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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8590950)			
<del>1. NSC profile</del>	<del>(1p) A 9/24/04 M1353 #1</del>	<del>9/21/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>2. NSC profile</del>	<del>(1p) R 9/24/04 M1353 #2</del>	<del>9/21/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>3. memo</del>	<del>from T. Cobb to R. McFarlane re: NSC meeting (1p)</del>	<del>9/21/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>4. minutes</del>	<del>of NSC meeting (8pp)</del>	<del>9/20/85</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
letter case (8590939)			
<del>5. NSC profile</del>	<del>(2pp) R 9/24/04 M1353 #5</del>	<del>9/18/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>6. NSC profile</del>	<del>(1pp) R 9/24/04 M1353 #6</del>	<del>9/18/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>7. memo</del>	<del>from T. Cobb to R. McFarlane re: NSC meeting, with notations (1p)</del>	<del>9/19/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>8. talking points</del>	<del>for NSC meeting, with handwritten notations (3pp)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>9. agenda</del>	<del>for NSC meeting (1p)</del>	<del>9/20/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>10. briefing paper</del>	<del>from R. McFarlane to the President re: NSC meeting, with notations (2pp)</del>	<del>9/19/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>11. agenda</del>	<del>for NSC meeting (1p)</del>	<del>9/20/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>12. memo</del>	<del>from T. Cobb/J. Matlock to R. McFarlane re: NSC meeting (2pp)</del>	<del>9/19/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>13. memo</del>	<del>from W. Martin to D. Gregg, et al. re: NSC meeting (1p)</del>	<del>9/19/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER: NSC 00121 20Sep85 Box 91303			12/12/94

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>14. agenda</del>	<del>for NSC meeting (1p) R 9/24/04 M1353 #14</del>	<del>9/20/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>15. memo</del>	<del>from C. Cleveland to W. Martin re: NSC meeting, with handwritten notations (2pp) A 9/24/04 M1353 #15</del>	<del>9/19/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>16. agenda</del>	<del>for NSC meeting (1p) R 9/24/04 M1353 #16</del>	<del>9/20/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>17. copy</del>	<del>of item # 15 (1p) R 9/24/04 M1353 #17</del>	<del>9/19/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>18. copy</del>	<del>of item # 16 (1p) R 9/24/04 M1353 #18</del>	<del>9/20/85</del>	<del>P-1</del>
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### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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**Freedom of Information Act - 16 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RECEIVED 23 SEP 85 08

TO MCFARLANE FROM COBB

DOCDATE 21 SEP 85

KEYWORDS: MINUTES NSC USSR SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD  
VISIT

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF 20 SEPT NSC MTG RE SHEVARDNADZE MTG

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ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

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FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
MCFARLANE

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BY Amf, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

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RECEIVED 23 SEP 85 08

TO MCFARLANE FROM COBB

DOCDATE 21 SEP 85

KEYWORDS: MINUTES NSC USSR SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD VISIT

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF 20 SEPT NSC MTG RE SHEVARDNADZE MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS CD FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO MCFARLANE

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National Security Council  
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1986



	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin	<u>2</u>	<u>um</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>?</u>	<u>ok.?</u>
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall		<u>OK</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>R</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II  
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September 21, 1985

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TC*

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Meeting on Shevardnadze Visit --  
September 20, 1985, 11:00 a.m., Cabinet Room

Attached at Tab I are the minutes from the NSC meeting on Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's upcoming visit.

Jack Matlock *JM* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the minutes at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab I - Minutes

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BY *SPJ*, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

September 20, 1985 -- 11:00 a.m. - 12:07 p.m.  
The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's Visit (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Office of the Vice President  
The Vice President  
Mr. Craig L. Fuller

CIA  
Mr. William J. Casey  
Mr. Robert Gates

State  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgeway

OMB  
Dr. Alton Keel

Treasury  
Secretary James A. Baker III

JSC  
General John A. Wickham, Jr.  
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

Defense  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

White House  
Mr. Donald T. Regan  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter

Justice  
Attorney General Edwin Meese III

NSC  
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock  
COL Tyrus W. Cobb

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting by noting that this NSC session would serve as a forum to provide the President with a strategic overview of the broad direction we hope to pursue in dealing with the Soviet leadership between now and the meeting in November. He added that we would also be reviewing the major issues on our bilateral, human rights and regional agendas. Mr. McFarlane explained that arms control had been dealt with earlier and would be addressed specifically again next week. (C)

Mr. McFarlane noted that the process that had been set in motion two months ago by the President's invitation to the Soviet General Secretary was well underway. Our preparations for these

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meetings have enabled us to prepare solid positions in the four areas that will be on the agenda. This includes bilateral issues such as air safety, the opening up of new consulates, and the renewed exchanges agreement; human rights concerns; regional issues, on Afghanistan, Central America, and other parts of the globe; and security issues, particularly arms control. (C)

Prior to turning the discussion to the substantive issues, Mr. McFarlane indicated that he wished to review briefly for the President the major public diplomacy events leading to the Geneva meetings. Our program, he explained, is designed to ensure that the President has solid support from three key audiences -- our Allies, the Congress, and the U.S. public. We have selected activities and events that will demonstrate that we are prepared for substantive results in Geneva and that we go there with a comprehensive and reasonable agenda. We feel the Soviets moved quickly and early to seize the high ground in this area with a blistering propaganda campaign. However, we feel that the Soviet effort has been perceived for what it is -- old propaganda in new packaging -- and has made no lasting impact on Allied or American public opinion. (C)

Mr. McFarlane noted that the Secretary of State's speech in New York next week, followed by his meeting with Shevardnadze, would initiate a series of critical events in our gameplan for Geneva. This would be followed by the President's very important meeting with FM Shevardnadze on Friday. We believe that the Foreign Minister will bring a fairly elaborate and concrete arms control proposal, to be revealed either during his UN speech or presented here on Friday. General Secretary Gorbachev will be in France from October 2-5. We can expect a flurry of media attention but we doubt that any concrete results will come from his meetings with Mitterand. (S)

We believe the tide of public opinion will be shifting to our favor given the substantive thrust of our proposals. While most of the media attention to date has been on arms control issues, these events will enable us to demonstrate that our agenda includes efforts to engage the Soviets on the other sources of tension between us -- human rights, Afghanistan and their expansionist policies. We will make it clear that our themes for the November meeting -- Realism, Restraint, Reciprocity -- offer real hope for substantive progress. (C)

Mr. McFarlane indicated he would now to turn to the Secretary of State who will provide us an overview of the three issue areas that are the focus of today's meeting -- human rights, regional concerns, and bilateral issues. (U)

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The Secretary remarked that he was not ready to fully discuss the three issue areas that were at the heart of today's meeting, but was better prepared to carry the discussion to the issues and objectives we have for the Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meetings. (C)

The Secretary pointed out that we had not achieved substantial progress on any of our bilateral issues: most remained on dead-center. The most fruitful discussions had taken place on the North Pacific Air Safety Agreement, but we still have not reached any operational understandings with the Soviets on improved procedures. A cultural agreement, providing for a resumption of our formal exchange program with the USSR, shows some promise of being ready for signature prior to November. The proposal to open up new consulates in New York and Kiev respectively, is proceeding, but we remain concerned with the increase of Soviet personnel this would place in New York. A boundary dispute in the Bering Sea is also under intense discussion. (S)

Under the regional concerns, there are four principal areas we will want to address. The Secretary noted that we have had extensive discussions with the Soviets on Afghan, Asian and African problems, and expect to discuss Central America prior to the President's meeting with Gorbachev. While no substantial progress has been achieved, we are interested in institutionalizing the concept of these meetings on regional concerns. This will help promote the idea that we and the Soviets are seriously talking about problems around the world. (S)

The Secretary stated that there was a general feeling that the area that might best lend itself to substantive progress is Afghanistan. The Indians, in particular, have made this point to us. He pointed out that in the President's meeting with the General Secretary, he would want on the one hand to stress our readiness to seek a resolution of the Afghan situation. At the same time, the President would want to demonstrate the depth of our concern with the continuing Soviet occupation of that country. The Secretary stated that it was important thereby to demonstrate to Gorbachev that he (the President) had steel in his backbone. (S)

Secretary Shultz stated that human rights were certain to be the thorniest issue on the agenda. The Soviets resent the perceived intrusion into what they regard as internal matters and have roiled at our linkage with their behavior in this area to bilateral trade. We have traditionally made it clear that there

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is a direct relationship between Soviet compliance with agreements they have signed with regard to human rights and the extent to which we are willing to increase non-strategic trade. (S)

The President noted that Bob Michel had sent over a pertinent excerpt from Forrest Pogue's biography of General George Marshall. In a discussion with Marshall near the end of World War II, General Deane made an interesting comment on the traditional Soviet way of dealing with foreigners. The President quoted Pogue:

"In a careful analysis of the situation Deane explained that part of the trouble arose from Russian suspicions of foreigners. They simply cannot understand giving without taking, and as a result even our giving is viewed with suspicion. Gratitude cannot be banked in the Soviet Union. Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past favors. The party of the second part is either a shrewd trader to be admired or a sucker to be despised. He made it clear that the picture was not all bad -- the individual Russians were likeable, and he thought that they would be friendly if they dared." (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that we must be careful in the language we use in our public presentations, i.e., we need to avoid using the phrase that we are "flexible". To the Soviets, this would connote a weak stance on our part. It would be much better to use the phrase, "We are prepared for a serious give-and-take". (S)

The President added that he agreed with that and drew attention to the alleged Soviet historical fear of invasions and suspicions of foreigners. The President added that this paranoia reaches extreme proportions in some cases. For example, during World War II the Eighth Air Force suffered extensive casualties flying bombing runs over German troop positions and, particularly, when they had a return over the same routes. This was because the Soviets denied them permission to land in Soviet-controlled areas. (C)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the most useful instruments we had to break down that suspicion were the exchanges and exhibits we were able to send to the Soviet Union. Turning to Ambassador Matlock, the Secretary asked how he evaluated the utility of these exhibits. The Ambassador agreed that these exchanges had considerable value and sighted the example of just one of our

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exhibits that drew 250,000 visitors from one single city. He added that these exhibits were staffed with Russian-speaking American guides, thus providing Soviet citizens with perhaps their most informative look at the American way of life. (C)

The President cited another example of the Soviet tendency not to seek a compromise. A defector recounted the story of when his father, a high-ranking general, was driving along a narrow mountain road and encountered another car. While there was room for the general to move over further, he directed his driver to stand fast. In the general's mind, any concession to move from his position would have been degrading. (C)

Mr. McFarlane noted that Director Casey would now present an intelligence perspective on Soviet objectives for the Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meetings. (C)

Mr. Casey stated that it is difficult to say with confidence precisely what the Soviets seek to achieve. We are fairly certain that their principal concern at the present time is our SDI program. A second major concern to the Soviets will be alleviating drains on their sluggish economy. Overall, there are three primary Soviet objectives: 1) limit our strategic defense program, particularly preventing any testing or deployment of weapons with real potential; 2) create the public impression that progress in the arms control area is directly dependent upon American willingness to cooperate; and 3) reduce tensions between the superpowers. Mr. Casey hastened to add that the rationale for doing so was not because of a desire to improve relations per se, but to increase trade between the USA and the USSR, which they realize depends on better ties. (S)

Mr. Casey pointed out that the Soviets will try to prevent SDI, through technical means, but if they are unsuccessful, they will seek to halt our program politically by influencing American and European public opinion. Thus, we understand that Shevardnadze will be bringing a major arms control proposal with him. We believe that he will introduce the proposal during his address at the United Nations, but he could make it public as early as this Sunday, or to increase the attention to his Washington visit, present it to the President during their meeting next Friday. (S)

The intelligence community sees little chance for progress in the arms control area and speculates that the Soviet proposal will provide little in the way of substance. It is important to the Kremlin to convey a picture of reasonableness at this time. On trade, Mr. Casey stated that the Soviets would not be coming "hat-in-hand" but would be seeking to promote trade by stressing

the mutual advantages such an increase might bring. The Director emphasized that the Soviets strongly wish to avoid any discussions of human rights. However, we have some indications, principally from Edgar Bronfman's discussions in Moscow, that they may create a publicity windfall by permitting the emigration of a few well-known Jewish activists. Finally, the Soviets will not stress bilateral issues during these meetings. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then asked the Secretary of Defense to provide a brief defense perspective on the upcoming meetings and the three issue areas under discussion. (S)

Secretary Weinberger stressed the importance of our SDI program in Soviet thinking. They will be looking for ways in which they can secure an advantage. The consular agreement currently under discussion presents serious concerns to us. The Secretary claimed that the Soviets send over only "fully-equipped spies," reporting directly to either the KGB or the GRU. (S)

The Secretary continued that both Shevardnadze and Gorbachev will be seeking to blame us for contributing to the creation of a charged atmosphere prior to these meetings. They will allege that this was the rationale behind our raising the "Spy Dust" issue, when this was in fact a blatant Soviet violation of standard diplomatic custom. We believe that attention should also be addressed to the Soviet failure to resolve satisfactorily all of the problems revolving around our military liaison missions (MLMs) in the Berlin area. Secretary Weinberger pointed out that the latest incident was not serious, but could have been. The Secretary concluded that he agreed with Mr. Casey that they will be seeking oil and gas equipment from us, and stated that it was imperative that we not allow them to use our technology to their own advantage. Finally, the Secretary noted that we should be prepared to counter strongly any allegations they will accuse us of in the human rights area, by stressing the nature of our free society and Soviet non-compliance with the Helsinki Agreement. (S)

Secretary Weinberger recommended that the President should be firm on the Afghanistan issue. The Soviets should understand that this is a matter all Americans feel strongly about. The Soviets need to withdraw from Afghanistan and we should be prepared to assist them in doing so. In Kampuchea, Moscow should be using its influence on Hanoi to get the Vietnamese to withdraw. And in Central America, we should tell the Soviets to stop interfering in the region. (S)

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The President returned to the issue of how best to handle human rights. In studying our successes and failures in the past, he noted that quiet diplomacy had produced substantive results. However, when the glare of publicity was brought on these negotiations, the Soviets quickly hardened their position. The President thought that we might speak privately to the Soviets and indicate that we were prepared to cooperate on this issue. In particular, we would not publicize their concessions if they complied fully with the Helsinki Agreement. (S)

Mr. McFarlane stated that he found himself in basic agreement with the President but wished for the sake of discussion to assume a devil's advocate position. If Gorbachev wished he might play this private dialogue back to American public opinion to create the impression that we were not sincerely interested in pressing this issue. Still, the thought had considerable merit. Perhaps the best tactic would be to approach the Soviets at the ministerial level. The President agreed and cited the success of one quiet arrangement, whereby we had rescinded the grain embargo with the result that there were some happy people now living in the West. That one, he explained, was worked quietly through Ambassador Dobrynin. (S)

Vice President Bush agreed that human rights would be one of the most divisive issues on the agenda. In his meeting with Georgy Arbatov, it was clear that the Soviets will either seek to avoid discussion or launch a concerted counterattack on us. The Vice President felt, however, that many of these problems could be resolved along the lines the President suggested; that is, through quiet agreements by high-level diplomats working privately. (S)

Secretary Shultz indicated that the CIA had produced a very useful paper suggesting that the Soviets may have a serious interest in reaching an arms control agreement. Economic conditions, their situation in Afghanistan, and Gorbachev's focus on his domestic agenda, could impel them to seek resolution of some of their international difficulties. We need to treat this possibility seriously and decide how best we can take advantage of potential opportunities. It is important, the Secretary stated, for us to strive to achieve our objectives. If we earnestly do so, it is very possible we can bring them to realization. The Secretary pointed out that we simply can't just continue claiming that all the Soviets have in mind is creating a propaganda screen. (S)

Mr. Casey agreed but stressed that the Soviets will still focus on stopping our SDI program. Secretary Weinberger concurred and added that they will seek to preserve their lead in areas where

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they are ahead. The President added that the Soviets traditionally only make agreements where they see clear advantages. The President agreed with the Secretary of State that the most acute problem facing the Soviets at this time is the state of their economy. The question is how far Gorbachev will be prepared to go because of this. We must be prepared to seize any opening presented to us. In this regard, Richard Nixon's recent statement was entirely a propos. The former President pointed out, "We want peace. They need peace." Thus, the Soviets will have some motivation to reach agreements. (S)

Secretary Weinberger concurred that the Soviets will perceive a need for reducing their arms burden but suggested that only at a later date will they be persuaded to move in this direction. The President agreed and pointed out that SDI may very well be our most important leverage. The President stressed that he was prepared, once any of our SDI programs proved out, to then announce to the world that integrating these weapons in our respective arsenals would put international relations on a more stable footing. In fact, this could even lead to a complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We must be prepared to tell the world that we were ready to consult and negotiate on integrating these weapons into a new defense philosophy, and to state openly that we were ready to internationalize these systems. (S)

Mr. McFarlane stated that this concluded the NSC meeting and indicated that more sessions will be held the following week as we finalize our preparations for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit. (C)

The meeting adjourned at 12:07 p.m. (U)

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KEYWORDS: USSR

NSC

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AGENDA

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KEYWORDS: USSR

VISIT

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

NSC

AGENDA

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS & AGENDA FOR 20 SEPT NSC MTG RE SHEVARDNADZE VISIT

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	9/19	<i>Pearson Regd Memos Agencies</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	ID 9/19	<i>For Information</i>		<i>UP, DR</i>
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FROM COBB

DOCDATE 18 SEP 85

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KEYWORDS: USSR

VISIT

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

NSC

AGENDA

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS & AGENDA FOR 20 SEPT NSC MTG RE SHEVARDNADZE VISIT

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William Martin	1	ln	
John Poindexter	given copy		
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall	2		
Bud McFarlane	3		
William Martin	4	ln	
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cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 19, 1985

**ROM HAS SEEN**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB/JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Your Talking Points for Shevardnadze NSC Meeting,  
Friday, September 20, 1985 -- 11:00 a.m.

Attached at Tab A are suggested talking points for your use for the Shevardnadze NSC meeting tomorrow. As we had discussed you would begin this session with an introduction highlighting to the President that this session is intended to serve as a strategic overview of our broad policy toward the Soviet Union and to examine the major issues on your bilateral, regional and human rights agenda. In addition, we recommend that you review for the President our public diplomacy strategy and highlight the key events between now and November 18 that present opportunities for us to convey our position convincingly to the American and Allied publics -- and to the Soviet leadership. You might then turn to Secretary Shultz who will follow with a review of the key Soviet-American issues in the three areas and delineate our objectives for the meeting with Gorbachev. Bill Casey is prepared to follow with a five minute presentation on Soviet objectives, followed by Cap who will treat Soviet defense concerns generally.

The Agenda for the NSC meeting is at Tab B.

Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard and Johnathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the suggested talking points at Tab A.

Approve       /       Disapprove       

Attachments:

Tab A Suggested Talking Points

Tab B Proposed Agenda

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE NSC MEETING

*4 areas*

-- Mr. President, this NSC meeting should serve as a forum to provide you with a strategic overview of the broad direction <sup>*objectives*</sup> ~~we hope to pursue in dealing~~ with the Soviet leadership over the next two months. We will also review the major issues on our bilateral, human rights, and regional agendas. We would prefer to hold off any analysis of arms control issues until next week.

*your adv recon be*

-- Before I turn to George I would like to briefly review our public diplomacy approach to the Geneva meeting and the key events around which our strategy will be focused.

-- Five public diplomacy milestones will generate the most media and public interest. We will reinforce with briefings, backgrounders and public statements.

1. George's September 24 speech to the UNGA.
2. His meeting the following day with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Soviet FM's own speech to the UN.
3. Your meeting here with Shevardnadze on September 27.
4. Gorbachev's October 2-5 visit to France.
5. Your speech to the UNGA and that of Soviet President Andrei Gromyko if he comes to New York.

**DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED**

- Believe that Gorbachev will trigger a new round of media interest when he visits France. Judgment is that his novelty value is wearing off. He has failed to convince European publics that his many proposals are more than old Soviet propaganda in new packaging. You will be giving a written interview to a French newspaper, Le Figaro, to get your own views before that same audience.
  
- We will stress that our Agenda for the meeting includes arms control, but goes much farther in an attempt to engage the Soviets on the many other sources of tension between us, including Human Rights, Afghanistan and their expansionist policies. We want, in other words, to discuss the sources of tension between us as well as the symptoms of it.
  
- We will want to demonstrate the Soviets' responsibility for Geneva results. Will stress that we want to make the meeting a success but we have no illusions. We are neither naive nor negative in our approach.
  
- Finally, Mr. President, your own role will include, in addition to your UNGA speech and your November press conference -- a series of press lunches with influential newsmen, a number of television and radio interviews for both foreign and domestic media, and a speech to the world via Worldnet. We hope to organize a well-publicized meeting with congressional leaders shortly before your departure.

*Reagan*

- Mr. President, George Shultz will now provide a review of the major Soviet-American issues in the three areas and delineate our key objectives for the meeting with Shevardnadze and, later, with Gorbachev.
  
- Bill Casey will now provide his perspective on Soviet expectations and objectives for these meetings.
  
- Cap will now present another perspective, focusing on key security concerns.
  
- I would like now to open this session to general discussion, Mr. President, to focus not only on the key issues in the areas we have discussed, but to stimulate our thinking with respect to our overall approach toward the Soviet Union.
  
- Mr. President, this concludes your briefing.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, September 20, 1985  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon  
Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)
- II. Objectives for Geneva Meetings  
and Perspectives of the  
Shevardnadze Meeting.....Secretary Shultz  
(10 minutes)
- III. Intelligence Review on Soviet  
Expectations.....William P. Casey  
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense Perspective.....Secretary Weinberger  
(5 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants  
(30 minutes)
- VI. Conclusion.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)

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BY Amf, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

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The White House

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Bob Pearson	1	P	
William Martin	2	un	
John Poindexter	3		
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	4	✓	P
William Martin	5	un	
NSC Secretariat	6	✓	D
Situation Room			

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cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

ASAP

(Date/Time)

NSC Meeting FRIDAY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 19, 1985

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: September 20, 1985  
LOCATION: Situation Room  
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon  
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RM*

I. PURPOSE

To review our agenda for the Shevardnadze visit, survey broad Soviet strategic objectives for the Geneva meeting between you and the General Secretary and to discuss our long-range objectives for managing the Soviet-American relationship.

II. BACKGROUND

Your upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze provides an opportunity for us to review the broad outlines of our policy towards the Soviet Union, the USSR's strategic objectives, and the Soviet and American "game plans" leading to the November meeting. Today's session will focus on the bilateral, regional and human rights issues between the U.S. and the USSR. We will hold the arms control issues for future sessions.

The Soviet game plan is becoming increasingly clear. They are seeking to create the public impression that they have exerted every possible effort in order to achieve a breakthrough in Geneva. We will want to be receptive to any serious Soviet proposal in order to lay the basis for further steps in our dialogue on the range of bilateral, regional and human rights issues.

-- REGIONAL ISSUES

While public attention has focused on the arms control aspects of our relationship, the Soviet use of force outside Soviet borders lies at the root of our problems. We are particularly concerned with the Soviet tendency to employ military force, directly or through surrogates, in their conduct of foreign policy. In the 1970's our efforts to develop an understanding with the USSR was severely impaired by Moscow's unrelenting pursuit of unilateral advantage.

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cc: Vice President  
Donald Regan

NLS M 1353 #10

B. *Amf*, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

We will look to our own strength, as well as closer cooperation with our Allies and friends, to defend our interests. We will make it clear to Shevardnadze that we will continue to pursue such policy as necessary -- in Central America, the Middle East, Africa or elsewhere. Further we will not forswear the right to lend assistance to democratic elements when they appeal to us to resist aggression. At the same time we are seeking to expand our dialogue with the Soviet Union on regional issues. As you know, this year we have had discussions on the Middle East, Southern Africa, Afghanistan and Asia.

-- BILATERAL ISSUES

It may be possible to complete several negotiations on issues such as exchanges and consulates in time for our November meeting. If the Soviets are not forthcoming on these issues, we are prepared to continue our discussions in the future. The important thing is to get agreements which can stand up to the test of time and are firmly grounded on each side's interests.

We told the Soviets we are prepared to discuss resumption of bilateral air service (which is very important to them), once agreement is reached on North Pacific safety measures and how to achieve a balance of economic benefits for American carriers serving the USSR. The Soviets in turn have tied the opening of Consulates and an exchanges agreement to the resumption of Aeroflot service to the U.S.

We may wish to consider some more ambitious proposals in the area of contacts, exchanges and reciprocal access to each other's media, since such steps would undermine the Soviet monopoly of information made available to its own people.

-- HUMAN RIGHTS

The Human Rights situation in the Soviet Union has, if anything, deteriorated since Gorbachev took power. Andrei Sakharov and his wife remain isolated and conditions for well known dissidents such as Shcharanskiy, Orlov, and Begun have deteriorated. In addition, several spouses of American citizens continue to be refused permission to emigrate.

Recent Gorbachev comments and an article by KGB Head Chebrikov call for a noncompromising hardline on internal dissent. The Soviets now respond to our criticism of their human rights performance with aggressive counter attacks on economic and social conditions in the west. Gorbachev advisor Yuri Arbatov recently made it clear to the Vice President that any serious discussion of human rights could spell failure for the summit.

We want to emphasize to Shevardnadze that we consider human rights an integral part of our relationship and an area where the Soviets can do much to improve relations at a low cost to themselves. We may want to tie an improvement with trade relations to moves in the human rights area. Some of these points are best made privately with Soviet interlocutors, to give them the opportunity to adjust their practices without being seen as backing down under U.S. pressure.

III. PARTICIPANTS

To be provided separately.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity in the ~~Cabinet~~ room prior to the meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject highlighting the main issues, followed by George who will provide a review of the key Soviet-American issues. Bill Casey and Cap Weinberger will have 5 minutes each to discuss Soviet strategic objectives in general terms, followed by a 30-minute discussion and concluding remarks.

Prepared by:  
Tyrus W. Cobb/Jack F. Matlock

Attachment

Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	List of Participants

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President  
Mr. Craig L. Fuller

State

Secretary George P. Shultz  
Ms. Rozanne L. Ridgway (Assistant Secretary for European  
Affairs)

Treasury

Secretary James A. Baker, III  
~~Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt~~

Justice

Attorney General Edwin Meese III

CIA

Mr. William J. Casey  
Mr. Robert M. Gates

OMB

Dr. Alton Keel

JCS

General John A. Wickham Jr. (Acting Chairman)  
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

White House

Mr. Donald T. Regan  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC

Amb Jack F. Matlock  
Colonel Tyrus Cobb

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, September 20, 1985  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon  
Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)
- II. Objectives for Geneva Meetings  
& perspectives of the  
Shevardnadze Meeting ..... Secretary Shultz  
(10 minutes)
- III. Intelligence review on Soviet  
expectations..... William P. Casey  
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense perspective..... Secretary Weinberger  
(5 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants  
(30 minutes)
- VI. Conclusion.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB/JACK F. MATLOCK

*JS*  
SIGNED

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Shevardnadze Visit - Friday  
September 20, 1985 -- 11:00 a.m.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing background on the NSC meeting scheduled for September 20, 1985, at 11:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum includes a proposed agenda at Tab A. The list of participants and the talking points for your use will be provided in a separate package.

Per your instruction this NSC meeting is designed to serve as a preliminary review of the major issues between the United States and the Soviet Union in the bilateral, regional and human rights areas. Arms control philosophy and issues will not be covered specifically, although broader security concerns will certainly be reviewed. We see this session as an opportunity for the senior members of this Administration to discuss candidly with the President our broad approach to our policy toward the Soviet Union and to stimulate discussion on the contrasting Soviet and American objectives for the meeting in Geneva between the President and the General Secretary.

We would anticipate that you would begin this session with an introduction highlighting to the President that this session is intended to serve as a strategic overview of our broad policy toward the Soviet Union and to examine the major issues on our bilateral, regional and human rights agenda. In addition, we recommend that you review for the President our public diplomacy strategy and highlight the key events between now and November 18 that present opportunities for us to convey our position convincingly to the American and Allied publics -- and to the Soviet leadership. You might then turn to Secretary Shultz who will follow with a review of the key Soviet-American issues in the three areas and delineate our objectives for the meeting with Gorbachev. Bill Casey is prepared to follow with a five minute presentation on Soviet objectives, followed by Cap who will treat Soviet defense concerns generally.

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

<sup>RL</sup> Ron Lehman, <sup>RL</sup> Bob Linhard, and <sup>JM</sup> Johnathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve   M   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I      Memorandum to the President
- Tab A      Proposed Agenda
- Tab B      List of Participants



REVISED

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

9/19/85

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: The NSC Meeting on Friday, September 20, will be held in the Situation Room rather than the Cabinet Room, as previously notified.

DATE:

TIME:

DURATION:

LOCATION:

REMARKS REQUIRED:

MEDIA COVERAGE:

FIRST LADY  
PARTICIPATION:

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc:	K. Barun	A. Kingon	W. Martin
	P. Buchanan	J. Kuhn	
	D. Chew	C. McCain	
	E. Crispen	B. Oglesby	
	T. Dawson	E. Rollins	
	B. Elliott	J. Rosebush	
	L. Faulkner	R. Scouten	
	M. Friedersdorf	R. Shaddick	
	C. Fuller	B. Shaddix	
	W. Henkel	L. Speakes	
	E. Hickey	WHCA Audio/Visual	
	C. Hicks	WHCA Operations	
	J. Hooley	N. Yates	

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 19, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. DONALD GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. STEPHEN GALEBACH  
Senior Special Assistant  
to the Attorney General  
Department of Justice

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. ALTON KEEL  
Associate Director for  
National Security and  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Treasury

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE JOULAN  
Executive Assistant to the  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting -- Shevardnadze Visit ~~(C)~~

There will be a National Security Council meeting in the Cabinet Room on Friday, September 20, at 11 a.m., on the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Attached is an agenda for the meeting. ~~(C)~~

The focus of this meeting will be on bilateral issues, regional concerns, and human rights. Arms control issues will be examined in-depth at a future NSC meeting. ~~(C)~~

  
William F. Martin  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Tab A      Agenda

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BY smf, NAME, DATE 9/24/04

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, September 20, 1985  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon  
Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)
- II. Objectives for Geneva Meetings  
& perspectives of the  
Shevardnadze Meeting ..... Secretary Shultz  
(10 minutes)
- III. Intelligence review on Soviet  
expectations..... William P. Casey  
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense perspective..... Secretary Weinberger  
(5 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants  
(30 minutes)
- VI. Conclusion.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)

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_____ Mr. Kimmitt	_____ [REDACTED]	_____ Mr. Mahley	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. Pearson	_____ Col. Douglass	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Mr. Sable	_____ Mr. Wigg
_____ Mr. Burghardt	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Mr. Sestanovich	_____ Mr. Wood
_____ Mr. Cannistraro	_____ Mr. Grimes	_____ Mr. Menges	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Mr. Wright
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Ms. Small	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Col. Cobb	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ Sit. Room
_____ Mr. Covey	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Stark	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Mr. Cox	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Steiner	_____
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Ringdahl	_____ Ms. Tahir-Kheli	_____

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THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

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_____ Mr. Kimmitt	_____ [REDACTED]	_____ Mr. Mahley	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. Pearson	_____ Col. Douglass	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Mr. Sable	_____ Mr. Wigg
_____ Mr. Burghardt	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Mr. Sestanovich	_____ Mr. Wood
_____ Mr. Cannistraro	_____ Mr. Grimes	_____ Mr. Menges	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Mr. Wright
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Ms. Small	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Col. Cobb	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ Sit. Room
_____ Mr. Covey	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Stark	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Mr. Cox	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Steiner	_____
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Ringdahl	_____ Ms. Tahir-Kheli	_____

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DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119	1	9/19	2018	<i>Maureen A. Melvin</i>
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
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Page 1 of 1 Pages

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4/21/98*

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*Urgent*

MESSAGE NO. 696 CLASSIFICATION ~~Confidential~~ Eyes Only PAGES 2  
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION National Security Council Meeting  
LOG 1. Sept 99939

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<u>B</u>	<u>Nichols Platt</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>KZ</u>	<u>Sherrie Cooksey</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>D</u>	<u>Colonel David Brown</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>A</u>	<u>John Risse</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>D</u>	<u>Blair George Joubert</u>	<u>Asst Dir</u>	<u>Chairs</u>

REMARKS Urgent Eyes Only

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM WILLIAM MARTIN (NAME) 436-2211 (EXTENSION)  (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION National Security Council Meeting 1001 Sep 25 99939

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Richards Platt</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	<u></u>
<u>XZ</u>	<u>Sherrill Cooksey</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	<u></u>
<u>D</u>	<u>Colonel David Brown</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	<u></u>
<u>A</u>	<u>John Rysse</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	<u></u>
<u>D</u>	<u>Blair George Joubert</u>	<u>Asst Dir</u>	<u>Ch</u>

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 FROM WILLIAM MARTIN (NAME) 456-2211 (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION National Security Council Meeting  
 LCG: Sept 11 99939

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<u>KZ</u>	<u>Sherrie Cooksey</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>D</u>	<u>Colonel David Brown</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>A</u>	<u>John Rippe</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>D</u>	<u>Blair George Joubert</u>	<u>Asst Dir</u>	<u>Chin</u>

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# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

19 SEP 1985 18 42

NMCC-CWO

**URGENT**

# C

MESSAGE NO. 696 CLASSIFICATION ~~Confidential~~ EYES ONLY PAGES 2  
 FROM WILLIAM MARTIN (NAME) 456-2222 (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION National Security Council  
meeting LOG: Sept 18 99939

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Nicholas Platt</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>XZ</u>	<u>Sherrie Cooksey</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>D</u>	<u>Colonel David Brown</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>A</u>	<u>John Rice</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>D</u>	<u>Bless George Julian</u>	<u>Asst Both China</u>	

REMARKS Urgent Eyes Only

MAN 4/2/86

RECEIVED

85 SEP 19 8:41

USE  
FORM

# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

DEF 11 0 45  
WATCH OFF

**URGENT**

KI

MESSAGE NO. 696

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*EYES ONLY*

PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM MARTIN

456-2221

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

*National Security Council*

*meeting*

LOG

*Sept 99939*

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

B

Nichols Platt

Exec Sec

KZ

Sherrill Cooksey

Exec Sec

D

Colonel David Brown

Exec Sec

A

John Rysse

Exec Sec

D

Allen George Jovan Assist Dir

REMARKS

*Urgent Eyes Only*

PLEASE RETURN TO THE  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

*William Martin*

RECEIVED

85 SEP 19 P 6: 41

# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 696 CLASSIFICATION Eyes Only Confidential PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM MARTIN (NAME) 456-2224 (EXTENSION)  (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION National Security Council Meeting LOG #: SEP II 99939

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Nicholas Platt</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	<u></u>
<u>KI</u>	<u>Sherrie Cooksey</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	<u></u>
<u>D</u>	<u>Colonel David Brown</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	<u></u>
<u>A</u>	<u>John Rixse</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	<u></u>
<u>D</u>	<u>Bren George Joulon</u>	<u>Assist</u>	<u>Both China</u>

REMARKS URGENT Eyes Only

10/2/2008

National Security Council  
The White House



System # II  
Package # 99939  
1978

SEP 18 P 2: 12

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1/6	✓	
William Martin	2/3/5/6	un	me
John Poindexter	3/4		
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat		B	D
Situation Room			
<u>Cole</u>	3	OK	redo on return

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Bill*  
*...*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II  
99939

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

ACTION

September 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TC*

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSC Meeting on September 20, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to pertinent agencies, forwarding an agenda for the NSC meeting on Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's upcoming visit. The meeting is scheduled for Friday, September 20, at 11 a.m., in the Cabinet Room.

*Other Ex*  
Jack Matlock, Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard and Jonathan Miller concur. *not available*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the Agencies  
Tab A Agenda

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
*MJD  
4/2/98*

National Security Council  
The White House

100-121

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_



	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	4	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>m</i>	<i>A</i>
William Martin	4	<i>um</i>	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<i>JP</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____



I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Bud,  
The only question I have is Bob Kimmitt. The problem here is that we are including Baker and Meese in their personal capacities. On the other hand a lower level point of contact <sup>(over)</sup>



John,  
I explained to Bob. He understands. Bice

*not if this  
note to  
imp.  
2/25*

on our issues would be good  
and Bob would be fine but  
then these will want to bring  
somebody.

Please explain  
to Treasury, it's  
a precedent problem.  
So we want to  
hold to them  
only for  
Simpson

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

→ J.M.P.?  
1) OK  
looks good  
to me.  
War

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: CAROL CLEVELAND *Carol*

SUBJECT: Attendees at National Security Council Meeting, September 20, 1985 (U)

2) Cabinet Room  
being used -  
We will use  
S.T. Room

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council Meeting on the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the Situation Room on September 20, at 11:00 a.m.  
~~(C)~~

The President

The Vice President  
Mr. Craig L. Fuller

State:  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Ms. Rozanne L. Ridgeway (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs)

Treasury:  
Secretary James A. Baker, III  
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt

Defense:  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Justice  
Attorney General Edwin Meese III

CIA:  
Mr. William J. Casey  
Mr. Robert M. Gates

OMB:  
Dr. Alton Keel

JCS:  
General John A. Wickham, Jr. (Acting Chairman)  
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1353 #15

BY *smf*, NAME, DATE 9/24/04



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

White House:

Mr. Donald T. Regan  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:

Amb Jack F. Matlock  
[Colonel Tyrus Cobb] — ?

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

At Tab A is a proposed seating plan for this meeting.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

At Tab B is an agenda for the meeting which we plan to put in the folders at the meeting.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A - Seating Plan  
Tab B - Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ridgeway Kimmitt

Gates

Keel

Cobb

Shultz

Baker

Meese

**Casey**

President

McFarlane

Vice President

Weinberger

Wickham

Regan

Fuller

Ikle

Moreau

Poindexter

Matlock

~~McFarlane~~  
OK

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, September 20, 1985  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon  
Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)
- II. Objectives for Geneva Meetings  
& perspectives of the  
Shevardnadze Meeting ..... Secretary Shultz  
(10 minutes)
- III. Intelligence review on Soviet  
expectations..... William P. Casey  
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense perspective..... Secretary Weinberger  
(5 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants  
(30 minutes)
- VI. Conclusion.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1353 #14

BY amp, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

→ J m P. ?  
1) OK  
looks good  
to me  
can

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: CAROL CLEVELAND *and*

SUBJECT: Attendees at National Security Council Meeting, September 20, 1985 (U)

2) Cabinet mem  
being used -  
be used in  
sit down

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council Meeting on the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the Situation Room on September 20, at 11:00 a.m.  
(e)

The President

The Vice President  
Mr. Craig L. Fuller

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz  
Ms. Rozanne L. Ridgeway (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs)

Treasury:

Secretary James A. Baker, III  
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt

Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Justice

Attorney General Edwin Meese III

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey  
Mr. Robert M. Gates

NLS M1353 #17

BY smf, NAME, DATE 9/24/04

OMB:

Dr. Alton Keel

JCS:

General John A. Wickham, Jr. (Acting Chairman)  
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

White House:

Mr. Donald T. Regan  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:

Amb Jack F. Matlock  
Colonel Tyrus Cobb] — ?

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

At Tab A is a proposed seating plan for this meeting.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

At Tab B is an agenda for the meeting which we plan to put in the folders at the meeting.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A	-	Seating Plan
Tab B	-	Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Ridgeway

Kimmitt

Gates

Keel

Cobb

Shultz

Baker

Meese

**Casey**

President

McFarlane

Vice President

Weinberger

Wickham

Regan

Fuller

Ikle

Moreau

Poindexter

Matlock

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, September 20, 1985  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon  
Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)
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& perspectives of the  
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(10 minutes)
- III. Intelligence review on Soviet  
expectations..... William P. Casey  
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense perspective..... Secretary Weinberger  
(5 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants  
(30 minutes)
- VI. Conclusion.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1353 #18

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 9/24/04

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



Office of Management  
Appointments Center  
Room 0601 OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on September 20, 1985

for The President of White House  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President ✓  
Mr. Craig L. Fuller ✓

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz ✓  
Ms. Rozanne L. Ridgeway ✓

~~Amb Arthur Holtzman~~

Treasury:

Secretary James A. Baker, III ✓

Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger ✓  
Dr. Fred C. Ikle ✓

Justice:

Attorney General Edwin Meese, III ✓

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey ✓  
Mr. Robert M. Gates ✓

OMB:

Dr. Alton Keel ✓

JCS:

General John A. Wickham, Jr. ✓  
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau ✓

White House:

Mr. Donald T. Regan ✓  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane ✓  
Admiral John M. Poindexter ✓

NSC:

Amb Jack F. Matlock ✓  
Col. Tyrus Cobb ✓

Building West Wing White House

Room No. Situation Room

Time of Meeting 11:00 a.m.

Requested by Carol Cleveland

Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Date of request 9/20/85

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742