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File Folder NSC 00138 3 OCTOBER 1986 (2/2) [SOUTH ASIA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, INDIA]

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2000-002

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SKINNER

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
2988	MEMO	SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE SOUTH ASIA R 2/22/2008 F00-002	7	9/30/1986	B1
2989	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO CASPAR WEINBERGER RE SOUTH ASIA R 2/6/2007 M06-043	1	10/2/1986	B1
2990	MINUTES	OF NSC MEETING PAR 10/8/2010 MR2006-043/1	3	10/3/1986	B1
2991	LIST	OF ATTENDEES PAR 6/6/2006	1	ND	B3 B6

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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90677

September 30, 1986

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI *SK*

SUBJECT: A Legacy of Peace in South Asia: A Strategy
NSC Meeting
White House Cabinet Room
Friday, October 3, 11:00 - 12:00 Noon

Our key optimal goal in South Asia is peace between India and Pakistan. In practical terms, this means the conclusion of a peace treaty between New Delhi and Islamabad. However, peace cannot really be meaningful unless it includes some limits on the nuclear weapons programs of both countries. Thus, we hope to facilitate progress on bilateral arrangements which institutionalize the Gandhi-Zia December 17, 1985 agreement not to attack each others nuclear facilities and add to it a deal on non-manufacture, non-testing and non-transfer of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. is uniquely placed to play a role. We alone can provide sufficient incentives for both India and Pakistan. India needs us for Gandhi's ambitious program of technological progress. It is also in New Delhi's interest to ensure that the U.S.-Pakistani security relationship remains Afghanistan related. Junejo needs ties to the U.S. He must demonstrate to the Pak military that, albeit a civilian, he can provide for substantial sums of U.S. money and access to American weapons systems. The economic component of the U.S. \$4.02 billion post-'87 program for Pakistan enables Junejo to ensure the domestic prosperity which is key to his sustaining internal support. Without it, Benazir Bhutto has a better chance to engage the average Pakistani who currently feels fairly well off and thus less amenable to sustained political agitation on behalf of Bhutto.

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NLS FOO-002 #2988
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 2/22/08

Progress Thus Far

Change of leadership in India in 1984 provided the impetus for improved Indo-Pak relations. Gandhi's main agenda was moving India forward economically. He thus envisioned a set of regional relationships which kept India's leadership but acknowledged the necessity for peace. This changed environment enabled the GOI to become more responsive to pending GOP proposals. In less than two years, we saw normalization along a broad spectrum of issues: liberalization of visa policy, fewer travel restrictions; exchanges of newspaper editors; freer government-to-government relations; cultural exchanges; increased trade within carefully prescribed limits.

A second-order attempt at rapprochement was initiated with active U.S. encouragement. Here, thornier problems were being tackled: a nuclear dialogue to test the limits of cooperation and seek agreement within those limits; discussion between senior defense officials to de-escalate fighting on the Siachin Glacier; discussions at the Foreign Secretary, Foreign Minister and Head-of-Government levels to see if both countries could agree to a peace treaty which could be formally signed at a historic journey to Pakistan by Rajiv Gandhi.

Recent Setbacks

There is a direct correlation between U.S. involvement and above mentioned progress. The top leadership may still be committed to peace, but the U.S. needs to continue to facilitate progress, which has slowed. In the past, the President's personal involvement has helped nurture our policy.

There are several reasons for the recent slowdown. First, a worsening internal situation in the Panjab has fed Indian suspicions that Pakistan is bound to exploit the Sikhs against New Delhi. Whether or not the GOP is actually doing so has become secondary to the fear of potential involvement. The Panjab is currently Rajiv Gandhi's most vulnerable point. The fact that the state shares a long porous border with Pakistan has exacerbated Indo-Pak relations.

Second, Junejo has been slow to understand that there is a real chance for peace with India. Ironically, Gandhi's basic distaste for military regimes caused him to hold back from Zia. He has since found that political leaders tend to be far more wary of India in today's Pakistan than is the military leadership.

Third, the U.S. has not been fully engaged in Indo-Pak normalization in the last six months. We have helped in the past as we let the Paks understand that their peace with India will not leave us disinterested in Pakistan's future. With Gandhi, our message has been that his vision of technologically rich India requires a changed Indo-Pak equation. Our ability to help India will be enhanced by an overall condition of peace in South Asia, which is, after all, in India's self interest.

Fourth, the above message had to be in tandem with tangible proofs of Indo-U.S. cooperation. Gandhi needed some visible benefits of his cooperation with the U.S. in place before his journey to Pakistan and prior to any approval of a U.S. follow-on program for Pakistan. (A \$4.02 billion post '87 U.S. package was agreed to with the GOP in March.) Unfortunately, at the same time that the USG was moving ahead with the Pak package, two U.S. items of urgency for the GOI, the supercomputer and cooperation on building an Indian fighter, were slowed. Gandhi saw this as being indicative of traditional USG reluctance to help India and another tilt toward Pakistan. His own efforts then shifted in favor of influencing Congressional opinion against Pakistan where a waiver of the Symington amendment is necessary before U.S. assistance to Pakistan can be pledged for another six years after the current package runs out next year.

Priorities for Peace

The first order of business will be two-fold: (a) to rebuild our credibility with Gandhi. A corollary of the above is to reassure Gandhi along the lines the President did last October: the U.S. will continue to press Pakistan to drop its nuclear weapons program. India can help increase the incentives, but we are not trying to shift the onus onto the GOI; (b) to convince Junejo that it is in Pakistan's interest to push for improved relations with India, and, that peace can be something more than simply the absence of war.

In the interim, we must be careful in how we proceed during the next twelve months when we have the greatest opportunity before the GOI and GOP focus on the end of the Administration. During these months, we must not make decisions on any major weapons systems for Pakistan which are dual-use items (Afghanistan/India). Specifically, sale of M-1 tanks, aerial tankers and AWACS will jeopardize the chances for further progress on Indo-Pak issues. These items are bound to generate controversy. Since there is no waiver and no money until the post-1987 program for Pakistan any way, we need not get involved in any controversies for the above period. (NOTE: I have worked with State and DOD and got interagency agreement on the approach. However, both agencies fear Weinberger may go beyond the guidance, as he did with Junejo, so a reminder will be very useful.)

A Proposed Plan

How do we go about achieving the above objectives? In the first instance, we must proceed quickly with key items pending for India. In particular, we must get on with the business of appointing a senior U.S. leader of the negotiating team to conclude a safeguards regime for the Presidentially approved sale of a supercomputer to India. We need to undertake this exercise, now slated for November, (but State has yet to agree to a senior leader of the team) -- before the nuclear emissary goes out to South Asia. After all, it is the supercomputer sale which increases Gandhi's stake in cooperating with the U.S. in the nuclear area.

The Weinberger visit to India and Pakistan in mid-October, gives us an unusual opportunity to press on with another part of our agenda. In India, the Secretary of Defense can again demonstrate high-level U.S. interest by: (a) furthering defense collaboration with the GOI through approved mission areas, e.g. the Light Combat Aircraft; (b) suggesting ways of reducing the threat of war through a series of confidence-building measures; (c) building on the positive and potential changes in the relationship between India and Pakistan and between these countries and the U.S. In Pakistan, Weinberger, particularly given DOD's role in the security relationship, is well placed to: (a) press Zia/Junejo to move on the peace front with India, and (b) assure the GOP that the U.S. will remain a steadfast friend of Pakistan. In doing the latter, he must be careful not to over-promise and to avoid comment on controversial items.

Subsequent to the supercomputer negotiations and the Weinberger visit, we must move ahead quickly on the nuclear emissary. This effort has to move in tandem with our collaborative moves with India (supercomputer, LCA) and with Pakistan (follow-on program, Symington waiver). There has been no real discussion on the nuclear issues agreed to in Delhi in December 1985 since February when the two Foreign Secretaries met in Islamabad. Movement on the nuclear issue is essential for making a lasting contribution on peace. As the nuclear scare of August 1984 demonstrated, pre-emptive strikes against nuclear facilities are potentially the most likely cause for another Indo-Pak war. In addition to the proposals detailed in the NSC nuclear strategy paper for South Asia, we can suggest that India and Pakistan also agree to give immediate notice of any nuclear power accident. This bilateral measure can be important given the heavy population belt along the border areas where radiation could easily affect safety outside the border.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

Three key areas exist for Indo-Pak cooperation. The U.S. can be helpful in all three.

A. Military (CBMs)

Talk of "war clouds" has been cheap in Indo-Pak relations. A recent Gallup/Pakistan poll shows that while the Soviet Union was seen as a greater threat to Pakistan by a ratio of two-to-one, half of those interviewed still believe that war with India was likely and 53% believed that India might use nuclear weapons against Pakistan. Given the fact that neither India nor Pakistan want war, proposals which dim the prospects of war by miscalculation are worth considering.

Other than nuclear matters, the issue which sparks fears of impending conflict is military exercises. India is scheduled to have its largest ever military exercise, involving several divisions, in Rajasthan near the Pak border in February 1987. One CBM that should be considered would require prior notification of any exercise by either side involving troops of a division or more. In addition, observers at each other's exercises might be proposed. As part of demonstrating our determination to drive down the probability of war and enhance mutual confidence, we could offer to furnish observers at exercises. Proposals of this sort would represent a natural follow-on (and be a quantum leap over) steps that were taken last year and first discussed during the Vice President's trip in May 1984; e.g. a hotline between the two capitals which followed similar service between military commanders of both sides. I am working with DOD in developing a list of proposals for Weinberger's meetings in Delhi and Islamabad. State agrees with this action.

B. Measures Against Terrorism

India and Pakistan have both suffered from terrorism, as most recently evident in the Pan Am hijacking in Karachi. Add to this the penchant of Indian Sikhs to hijack Indian airliners to Pakistan, to murder key Indian officials and then look for sanctuary in Pakistan, the problem becomes worse. The GOP is also far from immune. Renewal of political activity has been coupled with violence. Cutting off extreme elements -- e.g., the al Zulfikar terrorist organization headed by former Prime Minister Bhutto's son, who resides in Syria -- from support in India is important for Junejo. Giving Gandhi a stake in Pak stability can be essential for the GOP program of political evolution against Benazir Bhutto's plan of recurrent agitation and Soviet/PDPA sponsored acts of terrorism in the Northwest Frontier Province.

The GOP has proposed that Interior Ministry officials from both sides meet and discuss problems and concerns. The GOI has demurred because it does not believe that the Pakistanis are being sincere. The GOI has given the USG and Congressman Solarz what it considers to be powerful evidence of Pak collusion with dissident Sikhs in the Panjab. We have yet to become involved in examining the evidence and in dealing with both governments on this issue which may help bridge the credibility gap. The Vice President's role as coordinator of the recently issued report on combating terrorism gives him a natural leading role. As a starter, a letter from the Vice President can be carried by Don Gregg who is going to South Asia in late October. But we need, at a minimum, to follow-up on the "evidence" the Indians have given us if we are to foster cooperation in this area.

C. Anti-Narcotics efforts offer another avenue for Indo-Pak cooperation. It has become increasingly clear that neither Pakistan nor India can separately deal with this menace. As the GOP cracked down with controls against smuggling drugs from Pakistani ports of exit, smugglers began using India for export, making Panjab the main route. The GOI cannot afford to couple Sikh political discontent with international drug trafficking.

Gandhi wrote to the President last month (the first letter carried by the new Indian Ambassador, P. K. Kaul) praising the President's efforts against drugs. Pledging GOI support, the Indian Prime Minister pointed to the difficulties in stemming the flow from Pakistan and said that officials from both countries had agreed to meet.

Although Junejo pledged increased vigilance by the GOP against poppy cultivation, processing, and law enforcement, the State Department is concerned about the lack of actual performance. Narcotics can become a major issue in U.S.-Pak relations as our own war on drugs escalates. Junejo stands to lose Administration and Congressional support if no progress is made. Cooperation with India offers him an attractive way of demonstrating immediate progress.

The U.S. can make Indo-Pak collaboration an important showcase for the President's program against drugs. USG experience against drug trafficking and use can be put to the use of South Asian countries. Since the U.S. is the ultimate recipient of their imports, a trilateral watch-dog group can help monitor progress. This could be a worthwhile proposal to develop.

Dr
Dennis Ross concurs.

National Security Council
The White House

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 2, 1986

Cap

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ~~CASPAR W. WEINBERGER~~
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: A Legacy of Peace in South Asia: A Strategy (S)

As promised, I enclose some thoughts on how your visit to India and Pakistan can help us achieve our goals of peace in South Asia. You are in a unique position to help build Prime Minister Gandhi's confidence in the future of U.S. cooperation with India. His program for the Light Combat Aircraft will be critical to our defense cooperation effort. You can also help us convince Prime Minister Junejo that he must push for peace with India despite temporary setbacks, and that the U.S. is a steadfast friend of Pakistan. Your contribution to this overall effort will be important to the President. (S)

John

John M. Poindexter

Attachment:
Paper (4 pages)

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| _____ Ltc. Childress | _____ Mr. Kraemer | _____ Mr. McMinn | _____ Ms. Small | _____ NSC Secretariat |
| _____ Col. Cobb | _____ Mr. Laux | _____ Ltc. North | _____ Mr. Sommer | _____ Sit. Room |
| _____ Mr. Covey | _____ Mr. C. Lehman | _____ Mr. Raymond | _____ Cmdr. Stark | _____ NSC Admin. |
| _____ Mr. Cox | _____ Mr. R. Lehman | _____ Ms. Reger | _____ Mr. Steiner | _____ |
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FROM TAHIR-KHELI *As 1/21/87*

DOC DATE 18 FEB 87

KEYWORDS: SOUTH ASIA

MINUTES NSC

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF NSC MTG HELD 3 OCT RE SOUTH ASIA & THE WEINBERGER TRIP

ACTION: FOR DECISION

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87 FEB 20 National Security Council
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Colin Powell			
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci			
Grant Green			
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

SYSTEM II
90162

February 18, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI *STK*

SUBJECT: Minutes of the NSC Meeting held on
October 3, 1986, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
Cabinet Room
South Asia and the Weinberger Trip

Attached for your approval at TAB A are the minutes of the NSC Meeting held on October 3, 1986 in the Cabinet Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the attached October 3, 1986 NSC Meeting minutes for record purposes.

Approve *SK*

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

TAB A NSC Meeting Minutes of October 3, 1986

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CS* NARA, Date *1/21/05*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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National Security Council Meeting
October 3, 1986, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon, Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: South Asia and the Weinberger Visit

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office
Donald Gregg

State:
Deputy Secretary John Whitehead
Michael Armacost

Treasury:
Secretary James Baker

DEFENSE:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
William H. Taft, IV

Justice:
Attorney General Edwin Meese

CIA:
Director William Casey

OMB:
Director James Miller

USUN:
Amb. Vernon Walters

JCS:
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.
Lt. General John H. Moellering

USIA:
Marvin Stone

ACDA:
Director Ken Adelman

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David Chew

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James Kelly

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Minutes

Admiral Poindexter began the meeting by pointing out the importance of the Weinberger trip to South Asia. He added that the focus this NSC meeting was on where we are in terms of our relations with India and Pakistan and the U.S. effort to promote peace in South Asia. Success of the policy would help change the strategic balance in the region and required careful nurturing by the U.S. The Admiral pointed out the importance of the nuclear issue to the relationships. He added that the U.S. was uniquely placed to play a role. India needed us for technology and to place limits on the U.S. security assistance for Pakistan. Junejo needed us for both military and economic assistance. (S)

In recent months there had been a slowdown in improved Indo-Pak relations for several reasons. The U.S. now needed to push the agenda for peace which requires: (a) U.S.' help in convincing Gandhi to stay the course; (b) letting Gandhi know the U.S. is not shifting the onus of Pakistan's nuclear program to India; (c) convincing Junejo that peace with India is in Pakistan's interest, even if the progress is slow. In the next 12 months, the Admiral added that the U.S. must be extremely careful not to go for AWACS to Pakistan or the M-1 tanks, or aerial tankers because all of these were dual-use items. In closing the Admiral said that the Weinberger visit can enhance the U.S. relationship with South Asia and that the Secretary can offer some ideas on confidence-building measures to Gandhi. (S)

Director Casey was then asked to give his assessment on Afghanistan and the Pakistan nuclear program. Casey said that the war in Afghanistan was going well. Fighting had been heavy in cities and countryside. The Mujahadin were attacking the Soviets within the Soviet parameter. The air war had escalated and the Stingers had given the Resistance a capability against Soviet aircraft. The Chinese had also played a key role in Afghanistan by supplying arms and pack animals. Mr. Casey briefly reviewed the down-turn in Indo-Pak relations and said that both countries were on the nuclear weapons threshold. Pakistan has a workable nuclear weapon design and is more than 10 years away from providing a delivery system but did have U.S.-supplied F-16s.

However, Gandhi was very concerned with Pakistan's progress in its nuclear weapons program. (TS)

13526
E.O. 12958
AS Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-3-

Deputy Secretary Whitehead then talked of ways in which the Weinberger trip could contribute to our foreign policy goal of reduction of Soviet expansion in South Asia. He pointed out the recent down-turn in Indo-Pak relations and stated that it was in the U.S. interest to help resolve mutual suspicion and resulting tension. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said he looked forward to his trip to China and South Asia. There were a number of issues to discuss in each capital. In China he hoped that his visit would help strengthen defense relations. In India, the first ever by a U.S. Secretary of Defense, he would try to wean the GOI away from reliance on Soviet military equipment. Mr. Weinberger noted that the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister will be in Delhi just prior to his visit, and that the GOI could use the U.S. to get more from the Soviets. However, the visit offered a major opportunity to signal U.S. cooperation and willingness to help provide adequate safeguards. In Pakistan the AWACS issue would surface but one way to deal with the problem would be to offer the lesser E2C. Secretary Weinberger said that he will keep India's worries and sensitivities in mind when he goes to Pakistan. (S)

Attorney General Meese stated that the U.S. was working toward developing regional anti-narcotics program based in Thailand which could help train Indian and Pakistani officials who deal with this problem. (S)

ACDA Director Adelman stated that the USG had made 25 demarches to Zia, since President Reagan came to office, on Pakistan's nuclear program. The need for annual Presidential certification on Pakistan gets more and more difficult and Congress will not put up with this trend forever. By and large, the Administration's nuclear non-proliferation policy was successful; one exception was Pakistan. We now needed to go beyond letters to Zia, who had lied to us, and look at the possibility of holding back on the delivery of pending military systems in the pipeline to Pakistan. (S)

Admiral Poindexter responded that Junejo had told the President in July that he was not yet familiar with the Pakistan nuclear program, but would look into the same upon his return. He added that Secretary Weinberger could help by following up on the nuclear issue with Zia and Junejo. (S)

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June Mad...

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: **Officer-in-charge**
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, October 3, 19 86

for The President of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

See Attached List

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Requested by Baerbel Houck

Room No. Cabinet Room

Room No. GF/WW Telephone 2224

Time of Meeting 11:00 a.m.

Date of request 10/2/86

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

✓ The Vice President

~~Craig Fuller~~

✓ Donald Gregg

STATE

✓ John Whitehead

4/2/22

✓ Michael Armacost

4/15/37

TREASURY

✓ Secretary James Baker

DEFENSE

✓ Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

✓ William H. Taft, IV

9/13/45

JUSTICE

✓ Attorney General Edwin Meese

CIA

✓ Director William Casey

OMB

✓ Director James Miller

✓ L. Wayne Army

USUN

✓ Amb. Vernon Walters

1/13/17

JCS

✓ Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr.

✓ Lt. Gen. John H. Moellering

2/4/38

USIA

✓ Marvin Stone

2/26/24

✓ Edward T. Penney

1/14/35

ACDA

✓ Ken Adelman

6/9/46

✓ Michael Guhin

WH

✓ Donald Regan

✓ John M. Poindexter

✓ David Chew

✓ Al Keel

NSC

✓ Rodney B. McDaniel

✓ Shirin Tahir-Kheli

✓ James Kelly

FOIA(b) (3)

FOIA(p) (6)

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NLS F00-002 #8991

By LSJ, NARA, Date 6/6/06