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Ronald Reagan
Pacific Palisades, California 90272

Ed Meese

June 2, 1980

Dear :

The United States is faced with many important issues that concern the viability, growth, and competitiveness of business.

Among them are the nation's efforts to create additional investment incentives, renew plant and equipment, encourage capital formation, create additional jobs, and develop policies which can strengthen the ability of this country to compete in world markets.

So that I can adequately address these and other issues, which are beyond partisan concerns, I want the advice of leading business people like you who are familiar with the intricacies of the problems and can help create possible solutions.

Thus, my staff and I are seeking to establish an apolitical Business Advisory Panel. This Panel will review the subjects which I have mentioned and provide input to me and to my issues division for policy statements that will be developed. The Panel will serve as a sounding board for ideas that my other advisory groups or I might generate. The Panel is to be composed of individuals who represent various points of view and diverse business backgrounds. As I said, it will complement the other issues advisory groups we are forming on energy, foreign and defense policy, agriculture, health care, and other topics.

2.

So that it may be fully effective, the Panel's size will be limited, and its members may decide to establish subgroups to deal in more detail with various issues. Each subgroup would give its ideas and recommendations to the Panel staff. Summary reports would be developed for comment and "sign-off," and the resulting papers would be forwarded to Dr. Martin Anderson, my Director of Research and Policy Development, as input for policy development.

Enclosed is a charter statement for this Business Panel and an initial list of questions which the Panel may want to consider. I hope you will join with John Whitehead, Co-Chairman, Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Mil Batten, Chairman, New York Stock Exchange; Bill Agee, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, The Bendix Corp.; Fletcher Byrom, Chairman, Koppers Company, Inc.; Don Regan, Chairman, Merrill Lynch & Co., and others on the Business Panel to contribute your thoughts and ideas. In the next few years, we are going to need the best thinking we can obtain on these and other issues.

I am planning to meet with the Panel on Tuesday afternoon, June 17. If you have any questions about the Panel or its operation, please call James W. Fuller at 212/623-3051.

I look forward to your participation and to speaking with you personally at the Panel meeting.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

NAMES IN LETTER TO BE DELETED IN PARAGRAPH

✓ Mr. William M. Batten (Mil)
Chairman
New York Stock Exchange
11 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005

✓ Mr. Donald T. Regan
Chairman
Merrill Lynch & Co.
One Liberty Plaza
New York, NY 10006

✓ Mr. John C. Whitehead
Co-Chairman
Goldman, Sachs & CO.
55 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004

✓ Mr. William M. Agee (Bill)
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer
The Bendix Corp.
Bendix Center
Southfield, MI 48037

✓ Mr. Fletcher L. Byrom
Chairman
Koppers Company, Inc.
Koppers Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Hold

To: Joan Sweetland - RFPc

NAME-USE

Adam

✓ Mr. Ray C. Adam
President
RL Industries, Inc.
1230 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020 Mr. Adam
(212) 359-8400

✓ Mr. Theodore F. ^BBrophy
Chairman of the Board
General Telephone & Elect. Corp.
One Stamford Plaza
Stamford, CT 06904 Mr. Brophy
(203) 357-7000

✓ Mr. Robert A. Beck
Chairman of the Board &
Chief Executive Officer
Prudential Life Insurance Company
1111 Durham Avenue
60. Plainfield, NJ 07060 Mr. Beck
(201) 877-6000

✓ Mr. Philip Caldwell
Chairman of the Board &
Chief Executive Officer
Ford Motor Company
The American Road
Dearborn, MI 48121 Mr. Caldwell
(313) 213-3000

✓ Mr. Frederick E. Dent
President
Mayfair Mills, Inc.
Cordova, SC 29220 Mr. Dent
(803) 576-2600

Medina SC 29220

Fluor

✓ Mr. J. E. Fluor (Robert)
Chairman of the Board,
Chief Executive Officer
Fluor Corporation
3333 Michaelson Drive
Irvine, CA Mr. Fluor
(714) 975-2000

✓ Mr. Harry J. Gray
Chairman of the Board & President
United Technologies Corporation
United Technologies Building
Hartford, CT 06101 Mr. Gray
(203) 725-7000

✓ Mr. John W. Hanley
Chairman of the Board &
President
Hansonto Company
250 North Lindbergh Boulevard
St. Louis, MI 63165 Mr. Hanley
(316) 624-1000

✓ Mr. Charles J. Pilliod, Jr.
Chairman of the Board &
Chief Executive Officer
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
1144 E. Market Street
Akron, Ohio 44316 Mr. Pilliod
(216) 794-2122

Rec'd 5/29/68
M/SE

INDUSTRIAL

INDUSTRIAL & FINANCIAL

✓ Mr. Robert H. B. Baldwin
President
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020 Mr. Baldwin
(212) 974-4444 *Rob*

* Mr. William M. Batten
Chairman
New York Stock Exchange
11 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005 Mr. Batten
(212) 623-5190 *M.1*

* Mr. Donald T. Regan
Chairman
Merrill Lynch & Co.
One Liberty Plaza
New York, NY 10006 Mr. Regan
(212) 637-5630

* Mr. John C. Whitehead
Chairman
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
55 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004 Mr. Whitehead
(212) 675-6277

✓ Mr. Alfred Brittain, III
Chairman of the Board
Bankers Trust Corporation
380 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10017 Mr. Brittain
(212) 775-2500

✓ Mr. John F. McGillicuddy
Chairman & President
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022 Mr. McGillicuddy

✓ Mr. Arthur J. Santry, Jr.
& President
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
900 Long Ridge Road
Stamford, CT 06902
203/329-8771

* Mr. William M. Agee
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer
The Bendix Corp.
Bendix Center
Southfield, MI 48037 Mr. Agee
(313) 827-5050 *Bill*

✓ Mr. Frank Borman *Borman*
Chairman & President
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
Miami International Airport
Miami, FL 33148 Mr. Borman
(305) 873-2211

✓ Mr. Charles L. Brown
Chairman
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
195 Broadway
New York, NY 10007 Mr. Brown
(212) 363-3412

* Mr. Fletcher L. Byrom^m
Chairman
Koppers Company, Inc.
Koppers Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Mr. Byrom
(412) 227-2727

✓ Mr. Robert S. Batfield
Chairman
The Continental Group, Inc.
633 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017 Mr. Batfield
(203) 954-6261

✓ Mr. William A. Hewitt
Chairman
Deere & Co.
Moline, IL 61265 Mr. Hewitt
(309) 792-41141

✓ Mr. John V. James
Chairman of the Board,
President & Chief Exec. Officer
Dresser Industries, Inc.
1505 Elm Street
Dallas, TX 75201 Mr. James
(214) 746-60001

✓ Mr. James W. Fuller
The New York Stock Exchange
11 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005 *Jim*

JOHNS

✓ Mr. J. Paul Lyet
Chairman
Sperry Rand Corp.
1290 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019 Mr. Lyet
1(212) 956-3408

✓ Mr. Thomas A. Murphy
Chairman
General Motors Corp.
GM Building
3044 West Grand Blvd.
Detroit, MI 48202 Mr. Murphy
1(313) 556-3517
TELE #: (212) 486-2517

✓ Mr. Edward T. Pratt, Jr.
Chairman
Pfizer, Inc.
235 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017 Mr. Pratt

✓ Mr. Lewis W. Foy
Chairman of the Board
Bethlehem Steel Corporation
Martin Tower - Room 2110
Bethlehem, PA 18016 Mr. Foy
1(215) 694-2424

✓ Mr. Mark Shepherd, Jr.
Chairman
Texas Instruments, Inc.
P.O. Box 225474
Dallas, TX 75265 Mr. Shepherd
1(214) 738-2251

✓ Mr. George H. Weyerhaeuser
President
Weyerhaeuser Co.
Tacoma, WA 98401 Mr. Weyerhaeuser

✓ Mr. Edward G. Harness
Chairman of the Board
The Proctor & Gamble Company
P. O. Box 599
Cincinnati, Ohio 45201 Mr. Harness
1(513) 552-1100

✓ Mr. David T. McLaughlin
Chairman of the Board
& Chief Executive Officer
The Toro Company
One Appletree Square
8009 34th Avenue South - 8th Fl.
Minneapolis, MN 55420 Mr. McLaughlin
1(612) 857-5900

✓ Mr. N. Kenneth Gehman Oshman
President
Rohm Corp.
4900 Old Ironsides Drive
Santa Clara, CA 95050 Mr. Oshman
1(408) 928-2900

✓ Mr. Malcolm M. Price
Chairman, President
& Chief Executive Officer
Ryan Hesse, Inc.
100 Ryan Court
Pittsburgh, PA 15205 Mr. Price
1(412) 923-2020

✓ Mr. W. J. Sanders, III
Chairman of the Board,
President & Chief Exec. Officer
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
901 Thompson Place
Sunnyvale, CA 94086 Mr. Sanders
1(408) 732-2400

✓ Mr. Toby Schreiber
President & Chairman of the Board
Specialty Brands, Inc.
633 Battery - 5th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111 Mr. Schreiber
1(415) 991-7600

✓ Mr. Frederick W. Smith
Chairman of the Board
& Chief Executive Officer
Federal Express Corp.
P.O. Box 30167
Memphis, TN 38120 Mr. Smith
1(901) 369-2600

^E
✓ Mr. W. Russell ^{Esq.} Eggers
President & Chief Exec. Officer
Loctite Corp.
705 North Mountain Road
Newington, CT 0611 Mr. Eggers
(203) 278-1280

✓ Mr. Sidney Topol
Chairman of the Board,
President & Chief Exec. Officer
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
3844 Pleasantdale Road
Atlanta, GA 30340 Mr. Topol
(404) 449-2000

^P
✓ Mr. Edwin V. P. ^{Esq.} Ischan Zschau
Chairman of the Board
& Chief Executive Officer
System Industries
525 Oakwood Parkway
Sunnyvale, CA 94086 Mr. Ischan
(408) 732-1650

VENTURE CAPITALIST

✓ Mr. Rip Agopian
Brentwood Associates
11661 San Vicente Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90048 Mr. Agopian
(213) 826-6581

✓ Mr. Leonard A. ~~Lauder~~ ^{Lauder}
President
Ester-Lauder
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153
(212) 577-4200

^{Ned Heiser}
✓ Mr. ~~Red Heiser~~
Chairman & President
Heiser Corporation
20 Escher Street
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 641-2200

✓ Mr. Paul ~~Howell~~ ^{Howell}
Chairman & President
Howell Corporation
800 Houston National Gas Building
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 657-9641

INSTALL

✓ Mr. Thomas M. Macioce ^{Macioce}
President & Chief Exec. Officer
Allied States Corp.
1114 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036 Mr. Macioce
(212) 764-2000

✓ Mr. James D. Robinson, III
Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer
American Express Company
American Express Plaza
New York, NY 10004 Mr. Robinson
(212) 323-3504

✓ Mr. Phillip M. Hawley
President
Carter, Hawley & Hale
550 So. Flower Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071 Mr. Hawley
(213) 620-0150 ^{Ph?}

✓ Mr. Richard S. Shinn
Chairman of the Board
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
One Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10010 Mr. Shinn
(212) 578-3211

✓ Mr. Charles Lee
Newport Securities
Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10020 Mr. Lee
(212) 757-6000

✓ Mr. Shaw Hodge, Sr.
President
Shaw Hodge Company
Post Office Box 1375
Stanford, Connecticut 06902
(203) 327-3132

✓ Mr. F. Ross Johnson
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer
Standard Brands, Inc.
625 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 759-4400

✓ Mr. Donald Sale 2
Vice Chairman of the Board
Sale Corporation
Post Office Box 2122 19
Dallas, Texas 75222
(214) 634-6011

7 couldn't do

✓
Mr. Robert C. James
Chairman
The Marschalk Company
1345 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10105
(212) 974-7700

○
Mr. Stewart Monchik
President
Monchik-Weber Associates
111 John Street
New York, New York 10038
(212) 962-2400

✓
Mr. Charles Vincent Prothro
President
Mastek Corporation
1215 W. Crosby Road
Carrollton, Texas 75006
(214) 323-5800

○
Mr. Richard C. Marcus
Chairman
Koban-Marcus
Kain & Ervey
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 741-5911

✓
Mr. Noel Fenton
Chairman
Acurex Corp.
485 Clyde Avenue
Mountain View, California 94042
(415) 364-3200

✓
Mr. Herbert M. Dwight, Jr.
Spectra Physics, Inc.
1250 West Middlefield Road
Mountain View, California 94042
(415) 961-2550

✓
Mr. Charles Schwab
President & Chief Executive Officer
The Charles Schwab Corp.
One Second Avenue
San Francisco, California 94105
(415) 544-1000

BUSINESS ADVISORY PANEL

Charter Statement

OVERVIEW

Many important issues will face a new administration assuming office in 1981. Among the most important are issues which impact the nation's efforts to create additional investment incentives, renew plant and equipment, encourage capital formation, and create additional jobs within the economy. In addition, the U.S. faces particular difficulty in the international business environment because of current policies which tend to inhibit effective U.S. competition in world markets. This, while other countries (especially Japan and now Western Europe) are initiating efforts to ensure that their business entities can effectively compete in world markets.

It is the feeling of Governor Reagan that the advice of leading business leaders would be particularly useful in helping him address major national issues which directly affect the business community. This advice would also be useful to ensure that a smooth transition be accomplished in the new administration and that the policies necessary to redirect the nation's efforts in these areas be clearly delineated.

OBJECTIVES

Among the overall objectives which a Reagan administration would like to accomplish are to:

- . Provide sufficient capital to ensure vigorous economic growth for the U.S. economy.
- . Create and maintain an improved risk-taking environment in the U.S.
- . Eliminate or reduce obstacles in terms of laws, regulations or policies which are not clearly in the public interest to attainment of the twin goals of capital formation and risk-taking (benefits exceed costs, short and long term).
- . Develop policies and regulations (or lack thereof) which contribute to and promote the competitiveness of U.S. industry in a world market.
- . Develop policies and incentives which contribute to the formation of jobs and reduce unemployment.

Governor Reagan wishes to reach out and get the advice of concerned citizens who wish to contribute their expertise to the solutions of the nation's basic problems. Consequently, the Business Advisory Panel has been created.

Participation in this panel is designed to be informal in nature. The group is limited so as to provide an effective sounding board for the Governor to test ideas, as well as receive input for staff development of policy positions. This panel is designed to complement other informal groups in the economic, energy and foreign policy areas which are or will be established.

Attached is an initial list of questions the group may wish to consider in their deliberations. All participants are requested to add additional questions which they feel should be addressed.

Potential Questions for Business Panel

1. What can the government do, if anything, to increase productivity, increase real personal incomes of all workers and improve the quality of life arising from the business context?
2. Given the diversity of the U.S. economy, which is partially manufacturing, partially service, what group of tax incentives can be developed to accomplish maximum growth in all these sectors?
 - . What specific actions should the government take to encourage additional capital formation?
 - . Should the government reduce taxes on business and, if so, how?
 - Increase depreciation allowances?
 - Increase investment tax credits?
 - Reduce corporate tax rates?
 - Eliminate double taxation of dividends?
3. What policies or incentives should be taken by the government to encourage job creation and reduce unemployment?
4. What, if anything, needs to be done to promote the cooperation of government, business and labor to increase the effectiveness of U.S. competition in world markets?
5. What specific types of regulation should be proposed to assist business in becoming more competitive?
 - . Cost benefit analysis?
 - . Reduction of tariffs, quotas, entitlements?
6. What can the government do to promote advances in technological innovation?
 - . Expand investment credits for new investments in plant and training of people?
 - . Promote, through relaxation of antitrust laws and other impediments, joint research among companies and with the academic world?
 - . Use governmental procurement programs to stimulate process, product, and service innovations?

7. What domestic tax policy changes are needed to create a more favorable climate for investment in the U.S.?
 - . Should taxes on personal incomes be reduced and, if so, how?
 - Reduce steep gradation of tax rates?
 - Reduce personal income tax rates?
 - Reduce capital gains taxes?
 - Some combination?
8. What changes are needed in government regulation or tax policies to encourage productivity increases in the U.S.?
9. Given our export problems, what particular areas might be the objects of increased emphasis through federal and state policies?
 - . Exports of goods where the U.S. has comparative advantage?
 - . Exports of services where the U.S. has comparative advantage?
 - . Federal state programs to assist smaller businesses to export?
10. What special incentives, if any, might government provide to smaller businesses to allow them to continue to compete with larger enterprises, export more abroad, increase productivity?

TO: Ed Meese

FROM: Max Hugel

DATE: June 25, 1980

I highly recommend that the following telegram be sent from California. The Seafarers International Union will definitely be favorable to Governor Reagan and this telegram is most important.

Seafarers International Union
815 - 10th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Frank Drozak, Vice President

I wish to convey my deep regret at the death of your President, Paul Hall. His dynamic leadership in the Maritime Community at large and his unwavering vision of a better, stronger, and more prosperous United States through the enlightened use of the oceans for our commerce and defense will be sorely missed in the days ahead.

I trust his spirit of confidence in the ability of Americans to solve their problems by working together will continue to be the hallmark of the Seafarers International Union. Paul Hall exemplified the finest traditions of seafaring men throughout history. I pray that his dream of seeing merchant and naval ships flying the U. S. Flag on all the world trade routes and in all the major ports will indeed become a reality.

Please extend my heartfelt condolences to Mrs. Hall and their children.

Ronald Reagan

CIRCULATION

Ronald Reagan
Bill Casey
Ed Meese
Dick Wirthlin

June 20, 1980

MEMORANDUM

TO: Reagan for President
FROM: Thursday Night Group
SUBJECT: June 19 meeting

This summarizes last night's meeting.

---The group again emphasized its concern about the proliferation of unauthorized advisory groups. These groups should be kept under the control of senior staff. A single coordinator with substantive background was again recommended.

---Tom Evans reported that RR's visit to the Hill was a tremendous success, and the feedback from members of Congress has been very positive.

---Fred Biebel reported high morale and positive cooperation at the RNC in the wake of the Brock decision and RR's visit there. He and Drew Lewis are still settling in, but on balance things are going well.

---Tom Evans discussed the need for a clearing house for volunteers, both clerical and substantive. Everyone is particularly short of nuts and bolts workers, and many Hill offices are deluged by volunteers. The group recommended that a volunteer Clearing House be set up in the Arlington headquarters as soon as possible.

---Dick Allen brought up the question of background checks and campaign internal security. Fred Fielding and Fred Biebel will assess this problem and report back next week.

---Chuck Tyson reported on the scheduling operation. Although affected somewhat by the absence of a political director, Tyson is now designing an expanded scheduling operation which will be characterized by: (1) regionalized advancing; (2) more innovative scheduling events; and (3) a high degree of Congressional input. Tyson also intends to appoint as one of his assistants someone particularly sensitive to Congressional needs.

---Carroll Campbell discussed a forward strategy to go after Carter's base in the old south. Driven by a forceful surrogate campaign and occasional RR visits, this effort could secure some electoral votes but more importantly it would force Carter to divert resources from other areas to defend his base. Tom Evans and Carroll Campbell will contact Dick Wirthlin on this.

---Rich Williamson reported that the recent meeting of the Business Advisory Council in New York had proven so successful that businessmen in the Midwest and West wanted similar groups in Chicago and Los Angeles. Bill Casey has asked Rich to look into this.

ATTENDEES

Congressman Tom Evans
Congressman Carroll Campbell
Dick Allen
Fred Fielding
Al Drischler
Henry Cashen
Bill Hecht
Jerry Leonard
Fred Bieble
Rich Williamson

JERRIS LEONARD
SUITE 550
1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 872-1095

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

TO: Loren Smith
FROM: Jerris Leonard
DATE: June 2, 1980
RE: Lawyers' Organizing Committee for Reagan

Henry Cashen, Warren and JL met to discuss this proposed organization and the meeting resulted in the following observations:

1. Ed Weidenfeld has made contact with us and apparently other lawyers indicating that he has been given the assignment to organize a lawyers' committee for R.R.

2. Our concensus is that Ed should be named as director of the "Lawyers' Organizing Committee for R.R." together with about five or ten other lawyers whose purpose it is to recruit broad-based support of lawyers but that the final committee structure be withheld until a larger roster is completed in order to give a wider choice for the leadership positions.

3. The names suggested as possible choices for the organizing committee could include but is not limited to: Erwin Griswald, Herb Brownell, Ed Levi, Bill Saxby, Elliot Richardson, Bill Rogers, Bert Jenner, ~~Mordey~~ Morrie Liebman.

4. That the organizing committee contact all past presidents of the ABA and State Bars to seek their support for R.R. and service on the lawyers' committee.

5. That through some method of communication, i.e., direct mail, Bar publications, the organizing committee expanded by the past presidents seek to enlist the support of all lawyers concerned with the following objections in mind:

- a. General support, public relations and credibility.
- b. Letters to our clients and friends.
- c. Financial support.

d. Assistance by them and their firms on issues panels to assist in developing and refining issues in civil and criminal justice.

e. Assistance in balanced security for the November election.

6. Cashen to contact George Webster for his files from '68 and '72 and his views and assistance.

7. Leonard to contact Jenner, Liebman, Levi and ABA while in Chicago the week of June 2.

cc: Henry C. Cashen, II

P.S. Henry and Loren: Please call my secretary, Ellen Benson, for any omissions, etc. and your suggestions as to who this should go to.

26 June 1980
MEMORANDUM

To: BILL CASEY, ED MEESE
From: LORELEI KINDER *LK*
RE: WOMEN'S PLANK, 1980 PLATFORM

Wording approved 6/29 is as follows:

"In 1940 the Republican Party was the first national party to endorse the Equal Rights Amendment for women. Since then, we have continued and do continue to wholeheartedly support equal rights for all human beings. As we stated in the 1972 and 1976 Republican Platforms: 'we fully endorse the principles of equal rights, equal opportunities, and equal responsibilities for women and the elimination of inequities and discrimination wherever they exist'."

Believe statement would be strengthened by adding the following paragraph:

"The Republican Party is committed to the repeal and revision of statutes at all levels of government which promote discrimination against women."

Have discussed this with Marty Anderson. He agrees that it is consistent with RR. Politically, it will satisfy the feminists.

Thank you.

LCK/ym

June 17, 1980

M. PETER McPHERSON

Ed Meese -

IN RE: Court case on removal of
appointees because of
political party.

I thought this would be
of interest. Our memo on the
subject is in process.

A handwritten signature or set of initials, possibly 'B', written in dark ink.

United States of America
**Office of
Personnel Management**

Washington, D.C. 20415

APR 22 1979

Don F. G. Your Reference

SUBJECT: Branti v. Finkel: Removal of Non-Civil Service Employees
FROM: Alan K. Campbell
Director
Alan K. Campbell
TO: Heads of Departments and
Independent Establishments

The attached memorandum from the Office of Personnel Management's General Counsel explores the implications of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Branti v. Finkel. That decision involved the removal of a number of public defenders employed by Rockland County, New York solely based on their partisan political affiliation.

We have concluded that this case will have an extremely limited effect on the federal personnel system. Noncareer SES employees and Schedule C employees in the federal service are terminated for the destruction of the confidential or policy-determining relationship between these employees and their supervisors. Thus, the first amendment consideration which lead to the Court's decision in Branti is not applicable to the federal system.

If you need further information, please contact OPM's General Counsel, Margery Waxman, on 632-4632.

Attachment

Subject: Branti v. Finkel: Removal of non-civil service employees

Date: APR 17
In Reply Refer To:

From: Margery Waxman (MW)
General Counsel

Your Reference:

To: Alan K. Campbell
Director

On March 31, 1980, the United States Supreme Court decided Branti v. Finkel. That decision involved the removal of certain New York county employees solely based on their partisan political affiliation. Because of the way in which it has been reported in the press a number of questions have been raised about its effect on Schedule C positions and on non-career Senior Executive Service appointees. I believe that although this case slightly extends the Court's earlier decision in Elrod v. Burns, it will have little effect on the federal personnel system.

Plaintiffs were assistant public defenders in Rockland County, New York, who were appointed by a Republican Public Defender. Subsequent to an election which shifted the party control of the County legislature, they were terminated by the Democratic appointee. Although the Public Defender later contended that there had been other reasons for the removals, the Court based its decision on the lower court's finding that these employees had been terminated solely because of their political beliefs.

Noting their earlier decision in Elrod v. Burns, which held that the First Amendment prohibits the discharge of non-confidential or non-policy-determining public employees based on political beliefs, the Court found nothing in the duties of an assistant public defender which justifies conditioning employment on political affiliation. Rather, the Court cited the District Court's finding that assistant public defenders had "very limited, if any, responsibility" for managing the Public Defender's office or for implementing policy. Their primary responsibility was found to be the conduct of specific cases on behalf of their clients. Making clear that the test in Elrod was to be a common sense or reasonableness standard, the Court stated:

"in sum, the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position, rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved."

Although the Branti decision appears to have broadened Elrod, by holding that employees in the policy-determining or confidential positions cannot be terminated for political affiliation without a showing that party affiliation is essential to the performance of the job, it has not affected the right of the public employer to terminate confidential or policy-determining relationships for reasons other than political beliefs. It is only the fact that the employee suffers an adverse effect solely due to his political beliefs that raises a First Amendment issue.

Termination due to lack of confidence in a predecessor's personal assistant, does not penalize the employee for personal beliefs and therefore does not raise a constitutional issue. The Court noted that "to the extent that petitioner lacks confidence in the assistants he has inherited from the prior administration, he is, of course, free to discharge them." Thus, it seems that what offended the Court was not so much a system by which a high level public official would be allowed to retain an assistant in which he or she had confidence or who could be trusted to follow his or her policies but rather the use of partisan political criteria for the retention of what were essentially non-political jobs.

Schedule C Positions

Branti would not seem to affect Federal Schedule C positions which are, correctly classified as, "confidential or policy-determining." Employees in these jobs are not hired through competitive staffing and are not entitled to the statutory protections afforded to career employees or preference eligibles. Moreover, discharging these employees because of the destruction of the policy-determining or confidential relationship would not give rise to a constitutional claim. Accordingly, where this relationship is destroyed these employees continue to be terminable at will.

A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Committee to Protect the First Amendment Rights of Employees of the Department of Agriculture v. Bergland, decided December 27, 1979 clearly makes this critical distinction. In Committee, the circuit court held that State Directors of the Farmers Home Administration and State Executive Directors of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, despite being designated by the Civil Service Commission as Schedule A appointees, in reality, held policy-determining positions and were therefore terminable at the will of the appointing authority. Although the court found that under Elrod the positions were "policy-determining" and that the

termination of the incumbents did not raise any constitutional issues, ^{1/} it also ruled that the incumbents were not, in fact, dismissed for partisan political reasons but rather to "enhance policy formulation and execution."

The plaintiffs in Committee have petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Since the petition was filed on March 26, 1980 it will be several months before we know if the Supreme Court will hear this appeal. Even in the absence of Supreme Court consideration of Committee, however, it seems clear that neither Elrod nor Branti preclude the termination of a policy-determining or confidential employee when the confidential relationship ceases to exist or when a change occurs in policy direction. Because this is the premise behind Schedule C appointing authority, this authority would seem to remain secure.

Non-Career SES Appointments

A slightly different question arises in considering non-career Senior Executive Service appointments. In these appointments the nature of the job does not determine the status of the employee. Rather the status rests with the individual and depends on the appointment procedures. Thus, non-career SES employees may hold any general position within SES.

It may be argued, however, that these positions are by their very nature policy-determining and therefore there would be no constitutional bar to removing a non-career person in this type of position because of a lack of confidence or change in policy. The fact that Congress has chosen to provide some statutory protection to employees who are competitively selected for these positions should

^{1/} Under Branti, which was not decided at the time of the Committee decision, it would be necessary for the court to go further and determine whether the incumbents were dismissed for partisan political beliefs and, if so, whether the nature of the jobs warranted such action. Although such an analysis was not pursued, the court did find, in dictum, that the employees were not removed for their party affiliations.

not effect the constitutionality of the removal of non-career employees. 2/ Further, if political affiliation is a valid criteria for continued employment for a specific job an individual could be removed solely on the basis of political affiliation under Branti.

Conclusion

In conclusion, termination from a policy-determining or confidential position due to a change in policy direction or a lack of confidence in the incumbent is not an action taken against an individual due to private beliefs and therefore would not raise a First Amendment issue. So long as actions taken against Schedule C employees or non-career SES appointees are made on the basis of lack of confidence or change in policy direction, Branti would not appear to make any change in current law or policy. It is only if such actions are taken based on political beliefs or affiliation that the Branti issue would arise. In these cases, the appointing authority would have to show that the nature of the job was such that partisan political affiliation was necessary for its effective performance. 3/

2/ There are indications in the dissenting opinions that the majority opinion can be said to hold that the statutory basis for the positions determine the ground rules for the termination of the incumbents. If this is indeed the case, then Congress has clearly indicated that non-career SES appointees serve at the will of the appointing authority.

3/ If political affiliation is perceived as the basis for the action the burden may shift to the government to show that this perception is incorrect.

26 June 1980

MEMORANDUM

To: GOVERNOR REAGAN
From: Lorelei Kinder
RE: ATTACHED PHONE REQUEST

Governor, I have met with Nancy Kassebaum twice. She is a very delightful, sensitive woman.

She is pro-ERA, but not a feminist, she is concerned that ERA will be the focus of the Convention.

The Senator is going to have her dad, Alf Landon, introduce her at the Convention. She has invited Margaret Chase Smith to be a member of her Escort Committee.

Thank you.

LCK/ym

attachment

TO RR _____
FROM RR _____

REAGAN FOR PRESIDENT

Phone Request Form

DATE: 26 June 1980
TO: GOVERNOR REAGAN
FR: LORELEI KINDER

approved by _____

PERSON TO CALL: NANCY KASSEBAUM

TITLE IF ANY: U.S. SENATOR, KANSAS

PURPOSE OF CALL: To thank her for her support; to indicate pleasure that she is Temporary Chairman; to talk with her regarding women's issues and her feelings on ERA and the Platform.

OFFICE NUMBER: 202-224-4774

HOME NUMBER: _____

BEST TIME TO CALL IF ANY: 11:30 to 1:30 PST (Today) Thursday 26 June.
(leaving for New Hampshire at 2:00pm PST)

RESULT OF CALL: _____

DATE OF CALL: _____

PROPOSED STATEMENT ON ERA FOR PLATFORM

Equal Rights

In 1940 the Republican Party was the first national party to endorse ~~the~~ Equal Rights ~~Amendment~~ for women. Since then we have continued and do continue to wholeheartedly support equal rights for all human beings. As we stated in the 1972 and 1976 Republican Platforms: "we fully endorse the principles of equal rights, equal opportunities and equal responsibilities for women, and the elimination of inequity and discrimination wherever they exist."



REAGAN for PRESIDENT

901 South Highland Street
Arlington, Virginia 22204
(703) 685-3400

6/20

Dear Ed —

This should be
must reading.

Wren

THE CAMPAIGN

From Start, Hamilton Jordan Aimed at Overcoming Kennedy

First of a series

By Martin Schram

Washington Post Staff Writer

Hamilton Jordan was sitting at his desk, awaiting the word last Sept. 7, and when the flashing began on the telephone line that connects the Oval Office with his, he jumped to answer.

"Yes, sir?"

"I just met with Kennedy," said the president, who was sitting at his own desk, just a few steps down the corridor. "I have the certain feeling that he is going to run."

Jordan paused. "So be it," he recalls saying, and hung up the phone.

On that Friday last fall, as far as the president and most of his advisers were concerned, the battle of the 1980 campaign was officially joined. To Jordan, in fact, Edward M. Kennedy's conversation with Carter was just ratification of what he already expected.

For the last nine months, Jordan had been presiding over the beginnings of a reelection campaign that had always been aimed at defeating Kennedy. When virtually all other senior Carter advisers were believing

that Kennedy would not attempt the challenge, Jordan was maintaining that he would — as long as the polls were showing that he could win.

Jordan had built a campaign plan around this assumption, in a lengthy memo to the president that filled a black, loose-leaf notebook. The memo, dated Jan. 17, 1979, proved to be a blueprint for the Carter effort to win renomination. But it also offers insights into the workings of the Carter White House that are far more revealing than mere blueprints and battle plans.

The Jordan memo discloses the determination of the Carter White House to play tough power politics in an election year.

It emphasizes using the power of incumbency to achieve political goals, and it shows Jordan carefully attempting to steel the resolve of the president to use these powers, by citing the 1976 campaign of Gerald Ford as a perfect example — of what not to do and how not to do it:

"... President Ford failed to utilize

See CARTER, A16, Col. 1

THE PRESIDENT'S CAMPAIGN—I

CARTER, From A1

the advantages of incumbency and failed to minimize the disadvantages. He learned a very expensive lesson in the primaries which almost cost him his party's nomination."

It outlines plans for using White House pressure and influence to encourage state officials to shift the dates of various primary elections and caucuses — to create a "preferred version" of the 1980 calendar that would benefit Carter's campaign:

"... The easiest way to establish early momentum ... is to win southern delegates by encouraging southern states to hold early caucuses and primaries ... It is in our interest to have states that we are likely to win scheduled on the same day with states that we might do poorly in."

And it speaks of the importance of "playing the expectations game" in 1979 to reduce the impact that any challenge to Carter might have in 1980:

"... I believe that it is to our own benefit to help create the expectation that we will be challenged in our own party ..."

This account of the Carter campaign offers a view of the decision making of the president and his advisers rarely glimpsed by those outside the inner circle. It draws upon some previously unpublicized memos that were made available to The Washington Post, no doubt, because they portray the strategic success of their decisions.

In the course of his memo writing, Jordan outlined some things that proved right and some that proved wrong, set some goals that were attainable and others that were not. And, as he himself would later say in an interview, "An awful lot of what I wrote was just plain obvious."

Jordan correctly gauged the nature of Kennedy's eventual decision to run and even the timing of it, and predicted that California Gov. Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr. would be a candidate as well.


But Jordan proved unrealistic (and even naive) in setting a goal of raising by the end of 1979 all of the campaign funds permitted by law in each state — a goal that, in fact, has not yet been reached. And he, like virtually every other observer and practitioner of the unscience of politics, did not foresee the overwhelming impact that international crises such as those in Iran and Afghanistan would have on the 1980 campaign.

In the year-and-a-half that followed, the Carter campaign would have three chairmen; but in reality, it has always had just one chief: Jordan.

In a rather remarkable interview, the current chairman, the ever-aggrandizing Robert S. Strauss, slipped into a moment of uncharacteristic modesty (which is what made it remarkable) when he was asked about the nature of his role at the campaign committee.

"This has never been my operation, as you know," the 61-year-old veteran of important jobs said. "... The word 'chairman' is a misnomer. 'Chief spokesman' is really the role I have, and it's a good one for me. ... That and some fund-raising, the sort that required a senior person — someone with gray hair who could talk with those business council people."

The campaign of 1979-80 saw the president's political fortunes undergo extraordinary change. Having plummeted to the lowest rating accorded a modern president, and facing a challenge from a Kennedy who was already beating him by better than 2 to 1 in the polls, Carter found for himself a new image of leadership — aided immeasurably by the crises in Iran and Afghanistan. And he rode that new-found image and the political skills of those he had kept by his



"...President Ford failed to utilize the advantages of incumbency and failed to minimize the disadvantages. He learned a very expensive lesson in the primaries which almost cost him his party's nomination."

of our incumbents, but paradoxically, far less willing to summarily release them from their hold on us.

In the case of Jimmy Carter, a leader in title more than in public perception, it was a comeback that began with that memo from his chief of staff:

January 17, 1979
EYES ONLY
To: President Carter
From: Hamilton Jordan
INTRODUCTION

The Incumbent President As Candidate THE MYTH OF THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT

"Over the two-hundred-year history of our country, the myth developed and was sustained by events that incumbent presidents are always reelected. ... The history of presidential incumbents seeking reelection in recent history files in the face of this historical presumption that all presidential incumbents are reelected.

"... So, as we think and plan for 1980, we must be prepared to deal with the contradiction that exists. Namely, that while the myth persists that incumbent presidents are always elected to second terms, the fact is that the fragmentation of political power within the party and the tremendous difficulty the modern president faces in finding practical and attractive solutions to this new generation of complex foreign and domestic problems make a serious challenge to an incumbent president much more likely.

THE REELECTION CAMPAIGN OF PRESIDENT FORD

"... If I had to point to several factors that were the cause of our success [in 1976], one major factor would be that we understood the law, its implications for our political strategy and functioned better under it than any of the other candidates. Because

important to channel Carter's campaigning along the lines of acting firmly, aggressively and early if the nomination was to be won.

As Jordan outlined it in his memo, the fight for the nomination would be the toughest of all, and early demonstrations of strength would be crucial:

THE 1980 CAMPAIGN

THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION AND THE GENERAL ELECTION

"... Due to the fragmentation of political power in our country and in our party and the nature of persons in the Democratic Party who participate disproportionately in the nomination process, it has always been my feeling that there is a greater chance we will lose the nomination than there is we will lose the general election.

"... I assume that we will face a strong challenge within our own party. And we should not spend a lot of time worrying about where it comes from or who it may be, but we should be prepared psychologically and politically for a serious challenge.

"... Another way of discouraging a serious challenge is to demonstrate early political strength and organization in key primary and caucus states."

The thrust of the advice Jordan was giving the president was that the Carter campaign for 1980 had to start early and win early. By the time the first caucus of 1980 was held in Iowa in January, the Carter-Mondale campaign committee had already been operating for almost a year. And in that time, it had already gone through three campaign chairmen.

First was then Democratic Party treasurer Evan Dobelle, who was chosen by Jordan because, although he was then just 33 years old and relatively inexperienced, he was considered capable and supremely loyal to Jordan. By August, Jordan had concluded that Dobelle's skills were in fund-raising but not strategic organization.

There is also another explanation. "Hamilton had wanted Evan to take orders from him," says another of the Carter senior advisers, "but then Hamilton got busy running the White House and he didn't give the orders." Jordan was also busy at that time in de-



"The absolute worst thing that we can do is behave in a way that suggests we fear a Kennedy candidacy. We should proceed publicly on the same course that we have been on recently, that of praising him, minimizing differences, etc."

side for four years (preserved in the suspended animation of government jobs) to victories over a challenger who once looked unbeatable.

By the time he captured a majority of the Democratic National Convention delegates, his presidency was once again coming under unrelenting criticism and attack (and even ridicule) from the Democratic left and right in Congress, in the editorial columns and even in the election day interviews of many voters who had just cast their ballots for him.

He finished in 1980 as he had in 1976, staggering through a series of late primary defeats even as he was putting a numerical lock on his party's nomination. The pattern seems to be Carter classic. But in a way, his 1980 showing was more remarkable than the 1976 come-from-nowhere victory that got him into the White House in the first place. For in 1980, Jimmy Carter did not have the luxury of coming from nowhere; he came from being thoroughly inspected and seemingly rejected, from being down and apparently out.

It was a comeback that perhaps tells us as much about ourselves as it does about our president. It shows us as being tough in our judgments



"...it has always been my feeling that there is a greater chance we will lose the nomination than there is we will lose the general election."

President Ford's people did not understand the law initially and functioned poorly under it, he almost lost the nomination of his party.

"Secondly, President Ford failed to utilize the advantages of incumbency and failed to minimize the disadvantages. He learned a very expensive lesson in the primaries which almost cost him his party's nomination. By the general election, President Ford, the White House staff and his campaign staff had learned to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages, and consequently came very close to beating us.

"And finally... President Ford and his campaign made classic errors in strategy and judgment in almost every dimension of his campaign to win the Republican nomination. As an indication of what not to do, an analysis his primary campaign is beneficial.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE FORD CAMPAIGN FOR THE NOMINATION

"...There was never an early, conscious effort to develop a coherent strategy for winning the Republican nomination.

"...There was never a serious early assessment of President Ford's strengths and weaknesses nor a strategy for the use of the president that was oriented toward his strengths.

"...The Ford campaign spent most of 1975 trying to get Ronald Reagan out of the race instead of preparing for a serious challenge.

"...The best way to discourage a serious challenge from within your own party is to expect one and prepare for one; and

"Indications of lack of confidence in our own prospects for reelection will be interpreted as a sign of weakness and will only encourage a serious challenge."

Ford proved an effective foil for Jordan, as the Carter aide sought to focus the thinking of his boss upon the perils of incumbency — he put it delicately, writing of the complexity of modern problems, rather than plummeting polls and perceptions of falling leadership. Jordan also used the example of Ford to galvanize the president to endorsing aggressive steps to use the levers of incumbency.

(At the end of the memo, Jordan would have Carter mark his approval of every proposed step. He did this not because the president's approval was required to effect such action. Jordan would later concede in an interview, but because he knew it was

fending himself against allegations that he had used cocaine — allegations from two unreliable plea bargainers, that were dismissed months later by a special prosecutor.)

Jordan moved his 38-year-old White House political lieutenant, Tim Kraft, over to run the campaign committee, phasing Dobelle into the job of chief fund-raiser. Kraft's background was in political organizing but it soon became clear that he lacked the presence to command the media's attention and air time and to satiate the appetites of prominent Democrats who figured they deserved to deal with the president, or perhaps Jordan, but not much less.

And this led to the drafting of the redoubtable Strauss.

At the Carter campaign, chairman Strauss served as the out-front man, handling the network interviews and hitting up the nation's board chairmen and leading Democrats. Kraft remained as campaign manager, tending to the organization and strategic detail. They coexist, and Strauss explains why it works:

"Hamilton is a close enough friend of mine and of Kraft's that he probably lied enough to each of us about who was really in charge that neither of us resented the other one — and we get along fine."

All the while, Jordan, sitting in his office (the chamber used to be H. R. Haldeman's) as White House chief of staff, was serving as Carter's campaign chief without portfolio. To the other senior Carter officials, there is no doubt about this. "Hamilton is the chief strategist," says Tim Kraft. "Hamilton is the facilitator... and final arbiter," says Patrick Caddell. "Hamilton makes all the big decisions," says campaign counsel Tim Smith.

In an election year, political work and presidential work have a way of blending despite the best of intentions and purest of designs. For a couple of months this year, Jordan found himself swept away from the campaign, making secret diplomatic forays to Europe and elsewhere as a negotiator ad hoc, hoping to solve the Iranian hostage crisis by dealing with French lawyers who were serving as intermediaries to the government of Tehran.

"It was hard—damn hard—to get anything done on the campaign then," says one senior Carter adviser. "We couldn't get to Hamilton for final decisions."

When the negotiations failed, Jor-

dan returned to his two-hatted routine, overseeing the business of re-electing the president even as he was tending to the business of being the White House chief of staff.

It was a business he had been in, actually, ever since he suggested a reshaping of the primary and caucus calendar in that 1979 memo to Carter.

1980 DELEGATE SELECTION RULES

[Jordan provided Carter with two color-coded charts, one entitled, "The 1980 Delegate Selection Calendar—as of Dec. 15, 1978," and the other entitled, "Preferred Version."]

PREFERRED VERSION

"It is absolutely essential that we win the early contests and establish momentum. If we win the early contests, it is difficult to see how anyone could defeat us for the nomination. Conversely, if we lose the early contest(s), it is difficult to see how we could recoup and win the nomination . . . The easiest way to establish early momentum and stress the significant role of the South in the party is to win southern delegates by encouraging southern states to hold early caucuses and primaries . . . It is in our interest to have states that we are likely to win scheduled on the same day with states that we might do poorly in."

Jordan wrote Carter that they had what he called limited but significant influence to shape a preferred version of the delegate selection calendar by convincing some states to shift their primary and caucus dates. South Carolina Gov. Dick Riley, Tennessee Speaker of the House Ned McWhorter and Florida Gov. Bob Graham would likely be among those who would be helpful, Jordan figured.

As it turned out, Jordan and his assistants had limited but significant success in their efforts to shape the calendar to suit Carter's political aim.

Jordan envisioned dropping Kennedy's home state primary from its early slot on March 4 (just a week after the New Hampshire primary) to sandwich it among several southern state elections on March 11. The Carter aides could not move Massachusetts. ("We kind of bungled that one," said one Carter campaign official.)

But Connecticut, another state Jordan feared early, was dropped down into April from its original early March 4 pairing with Massachusetts.

Jordan did succeed, however, in moving Georgia and eventually Alabama to join Florida on March 11, guaranteeing a Carter southern sweep on that Tuesday.

Originally, Jordan had seen Illinois—on March 18—as a potentially damaging state for Carter. He had first hoped to move Alabama's primary and then Tennessee's to sandwich Illinois among pro-Carter slices of the South that day. Neither could be done. But then Illinois turned out to be a landslide victory that came close to demolishing the Kennedy candidacy.

New York was originally scheduled for April 1, as was Kansas, and Jordan, seeing New York as a poor state for Carter, hoped to move the caucuses of Michigan (a state judged as more favorable to Carter) to that date as well. That didn't succeed, but the effort proved irrelevant anyway.

"It should have been obvious all along that New York would have to change," recalls one Carter strategist. "April 1 was the first day of Passover—but Hamilton just didn't see that back then."

Jordan viewed the April 22 Pennsylvania primary as potential bad news for Carter; he proposed trying to shift the caucuses of Missouri, Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma to that date as well. Much of that did not come to pass, but Missouri did hold its cau-



"It is absolutely essential that we win the early contests and establish momentum. If we win...it is difficult to see how anyone could defeat us for the nomination. Conversely, if we lose the early contests, it is difficult to see how we could recoup and win the nomination...it is in our interest to have states that we are likely to win scheduled on the same day with states that we might do poorly in."

TIMETABLE FOR CANDIDATES TO MAKE DECISIONS Possible Candidates/Types of Candidates

... Governor Jerry Brown. The single candidate who is sure to run and sure to announce early. . . . And although my strong personal inclination is to discount a Brown candidacy and not treat him seriously, I am reminded of his performance against us in the late primaries and his adept handling of Proposition 13 in California . . .

... Senator Ted Kennedy. . . . There is no question in my mind that Senator Kennedy will challenge us for the nomination in 1980 if he believes that there is a very good chance that he can win. If the odds are 40-60 against him, he will not run. But if the odds are 60-40 in his favor, he will definitely run. . . . Senator Kennedy will probably have to make a very close and very difficult decision in the late summer or early fall of this year.

... The absolute worst thing that we can do is to behave in a way that suggests we fear a Kennedy candidacy. We should proceed publicly on the same course that we have been on recently, that of praising him, minimizing differences, etc.

PLAYING THE "EXPECTATIONS" GAME

"The 'expectations' game might be described as the effort by the national media and the political community to establish arbitrary expectations against which to measure the political successes and failures of the various presidential candidates. And although this game is played on the terrain of the media and the political community, it can be influenced—in varying degrees—by the candidates themselves. In 1976, we played the 'expecta-

who now says: "I was one of the last to say that Kennedy would run."

And not Rafshoon, who even wrote the president a memo about it. (Rafshoon later sent a shorter version of his thoughts to then-chairman of the Carter campaign, Evan Dohelle.)

"The only person who can beat Jimmy Carter is Jimmy Carter," Rafshoon wrote to the president early in 1979. "And this can happen when you fail to follow your own instincts."

This theme (follow-your-own-instincts) is the underpinning of much of the advice that Rafshoon has given Carter during politically tough times. He went on to discuss opposition:

"Teddy Kennedy. Kennedy is the only serious potential challenger. The press will promote his candidacy because they like him and more importantly, because it keeps things interesting . . .

"Whatever we do in reaction to or fear of a Kennedy candidacy will seriously hurt our chances in both the primaries and the general. We should forget about it for two reasons; he isn't going to run and if he does he'll lose."

To this, Rafshoon added a listing of six points telling Carter why Kennedy wouldn't run.

Meanwhile, back at the White House, the president was digesting the advice of aides that was at times in conflict and at times in concert. He read Jordan's explanations of why Kennedy would run if the polls showed he could win, and Rafshoon's explanations of why Kennedy would not.

He could not help but notice that from these divergent views the two advisers recommended a similar tack: both recommended against doing anything to suggest "fear" (they both used the word) of a Kennedy challenge. Both warned against any change of public course; continue praising Kennedy, Jordan had added.

Apparently, the president felt moved to act. "If Kennedy runs, I'll whip his ass," Carter told a group of congressmen during dinner at the White House on June 11. One startled Democrat, disbelieving, asked the president what he had just said. The president patiently repeated: "If Kennedy runs, I'll whip his ass."

Later, White House officials urged the congressmen to have no qualms about making the comment public, which they dutifully did. Kennedy, who had been insisting in those days




"If Kennedy runs, I'll whip his ass."

ous on that date. It provided a large victory that enabled the Carter officials to eventually proclaim that they had won far more total delegates than Kennedy on April 22, despite Kennedy's razor-thin victory in Pennsylvania.

Jordan believed all along that the nomination had to be won early or not at all. Fund-raising was a chore that had to be gotten out of the way quickly, to leave time for the business of politics. And when it came to opponents, Jordan's advice came down to expect the strongest, which means, prepare for the worst:

SPENDING LIMITATIONS ON THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

"... We should try to raise most—if not all—of our funds in 1979 so that all of our political time and resources can be directed toward the early caucuses and primaries in 1980."



"The only person who can beat Jimmy Carter is Jimmy Carter. And this can happen when you fail to follow your own instincts."

tions' game well at times, poorly at others and many times it was simply beyond our control. We realized the importance of relating our political strategy to the expectations the media and the political community had of us. To begin with, we had no choice as your candidacy and prospects for winning were not taken seriously by anyone at the national level. Recognizing these 'low expectations,' we shaped and executed a political strategy that resulted in our exceeding the low expectations in a dramatic way that thrust you into the early role of being the front-runner for the nomination and the probable nominee of the party.

"Based on this early and unexpected success, we lost control of the public expectations of your candidacy..."

THE 1980 "EXPECTATIONS" GAME

"Our situation in 1980 is the converse of 1976. Based on the historical myth of the incumbent president as presented earlier, the expectation is incredibly high that you will be re-nominated by the party and reelected. This expectation is so high and so great that anything that happens in the next year to eighteen months that challenges that 'expectation' will be closely scrutinized and greatly exaggerated by the news media..."

"... I believe that it is to our own benefit to help create the expectation that we will be challenged in our own party..."

Of the people within the Carter inner circle, only Jordan argued all along that Kennedy would challenge Carter in the fall. (Press secretary Jody Powell, who gets his political inspiration from glands and visceral sensations, had believed that Kennedy wanted to take on Carter ever since the Massachusetts Democrat went to the party's mid-term conference in Memphis in 1978 and delivered his emotional "sail against the wind" speech; but Powell did not press the point on the basis of politics.)

Most of Carter's other experts within did not share Jordan's view. Not Caddell, who had admired Kennedy and had served as his pollster in his 1976 Senate race, and who argued through much of 1979 that it was unlikely Kennedy would run.

Not Strauss, who tried to stay plugged into the Kennedy plans through his friendship with House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, and

that he would not run, commented: "I think what he meant to say was that he was going to whip inflation."

Jordan's study of Gerald Ford's 1976 fight to win the nomination of his party had convinced him that it was important for the president to remain "in a noncandidate posture" for as long as possible, even as the campaign organization was getting off to a vital early start. This conviction had led Jordan and the other Carter advisers through a series of political contortions. In informal sessions late in 1978 at the home on Georgetown's R Street shared by Caddell and Kraft, several Carter advisers puzzled over how they could possibly put a campaign committee in place without it being taken as announcement of candidacy.

They even discussed the possibility of mounting a grass-roots groundswell of their own, and then having the committee formed without Carter's blessing. Finally, they just decided to form the exploratory committee, just like every other campaign, and get on with it.

The president, meanwhile, continued to hint at—but stop short of announcing—his candidacy throughout most of the year. He was maintaining the "noncandidate posture" Jordan had advocated in his 1979 memo.

Jordan had included in that memo what he felt was a key chapter. It was the section in which he outlined the strategy for the coming campaign. It contains 11 points. Some of them read like political bromides, emphasizing the importance of a strong record on which to stand and the need to prepare for a strong challenge. Others get down to what is generally considered hard strategy, such as the political reshaping of the delegate selection calendar and an early show of power in the South. Jordan's memo:

STRATEGY FOR 1980

"... To the extent that we have political decisions to make, they are more tactical than strategic. We will be expected to do well in every primary and caucus against every opponent. Our potential opponents will have the latitude and the luxury of deciding the time and place where they will make their challenge..."

"1. We will be reelected or not re

See CARTER, A17, Col. 1

From the Start, Hamilton Jordan Aimed at Overcoming Kennedy

CARTER, From A16

elected based largely on your performance as president.

"2. The best way to discourage a strong challenge from within the Democratic Party is to prepare for one

"3. I assume a serious challenge will develop from the left. The Brown challenge will be nonideological and will have to be treated differently.

"4. We should not discount any challenge. Remember our campaign and how people laughed at us.

"5. The best way to prepare for a strong challenge is to get an early start.

"6. At the same time, it is important politically and substantively that the president remain in a noncandidate posture for as long as possible.

"7. It is important that we create a positive mood among the party elite toward our candidacy.

"8. In accordance with our strategic and tactical decisions, it is important that we use our limited influence to shape the primary and caucus schedule.

"9. It is important that we demonstrate early that our southern base is intact.

"10. We should use the next 10 months to advantage to get well-orga-

nized and to raise the bulk of our campaign funds.

"11. While displaying basic political confidence in our prospects for reelection, we should not be perceived as taking the Democratic Party or the nomination for granted."

EPILOGUE: Jordan and campaign counsel Tim Smith are walking into the basement entrance to the West Wing of the White House, dripping with perspiration after a couple of sets on the president's court on a muggy June day in 1979.

Almost casually, Jordan shifts from talking tennis to talking politics.

"Kennedy is going to run and we'll beat him bad," Jordan says, as he enters the elevator that will take him to his office upstairs.

"You know what the one issue will be?" he asks.

Smith, standing outside the elevator, shrugs.

"Kennedy!" Jordan answers, and as the doors close, he shouts a final obdurate observation: "And we're going to be geniuses again!"

Researcher Maralee Schapiro contributed to this report.

NEXT: Coping with Kennedy

By Martin Schram

Washington Post Staff Writer

In the Oval Office, Patrick Caddell is lecturing to an audience of one, his boss, on the positive value of negative campaigns.

It is September 1979, and President Carter is at 25 percent in the Gallup poll, which puts him 38 points behind Sen. Edward M. Kennedy.

"Politics is undergoing a change," Caddell recalls telling Carter. Caddell, the McGovern Wunderkind of '72 who is now older and richer, as the president's pollster, launches into a discussion of the lessons of the major campaigns of 1978. A Carter victory in 1980 must be a come-from-behind victory; so Caddell focuses upon the comeback victories of governors Hugh Carey of New York, Bren-

Making the Opponent the Issue

dan Byrne of New Jersey and Ella Grasso of Connecticut.

"Negative campaigning worked in these elections, more so than ever before," Caddell explains. He means a "negative" strategy in which a candidate broadcasts his opponent's shortcomings even more than he emphasizes his own virtues.

"All of the winners who had to come back from behind to win did so on the basis of negative campaigns. Given that, we can probably make our opponents the issue in 1980."

Caddell goes on to talk about Kennedy, and

Carter listens attentively. Caddell is, after all, the closest thing Carter has to someone from the other side. In 1976, Caddell worked as pollster for both Carter for president and Kennedy for Senate.

The Carter Campaign—II

"This has to be a general election-type of campaign. Even though it is just a primary election, people have to be made to face all of the complications that go into making an

actual choice for the presidency: not just "Who do you like better" but "Who do you really want to sit in the Oval Office?"

At one point, Caddell pointedly warns: "This campaign could get very bloody."

Kennedy and Carter, he explains, represent opposite strengths and weaknesses. Kennedy's strength is a public perception of his leadership capabilities; his weakness is the perception of personal characteristics associated with his private life. Carter's strength is his personal traits—honesty, decency, trustworthiness. His weakness is the

widespread public view that he lacks the abilities of leadership.

"There is no way that one of you can represent his own strength in a campaign without in effect attacking the other's weakness," Caddell says.

"So it could be very bloody. But at least our weakness is something we can do something about."

As he is saying that, Caddell recalls, "My mind was spinning—how do we use the White House to do what we wanted to do?"

An inside glimpse of Carter and his advisers planning their 1980 campaign, revealed by internal memos and lengthy interviews, suggests this: Carter and his people seem more aggressive, thorough and practical at

See CARTER, A2, Col. 1

Taking a Different Tack: Making the Opponent the Issue

CARTER. From A1

politics—some call it hardball—than they appear to many to be at running government. They are obviously better prepared for the real contest of 1980 and its real contours than is their principal opponent for the Democratic nomination.

At the outset, they assume one of their greatest assets will be what they see as the aggressive capabilities of the president as a campaigner, out there among the people, winning them back to the fold. They will prove wrong about that. The unanticipated events in Iran reverse the script. Carter will make his comeback without going anywhere.

But Caddell is right about the "negative" nature of the campaign. Kennedy will emphasize Carter's alleged failures as a leader. The media coverage, plus subtle campaign advertising from Carter, will underline the questions about Kennedy's character.

Kennedy will deride Carter for the president's famous declaration of American malaise. Carter's TV messages, prepared by media adviser Gerald Rafshoon, will emphasize the president's personal qualities.

There is:
"President Carter. He's a solid man in a sensitive job."

Which will be escalated to:
"Husband, father, president—he's done these three jobs with distinction."

And: "A man brings two things to a presidential ballot. He brings his record and he brings himself. Who he is is frequently more important than what he's done. In the voting booth the voter must weigh both record and character before deciding. Often it's not easy. And this voter winds up asking—'Is this the person I really want in the White House for the next four years?'"

The personal character question will contribute mightily to Kennedy's early defeats in the caucuses of Iowa and the primaries in New Hampshire, throughout the South, and in Illinois. When Kennedy finally mounts a comeback of his own later in the campaign—too late, in fact—the Carter strategists will come up with a new

margin that was in fact closer than it seemed.

Before the meetings adjourned, there was some tough talk and some tough decision making about money. It would prove to be perhaps the least titillating, but most important of the campaign's early decisions.

The Carter advisers were shown three campaign budgets: a high level (\$18 million), medium level (\$15 million) and a low level (\$12 million).

This opened what would be a campaign-long series of disputes between those who advocated increased spending for field operations, chiefly Kraft, and those who advocated increased spending for advertising, chiefly Rafshoon. In the months that followed, this dispute between Kraft and Rafshoon would be repeated frequently and would escalate in intensity.


The Carter officials were told there was no way they could reach even their mid-level budget goal unless they doubled, between Labor Day and Christmas, the amount of money raised between March and August. They decided to build a series of fund-raising events around the president's official announcement of candidacy.

They also decided to cut back sharply on spending—especially on staff travel.

Both decisions proved to be crucial. In the week of Carter's December announcement alone, the campaign raised \$2.5 million. Because of the fund-raising increases and spending cutbacks, says Smith, "We were in excellent financial shape in January 1980."

This put the Carter campaign in healthy contrast to the Kennedy campaign. The challenger, ill-served by his advisers, wound up spending himself virtually out of existence in the first month of 1980 because of a series of poor management decisions or, often, no decisions at all.

Kennedy campaigned around the country in those days in a Taj Mahal of a jetliner and the plane sat grounded in Florida at a cost of \$5,000 a day while Kennedy enjoyed his Christmas vacation. The Kennedy campaign housed itself in lavish offices in Illinois, and spent at least



At dedication of John F. Kennedy Library in Boston last October, Carter made a rare appearance with his soon-to-be rival for the 1980 presidential nomination.

United Press International

batch of "negative" ads that shift the focus directly back upon Kennedy's character as the issue. That will be sufficient to see Carter through the primary season.

It will be, just as Caddell was saying, "very bloody."

In September, the Carter White House was a decidedly down place.

Kennedy, having privately put the word to the president, was publicly putting out the word that he would soon be running. The daily press summary and the weekly polls were bringing nothing but bad news. Carter's ratings were low and the spirit of his staff even lower.

"People around here were panicky," Hamilton Jordan recalls. "That was something I had to fight internally. . . . One of the main jobs I had in the first few days was calming everybody down. Most of the people here had never been through a campaign before. They just didn't have the confidence I had in our ability to win the nomination."

Another of Carter's senior advisers remembers: "The White House was like the city morgue. It was a very quiet and very depressing place."

However, before the Kennedy forces had even gotten around to the serious task of starting up a campaign, the Carter officials had already made most of their crucial initial strategy decisions. A number of these were made at a two-day political retreat last Aug. 19 and 20 at the spacious Easton, Md., home of Nathan Landow, a Maryland developer and friend of Jordan's. They proved to be crucial to Carter's success.

As the senior officials of the Carter White House and the Carter campaign committee filed into Landow's modern home of glass and old wood, each was given an agenda book numbered and affixed with the name of the designated adviser. The books were not to leave the meeting and were to be returned at its conclusion, the advisers were told. This meant that if anything was to be leaked, it must be committed to memory.

Those meeting Aug. 19, a Saturday, included Jordan, the conference master; Tim Kraft, the campaign manager; Richard Moe, Vice President Mondale's chief of staff (a Mondale aide was carefully invited to every major campaign meeting), and two young aides who had prepared the agenda books, Tom Donilon, who would emerge at age 23 as the chief delegate counter for the campaign, and Tim Smith, the campaign counsel.

Sunday's arrivals included Jody Powell, Rafshoon, Evan Dobbelle, Caddell, White House aides Phil Wise, Sarah Weddington and Rick Hutcheson, Mondale administrative assistant Jim Johnson and a number of the campaign committee's officials.

"It was a watershed meeting for our campaign," one adviser later recalled.

Wise, White House appointments secretary, who ran Carter's Florida campaign in 1976, made a strong pitch for the need to go all out to win the Florida caucus and convention straw vote in the fall of 1979. These events are officially meaningless, but psychologically crucial, he argued; they have nothing to do with electing a single delegate to the convention—but there will be a draft-Kennedy effort in Florida and Carter cannot afford an early showing of defeat.

Jordan had already counseled Carter in a January 1979 memo that he could not afford any early defeats—that the press would magnify them out of proportion. The Carter people concluded that Florida Gov. Bob Graham would be a Carter ally.

They agreed that they would go all out to win the Florida caucus and straw vote. They would invest heavily in money and time. Cabinet and White House officials would descend upon the state like crows on a cornfield. As a result, Carter stayed off what could have been an embarrassing precampaign defeat, winning, by a

\$50,000, to renovate its own Washington headquarters. From March to December 1979, the Carter campaign spent \$2.8 million. The Kennedy campaign spent nearly as much in two months.

Throughout the fall, the president kept in touch with his campaign largely through weekly meetings that were never part of his officially disclosed schedule, but which were held at about 5:30 p.m. in the Treaty Room of the Old Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House.

The president would nominally preside, but in fact Jordan directed the flow of discussion. "Hamilton was the facilitator," one senior adviser explained. Those attending included Rosalynn Carter, the vice president, Robert S. Strauss, Powell, Rafshoon, Caddell, Kraft and, at times, Weddington.

Throughout October, Carter and Jordan were invariably optimistic about the prospects for defeating Kennedy, even when the moods of most of those at the mid-levels of the White House were ranging from pessimism to panic.

During one meeting, the campaign advisers were talking about how tight the campaign budget was. "Don't forget, it has to last until June 3," one of them said. Jordan interrupted: "Ridiculous! We've got to go heavy at the outset. If we do, it'll all be over early."

On Oct. 21, Carter ventured into the heart of Camelot to address the dedication of the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library in Boston. He had accepted the invitation during the summer, based on the advice of Jordan. Jordan's recommendation was based upon a hard calculation of 1980 politics, not 1960 sentiment. If Carter said he would be there, Jordan advised, Kennedy would not dare start up his formal campaign before then.

Carter, usually an unimpressive public speaker, gave a performance at the library dedication so strong that it impressed even the most skeptical of the Kennedy partisans.

On Nov. 4, the U.S. Embassy and its personnel in Tehran were seized. The nature of the Carter presidency changed markedly and so did the mood of those meetings in the Treaty Room.

"A change came over the president — you could see it and you could feel it," said one of the regular attendees. "You could feel that he wasn't paying attention at times. Sometimes he would be just distant and sometimes he would interject to ask, 'How long is this meeting going to take?'"

But two days after the embassy in Iran was seized, Carter, still trailing badly in the polls, agreed to debate his opponents for the Democratic nomination — an unprecedented move for an incumbent president.

On Dec. 29, with the Soviets having invaded Afghanistan, with the Iranian crisis continuing, but with Carter having overtaken Kennedy in the polls, the president withdrew from the debate. His decision not to debate would be made into an issue that would last the rest of the campaign — Kennedy would see to that — but it would not seriously hurt Carter.

Carter had declared at the time that he could not debate or campaign actively because the crises in Iran and Afghanistan required his constant attention and decisionmaking. And his aides put out an additional, profile-in-courage explanation that Carter did this despite the pleas of his political advisers to press on with the debate for the good of the Carter campaign.

But that was not really the case.

One of his most senior advisers now concedes that, indeed, the crises alone did not prevent Carter from debating. The president actually could have continued campaigning through January and into February, he says, which is when the negotiations with Iran reached a crucial stage that required

Carter's Tack: Thinking Positive, Acting Negative

CARTER, From A8

frequent (almost daily) presidential consultations and decisions.

And other advisers concede that at least some of the president's political advisers were counseling then that there was a strong political case to be made for not debating or campaigning now that Carter had taken the lead in the polls. Caddell, Rafshoon and Powell are said to have held that view, while the top campaign officials, Strauss and Kraft, plus White House domestic policy chief Stuart Eizenstat, were urging Carter to go through with the debate. Jordan is portrayed as not having pressed strongly for Carter to debate, even though he is said to have feared that the Des Moines Register could cause political damage to Carter in the upcoming Iowa caucuses, if the president withdrew.

Ultimately, the decision was Carter's. One senior adviser, in explaining the view of those who counseled that there was political advantage in pulling out of the debate, says:

"Things were going well for us in the polls. My argument . . . was that by being president, by leading, he could do more for himself than by

campaigning . . . We had nothing to gain by Carter debating."

And another senior adviser, asked what the central reason was for Carter's decision not to debate, offered a somewhat more succinct explanation. He said:

"F-- the fat rich kid."

EPILOGUE: The president's advisers decided to bolster public understanding of Carter's decision to withdraw from the debate with a bit of political gamesmanship. The idea, according to several senior advisers, was Powell's.

Powell wrote a memo to the president that was intended for public consumption. The two-page document, which was then leaked to The Los Angeles Times, outlined arguments of Carter's political advisers, supposedly urging him to go through with the debate in Iowa. It said that these were the consensus views of Powell, Jordan, Strauss, Kraft and Eizenstat.

(Powell offers a minor variation; he says he initially wrote the document as a genuine internal memo and only then did he decide to leak it.)

For added measure, the leaked memo contained a penned notation in Carter's own handwriting, worded more formally than many of the president's comments that are intended strictly for in-house distribution.

Carter had, dutifully written:

"I can't disagree with any of this, but I cannot break from my duties here, which are extraordinary now and ones which only I can fulfill.

"We will just have to take the adverse political consequences (sic) and make the best of it. Right now both Iran and Afghanistan look bad, and will need my constant attention."

Later, asked about the orchestrated memo and the president's notation, Strauss said: "Well, it was somewhat overwritten."

Staff researcher Maralee Schwartz contributed to this report.

• NEXT: Protest vote is born

Rise and Fall of the Protest Vote

By Martin Schram

Washington Post Staff Writer

The dignitaries in the Treaty Room strategy session are conducting themselves with all the decorum of Shriners in convention.

The president, the vice president, the first lady, and their highest echelon of advisers are celebrating the Illinois primary blowout of the night before—it will be Carter 163 delegates, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy just 16—with backslaps and belly laughs.

Jimmy Carter is cheerily demanding to know why his crack team allowed Kennedy to win even those few delegates. Robert S. Strauss is talking about how they are going to get Kennedy out of the race now once and for all. Patrick Caddell is passing out sheets of paper with the latest poll results for next week's primary state.

The room falls silent as those assembled read the first sheet, and then the second. They are looking at an unforeseen development that will plague the president for the rest of the campaign: the birth of the anti-Carter protest vote.

All of the public polls have been showing Carter headed for a huge win in New York, the next primary, that would surely mean the end of the Kennedy candidacy. Caddell's figures also show Carter 51 percent, Kennedy just 32.

But Caddell's technique for probing beyond the initial responses with a unique "second vote" question—which has produced the most reliable of all political

The Carter Campaign—III

polling figures this year—shows that Kennedy has actually taken the lead: 43 percent to Carter's 39.

There follows a third figure that is the most amazing of all.

Kennedy holds this lead despite the fact that he is viewed "unfavorably," as opposed to "favorably," by a majority of people. And Carter is trailing even though he is viewed "favorably" by a substantial majority of the people. (The figure is 60 percent "favorable," 38 percent "unfavorable.")

See CARTER, *ibid.*, Col. 1

"Everyone's eyes just popped out," recalls one adviser who was at the meeting. Caddell explains to the president and his advisers that apparently people are now suddenly willing to vote for Kennedy even though they do not care for him. He says that now that people believe that Carter will be the party's nominee, they are focusing on Carter almost exclusively, and they are deciding they do not like what they see.

The "protest vote" proves to be at the heart of what is happening throughout the rest of the Democratic primary campaign of 1980.

For a while it will confound the Carter strategists. They will not find a way of coping with it for several weeks, until they are well into the Pennsylvania primary. Finally, they will neutralize it significantly with a new batch of negative ads created by media adviser Gerald Rafshoon that will focus attention — and doubts — on Kennedy once again. (In the process they will also focus controversy upon Rafshoon.)

But it will come back to afflict Carter once more, at the end of the primary campaign. And in fact, it is probably a harbinger of things to come for Carter in a general election contest against Republican Ronald Reagan.

Understanding the "protest vote" means understanding much about what is going on in this country this year; it means understanding ourselves and the way we work our politics.

Just how the president and his campaign came to view this anti-Carter vote is seen in a study of the internal statistics of Caddell's campaign surveys, some of which have been made available to The Washington Post. They basically show numerically what journalists had been gleaning and writing during their own lengthy interviews during the primaries: that many people just did not like Carter's performance as president. Even though they did not like Kennedy, the more they thought about Carter, the more willing they were to vote for his opponent. Kennedy was most successful when he became brand X.

The Carter campaign of 1980 could not be like the Carter campaign of 1976. This year, Carter had to make his opponent the issue, which is far different from 1976, when he won the nomination mainly by convincing people to like him. He made them view him as trustworthy and decent and so he made them vote for him, not against his opponents.

A glimpse at how the Carter campaign came to cope with this "protest vote" with new negative ads shows how polling and advertising mix in the politics of 1980, and how campaign spending decisions are made. It also offers a marked contrast between the Carter and Kennedy campaign organizations.

For by New York, the Kennedy campaign had mostly run out of money, which greatly limited its polling. And it had been running its advertising at the outset through a consortium of media experts. They produced media results about as successful as the storied committee that tried to assemble a horse — and produced a camel.

New Yorkers had more than just Carter's campaign successes to give them cause to protest his leadership. There was that U.S. vote in the United Nations Security Council for an anti-Israel resolution — quickly followed by that U.S. renunciation of its own vote.


More than one-quarter of New York's Democratic primary voters are Jewish, and Caddell's figures showed that in a 10-day period after the United Nations vote, New York's Jewish voters had shifted from favoring Carter by a 9-point margin to favoring Kennedy by a 17-point margin.

This contributed greatly to Carter's problem in New York, Caddell was saying a week before the vote there, but it could not account for all of it. "It wasn't just the Jews," Caddell says. "It was upstate. It was across-the-board. It was something else."

Caddell was more concerned about what he saw as the larger problem for Carter: that Kennedy could have the lead despite the fact that a majority of the people gave him an "unfavorable" rating. Additional speeches by Carter surrogates were scheduled, and new Carter media spots were aired.

Still, publicly, all signs were pointing to a Carter landslide. By the Friday preceding the Tuesday, March 25 primary, the Louis Harris poll in the New York Daily News was showing Carter with a huge 27-point lead.

Caddell, using his own "second vote" adjustment technique, was coming up with something else. He and his associate, John Gorman, had devised a two-step polling procedure



Patrick Caddell

More than one quarter of New York's Democratic primary voters are Jewish and Caddell's figures showed that in a 10-day period following that United Nations vote, New York's Jewish voters had shifted from favoring Carter by a 9-point margin to favoring Kennedy by a 17-point spread.

which had proven very accurate in this tumultuous year.

First the poll-takers would ask who he or she would vote for. Then they would ask a short series of questions designed to get the person being interviewed to think as intensely about the choice as he would on election day when walking into the voting booth. Then, they would ask the person again, in a "second vote," to choose the candidate he or she would vote for. Invariably, much of Carter's support dropped away in that second vote.

On Friday, Caddell's data were showing that Carter had climbed back to a very narrow lead. But that same day, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance was testifying in Congress that the controversial U.N. resolution vote really had coincided with Carter administration policies after all, an admission that made for stunning front page news in New York on the weekend before the primary election.

Carter's strategists were apoplectic.

Vance's testimony was politically undiplomatic—and potentially disastrous. But also damaging, Caddell felt, was that Friday Harris poll, which the New York Daily News headlined,

"Carter's the One—in a Pollslide." It could fuel the anti-Carter vote.

Sunday, 2 p.m. Caddell is in the kitchen of his home on R Street NW when his associate Gorman calls with the latest results.

"I have some good news and some bad news," Gorman says. "The good news is that we have now seen the most dramatic shift ever in our regression analysis [factors that people view as important when they made their voting decisions]."

"The bad news is that . . . Ted Kennedy has disappeared as a factor in this election. It's Carter versus Carter. And Carter is going to get murdered."

The protest vote has hit with full force. Publicly, the Harris poll is still showing a 20-point Carter lead, but the bottom has fallen out of the president's prospects for a victory in New York that would have meant the end of Kennedy's challenge. On Friday, Caddell had shown Carter with a 4-point lead. On Saturday it was Kennedy who had a 4-point lead. Now, on Sunday, Kennedy's lead has swelled to nine points.

Caddell calls the president at Camp David. He goes over the figures with Carter. He explains how his associates have done this analysis of internal questions to determine what factors are leading people to vote the way they say they will.

Usually, trustworthiness of a candidate is the number one factor—and that has always been a strong plus for Carter. Now, Caddell explains, trustworthiness has "fallen off the charts"; it is not even among the top 12 factors that New Yorkers consider important in the making of their presidential decision.

What comes first is a "protest question" that Caddell has added to his survey. It is a statement read to people by his interviewers: "Carter can't handle the presidency; we would be better off trying a new president." Suddenly, a majority of the New Yorkers are agreeing with this statement; two weeks earlier, a majority were disagreeing with it.

The president listens to all the bad news without comment. When Caddell finishes his hurried presentation there is still silence.

"We'll try to do everything we can," Caddell says.

"Thank you," says the president.

New York and Connecticut turn out to be dual debacles for the president; most pollsters and even the Kennedy camp are stunned by the outcome, which is Kennedy by 18 points in New York and by 5 points in Connecticut.

No longer are the president's advisers thinking about forcing Kennedy out of the race early. Now they are looking thankfully ahead to a respite in the Wisconsin primary. They call it their "safety net."

For the moment, there is no urgency about figuring out how to solve the protest vote problem—for, after New York and Connecticut, people are no longer looking at Carter as a sure winner. Several weeks down the trail, Pennsylvania looms as a potential New York. But for now, Caddell's polls are showing Carter with a comfortable lead in Wisconsin.

This is somewhat of a surprise to Caddell.

Back in the planning stages, he had advocated skipping Wisconsin, contending that the state was simply too liberal, that it would be a Kennedy state. Vice President Mondale had argued that Caddell was wrong, that the state was solid, midwestern and a good Carter state.

Caddell took a poll and came back with a report: "Mondale was absolutely right."

With New York behind them and Pennsylvania ahead, the Carter advisers needed a decisive win in Wisconsin on April 1, as one adviser noted, "to show that we are not in a complete state of collapse."

Campaign—III

Public opinion on Carter's handling of the crisis in Iran had begun to sour and several days before the primary Caddell's surveys showed that Carter's lead was beginning to narrow. "The Iranian thing was clearly a problem," Caddell says. "The president's ratings on his handling of it were declining."

Privately, there were signs that an agreement was near on transferring control of the American hostages out of the hands of the militants. But publicly, things took a turn for the worse when: Iran went public with what it said was a message from Carter that was apologetic in tone; and next, press secretary Jody Powell issued what seemed to be a denial that any message had been sent to Iran's leaders; but then Swiss officials said they had indeed delivered some type of message from Carter. Powell tried to clarify that he had been saying was that no apologetic message had been sent, but the effort seemed mostly to be making the worst of a bad thing.

The Carter officials were desperate to turn things around. The president personally met with a group of newspaper representatives, and later talked with television network anchorpersons as well, to let it be known that agreement seemed near.

And on election day in Wisconsin, the president summoned reporters to his office just after 7 a.m.—just in time for the network morning news shows—to proclaim that the latest statement from Iran that morning was a "positive step."

The resulting good news did the political trick, short term.

"When it was made clear over the weekend that there was going to be some progress, that bumped the race up for us," Caddell says. "It went from a lead of 15 to 18 points to a win of about 30 points."

"Wisconsin was the only state where we ever got the undecided to go for us in the end."

But there are some members of Carter's highest council who feel that there were also long-term setbacks to that last-minute attempt at election day dramatics.

"The bad news is that Ted Kennedy has disappeared as a factor in this election. It's Carter versus Carter. And Carter is going to get murdered."

"The president decided that he wanted to do it—and now Jody is kicking himself for going along with it instead of thinking about it and stopping it," says one senior adviser. "We paid a price for that—a real price, especially as far as our relations with reporters are concerned. That 7 a.m. thing crossed the line. Carter no longer seemed decent and honorable, but manipulative. Ironically, it probably had no impact—usually it takes a 24-hour gestation period for big events to have an impact on the public."

The president's strategists are locked in a major strategy dispute.

It is Saturday, and with the overkill of Wisconsin behind them, the Carter campaign's board of directors has just heard Caddell's latest analysis, which is that the April 22 Pennsylvania primary is looking "very New Yorky."

All of the public polls are showing a huge Carter lead in Pennsylvania, and Caddell's "first response" figures are

also showing that: Carter 53 percent, Kennedy 30. But his "second vote" response in those same interviews shows that there already has been a dramatic reversal, with Kennedy leading Carter, 43 to 40 percent.

Once again, "trustworthiness" is not being listed as a major factor in people's decisions. And people are agreeing in large numbers with the "protest" statement of Caddell's questionnaire that it is time to try a new president.

Tim Kraft argues that the Carter campaign should write off Pennsylvania. His argument—at that meeting attended by Jordan, Rafshoon, Caddell, and campaign officials Tim Smith and Tim Finchem—is that the campaign will soon be hard pressed for money and hard pressed to stay within the legal spending limits of the primary campaign.

Pennsylvania is a lost cause; don't waste money on it, Kraft says. Rafshoon vehemently disagrees.

The advisers have already concluded that they will mostly concentrate their field operations money on the caucus states and the media money on the primary states. Rafshoon argues that with a good media plan, Pennsylvania can be saved. There are too many delegates at stake to surrender them to Kennedy at this late stage.

Jordan quietly keeps his own counsel. He will spend a couple of days asking if Carter aides think it would be smart to write off Pennsylvania; he seems to be siding with Kraft. But his decision will be to spend for the media plan and trust Rafshoon to deliver.

Rafshoon takes a camera crew to Pittsburgh and begins interviewing people on the subject of what they think of Kennedy. The idea, he concedes, is far from original.

"I remembered what Ford was able to do to us at the end of the 1976 campaign with those man-in-the-street ads," Rafshoon says, recalling the devastating ads that featured Georgians saying why they were going to vote against Carter.

It is early morning in Pittsburgh. As Rafshoon is working with his camera crew, he notices a middle-aged woman loitering to the side, studying him suspiciously. Finally she approaches, a sparkle in her eye.

"I know you," she says. "You're you're . . ."

"Dan Rather!" says the short, mop-haired Rafshoon, who is to Dan Rather what Woody Allen is to Sir Laurence Olivier.

"I knew it!" the woman beams, shaking his head before walking away.

The ads Rafshoon produces are negative—but then again, so is Kennedy's daily stump rhetoric.

Rafshoon's ads show different people saying that Kennedy is "too liberal . . . a big spender . . . wrong on welfare . . ." The closest thing to a personal attack is one commercial which deals only subtly with character:

MAN: I don't think Kennedy's qualified to be president.

WOMAN: I don't think he has any credibility.

WOMAN: I don't believe him.

WOMAN: I just don't think he's the man for the job.

MAN: I don't trust him.

WOMAN: You're taking a chance with Kennedy.

WOMAN: I'm going to vote for Carter because I think he's the best qualified.

MAN: Carter's got his hands full with Kennedy. He's got his hands full with the country and the economic situation. He's got his hands full with Iran and Afghanistan. He's not doing a bad job.

MAN: Between Kennedy and Carter, I would definitely go with Carter myself. I trust him.

The ads spoke to the perceptions of Kennedy that people already had in their minds," Rafshoon says, taking care to always refer to them as the

man-in-the-street ads, never the negative ads. "We needed to remind people, that's all."

The ads begin running during the last week of the Pennsylvania campaign. Kennedy has been steadily lengthening his lead in the Caddell polls; Friday's "second vote" figures give him a 9-point lead over Carter.

But significantly, they also show a sharp increase in the number of people who now believe that Kennedy can win the nomination. In the next couple of days, voters begin expressing concerns about Kennedy's character.

Like those unpleasant television commercials where the Roloids neutralize stomach acid by the pitcherful, the Carter people believe they are watching Rafshoon's ads neutralizing the anti-Carter vote right before their eyes.

Caddell's polls are showing that people are once again listing "trustworthiness" as the main factor in their election day decision-making—just as



Gerald Rafshoon

"I remember what Ford was able to do to us at the end of the 1976 campaign with those man-in-the-street ads" — those devastating ads that featured Georgians saying why they were going to vote against Carter.

it used to be in Carter's good old days when he was winning big. A majority of the people are now agreeing with the statement that Kennedy is a big spender. Caddell's last poll, finished the Sunday before Tuesday's election, shows Carter and Kennedy dead even, at 40 percent.

That is just the way it is on Tuesday night, when Kennedy wins by a whisker. The reality of it is that Carter — whose aides almost had him abandoning the state — comes away with half of Pennsylvania's 185 delegates.

And added to the landslide victory in the Missouri caucuses the same day, Carter comes away from a day that could have been a disaster by making up all of the ground he lost in that New York-Connecticut debacle.


"Jerry's negative ads made it possible," Caddell will later say. "They made Kennedy the issue again."

The month of May will give Carter a delegate cushion that will provide crucial comfort as he goes through what has become his traditional, quadrennial June 3 tail-first crash landing. In 1980, as in 1976, he wins in Ohio but loses in New Jersey and California.

"Luckily," Caddell says, "the month of May made June 3 irrelevant."

NEXT: Leaving the Rose Garden

Departing the Rose Garden Without a Strategy



HAMILTON JORDAN
... bringing authority to campaign

'Nothing Has Ever Come Easy ...'

Last of a series

By Martin Schram
Washington Post Staff Writer

Hamilton Jordan, still in his jogging clothes, is doing a couple of miles around his spacious office as he talks about the campaign that lies ahead.

He walks a couple of laps around his conference table and detours to the huge window that starts almost at the floor and stretches almost to the ceiling. He steps into the window sill and studies the elite traffic on the private thoroughfare below.

"Nothing has ever come easy to Jimmy Carter," he

The Carter Campaign—IV

says. "It never has, and I guess it never will. But we're going to win."

The president's chief of staff and chief strategist had been asked about what all of Washington has come to call "The Anderson Factor"—how John B. Anderson's independent candidacy will affect the November election.

For months, the president's advisers had been hoping that the general election campaign would come down to Republican Ronald Reagan versus Democrat Jimmy Carter.

But the Anderson candidacy has roughed what once

See CARTER, A6, Col. 1

Exiting the Garden Without a Strategy

CARTER, From A1

seemed like a smooth-sailing dream by introducing new complications and uncertainty.

"Anderson can hurt Reagan more than it hurts us before it is all over," Jordan says. But others in the Carter inner circle are not as sure.

Jordan goes on to recite accurately the litany of Carter's history of comebacks from political adversity: how he came from obscurity in 1976 to win the presidency that people had once laughed at him for seeking; how he came from seemingly sure defeat this past year to beat a Kennedy who once seemed a prohibitive favorite.

"It's never easy for Carter," he says again.

In 1980, as in 1976, the Carter campaign laid out its strategy early and followed it religiously. In 1980, as in 1976, the Carter campaign won with a formula of what pollster Patrick Caddell four years ago defined with precision: "Skill and luck."

The president amassed a majority of the Democratic convention delegates this year in large measure because his advisers followed the blueprint laid out a year and a half ago by Jordan.

The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Iran gave him a timely opportunity to gain points for leadership, as Americans rallied behind their president in time of crisis. Only later in the campaign did it prove to be a political liability.

The Carter advisers got where they are today by following the blueprint: they won early in the South, for example, and in fact piled up huge delegate margins there with relatively little expenditure of campaign funds.

But that blueprint did not carry them further than June 3, the last day of the primary season. Despite all their planning, the president's advisers have not come up with a strategy to take care of the unforeseen situation they are faced with today: getting Sen. Edward M. Kennedy out of the race that Carter seems to have numeri-

A senior Kennedy adviser says: "Kennedy asked three times, 'Will you agree to a debate?' And three times, Carter wouldn't give him a flat answer. Instead he suggested the platform as a substitute."

Both sides agree that at one point, Carter said: "Well, if we had this debate, would you then abide by the choice of the convention and support the nominee?" And that Kennedy essentially did not give a direct response, but said that he still had a number of questions about the economy and so on.

One of Carter's advisers gets to the heart of the problem when he says:

"I can't say that if Kennedy had said that yes he would support the nominee if they had this debate, whether the president was then prepared to go on with it."

So the meeting ends to no one's satisfaction, but that is a problem that is Carter's, not Kennedy's. With his delegate majority amassed and his convention victory virtually assured, it is Carter who must look ahead to the prospects that lie ahead of the August nomination.

The president faces the prospect of trying to campaign in the fall at the head of a party that is deeply disaffected with his leadership. It is not just a problem of the Republicans rallying around Ronald Reagan in a summertime lovefest while the Democrats struggle through a summertime slugfest. At least that would get some of the Democratic juices flowing for the fall. It is instead a problem of party-wide malaise.

The disaffection among the Democrats runs deep and wide and Carter needs the support of Kennedy liberals in the fall. For he is facing a united Grand Old Party in which even liberals like Jacob R. Javits have decided to duck under the Reagan umbrella in the hopes that there will be a quick end to the Carter reign.

But Carter has opted against pressing actively for a reconciliation with Kennedy—even though such a gesture would be grounded not in a sense



Associated Press

heads.

"Carter does not have to grovel to Kennedy now," said one of the president's most senior advisers. And the president apparently was determined to do nothing of the sort when he met with his principal adversary, Kennedy, at the White House last Thursday.

It is not that they don't trust each other, but the two sides do have their healthy doubts, which perhaps is why, as Kennedy is making his way down the White House hallway to meet with the president, one of his aides suddenly produces a small tape recorder and palms it toward his boss.

"You just press this button and . . ."

There are Carter people present and they think that is a look of incredulity crossing Kennedy's face as he hastily rejects the machine with a brush of the hand, probably hoping that the incident will go unnoticed.

It is clear, from the way the Carter advisers later recount the story, that they regard this incident before the meeting as far more amusing than anything that transpired in the political session itself.

Both sides tell essentially the same story, each with its own partisan spin. Says a senior Carter adviser: "Kennedy had no interest in anything other than a debate. That's all he cared about. And whenever the president brought up any other subjects, Kennedy got him around to a debate again." Carter talked about trying to reach an accommodation in naming people to the party platform committee and on reaching agreement on the issues. Kennedy talked about a debate.

sense of personal political preservation.

Carter could have laid the groundwork for this back when he decided to end his Rose Garden strategy and come out to campaign in order to assure a June 3 victory in Ohio.

The Carter advisers concede in interviews that they never had a strategy of reconciliation when Carter decided to announce the end of his self-imposed political isolation. They had only a tactic of public relations: the president had planned to say at his April 29 news conference that he felt he could now come out to do some campaigning, what with the hostage situation not resolved but instead apparently hopelessly out of his control.

But no one asked him about it during his news conference. So the next day, White House aides planted the question with one of their own kind, Charles Manatt, chairman of the Democratic National Committee's National Finance Council, who was attending a party session with Carter.

Manatt begged the question: can you please come out and campaign to help us now? The president said sure. He then ad-libbed that he could do it because all of his problems are "manageable" now—his advisers still grimace at their boss' choice of words.

By exiting the Rose Garden without a strategy, the Carter advisers surrendered a crucial initiative. It was predictable that Kennedy's first response would be that now they could have that debate that Carter had canceled back in December, and it was predictable that Kennedy would also set some conditions that Carter could not accept.

The Carter people summarily re-

jected the Kennedy debate challenge, which of course has only made Kennedy all the more insistent.

The Carter advisers never tried to come up with a way out of the situation. They could have, for example, proposed that Carter and Kennedy meet to discuss the issues before television cameras in a non-confrontational, parlor-like setting. Or they could have suggested a similar setting but perhaps with representatives of the Democratic Platform Committee there serving as either an audience or as participants in a town-like shaping of the party platform.

But they did none of the above. "Jimmy Carter just is not about to debate Teddy Kennedy" one Carter adviser explains. And so the Democratic estrangement remains.

Carter faces in the fall a problem that is a mix of disaffection, recession and Anderson: Most of the nation's Democrats will not feel enthusiastic rallying around a president who must defend economic policies that have produced high unemployment, and who will find his economic explanations alien to their partisan ears. And a number of them may take comfort by voting for John Anderson.

For public consumption, the Carter strategists talk a good game about how "Anderson will self-destruct . . . Anderson is almost as conservative as Reagan."

But privately, a number of the highest echelon of Carter advisers have become quite convinced that Anderson may cost Carter the election in the fall.

Gallup Polls are a reflection of nationwide popular voting, but general elections are not decided that way. In

November, every state is winner-take-all and it is the total electoral votes amassed state-by-state that count.

So the Carter strategists have taken a look, state by state, at the fall election with just Carter versus Reagan, and again in a three-way race between Carter, Reagan and Anderson. States were grouped according to being reasonably safe for each candidate, or in doubt. The results surprised even some of the more savvy of that politically attuned inner circle.

In 1976, Carter won with 297 electoral votes, just 27 more than was needed, which meant that a shift of just one big state—New York, or a couple of mid-sized states—would have elected Ford instead of Carter.

In a two-way race this year in the Carter camp's own estimates, Carter would fare very well against Reagan.

But when Anderson was added, many of those states that were once considered safe for Carter were now plunged into doubt. The concern was that votes of liberals and moderate Republicans who cannot accept Reagan could go to Anderson. This could result in such 1976 Carter states as New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio, now shifting to Reagan.

The addition of Anderson may also make it difficult for Carter to capture some states that in 1976 went to Ford, but which might well be his if Reagan were his lone opposition. Among these states are Connecticut, New Jersey, Michigan and Illinois.

Hamilton Jordan and Gerald R. Shaheen and Patrick Caddell and all of the others who mapped the plans that led to Jimmy Carter's victories this year are looking to the fall now even

as they are faced with a Kennedy who won't quit.

They succeeded most of all in making Kennedy the issue of the primary campaign of 1980. And they are looking now to make Reagan the issue for the fall.

"Remember this," says Hamilton Jordan. "I know about what can happen in this state and that state. But I also know that Jimmy Carter always comes back — and he always comes through in the clutch. That is what I believe."

EPILOGUE: They have kept the secret carefully for months, the president and his pollster, ever since those winter days of January when Kennedy was at his lowest.

As he sat in the Oval Office, Caddell laid out the results of a poll based on open-ended questions. It showed, he explained, that people can see Kennedy—despite all of his current problems and the re-arranging of Chappaquiddick—as their president. And they can be very comfortable with him sitting in that desk, making decisions.

"The president was more surprised than I have ever seen him," Caddell recalls. They agreed, that day, that the results would not be shared, not even with the staff, lest they leak. For Kennedy was launched a series of strident attacks against the president then, and they did not want him to switch to a more statesmanlike strategy. Said Carter:

"I learned this painfully back when I tried attacking Jerry Ford [in 1976]—people don't like you attacking an incumbent president."

Staff researcher Maralee Schwartz contributed to this article.

Roger Sandler

1601 NORTH BEVERLY DRIVE
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90210
(213) 275-9837
(202) 296-0070 WASH., D.C.

PHOTO JOURNALISM

13 June 1980

Mr. Ed Gray
Mr. Ed Meese
REAGAN FOR PRESIDENT

Dear Gentlemen;

Thank you very much for allowing me to submit the following proposal to you regarding my continuing service to the Campaign. Attached to this letter are detailed lists of my work and coverage for the Reagans and the Reagan Campaign over the past twelve months.

From my perspective, the role of the Campaign Photographer is very, very important. He can further the goals of the Campaign by providing a reliable source of good photographs for the Campaign to use and distribute and in assuring an insightful and complete photographic documentation of this candidate and this Campaign year. And, as I have done in the past, he can help place special pictures in the public domain to accompany reflective news essays, and enhance the good will of the Campaign by taking and sending-out photographs of the Reagans to supporters and friends along the Campaign Trail --- making sure that those that should be autographed are so taken care of.

However, in order to assure that this role is properly carried-out, I think that the responsibilities and access must be clearly defined and communicated within the Campaign so as to avoid further misconceptions and misunderstandings. I am sorry that there has been aggravation in the recent past, largely because of the lack of such understanding on everyone's part.

Though coverage must always be with good discretion, it must also be with assured confidence. Being different in nature and purpose, the Campaign's photography should be most sensitive, most perceptive. It is very much part of the role of the Campaign Photographer to know and anticipate when and where the best pictures are to be taken and how much time is needed to capture the most important occasions of history. I have tried to do just that over the past year and thereby do justice to the purpose of my covering the Campaign.

Far more voters will see photographs of Ronald Reagan and his wife this year than will have the opportunity to meet them or see them in person. Photographs are of course more lasting than film, and can do a great deal to personalize the Reagans to the country. I would hope that everyone would come to understand how gracious, sensitive, and vital the Reagans are as human beings.

Roger Sandler

13 June 1980

Page 2

Thus far, my photographs have been used within the Campaign in the following ways:

- 1) In Campaign Advertising as part of the national campaign poster, the cover of the national and regional brochures, and in the Primary TV ads.
- 2) As illustration for RFP and Republican Party newsletters.
- 3) In response to the request for pictures by constituents.
- 4) For distribution to various publications and news organizations.
- 5) In distribution to various RFP offices around the country.
- 6) As gifts to members of the traveling press corps, the Secret Service, staff members, local supporters, volunteers, local law enforcement personnel, airline crews, and personal friends of the Reagans.
- 7) Office decoration at the national and California RFP headquarters.
- 8) Governor and Mrs. Reagan's personal requests.

The work of filling orders; updating the RFP photo file; cataloging photographs and transparencies; providing for photographs to be retouched and duplicated in the best possible quality has been a considerable responsibility in terms of both time and attention. It has often required the contribution of an assistant working with me, and yet I foresee that between now and November the requests and demand for photographs from within the Campaign will be far more extensive. I am confident, nonetheless, of keeping ahead of this part of the job.

In terms of compensation, I would like to volunteer my photography services, but ask that a monthly fee be paid to cover the expenses of servicing the Campaign's needs and filling its orders. In addition, I think it fair that all expenses related to travel and photography (film, processing, etc.) be covered by the Campaign. I am prepared to forego all news assignments per se, so as not to compete against any members of the news media on a daily basis. I would however appreciate the right to sale photographs of events on the Campaign Trail that any member of the news media also covered and to contribute to retrospectives and overviews of the Reagans and the Reagan Campaign. This privilege would of course be in lieu of normal salary.

In addition, I would like to propose that no photographs of mine be used or published in marketable items sold for profit, without further, agreed upon, compensation to me. As is presently the case, copyright to the photo files that I keep for the Campaign's use would remain mine, but both the Campaign and the Reagans will retain unlimited access to the material therein. Furthermore, as has also been the case over the past year, photographs distributed by the Campaign should appear with my photo credit.

Thank you very much. I hope that this all works out. For my part, I promise to do my very best;

With my appreciation,



Master List of RFP

Print & slide orders

minor additions to be made

Shoot Date of Order	By Whom	Subject	Order	Use
July 30, 1979	Mike Deaver	RR - e O & H '76 Carpin	24 B/W 8x10's 16 Color 8x10's set of B/W proofs	RR Files RFP office
July 12 '79	Mike Deaver	RR & staff briefing	40 B/W 8x10's 10 Color 8x10's 7 Color 8x10's mated set of slides set of B/W proofs	RFP Files Give Aways
July 19 '79	Mike Deaver	Trip: A. Calif.	9 B/W 8x10's 2 Color 8x10's set of proofs set of slides	RFP Files give away
Aug 10 '79	O & H	Trip: A. Calif.	2 B/W 8x10	Press Release
Aug 10 '79	Mike Deaver		4 Color 8x10 4 B/W 8x10	RR Files Give Aways
Aug 29 '79	Mike Deaver	7/12 Briefing	1 Color 8x10	MO
Aug 29 '79	O & H	Various	set of B/W proofs set of slides	review review
Sept '80	O & H	Mike Deaver	2 B/W 8x10's 1 B/W proofs	Release release

Date of Order ^{Ship of on}	By whom	Subject	order	use
Sept 26 '79	RNC	RR e put. Fund.	110 B/W 8X10	Give Aways
Sept 15 '79	Mike Deaver Mrs. Reagan	Trip: San Diego	15 B/W 8X10 2 Color 8X10	RFP files NR
Oct 4 '79	Mike Deaver	RR various	set of proofs set of slides	
Oct 31 '79	RFP - Nyc	9/30/79 Trip: East Coast	168 B/W 8X10's	give aways
Oct 31 '79	Robin Gray	RR, NR e LA Hyts	10 B/W 8X10's	RFP Files
Nov 2 '79	Gary Taylor	Trip: Boston	2 B/W 11X14 5 B/W 8X10	RFP - Calif. ad
Nov 2 '79	Mrs. Reagan RS for Ad Agency	Trip: Boston Trip: Boston	3 Color 8X10 5 Color 8X10	RR & NR samples
Nov 9 '79	Robin Gray	various	168 B/W 8X10	press files
Nov 7. '79	Elaine	Trip: N Calif.	2 B/W 8X10	release
Dec 4 '79	Pete Hanford	Trip #1	35 slide presentation	review
Dec 5. '79	Mike Wallace Henry Reagan	Trip #1	slide selection	Christmas card
Dec 13	Robin Gray	Trip #1	6 B/W 8X10	Wash. News letter

Date of
Order / Shoot

Trip #1

By Whom	Subject	Order	Use
Mrs. Reagan	R Family	6 8x10 color C	personal
Mrs. Reagan	RR, NR	3 8x10 color inted	personal
Mrs. Reagan	RR, NR	5 8x10 BW	personal
Mrs. Reagan	NR + PR	2 5x7 color	personal
Mrs. Reagan	NR + RR	15 8x10 color R	review
Mrs. Reagan	Trip #1	4 8x10 color C	personal
		2 5x7 BW	

Nov 26 '79

Pete Hamford	Trip #1 RR Commercial Taping	16 8x10 BW	O&H files give away
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Nov 8 '79

Ray Hoitman	Trip #1	24 8x10 BW	RFP newsletter
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Dec 8 '79

Pete Hamford	Trip #1	30 8x10 BW inted	advertising
		6 11x14 BW inted	advertising
			RFP office

Dec 20 '79

Ray e RFP lab	Trip #1	4 8x10 BW inted	office
		2 11x14 BW inted	office
		1 8x10 color inted	office

Dec 28 '79

CT. Cline Co	Trip #1	23 8x10 BW	advertising
		2 8x10 BW	advertising
		164 slides	advertising

Dec 28 '79

RS / JL	Trip #1	5 BW 8x10 retouching	duplication
Mrs. Reagan	Trip #1	3 BW converted for color	duplication

Date of Order	By Whom	Subject	Order	use
Dec 15 '79	Jery Carson	R Family	1 Blw 8x10	A.H. Mansfield
Dec 16, '79	Jery Naylor	Trip: Boston	9 Color 8x10	Special envs }
		Trip: Wash D.C.	3 Color 11x14	
			1 Blw 11x14	
Dec 11 '79	C-T-Clyne Co.	Various	9 Blw 8x10's	review
			9 Blw 8x10's mtd	review
Trip #1	RS.	Trip #1	6 Blw 11x14	RFP
			4 Color 8x10 mtd	RFP
Jan 3	Jim Lake	Staff meeting	5 Blw 8x10	give away
Jan 4 '80	Robin Gray	various	20 Blw 8x10's	release
	Robin Gray	Trip #1	50 slide dupes	release
Jan '80	Robin Gray	various	126 Blw 8x10	release
Jan 29 '80	J.L.	Trip #1	5 Blw 8x10	duplicate
			5 Blw retouch	duplicate

Date of Order	By Whom	Subject	Order	use
Jan 15 '80	Helen - NYC	RR - NYC 1115	18 3/W 8X10	give away
Jan 22 '80	June Payne - NYC	RR & MA Rabb	2 3/W 8X10	give away
Jan 28 '80	Louie Koelen	Trip: East Coast	1 8/W 8X10 mtd 1 Color 8X10	give away give away
Jan '80	Carol McClain	Mrs. Reagan	60 3/W 8X10's 15 3/W 8X10's	give away
Feb 2 '80	Jay Naylor	RR Bir Hady	Slide Steer 8 color dupes	— —
Feb 8 '80 more	Joe Holmes	Mrs. Reagan RR & NR	15 3/W 8X10 15 3/W 8X10	release release

Date of Order	By Whom	Subject	Order	use
March 31 '80	Robin Gray	Mrs. R - Trip #1	100 B/W 8x10	files
		RR - casual	250 B/W 8x10	
		RR - portrait	250 B/W 8x10	
		N.H. Debates	10 B/W 8x10	
		RR - airplane	25 B/W 8x10	
March '80	Helene Van Dam	RR - NYC	2 B/W 8x10	give away
March 31 '80	Robin Gray	RR - portrait	60 color dyes	files
		NR - portrait	25 color dyes	
April 1 '80	Mrs - Reyan	The Campy's Trail	B/W print selection	review
			Color slide selection	review
	Mrs - Reyan	NR + RR	5 color 8x10	personal
	Mrs. Reyan	RR, NR, PR	2 color 3x5	personal
			1 color 5x7	personal
April 2 '80	Robin Gray	RR - portrait	12 color dyes	files
April 14 '80	Robin Gray	RR + NR	50 B/W prints	files
		RR	50 B/W prints	
		NR	25 color dyes	
		RR + NR	25 color dyes	

Date of Order	By Whom	Subject	Order	Use
April, 1980	By Buchen	By Buchen	2 8x10 B/W	release
April '80	Loreli Kuder	Loreli Kuder	2 8x10 B/W	release
May 12, 1980	Pete Hartford	RR-Enye '78	16 B/W 8x10's	O+H
June 2, 1980	RS/R Gray	retouching RR - 3 NR - 3 Family - 1	master proof print & retouching for duplication & conversion	General & all used

Master listing of photographs
sent out or ordered by individuals
along the Campaign Trail.

to Shoot
Trip
July 17, '79

Locale	Person	Order	Cost	Date Sent	Rg by
N. Calif.	Cassandra Brotius	2 8X10 B/W	\$8.50	1/27/80	MD
	Boat Captain	1 8X10 Color	\$5.00	11/25/79	MD
	Mrs. Ann Stadler	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50	11/20/79	MD
	Denis LaBlanc	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50		
San Diego	Policemen	2 8X10 B/W	\$8.50	✓	DF
San Diego	Mike Couts	1 8X10 Color	5.00	✓	NR

Trip
Sept 15, '79

B. H.	Contributors	110 8X10 B/W	\$450.00	11/7/79	MD
	Furchauser & Cummings				

Trip
Sept 27-30

Penn	Mary N. Pegg	1 8X10 B/W		11/27/79	J
Penn	Mr. Brown	1 8X10 B/W		11/27/79	J
Penn	Mr. Gelba	1 8X10 B/W		11/27/79	J
N.H.	Local worker	1 8X10 Color			Judy Caban Judy Caban
N.H.	Local official	1 8X10 B/W			
Indiana	RNC Women	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50		Kinder
		1 8X10 Color	\$5.50		Kinder
NYC	Mike Evans	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50	✓	RS

NYC	Local Contributors	170 8X10 B/W			MD
N.J.					MD

Oct 30 '79

	Dick Allen	2 8X10 B/W	\$8.00		DA
LA	Bob Dunn CBS	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50		RS
	Marty Anderson	3 8X10 B/W	\$12.00		MA

Nov 2 '79

Boston	Celeba & Reagan	7 8X10 Color			NR
	RR & NR	3 8X10 Color			NR

Date of Shoot	Locale	Person	Order	Cost	Date Sent	By
v 10, '79	Blight to NYC	Donna Seier	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		J
		Thomas Holte	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		J
		Tom De Fazio	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		J
		TWA pilot	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		DF
v 10 '79	NYC	Thomas Bagallo	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		
v 12 '79	NYC	Walter Kirby + NY PD	5 8x10 B/W	21.00	4/80	DF
v 12, '79	NYC	Chauffeur	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		DF
v 12 '79	NYC	Bob Sheffer CBS	1 8x10 ^{mt} Color	7.25		JL
		Tom Brokaw ABC	1 8x10 ^{mt} Color	7.25		JL
		Barbra Walters ABC	1 8x10 ^{mt} Color	7.25		JL
v 13 '79	NYC	Meese Family	4 8x10 ^{mt/dup} Color	30.00		EM
		NY Senator Knowe	2 8x10 B/W	8.00		EM
v 14 '79	Wash D.C.	Senator Lowell	2 8x10 B/W	4.50		NR
		Sen & Mrs Schmitz	1 8x10 ^{mt/dup} Color	8.50		NR
v 14 '79	plane	Frank Johnson	1 8x10 B/W	4.00		JL
	}	Dennis Brack	1 8x10 B/W	4.00		JL
		Bob Jennings	1 8x10 B/W	4.00		JL
		Dick Beiglotz	1 8x10 B/W	4.00		JL
		U.A. crew	4 8x10 B/W	18.00		DF
v 14	N.H.	local symphon	2 8x10 B/W	8.50		Carmen
	A.H.	2 local Police	2 8x10 B/W	8.50		DF
	N.H.	1 local Patm	1 8x10 Color	6.50	1/21/80	RR
13-17	plane	Secret Service	15 8x10 B/W	60.00		KJ
v 13	NYC	Reign Family	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	Dec 18	Carmen

Shoot	Locale	Person	Order	Cost	Date Sent	Reply
17	Oxlands	Walt - AP	1 8x10 BW	\$4.50	6/80	RS
	plane	Jay Lubanow	1 8x10 BW	✓		JL
	}	Lou Canon	1 8x10 BW	✓		JL
		Robert - Post ^{3/4}	1 8x10 Color			JL
		Margitt Warren	1 8x10 BW	✓		JL
13-17	Tom #1	Jim Lake	3 ^{noted} 8x10 BW	\$15.00		JL
13-17	Tom #1	Marty Anderson	3 8x10 BW	12.00		MA
12	Nyc	RR Taping	16 8x10 BW	\$64.00		P.H.
15	Chicago	Doug Bendow	1 8x10 BW	\$4.00		
13-17	Tom #1	Dave Fisher	2 8x10 BW	\$8.00		
12	Nyc	Mimi Deaver	1 8x10 BW	\$4.00		
16	Atlanta	Billboard Sign	1 11x14 BW	\$6.50		EM

Date of Shoot	Locate	Person	Order	Cost	Date Sent	By
Oct 30 '79	RFP	Dick Allen	2 8X10 B/W	\$8.00		DA
Dec 11 '79	Van Neys	Frieren	1 11X14 B/W	\$5.50	12/24	RR
			3 8X10 B/W	\$13.50		RR
Dec 20 '79	more peris	RR & NR	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50		RS
Tom #4 Jan 7-10	Jawa	Jon Van Voorse	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50		RS
"	Plane	Dan Blackburn	2 8X10 B/W	\$8.00	6/80	RS
"	S.C.	Mrs. Medalta	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50		DF
Tom #4	plane	UA crew	3 8X10 B/W	\$12.00	✓	DF
Tom #5 Jan 15-19	N.H.	pres - Student body Doffstow High Kim Kwieczny	1 11X14 B/W	\$8.00		
Jan 18 '79	Rye, NY	Walter Caonkita	1 8X10 B/W	\$4.50	1/2/80	JL
		Doug Bodie	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	✓	RS
		S.S.	4 8X10 B/W	18.00	✓	RS
63	LA	NR, RR, PR	2 3x5 Color	\$7.50		NR
Tom #7 Jan 4-10	N.H.	Norton Humphrey	1 8X10 B/W small auto	\$6.50		

Date of Shoot	Locale	Person	Order	Cost	Date Sent	Rg by:
Feb 13, 1980	N.H.	John Webster	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		EM
	N.H.	Mr. Rod Cunningham	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		RS
Feb 16, 1980	N.H.	Central Towers Senior Citizens	1 ^{mted} 8x10 B/W	5.00	—	JL
Feb 16, 1980	N.H.	^{reporter} ABC crew	3 8x10 B/W	13.50	—	JL
Feb 17, 1980	N.H.	Patrolman	3 8x10 B/W	13.50	—	JF
Feb 18, 1980	N.H.	Mr. & Mrs. Gordon Wheeler	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	✓	RS
Feb 18, 1980	N.H.	To N.H. Hpts Student on bus	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	○	EM
Feb 19, 1980	Mass		1 8x10 B/W	4.50	—	Rick A Hean
Feb 19, 1980	N.H.	Joe Harris	2 8x10 B/W	8.00		LH
Feb 20, 1980	Mass	General	1 8x10 B/W	4.00	✓	DA
		Mr & Mrs	1 8x10 B/W	4.00	—	DA
		Long Kemp	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	○	EM
Feb 22, 1980	Fl	Mr. Stanley Hamilton	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		RS
Tom #11 Feb 24	N.H.	Mr. A D'Unso	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		JL RS
Feb 24	N.H.	TKB Frat	1 ^{mted} 8x10 B/W	5.50	✓	RS
		USSS	3 8x10 B/W	14.50	✓	RS
Feb 26	N.H.	Rick A Hean	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		RA
Feb 26	N.H.	Jing Cannon	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	✓	Jing Cannon
	N.H.	Cannon, PH, EM	1 8x10 color	6.50	○	RS

Date of Shoot
 March 11, 1980

Locale	Person	Order	Cost	Date Sent	By
LA	KNXT crew	2 8X10 B/W	8.50	✓	RS
St Louis	St Louis Hawks	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	O	JH
St. Louis	Mrs. Larson	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	✓	RS
St. Louis	Animal Channel	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	✓	JH
Illinois	Mr + Mrs Fung	1 8X10 B/W	4.50		RS
Chicago	Bob Clark - ABC	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	O	RS
N.H. Conn	Mr. + Mrs Frank Margillo	2 8X10 B/W	8.50	—	RS
Nyc	RR	1 11X14 B/W	5.00	✓	MD
	SS	2 8X10 B/W	8.00	✓	RS
Kansas	Lenny Wilos	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	O	LW
Kansas	Mr + Mrs. Mee	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	O	LW
Buffalo, Ny	Corpus Kemp	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	O	RS
Texas	Betty	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	O	RS
Texas	USSS	5 8X10 B/W	22.00	✓	RS
Wisc	John Scott Farm	1 8X10 Color	7.50	O	RS
Wisc	Mrs. Rd. Day	1 8X10 Color	6.50	O	NR
Wisc	Scott Tyler	1 8X10 B/W	4.50	✓	NR

March 14 '80

March 16

March 18

March 19

March 23

March 25

March 25

March 25

March 27

March 28

Date of Shoot	Locale	Person	Order	Cost	Date Sent	By
April 7, 1980	N. Carolina	Gov	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	0	
April 7, 1980	N. Carolina	Max Barber Family	2 8x10 B/W	*9.00		KAC
April 8, 1980	N. Carolina	Kalvin McDowell Family	2 8x10 B/W	9.00		KAC
April 8 '80	Wash D.C.	Dr. Walsh	4 8x10 B/W	9.00		DA
	Wash D.C.	Mr. Strizer	2 8x10 B/W	9.00		DA
4/10	Penn	Mrs. Gov's wife	1 8x10 color	3.00	0	DA
4/16	Penn	USSS	3 8x10 B/W	*12.50	✓	RS
	Penn	Ed Gray	1 8x10 B/W	4.00		
		Dick Andrews	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		
April 17	N. Dakota	USSS	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		RS
	Ill. Ore	Braniff Personnel	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		DF
April 17	Texas	Newsweek	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	✓	RS
		Jim Brady	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	✓	RS
		Time Inc.	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		RS
		Detroit News	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		RS
April 18	Texas	Patrolman	2 8x10 B/W	9.00	✓	RS
		ABC man	1 8x10 color	6.50		DF

Date of Shoot

Locale

Person

Order

Cost

Date Sent

By

April 20

Ohio

Gov Rhodes

1 8x10 color

7.50

0

April 20

Penn

Drew Lewis

1 8x10 ^{mted} B/W

5.00

0

Penn

Senator Baker

1 8x10 color

7.50

0

Penn

Mrs. Halle

1 8x10 B/W

4.50

DA

April 21

Penn

Senator Schuster

1 8x10 B/W

4.50

0

April 22

Indiana

Suzie Andrews

1 8x10 B/W

4.50

0

Molly Nolan

1 8x10 B/W

4.50

✓

RS

Hanna Storen

1 8x10 B/W

4.50

✓

RS

April 23

Texas

Jim Brady

2 8x10 B/W

8.00

✓

JB

Ed Gray

1 8x10 B/W

4.00

✓?

RS

1 11x14 B/W

5.00

✓?

RS

April 24

Texas

Gov Clener

1 8x10 ^{mted} color

7.50

?

April 24

Texas

Sally Seal

1 8x10 B/W

7.50

✓

ETA

May 15

Ny

Guy Mastard

1 8x10 B/W

May 17

Grand Rapids

Ed Munroe

1 8x10 B/W

May 18

Detroit

Kevin Stoa ^{1.75x2.25}

3 8x10 B/W

Detroit

John Green Family

1 8x ^{mted} B/W

Date of Shoot	Locale	Person	Order	Cost	Date Sent	Qty.
Aug 9, 1980	S.F.	Evan Admissions	3 8x10 B/W	\$13.50	0 ?	
Aug 15	Nyc	Local RFP	3 8x10 B/W	\$13.50	0 ?	
Aug 16	Wash D.C.	Senator Loyalt	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	0 ?	
		Senator Goldwater	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	0 ?	
		Sen Hyakawa	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	0 ?	
Aug 23	San Diego	Ed Long Family	3 8x10 B/W	\$12.00	0 ?	
Aug 26	Victorville	FBI	2 8x10 B/W	\$8.00	0 ?	
Aug 27	Pasadena	Mrs. Skelton	1 8x10 B/W	4.50	0 ?	
Aug 2	San Diego	Maureen Reagan	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		MR
		Mimi Reagan	1 8x10 B/W	4.50		MR

Reagan For President

RFP + News Storytriss + Trips

June, 1979 - July 1980

Dates	Event	Requested by	P&C
June 12, 1979	RR Luncheon e Riviera C.G. Portrait Shooting e Deaver & Hannaford	ABC News Mike Deaver	✓ T+E
July 12, 1979	RR e Office & Meetings e O+H	Mike Deaver	T+E
July 19, 1979	RR Trip: Nappa Valley + Sacramento	Mike Deaver	T+E
Sept 15, 1979	RR & NR Trip: San Diego	Mike Deaver	T+E
Sept 26, 1979	RR Fundraiser: Camrings home, B.H.	Mike Deaver	RNC
Sept 27-30, 1979	RR Trip: East Coast	Mike Deaver	T+E
October 30, 1979	RR & NR: Visit to JH Hqts RFP Staff	Jim Lake Deaver & Lake Time	E T+E
Nov 1-3, 1979	RR & NR Trip: Boston, Wash D.C.	Mike Deaver Newsweek	T+E
Nov 6, 1979	RR & NR: RNC pvt dinner in B.H and press conference RFP Staff Photos	RS Deaver & Lake	— T+E
Nov 7, 1979	RR & NR: At Home	Newsweek &	—
November 8, 1979	RFP Staff	RFP	—
November 10-17, 1979	RR & NR Announcement Trip	Deaver & Lake	T+E
Nov 27, 1979	RR & NR Trip Departure LAX	RS + Lake	—
December 10, 1979	RR T.V. Taping e O+H	Hannaford	—
Dec 11, 1979	RR T.V. Taping e Van Nys Airport RR lunch with friends - Van Nys	RS D+H	E
Dec 12, 1979	RFP contributor pins	Jung Taylor	T+E
Dec 20, 1979	RR & NR e RFP Christmas Party RR & NR to movie premier. LA..	Lake RS	E E

Dates	E +	Events	Requested by	A
January 3, 1980	RFP	Staff meetings	RS + Lake	E
Jan 4, 1980	RFP	Issues Briefings	RS + Lake	E
Jan 7-10, 1980	Tour #4	^{Hanford} Iowa, N.H., Mass South Carolina, Florida, Iowa, Ill.	Newsweek RFP	E
Jan 17, 1980		W.H. Photo	C.T. Chis Co.	
Jan 15-19, 1980	Tour #5	NYC, N.H., Vermont Ny, Iowa inc put party NYC	Newsweek + Lake NYC RFP	E
Jan 22, 1980	1) RR	morning staff meeting e RFP	RS + RFP	E
	2)	press conference "		
	3)	portrait "	C.O. Clyne & Co.	
February 3, 1980	RR + NH	Shrine Auditorium LA	Jerry Mayton	+
February 4, 5, 1980	RR + NR	Tour #7: Mass, N.H.	Newsweek / RFP	
February 9, 1980	RR + NR	Tour #8: N.H., Mass	}	
Feb 16-23, 1980	RR + NR	Tour #9 N.H., Mass Tour #10 Vermont, Alabama Florida, Mass		
Feb 24 - March 1	RR + NR	Tour #11 N.H., Mass South Carolina, Florida		
March 4, 1980	RR + NR	Press Conference LA night	Newsweek / RS	
March 11, 1980	RR	Press Conference LA night	RFP & RS	
March 14-20, 1980	RR + NR	Tour #13 Illinois, Connecticut, NYC	Newsweek	
March 23-27, 1980	RR	Tour #14, Kansas, Oklahoma, NY, Texas Wisconsin	Newsweek	
April 7-11, 1980	RR	Tour #17 North Carolina, Wash D.C.	Life	
	NR + RR	Pennsylvania	Newsweek	
April 14, 1980	RFP	Staff Shootings	RS	
April 16-18, 1980	RR	Tour #18 Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Texas	RS	
April 19-24, 1980	RR	Tour #19 Ohio, Pennsylvania Indiana, Texas	RS, Newsweek	

Dates	Events	Requested by	Pd
May 2, 1980	RFP Staff Shootings	RS, RFP	—
May 7, 1980	RFP Staff Shootings	RS, RFP	—
May 8, 1980	RFP Staff Shootings	.. RFP..	—
May 9, 1980	RR Trip: Oakland, San Francisco California	RS (RFP)	PE
May 12, 1980	RFP Staff Shooting	RFP	—?
May 14-19, 1980	RR Trip #21: NYC, Wash D.C., Ny, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Oregon	RS —	—?
May 23, 1980	RR Trip: San Diego, California	RS	—
May 26, 1980	RR Trip: Victorville, California	RS	—
May 27, 1980	RR Trip: San Gabriel + SA, California	RS	—
June 2, 1980	RR Trip? San Diego, San Jose, Anaheim.	RS	—
June 3, 1980	1) Reagan's voting 2) Calif. Primary Election Nite	RS / RFP	—
June 5, 1980	1) RR + Pres Fund - Palm Springs	RS	—
June 11, 1980	RFP Staff shooting	RFP	—
June 12, 1980	RFP Staff Shooting	RFP	—
June 13, 1980	RFP National meeting	RS	—
June 13, 1980	Republican Unity Dinner	WWD	—

L.A. RFP Shootings - adding up cost of post shootings to be made

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Dates	Subject	Film	Film Cost	Lab order	Lab cost	Fee	Use
Oct 30 1979	<u>RR & NR</u> Visit to LA Hqts	3 B/W @ 2.00 3 Color	\$6.00 \$12.30	3 O&P @ 3.50 3 PC 635	\$10.50 \$18.75	\$35.00	1) RFP files 2) send out 3) travel packet for Carol McCain
Oct 30 Nov 6 Nov 8	<u>RFP</u> Senior Staff	7 B/W @ 2.00	\$14.00	7 O&P @ 3.50	\$24.50	\$75.00	1) RFP files 2) send outs
Nov 6	<u>RR & NR</u> @ Press Conference + Buddy Russell	2 B/W 4 Color					
Nov 27 1979	<u>RR & NR</u> Departure LAX	2 B/W 2 Color	\$4.00 \$8.20	2 O&P 2 Process	\$7.00 \$13.00	∅	1) Mrs. R order 2) RFP files
Dec 11 1979	<u>RR</u> Commercial Film + Van Ness	2 B/W 2 Color	4.00 8.20	2 O&P 2 Process	7.00 \$13.00	 \$25.00	1) RFP files
	<u>RR</u> Lunch with Firemen	1 B/W 1 Color	\$2.00 \$4.10	1 O&P 1 Process	\$3.50 \$5.10		1) sent out to firemen
Dec 11 1979	"	\	\	3 B/W 8x10 1 B/W 11x14	\$10.50 \$5.50		"
Dec 12 1979	Studio shooting of Contributor <u>Pina</u>	1 Color	4.50	1 O&P	\$5.50	\$100.00	special events
Dec 20 1979	<u>RR & NR</u> RFP Christmas Party	1 B/W 3 Color	2.00 \$12.30	1 O&P 3 Process	3.50 \$19.50	 \$20.00	1) Mrs. R order 2) RFP files

L.A. RFP Shootings

(2)

Date	Subject	Film	Film Cost	Lab	Lab Cost	Fee	Use
Jan 3 Jan 4 1980	RR + Susan Stoff Briefings	3 B/W 2 Color	\$6.00 \$8.20	(3) D+P (2) Process @ 6.50	\$10.50 13.00	? \$15.00 }	1) Stoff giveaway 2) RFP Files
Jan 22	RR portrait @ RFP & Press Conf.	2 B/W 2 Color	\$4.00 \$8.20	(2) D+P (2) Process @ 6.50	\$7.00 \$13.00	? 35.00 ?	C.J. Clyde Co.
Jan 12	White House	1 B/W	\$2.00	∅	∅	\$55.00	C.J. Clyde Co.
Feb 3 1980	RR 8-Day Strike Audition Slide Show					? 250.00 }	1) Mrs. R order 2) Special events
Feb 4 1980	RR 2 NR Press Conference	1 B/W 2 Color	\$2.00 \$8.20	\$7.00 \$12.50			1) RFP Files
Feb 11 1980	RR Press conference	1 B/W 3 Color	\$2.00 \$12.30	(1) D+P 3 Process	7.00 18.30	? }	1) RFP Files

April 14. Staff meetings

RFP Files

May 2 Staff meetings

?

May 7 Staff meetings

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May 8 Staff meetings

May 12 Staff meetings

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