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Allen DEFENSE

Q: Would RR as President retain General David Jones as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

A: RR believes that we must have the best personnel possible in all positions of governemt. As President, RR would carefully review not only General Jones but all of the people in senior positions. He would look for men and women of character, principle, and integrity, and would evaluate and retain or replace solely based on those criteria.

Q: Doesn't that imply it is possible to survive and win a nuclear war?

A: We should not base our planning on losing a nuclear war or on not trying to save as many American lives as possible. In contemplating the possibility of any type of war, it makes no sense whatsoever to base planning on losing or on maximizing destruction rather than trying to control and limit it. Rather than occurpying ourselves with theories of massive or "assured" destruction, we should explore means to assure survival; and RR believes that such an ability would constitute the best deterrent to war in the first place.

I would add another consideration: It has been recognized for some time, for example by the CIA as well as by reputable scholars on the Soviet military, that the Soviets clearly do dollow nuclear doctrin based on the conviction that it is possible to survive and win nuclear war. Soviet leaders further believe that if one side has developed such a capability while the other has not, then that side will be in a position to have its own way in a major crisis or confrontation.

Q: Does this answer mean that RR believes that a nuclear war can be meaningfully limited?

A: Our primary objective is to dter the Soviet Union from starting a nuclear war in the first place. The best way to limit the destructiveness of a nuclear war is to assure that it does not occur; and the best way to assure that it does not occur, without surrendering vital interests in an effort to avoid it, is to assure that the Soviets are never tempted to threaten us with nuclear war. To do that, we must assure that Soviet leaders never believe, in any situation, that they could gain more from starting such a war than from avoiding it, or that they might achieve political gains from threatening us with usch a war. This, then, requires a secure and conficent nuclear deterrent on our part.

We must base our planning on thelimiting of nuclear war should it occur. The last thing we should want is that there be no limits on the use of nuclear weapons, should deterrence fail, so that massive destruction--which otherwise might be avoided--occurs inevitably, as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This is not a new approach. Successive U.S. presidents and policy makers, for over thirty years, have recognized that nuclear planning, both for deterrence and for the contingency of its failure, must be based upon the ability to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, in a limited and controlled manner.

Q: Doesn't RR's call for more military strength simply mean adding more and more nuclear weapons and more overkill?

A: No. First, our military strength has declined relative to that of our adversaries across the board, both due to greater efforts on their parts and less on our own.

Second, our first priority in the nuclear area is to assure that the forces we have are adequately survivable and responsive to the threat and to our requirements; it is NOT to add more and more force. The United States reduced the total yield in its nuclear stockpile to about half what it was at its peak. The principal arms limitation objective that RR has advocated for SALT is the true and equitable reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the United States has tried for a decade to get Soviet agreement in SALT to significant mutual reductions, without any success whatsoever.

Third, the Soviet arsenal continues to expand beyond any reason. This forces us to do more than we would otherwise wish in two respects: We must assure that our deterrent remains secure and our forces remain adequate to carry out the missions we desire; and, we cannot politically allow the Soviet Union to be so clearly superior in nuclear strength that it impairs our alliances and adversely influences the political decisions of allies and third parties.

Finally, the "overkill" proposition is a prime example of resorting to oversimplifications and slogans rather than coming

to grips with deep and complicated problems. We plan forces, firs, to deter a range of possible threats against the United States and its allies; and, second, to give the President a range of options that might control escalation and limit, not maximize destruction, should deterrence fail.

Q: Hasn't the Soviet threat and military buildup been exaggerated, and even if it were true what good would so-called military superiority do for the Soviets? Military superiority did not do us any good in Vietnam.

A: The Russian invasion of Afghanistan, at a time of America's impotence in Iran, demonstrated and signaled the tangible results of an altered balance of power that now favors the Soviet Union.

As a result, a clear majority of the American electorate now favor increased levels of military spending. There is almost no opposition among the general population to increased efforts in national defense. In many respects, the American people are well ahead of the Congress in their appreciation of the present danger.

The Soviet Union is now verging on decisive strategic nuclear superiority--decisive in the sense that the outcome of any potential war will increasingly favor the Soviet Union. The strategic nuclear threat provided by the United States (which heretofore has been the core of NATO doctrine) is no longer sufficient to deter Russia in Europe or elsewhere. A single major breakthrough in weapons technology by Russia could leave our own country effectively defenseless.

Almost without doubt, things are going to get much worse before they get better.

On February 20, 1980, the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, in explaining the military balance, stated categorically to the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the United States does not now have even those minimum strategic forces needed for "essential equivalence" with Russia.

Administration spokesmen have admitted that the United States cannot successfully defend the oil fiedlds in the Persian Gulf without which the economies of the Western world cannot long survive.

The so-called five percent increase in defense procurement in the revised Carter military budget is fraudulent gimickry and shows the folly of dealing in percentages instead of weapons systems and force structure. No battle was ever won by a percentage point and no country saved by posturing demands for that which is essentially insignificant and cosmetic.

The Central Intelligence Agency now estimates that the Soviets are spending more than 50 percent more on defense than the United States, 80 percent more in military procurement, two and one-half times as much on ground forces, and 2.6 times as much on strategic forces. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates are even higher.

The Soviets have made enormous strides in closing the gaps in technology, frequently with American assistance. They will very soon be ahead of the United States in missile

accuracy. They have been ahead of us in tanks and armored vehicles since 1970. Many of their ground forces weapons are clearly better than ours. They have the only long-range (100-mile or more) cruise missiles operational in the world today.

Q: Does RR think that the Carter Administration made a mistake in deciding not to deploy the neutron warhead on our Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe?

A: Yes, not only did they mistake in not deploying the neutron warhead, but the whole issue was mishandled with our allies, particularly the Germans. President Carter had gotten Chancellor Schmidt to accept the deployment and convince members of his party to go along, when President Carter publicly announced the non-deployment of the neutron warhead. This left Chancellor Schmidt and many of America's friends vulnerable to bullying by the Soviets and attacks by their own left-wing supporters.

RR favors development and deployment of the neutron warhead for U.S. theater nuclear forces including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery, and bombs. The neutron warhead is the most effective technological development available to meet the growth inSoviet armored strength (more than 100,000 troops have been added to Soviet East Europeans from the the devastation of war.

The special characteristics of the neutron warhead would increase deterrence in Europe by improving the credibility of an effective NATO counter to Soviet military power. Such an increase in the credibility of deterrence would diminish the prospect that war would every break out in Europe.

Q: Has the Carter Administration tried to correct this growing imbalance in Theater Nuclear Forces?

A: The Carter Administration has done very little to correct the imbalance in TNF until very recently when they proposed to build and deploy Pershing II ballistic missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This was done after overwhelming criticism of the Carter Administration's listlessness in this area in the first three years of office.

All deployed United States theater nuclear weapons are obsolete technically with perhaps one exception. Ecluding the B-61 nuclear bomb, all United States theater nuclear weapons became operational between 1957 and 1965.

Russia is now substantially ahead of the United States in long-range theater nuclear forces and should increase her present lead throughout the 1980s. The plan adopted by NATO to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles by the mid01980s is woefully inadequate both in terms of the Russian threat and the late deployment dates of the two principal American systems involved. Russia now has far more than 100 mobile SS-20 IRBM launchers, more than 70 Backfire bombers, more than 450 other IRBM launchers and more than 450 theater nuclear bomber aircraft which are currently opposed in the European theater by only 56 British Vulvan bombers and 76 U.S. FB-111s.

In the area of naval nuclear weapons, Russia has almost completely reversed the long-standing advantage of the United States and is now in a position to negate the ability of the Western navies to control the seas during wartime. The United States has no real naval nuclear weapons modernization program and reliance on obsolete systems could mean the destruction of American maritime power by advanced Soviet naval nuclear weapons systems.

Q: How would RR characterize the Theater Nuclear Force (TNF) balance in Europe?

A: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff achnowledges that the Soviet Union will "hold an advantage in long-range theater nuclear forces by the early 1980s", that in "equivalent megations and hard target kill capability, the Soviet advantage will range from two-to-one to four-to-one", and that "these advantages continue to increase throughout the 1980s" even if we deploy the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile.

The recent introduction of Russian nuclear artillery and three new theater nuclear missiles has dramatically changed the balance of power in Europe. Most U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are obsolete and were introduced prior to 1964. President Carter's decision on the neutron bomb will assure that perhasp half the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe during the 1980s will have only about 30 tc 40 percent the effectiveness they would have had if the Ford Administration plan had been carried out.

The Soviets have gone ahead of the United States in tactical nuclear weapons delivered by fighter bombers because America has not produced long-range replacements for either the F-4 or F-111 aircraft while Russia has developed the long-range nuclear-capable MIG-27 and SU-19 Fencer aircraft.

The United States does not have a single modern naval nuclear weapon. The current situation is almost the reverse of that in the 1960s when the United States had a great advantage in effective naval nuclear forces. The vulnerability of the U.S. Navy to nuclear long-range cruise missiles launched from submarines, from Backfire bombers, or from surface ships is particularly severe. The U.S. has no modern, nuclear-capable anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, or anti-surface ship weapon. The nuclear air strike capability of the Navy is limited to subsonic aircraft, which carry no standoff nuclear weapons.

Q: There have been press reports that there is not enough nuclear material available to support the necessary rearmament program that you and others have outlined as essential for our strategic nuclear forces and our theater nuclear forces. What would RR do about it?

A: The US has allowed its facilities for production of nuclear weapons to erode away.

Capital investment in the nuclear weapons production complex is on the order of only about one percent of total capital peryear compard with a normal capital investment per year of 15 percent of the total capital in normal industrial production. Simply producing a certain number of warheads and then going out of business is exceedingly dangerous.

Moreover, the nuclear weapons testing program has been cut by about 70 percent when compared with the program of testing conducted during the 1960s. There has been a disturbing decline in manpower at nuclear weapons laboratories, and the entire area of nuclear weapons research has become a backwater in American strategic planning and weapons development.

During fiscal year 1981, an additional $100 million should be expended on nuclear warhead production just to meet the supposed defense program goals set forth by the Carter Administration. The Administration plan, at present, in many instances appears to envision nuclear delivery vehicles without nuclear warheads.

Additionally, a total of $500 million to $1 billion should be authorized in fiscal year 1981 and 1982 to permit modernization of basic warhead production facilities so that the industrial base for modern warhead production would at least approach the present warhead industrial capability of the Soviet Union.

Q: Why not an agreement with the Soviets banning the first use of nuclear weapons?

A: Such an agreement would be meaningless in wartime. If the Soviets see it in their interest to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict they will do so just as they have used nerve gas in Afghanistan.

Q: Do you believe that there are circumstances under which you would initiate the use of nuclear weapons?

A: Since Harry Truman used nuclear weapons to end the Second World War, every American President, including President Carter, has stated that there are circumstances in which the United States would initiate the use of nuclear weapons. RR contemplates no change in this policy.

Q: Isn't there a great deal of waste in the Soviet military establishment?

A: There is certainly some waste in the Soviet military establishment. However, the Soviet military economy, including military production, is relatively well-run--far above the normal standards of Soviet industry. In some areas, such as military reserch and development, the Soviets seem inclined to accept some waste as the price of a dynamic approach; that is, they will spend money on what we would regard, iwth our conservative approach, as high risk technology. They may waste some resources with this approach, but they may also make rapid progress in advanced technology.

U.S. technical superiority is rapidly eroding due in large part to Soviet research and development expenditures which are 50% above ours. They have closed many of the gaps and are ahead of the Untied States in some important areas. For example:

--Soviet ICBM accuracy is almost identical to our own.

--Soviet tank armor on the T-72 is a generation more advanced than on any Western tank now developed.

--Soviet artillery is generally better than our own.

--Soviet tactical fighter aircraft now have range-payload characteristics similar to our own.

--The Soviets have closed the gap in ABM interceptor missiles and radar technology.

--The Soviets have introduced superior anti-submarine warfare missiles.

--The Soviets have introduced a modern supersonic strategic bomber.

--The Soviets have widely int-oduced MIRVed missiles.

--The Soviets were the first to introduce intercontinental range submarine-launched missiles and MIRVed intercontinental SLBMs.

--Anti-tank guided missiles are the equal of our best.

Q: If the United States does not sell technology and know-how to the Soviets won't they just get it from other countries?

A: The Soviets are selective purchasers of Western technology. In certain key areas; such as computers and oil drilling equipment, where they have the greatest need, the U.S. enjoys a considerable technological lead over other Western nations, and thus we have some measure of effective unilateral control. Frequently, other countries cannot design and construct projects on the scale desired by the Soviet Union. It is one thing for a European or Japanese country to possess cetain technologies, it is quite another to meet the quality and size capabilities of the U.S. industry. For example, in the early 1970s the Commerce Department agued successfully that the Kama River plant would be built solely by Euripean firms if the U.S. did not participate; the Department of Defense however, doubted that foreign availability for the entire project existed. A similar situation existed with respect to the 1979 sale of a $144 million dollar plant to the USSR for the construction of a turndey plant for the manufacture of rock drill bits.

Furthermore, even if foreign availibility exists, U.S. export control laws require disapproval of any particular sale if it can be established that a significant contribution to the military capabilities of an adversary would be made. Finally, advanced sophisticated technology of the kind desired by the USSR is mostly available from Western Euripe

and Japan. The NATO countries, plus Japan, participate in an informal multilateral export control coordinating committees which must approve items on the control list. Unfortunately, over the past few years the United States has been the leading requestor of exceptions to this list, and we should not be surprised that our allies doublt our intentions in these matters. If the U.S. shows leadership in the application of national security export controls, we can then negotiate with our partners to get their cooperation. They must be prepared to participate in this effort, or Europe will soon be "Finlandized". They will face the donsequences sooner than we.

The U.S. Government also has full legal authority to block the sale of a U.S.-origin technology when it is proposed for sale by another country. For example, a computer sold to France may not legally be sold by them to a controlled country such as the USSR without the explicit approval of the commerce Department. Some multinational corporations attempt to evade these contorls, but eh law can be enforced if the Federal government has the commitment and the resources. Finally, even if we cannot permanently deny technology transfer, we can slow it down.

Q: Won't trade be damaged if we apply sanctions against the Soviet Union?

A: No, it will have a negligibel effect on our balance of payments or overfall exports. About 9½% of our manufactured exports to the Soviet Union, for example, are shipped without any prior government review; these are so-called general license shipments. Only 5% are affected by export controls. More than two-thirds of our exports to the USSR consist of agricultural goods, not technology. The present sanctions apply apainst only 1% of our total manufactured exports worldwide.

Q: How do we know the Soveits are misusing U.S. technology?

A: Our intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA and the DIA have confirmed this fact in many cases. In other areas they do not know the full extent of the diversion but experts have testified before Congress that as much as 25% of a computer's capacity can be diverted without detection by the U.S. personnel who service the equipment. In recent years, we have sold large numbers of relatively sophisticated computers and softward to the Soviet Bloc countries, and we can only assume that some are being improperly utilized.

Q: Isn't the MX in any of the basin variations an overly expensive weapons system and a waste of the taxpayers' money?

A: Over a decade ago we recognized that we would have to take measures to protect and modernize our ICBM force if we could not dissuade the Soviet Union, in SALT, from developing a threat to it. At that time the Nixon Administration decided tentatively on an ABM defense to preserve the survivability of the force, but we negotiated that option away in SALT I in the hope that doing so would promote our goals in SALT II. SALT has by now clearly failed to prevent or reduce the Soviet development of a threat to our ICBM force, and we now have no prudent alternative to modernizing that force. It is precisely the Soviet threat posed to our present land-based ICBM force that necessitates the deployment of MX in a survivable basing mode.

As for expense, RR believes that we must compare the MX to the other major strategic systems we have built. The MX turns out to be the least expensive, when all costs are adjusted for inflation than the Minuteman, Polaris, Poseidon, and the B-52 programs.

Q: Which of the confusing array of strategic aircraft options that are being considered today--the B-52G cruise missile carrier, the B-52H penetrating bomber, the FB-111B/C, the B-1, or the LRCA--would your administration pursue?

A: The array of strategic aircraft under conseration today appears to be confusing because options for different future eras are being discussed as if they were equivalent alternatives. When you consider the near-term, mid-term, and far-term options separately, the picture is clearer.

In the near-term, between 1982 and 1985, the B-52G standoff cruise missile carrier will be the principal element of the strategic aircraft forces, and RR would see that it is the product of a careful modification and deployment program that does not cut corners at the expense of survivability or performance as is being done today. For example, coastal instead of inland basing makdes the B-52s needlessly vulnerable to submarine-launched ballistic missile attack, and less than 30 percent of the aircraft are on alert. On the other hand, the B-52H bomber is unlikely to retain its ability to penetrate increasingly sophisticated Soviet territorial air defenses, and therefore RR would instead consider converting Hs as well as Gs to additional standoff cruise missile carriers.

For the mid-term, from 1985 to 1990, the options are:

--The B-1 penetrating bomber

--A B-1 variant standoff cruise missile carrier

--The FB-111B/C penetrating bomber

--A more capable re-engined B-52 cruise missile carrier.

Each of these options has its strong points, and I would consider each further before making a decision.

The LRCA is in the concept formulation stage at the present, and it would not lead to an operational system until the late 1980s at the earliest. I would continue to pursue the long-range conceptual work and review it periodically to determine if and when we should commit to developing a new system.

Q: Do you agree with President Carter's decision to sell uranium fuel to India?

A: RR favors examing the question of the sale of reactor fuel on a case by case basis. In this regard, questions of foreign policy become paramount, as do questions concerning safeguards over the uses of the possible by products of the fuel.

In the first place, we are discussing the sale of uranium of very low enrichment, which, itself, has no military uses although, in a reactor, it would produce plutonium, which does have direct military uses. We therefore need safeguards over the use of that plutonium. If a nation provides those safeguards, and if it is an ally, or is friendly to the United States in its foreign policy. RR's inclination would be to approve such transactions. Many nations have based their economic development to an important extent on nuclear energy, and when those nations are firendly and trustworthy we should be willing to assist them.

India represents a special case. It would certainly be RR's objective to improve relations between the Untied States and Indea. We have had good relations in the past, and RR believes that high priority should be given to even stronger relations in the future. RR does not wish for India to move closer to the Soveit Union.

India, however, has already once diverted civilian nuclear materials to the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device, and India continues to refuse to permit proper

safeguards against future diversion. In addition, we must note that India has recently contracted with the Soveit Union to purchase $1.6 billion in modern Russian tanks, ships, and aircraft. These considerations, along with its close relationships with the Soviet Union--a nation that has invaded Afghanistan and now threatens Pakistan--leads RR, on balance, to oppose this particular sale of uranium fuel. With improvement in our relations with India, and with more Indian flexibility concerning proper safeguards, RR would, on the other hand, favor such a transaction.

Q: Does RR agree that the U.S. should comply with the terms of the unratified SALT II Treaty, as we are now doing?

A: In the wake of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter requested a delay in the U.S. Senate's consideration of the proposed SALT II Treaty. In a letter of January 5, 1980 to Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, the President stated that "the purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this (Afghan) crisis."

The President and senior Administration officials have continued to stress their faith in the proposed treaty and their intention to seek its ratification by the U.S. Senate at some unspecified future time. Even in the absence of the Senate's formal consideration of the treaty, however, President Carter has decided to have the United States comply with the treaty's provisions.

In view of questions raised during Congressional hearings concerning major inequities and risks involved in the Carter SALT II treaty, in view of the continued Soviet buildup, and in view of legislation requiring Congressional authorization of any new U.S. arms control obligations, the Adminstration's unilateral actions raise serious national security and legal questions.

President Carter's request for Senate delay and his

decision to comply unilaterally with the proposed treaty even in the absence of Senate ratification mark attempts to circumvent the political reality that his flawed treaty was headed for Senate defeat.

Even prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Carter SALT II treaty lacked the two-thirds support required for Senate ratification. Hearings before the Senate's Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Intelligence Committees had highlighted a number of fatal flaws in the treaty's unequal, escalatory and unverifiable terms. These Senate hearings had also focused concern on the linkage between the trust assumed in the treaty and the contrasting realities and risks of Soviet non-compliance in a period of an accelerating Soviet drive for strategic superiority.

The President should declare that the U.S. will not abide by the provisions of the SALT II Treaty but will observe the more general limits (2,400 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, 1,320 with MIRVs) contained in the Vladivostok Accord (negotiated by President Ford and President Brezhnev), as the U.S. rebuilds its strategic military strength with an eye toward reopening the negotiations on SALT in 1981.

Q: The SALT II agreement negotiated by President Carter places a limit on both the number of ICBMs and the number of warheads on each ICBM that the Soviets can deploy. If the Senate were to ratify that treaty, wouldn't your concern over possible growth of the Soviet threat be eliminated?

A: SALT II does not limit missiles or warheads. The proposed treaty purports to limit certain types of launcers, which it does not effectively define. The Soviets can produce and stockpile as many missiles and warheads as they want. Even counting only those on-launcher forces recognized by SALT II the treaty allows the Soviets to deploy some 6,000 ICBM warheads before its expiration. The MX missile system being proposed by the Carter Administration would take nearly a decade to deploy fully. The SALT II Treaty would expire at the end of 1985, before the first MX missile would be deployed. Moreover, a treaty can be broken within months legally, or overnight by the choice of the other party. U.S. security should not depend upon the Soviets continuing to embrace any treaty.

My administration would make it clear to the Soviets that the United States will not allow itself to be overwhelmed by the Soviet arms buildup, and that the United States will not rely on fragile paper agreements for its national security.

Q: What about superiority? Does RR favor a return to superiority?

A: When we had superiority, we could preserve the peace and thwart aggression. Now that we are inferior, we and our friends will be subject to blackmail. Achieving superiorty is an academic question. It will take a concerted effort over the next four years for us to regain parity, that is a posture of equality.

Q: To continue to be specific, what would RR do with respect to strategic offensive forces?

A: As a matter of highest priority, RR would disperse our MINUTEMAN ICBM's. RR would continue to develop the MX and work on reducing the lead time for ICBM basing modes in a manner to permit an optimum deployment. RR would accelerate the development of cruise missiles, and their deployment, and would take measures to exptend the serviceability of B-52s as cruise missile carriers. And he would build a B-1 or comparable modern bomber.

Q: Would RR favor "killer amendments" to the Treaty?

A: The rhetorical use of the term "killer amendment" is an invention of the Carter Administration. It is only an assertion that any amendment would be a "killer amendment." Many important treaties--the Panama Canal Treaty, for example--have been amended by the Senate. A "killer amendment" is apparently an improvement unsatisfactory to the Soviets.

Q: Would RR be in favor of bringing the Treaty up for a Senate vote?

A: Yes, bringing this treaty up for a vote would force a debate on the treaty's terms. The Senate did not have the votes before Afghanistan to approve this treaty. It will have even more votes against it now. Carter's deferral of the Treaty allows him to assert that it is a good one and conceals the oppositition to it. The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected it outright and even the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended approval only with more than twenty conditions.

Q: Why does RR think the treaty is unverifiable?

A: Because the Soviets have avoided agreeing to any number of measures which would a-sure adequate verification. The most important is that the Treaty permits the Soviets to ocnceal their testing. The Treaty sanctions the encryption of telemetry--that is, permits testing data to be placed in scrambled code, even though we do not do this.

Q: Why does RR think this treaty is unequal?

A: It is unequal for a number of reasons. But the three most important are that this treaty:

1. Grants the Soviets a unilateral right, that is, permits them but bars us from having heavy missile launchers;

2. Permits the Soviets to exculde--that is, not to count in the totals--some 375 intercontinentally-capable heavy bombers; and

3. Allows the Soviets to continue to enjoy superior levels of strategic destructive power.

Q: Why is RR against a SALT treaty?

A: RR is not against a SALT treaty. RR is against this particular unequal treaty, which does not accomplish the objectives for which we entered SALT I or SALT II. In important aspects it is also unverifiable.

Q: Specifically, what would you do with respect to our policy on SALT?

A: First, RR would reverse the practice of making arms control the centerpiece of our foreign policy. This only plays into the ahnds of the Soviets who do not share our goals and objectives. Second, RR would take those unilateral steps necessary to assure strategic stability, to deny the Soviets one-sided advantages, and to demonstrate to the Soviets that it is in their own interest to reach better arms agreements. Third, RR would reverse the policy of non-linkage of SALT with other foreign affairs issues. SALT always was and is linked to other issues. Soviet intervention in Angola proved this. So did their introduction of a combat brigade into Cuba. So did their aggression in Afghanistan.

Q. What went wrong with SALT II?

A. First of all, the U.S. failed to take the actions necessary to maintain strategic balance and to give us a solid SALT II negotiating position, while, in contrast, the Soviets increased their strategic position after SALT I. Then, in our zeal to get a treaty, we gave more than we got. We made too many concessions. Our greatest concession was that we failed to include

FOREIGN POLICY

NATIONAL SECURITY

MX

Q. What does RR think of Carter's MX proposal?

A. RR believes that the Carter Administrations efforts to regain a survivable land-based missle force have been dominated by indecisiveness, delay, and attempts to accomodate the Soviets in the SALT II negotiations. The MX design has been abruptly changed time and again--a clear indication that none of the designs has been carefully thought through. In fact, the Carter Administration rejected bhe basing system favored by the Air Force and the scientific advisory panels in favor of a less timely, more costly, and more uncertain system.

RR intends to review the work that has been done on the land-based missile force problem, but will not be indifferent to the present and growing Soviet threat. His emphasis on a timely, economical land-based missile force will put the work that has been done in the proper perspective and will lead to rapid deployment of the best force.

FOREIGN POLICY

MX #2

Q. If RR were to change the design of the MX system next January, wouldn't he be throwing away years worth of work and billions of dollars worth of effort and actually delay, rather than hasten, the deployment of a new land-based missile force?

A. RR would not ignore the work that has been done to date but, rather, he would build upon it. The work on the MX missile would continue, and RR would utilize studies and work on the appropriate basing for the missile which have unwisely been ignored or rejected by Carter in his effort to accomodate SALT II. If the MX program, including proper basing, cannot be speeded up RR would make a decision concerning rebasing the existing Minuteman force rather than leaving it vulnerable while we develop the MX missile. It should be possible to adapt both missiles to the same basing. RR would consider not only the work on the MX system, which as proposed by the Carter Administration will take another six years to begin deployment, but also the United States experience with the Minuteman missile, which became operational in about developing and deploying these systems now than we did when we started Minuteman, and we should be able to do at least as well as we did then.

US-USSR - STRATEGIC WEAPONS #1

Q. In what areas of the strategic balance has the Soviet Union moved ahead of the U.S.?

A. The Soviet Union has been making a massive effort to build up its strategic forces for a decade and a half. Since 1965, the strategic balance has dramatically shifted in favor of the Soviet Union and will continue to do so for the next decade.

It is now clear that:

-- The Soviet Union is outspending the U.S. on strategic forces by a factor of almost three to one.

-- The Soviets have under development five new ICBMs, several new SLBMs, (including the Typhoon) several heavy bombers, advanced ABM radars and missiles, advanced intercepter aircraft, and probably laser and particle beam weapons.

-- The Soviet Union is already ahead of the U.S. in perhaps 75% of all measures of strategic forces and is rapidly closing the gap in the remaining areas.

-- At this moment in time, the U.S. has one ICBM, no SLBM and no strategic bomber under active development, although the Trident II SLBM is in a conceptual and study phase. U.S. R&D efforts in the ABM area and directed energy weapons are minimal.

-- Beginning this year and for the rest of the 1980s, the Soviets will be able to destroy 90% of the U.S. ICBM force. U.S. bombers are 20 years old with no replacement in sight. U.S. Trident submarines are being built at 1/3 the rate required to maintain the current number of missile submarines into the 1990s.

-- Soviet civil defense efforts are over 20 times that of the U.S. and include a major blast shelter building program and sophisticated plans for population evacuation in the event of war.

US-USSR - STRATEGIC WEAPONS #2

Q. What have been the differences in U.S. and Soviet Strategic Doctrine and have these differences had an effect upon the shifting balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

A. The U.S. for a decade and a half has procured its strategic forces under the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction which defined deterrence in terms of killing the enemy population; this doctrine makes light of strategic nuclear superiority. The Soviets, however, have been building strategic nuclear forces to fight, survive and win a nuclear war. The results of this has been the emergence of Soviet strategic superiority and a declining U.S. ability to meet even the limited objectives set forth under the MAD doctrine.

As Soviet strategic forces has increased, we have seen an increased Soviet tendency to take actions such as Angola and Afghanistan that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. The steady decline in U.S. deterrent capability and the steadily increasing Soviet capability to limit damage and wage nuclear war is in large part responsible for our deteriorating position around the world.

The U.S. faces a number of critical strategic force decisions including: "quick fixes" to our strategic forces; the future of the MX; the question of a new-manned bomber; and the nature of Trident II.

U.S. STRATEGIC SUBMARINE FORCES

Q. Since you have stated your concern with the land-based missile and strategic bomber components of the U.S. strategic force triad, are there any actions that you would take to change the strategic ballistic missile submarine forces?

A. While the strategic submarine force has suffered from some neglect under the Carter Administration, it has been less affected than have the land-based missiles and the aircraft. Nevertheless, the strategic submarine force could be substantially improved in the next five years by programs such as the following which Ronald Reagan would review and consider carrying out:

-- The existing C-3 missiles could be replaced by the new, longer range, more accurate C-4 missiles on all 31 Polaris submarines instead of on only 12 of them as is planned by the Carter Administration.

-- The construction rate of the new Trident submarines is currently about one per year. Originally, the Trident program called for the construction of about two submarines per year, and that higher construction rate is still feasible.

-- The present submarine communication systems require that the subs routinely operate antennas on or near the ocean surface, increasing the chance of Soviet detection. A combination of operational and technical improvements could make such operation necessary.

TRIAD

Q. Do we really need to maintain a "Triad" of strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) and is the MX the best ICBM?

A. We live in a highly uncertain world where technological advances are often unpredictable and our intelligence information is almost always incomplete. The original purpose of the Triad was to make a decisive technological breakthrough by the Soviets highly unlikely by building a U.S. strategic force that had several basing and penetration modes. The requirements for the Triad have certainly not declined. However, financial pressures and anti-defense thinking in the Executive and Legislative Branches have allowed our deterrent to erode. We have allowed multiple vulnerabilities to develop in two "legs" of the Triad--the ICBM and bomber forces. These vulnerabilities must be corrected if we are to assure continued U.S. ability to deter nuclear war.

Defense Department studies have repeatedly concluded that it is not cheaper to abandon the ICBM force and develop a larger force of SLBMs and manned bombers or cruise missile carriers. The ICBM force has historically been the cheapest element of our deterrent. Those who advocate scarpping the ICBM and going to alternative systems are often really advocating the acceptance of a U.S. capability that is inferior to that of the Soviets.

NAVY

Q. Isn't it true that the U.S. Navy is the strongest in the world, that we have been building a greater tonnage of combat vessels and that we have significantly greater amphibious capabilities than the Soviet Union?

A. This is nominally true, but misleading unless put into context. The Soviet Union is not dependent on the use of the seas as are we and the Free World. The Soviet navy is designed to deny Western navies the use of the seas in wartime. As our naval capability has eroded and theirs has expanded, we have lost the ability to assure that we can continue to use the seas.

Over the last decade, the U.S. Navy has been cut in half. We have a one-and-a-half ocean Navy for a three-ocean world. To deploy two carriers in the Indian Ocean, we have been forced to reduce our strength in the Mediterranean Sea and Western Pacific. We have also had to keep carriers and escort vessels at sea for a much longer period of time than wise, and we will pay the price--indeed, are paying the price--in crew retention.

The only reason we have produced more than the Soviet Union in tonnage over the last decade has been our construction of carriers. In all other classes of warships, U.S. Naval construction has been deficient. In surface combat ships and in numbers of submarines the Soviets are ahead. We have reduced our goals from a navy of 850 ships to one of 770 ships, to one of 600, and now to one of 550, but we are not building enough ships to achieve and maintain even that lower goal. In something over a decade, we have allowed our Navy to shrink from about 950 ships to less than 500, including the Naval Reserve.

MILITARY READINESS

Q. Specifically, what does Ronald Reagan see as the major deficiencies in our conventional and theater forces?

A. Our ability to counter this threat is determined largely by the availability and readiness of highly skilled personnel which are essential to the defense of the country.

Recruitment and retention of qualified individuals in key positions poses the critical problem which may surface as the "weak link" in our defense structure. Despite the sophistication of our weapon systems (and, often, because of it), we need skilled individuals who are highly trained, available and ready.

-- Currently, we are short 20,000 highly skilled and technically trained petty officers. Recently, the U.S.S. Canisteo was removed from operational status because it was judged unsafe due to personnel shortages.

-- The Air Force is short 2,400 pilots and, if current re-enlistment rates don't improve, the pilot shortage will go as high as 5,000. Only 27 out of every 100 pilots are reenlisting at the end of their first term, down 50 percent from just two years ago. For the Strategic Air Command, the retention rate last year was 38 percent versus 58 percent two years ago. We lose 500 to 750 thousand dollars in training expenses for each pilot who leaves.

-- Similarly, Navy pilot retention rates are decreasing from approximately 60% in 1977 to a projected 20% in 1980. In addition, the Navy is losing nuclear trained submarine officers.

-- The Air Force is short 3,000 non-commissioned officers. Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen has been forced to suggest that in the early 80's he wants to spread the shortages "in a way as wise as we can."

-- The Army is short 46,000 non-commissioned officers. Army Chief of Staff General Edwin Meyer maintains that early deployment forces can be maintanied at high readiness levels, but that support and reserve forces are under strength. This is overly optimistic.

-- There are requirements for one million personnel in the Active Reserve - currently there are 800,000. The Individual Ready Reserve requires 700,000 but has 200,000 personnel. These shortages of personnel in the Reserves, the National Guard and the Individual Ready Reserve, would prevent a prompt mobilization in time of crisis or war. The recent Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise, designated Nifty Nugget, that was designed to test our wartime mobilization capabilities, showed that we could only fill 52 percent of infantry positions, 73 percent of artillery, and 28 percent of armor requirements -- and M60 tank crews are far below standards for readiness now.

-- The Army's medical corps has less than 40 percent of the doctors, 25 percent of the nurses and half the medics needed to look after casualties in wartime. There are peacetime shortages as well.

Shortfalls in ammunition and spare parts also affect readiness. They have occurred because these areas have traditionally represented target areas for budget cutters who have assumed that supplies were adequate. All Services have serious shortfalls in ammunition, spare parts and combat equipment.

-- In many categories of ammunition there are only enough stocks for a few days combat.

-- Current ammunition production capabilities make up deficiencies in war reserve stocks in a major conflict that begins on short notice.

-- Due to a shortage of spare parts, only 50 percent of the F-14 and F-15 tactical aircraft are "fully mission capable." The readiness of ships and other equipment is poor also.

I recommend that we:

-- Review the roles (and needs) of reserve and National Guard forces in light of rapid deployment force and conventional force objectives.

-- Provide for sound pay and benefit packages for military personnel which would make a military career attractive and provide adequate numbers of quality personnel.

-- Provide for the basic equipment that is often overlooked but mandatory to engage successfully in conflict at any level -- ammunition, spare parts, etc.

-- Provide operations and maintenance adequate to operate and train our forces to required levels and to conduct conflict equivalent readiness evaluations.

Q. How could the IRR be improved?

A. Reenlistment programs could be developed and management, location, and mobilization notification procedures could be improved.

Q. What general programs would you recommend to improve overall quality and strength of the Ready Reserve?

A. First, pay increases should be sought to aid recruitment. Second, greater reenlistment bonuses should be offered. Third, better educational benefits should be sought along the lines of the old G.I. Bill. Fourth, greater retention incentives should be offered so that qualified, skilled people would not leave the military sector for better paying civilian jobs. Fifth, more liberal credit for housing loans would help as well.

Q. How could the Selected Reserve be improved?

A. Enlistment bonuses and educational assistance incentives would help increase the strength of the Selective Reserve. In addition, optional enlistment terms and optional training programs could help.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE READY RESERVE

Q. What is the Ready Reserve?

A. The Ready Reserve is made up of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).