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July 9, 1980

To: Jack Savage  
From: Steve Cohen  
Re: Marketing Strategy

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR MARKETING STRATEGY:

Information

There are at least two sets of information which exist, but which we do not yet have:

- (1) Polling data
- (2) Position papers

According to Monday's Wall Street Journal, Richard Wirthlin is preparing a 100-page "game plan" based on his polling data. The Journal says that while the information gathered is generally first-class, Wirthlin's weakness is translating that data into a strategy.

Recommendation: Let's get involved with Wirthlin now. We need the raw data ASAP, and we may have a better overview position to translate it into strategy.

With regard to the Governor's position on issues, we have asked the Washington staff to provide a set of existing position papers. They said they would send the information today, and we can assess it then.

Initial Observations

The general election will be a tough one for Governor Reagan to win. If we treat the race as anything less than an uphill fight we will be in serious trouble.

We must remember:

---This is not the primary. Nor is it the '76 race against Ford. Governor Reagan's support is intense but narrow. He is very popular among registered Republicans, but Republicans constitute only about 20% of the electorate.

---Carter's popularity is very low right now, but it is also extremely volatile. In the four months since February, Carter's support dropped from 53% approval rating to a 30% approval. However, in the 4 months prior to the 53%, it soared from below 30%. In short, it is not unlikely that Carter can achieve another 20% shift between now and election day.

---The electorate is not happy with choices for President. Fully half of the respondents in the most recent New York Times/CBS poll were dissatisfied with a Carter-Reagan choice.

#### Reasonable Assumptions - Carter

---Economic news will improve. The tools available to the Presidency can manipulate the economic information if not the economy itself. Mortgage rates will fall, credit will expand, inflation will drop, and unemployment will level off. The economy can be made an issue, but the trends will be working against us.

---The hostages will be released. Irrespective of the cost, the hostages will be home before election day.

---The Middle East peace talks will move ahead. Perhaps limited substantively, the gains will be dramatically portrayed. The unhappiness of Jewish groups -- among

the highest in voter turnout, particularly in the key states -- will be mitigated.

---Trade restrictions will be imposed on foreign car imports. A dramatic gesture will be made towards the auto workers and unions generally.

---At least one new weapons program will be pushed forward. Perhaps a new bomber, possibly the neutron bomb. A get-tough move on defense.

In sum, Carter will do things right. His campaign organization is first-class. His ability to employ the services of cabinet officers to announce new contracts and grants to local communities and companies cannot be matched. His ability to make news cannot be equaled.

#### Reasonable Assumptions - Reagan

---The campaign disorganization will continue. The press will continue to focus on it, and it will cast doubts on the Governor's skills as a manager. Comparisons will be made to Carter's "incompetence".

---The press will intensify its scrutiny of the Governor's positions. The earlier problem with selective or erroneous use of statistics could recur.

---The debates could prove a greater benefit to Carter than to Reagan. The Governor's superior speaking ability could be offset by Carter's experience and detailed briefings. It is not inconceivable that the parity problem could be repeated.

In sum, it is probably best to assume a worst-possible-case mentality.



### Carter's Probable Strategy

Carter's strategy will probably be fairly simple, They will push Governor Reagan to the right, not just on economic policy, but more importantly on foreign affairs. They will combine the Governor's relative lack of foreign policy exposure with his tough talk, and try to create a picture of a man who is just a little extreme, a little trigger-happy.

They will try to make people just a little bit afraid. They won't go to a "little-girl-and-her-daisy-atomic-bomb" commercial, but they will create doubts.

At the same time, Carter will be portrayed as man of peace: Carter-Begin-Sadat, no boys dying in foreign wars, etc.

Domestically, Carter will try to appeal to the traditional Democratic constituency. He will talk about the economy's recovery. He will blame inflation on oil price increases, and by implication blame the oil companies. And, of course, the windfall profits tax will be incorporated as a means of promoting conservation, stimulating exploration and production, and countering unreasonable profits.

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Carter will try to appeal to a moderate woman's vote through the ERA and possibly abortion.

Union members will be reminded about the Chrysler loans, not in the context of promoting big business, but in terms of saving jobs.

Carter will admit making mistakes, he will admit failures. But, he will portray himself as a man trying, and as a known quantity.

Carter's strategy will be to portray Reagan as a decent man, but one whose answers to domestic problems are a bit simplistic; and whose foreign policy inexperience and views should make us a bit uneasy about resting his finger on the button.

#### Reagan Marketing Strategy

Objective: The primary objective should be to build confidence in Governor Reagan among independent and conservative/moderate Democrats. Governor Reagan must be perceived as a reasonable, responsible, and acceptable choice.

The second objective should be to reinforce the doubts these same independents and moderates have about President Carter.

#### Strategy

It is not enough simply to capitalize on the conservative mood in the country to achieve the objectives noted above; we should attempt to communicate the following:

- (1) That Governor Reagan is a leader.
- (2) That Governor Reagan has a vision of where this country should be going, and the ability to move us in that direction.
- (3) That Reagan's record as Governor was an impressive one, and that it is a reasonable measure of his ability.
- (4) That the Governor's "plain talk" on issues is important to clarify the problems; that those who charge him with being simplistic are more concerned with "politics" than with solving problems.

- (5) That Governor Reagan is "tough" with respect to foreign policy, not trigger happy.
- (6) That the Governor's age and good health are assets.
- (7) That people respect Governor Reagan for his vision, his leadership and his record, not just for his ideology.
- (8) That people have confidence in Governor Reagan.

WE MUST GIVE PEOPLE A REASON TO VOTE FOR GOVERNOR REAGAN,  
NOT JUST AGAINST PRESIDENT CARTER.

To assume that the dissatisfaction in Carter's performance will translate automatically into Reagan votes is a serious mistake. Unless we develop confidence in Governor Reagan, independent and moderate voters will display their unhappiness by not voting in the Presidential race, voting for John Anderson, or not voting at all.

#### Themes

- (1) Defense -- The Carter position on defense is a continual series of flip-flops and one which can be easily and dramatically conveyed. But more importantly Governor Reagan could criticize the Carter "solution" of "throwing money" at the problem -- the 3% vs. 5% debate. Instead the Governor could talk about specific programs: a new B-1 bomber, better training, etc.
- (2) Welfare -- The Reagan gubernatorial record is impressive on this. It is always an emotionally and politically effective issue.
- (3) Foreign Policy -- I recommend focusing on the sale of F-15 extenders to Saudi Arabia. We can satisfy several objectives with this spot. First, Carter's reversal on this one is simple. Second, it shows Carter's willingness to sell out Israel. Third, it hints at repeating the



mistakes of Iran. Fourth, it smacks of Arab blackmail. This spot is at once an anti-Carter, pro-Reagan commercial.

- (4) Vision of America -- Governor Reagan talking about his sense of where the country should be going. Position the Governor away from the extremism label.
- (5) Leadership -- We should try to convey an impression of vigor, to counter the age question. Reagan campaigning, meeting with advisors, acting like a leader, with his own voice-over about his gubernatorial record and skills.
- (6) Economy --- How government thwarts economic growth and productivity. Also, pro-small business spot could jibe nicely with California record and vision-of-America/American Dream themes.
- (7) On Being Tough -- Use the Russian garrison in Cuba example. Again a Carter flip-flop, but position this as an example of confusing our Allies as contributing to weakness. Strength is more than rattling sabres or sending troops. Reagan as the reasonable man.
- (8) The Carter Record vs. The Reagan Record -- Probably works best first in print. Equates their experience and contrasts their leadership abilities and effectiveness.

#### Recommended Media Vehicles

- (1) :30 second TV spots, and :60 second spots. Probably in a 3:1 ratio of 30's to 60's, these should comprise the bulk of the advertising expenditures.

The :60's should be all pro-Reagan: issues, leadership, vision, of America, etc. The :30's can be a combination of pro-Reagan and anti-Carter, also in a 3:1 ratio.



- (2) I do not recommend anything longer than a :60. Five minute and longer ads too often reach only your supporters.
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#### Scheduling

I strongly recommend a very early start, with low GRP's, and a long steady build-up. Again, the strategy should be to give voters confidence in Governor Reagan.

In addition, the number of senate and gubernatorial races which get more active after Labor Day will create a serious clutter situation.

One unusual scheduling opportunity may be during the Democratic National Convention. Anti-Carter spots would find an unexpected synergy from the Carter-Kennedy split, as well as the Carter piety.

#### The Anderson Factor

There is no discussion of John Anderson's candidacy in this memo. If it appears that Anderson will achieve ballot access in key states, then a contingency effort should be developed. However, to devote resources to an anti-Anderson effort early on seems wasteful. It would legitimize and draw attention

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July 16, 1980

To: The Files

From: Steve Cohen *SC*

cc: Jack Savage

Re: Detroit Strategy Meeting

Two meetings were held on July 15, 1980 regarding the development of a marketing strategy for Governor Reagan's presidential campaign. Present at both meetings were: Peter Dailey, Phil Joanau, Jack Savage, George Karalekis, John Overater, Steve Cohen, Jack Frost, and Peter Dailey, Jr.

The afternoon meeting included a presentation by Richard Wirthlin.

#### Budget

There will be a budget meeting in Washington on Tuesday, July 22, 1980.

#### Washington Office/Personnel

Eleanor Callahan is authorized to hire a secretary and an account executive for the Washington office.

#### Security

It was agreed that no security system or guards would be employed at the present time, but that the situation would be reassessed in a month.

#### Producers

John Overater was authorized to hire one full time television producer with the possibility of bringing on another as needed.



It was noted that Bill Caruthers will be the broadcast production director for Campaign 80. Although he will spend the bulk of his time with the candidate coordinating personal appearances and video tapings, he is the campaign's principal producer.

#### Media Staffing

George Karalekis outlined his thoughts on media staffing. He proposes that the media operation be headed by himself as "consultant", with the bulk of his time devoted to the campaign, though still maintaining his full time association with the D'Arcy Agency. He recommends a full time director reporting to him, and a broadcast director and planning director (with support staff) below the director.

It was noted that no staffing recommendations were ready at this time.

Several issues have yet to be resolved:

- Who is to be responsible for the planning function, given the resources of the media services under consideration?
- Who will execute the network, spot, radio and print buys?
- What role could Ruth Jones play? It was suggested that she might fill the broadcast director's role, but without executional responsibility.

#### Strategy Presentation

The presentation of the marketing strategy to the top campaign staff is scheduled for July 29, 1980.

A run-through of that presentation is to be held on Friday, July 25, 1980.

It was agreed that the presentation would use overhead projectors, and that the presentation would include:

General background/overview

- Polls
- Strengths
- Weaknesses

Assumptions

- Competitive strategy

Key State strategy

- Numbers
- Issues

Marketing strategy

Media

Creative strategy

Creative

- Themes suggested
- Executions
- Promotion

Promotional Materials

It was agreed that a single promotional kit would be developed, and would include an order blank.

The following materials are to be costed out and designed:

Posters - Reagan

- Large
- Small

Poster - Reagan and VP

Large banner with Reagan and VP

Bumper sticker

-- Reagan

-- Reagan and VP

Buttons - medium and small sizes

-- Reagan

-- Reagan and VP

-- Picture button

-- Theme

-- "Ethnics" for Reagan

-- Enameled rectangle

Shopping bags

#### Advance Kits

Advanceman kits are to be developed. Past samples are to be secured from Ron Walker.

#### Theme

The proposed theme is "The Time is Now".

#### Wirthlin Presentation

Dick Wirthlin suggests that the campaign can best be described as volatile and fluid.

It was noted that 40% of the electorate says that at this time they do not know enough about Governor Reagan.

Implication: We must build a positive image of the candidate. In addition to giving the voters a reason to vote for Governor Reagan, we must "innoculate" them against the negative campaign expected of Carter.



Decision - Timing

It was noted that most voters make their candidate preference during one of two periods: 1) immediately after the convention, and 2) during the last three weeks of the campaign.

Key State Targeting

Two separate targeting efforts have been undertaken:

- Winnability
- Allocation

The targeting effort is using a "Pins" system which employs current polling information and past voter performance. Cross-sectional polling will be updated every two weeks through the campaign, until the last two weeks when it will be updated daily.

Winnability Targeting

Seven "A" states comprise 40% of all electoral votes, or 80% of Governor Reagan's target of 270.

The A-1 group of 5 key states will have a constant monitoring of voter shifts and competitive activity. The states include:

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>
California	45
Illinois	26
Texas	26
Ohio	25
Pennsylvania	<u>27</u>
Total	149

The A-2 states, which are less probable wins, include:

New York  
Michigan

The "B" states, important, favorable, medium size states, include:

- Indiana
- Virginia
- Tennessee
- Florida

The A-1 and B states total 201 electoral votes.

The "C" states are smaller, favorable states:

- ~~Idaho~~ <sup>Maryland</sup>
- South Dakota
- Wyoming
- Vermont
- Utah
- Nebraska
- North Dakota
- New Hampshire

- Kansas
- Montana
- New Mexico
- Nevada
- Arizona
- Oregon
- Alaska
- Iowa

*Calo*  
*Wash*  
*MAINE*

Allocation Strategy

A-1 States -- very high

- California
- Illinois
- Texas
- Ohio
- Pennsylvania

B States

- Indiana -- medium
- Virginia -- medium
- Tennessee -- ?
- Florida -- high

C States

No Spot Media

- Idaho
- Utah

Very Low

- South Dakota
- Wyoming
- North Dakota
- New Mexico
- Nevada

Low

- Vermont
- Nebraska
- New Hampshire
- Kansas
- Montana
- Alaska

Medium

- Oregon
- Iowa
- Colorado
- Washington

Convergence

It was agreed that we should attempt to maximize the convergence of campaign elements in key states whenever possible. These elements include:

- News, particularly in conjunction with major policy statements
- Candidate appearance
- Surrogate appearances and press conferences
- Media spots

"Image" Issues

It was noted that "leadership" translates into the following personal characteristics:

- Strong
- Decisive
- Mature
- Compassionate
- Trustworthy
- Steady

The most important of these, in terms of the correlation between voter perception or voter preference is "trustworthy".

There is a "new" characteristic taking on an increasingly important role: accountability.

Reagan Characteristics

Governor Reagan is seen as strong, decisive, determined. He is not seen as compassionate. He is seen as trustworthy, but only slightly more so than Carter.

Issues

Issue polling will be grouped in three areas:

- (1) Broad coverage, top-of-mind issues
- (2) Issues for special situations, i.e., states, voter groups
- (3) Single issue "litmus tests", e.g., gun control, abortion, ERA



Assumed Attack Strategy

It is assumed that President Carter will attempt to position Governor Reagan as simplistic, naive, dumb, and deceptive about his record as Governor. In the latter category, the Carter effort will probably be to discredit the Reagan gubernatorial record as:

Anti-union  
Anti-Black  
Anti-elderly

Vulnerable Issues

Carter will probably attempt to mitigate the Governor's credibility on the following issues:

Energy  
Economy/taxes  
Government spending -- where cut?

Targeting - Next Steps

- (1) Identify winnability/allocation states by ADI.
- (2) Identify key issues by ADI.