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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. letter	Ray Cline to RR (3 pgs)	6/23/80	B1

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• NARA *anf* ~~DM~~ *10/25/07*

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR REAGAN

July 1, 1980

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NARA *smf* ~~DATE~~ 10/25/07

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MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR REAGAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL AND SENSITIVE~~

FROM: Dick Allen

SUBJECT: Taiwan and China Policy

The recent attention to your views on China policy provides us with a good opportunity to review just how that policy ought to be enunciated during the campaign.

It is clear from signals and rumors we receive that Carter will charge you with trying to "turn back the clock" on U. S. relations with China because you are proposing a "two China" policy, which will result in severe damage to U. S. interests and will play into Soviet hands. He'd like to be able to accuse a Republican Presidential candidate of wrecking what another Republican achieved.

While you know and we know that you have not proposed a "two China" policy, garbled press accounts, commentaries and even a blast from Peking are the ammunition which will be fired at you to establish the credibility of the charge.

You have consistently used what happened to Taiwan as an example of betrayal of America's allies and the impact it has on both other nations and our own country's credibility. The illustration is completely correct, and it goes down well with your audiences. It was ideal for the primaries. But you must now have a new formulation, one which takes into account what Carter will try plus what the Taiwanese and the Chinese are saying to us, plus the requirements of long-range policy in your Administration.

I do not recommend a fundamental change in what you have been saying; rather, it is a change in emphasis, a shading of the nuances which will convey your message in less explicit terms and which portray you as a responsible statesman.

The premise is that it is not helpful to have China policy as a central issue in the campaign.

At TAB A, you will find a memorandum from Ray S. Cline, who has just returned from Taiwan. Dr. Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA and now at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, is a very savvy man. You have just appointed him a member of your Foreign Policy Advisory Group.

His message comes directly from President Chiang Ching-kuo, and it deserves your careful attention. I have marked it at significant spots.

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The message is clear: they are requesting that you do not stress the Taiwan issue now. They sense that controversy on the issue will not help you or them. They are suggesting that the issue of the Liaison Office be dropped during the campaign. Above all, they are asking that you become President, because they know you will do the right thing by them once you are in office -- and even then, they stress, it is not necessary to make moves which might be controversial or destabilizing.

Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which provides authority for our dealings with Taiwan, there are many things which a President can do to assure Taiwan's status. At TAB B you will find a memo on this subject which Senator Goldwater has sent us. It discusses a range of activities that can be undertaken without changing anything; these examples are illustrative, and more can be found.

At TAB C I have appended a one-page memo from Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, whose name you know from his "Cubans in Arabia" piece and who is a member of your Foreign Policy Advisory Group.

The question is how you should recast your policy statements on this issue. I am including a Q&A version of what I recommend you say from now on, but I think that you may wish to consider a reference to this restatement of your views in the acceptance speech -- or, at any rate, shortly after the convention.

You should also be aware that I have recently spoken with PRC diplomats here, and I believe that, upon hearing my explanation of what you have actually been saying (in contrast to newspaper reports, to which they have apparently been reacting), they are willing to "turn down the volume" for the time being. They, too, do not want China policy to become an issue.

In addition to consulting with various of our advisors, I have also consulted with Former Secretary of State William Rogers (who you have also recently named to the Foreign Policy Advisory Group). He recommends that you adopt the modified position, one which de-emphasizes the Taiwan issue for the duration of the campaign, and believes that you will play directly into Carter's criticism if you do not. I agree with his observation.

Finally, in discussing this matter with the "Gang of Ten," the ten-member coordinating group for the combined Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Advisory Groups, there is a strong consensus that by modifying your approach, you can gain substantial benefits without sacrificing or appearing to sacrifice your basic position.

Questions and Answers

Q: What is your position on Taiwan? Won't your plan for establishing official (diplomatic) relations with Taiwan threaten our new ties with the People's Republic of China?

A: To begin with, I have criticized the Carter Administration for scuttling our defense treaty with Taiwan. I remain convinced that it was both unnecessary and unwise to treat an old ally like that. It was an unnecessary concession for the purpose of strengthening our relations with Peking. It was unwise because it damaged our credibility around the world. What will other friends and allies think of us -- Israel, South Korea, Saudi Arabia -- if they see us suddenly sever all ties with an old ally just because some other power demands it?

The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China was a good policy decision. The manner in which it was done at the expense of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan was both unnecessary and damaging to American credibility in the Western Pacific. We gave away on key issues and received nothing in return. In the same manner the Carter Administration gave away "most favored nation" treatment to the PRC in the fall of 1979 and received nothing in return. On January 24, 1980 the White House announced that it would sell defense-related technology to the PRC. Again there was no quid pro quo.

But we have formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (NOT "Mainland," but use PRC), and a developing relationship. As I have said repeatedly (e.g., in January 1979 Pepperdine speech), I believe we should find ways to develop that relationship in our mutual interests.

Peking needs American credibility in the Western Pacific as much as or perhaps more than any other country, given the Soviet threat on its borders. We are therefore in a position to work for some clear understandings on the issue of Taiwan and other security considerations in East and Southeast Asia.

In the short and medium term, we have an obvious common interest in resisting Soviet expansionism,

they for their purposes and we for ours. It's possible that in the long run our other interests may still be common; I'd do what I could to insure that friendly relations are maintained.

But no, I don't favor any policy that will simply turn back the clock. We need all the help we can get for the challenges of the 1980s.

On the other hand, I am very much committed to seeing that the safety of those 17 million people on Taiwan is assured, and as long as there is no attempt to change the situation there by force, I think we can conduct our relations responsibly toward both parties.

Q: But you have spoken of restoring government-to-government relations. Are you now going back on that position?

A: The damage has been done by the Carter Administration. Our commitment has been broken, and you can't just glue the pieces together again.

I have not proposed that the U. S. restore diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but I do believe that there are actions we could take under the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by Congress, which governs our relations with Taiwan. It's also partly a matter of our attitude, how we behave toward the Taiwanese. They, like we, are concerned with the substance of our relations, not just the form.

So, when I have referred to studying the possibility of giving our relations some official character, I am referring to actions that can be taken that are specifically within the legislation, and are therefore perfectly appropriate.

Q: What sort of actions?

A: Well, for one thing, our representatives on Taiwan could begin meeting with officials in their offices, instead of meeting with them in restaurants, clubs and other places, and Taiwan's representatives here (the "Coordinating Council on North American Affairs") should be allowed to visit U. S. government offices.

And the U. S. could furnish Taiwan with the equipment necessary for its self defense. The Carter Administration has failed to approve the priority items which Taiwan is seeking.

The United States should push for more formal understandings with the PRC for the renunciation of force in the Taiwan area and the guarantee against discrimination or embargoes or other measures which could threaten the freedom and security of our Chinese friends in Taiwan.

Another example: the U. S. Customs Service was planning to ban any imports from Taiwan which bear the national identification, "Republic of China." Only a storm of protest in Congress forced Customs to cancel this restriction. I would not permit such a rule as this, which President Carter tried to get through.

The President can also set a different tone in his policy, completely within the TRA legislation.

These are all things which can strengthen our relations without jeopardizing in the slightest the official diplomatic relations we presently have with Beijing (Bay-jing, formerly Peking).

Q: You have been criticizing the Carter Administration for being too soft on the Soviets after Afghanistan, but hasn't President Carter been very tough and very anti-Soviet in announcing that he will allow American companies to sell military equipment to mainland China? Isn't this a very sensitive nerve for the Russians?

A: Well, the idea of selling military equipment to China is not a Carter Administration initiative. It was discussed a great deal in 1976 by the Ford Administration. I discussed it myself in 1976 when I said that I thought arms sales to mainland China would be a natural development. I said that we can benefit from China because our relations with China serve as a counterweight to Soviet adventures. But that was four years ago. The Carter Administration just debated and stalled and went back and forth on this for four years, with leaks of secret papers every few months, I might add, to tell the public whether Vance or Brzezinski was ahead. So their recent announcement is not only long overdue, it is probably too little, too late. The purpose of the policy was to restrain the Soviets from the kind of adventurism shown by their invasion of Afghanistan. Carter just waited too long.

Q: So you are for selling arms to mainland China?

No. I didn't say that. I said that this is not Carter's idea. I believe in dealing with Communist China in a serious way. They can be of great benefit. But we must do it with one foot back. The Soviets would very much like to get China back into the Communist world dominated by Moscow. If China ever cooperates with Russia again, I hope they don't have American weapons that can be used against us or our allies. So I say "Yes" we must have defense ties with China, our military should hold discussions with their military about common interests, but "No" we must not treat them like a normal ally or non-Communist friend because they may some day rejoin their Soviet Communist former allies.

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TAB A: CLINE MEMO

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TAB B : GOLDWATER MEMO

Smf *10/25/67*

1981 Taiwan Options

A new Administration can initiate major changes in policy towards Taiwan without any new authority from Congress. Some changes will need appropriations or confirmation action to fully implement, but the basic course of national policy can be moved under existing law or the President's independent powers.

1. Government-to-Government Relations. On his own Constitutional authority, the new President can exchange Ambassadors and reestablish government-to-government relations between the two countries. Under Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution, the President has power to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Counsuls." Section 3 of Article 2 confers power on the President to "Receive Ambassadors and other Ministers."

The power to "receive" Ambassadors is not contingent on any form of legislative approval of consultation. The next step, that of sending an Ambassador to Taiwan, is initiated by the President, but the Senate must give its "Advise and Consent." Congress could theoretically withhold appropriations for the new office, but Congress has never denied funds for a requested Embassy in history. The President has general authority under the Foreign Service Act of 1946 to create a new Ambassadorship for a liaison office in Taiwan. (22 U.S.C. 801 et seq., especially Sec. 901.) Also, special representatives of the President can be sent to Taiwan on temporary missions with the rank of Ambassador without Senate approval. See 22 U.S.C. 901(C); Constitution Annotated (1972), pp. 521-523.

Section 6(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 provides that "relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through ... The American Institute in Taiwan." A broad reading of this provision is that it would give the President flexibility to deal on a government-to-government basis if he so chooses. A restrictive interpretation would run afoul of the Constitutional prerogative of the President to receive Ambassadors and establish (or withhold) any type of diplomatic relations he wishes.

The TRA was enacted because President Carter terminated governmental relations between the Republic of China and the United States. In response to this Presidential decision, the law is designed to preserve some form of minimum dealings between the two nations, not to attempt to interfere with the President's power to change his mind and resume some form of direct relations. Section 4(b)(2) of the Act strengthens the view that the President has flexibility in dealing with Taiwan. This section authorizes "the President or any agency of the United States Government... to conduct and carry out...relations with respect to Taiwan."

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The United States does not have to recognize another international entity in order to exchange Ambassadors. Although the United States did not recognize the government of the PRC, Ambassadors were exchanged and "liaison" offices established in each territory, while the United States still recognized the Republic of China as the government of China. President Nixon was received as a head of state by the Chinese Communist government before recognition occurred. Thus, the United States may have de facto relations with another government or state without formal recognition. The China desk at the State Department asserts Nixon exercised his Constitutional powers solely and did not rely on any Congressional authority in setting up the office, a precedent for a new President regarding Taipei.

2. Improved Unofficial Ties. Even without resuming direct governmental contacts, the new President could greatly improve relations between the two nations simply by bringing the staff of the American Institute in Taiwan up to the same number as the former U. S. Embassy in Taipei. Also, Taiwan could be allowed to open the same number of offices in the United States that the Republic of China formerly enjoyed. These two steps are authorized by the Taiwan Relations Act, but the Carter Administration has not carried them out.

Moreover, the new Administration could reaffirm the continued validity of earlier treaties with the Republic of China, consistent with Section 4(C) of the Taiwan Relations Act, by updating those agreements by amendment of the original agreement and an exchange of letters between the Institutes. The Carter Administration policy of replacing those agreements in their entirety with unofficial agreements should be dropped. Americans at the Institute in Taiwan should be allowed to meet directly with government officials of Taiwan at least on critical matters, and representatives of Taiwan should be allowed to meet in U. S. government offices with high officials on matters of major importance. Again, the Taiwan Relations Act is broad enough to authorize these actions without need of any new law.

3. Military Defense Sales. Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act specifically mandates that the President shall furnish Taiwan with the equipment necessary for its self defense. The Carter Administration has not yet approved the priority items sought by Taiwan. A new Administration could reverse this policy immediately.

Ample Congressional authority exists to sell Taiwan the FX fighter, now under development, and the Harpoon naval defense missile. If the sales are approved, the President must report them to Congress. Congress can object to proposed sales of major equipment by adopting a concurrent resolution, but the President can get around this objection by stating any sale is "in the national security interests." (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq., especially Sec. 2776).

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4. Renewed Military Defense Arrangements. The new Administration could strengthen its bargaining position with the PRC by leaking the notion it is considering reviving the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the case of Goldwater v. Carter on December 13, 1979, but did not rule on the legality of the President's action and did not decide whether the treaty expired under international law. The Court specifically overturned the Court of Appeals decision which had approved the Presidential notice.

Since the decision leaves the Constitutional issue open and since Taiwan has protested the notice of termination, the new President could announce that the notice of termination was defective, withdraw the notice, and the treaty would still be in force. Just the threat that the idea may be under consideration would give the Administration a new weapon in our relations with the PRC and likely discourage extreme demands by the PRC affecting Taiwan.

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TAB C : LUTTWAK MEMO

POSSIBLE U. S. ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE STATUS
OF U. S. - TAIWAN RELATIONS WITHOUT ANY
CHANGE IN THE FORMAL DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENTS

1. What follows is not an argument against upgrading the U. S. representation with China - Taiwan to Consular "Liaison Office" or even higher status. Instead the purpose is to identify what could be done if it were decided not to make formal changes.
2. The Chinese government of Taiwan would like more "officiality" in the U. S. - Taiwan relationship. We for our part must recognize the absurdity of the current official U. S. positions according to which the government does not exist and all U. S. relations are with the "People of Taiwan." One cannot supply jet fighters to the "people" only to an Air Force, of necessity an arm of a government that does exist.

More "officiality" can be obtained by:

- a) Removing the current prohibition against AIT personnel ("American Institute in Taiwan") meeting with Chinese officials in their governmental offices. (Meetings now have to take place in restaurants, clubs, etc.; this is clearly a petty rule unworthy of Americans.) Similarly, officials of the China-Taiwan body in the U. S., the so-called "Coordinating Council on North American Affairs," itself a foolish and clumsy name imposed upon the Chinese by the State Department, should be allowed to visit U. S. government offices. If the two insulator bodies, AIT in Taiwan and CCNAA in Washington, are to remain in existence, let them carry out their functions free of petty restrictions motivated by an excess of deference to Peking.
 - b) Changing AIT's status from a "private, non-profit corporation to a government-owned corporation, such as the TVA. As part of this, remove the current stipulation that personnel resign before taking up posts with AIT. Let them be "detailed" instead. (These two measures might require amendment of the Taiwan Relations Act.)
3. Two substantive questions are of U. S. concern, quite independently of China - Taiwan attitudes and preferences:
 - a) Re-establishing the principle that the U. S. will decide what weapons will be sold to Taiwan. Some recent U. S. diplomacy has tended almost to give veto power to Peking. (We should accordingly make one sale deliberately above the currently understood "threshold".)
 - b) The long-term Peking strategy of using our own mismanaged "normalization" to strip away Taiwan's sovereignty bit by bit. The U. S. language in the "normalization announcement cannot be changed now. But the new words of assurance can be spoken.

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Oct. 1958, Sec. 7(a)

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— TAB D: EMERSON MEMO

Administration Attack on Reagan Taiwan Position

Issue: The Carter Administration appears to have started a deliberate effort to discredit Governor Reagan's policies towards Taiwan and to shift them.

Carter Administration Position: On Saturday, June 14, the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Byrd, attacked Governor Reagan for advocating "rerecognition" of Taiwan, pointing to dire consequences if this happened. (The Washington Star, June 15, A-3, col. 1).

In what may well be an orchestrated move with the Administration, Zhao Xingzhi, deputy Mayor of Shanghai, told visiting Americans on Sunday, June 15, that Reagan's proposal to "reestablish" formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan could "endanger" relations with Peking. On Friday, the New China News Agency of Communist China had charged that Reagan's plan "would wreck Sino-U.S. relations." (The Washington Star, June 16, 1980, A-4, col. 3)

No reference was cited in any article to any particular occasion or date when Governor Reagan actually called for restoring full diplomatic recognition on Taiwan. This is the most extreme interpretation of any statements the Governor may have made and apparently is a deliberate distortion of general comments he has made about "improving" relations with Taiwan or renewing "government to government contacts."

Options: The Chinese statements are a blatant intervention in the U.S. election process and should be denounced as such. The Administration sees itself as vulnerable to the betrayal of Taiwan and clearly wants to remove the issue from the campaign, to divide Republicans or to recast the issue in extreme terms, with the active participation of Red China.

There are numerous ways to upgrade relations with Taiwan without reestablishing diplomatic recognition. Just allowing U.S. government officials to meet in their regular offices with representatives of the Taiwan Coordination Council would raise contacts above their present level.

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The latest Chinese announcements are an obvious change in position timed for the election. Vice Premier Teng told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year that Communist China would not object if the U.S. had dealings with the "government" of Taiwan. Governor Reagan's position of establishing some form of government contacts, as distinguished from private corporation to corporation dealings, is perfectly consistent with what the highest Chinese official told U.S. Senators in a personal meeting after derecognition. (See attached hearings on the Taiwan Relations Act.)

Also, the Reagan statements would seem to fall far short of offending the PRC in comparison with remarks by President Carter last year when he publicly announced the U.S. could go "to war to protect Taiwan against a future challenge from the People's Republic of China," regardless of derecognition. For the President to indicate the U.S. could and would consider military action against Peking in defense of Taiwan, in contradiction of the abrogation of our formal defense treaty, must have upset the relationship with Red China more than any mild statements by a candidate about improving relations could do. The hypocrisy of the Administration is obvious. (See attached record from TRA hearings.)

Governor Reagan need not announce exactly how he will improve relations with Taiwan. Just taking a general position that our ties should be strengthened is consistent with the widely accepted Republican position.

Terry Emerson
Office of Senator Barry Goldwater

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Laxalt
FROM: Al Drischler
SUBJECT: Robert Byrd on China Policy

I have reviewed the attached statement on Reagan's Asia policy by the Majority Leader. I have a number of conclusions.

Conclusions

1) The response by Senators Baker and Percy is marketedly inadequate. No doubt they were caught off guard. However, the Minority Leader's defense that a single slip of the tongue does not a foreign policy make, will not do. Nor will Senator Percy's assertion that he tried to protect the security of the Taiwanese and that Reagan's overall position is an adequate defense, is the best way to preserve peace.

2) The issue should be Carter's dumping of the Taiwanese. It is clear from memoirs recently released by President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and others that the PRC was willing to normalize relations with the United States without terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty, and that they would allow a liaison office in Taipei. It was easy to secure normalization by throwing over the Taiwanese. It is now difficult for the Governor to undo the damage done by the excessively hasty abandoning of a long-standing ally.

3) This episode indicates the need for a more finely tuned response mechanism. I have discussed this matter with Senator Goldwater's office. They were prepared to respond in detail, but were uncertain as to whether such a response was desired by the Governor's campaign. My understanding was that

Page 2

Senator Goldwater will be addressing a letter to the Governor with a copy to you urging a more effective response on this issue.



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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 96th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 126

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 20, 1980

No. 128

Senate

(Legislative day of Thursday, June 12, 1980)

The Senate met at 11 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. QUENTIN N. BURDICK, a Senator from the State of North Dakota.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray.

O Thou, Giver of every good and perfect gift, help us to use these precious moments of each day to renew our spiritual vitality, our sense of direction and the purpose of all our striving. Forgive us for rushing to Thee in moments of desperation when the lesson of life is that they who wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall mount up on wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary, walk and not faint. Give us strength to walk when we must and to wait when it is wise. When we cannot achieve the ultimate objective, help us to do what can be done, for small deeds done are better than great deeds planned. Help us through this day, O Lord, and prepare us for all the days yet to come, that each moment may be lived under the shelter of Thy love, and for the glory of Thy holy name. Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF THE ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. MAGNUSON).

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., August 20, 1980.

To the Senate:

Under the provisions of rule I, section 3, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint the Honorable QUENTIN N. BURDICK, a Senator from the State of North Dakota, to perform the duties of the Chair.

WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
President pro tempore.

Mr. BURDICK thereupon assumed the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings be approved to date.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

U.S.-ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, this Nation's relation with east Asia and the Pacific region are a critical element of our foreign policy. The east Asia-Pacific area has been profound political and economic changes during the past decade, and U.S. policy has been challenged to adjust positively to those changes. Central to our interests are relations with Japan, with our other allies, and with the People's Republic of China.

The most basic change has been in our relations with China, the world's most populous nation. The importance of China in world affairs and the fortuitous improvement in United States-Chinese relations make it essential that the American people understand precisely how our Presidential candidates view our relations with China.

President Carter's policies are well known. Continuing the normalization process begun under his two Republican predecessors, the President extended full diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China. He has directed a gradual, steady growth in our relations with China. Earlier this year, our relations were further solidified through the United States-China trade agreement and the granting of most-favored-nation—MFN—trade status to China.

While President Carter's position is clear, the views of the Republican Presidential candidate on this subject can best be described as hazy and uncertain.

On a matter of such importance, the American people need to know where the Presidential candidates stand. Mr. Reagan has a responsibility to make his views known in clear terms.

Mr. Reagan has expressed on many occasions his reservations about normalizing relations with China. Recently, there have been indications that he may be attempting to back off somewhat from his earlier assertions that he would restore "official relations" with Taiwan.

But last week, when he was supposed to be clarifying his position, Mr. Reagan raised more questions. Again, he said he favored an "official Government relationship" with Taiwan, although he said he was not calling for diplomatic recognition, and that he did not intend to break relations with the People's Republic of China.

An aide to Mr. Reagan insisted that the Republican candidate had not called for government-to-government relations with Taiwan, despite Mr. Reagan's call for official relations.

This has been a consistent pattern. Mr. Reagan makes a statement calling for "official" relations with Taiwan, and then his aide "clarifies" his remarks, leaving even more doubt about what the candidate's true position is.

On May 18, while campaigning in Michigan, Mr. Reagan said, referring to our relations with Taiwan:

I would make it an official liaison office so that they knew they had a governmental relation.

When asked if he would be prepared to inaugurate a two-China policy, he said:

We had a two-Germany policy, and do have, and there doesn't seem to have been any conflict about that or any problem with it.

He said he thought a "two-China policy" would "be something very much worth exploring."

Mr. Reagan said:

I want to have the best relations and have the Republic of China, the free Republic of China, know that we consider them an ally and that we have official relations with them.

Later, on June 20, in a briefing on Reagan's foreign policy, Richard V. Allen, a

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

foreign policy adviser for Reagan, was reported as saying that Reagan believed that—

At the minimum, there should be a retention of some official relationship between the United States and Taiwan.

I visited the People's Republic of China in early July, and I found considerable apprehension there about Mr. Reagan's statements and about what his policies might be if he were elected. I assured the Chinese leaders that I thought the American people and the Congress favored the continuum in U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China that had been carried out during three administrations—Republican and Democratic. I said that I did not believe that this country favored turning back the clock in our relations with China.

At the conclusion of my trip, I called for candidate Reagan to make clear his views on U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China. Despite statements made by the candidate and his aides, I do not believe he has yet done so.

On July 10, during the Republican Convention in Detroit, his aide, Mr. Allen, again spoke on the subject, attempting to clarify the candidate's position. This time, Mr. Allen said that suggestions that Reagan might advocate a two-China policy were "simply not accurate."

I am encouraged by Mr. Allen's apparent repudiation of Mr. Reagan's earlier statements. But the Republican nominee's own views remain obscure.

Vice-Presidential candidate George Bush is presently visiting China. I hope this can be interpreted as a recognition by the current Republican leadership of the importance of China in today's world and for future U.S. foreign policy interests. Prior to his departure, Mr. Bush was quoted as saying that he intended to use the trip—

To articulate as best I can the objectives of a Reagan foreign policy.

Some articulation would certainly be welcome. But, again, this is not Mr. Reagan speaking, and it is well known that there were sharp differences between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Bush during the Republican primary campaigns. Even though Mr. Bush served as the head of the U.S. liaison office in Beijing, before the opening of full diplomatic relations, his positions on relations with the People's Republic of China have not been clear cut either.

Mr. Reagan's Asia-Pacific policy—or his lack of a policy—has caused considerable consternation in Asia. A respected regional journal, the Far Eastern Economic Review, recently reported that:

Following a briefing of Washington diplomats by Reagan foreign-policy aide Richard Allen, the diplomats could only conclude that the former California governor has predilections but no policy.

The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that:

The most troubling of Reagan's predilections is for restoring some form of official American recognition to Taiwan.

A report in the July 11 edition of the magazine continued:

Reagan is committed to some form of up-graded relationship with Taiwan. On the campaign trail the candidate typically concludes his stump speech with a promise of "no more Taiwana."

Allen modified the candidate's stance to suggest that the United States would establish a liaison office in Taipei with a status identical to the liaison office which the United States maintained in Peking prior to normalization.

The article comments that a move such as that suggested by Mr. Allen "would be interpreted by China, and perhaps explained by a Reagan administration, as a form of official relationship."

In assessing Mr. Reagan's probable Asia-Pacific policy, the Review reported:

His two major addresses on foreign relations barely mention the region, except to congratulate the private enterprise, thrift, and hard work of the people of Taiwan.

The article noted that Mr. Reagan defended himself against charges that he knew little about foreign policy by recalling that he had had an extensive discussion with "the King of Siam."

Apparently, Mr. Reagan was referring to the King of Thailand, a nation which is a close ally of the United States. Perhaps, because of his background, Mr. Reagan was recalling the musical, "The King and I," which is based on Margaret Landon's "Anna and the King of Siam," a story based on the 19th century monarchs. The country's name was changed from Siam to Thailand in 1939.

IMPORTANT ISSUES

The issues at stake in our Asia-Pacific policy are too important to be left hazy and vague.

The fact is that through the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, strengthened by Congress, we have maintained close ties with Taiwan. And the economy of Taiwan and United States-Taiwan trade are flourishing. Taiwan continues to prosper.

In 1979, after the United States had formally recognized the PRC, Taiwanese exports to the United States broke the \$5-billion barrier, climbing to \$5.6 billion, and constituting 35 percent of Taiwan's total external trade. Already, in the first 6 months of 1980, the export figure has reached \$3.2 billion—a 26-percent jump over the same period last year.

Imports from the United States were \$3.38 billion last year, a \$1 billion increase over the previous year. Thus far during 1980 they have leaped by almost 50 percent more.

Putting these figures in context, it should be recalled that 10 years ago, two-way trade between the United States and Taiwan totaled only \$700 million.

As the Christian Science Monitor recently reported:

The economic relationship can continue to boom, and Taiwanese officials are confident it will do so.

In Mr. Reagan's comments on Taiwan, he chooses to ignore a very basic point: There was no way we could maintain an "official relationship" with Taiwan and still proceed with normalization and the building of strong ties with China.

If such a "two-China" policy were to be pursued, I fear that it would seriously undermine the increasingly important relationship which we have steadily and gradually built with the PRC. China would look upon any change in the current "unofficial" relationship between the United States and Taiwan as a direct affront.

The Republican candidate needs to clarify his position on this vital matter. And in doing so, he might be well advised to re-read the Shanghai Communiqué, agreed to by President Nixon in 1972, and subsequently the basis for normalization. The communique states:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for his statement this morning. I expect there are many issues on which we agree and some on which we disagree. Much of the content of his statement would not find a significant disagreement on this side of the aisle. But I fear that there is an overtone of criticism of Governor Reagan, the Republican Presidential nominee, with which we would all disagree.

I do not think, nor do I know of anyone on this side of the aisle who thinks either our candidate for President or Vice President believe that we should resume a policy of two Chinas. I do not believe that. I think Governor Reagan does not believe that. I think his statements on the matter would indicate as much.

I do not believe he wishes, nor do I wish, to try to turn the clock back to a previous era.

Instead, I believe we should go forward. I think Governor Reagan believes we should go forward, forward in elaborating and extending the good relationships which are growing and emerging between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Having said that, I have no quarrel whatsoever with those who say that President Carter's treatment of Taiwan was shabby.

As one distinguished public servant from a previous administration said, we could have had that deal a long time ago; that is, we could have had a normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China at the expense of severing of relationships with Taiwan.

I do not believe we should have an "official relationship with Taiwan" in the commonly accepted sense. I do not believe that, notwithstanding what I think of as shabby treatment by the Carter administration of Taiwan, we can go back and undo it. That course is set and fixed. We must build on it as best we can.

Mr. President, the Presidential campaigns produce meaningful and significant debate on many issues, including the foreign policy of this country. It is highly proper and wholly anticipated that statements such as this, that is, a simple statement by Governor Reagan that we ought to improve our official relationships with Taiwan, which may not be precisely what he had in mind, will be thought of as one of the key elements in a Presidential campaign.

We know that slips of the tongue, or statements which are less than accurate in reflecting a person's thoughts or position, are not the province of one candidate. I recall hearing President Carter at the Democratic National Convention, speaking of our former colleague, the former Senator and Vice President of the United States, as Hubert Horatio Hornblower, referring, of course, to the late Senator Hubert Humphrey.

I understand that. I understand that we simply cannot make a single statement by either candidate or a misinterpretation of that statement, the criterion by which we judge his competence or fitness to be President of the United States.

I will look forward, as the majority leader will, I am sure, to further statements by Governor Reagan on what he proposes as our Far Eastern policy. The majority leader will not be surprised to know that I—and I see my friend from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), who is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee—may be so bold as to suggest what we think that policy ought to be.

I fully expect in the future we will have a more definitive statement of the Reagan foreign policy in the Pacific Basin and in Eastern Asia. I expect there will be no lack of clarity in that statement as it evolves and develops, and it will not be a significant issue in this campaign.

I have a high regard for Governor Reagan. I think he is an exceptional candidate for President. I believe he understands the necessity to build a foreign policy that will serve us in the decade of the 1980's and beyond. As proof of that, I would offer one personal observation.

During the week when the Democratic Convention was in session in New York, it was my privilege to travel to Europe, to visit our NATO neighbors, and to receive their briefing on the status of that alliance—a visit, by the way, which will be the subject of a report which I will later file and ask consent to be published as a Senate document.

I consulted with the Secretary of State, our former colleague, Mr. Muskie, before making that trip, and I consulted with Governor Reagan.

I indicated to him that I was certain his foreign policy with respect to NATO, with respect to arms limitation, and with respect to the modernization of theater nuclear weapons, would be matters of great interest to our friends in Europe.

Governor Reagan authorized me, not as a spokesman, but as a friend and associate, to say that an accurate portrayal of his views on NATO were that he believes it essential to the preservation of peace and stability, that he supports a

strong defense, strong enough to withstand any threat, and to say that, notwithstanding his opposition to the ratification of the SALT II treaty (and I opposed that treaty—thinking it inadequate under present day circumstances), he believes there is a moral imperative requiring great nations to continue the negotiations to try to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

I cite that example only because I believe that foreign policy is neither created nor stated in a single instance. In the course of this campaign there will be statements on China. There will be statements on Japan, no doubt, and others on Taiwan. There will be statements about NATO, about Germany, France, and England, on the status of our defense generally and our alliances in particular.

Mr. President, the campaign in 1980 for President, I judge, probably will be more meaningful in terms of a debate of our foreign policy and national defense than any campaign we have seen since 1960, the time of the debate between former President Nixon—then vice Vice President Nixon—and then Senator KENNEDY, on the so-called missile gap.

I expect that there will be other mornings when we will discuss other aspects of the Carter policy and the Reagan policy; and the majority leader and I will do our best, I am sure, in our meager way and according to our talents, to clarify the positions of our respective candidates.

So I have absolute confidence that the people of this country will hear and understand the statements of our candidates in toto and not based on a single effort, a single statement, a single interpretation or a single aspect of that policy.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I asked the distinguished minority leader to yield not for the purpose that I originally asked him to yield, to give a speech or a short statement on tax policy, but to comment on his remarks on the statement of the majority leader with respect to the Reagan speech.

I was not in the Chamber to hear the entire statement of our distinguished majority leader, but I know of the work he has done to strengthen our relationship with a fourth of the human race.

I look back 14, 15, or 16 years ago, when I ran for election against a beloved friend of mine, a former professor of mine at the University of Chicago, Paul Douglas. I disagreed with him on two things: First, the way we had entered the Vietnam war, without a real goal and objective clearly in mind, and we sort of stumbled along for years. Second, he was a founding member of an organization of a million Americans to keep Red China, as he called it, out of the U.N.

I felt that keeping the People's Republic of China out of the U.N. was a really backward policy. I felt that what we should do was to bring that country, representing almost one quarter of the human race, into the community of nations, have them sit in that council, and just let the world see two Communist countries—the People's Republic of

China and the Soviet Union—competing with one another out in the open.

As a delegate to the United Nations, I later watched exactly what I had said 15 years earlier would happen at the U.N. We did not see a monolith of communism against the rest of the world. There was a split in the Communist world for the whole world to see, and there was evident bitterness existing between those two countries.

With respect to Governor Reagan's comments in connection with Taiwan, I have the privilege of serving on the Foreign Relations Committee with Senator HELMS. We do not always agree on every issue, but we do come together on many issues after consultation with one another. I have been honored to serve on the Reagan Foreign Policy Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of our distinguished colleague, Senator WARNER, who is in the Chamber at this moment.

Mr. President, with respect to Taiwan, I feel there is no question that Governor Reagan wants to protect the rights of the people of Taiwan but also wants a relationship with the People's Republic of China.

I made it very clear last year that I felt that the administration was wrong in the way in which it proceeded in making arrangements with the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.

First of all, I felt that there should have been consultation with at least the Senate. Second, I did not agree with the proposal that the United States state in the Taiwan Relations Act that we would view with mere grave concern any use of force against the people of Taiwan.

We wrung our hands with grave concern about Czechoslovakia and Hungary and we did nothing about it. It was my view that we should make it eminently clear to the People's Republic of China that we intended to do something about it if force was ever used against Taiwan.

The Senator from Illinois submitted an amendment, fought for it, but failed by only eight votes to get in the legislation language stating that an effort to resolve the Taiwan issue by other than peaceful means would be considered a threat to the security interests of the United States. The legislative history and the debate on that amendment in the Senate sent a clear message to the People's Republic of China that the continued peace and prosperity of Taiwan is of the utmost importance to the American people.

That is not to say that we do not want a good relationship with the People's Republic of China, but I believe it defines more clearly how strongly we feel about some things, just as the Chinese always have laid it right on the line and said how strongly they feel about certain things.

So I feel that these policies can be and will be worked out. We are not going to turn the clock back, and I do not believe Governor Reagan intended to do that. What he is saying very clearly is what I agree with—that an adequate defense is the best way to preserve peace. It is a deterrent. No temptation should ever be given an adversary to move in

because they perceive a vulnerability or weakness or lack of will in the United States of America. They should recognize that any time our national security interest is threatened—in the Middle East or wherever it may be—we have the will, we have the might, and we must have the capability.

When a President of the United States says, "In the Gulf, this far and no farther," it means nothing if we do not have the capability, and the wherewithal to move that capability where it is needed.

That is why I back and support what the administration is doing in establishing three bases in the Persian Gulf area, with enough naval power to make certain we can protect and defend our interests there.

That is why I am asking the Japanese and NATO to step up their own efforts now. We cannot extend our operations in the gulf and increase our presence there without putting a strain on our capabilities in other areas, unless our allies step up their investment in their own self-defense.

Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for the opportunity to comment on this colloquy.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, my distinguished friend, the minority leader, has stated that in his opinion President Carter's treatment of Taiwan was "shabby." That can be a genuinely-held viewpoint.

I do not think it was "shabby." I think it was a step in the normalization process that had been first set in motion by Mr. Nixon and I think wisely so.

Under the terms of the treaty, of course, either side, upon giving a year's notice to the other party, could withdraw from the treaty, and that was done after due notice.

The distinguished minority leader also has indicated that there will be times when candidates will, by the "slip of the tongue," misstate their positions. I agree with that.

May I say that this is one Senator who has never hesitated to support a Republican President against my own party position if I thought that the Republican President's position was in the interests of the United States, as I did when I offered an amendment during the Vietnam war to clarify then-President Nixon's position and duty under the Constitution, which would require him to take whatever action was necessary to protect the lives of American servicemen. I offered the amendment to support President Nixon's actions in bombing the Viet Cong enclaves on the Cambodian side of the border.

Nor have I hesitated to criticize my own President if I thought he was wrong. Nor have I ever departed from the realization that I can be wrong in both instances.

But I think that the thrust of the distinguished minority leader's response is to the effect, if I interpret it correctly, that we should not base criticism on a "single statement" by either candidate or upon a "slip of the tongue." That is precisely what I am talking about.

Mr. Reagan has repeatedly from time to time indicated—at least I have in-

terpreted his statements thusly—that there should be some "official" status accorded to Taiwan and therein "hangs a tale."

I think it would be very detrimental to our policy of normalization with the People's Republic of China if we turned the clock back by according some "official" status to Taiwan.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BOREN). The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the distinguished minority leader yield me some additional time?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I yield. I do have 5 minutes under the order. Mr. President, I yield 4 of those minutes to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the distinguished minority leader for his courtesy, which is characteristic of him.

I think that any degree of "official" status accorded to Taiwan would be detrimental to our policy of normalization which was begun under what I considered at the time to be a courageous act by Mr. Nixon. I felt that he was probably the one man who could initiate the normalization process. I think it would be detrimental to that policy which he initiated and this I am sure would set back our relations with the People's Republic. The American people are entitled to know what his position is.

I am delighted to hear the distinguished minority leader state, as I thought I heard him say, that he does not believe that there should be any "official relationship" with Taiwan. That is precisely my own position. I hope that is also Mr. Reagan's position. That seems to be the position of his aide who has on a number of occasions attempted to clarify Mr. Reagan's position. But one cannot be sure that that is Mr. Reagan's position. That is what has me concerned. I am sure it has the People's Republic of China concerned, and I am sure that the American people are concerned. They want to hear from the candidate's own lips precisely what his position is. Is he talking about "official relationship" with Taiwan or is he not? Perhaps it was a slip of the tongue the other day when he was present at the departure of Mr. Bush for the People's Republic. Maybe it was a slip of the tongue. Perhaps it arose from some misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Reagan of just precisely what "official relationship" means. Perhaps it was not meant to convey what the term connotes, but in any event that is what we are waiting to hear. This is the sole thrust of my statement this morning.

Let us hear from Mr. Reagan what Mr. Reagan means. Does he indeed mean that he would restore an "official" relationship with Taiwan? If he is talking about a liaison office with Taiwan, that is a form of official relationship. That lends officiality, government to government, and that is what has those of us disturbed who do not want to see the clock turned back, who do not want to see the normalization process delayed, impeded, or set on an opposite course.

It is not a "single" statement that puzzles us. It is not an inadvertent single slip of a tongue. It is the continued zig-

ging and zagging on this point that I hope that Mr. Reagan will clarify.

I thank the distinguished minority leader for his courtesy in yielding to me, and I also say again that I am pleased that he, if I have not misstated his position, believes as I do, that we should continue the normalization process and that there should not be a restored relationship which connotes or establishes governmental officiality between this country and Taiwan.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, once again I thank the majority leader and he does correctly understand me. I said earlier that I thought President Carter and his administration had not treated Taiwan wisely or well, but that is behind us. The fact is we did normalize relations with China and we simply and wisely must build on it now. I think we should build on it. We cannot turn the clock back.

I guess the rub here and the essence of the dialog today is what is meant by an official relationship.

I said earlier I do not believe that Governor Reagan meant to imply official in the commonly accepted sense but rather something that would protect the rights of the people of Taiwan and would not interfere with the future course of normalization.

The majority leader is right. This is an issue on which there should be further discussion, and I trust there will be, and I fully expect that Governor Reagan and his spokesmen will have more to say on this subject in the next few days. I hope so, and I pledge that I will do my best to see that there is a worthwhile, meaningful discussion of this issue in the course of this campaign.

ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, that Senators may speak therein up to 5 minutes each, and that the period not extend beyond 15 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TAX REDUCTION

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the Senate Finance Committee this week will put the finishing touches on a tax reduction package which I hope the full Senate will consider expeditiously. I want to commend the members of the committee for acting so quickly and decisively on the tax cut question.

As 1 of 37 Republican Senators, led by Senators DOLZ, ROTH, and BAKER, who urged the Senate to adopt a tax cut package last June, I am particularly pleased that action now appears imminent and that the committee has agreed that the tax cut should take effect on January 1, 1981.

However, Mr. President, the \$25 billion to \$30 billion size of the tax cut the Finance Committee is considering should not be looked upon as excessive or even adequate. A tax cut of this size is not really a tax cut at all from present levels. Taxes will increase by almost \$90

PEKING --- In an unprecedented public attack, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Woodcock today warned that Ronald Reagan's controversial Taiwan policy could wreck Sino-American relations and endanger Washington's worldwide position.

Woodcock called an extraordinary news conference to denounce Reagan's policy and said it would be "logical" to assume the Chinese would close down the U.S. Embassy in Peking if the Republican was elected President and resumed "official" ties with the Nationalist Island.

Woodcock insisted he called the news conference himself and not at the request of President Carter or the State Department -- but his scathing attack undoubtedly enjoyed Administration approval.

"To endanger a carefully crafted relationship is to run the risk of gravely weakening the United States' international position" at a particularly sensitive time in global affairs, the Ambassador told journalists.

He described the triangular relationship between the United States, China and Taiwan as "delicate" but added, "we should preserve both the fact and the appearance of the unofficiality of our relations with Taiwan."

Woodcock insisted that although awkward and delicate, it was in fact working very well.

"Tensions are at their lowest levels in 30 years," he said. "The Chinese military presence opposite Taiwan is down to normal levels. I have heard no one claim there is any military threat from the mainland against Taiwan."

UPI -- 8/26/80 10:30 a.m.

ED MEASE

8/14/80 8:00 A.M. (1)

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR THURSDAY, AUGUST 14, 1980, KENNEBUNKPORT

8:30 P.M.

BURCH/ ALLEN / LILLEY arrive your home

Burch and Allen will be overnighiting at your home. UNLISTED PHONE given to both.
Lilley will be overnighiting at Breakwater

All these men will arrive on the same flight
and Lilley will drive them to Kennebunkport.

Lv. D.C. National	4:59 P.M.	DL# 320
Ar. Portland	7:28 P.M.	

OVERNIGHT KENNEBUNKPORT

NOTE: BURCH MAY NOW BE ARRIVING LATER THIS evening. I will stay in touch with JK on this. MDT

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR FRIDAY, AUGUST 15, 1980 MAINE TO CALIFORNIA

A.M. will be your briefings with Burch / Allen and group at your home in Kennebunkport.

2:30 P.M. (EST) DEPART KENNEBUNKPORT for BOSTON

GB/BPB/DQB/DB/RA/
SS motorcade with group to Boston
(Apx. 1½ hr. drive)

4:00 P.M. (EST) ARRIVE BOSTON LOGAN AIRPORT

4:15 P.M. (EST) DEPART BOSTON for LOS ANGELES AM# 49

GB/BPB/DB/RA (first class)
DQB (coach)

6:55 P.M. (PST) ARRIVE LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

GB you will be taken immediately to the airport Marriott.

* NOTE - TEELEY will already be at your hotel.

PRIVATE DINNER GB SUITE WITH
JERRY WEINTRAUB AND WIFE (JANE)
GB & BPB ONLY

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 16, 1980 LOS ANGELES/ SEATTLE/ ANCHORAGE

8:30 A.M.-
8:45 A.M.

FILMING SESSION FOR COMMITMENT 80 PROGRAM

Hugh Branson and Bill Gibson plus crew of 4 will be here. Bates has briefing paper. Same hotel.

* Note you are to wear one of your normal suits! Dark is best.

8:50 A.M.-
9:55 A.M.

GB PRIVATE TIME (your suite)

(213) 641-5700

10:00 A.M.-
11:00 A.M.

GOVERNOR REAGAN ARRIVES IN YOUR SUITE

RR/GB/ BPB meeting

11:10 A.M.-
11:30 A.M.

RR/GB PRESS CONFERENCE

BPB attending.
Salon rooms 1,2,3, Marriott

(213) 641-5700

11:35 A.M.
12:10 P.M.

GB/ BPB PRIVATE TIME (your suite)

(213) 641-5700

Senator Ted Stevens will be in L.A. and is going to call your room.

12:15 P.M.-
1:10 P.M.

RR/ / GB/ BPB PRIVATE LUNCHEON

(GB suite)

(213) 641-5700

1:20 P.M.

DEPART HOTEL for AIRPORT

GB/BPB/DQB/DB/RA/PT
(10 min. drive)

1:30 P.M.

ARRIVE LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 16, 1980 SEATTLE/ ANCHORAGE1:50 P.M. DEPART LOS ANGELES for SEATTLE WA#711 (Western Air)

GB/BPB/DB/RA/DQB/PT

4:11 P.M. ARRIVE SEATTLE

Congressman Joel Pritchard will be here to meet you. He has organized with the RR state people an airport arrival rally. Several 100 people

BPB will separate from GB and spend apx. 10 min. thanking everyone etc. GB will spend 3 min. thanking and then go on to separate area for press availability for 10 min.

4:20 P.M.-
4:30 P.M. PRESS AVAILABILITY - SEATTLE AIRPORT4:40 P.M. DEPART SEATTLE for ANCHORAGE WA# 723 (Western Air)

GB/BPB/DB/RA/DQB/PT

* Jim Lilley and Jim Brady will join the group in Anchorage today.

5:52 P.M. ARRIVE ANCHORAGE (Gate 20)

NOTE: CONGRESSMAN DON YOUNG will now be at airport to greet you and will stay with you until he has to leave tonight's dinner.

NOTE: GB/BPB should be last off plane- allowing traveling press and staff ample time to set up

YVONNE ALFORD will greet GB/BPB She will have apx. 12 others with her.

6:00 P.M.-
6:10 P.M. PRESS AVAILABILITY AT ANCHORAGE AIRPORT6:15 P.M. DEPART ANCHORAGE AIRPORT for HILTON

(15 min. drive)
YVONNE ALFORD will accompany

ADD CONGRESSMAN YOUNG TO GB CAR

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 16, 1980 ANCHORAGE

6:30 P.M. ARRIVE ANCHORAGE WESTWARD HILTON (907) 272-7411

GB/BPB will proceed imd. to
their suite # 2206

PRESS: proceed to front desk for
registration, press office set
up in Rm.#2065. press luggage
will be delivered to Rm.#2065

STAFF: you will have been pre-
registered. Your luggage will
be delivered to your rooms.
Staff office Rm.# 2166

6:30 P.M.-
7:30 P.M. GB PRIVATE TIME (your suite)

NOTE: Andre Schaeffer, hotel manager
will be in suite for 2 min. for
photo with you and BPB.

7:35 P.M.
7:50 P.M. GOP WORKERS RECEPTION (in hotel room #1450)

Open press
35 GOP local workers
Yvonne Alford will escort GB/BPB

GB 5 min. Brief Remarks

7:55 P.M.-
8:00 P.M. PRIVATE MEETING WITH EDITH HOLM

(your suite)

8:05 P.M. DEPART SUITE FOR CAPTAIN COOK HOTEL (907) 276-6000

(5 min. drive)

8:15 P.M. ARRIVE CAPTAIN COOK HOTEL

Greeted by Yvonne Alford

8:20 P.M.-
9:00 P.M. DINNER IN HONOR OF GB/BPB

Hosted by the Alaska GOP
300 people - \$25 a head - not
a fund raiser

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 16, 1980 ANCHORAGE

9:10 P.M.

GB REMARKS AT ALASKA GOP DINNER

GB 10-15 min. remarks on anything you wish.

NOTE: GB you will be presented with a gift after your remarks by Edith Holm.

9:20 P.M.

DEPART HOTEL FOR ANCHORAGE HILTON

9:30 P.M.

ARRIVE ANCHORAGE WESTWARD HILTON

GB/BPB proceed imd. to your suite.

OVERNIGHT ANCHORAGE WESTWARD HILTON

(907) 272-7411

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SUNDAY AUGUST 17, 1980 ANCHORAGE/JAPAN

GB/BPB private breakfast in your suite

STAFF: fruit, juice, danish in lobby on
22nd floor at 8:30 A.M.

9:25 A.M.

GB/BPB ONLY WILL DEPART HOTEL FOR CHURCH

(15 min. drive)

STAFF: If you wish to attend service
you may but no staff is to
continue on to the luncheon.
A tour of the glaciers can be
arranged for any who
would like to visit.

PRESS: You may attend church service
but cameras must be left out-
side.

STAFF & PRESS: A motorcade will depart
the hotel for airport at 3:15 P.M.
Your luggage will be picked up
at 2:30 P.M. outside staff rooms and
press luggage in press office.

9:45 A.M.

ARRIVE ST. MARY EPISCOPAL CHURCH

(907) 279-4280
272-8141
272-1841

GREETED BY: Rev. Chuck Eddy
John & Susan Overbey
Lowell & Mary Taylor Thomas

10:00 A.M.-
11:00 A.M.

ST. MARY EPISCOPAL CHURCH SERVICE

Conclusion GB/BPB will mingle
briefly with congregation and
then proceed imd. to motorcade.

En Route to Overbey home.

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SUNDAY, AUGUST 17, 1980 ANCHORAGE/ TOKYO

11:30 A.M.- TOTALLY PRIVATE LUNCHEON OVERBEY HOME (907) 272-7411
1:00 P.M.

Attending: GB / BPB
John and Susan Overbey
Lowell & Mary Taylor Thomas

1:00 P.M. GB YOU WILL BE STAYING AT THE OVERBEY'S UNTIL FLIGHT

OPTIONS: They can arrange a doubles game for you.
Good place to jog near by
Private time in separate area of their home.

3:30 P.M. DEPART OVERBEY HOME FOR AIRPORT
(.5 min. drive)

3:35 P.M. ARRIVE ANCHORAGE AIRPORT

3:40 P.M.- GB PRIVATE MEETING GOVERNOR JAY HAMMOND

Alaskan Room at airport
The Governor has a flight to catch and we do not know what time his exact departure is. This meeting will be apx. 10-20 min.

4:15 P.M. GB WILL PROCEED TO JAL FLIGHT

4:25 P.M. DEPART ANCHORAGE for TOKYO JAL# 5

There is not an overnight. you will gain a day in flight.

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR MONDAY, AUGUST 18, 1980 TOKYO

5:45 P.M.

ARRIVE TOKYO

2½ hour motorcade to hotel

OVERNIGHT OKURA HOTEL - TOKYO

Direct line

011-81-3-582-0111

Office in N.Y.

(212) 838-7874

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR TUESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1980 TOKYO

- (t) Breakfast meeting with Amb. Mansfield.
Briefing-at GB hotel?
- (t) Photo Opportunity

10:00 A.M. (t) Former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda would also like a meeting with you. RA is working on this.

11:00 A.M. (t) Former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi has requested a meeting with you. He knew your father.

----- Holding Lunch Per RA 8/13/80 -----

2:30 P.M.- MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MASAYOSHI ITO
3:30 P.M.

4:20 P.M.- MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER ZENKO SUSUKI
5:00 P.M.

5:15 P.M.- MEETING WITH MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
6:00 P.M. INDUSTRY - ROKUSUKE TANAKA

MANSFIELD RECEPTION is DEFINITE - EARLY EVENING

Press Availability back at hotel before
Dinner - Private Dinner - at Hotel

OVERNIGHT - OKURA HOTEL - TOKYO

(212) 838-7874
011-81-3-582-0111

ADDITION TO THE SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH - AUGUST 19, 1980-TOKYO

....IN ADDITION TO THE TUESDAY A.M. SCHEDULE:

A.M....

1. Former Amb. Heishiro Ogawa and Mrs. Ogawa (He is the Former Amb. to Beijing) say they know you. They would like to pay a courtesy call. RA is suggesting that, prior to the Mansfield Reception, or after the Reception, would be good.

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 20, 1980 TOKYO/ BEIJING

7:15 A.M. DEPART HOTEL FOR 2½ HOUR DRIVE TO AIRPORT

GB/ BPB/ DQB/ DB/ RA/JL/JB/ PT

9:55 A.M. DEPART TOYKO for BEIJING JAL # 1789

1:35 P.M. ARRIVE BEIJING

OVERNIGHT BEIJING

SCHEUDLE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR THURSDAY, AUGUST 21, 1980 BEIJING

ENTIRE DAY IN BEIJING

OVERNIGHT BEIJING

8/14/80 8:00 A.M. (10)

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR FRIDAY, AUGUST 22, 1980 BEIJING

ENTIRE DAY IN BEIJING

OVERNIGHT BEIJING

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1980 BEIJING/ HONOLULU

Entire A.M. in Beijing

2:10 P.M.

DEPART BEIJING for TOYKO JAL# 784

GB/BPB/DB/RA/DQB/PT/JL/JB

* This flight makes one stop in Osaka .
41 min. stop - you will not get off
the plane.

8:55 P.M.

ARRIVE TOKYO

10:00 P.M.

DEPART TOYKO for HONOLULU JAL# 072

GB/BPB/DB/RA/DQB/PT/JL/JB

* GB/BPB/RA/DB have reserved
sleepers - you each have a
separate ticket for these.

NOTE YOU LOSE A DAY IN FLIGHT

10:05 A.M.

ARRIVE HONOLULU (same day Saturday, Aug. 23)

Proceed to office of LARRY BARONE (808) 836-3163
He is customs official .
Bates will go with GB/BPB .

FRED & MARTHA ZEDER will be in this office
to greet you.

STAFF & PRESS PROCEED TO CUSTOMS AREA - SPECIAL
BAGGAGE ASSIGNED

10:30 A.M.

GB/BPB clear customs and proceed to departure area

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1980 HONOLULU

10:40 A.M. GB/ BPB proceed to motorcade for boarding

* Press and staff do the same .

10:45 A.M. DEPART HONOLULU AIRPORT for ILIKAI HOTEL

IN CAR WITH GB/ BPB

Former Governor William Quinn , your
primary GB Chairman .
St. Rep. Kina'u Boyd Kamali'i RR primary
chairman and the present RR/GB state
chairman for Hawaii. (female)

11:05 A.M. ARRIVE ILIKA HOTEL (808) 949-3811

1777 Ala Moana Blvd.

Greeted by THOMAS GURTNER, General
Manager of hotel .

11:07 A.M. GB/BPB will proceed on to their suite .

11:07 A.M. GB/BPB will proceed on to their suite

PRESS INSTRUCTIONS: You are pre-registered -
pick up keys at front desk - special line .
Coin telephones located as follows - 3
in main lobby, 3 at the bathers elevator.
Baggage will be delivered to individual
rooms.

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS: room keys located in
staff office - RM# 2302 - your baggage
will be delivered to individual rooms.

11:10 A.M.-
3:45 P.M. GB/ BPB PRIVATE TIME (your suite)

3:45 P.M. -
3:55 P.M. MEETING FORMER U.S. SENATOR HIRAM FONG

(your suite)
Press pool covering at beginning

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1980 HONOLULU

4:00 P.M. -
4:50 P.M.

MEETING WITH ADMIRAL ROBERT LONG USN
Commander & Chief of Pacific (CINCPAC)

This meeting will be in GB suite.
As of 8/13/80 RA has not yet been
able to lock in for firm.

Press pool covering beginning.

SEPERATE SCHEDULE FOR BPB ONLY

4:00 P.M. - Mrs. B. you will be taken to a
separate adjacent room for the
following three individual interviews.
This is the only time your schedule
is different from GB's.

4:00 P.M. - INTERVIEW - STAR BULLETIN
4:15 P.M.

Editor of family section - name not
given to me.

4:16 P.M. - INTERVIEW - HONOLULU ADVERTISER
4:30 P.M.

Editor of family section - name not
given to me.

4:33 P.M. - INTERVIEW - KGMB TV - Local CBS Affiliate
4:45 P.M.

Name not given to me.

4:54 P.M.

GB/BPB proceed to motorcade

Accompanied by ED BRENNAN, Nat'l. Committeeman
St. Rep. DONNA IKEDA, former GB
state co-chairman.

4:57 P.M.

GB motorcade departs hotel in route for RR/GB St. Hdqtrs.

1585 Kapiolani Blvd.

(808) 523-0494

GB you will have been given a typical
Hawaiian shirt by Zeder and they
would like for you to please wear it.

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1980 HONOLULU

5:02 P.M. ARRIVE GB/RR STATE HEADQUARTERS (808) 523-0494

Met at curb side by MAYOR HANNIBAL TAVARES, Mayor of Maui. GB you last saw him in Maui in Dec. 79'

Also St. Rep. Kina'u Boyd Kamali'i, former RR primary st. chair. Presently RR/GB st. chair. You just met her earlier today!

5:04 P.M. GB/BPB proceed to reception rally for grand opening of RR/GB state headquarters.

OPEN PRESS - note no filing facilities

Apx. 700-1000 people
GB/BPB will meet informally with guests
Former Gov. Quinn will serve as your MC

Rev. Kaapu the Kamehameha school chaplain will deliver the Hawaiian blessing.

5:20 P.M. GB INFORMAL REMARKS TO GROUP

5:35 P.M. DEPART HEADQUARTERS for ILIKAI HOTEL

5:40 P.M. ARRIVE ILIKAI HOTEL

(GB/BPB will proceed immediately to their suite)

PRESS & STAFF NOTE: Pier 7 Restaurant and Room Service open 24 hours a day.

5:45 P.M.-
6:30 P.M. GB PRIVATE TIME (your suite)

6:30 P.M.-
6:55 P.M. VISIT WITH HOLT & FLO ATHERTON (your suite)

Flo is going to suggest that you call Mrs. Barbara Cannon. Her husband Wilson Cannon died 10 days ago. He was on your Nat'l Fin. Steering Committee. Flo will fill you in. You met Mr. Cannon in 74' and again last X'mas. We are still working on Jack Lord mtg.

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1980 HONOLULU

6:58 P.M. DEPART HOTEL for WAIALAE COUNTRY CLUB (808) 734-2151

In GB car: FRANK COOPER, RNC State Chairman
CARLA CORAY, you know

* Holt & Flo will be in separate car in
motorcade.

7:05 P.M. ARRIVE WAIALAE COUNTRY CLUB GOP RECEPTION

OPEN PRESS - Outside event

Apx. 60 people - Finance men in
Honolulu - Don't have any names
of attendees for you 8/13/80
This is a state GOP- FR.

7:50 P.M. DEPART RECEPTION for ILIKAI HOTEL

8:02 P.M. ARRIVE ILIKAI HOTEL

GB/BPB proceed immediately to your
suite.

OVERNIGHT ILIKAI HOTEL (808) 949-3811

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR SUNDAY, AUGUST 24, 1980 HONOLULU / LOS ANGELES

* GB if you want to jog at 6 A.M. there is a jogging path adjacent to this hotel - Ala. Moana Beach Park. Advanceman says it is beautiful.

6:30 A.M. BAGGAGE CALL FOR ALL STAFF & PRESS

All luggage must be outside your rooms by this time.

8:10 A.M. GB/BPB proceed from suite to motorcade

8:13 A.M. DEPART HOTEL for HONOLULU AIRPORT

8:33 A.M. GB/BPB proceed to Pan Am boarding area

The entire traveling party will be pre-boarded with assigned seating.

9:00 A.M. DEPART HONOLULU for LOS ANGELES PAN AM # 812

GB/BPB/DB/RA/DQB/JL/JB/ PT

* Flo Atherton might be on this flight with you in first class.

5:10 P.M. ARRIVE LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

5:15 P.M.-
5:20 P.M. BRIEF PRESS AVAILABILITY AT AIRPORT

5:25 P.M. DEPART AIRPORT - MOTORCADE TO HOTEL

* REMAINDER OF EVENING PRIVATE

OVERNIGHT LOS ANGELES MARRIOTT

(213) 641-5700

SCHEDULE FOR GEORGE BUSH FOR MONDAY, AUGUST 25, 1980 LOS ANGELES /
KENNEBUNKPORT

8:30 A.M. - (t) BREAKFAST WITH RR - your suite
10:10 A.M.

10:15 A.M. PRESS CONFERENCE - RR / GB

Marriott Hotel
Salon Rooms 4,5,6,

(213) 641-5700

11:20 A.M. DEPART FOR AIRPORT
(10 min. drive)

11:30 A.M. ARRIVE AIRPORT

11:45 A.M. DEPART LOS ANGELES for BOSTON TWA# 2

GB / BPB / DQB

9:44 P.M. ARRIVE BOSTON

Motorcade to Kennebunkport

OVERNIGHT KENNEBUNKPORT

NOTE**** DB/ RA/ PT/ JL/JB Lv. LAX 12:10 P.M. WA# 506
Ar. D.C. Nat'l. 9:04 P.M.