.

to meeting our energy needs" instead of focusing on health and safety issues.

COAL

It is widely recognized that America can be energy independent if we develop our full potential in coal resources. The World Coal Study, directed by MIT's Carroll Wilson, recently estimated that the world has 250 years' worth of coal; the United States leads the world in coal reserves, with 167 billion tons -- nearly a third of the world supply. (The New Republic, June 21, 1980) While campaigning in 1976, Mr. Carter seemed to recognize coal's potential when he said:

We must substantially shift our efforts to increase our production of coal.... (Jimmy Carter's Platform Program, June 16, 1976; The Presidential Campaign, 1976: Jimmy Carter)

Three years later he said,

(W)e can burn twice as much coal in this nation and not lower our environmental standards at all. That's what I believe our nation wants to do. And that's what I'm determined to do. (New York Times, August 1, 1979)

Again, however, Mr. Carter's performance has fallen short of his rhetoric.

Domestic coal production has increased by an average of less than five percent a year in Mr. Carter's first three years, while coal imports have increased by 71 percent.

Various executive departments and agencies have promulgated regulations which have increased the expense of coal production and use, or made them impossible altogether. For instance, the Department of Interior has issued regulations which go unreasonably beyond the requirements of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977, and the EPA has similarly abused its authority under the Clean Air Act. Typical is one proposed rule -- requiring emissions from "cleaner" (low sulfur) coal to be further reduced to levels even below those allowed for "dirtier" (high sulfur) coal -- which would, for purely political reasons, increase the cost of coal use and probably cause dirtier air as well. (The New Republic, June 21, 1980)

CONCLUSION

Mr. Carter has failed in every area of energy management, and in all cases for the same reason. He has abandoned, undermined, and denigrated the one best solution to America's energy woes: private enterprise in a free market.

A P P E N D I X

"The energy problem is not insoluble if we meet it with the vision, determination, and competence that will come about only with a change of leadership."

--The Presidential Campaign, 1976: Jimmy Carter

"We need a national, unified, long-range and comprehensive energy policy."

--The Presidential Campaign, 1976: Jimmy Carter

"No substantial increase in stockpiling facilities is underway...oil from... domestic and foreign sources should...be channeled into permanent storage facilities until we have accumulated at least an additional thirty-day reserve supply."

--Address by Jimmy Carter on Energy to
the Washington Press Club
July 11, 1975

"First, I will work with Congress, as the Ford Administration has been unable to do, to deregulate new natural gas."

--1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac

"I do not support complete deregulation of natural gas prices."

--1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac

"As I said in my campaign and also as I said to Congress when I made my energy speech last April, we are working toward deregulation of natural gas."

--1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac

"I don't believe that I've changed my position. I don't interpret it that way. My position was that I would work with Congress, as had President Ford, for deregulation of natural gas."

--1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac

"I will redirect our energy research and development efforts to correct the disproportionate emphasis which we placed on nuclear power."

--The Presidential Campaign, 1976: Jimmy Carter

"It (nuclear power) must play an important role in our energy future. We cannot simply shut down all our nuclear power plants."

--New York Times
July 17, 1979

"We believe that the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) should proceed with issuing operating and construction licenses."

--Wall Street Journal
November 19, 1979

"We must substantially shift our efforts to increase our production of coal..."

--Jimmy Carter's Platform Program

June 16, 1976

The Presidential Campaign, 1976: Jimmy Carter

"[W]e can burn twice as much coal in this nation and not lower our environmental standards at all. That's what I believe our nation wants to do. And that's what I'm determined to do."

--New York Times

August 1, 1979

ETHICS

ETHICS -- THE RECORD

I think that after a period of two or three years, the difference between what I am and what the people perceived me to be during the campaign and what my programs actually are as they wind their way through the Congress -- that difference will be narrowed and people will see that there's no difference. ("Issues and Answers," August 14, 1977)

Contrary to Mr. Carter's initial statements concerning political favoritism, open government, honesty, and presidential appointments, he and his Administration have been anything but the most ethical and moral in carrying out their official and unofficial dealings.

- New York Post publisher Rupert Murdoch received a surprisingly low-interest loan from the Export-Import Bank just three days after the New York Primary, and only six days after a Post endorsement of Mr. Carter for the presidency. The paper's circulation numbers 600,000.
- Secretary of Transportation Neil E. Goldschmidt publicly expressed his desire to refuse funds to Chicago. The city's mayor, Jane Byrne, had endorsed Kennedy for the presidency on October 31, 1979. (National Journal, April 4, 1980)
- Energy Secretary Charles Duncan refused to release data on the Administration's "oil import fee" to the House Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee before consulting with his "colleagues," namely the President. The data in question was finally released to Congress in May 1980 in the wake of a lawsuit and a contempt of Congress citation. (Jack Anderson, Washington Post, May 6, 1980)
- Though Mr. Carter has consistently expressed an honorable obsession with the truth, he and his Administration have many times allowed less than the truth. Even Cabinet-member Andrew Young, in relating his dealings with the P.L.O. to Mr. Carter, didn't give the President "the whole truth."
- Mr. Carter has exploited and misused his power of presidential appointments. Furthermore, many of his appointments have been questioned in regard to conflict of interest and buying favors, as well as the misuse of influence.

ETHICS: ANALYSIS

In June 1976, Candidate Jimmy Carter promised:

Together we can have an open, compassionate, and effective government which will reflect the best qualities of the American people. ("A New Beginning," Carter's Platform Program presented to the DNC Platform Committee, New York City, June 16, 1976)

Yet in spite of such lofty themes pontificated and explicated since he first began campaigning for the presidency in 1974, which emphasized a moral condemnation of the past coupled with a vigorous commitment to a "higher" ethical standard -- Carter's political tactics have been heavy-handed, his political style at times ruthless and certainly deceptive, with many of his principal underlings anything but the most ethical, moral, and mature in their official activities and unofficial dealings.

As former Carter Chief Speechwriter James Fallows wrote in the first reputable expose on Carter and his White House, "(w)here Lyndon Johnson boasted of schools built and children fed, where Edward Kennedy holds out the promise of the energies he might mobilize and the ideas he might enact, Jimmy Carter tells us he is a good man ("The Passionless Presidency," The Atlantic, May 1979) Indeed, throughout the campaign and to date in his White House performance, Carter has continuously emphasized that he would be and is a "good" president, if not a much "better" president than any of his predecessors, especially in terms of personal morals and ethical stands, standards, and behavior. When the Carter record is examined closely, however, one finds a myriad of inconsistencies. There is, in fact, a schizoid appearance to the Carter style: his words are not too often in concord with his deeds.

POLITICAL FAVORITISM

In early 1977, at his well-publicized town meeting performance in Clinton, Massachusetts, Carter proclaimed:

...The only way that I know that we can restore the trust of the American people in public officials is for the public officials to be trustworthy, to tell the truth, and to make sure that there's a closeness and an intimacy between leaders who've been elected and the people who put them in office. This is something crucial to me. (Town Meeting, Clinton, Massachusetts, March 16, 1977)

This closeness between those who put Carter in office and the President himself can be readily seen in the personal relationship between New York Post Publisher Rupert Murdoch and the President. On February 19, 1980, Carter had a private lunch with Murdoch. Earlier that day, Murdoch met with U.S. Export-Import Bank Chairman -- and old Carter crony -- John L. Moore to discuss a loan to acquire jets for his Australian airline, Ansett Transport Industries. (Moore's former Atlanta law partner is Philip Alston, now Carter's ambassador to Australia, who had pushed hard for the Export-Import Bank loan for Murdoch.) That was followed three days later, on February 22nd -- three days before the New York Primary -- by the

endorsement of Carter for re-election by the New York Post, a newspaper with a circulation of 600,000. Then on February 28, Murdoch was granted a surprisingly low interest (eight percent) loan of \$290 million by the Export-Import Bank. Perhaps this was coincidental, but this Pavlovian set of events was serious enough to provoke an investigation by the Senate Banking Committee.

Similarly, in a memo written in March 1979 by then-White House Counsel Robert Lipschutz, the White House staff as a whole was warned that it is, in fact, a crime to buy political support with taxpayers' money. It is a crime for "anyone with grant-making authority to use that authority in order to affect the nomination or election of a candidate," said Lipschutz. "It is also a crime for anyone to promise employment...in return for political support for a particular candidate" (Jack Anderson, Washington Post, June 30, 1980). Typically, this strong warning remained unheeded when it came to parcelling out census jobs earlier this year. Last July 25, in a Census Bureau memo sent out to all the Bureau's regional offices, it was blatantly stated: "Throughout the recruiting process, preference will be given to candidates recommended by the political party of the incumbent administration." The memo further stated that "all recommendations from Democratic sources should be listed." The memo reminded regional administrators that they were responsible for "seeing that applicants who were recommended" were clearly identified. This systematic politicization of the census recruitment process -- a return to the spoils system at its worst -- according to Jack Anderson, appeared in the eyes of many at the Justice Department to be a criminal code violation.

STAFF INDISCRETION

Among the more grievous examples of the Carter cut-throat tactics is his questionable direction of White House staff and Cabinet members.

The highly respected National Journal (April 4, 1980) described in detail a plethora of staff and Cabinet Secretary indiscretions bordering upon the illegal. As the National Journal noted, "(T)he most celebrated public display of the Administration's willingness to reward its friends and punish its enemies came on November 20, 1979, when Transportation Secretary Neil E. Goldschmidt, saying he represented 'the political arm' of the Cabinet, told reporters he would look for ways to deny funds to Chicago." Goldschmidt said he had 'lost confidence' in Mayor Jane M. Byrne, who had endorsed Kennedy on October 31. These and similar statements, of course, are quite the opposite of candidate Carter's November 29, 1976 campaign promise: "I pledge to you that if I become President, you, the mayors of America, will have a friend, an ally and a partner in the White House." (Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1979) In fact, Secretary Goldschmidt had the audacity to say: "There's no reason to treat the mayor of Chicago as if she were a major national figure because she's not...Chicago plays by a unique set of rules. I'm capable of playing by them, too. I've got a lot of pink slips on my desk -- telephone calls. Hers would not be the first I would answer." As Columnist Patrick Buchanan concluded, "It is a sign of political health restored that the self-appointed keepers of the public morality are not so much talking about Goldschmidt's impeachment as they are having a good laugh at his first national exercise in the politic of dumb."

It is interesting to look as far back as three years ago when President Carter said during an "Issues and Answers" interview:

I think that after a period of two or three years, the difference between what I am and what the people perceived me to be during the campaign and what my programs actually are as they wind their way through the Congress -- that difference will be narrowed and people will see that there's no difference. ("Issues and Answers," August 14, 1977)

CLOSED GOVERNMENT

Well, there is quite a discrepancy between perception and reality and this is well-illustrated in his doctrine of open government. Throughout the campaign and as President, Carter continually said that

there's a general feeling that when we make a mistake, that mistake is not concealed but instantly revealed. I think the frequent news conferences and the frankness with which we've discussed formerly secret issues has been constructive. ("Issues and Answers," August 14, 1977)

Yet when it came to the Administration being put on the spot by the House Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee with regard to releasing data on their "oil import fee," in spite of a subpoena of Energy Secretary Charles Duncan and lawsuit by several Congressmen, the Energy Department refused to release that data. According to Columnist Jack Anderson (May 6, 1980), when Subcommittee Chairman Toby Moffett angrily accused Secretary Duncan of using executive privilege, Duncan tried to side-step the accusation by proposing a compromise. "I'll have to talk it over with my colleagues," said Duncan. Just who, a subcommittee member asked, are "your colleagues?" "The President," confessed Duncan, a bit sheepishly. In spite of "openness in government" and "government in the sunshine" doctrines preached by Candidate Carter, that seemingly embarrassing data was eventually given over to Congress in May 1980 in the wake of a lawsuit and a contempt of Congress citation.

DISHONESTY

Still an even more basic side to the Carter morality code is the issue of "honesty." Said Candidate Carter at an Atlanta rally on December 12, 1974,

There are many other things I would not do to be President. I would not tell a lie; I would not mislead the American people; I would not avoid taking a stand on a controversial issue which is important to our country or the world. And I would not betray your trust.

Even Speechwriter Fallows admits that Carter tells lies, if only "white lies:"

(Carter) would personally review all requests to use the White House tennis court. (Although he flatly denied to Bill Moyers, in his November 1978 interview that he had ever stooped to such labors, the in-house tennis enthusiasts, of whom I was the most shameless, dispatched brief notes through his secretary asking to use the court on Tuesday afternoon, while he was at a congressional briefing, or a Saturday morning while he was away. I always provided space where he could check yes or no; Carter would make his decision and send the note back initialized J.) ("The Passionless Presidency," The Atlantic, James Fallows, May 1979)

On the other hand, Carter stated in 1976 that

if any member of my Cabinet should ever tell you a lie, they'll be gone the next day. This is a very important and simple consideration -- to make sure that we can have a government we can both love and trust. (Detroit Sunday News, August 18, 1976)

It, in fact, took more than one day for Carter's U.N. Ambassador Andy Young, who held Cabinet rank, to resign after clearly lying to the President. As a Los Angeles Times editorial of August 16, 1979 pointed out, "Ambassadors can be forgiven for disagreements but not for lies." By his own admission what Young told Carter regarding his secret meetings with the P.L.O. -- a clear violation of U.S. policy -- "was not the whole truth."

PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: MISUSE AND QUESTIONABLE QUALITY CONTROL

As early as 1974, candidate Carter was saying with regard to the role of the Attorney General that:

Following recent presidential elections, our U.S. Attorney General has replaced the Postmaster General as the chief political appointee; and we have recently witnessed the prostitution of this most important law enforcement office. Special prosecutors had to be appointed simply to ensure enforcement of the law! The Attorney General should be removed from politics. (Formal Announcement, December 12, 1974)

In spite of such a noble statement, shortly after Benjamin Civiletti became Attorney General, he joined Carter on an election swing through the Italian neighborhoods of Baltimore (Presidential Documents, August 7, 1979) In response to this political junket, RNC Chairman Bill Brock said,

In a blatant political trip reminiscent of big city bossism, President Carter visited an Italian neighborhood in Baltimore this week to be cheered by more than 100 members of a federally funded jobs program who were told they would be suspended from their jobs if they did not attend... In addition to politicizing a federal jobs program, the President openly used Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti as a political prop in telling Baltimore's Italian-Americans that if they didn't think enough Italians were appointed to the Federal bench to call the Attorney General. (August 10, 1979)

Where candidate Carter called for a strict merit system in the selection of judges and ambassadors, his actions have deviated significantly. In his formal announcement statement on December 12, 1974, Carter said quite firmly

(W)e top this off with the disgraceful and counter-productive policy of appointing unqualified persons to major diplomatic posts as political payoffs. This must be stopped immediately...All federal judges, diplomats, and other major officials should be selected on a strict basis of merit...

Yet Carter has personally continued to politicize the judiciary far beyond the Civiletti example. In his attempt to pick politically compatible judges for vacant judicial seats in New England and Puerto Rico, it appears, according to the Washington Post, that Carter has injected "a good dose of the politics (he) promised to avoid when he set up nominating commissions to carry out his campaign promise of using 'merit' alone to pick judges." (March 28, 1980)

During these judicial searches, among other questionable actions, Carter has "reshuffled" the makeup of the nominating commissions, removing supporters of Senator Kennedy, his chief political opponent. Moreover, among those rejected from panel consideration was Kennedy-supporter Archibald Cox.

Yet these are not isolated examples of presidential interference in judicial matters. The firing of David W. Marston, the well-respected Republican U.S. Attorney for Philadelphia, in early 1978 was a major violation of Carter's promise to take politics out of judicial appointments. In fact, in an agreement with Senator James O. Eastland (D-Miss.), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Carter agreed to limit merit selection only to federal appeals court judges. According to the Congressional Quarterly News Service, "As a result, Carter left intact Senate patronage for the juiciest and most plentiful judicial and prosecutor appointments -- district judges, U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshalls." (February 16, 1978)

Furthermore, when it comes to the quality of his diplomatic appointments, again there is a distinction between the Carter promise and the Carter action. A case in point is Carter's Ambassador to Singapore, former South Dakota Democrat Governor Richard Kneip, who, as reported in the Foreign Service Journal and in Newsweek (February 11, 1980) was so ill-prepared for a major foreign affairs post that he had to ask his aides to their embarrassment and chagrin:

What is this 'gang of four' that everyone is talking about?

Did you say there are two separate Korean governments? How come?

What's Islam?

Indeed, Ambassador Kneip never heard of such international notables as Gandhi, Sukarno, Giscard d'Estaing, and Deng Xiaoping. And, in just plain "poor taste," while visiting a U.S. warship, he slipped away from the foreign VIPs to join his family -- and casually dispatched his houseboy as a stand-in!

At the same time that one looks at the competence of Carter appointments, one must also question the basic honesty and maturity of other Carter underlings. The following litany of appointees, confidants, and Democratic party officials, together with their actions beg the question:

"Why not the best?"

Moon Landrieu was confirmed as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development even after he acknowledged that he had received gifts of real estate from a promoter doing extensive business with both the New Orleans City Hall and HUD; this payoff occurred shortly after the expiration of his two terms as mayor of New Orleans. (Sacramento Bee, August 19, 1979)

Less than two weeks after he declared David G. Gartner free of conflict of interest, President Carter decided that the newest member of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission should resign -- for conflict of interest. The conflict involves

Gartner's acceptance of gifts on behalf of his children from big-time agri-businessman Dwayne Andreas (who has also been a large political contributor). Gartner took stock, worth \$72,000 from Andreas whose large holdings gave him a keen interest in the decisions of the Commission. (New York Times, June 27, 1978, IV)

Daniel W. Horgan, former executive director of the Democratic National Committee, resigned from his position as personnel consultant to Carter Administration after his name was linked to a federal investigation into the operation of the New Jersey Housing Finance Agency. (New York Times, August 15, 1979, II)

Dr. Stewart Lee Richardson, Jr., Office of Consumer Affairs, was under investigation for simultaneously heading that agency and accepting a fee of \$4,300 for a contract from HEW. (New York Times, March 12, 1979)

In 1978, Senator Barry Goldwater asked presidential media advisor, Barry Jagoda, to testify before Congress about possible conflict of interest. At a time when he was presidential media advisor, Jagoda had been helping to draft legislation dealing with public broadcasting, to select members for the board of directors of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and had reportedly been influencing decisions on the content of programs broadcast by PBS. (Report of Senate Commerce Committee, Communications Subcommittee, May 3 and 4, 1978)

An investigation is pending with regard to Billy Carter's role as a federal agent for Libya and his association with that government.

White House aide Richard Harden is under investigation to determine involvement in alleged attempt by fugitive financier Robert Vesco to buy legal favors from the Carter White House; Harden may have also misused his position to help his father clear up a threatened law suit. (New York Times, August 31, 1979)

Dr. Peter Bourne's former aide Ellen Metsky, on whose behalf Bourne wrote false prescriptions, was named to the staff of new Peace Corps Director, Richard F. Celeste. (New York Times, June 12, 1979, III)

And last but not least is Bert Lance, one of Carter's closest intimates, his first Cabinet-level appointment, and his first appointee to resign in disgrace. Though in May 1980, a jury acquitted Lance on nine counts of bank fraud (it was a "hung jury" on two counts), the moral of the Lance affair should not be forgotten:

Lest we forget, the "Lance affair," was never primarily the falsification of loan documents, or even the use of a small bank in Georgia as a piggy-bank for its president. The point of the Lance case was the abuse of powerful influence, conflict of interest, and a cover-up by an Administration that owed its existence to the exploitation of the public memory of scandal. (New York Times, William Safire, May 12, 1980)

And on and on it goes, White House Drugs and Narcotics Advisor Dr. Peter Bourne: resigned for improperly prescribing drugs for White House aides (New York Times, July 21, 1978); Treasury Secretary G. William Miller was under investigation for illegal payments to foreign officials while Textron President (New York Times, July 27, 1979); and Hamilton Jordan, close confidant of the President, who is noted for raucous barroom behavior (the amoretto and cream incident) and had been under investigation for snorting cocaine at the fashionable New York 'Studio 54' disco. (New York Times, August 25, 1979)

Mr. Carter on ethics and morality, in fact, can be summed up by his own words:

I really don't believe there's that basic conflict between what I am, what I stand for, what I said during the campaign on one hand and our actual programs on the other. ("Issues and Answers," August 15, 1977)

A P P E N D I X

"Together we can have an open, compassionate, and effective government which will reflect the best qualities of the American people."

--"A New Beginning"

Carter's Platform Program presented to
the DNC Platform Committee
New York City, June 16, 1976

"...The only way that I know that we can restore the trust of the American people in public officials is for the public officials to be trustworthy, to tell the truth, and to make sure that there's a closeness and an intimacy between leaders who've been elected and the people who put them in office. This is something crucial to me."

--Town Meeting

Clinton, Massachusetts
March 16, 1977

"I think that after a period of two or three years, the difference between what I am and what the people perceived me to be during the campaign and what my programs actually are as they wind their way through the Congress -- that difference will be narrowed and people will see that there's no difference."

--"Issues and Answers"

August 14, 1977

"...There's a general feeling that when we make a mistake, that mistake is not concealed but instantly revealed. I think the frequent news conferences and the frankness with which we've discussed formerly secret issues has been constructive."

--"Issues and Answers"

August 14, 1977

"There are many other things I would not do to be President. I would not tell a lie; I would not mislead the American people; I would not avoid taking a stand on a controversial issue which is important to our country or the world. And I would not betray your trust."

--Atlanta Rally

December 12, 1974

"...If any member of my Cabinet should ever tell you a lie, they'll be gone the next day. This is a very important and simple consideration -- to make sure that we can have a government we can both love and trust."

--Sunday News, Michigan

August 18, 1976

"Following recent presidential elections, our U.S. Attorney General has replaced the Postmaster General as the chief political appointee; and we have recently witnessed the prostitution of this most important law enforcement office."

Special prosecutors had to be appointed simply to ensure enforcement of the law! The Attorney General should be removed from politics."

--Formal Announcement
December 12, 1974

"...[W]e top this off with the disgraceful and counter-productive policy of appointing unqualified persons to major diplomatic posts as political payoffs. This must be stopped immediately...All federal judges, diplomats, and other major officials should be selected on a strict basis of merit..."

--Formal Announcement
December 12, 1974

"I really don't believe there's that basic conflict between what I am, what I stand for, what I said during the campaign on one hand and our actual programs on the other."

--"Issues and Answers"
August 15, 1977

FAMILY

THE FAMILY -- THE RECORD

- The breakdown of American family life has worsened during Mr. Carter's term of office as evidenced by the following statistics:

--In 1976, one child in eight was born out of wedlock; it's now one in six.

--One child in seven was living in a single-parent household in 1976; the proportion has now become one child in five.

--Children in foster homes numbered 350,000 in 1976; they now total 500,000.

--Two of every five marriages ended in divorce in 1976; that ratio has not improved.

--Nearly one-third of U.S. families could afford to buy a home in 1976; that share has plunged to less than five percent. (Wall Street Journal, May 1, 1980)

- Although Mr. Carter promised that,

each federal program present a family impact statement, to analyze how it would affect the family. (Carter speech, Manchester, N.H., August 3, 1976),

no such initiative was ever enacted.

- Thirty-eight months after saying,

we need a government that...makes its every decision with the intent of strengthening the family (Carter speech, Manchester, N.H., August 3, 1976),

Mr. Carter announced he was creating an "Office for Families" within the Department of Health and Human Services, but no director for this office has yet been named, only one professional staffer has been employed, and no funds have been provided. (Wall Street Journal, May 1, 1980)

- Despite Mr. Carter's promise of

soon after becoming President...to convene a White House Conference on the American Family. (Carter speech to the National Conference of Catholic Charities, October 4, 1976),

it was three and one-half years before the Conference began.

- Mr. Carter said in 1976,

We have tax policies that often seem to discriminate against families. (Carter speech, Manchester, N.H., August 3, 1976)

Yet the average family of four will have seen its federal tax burden increase fully 55.5 percent during Mr. Carter's four-year term (Joint Committee on Taxation) and now lose more than 27 percent of its gross income to federal taxation. (Tax Foundation study, February, 1980)

THE FAMILY: ANALYSIS

When campaigning in 1976, Mr. Carter said,

The American family is in trouble. I have campaigned all over America, and everywhere I go I find people deeply concerned about the loss of stability and the loss of values in our lives. The root of this problem is the steady erosion and weakening of our families. (Carter speech, Manchester, N.H., August 3, 1976)

After three and one-half years of Mr. Carter's presidency, Americans have greater cause for concern about our family structure than ever before.

BREAKDOWN OF FAMILY LIFE WORSENING

Mr. Carter cited several statistics he described as "shocking" to demonstrate the breakdown of family life in America. (Carter speech, Manchester, N.H., August 3, 1976) Unfortunately, these statistics have worsened during Mr. Carter's term of office. For example,

--In 1976, Mr. Carter related, one child in eight was born out of wedlock; it's now one in six.

--One child in seven was living in a single-parent household in 1976; the proportion has now become one child in five.

--Children in foster homes numbered 350,000 in 1976; now they total 500,000.

--Two of every five marriages ended in divorce in 1976; that ratio has not improved.

--One-third of U.S. families could afford to buy a home in 1976; that share has now plunged to less than five percent. (Wall Street Journal, May 1, 1980)

BIG PROMISES -- LITTLE ACTION

As in so many areas, Mr. Carter's record on family matters has been one of grandiose promises, followed by negligible performance, even in the face of a declining situation as evidenced by the statistics cited above.

Although Mr. Carter promised that,

each federal program present a family impact statement, to analyze how it would affect the family. (Carter speech, Manchester, N.H., August 3, 1976),

no such initiative was ever enacted.

On October 15, 1979, thirty-eight months after saying,

we need a government that thinks about the American family and cares about the American family and makes its every decision with the intent of strengthening the family. (Carter speech, Manchester, N.H., August 3, 1976),

Mr. Carter announced he was creating an "Office for Families" within the Department of Health and Human Services to provide "the focal point for the development of federal policies and programs affecting the families." (Wall Street Journal, May 1, 1980)

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES

The cornerstone of Mr. Carter's proposed efforts on behalf of the American family was,

soon after becoming President...to convene a White House Conference on the American Family. My goal will be to bring leaders of government, leaders of the private sector like yourselves, and ordinary citizens and parents to discuss specific ways we can better support and strengthen our families. (Carter speech to the National Conference of Catholic Charities, October 4, 1976)

The White House Conference on Families finally began this summer, three and one-half years after Mr. Carter took office.

The first of three sessions, held in Baltimore, Maryland, produced a laundry list of resolutions bearing little relation to traditional American family values. The Conference's first session endorsed abortion, non-discrimination against homosexuals, national health insurance, and a guaranteed annual income for poor families.

Conservative and moderate delegates to the Conference walked out amid charges that Mr. Carter had stacked the Conference with liberal delegates who would favor existing government programs and Democratic party proposals.

The Wall Street Journal was moved to editorialize on the subject of Mr. Carter's White House Conference on Families, "...maybe we've had enough federal sponsorship of meetings on women or the family or other topics that are little more than masks for another, underlying ideological dispute...there is no such thing as a family policy separate from a broader philosophy of government." (Wall Street Journal, June 11, 1980)

SOARING TAXES CRIPPLING PURSUIT OF FAMILY GOALS

Although Mr. Carter said,

We have tax policies that often seem to discriminate against families...one basic goal of any tax reform must be to help and strengthen our families. (Carter speech, Manchester, N.H., August 3, 1976),

his tax policies have severely hampered our families' abilities to feed, clothe, house, and educate their children. A study released in February 1980 by the Tax Foundation, a non-profit interest group, indicated that in Fiscal Year 1980, the average family of four earning the median income of about \$20,000 will pay \$5,451 in total federal taxes. This represents more than 27 percent of their gross income.

According to the Joint Economic Committee on Taxation, that family of four will have seen its federal tax burden increase fully 55.5 percent during Mr. Carter's four-year term.

THE FAMILY CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO BUY A HOME

Despite Mr. Carter's promise of universal home ownership, the number of American families who can afford to purchase a home has declined sharply during Mr. Carter's term of office. When Mr. Carter became President, 27.5 percent of all American families could afford to purchase a new home. In the early months of 1980, with mortgage rates pushing 17 percent, that percentage dropped all the way to five percent. Even if mortgage rates "drop" to between 12 and 13 percent as some predict, home affordability will still be limited to less than ten percent of all American families. (National Association of Home Builders)

A P P E N D I X

"One idea that Senator Mondale has proposed is that each federal program present a family impact statement, to analyze how it would affect the family, much as federal programs now prepare environmental impact statements. We don't need a new bureaucracy, but the President and Congress should routinely conduct such an analysis when any major decision is made, and when I am President this will be done."

--Carter Speech
Manchester, N.H.
August 3, 1976

"The American family is in trouble. I have campaigned all over America, and everywhere I go I find people deeply concerned about the loss of stability and the loss of values in our lives. The root of this problem is the steady erosion and weakening of our families."

--Carter Speech
Manchester, N.H.
August 3, 1976

"We need a government that thinks about the American family and cares about the American family and makes its every decision with the intent of strengthening the family."

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"One step I intend to take soon after becoming President is to convene a White House Conference on the American Family. My goal will be to bring leaders of government, leaders of the private sector like yourselves, and ordinary citizens and parents to discuss specific ways we can better support and strengthen our families."

--Carter Speech to the National
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"We have tax policies that often seem to discriminate against families...one basic goal of any tax reform must be to help and strengthen our families."

--Carter Speech
Manchester, N.H.
August 3, 1976

FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN POLICY -- THE RECORD

Mr. Carter's foreign policy has:

- Vacillated and produced an impression of inconsistency and incoherence.
- Pursued a course of conciliation and appeasement toward the Soviet Union.
- Ignored, until lately, the expansion of the Soviet Union and its surrogates throughout the Third World.
- Undermined our alliance system and the United States' credibility as spokesman for the free world.
- Confused the world as to the practical application of "human rights" policy.
- Emasculated our intelligence capabilities.
- Failed to stem the expansion of terrorist tactics throughout the world.

FOREIGN POLICY: ANALYSIS

To be fair, any evaluation of Mr. Carter's record on foreign policy must take into account that he warned us ahead of time that, "*I don't claim to be an expert on foreign affairs.*" (Chicago Sun Times, October 19, 1975) What he didn't warn the American electorate about is that his management of foreign affairs would be incompetent and his policies inconsistent, incomprehensible and, at times, non-existent. Under Mr. Carter, the United States has pursued a reactive foreign policy, improvising responses to international events rather than seeking to influence their course. Mr. Carter fails to provide even a comprehensible world view, let alone a strategy within which individual issues can be evaluated in terms of our own legitimate interests and these interests pursued in a coherent fashion. Instead, he bases his reactions on vague and unrelated perceptions and misperceptions of how the world is and ought to be. The result has been a foreign policy characterized by its vacillation and contradictions -- a policy that has led even our staunchest allies to question whether the United States can any longer legitimately claim to speak for the free world.

LACK OF COORDINATION

During his campaign, Mr. Carter promised to ensure better coordination within the government in dealing with foreign countries and to minimize disharmonies among the different agencies. (National Journal interview, July 17, 1976) He also said he wanted to be sure that when he or other foreign policy officials spoke it would be "*the absolute truth,*" that other countries would know if the U.S. made "*a commitment it will be honored,*" and that we would convey "*the same message to all countries so there is never any sense of being misled.*" (Speech to Department of State employees, February 24, 1977) What he did, however, was to ensure that the Administration spoke in many tongues on questions of foreign policy. The dispute between then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski over whether or not to pursue a policy of linkage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union became embarrassingly public in the spring of 1978 with the staffers from the National Security Council (NSC) and Foggy Bottom hurling accusations at each other. The dispute was so disruptive that the House International Relations Committee was forced to write a letter to Mr. Carter requesting clarification of the Administration's policy. The explanations and retractions necessitated by Andy Young's gaffes were inexcusable. But the ludicrous examples of terming Sweden a "racist" nation, the Cubans in Africa a "stabilizing force," and the Ayatollah a "saint" were comic relief compared to the U.N. Ambassador's unauthorized meeting with representatives of the P.L.O., in direct contradiction of official U.S. policy. Nor was consistency of policy restored with Mr. Young's resignation. Just this March the United States cast a vote in the United Nations Security Council supporting a resolution condemning Israeli settlement policy and then repudiated it as a foul up and a failure of communication. In short, Mr. Carter has failed to preserve even the facade of agreement on fundamental policy questions among his own advisers. No more dramatic proof exists than the abrupt resignation of Vance, not because of our failed rescue attempt in Iran, but because he could not support the decision to take the action in the first place. Nor does it appear that Mr. Carter has learned any lessons from the past three years. In introducing his new choice for Secretary of State he said he saw "*Ed Muskie as being a much stronger and more evocative spokesman for our nation's policy.*" (Speech to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, May 9, 1980) It appears that there will continue to be a conflict between assumptions and policies pushed through the national security adviser's office and those promoted from Foggy Bottom.

THE THREATENING NO-THREAT

After only four short months in office, Mr. Carter freed us from our *"inordinate fear of communism."* (Speech at Notre Dame, May 22, 1977) Thus liberated, United States' policies toward the Soviet Union were based on the firm belief that the Cold War is over. Mr. Carter told us that the Soviets' increase in naval strength didn't mean *"a commitment towards belligerency"* but rather that they had decided *"their emphasis should be on influence through peaceful means."* (Readers Digest, October 1976) He asserted his *"deep belief"* that *"Mr. Brezhnev...wants peace and wants to have a better friendship"* and that our pursuit of *"peace as an overwhelming sense of our goals with the Soviet Union"* was *"shared in good faith by President Brezhnev."* (News Conference, June 26, 1978) Carter's policies sought to convey to the Soviets that the U.S. posed no threat, assuming that the Kremlin would then be freed from traditional insecurities and paranoia, cease its expansionist behavior and assume a responsible position in the world community. The search for arms control agreements was expanded and pursued with religious fervor with SALT II becoming the litmus test of U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the Administration cancelled, cut-back and delayed military programs and weapons systems at breakneck speed. (see Defense section) The unilateral disarmament policy that was pursued undermined any chance for gaining meaningful or comparable concessions or reductions from the Soviet Union. It did succeed, however, in achieving one of its objectives: to convince the Soviet Union that the United States not only doesn't pose a threat but that it lacks the will and the means to promote its own legitimate national security interests. If the Kremlin had not reached this conclusion earlier in the Administration's term, it certainly must have been pushed in that direction by the convoluted logic that wished the Soviet brigade in Cuba out of existence. First Mr. Carter told us that the brigade's presence was *"a very serious matter"* and that the *"status quo is not acceptable."* (Washington Star, September 8, 1979) Three weeks later he told us that we were trying through diplomacy to eliminate *"the combat nature"* of Soviet presence and that if diplomacy didn't succeed we would *"take appropriate action to change the status quo."* (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 26, 1979) Then, just a week later, the unacceptable status quo became a benign presence because it was *"not a large force, nor an assault force"* and therefore *"presents no direct threat to us."* For this reason the issue was *"certainly no reason for a return to the cold war."* (Televised Address to the Nation, October 1, 1979)

A SUDDEN REVELATION

Mr. Carter's conversion following the brutal invasion of Afghanistan is transparently shallow. His "tough" rhetoric seems to have resulted more from pollster's conclusions about the mood of the country than from any genuine conversion. A few days after the invasion he said that

the action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time that I've been in office. (Interview with Frank Reynolds, ABC, December 31, 1979)

Later he tried to disavow this shocking revelation, telling Meg Greenfield to check her quotes and that he *"didn't insinuate or say that my assessment of the Soviet policy or ultimate goals had been changed at all."* (Interview with Meg Greenfield, Washington Post, March 29, 1980)

ALL TALK...

His tough talk about sanctions is not matched by his actions. Initially he waffled on the issue of an Olympic boycott saying first that *"the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games"* (Televised Address to the Nation, January, 1980) and then three weeks later urged *"the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and...other like-minded nations not to participate in the Moscow games"* in order *"to help secure the peace of the world at this critical time."* (Letter to Robert J. Kane, President of the USOC, January 21, 1980) The announcement surprised our allies and elicited only half-hearted support; 29 countries declined to participate, 27 failed to reply to the invitation. (Washington Post, May 28, 1980) In announcing *"stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union,"* Mr. Carter told us that *"neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace can continue to do business as usual"* with the invading nation. (State of the Union, January 23, 1980) He announced his determination *"to minimize any adverse impact on American farmers from his grain embargo"* (Televised Address to the Nation, January 4, 1980) but succeeded in damaging them more than the Soviet Union which managed to fulfill five-sixths of their needs through other markets. His embargo of trade in high technology came reluctantly and belatedly after three years of ignoring pleas for just such action by concerned legislators and experts. (See for instance, "Selling them the Rope: Business and the Soviets," Carl Gershman, Commentary, April 1979)

...NO ACTION

At the same time, Mr. Carter refuses to support measures that might have a chance of deterring further Soviet expansionism. He has done nothing to reverse the alarming trends toward military inferiority in both the conventional and strategic realm. In fact, he fights Congressional efforts to force him to do so. (See Defense Section) On January 4, he asked the Senate to *"defer further consideration of the SALT II treaty"* (Televised Address to the Nation, January 4, 1980) but then only three weeks later announced that since *"preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers...observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms"* of SALT II is *"in the best interest of both countries."* (State of the Union, January 23, 1980) Mr. Carter, therefore, continues to comply with limitations imposed by an inequitable and unratified treaty. He does so, moreover, without any assurance, without any effort to gain assurance, and without any reason to believe that the Soviet Union will follow suit.

Mr. Carter still does not understand that the Soviet Union will be deterred from taking advantage of opportunities to expand its influence and domination only by a United States with the will and the means to impose higher than acceptable costs for doing so. He continues to question Soviet motives, saying that *"we cannot know with certainty the motivations of the Soviet move into Afghanistan -- whether Afghanistan is the purpose or the prelude."* (News Conference, April 10, 1980) The Soviets' answer to him is to mass troops along their border with Iran, similar to their moves prior to Afghanistan.

AN UNRELIABLE ALLY

Candidate Carter asserted his understanding of *"the vital importance of our relationship with our allies,"* saying that they must know *"that we will keep our promises"* and that *"they will be reassured not by promises but by tangible actions and regular consultations."* (Address to members of the American Chamber of Commerce,

Tokyo, Japan, May 28, 1975) Incumbent Carter claims to *"have helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances."* (State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980) But what has he done to sustain such claims? He achieved agreement among the alliance members to increase defense spending by three percent per year after inflation. But neither the U.S. nor its allies have come anywhere close to achieving that kind of real growth. After much arm-twisting he elicited a statement of support from West German Chancellor Schmidt for deploying neutron weapons on German territory. ("Bonn Backs Producing Neutron Arms," Walter Pincus, Washington Post, April 5, 1978) But after Mr. Schmidt had placed himself out on that political limb, Mr. Carter abruptly and embarrassingly changed his position and decided not to decide on that particular weapons system for awhile. ("President Decides to Defer Production of Neutron Arms," Walter Pincus, Washington Post, April 7, 1978) He created concern within NATO countries during the SALT II negotiations regarding concessions on weapons systems of importance to them, particularly ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles by not keeping them fully informed of our position. He managed to achieve some diluted support from NATO members on sanctions against Iran, but only after an erratic six months of constantly changing positions that must have left our allies questioning exactly what it was they were being asked to support and whether in fact the position might change again tomorrow. Most of our allies are sending teams to the Olympics and little cooperation has been forthcoming on other economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Despite his pronouncement that

there is a fundamental difference between informing governments after the fact and actually including them in the process of joint policy making, (Foreign Policy Association, New York)

he announced his plan to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea, informing rather than consulting with those most concerned -- Japan and South Korea itself. (Congressional Quarterly, July 4 and 7, 1977) He unilaterally terminated our mutual defense pact with Taiwan, leaving allies throughout the world wondering whether he would not see fit to do the same with other alliance agreements.

Mr. Carter has failed to demonstrate to our allies that the United States can be counted on to stand firm on its decisions and to maintain its commitments. Faced with an increasingly powerful Soviet Union so close to their own borders, our staunchest allies have been forced to question whether they can bear the costs of requests from an Administration that may change course the next day. The Soviet Union has never ceased its efforts to weaken ties between the U.S. and its European allies and is now presented with growing opportunities to drive a wedge in one of our most vital alliances. Their "peace offensive" following the Afghanistan invasion has been mixed with thinly veiled threats regarding the price of solidarity with the United States. Just four months after their tanks violated the Afghan border, the Soviet ambassador to Paris felt free to warn European leaders against moving ahead with plans to deploy modernized nuclear missiles on their own territory. (Speech by Soviet Ambassador Stephen V. Chervonenko to the International Diplomatic Academy, Paris, April 5, 1980) Capitalizing on the confusion following the failed Iranian rescue mission, Pravda told Europe it would never be consulted on the use of such weapons and warned against "appeasing the United States." (Anthony Austin, "Soviet Expands Attack on Iran Raid," New York Times, April 28, 1980) With his vacillating policy positions and his wrong-headed assumptions regarding the goals and tactics of the Soviet Union, Mr. Carter has seriously undermined alliance unity by failing to provide a credible counterweight to the Kremlin.

HUMAN RIGHTS INCONSISTENCIES

During the campaign and the initial months in office, Mr. Carter loudly proclaimed his commitment to the promotion of human rights, making it a *"fundamental tenet"* of his foreign policy. (Speech at Notre Dame University, May 22, 1977) Rejecting the role of policeman for the world, he gave us the role of preacher to the world, seeking to judge each nation as worthy or unworthy of our aid and friendship based on criteria of Western civil liberties, regardless of the social, cultural or historical position of that country. In practice, his policies were highly selective and inconsistent. Mr. Carter bullied countries traditionally friendly to the United States, cutting back on military and economic aid and issuing report cards on their human rights practices, while pressing ahead vigorously for normalization of relations with Vietnam and Cuba. Initial attacks on the Soviet Union for its brutal repression of religious and ethnic minorities were blunted and virtually eliminated from official rhetoric in the interests of detente and the SALT II treaty. He has been less than outspoken in denouncing the Vietnamese for the genocide practiced against Cambodians, the Chinese for repression in their society, or Cuba for its holding of thousand of political prisoners. The opening of emigration rights to thousands of Cubans, while obviously an attempt by Castro to turn a bad situation into political gain, gave Mr. Carter a chance to give meaning to his pronounced commitment. But he dawdled for weeks, finally announced that we would welcome the refugees with *"an open heart and open arms,"* (Questions and Answers with the League of Women Voters, May 5, 1980) and then 10 days later ordered a halt, threatening penalties on those assisting the refugees and saying that *"we will not permit our country to be used as a dumping ground for criminals who represent a danger to our society."* (Washington Post, May 15, 1980)

In line with his unilateral termination of the Cold War and his embrace of *"human rights,"* Mr. Carter also rejected *"balance of power politics,"* saying that the strategy of *"maneuver and manipulation"* is *"not in keeping with the character of the American people, or with the world as it is today."* Assuming that *"in the near future...issues of war and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of military security"* he opts instead for *"world order politics."* (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Speech, March 15, 1976) This assumption allows him to ignore Soviet use of proxy forces altogether or accept his U.N. ambassador's advice that they are merely serving to stabilize countries beset with social and economic difficulties. Mr. Carter once declared that the U.S. *"should make it clear that detente requires that the Soviets...refrain from irresponsible intervention in other countries."* He went on to say that *"the Russians have no more business in Angola than we have."* (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Speech, March 15, 1976) But 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola have been quite acceptable over the last three years. In fact, a doubling of the Cuban presence throughout Africa -- to over 40,000 troops -- has been accepted for the last three years. The almost total lack of concern over this expansion is incomprehensible in terms of the Administration's professed concern about human rights and civil liberties. It is even more disturbing when U.S. dependence on mineral resources from that continent to run our businesses and build our weapons systems is taken into account. But in a world free of "balance of power politics" Soviet and Soviet proxy aims apparently have nothing to do with gaining control over our access to such necessities.

NO CONCEPTION OF REAL AMERICAN INTERESTS

The consequences of Mr. Carter's lack of a clear conception of legitimate American interests and policies to promote them are not limited to Africa. In Central America

and the Caribbean a virtual lack of any response to Cuban training, arming and sponsorship of revolutionaries has led to strongly anti-American shifts and the proliferation of new and potential Marxist governments throughout our own continent -- regimes that will continue to take direction from their original tutors. The previously strongly pro-American Nicaragua is now dominated by a party that not only refuses to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but sends a telegram to the puppet regime in that country congratulating it on being saved by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Carter declared three years ago that *"the Soviets have moved toward a much more balanced position"* in the Middle East and that *"the desire"* throughout the world for peace in that region was *"so great...that the Soviets will follow along and take advantage of any constructive step toward peace."* (News Conference, November 30, 1977) Thus, he initially invited them to participate once again in a negotiated settlement. Later, he pursued a separate approach through the Camp David accords. But the unpredictable course of U.S. foreign policy over the last three and one-half years has brought us to the point where it is necessary for the President of the United States to go before the American people and the world to declare the obvious -- that the Middle East *"is of great strategic importance."* Mr. Carter, therefore, declares that *"an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States"* and that it *"will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."* (State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980) This "Carter Doctrine," enunciated without prior consultation with major allies, was quickly modified with the qualification that we don't *"expect to have enough military strength and enough military presence there to defend the region unilaterally,"* without the cooperation of the allies we didn't consult. (Question and Answer Session with Editors and News Directors, January 29, 1980)

Mr. Carter has compounded the failures of his foreign policy with his early and vigorous support for a process begun by the Democrat Congress -- the emasculation of our intelligence capabilities. Congruent with his notion that the Cold War is over, Mr. Carter entered office with the belief that in this new environment of detente and *"world order politics,"* covert activities were no longer necessary. He said he wanted to have the CIA *"perform its functions effectively and efficiently and legally for a change."* ("Meet the Press," July 11, 1976) In order to do so he initially sought to install a long-time critic of the intelligence system, Theodore C. Sorenson, as CIA chief but was dissuaded from this effort by the Senate's refusal to confirm a fox to guard the hen house. (Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Innocence Abroad: Jimmy Carter's Four Misconceptions," Readers Digest, May 1980, p. 106) The current director, Stansfield Turner, undertook radical agency reorganization. Just a few months after assuming the position, he terminated 816 operations directors, men and women with invaluable experience. (Washington Post, December 4, 1977) Among the casualties were the agency's top experts in Iran, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet power structure and the Middle East. Mr. Carter proposed a comprehensive intelligence charter during his second year in office -- legislation that was drafted by a small group of individuals who seemed more bent on an old anti-CIA crusade than in creating an effective intelligence community. (Statement of Republican National Committee Advisory Council, Subcommittee on Intelligence, August 6, 1979) There is more truth than humor to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's suggestion that the only remaining functions left to the CIA are those of analysis that might just as well be left to the Library of Congress' research service. (Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Innocence Abroad: Jimmy Carter's Four Misconceptions," Readers Digest, May 1980, p. 106) Mr. Carter has consciously aided a process of so reducing our capabilities that the United States cannot perform the intelligence functions necessary to promote our own interests,

assist our allies and compete with the Soviet Union. It is no wonder that Mr. Carter seems continually surprised by events. In December of 1978 he announced that he *"fully expect(ed) the Shah to maintain power in Iran"* and *"the present problems in Iran to be resolved."* (New York Times, December 31, 1978) Less than a month later he virtually shrugged off events, saying that *"it's impossible for anyone to anticipate all future political events."* (New York Times, January 18, 1979)

NO STRATEGY

But Iran is not merely an example of failed intelligence. In fact, given Mr. Carter's inclinations, a detailed prediction of events in that country might very well have gone unnoticed. Iran is, above all, an example of the consequences of a failed foreign policy. And it is only the latest example. The policies pursued in the present hostage crisis dramatically illustrate the pattern of the last three and one half years. There is no plan or strategy for dealing with the various Iranian authorities. Mr. Carter simply reacts and improvises. When the hostages were first taken, Mr. Carter announced that he would impose sanctions and ask allies to join with us in those efforts. In fact, the implementation of these sanctions was only half-hearted. The United States imported more oil from Iran in January 1980 than it had in the same month the year before. Some 11,000 Iranians were admitted to the United States from November 4, 1979 through March 1980. In April, Mr. Carter announced that he would announce additional sanctions. But then the "moderate" Iranian president said that maybe he could arrange for the transfer of U.S. citizens from one set of captors to another. Mr. Carter delayed the announcement of sanctions and went on television, fortuitously on the morning of a primary (April 1), to announce the positive signs of progress. But the "progress" was only another jerking of the string by the multi-headed Iranian government.

Mr. Carter eventually announced a new set of sanctions (April 7) and elicited statements of support and promises of cooperation in the effort from our allies. Their support was largely the result of his indications that this would forestall more assertive measures, presumably some form of military action. But then he pulled the rug out from under them once again with his attempted rescue mission. Failure to consult as to the specifics of such an attempt is conceivably proper, but the timing of the raid so soon after the pressure for allied cooperation could only leave our allies wondering if they had been purposefully deceived.

THE REACTIONARY PRESIDENT

For months, the president who promised *"to take steps to crush"* international terrorism and to *"eliminate"* it *"once and for all"* (American Legion Convention Speech, Seattle, Washington, August 24, 1976) has watched as 53 U.S. citizens are held hostage. For months he has allowed one country, run by a religious fanatic virulently anti-American, to dominate our entire foreign policy. He has reacted to Iranian leaders' every twist and turn with some new improvisation but with no clear notion of what effect it might have. For months Mr. Carter sequestered himself in the Rose Garden, refusing to campaign or debate the issues, hiding behind the understandable and generous American impulse to stand behind their president in a time of crisis.

But after the failed rescue mission, Mr. Carter emerged from the White House telling us that he could once again campaign because *"times change and a lot of the responsibilities that have been on my shoulders have been alleviated."* (Washington Post, May 1, 1980) He does not explain how this miraculous transformation

took place but, as usual, is compelled shortly thereafter to tell the American public what it already knows, that he doesn't "*think the hostage question is anymore manageable than it was before.*" (Address to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, May 9, 1980)

Once again Mr. Carter deals with a crisis as if it was an isolated incident, unrelated to other events in the world. The State Department, in its press briefings, mentions that the Soviet Union has massed military units of combat strength along its border with Iran in much the same manner as its actions prior to the invasion of Afghanistan. But what has Mr. Carter had to say about this? Nothing. What does Mr. Carter intend to do about this? Nothing. Nothing, that is, unless he is forced once again to react.

In the post-Afghanistan setting, Mr. Carter's rhetoric has taken a turn toward the tough. "Human rights" has been replaced by "U.S. vital interests" in the vocabulary of his speech writers. But the same transformation is not evident in actual policies. The record over the last few months indicates that we can only expect more of the same from Mr. Carter.

A P P E N D I X

"I don't claim to be an expert on foreign affairs."

--Chicago Sun Times
October 19, 1975

"I want to be sure that when Cy Vance speaks or when I speak that it's the absolute truth. I want over a period of time other nations to know that if our country makes a commitment, it will be honored. And I want us to tell the Saudi Arabians and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Lebanese and the Jordanians and the Israelis the same thing, so that there never is any sense of being misled. These are the kinds of hopes that I have, that I believe can be realized."

--Speech to the Department of State Employees
February 24, 1977

"My hope is that with Ed Muskie coming on Board as part of our team...that he will play a somewhat different role than the one Secretary Vance played because of a difference in background and temperament and attitude...I see Ed Muskie as being a much stronger and more statesmanlike senior citizen figure who will be a more evocative spokesman for our nation's policy."

--Speech to the Philadelphia World
Affairs Council
May 9, 1980

"Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear."

--Speech at Notre Dame
May 22, 1977

"The Soviets have made an extraordinary increase in naval strength in order to extend their influence throughout the world. But I don't think it necessarily means a commitment towards belligerency. It may be that they have decided that, in the absence of war, their emphasis should be on influence through peaceful means and the assertion of military strength."

--Readers Digest
October 1976

"But I have a deep belief that the underlying relationship between ourselves and the Soviets is stable and that Mr. Brezhnev, along with myself, wants peace and wants to have better friendship."

"We try to pursue peace as the overwhelming sense of our goals with the Soviet Union, and I think that's shared in good faith by President Brezhnev."

--News Conference
June 26, 1978

"The presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba is a very serious matter. This status quo is not acceptable."

*--Washington Star
September 7, 1979*

"We are not trying through diplomacy to get the Soviets to eliminate the combat nature of this troop. And I don't know yet whether we will succeed. If we do not succeed, we will take appropriate action to change the status quo."

*--St. Louis Post-Dispatch
September 26, 1979*

"This is not a large force, nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. I have concluded that the brigade issue is certainly no reason for a return to the cold war."

*--Televised Address to the Nation
October 1, 1979*

"My opinion of the Russians has changed most dramatically in the last week (after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan) than even the previous two and one-half years before that...The action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time that I've been in office."

*--Interview with Frank Reynolds
ABC
December 31, 1979*

"It would be good to go back and read the quote to see if you have it accurate. I didn't insinuate or say that my assessment of the Soviet policy or ultimate goals had been changed at all."

*--Interview with Meg Greenfield
Washington Post
March 29, 1980*

"Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games."

*--Televised Address to the Nation
January 4, 1980*

"But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression. While this invasion continues, we and the other nations cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union."

*--State of the Union
January 23, 1980*

"...That is why the United States has imposed stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union."

--State of the Union
January 23, 1980

"I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action. The undelivered grain will be removed from the market through shortage and price support programs and through purchases at market prices..."

--Televised Address to the Nation
January 4, 1980

"The successful negotiation of the SALT II treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this Administration -- and we Americans, the people of the Soviet Union, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of strategic nuclear weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated treaty."

"However, because of the Soviet aggression, I have asked the United States Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis."

--Televised Address to the Nation
January 4, 1980

"Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That is why we have negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties -- SALT I and SALT II. Especially now, in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries, and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort to control nuclear weapons will not be abandoned."

--State of the Union Address
January 23, 1980

"...We cannot know with certainty the motivations of the Soviet move into Afghanistan -- whether Afghanistan is the purpose or the prelude."

--News Conference⁴
April 10, 1980

"We understand the vital importance of our relationship with our allies. Our friends in Japan, Western Europe and Israel must know that we will keep our promises; yet, they will be reassured not by promises but by tangible actions and regular consultations."

--Address to Members of the American
Chamber of Commerce
Tokyo, Japan
May 28, 1975

"We have helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances and recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized intermediate range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union."

--State of the Union
January 23, 1980

"...There is a fundamental difference between informing governments after the fact and actually including them in the process of joint policy making..."

--Foreign Policy Association
New York

"...we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy."

--Speech at Notre Dame Univeristy
May 22, 1977

"But we'll continue to provide an open heart and open arms to refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination and from economic deprivation, brought about primarily by Fidel Castro and his government."

--Questions and Answers with the
League of Women Voters
May 5, 1980

"We will not permit our country to be used as a dumping ground for criminals who represent a danger to our society."

--Washington Post
May 15, 1980

"For too long, our foreign policy has consisted almost entirely of maneuver and manipulation, based on the assumption that the world is a jungle of competing national antagonisms, where military supremacy and economic muscle are the only things that work and where rival powers are balanced against each other to keep the peace....Exclusive reliance on this strategy is not in keeping with the character of the American people, or with the world as it is today. Balance of power politics may have worked in 1815, or even 1945, but it has a much less significant role in today's world. Of course, there are rivalries -- racial, religious, national, some of them bitter. But the need for cooperation, even between rivals, goes deeper than all of them."

"...in the near future...issues of war and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of military security..."

"That is why we must replace balance of power politics with world order politics."

"We should make it clear that detente requires that the Soviets, as well as the United States, refrain from irresponsible intervention in other countries. The Russians have no more business in Angola than we have."

--Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Speech
March 15, 1976

"My own feeling is that in recent months the Soviets have moved toward a much more balanced position [in the Middle East]."

--News Conference
November 30, 1977

"My belief is that the desire of the whole world is so great for peace in the Middle East that the Soviets will follow along and take advantage of any constructive step toward peace."

--News Conference
November 30, 1977

"The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance....Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America -- and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

--State of the Union Address
January 23, 1980

"I don't think it would be accurate for me to claim that at this time or in the future we expect to have enough military strength and enough military presence there to defend the region unilaterally."

--Question and Answer Session
Editors and News Directors
January 29, 1980

"I think the proper role of the CIA is the role that was spelled out in the original legislation that set up the CIA as a source of information and intelligence. And I would try to have the CIA perform its functions effectively and efficiently and legally for a change, and I would be responsible to the American people for that performance."

--"Meet the Press"
July 11, 1976

"I fully expect the Shah to maintain power in Iran and for the present problems in Iran to be resolved...I think the predictions of gloom and disaster which come from sources have certainly not been realized at all. The Shah has our support and he has our confidence."

--New York Times
December 31, 1978

"Well, it's impossible for anyone to anticipate all future political events."

--New York Times
January 18, 1979

"If I become President, I intend to recommend strong multinational sanctions against guilty nations as a necessary and productive means of crushing this intolerable threat to international law and peace. International terrorism must be stopped once and for all!"

--American Legion Convention Speech
August 24, 1976

"I have stayed in the White House under extraordinary circumstances. But times change and a lot of the responsibilities that have been on my shoulders have been alleviated."

*--Washington Post
May 1, 1980*

"I don't want to mislead anyone...I do not think the hostage question is anymore manageable than it was before."

*--Address to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council
May 9, 1980*

"I urge the USOC and the Olympic Committees of other like-minded not to participate in the Moscow games."

"The course I am urging is necessary to help secure the peace of the world at this critical time."

*--Letter to Robert J. Kane
President, USOC
January 21, 1980*