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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Archivist: mjd
 FOIA ID: F98-018
 Date: 08/31/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re: Lebanon, 6p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #9, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56499</i>		
2. paper	re: Lebanon, 4p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART " " #10, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56500</i>		
3. agenda	re: NSC meeting, 1p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>R " " #11</i>		
4. notes	re: NSC meeting, 2p	9/10/83	P1/F1
	<i>R " " #12</i>		
5. memo	William Clark to the President re: Lebanon, 1p	9/9/83	P1/F1
	<i>R " " #13</i>		
6. cable	09104Z SEP 83, 5p	9/9/83	P1/F1
	<i>PART. F98-018/1 #14 10/27/01, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56501 upheld</i>		
7. paper	re: Lebanon, 3p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #15, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56502</i>		
8. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 4p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART " " #16, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56503</i>		
9. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 6p	9/8/83	P1/F1
	<i>PART " " #17, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56504</i>		
10. talking points	re: Lebanon, 10p-3p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART " " #18, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56505</i>		
11. memo	William Clark to the President re: NSC meeting, 2p	9/9/83	P1/F1
	<i>R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56506</i>		
12. paper	re: START, 10p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>R 11/9/05 M03-1348 #26</i>		
13. memo	Ron Lehman/Sven Kraemer/Bob Linhard to Clark re: NSC meeting, 1p	9/9/83	P1/F1
	<i>R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56507</i>		

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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WORST CASE STRATEGIES FOR LEBANON

Background:

Our stated objectives in Lebanon have consistently been:

- restoring the sovereignty of the government of Lebanon throughout its territory;
- obtaining the withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- ensuring the security of Lebanon's borders especially the northern border of Israel.

Ambassador McFarlane's recent cable on this subject underscores the point that we may be at a watershed in our efforts to promote U.S. objectives in Lebanon. The problem simply put is apparent Syrian determination to impede the process of national reconciliation, maintain a zone of influence in Lebanon and force the withdrawal of the multi-national peacekeeping forces in Beirut. Our efforts to date including measures to augment our offshore presence and to undertake a more aggressive self-defense of our MNF contingent may not have persuaded the SARG that we are prepared to confront Syria directly in furtherance of our stated objectives and in our support of the GOL. Furthermore, the precipitous Israeli withdrawal to the Awwali River--owing largely to domestic political pressure and the refusal of the GOL to implement the Lebanon-Israel agreement--may have encouraged the SARG to pursue its objectives in Lebanon in a manner that does not cross redrawn Israeli "red lines" and thereby incur serious risk of Israeli reprisals.

The Core Problem:

If McFarlane's analysis is correct, we have stark choices to make. In short:

- Retain our stated objectives and escalate our involvement in the Lebanon problem, politically and militarily, to bring an early and positive change in Syrian behavior.
- Retain our stated objectives but disengage from the active effort to promote national reconciliation and restore Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Syrian intransigence. At the same time, work in other arenas to encourage international and Arab opprobrium for Syrian behavior.
- Modify our objectives for Lebanon and realign our strategy to what is feasible and doable without incurring the risk of a direct confrontation with Syria.

The first option obviously entails a high risk of military confrontation with Syria and a serious crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. It also entails a clear prospect for worsened U.S.

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BY LUJ NARA DATE 5-19-10

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relations with certain other Arab countries, although the reaction of moderate Arab powers will depend fundamentally on the degree of pressure which is ultimately needed to force a change in Syrian behavior. To mitigate the adverse reactions from the Arab world, McFarlane stipulates the need for prior assurances of support from the key Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Given traditional Arab concern for U.S.-Israeli collusion, McFarlane has made a multilateral approach by the U.S., France, Italy, and the UK an indispensable condition for a strategy of escalating pressure on Syria.

The second option leaves open the question of what we would do with the MNF in the face of continued Syrian (surrogate) pressure to force its withdrawal. We could buy time and reduce the risk of casualties by continuing a policy of aggressive self-defense although the question of how we treat the provisions of the War Powers Resolution might eventually require the withdrawal of the USMNF. The most significant risk if we choose this option is a serious erosion of U.S. credibility in the Middle East and beyond. There is also some possibility that the tentative policy implicit in this choice will lead to an expanded civil war which culminates in a defacto partition of Lebanon into Muslim, Druze, and Christian entities and Syrian and Israeli spheres of influence.

The third option is in reality a grouping for a variety of sub-options. For example, we could settle for a partitioned Lebanon and cut our losses by actively supporting a new political entity comprised of Greater Beirut and the Maronite heartland. Depending on the success of our efforts with the LAF, there might be some possibility that the dominantly Shia districts in southern Lebanon could ultimately be incorporated into such a Lebanese entity, if Israel was persuaded that security of her border could be assured. The common denominator in these sub-options is acceptance of a Syrian zone of influence in the areas currently occupied by the Syrian Army in addition to the Alayh and Shouf Districts. The precise role of the MNF in the various possibilities grouped under this option is not clear. However, provided the Syrians acquiesced in a partition of the type discussed above, there is a good possibility that U.S. forces could be withdrawn as the situation on the ground stabilized-- although we might continue a residual training and support effort for the LAF. As true with the second option, this option could also lead to an erosion in U.S. credibility.

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The Press of Time:

McFarlane's cables stress that the situation in Alayh and the Shouf is very fluid and that the trends are adverse (massacres, continued shelling, presence of PLO, etc.). While we would ideally prefer more time to thoroughly study and sort through the costs and benefits which attend these options (especially the first one), we need to act promptly, if we decide to continue with our present objectives.

Elements of McFarlane's Recommended Strategy

The critical element is a multilateral approach to Syria which for simplicity's sake would be limited to objectives which are ostensibly shared already. The immediate objectives of this collective strategy would be:

- an immediate ceasefire in place
- minor LAF redeployments within Beirut
- commencement of an immediate process of withdrawing all foreign forces to be completed by a date certain
- restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in areas evacuated via a gradual extension of the LAF presence.

The approach would feature common determination to restore Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity supported by a demonstrated willingness to halt Syrian interference by MNF deployments to "strategic locations" adjacent to Syrian positions. Our chances for persuading the other MNF countries to join in this approach will be enhanced if we describe the alternatives as we see them. In the final analysis, they must be made to see that a coordinated multilateral approach to Syria is the only alternative to the partition of Lebanon and the failure of our respective efforts thus far.

Inasmuch as the objectives are already included in the "Bandar Plan," we might expect Saudi (and other moderate Arab) support for this multilateral approach although the "muscle" would have to be provided by the MNF countries. The recent crisis in Saudi-Syrian relations owing to Syrian rejection of Bandar's four elements, provides us with an opportunity to capitalize on Saudi frustration, if we move quickly before possible Syrian counterpressure can be brought to bear and the Saudis back away from their commitment to Gemayel.

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TWO CONCEPTS FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE LEBANON CRISIS OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS

I. Concept A. [where we can easily be]:

A measured response to the current crisis, this option buys time for a sober review of US interests in the maelstrom of Lebanese politics and in the Middle East. Help GOL/LAF control Beirut, hasten Lebanese Reconciliation Process, and send forceful signal to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Soviets, etc, through increased MNF aggressive self-defense and deterrence, with LAF taking lead role in pushing out from Beirut and expanding GOL/controlled perimeter.

A. Immediate Objectives:

1. Buttress LAF to carry out its duties
2. Deter Syria and Lebanese factions from firing at MNF
3. Enhance MacFarlane mission leverage on Damascus.

B. Basic Concept

1. Obtain greater international support through increased participation and commitment by other MNF contributors.
2. Lebanese Government Legitimacy Reinforced
3. US role continues to be supportive although more active.

C. Illustrative Measures

1. LAF training and supply is tailored towards aggressively pushing out from Beirut perimeter.
2. All MNF countries [France, UK, Italy, US] loosely coordinate response to hostile fire with immediate, violent, but prudent and proportional response. Share intelligence and maximize impact
3. All MNF forces mutually support each other's areas of responsibility, eg EISENHOWER responds to shelling of UK positions in West Beirut.
4. More aggressive measures to defeat artillery including, as appropriate, naval bombardment, counter-battery fire, and air strikes.
5. US/French carriers on scene [Eisenhower, Foch, Iwo Jima and Tarawa] and British land-based aircraft provide immediate support. UK Harrier carrier INVINCIBLE arrives in area. Italian cruiser on way.
6. Second USN attack carrier and New Jersey prepare to sail.

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NARA DATE 5-19-17

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D. Area of Operations

1. National MNF forces stay in present areas but cooperate and reach out together to sting those who dare hit MNF.
2. LAF, with its rear better covered by more powerful MNF defense, expands GOL controlled perimeters, aggressively seeking out by most appropriate means and silencing artillery positions threatening Beirut. [Knives could be most effective.]

E. Implications

1. New situation leads to more explicit expression of war powers, opening way for sharing intelligence, hostile fire pay, and essential training of LAF.
2. Low risk of direct confrontation with Syria
3. Opportunity for GOL to continue its consultations for Lebanese consensus and for Bud to work solution.

F. Rationale: to gain time

1. Time is needed for US policy makers to make considered decision on importance of Lebanon to US policy in the region and critical consequences of potential next steps.
2. Gemayel needs time, and a substantially strengthened hand, if he is to pursue a policy of national reconciliation and consolidate.
3. Mandate for MNF in 1982 stretches like rubber band but does not break. With this ~~with this~~ concept we can generate Congressional and public support.

II. CONCEPT B. [Significant Step]

US now assumes responsibility for defense of city of Beirut if it becomes obvious LAF unable to defend itself. US now willing, as bottom line, to ensure survival of GOL and city [State] of Beirut. A watershed option to be taken only as a consequence of review of global requirements at the highest level.

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A. Immediate Objectives

1. Prevent final collapse of GOL and destabilizing effect that would have on region and future peace prospects
2. Maintain minimum semblance of order in Lebanon.
3. Deter Syrian advance to occupy all of Lebanon.

B. Basic Concept

1. Maximum effort to sustain international support through MNF partners. We sink or swim together.
2. Active US and European military action to deter or defeat attempt to overrun Beirut and establish Lebanese Government hostile to western interests.
3. Accept that preservation of Beirut city is imperative US national interest if GOL is legitimate by our definition. We would do the job alone [ie - without MNF] if necessary.

C. Illustrative Measures

1. Keep LAF out front [and controlling internal factions] but resume MNF patrols in the city of Beirut
2. Expand USMC contingent and widen USMC perimeter round city and airport. French, Italians and UK take similar steps.
3. Increased defensive artillery, naval and air support as required. MNF "reaches out to sting well beyond city limits".
4. Massive international buildup offshore; second carrier and NEW JERSEY speed to Lebanon.

D. Area of Operations

1. MNF would assume active defense of city extending area to cover approaches to Beirut.
2. Air and Naval activity extended to any area of Lebanon where necessary to silence hostile fire. Commando raids could be expected.
3. Possible Strikes against Syrian artillery positions inside sovereign Syrian territory could not be excluded. [Soviet Sa-5's].

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E. Implications

1. Imperative requirement is strong bipartisan congressional support as well as backing from our MNF partners.
2. Rubber band mandate of original purpose stretches immediately beyond breaking point.
3. Premature unless LAF collapses and even then still imprudent without intense scrutiny.
4. Potential for disruption of Middle East peace efforts. Polarization of friend and radicals.
5. Possible Alienation of Moderate Arab Governments but might unite key friends.
6. Preservation of Symbol of Lebanese Independence.
7. Big spin-offs for Bud.

F. Rationale

1. Even with collapse of GOL, Middle East interests of the US would continue. Preservation of US presence in Lebanon may prove to be overriding consideration.
2. Independence of Lebanon has been pledged by succeeding American administrations since Eisenhower.
3. Israelis are still dominant local force.
4. Can an unpredictable situation lead to instant and lasting success.

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SEP - 8 1983

Near-Term Lebanon Strategy
Concept for Management of the Next Few Weeks

We have reached a critical juncture in our Lebanon policy. The prospects for further casualties among U.S. Marines and other MNF contributors, the evident weakness of the GOL and the restricted operational area of the LAF, the GOL's difficulties in forming a government of national union, the intransigent hostility of Syria, and the Israeli pullback have combined to force immediate decisions with far-reaching consequences affecting our presence in Lebanon and our future role both in the Middle East and throughout the globe. In considering the options for immediate action we must not only keep in mind the four objectives which determined our decision to intervene: move to a cessation of Syrian/PLO/Israeli hostilities; strengthen the central government to make possible eventual control throughout Lebanon; departure of foreign forces from Lebanon; and securing the Northern border of Israel but how our overall objectives in the Middle East are best served.

U.S. credibility is also at a critical point. Can we use our military power to help a friendly but weak government in a manner which will not jeopardize our larger interests in the Middle East? The answer turns on (a) military effectiveness, (b) broad acceptability of our political goals for Lebanon to the Lebanese, our Allies, and to moderate Arab friends as well, and (c) prospects for stabilization in the region as a whole.

To achieve these objectives we must decide whether to expand operations within the limits we have defined for ourselves thus far, or whether we should take actions that would cross military and political thresholds requiring a major new commitment of U.S. force and prestige. We will also have to consider at some point, the possibility that events on the ground and our larger interests in the Middle East and elsewhere could cause us to reduce or withdraw our MNF contingent despite it not having fully achieved its objective.

Where we are Now

US marines of the MNF and offshore support forces have in the last few days been given more latitude for aggressive but for prudent self defense measures, and have already begun to implement those instructions; including carrier air reconnaissance and naval gunfire support directed at artillery firing into the airport. Additional forces are being deployed by us, the French and the UK to provide further muscle for the MNF.

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BY RW NARA DATE 5-19-10

Otherwise, our basic mandate remains unchanged: providing spine to the GOL by our static military presence and deterring external attacks against that Government. These recent measures can buy some time, possibly as much as several weeks, while we consider future options. This paper describes two concepts for management of this problem over the next few weeks until basic US policy objectives can be defined and an overall policy decided given the fluid situation created by recent events such as the Israeli withdrawal, Begin's death and factional fighting.

Two Basic Concepts

Pending a fuller review of the crisis in all its dimensions and solutions extending from extraction of US forces, possibly under cover of a UNIFIL flag all the way up through confrontation with Soviets in Syria, we should consider two basic concepts to support US policy in Lebanon. The most important military contributions in support of this policy have been: (a) an MNF presence to help deter hostile actions against GOL/LAF authority in Beirut; and (b) an accelerated military assistance program to rebuild the LAF.

The first concept would involve a more aggressive employment of these military instruments (within their current mandate) to provide increased assistance and support for the GOL and LAF as the legitimate authority in Lebanon. It would envisage a further more aggressive defense of the MNF, including both the Marines and our European partners, as well as a dramatic expansion of the MNF offshore to bolster our deterrent posture in the region.

The second concept would involve a major change in the mandate for U.S. forces. This approach would continue the steps undertaken in the first concept but would go significantly further. It would mean that the US could well find itself responsible for the defense of Beirut. Support by the Congress, our MNF allies and key Middle East governments would be imperative.

I. Option A: Aggressive Defense by the MNF within the Limits We have Defined for Ourselves

(Note: Sequence of steps indicated by letters have a certain logical sequence reflecting level of intensity but numbers are simply illustrations, a menu of ideas of which there are hundreds more needing professional refining and the most sophisticated political-military coordination.)

A. Strengthen GOL Forces:

- 1 Continued resupply of LAF: This would finish out the massive ammunition effort which we have already begun through Egypt.

2. Accelerated training of new LAF units to increase the viability of the LAF and its capabilities to defend Beirut in new circumstances.
3. Increased supply to the LAF of weapons to deal with the current threat to the MNF, including long range artillery and armor.
4. Provision of tactical intelligence to the LAF in real time.
5. Tactical reconnaissance support by carrier aircraft and other U.S. assets minimizing risks.
6. Consider armed reconnaissance in support of MNF permitting U.S. aircraft to counter hostile fire.
7. Carefully consider direct artillery support for LAF operations initiated in retaliation for fire at MNF positions.

B. More Aggressive Self-Defense by Entire MNF and Marines:

1. Improve MNF ability to locate and identify sources of hostile fire through intelligence, reconnaissance and the provision of additional equipment and intensify intelligence sharing to deal with artillery. Maximize from satellite to humint. Share results immediately among MNF.
2. Discrete but responsive artillery, air and naval bombardment actions to silence hostile fire directed against any MNF positions.
3. Mount armed reconnaissance of Syrian controlled zone in Lebanon both to identify units firing at the MNF and to lend credibility to our warnings to Syria.
4. Consider retaliatory action against discrete Syrian artillery positions in Lebanon.

C. Expand MNF Offshore:

1. Carefully coordinate and build up mobile international forces offshore with the French, who now have the Carrier FOCH on station, and British, who have sent six attack aircraft to Cyprus and who could have the Harrier carrier HMS INVINCIBLE off Lebanon on September 22, to maximize the air strike and naval gunfire capability to intimidate those planning hostile action against the MNF and to broaden the base of Western involvement. At the same time Syrians and others who manipulate surrogates have strong signal. Convince Italian Navy to play a more substantial role in support of MNF and LAF ground forces.

2. Move another U.S. carrier battle group to Mediterranean.
3. Send New Jersey from Western Central America through Panama Canal to Lebanon.

II. Concept B. US willingness now (as bottom line) to ensure survival of the GOL in City (State) of Beirut

This is a logical extension of the above activities pushing the LAF as a priority but ultimately willing to apply U.S. combat power to defend Beirut and actively to protect the GOL in the city. The sequence of steps needed in this approach would involve a continuation and intensification of the military measures plus actions along the lines of the following:

A. First, skillfully build maximum bi-partisan Congressional support. In moving forward on an increased U.S. commitment in Lebanon, clearly some action with the Hill beyond War Powers notification would be necessary. In any case, before proceeding further with this option as a first step we should astutely calculate support in the Congress.

B. Resuming MNF patrols in the city of Beirut and manning keycheck points would release LAF assets for operations in the Shuf and on the coastal road. Well defended patrols would send messages and would have maximum counterbattery capability.

C. Enlarging the size of the USMC contingent to enable it to play a larger role in the defense of Beirut. Necessarily, this would widen the defensive perimeters around USMC positions in the city and would require augmented defense and defense support activities by all elements of the MNF.

D. At a minimum permitted defensive artillery, naval and air support would have to be extended to enable the Marines to properly defend themselves. Retaliatory fire, and direct and indirect actions would be executed against any forces (including Syrian) which initiated attacks against the GOL/LAF in this area, as well as the MNF.

III. Building Allied Support and GOL Base

A. If our initial actions are to lead to success, we must skillfully nurture the support of our partners in the MNF. We should undertake a complementary consultative effort with Western allies in Europe. The Secretary of State has already reinforced these efforts with MNF nations while in Madrid.

B. We should work to keep the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt engaged in supporting our efforts. Moderate Arab backing is a key ingredient both in isolating Syria and in gluing together a new Lebanese consensus.

C. We should consult closely with Israel regarding its current posture in the region after withdrawal from the Shuf. An unhealthy perception is emerging of Israeli strategic vulnerability and diminished will, particularly among the Syrians. This is something both we and the Israelis need to redress.

D. We should accelerate efforts to maintain and strengthen the Lebanese central government, concentrating in the short term on achievement of a political agreement which includes a ceasefire, movement of the LAF into the Shuf and initiation of a process to broaden the base of the GOL.

E. In the longer term, we should continue to strive for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces, including the Syrians. At the same time, while a broadened government would want to review the Agreement with Israel and freeze implementation, we would make clear that we do not support abrogation since it is an instrument through which Israel's eventual withdrawal can be achieved.

IV. Other Activities to Study Urgently

A. Implications of undertaking more direct and indirect action against Syrian forces both in terms of our sustained military effectiveness and consequences for our relations with other Arab states.

B. Whether to defend a perimeter beyond Beirut targets in Lebanon, its dimensions (e.g. interlocking confederation with capital in Beirut that coexists with Israeli and Syrian dominated areas) and the forces that would be required to defend it.

C. Trends and realistic possibilities over the next few months.

D. The longer-term Lebanon problem in the broad global context of the next two years. Where we, Israel, Arab friends, Europeans, Soviets, etc., are going.

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V. The Need for Urgent High Level Study

Having said all of the above, the fact remains that with concepts A or B we are simply buying a brief time to give the NSC an opportunity to study our goals and objectives in the entire Middle East. Success or failure in Lebanon will have a crucial effect on overall solutions to the Middle East question. Will the cost of achieving success in Lebanon be failure of our overall regional goals or will failure to achieve success be even worse? Decisions on Lebanon policy beyond the next few weeks must be considered in this context.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

September 9, 1983

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ACTION

WPC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PHILIP DUR ^{HT FOR}
HOWARD TEICHER ^{HT}

SUBJECT: Talking points for Lebanon Discussion at
September 10, 1983 NSC Meeting

Attached are talking points on Lebanon for use by you (or the Vice President) at tomorrow's NSC meeting. The points are structured to conform with Bud's cable and the options described in the paper on "Worst Case Strategies for Lebanon."

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the attached talking points.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By M-87 NARA, Date 9/1/96

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TALKING POINTS ON LEBANON

- Turning our attention to Lebanon, you received a set of papers focused on our strategy for dealing with Syria in Lebanon. Of special concern to this discussion is Bud's cable describing what he thinks is a likely worst-case scenario.
- Bud argues that we need to consider a tough strategy toward Syria now. The Syrians are duplicitous, and are making every effort to undermine our policy. They do not think the U.S. is credible.
- As you recall, Bud came here last week to discuss the Syrian dimension of the problem and he feels that events on the ground may not provide us the luxury of too much more time to study the problem. Bud argues that the longer we wait the less credibility we have. I agree, but some may feel differently.
- The choices we face and the risks which attend each option are known. We may disagree on the costs and benefits of each option, but this is what must be discussed today.

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 BY RW NARA DATE 5-19-10

- I believe some of you feel we can wait ~~for~~ a few more weeks before we have to decide among ~~the~~ stark choices. Work has been done over the past weeks on possible near term concepts that could be implemented while we urgently study ~~the~~ more fundamental choices. It would seem appropriate to discuss first these fundamental choices that are raised by Bud's cable.

- The first option would have us escalate our political and military involvement in a manner that would clearly demonstrate to the Syrians and their allies that we will not acquiesce in Syrian efforts to bring down the Gemayel government and to partition Lebanon. Let's discuss this first.

- The second option is to continue our diplomatic efforts against Syria but discontinue direct U.S. involvement in Lebanon's internal problems in the face of Syrian intransigence and our willingness to meet it head on.

- The third option is to cut our losses and salvage what we can of a partitioned Lebanon. This is where Bud thinks our incremental approach is taking us.

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- In conclusion, and in the starkest possible terms, the issue before us is whether a confrontation with Syria is more costly than reneging on the commitment we have made to restoring Lebanon. It is not just Lebanon that is at stake. If we fail to bring Syria to reasonable terms, I am afraid our strategic position in the Middle East and beyond will be badly eroded. Moreover, we run a clear risk of another round of Arab-Israeli fighting with all that implies.

-- NAVAL MOVEMENTS ?

-- EXECUTE

(OR)

-- PREPARE TO MOVE

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____
per NSC

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ACTION

September 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Build Down -- Saturday, September 10

Issue

What should be the final Administration position on the build down concept and how should we reveal that position in our dealings with Congress over the coming weeks?

Facts

Key legislators expect the Administration to provide its position on the implementation of a build down during hearings which begin on September 14 and lead to a series of votes involving arms control, the freeze and MX.

Discussion

As reflected by the suggested agenda provided at Tab A, the September 10 NSC meeting is designed to ensure that you can decide on the proper Administration stance on this critical issue before Administration officials begin to testify before the Congress.

The paper at Tab B was developed by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group to support the NSC discussion. The paper is organized to provide the following:

- an introduction and overview of the problem;
- a review of the current US basic START position;
- a preferred stance on the build down that incorporates it into our START position;
- a suggested strategy for presenting this stance on build down to the Congress and the public;
- a review of possible Soviet reactions;
- a series of items that we could consider adding to the basic build down position if needed; and
- a discussion of associated changes to our basic START position that some may propose.

The main judgment you will have to make following the meeting will be whether the basic position on build down recommended in the NSC discussion paper, and the associated strategy for presenting it, go far enough to provide the political support

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Prepared by:
Bob Linhard, Sven
Kraemer and Ron Lehman

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needed to protect the modernization program and avoid unhelpful alternative Congressional arms control proposals. We recommend that you read the attached paper and use the NSC discussion to frame your judgment. After the meeting, we will provide to you the appropriate decision package and staff recommendations on this issue.

Recommendations

- | <u>OK</u> | <u>No</u> | |
|-----------|-----------|--|
| ___ | ___ | 1. That you approve the suggested agenda provided at Tab A and use the NSC meeting to frame your judgments on this issue. |
| ___ | ___ | 2. That you not announce your decision on the Administration position on the build down at the NSC meeting, but use the decision package which NSC Staff will provide after the meeting to make your final judgment. |

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Agenda (S)
Tab B Discussion Paper (S)

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~START Discussion PaperI. Introduction

There has been interest in the Congress in seeing modifications to our START position -- combined with a build-down proposal -- as evidence of the Administration's seriousness on arms control and as the quid pro quo for support of the President's strategic modernization program. The signals from the Hill, however, are mixed and in many ways contradictory. Moreover, the current US negotiating position is fundamentally sound and the Soviets have given us little ground for believing that additional modifications at this time will result in progress.

On balance, we see no need at this time to adopt fundamental changes to our current START position. However, our current understanding of the situation on the Hill is that some form of a build-down proposal must be forthcoming from the Administration to assure support for defense programs in the upcoming appropriations cycle.

It is apparent, moreover, that there is not a good understanding of our current negotiating proposal -- on the Hill or with the public -- or of the magnitude and significance of the changes made in the last round to bring the US position into line with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. Therefore, we should undertake a major educational effort on the Hill, stressing that in fact our current START position is commensurate with and responsive to the recommendations of the Commission and that it offers a solid chance for making progress toward reaching agreement with the Soviets -- provided they are interested in reaching agreement.

The issue for decision is what form of build-down we should propose, and how, if at all, it should be augmented by changes in our START position. This decision must be based on an assessment of our national security requirements and of the actual political situation on the Hill -- a situation which is fluid and subject to change over the next two weeks. This paper presents a basic build-down proposal within the START

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negotiations as well as elements that are more extensive with respect to build-down and some possible adjustments to our current START position.

II. Basic Position

A. Current US START Position

Prior to Round IV President Reagan announced a number of fundamental changes to the US START position. These changes reflect the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces and respond to concerns the Soviets had expressed during the first three rounds of the negotiations. During Round IV the US tabled a draft treaty which embodies this new, more flexible approach while, at the same time, preserving the central element of the US START approach -- mutual reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads.

Following are the major changes to the US position introduced in Round IV:

- We relaxed the limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles in order to allow the deployment of additional single-RV ICBMs, as recommended by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.
- We proposed a single-phase agreement, in place of our previous two-phase approach, to make it clear that all systems, including ALCMs, would be limited from the outset of an agreement.
- We proposed limits on heavy bombers (400) and on ALCMs (a maximum of 20 per heavy bomber) which are well below SALT II levels.
- On throw-weight, we offered to withdraw the collateral constraints (the 2500/210/110 subceilings) in favor of a direct limit on aggregate missile throw-weight, if the Soviets prefer. We told the Soviets that we are not insisting on reductions to US levels, but made clear that the level would be a matter of negotiation. We also discussed a variety of other possible approaches to resolving the throw-weight issue and said we would be receptive to any serious Soviet proposals.

- We made it clear to the Soviets that the substantial reductions we seek in the strategic forces of both nations would be implemented over time. We stressed -- in accordance with the recommendation of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces -- that our objective is to channel the modernization of both sides in a direction which will enhance stability and reduce the first strike threat.

- One of the ways we seek to do this is by reductions in the weight -- and hence the destructive power -- of warheads on new ballistic missile systems. We have proposed separate weight ceilings for RVs on MIRV and single-RV systems. We left the specific ceilings blank in our draft treaty in order to demonstrate our desire to take into account Soviet views on what the levels should be.

During the last round, the Soviets also modified some of their previous proposals which were so obviously one-sided that it was clear that they had been made primarily for negotiating purposes: the Soviets expressed a willingness to drop their proposed ban on all ALCMs while maintaining a ban on "long-range" GLCMs and SLCMs, and to modify provisions whose effect would have been to stop deployment of Trident submarines and the D-5 missile. We welcomed these Soviet moves.

However, the Soviets did not respond to our flexibility with any equivalent willingness to modify the central elements of their position. Moreover, they tabled subceilings for MIRV missiles under their 1,800 SNDV aggregate which would, if fully implemented, allow them to deploy over 11,000 ballistic missile warheads and 6,800 warheads on MIRV ICBMs; substantial increases over the already high Soviet levels.

B. Basic Build-Down Position

Within the context of START, the US could seek a guaranteed mutual build-down of ballistic missile warheads (to a floor of 5,000) as a means of achieving reductions. The US could accept ballistic missile warhead reductions of approximately 5% per year (based on entry-in-force warhead levels) which equates to a certain, constant number of warheads guaranteed to be retired each year during the treaty's period of reduction. The US would propose to count warheads according to SALT counting and type rules. This would mean that the starting level for US and Soviet forces would be approximately equal. (The Poseidon C-3 would be credited with 14 RVs.)

From equal accountable entry in force levels, both sides could reduce to a 5,000 floor in slightly over eight years, a guaranteed annual build-down of approximately 440 accountable warheads.

There is an apparent contradiction between the actual deployed warhead figures we have used (7,300 for the US and 7,900 for the Soviets) and the accountable warheads on which the build-down would be based (8,800 on both sides). This could cause the credibility of this approach to be questioned; i.e., the charge could be leveled that we were proposing to build-down 1,500 non-existing warheads (the difference between 8,800 US SALT accountable warheads and 7,300 now deployed). The contradiction would be explained as follows:

- For existing types of missiles the maximum number of warheads tested must be used to enable verification, and to deny the Soviets any possibility of actually increasing their current advantage over the number of US deployed warheads during the reduction period.
- This counting method would be consistent with figures and counting concepts used in the past with the Soviets and should be relatively easy to negotiate.
- Our START position has as its focus achieving a reduced number of actual deployed warheads. This is constant with the build-down formula. The issue is not how we get to 5,000, but actually achieving the goal of 5,000 deployed RVs.
- Finally, using the 7,300/7,900 figures would expose us to charges that the Soviets were obliged unfairly to build-down at a faster rate than the US, or that the Soviets were permitted a longer period to reach the floor level.

C. Strategy for Pursuing Basic Build-Down Position

Packaging the incorporation of build-down in our START position will be key to its acceptability by the Congress. This will involve a clear exposition of how our START position, modernization program and build-down fit into a comprehensive approach to a more secure strategic environment. We would make clear that our approach to build-down represented a seriously considered, firm Administration position.

o The US strategic modernization program and the US arms control position as modified during the last round of negotiations to fully incorporate the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces are designed to complement each other in an overall framework designed to promote long-term strategic stability.

o Our modernization program includes modernizing our aging bomber forces and ALCMs, the B-1 bomber and the Stealth bomber, to achieve greater survivability and penetration of Soviet air defenses. Modernization of the SLBM force with Trident II will permit greater use of wide-ocean areas so as to reduce the effectiveness of Soviet ASW against the SSBN fleet and, thus, ensure its long-term survivability. All of these changes are designed to promote long-term stability of our strategic forces.

o Our modernization program also includes a limited number of MX missiles designed to counterbalance Soviet hard-target kill capability and, thereby, to increase near-term stability. It also serves to encourage, in combination with the D-5 SLBM, Soviet movement from large silo-based ICBMs toward smaller mobile ICBMs while we, ourselves, pursue, on an urgent basis, development of a small single-warhead ICBM adaptable to a number of more survivable basing modes, to replace Minuteman. Again, the goal is maintaining and enhancing the contribution of the ICBM force to deterrence and long-term stability.

o Complementary to this program, our START position focuses on deep reductions in the destructive capability and potential of the strategic forces of the US and Soviet Union and to channel residual deterrent capability into more survivable and, thus, more stable systems, that is, toward greater dependence on small single-RV ICBMs, on SLBMs and on second-strike bomber forces.

o This position has as its central element reduction by roughly one-third in the numbers of deployed ballistic missile warheads of both sides, a key measure of destructive capability.

o It also calls for significant reductions in the throw-weight of Soviet missiles. Throw-weight is an important measure of destructive capability and potential because in an agreement limiting both sides to equal numbers of warheads, the side with the greater throw-weight can deploy larger warheads or in a breakout deploy more warheads.

o We have also indicated wide flexibility on the ceiling for deployed ballistic missiles, which, in combination with our proposed missile RV and throw-weight reductions, should further encourage Soviet movement toward more survivable and, thus, more stabilizing single-RV missiles.

o To this position we now intend to add a new major element suggested by the US Congress -- a mutual, verifiable, guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads.

o We have studied the concept intensively over the past months to see how it could be integrated in and complementary to our START position and the US objectives in START. These objectives include significant reductions leading to increased stability, equality in key measures of destructive capability and potential, and verifiability. A number of alternatives were examined and discarded because they failed in one way or another to meet these essential objectives.

o The build-down we will propose will be an integral part of our START proposal, taken in concert with reductions in all other elements of our proposal.

o Specifically, it will call for both sides to reduce from their approximately equal current levels by about 5% per year (about 440 warheads) over an eight-year period to a level of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads.

o We have chosen percentage reductions in ballistic missile warheads to an agreed floor rather than tying it to modernization because of the obvious and serious verification and compliance problems we have with regard to differentiating Soviet modernization of existing systems from new systems, a key element in any build-down tied to modernization.

The percentage reduction formula has the same effect on ballistic missile warheads as a two-for-one build-down but would ensure a guaranteed Soviet build-down.

o We believe that this significant addition to our current highly-flexible START position involving deep reductions in strategic destructive capability and potential provides a sound and fair basis for an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, one that promotes long-term stability while allowing each side great latitude to configure its forces to meet its strategic needs.

o This modified position, in combination with our planned strategic modernization program, form the two key building blocks upon which, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, we can build a more secure and stable strategic environment, one that reduces the risk of war.

o Given this overall framework and a consensus of the Congress and the US public behind this coordinated and comprehensive approach to arms control and national security, we provide the clearest mandate to the US negotiating team to seek an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement at lower, more stable levels. We can only hope that the Soviet Union can exhibit equal flexibility and desire to achieve such an agreement.

D. Soviet Reaction to Basic Build-Down Position

1. Initial reactions

The initial Soviet reaction to the build-down is likely to be negative mainly on the ground that it does not address bomber weapons in aggregation with ballistic missile warheads. A second objection to the proposal, possibly not voiced, is that the Soviets have indicated that they desire to retain significantly more than 5,000 warheads in their ballistic missile inventory.

However, it is unlikely that they will either accept or reject the proposal outright. They have been following closely the internal US debate on arms control policy and could possibly see advantage in encouraging Congressional advocates of the proposal by evidencing some interest in it.

The initial Soviet reaction will also be influenced by the current state of US-USSR relations, especially the public flavor, which does not appear to provide a climate for, much less allow, the Soviets to compromise on central issues. Moreover, we know of no apparent internal pressures on the Soviet leadership to negotiate seriously.

2. Possible Soviet Actions--After Round V

In the absence of an outright rejection, the Soviets at least may attempt to modify a build-down proposal to minimize its effect on their force modernization programs. Some actions the Soviets could take to protect their forces while appearing to accept the basic build-down concept include (in each case the Soviet proposal would include all strategic offensive systems):

- proposing an agreement where modernization triggers build-down; this would enable them to defer modernization for a number of years since their strategic forces are generally more modern than ours;
- proposing an agreement in which modernization of existing deployed systems was exempted; this would allow them to deploy follow-on systems without triggering build-down;

--proposing an agreement where modernization restrictions apply only to those systems first flight-tested after the agreement goes into effect; this would protect weapons like the SS-X-24, PL-5 and SS-N-18 follow-on, which are in a late stage of development.

The Soviets may chose to make a direct counter build-down proposal rather than negotitate a US proposal. Some key elements of proposals they could make to promote their START position while undermining ours include:

--aggregating bomber weapons and cruise missiles with ballistic missile RVs;

--proposing a build-down ratio higher than the US would accept;

--proposing different rules for a build-down that impact more heavily on the US.

It is possible that after a lengthy negotiating process, and then only in return for appropriate US concessions, the Soviets would agree to some type of build-down as a mechanism for the reductons required in a negotiated START agreement.

III. Modifications to the Basic Build-Down Position

If it is decided that we must augment the basic build-down position, the following elements could be considered. Adoption of these elements should be avoided if possible.

A. Percent Reductions "Build-down" Tied to Modernization

This variant would add the link between modernization and force reductions to the percentage annual build-down in START. Under this concept, there would be two mechanisms for reductions. First, a percent annual reduction would be in effect. Second, for every new, modern warhead deployed, a certain number would have to be withdrawn. The preferred formulation would require 1.5 older warheads to be withdrawn for each new warhead deployed. This would represent a 3:2 across-the-board build-down for ballistic missile warheads. An alternative of 2:1 build-down for ICBM warheads and 3:2 build-down for SLBM warheads could also be considered, if necessary. In any event, the actual reductions would be the greater required by either the modernization schedule or the specified percent annual reductions.

The central problem with linking the build-down to modernization is the difficulty in defining, negotiating and effectively verifying "modernization". A build-down with modernization would also be particularly sensitive to the definition of new warheads. The ambiguities inherent in this approach would prolong negotiations and bedevil an actual build-down.

B. Inclusion of Heavy Bombers in Build-Down

This variant would build-down heavy bombers in addition to ballistic missile RVs by reducing heavy bombers in the force on the basis of a negotiated schedule. As long as retired B-52s (in storage) are counted as well as operational bombers and a floor consistent with our current position in START (400/350) is used, a variety of build-down ratios for bombers would not adversely affect our force plans. A reduction schedule that is similar to that proposed for missile warheads would be easiest to negotiate and explain publicly. A build-down of bomber weapons would not be acceptable to the US.

IV. Adjustments to the START Position

Some believe that pressures on the Hill to adopt build-down and to change our START position are deeply held and transcend the current international political circumstances. This is clearly not the time for fundamental changes or major initiatives in our START position. Nevertheless, pressures may be such that we will need now to take the steps which could propitiate the condition for achieving progress in START in the coming months.

On the other hand, it is a widespread interagency view that since our position is fundamentally sound and that recent significant changes have not been adequately responded to by the Soviets, changes to our START position are now unnecessary and would be perceived by the Soviets as a lack of resolve. Moreover, the Soviets are unlikely to make major moves in START until the situation in INF becomes more clear.

The following adjustments to the current US position could be added to the basic build-down proposal to demonstrate additional flexibility in our negotiating stance. Additional analysis on each of these changes would be needed before a decision is made to adopt any of them.

1. Unconditionally Drop 2,500 Sub-Limit on ICBM Warheads. This could be seen by some critics of the current START position as a major move in our START position. Under the current 5,000 ballistic missile warhead limit, the Soviets probably would not deploy more than about 3,400 ICBM warheads in any event.

2. Adopt 2,500 MIRV ICBM Sub-Limit. This change could be portrayed as an additional step toward consistency with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. It would represent an intermediate step between our current position and unconditionally dropping the 2,500 sub-limit as discussed above.

3. ALCM Limits Close to Our Requirements. The current US position would theoretically permit 8,000 ALCM warheads, well over twice the size of current US force plans. We have not proposed sub-limits on ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. We could propose a direct limit on ALCMs of 3,000-4,000, in line with current US plans. This could be implemented by offering a sub-ceiling of 200 on ALCM carriers. Proposing either of these limits would undercut critics' charges that the US is not willing to discuss reasonable limits on its bomber forces.

4. Ban New Types of MIRVed ICBMs. A ban on new types of MIRVed ICBMs would be consistent with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces that encourage greater reliance on single-RV missiles. It would also insure that future types of mobile ICBMs are single-RV missiles. Presumably, this ban would allow no new MIRV ICBMs beyond the MX and the SS-X-24. The US would need to decide first whether it needs to protect the option of a new type of MIRV ICBM after the MX. This type of ban would also raise the difficult problem of rules concerning modernization of existing types.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RON LEHMAN ^{SK} / SVEN KRAEMER / BOB LINHARD ^{RE}

SUBJECT:

NSC Meeting on Build Down -- Saturday,
September 10, 1983, 11:00 A.M.

SIGNED

Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memorandum to the President summarizing the issues and the proposed agenda (Tab A) for the September 10 NSC meeting on the build down concept and forwarding the discussion paper (Tab B) developed by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group.

There are a number of recent developments involving the Scowcroft Commission and the Congress. We are still modifying a set of talking points for your use at the meeting. We will provide them to you, with a final update on the Congressional situation, by close of business today. We have not recommended any talking points for the President's use.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached package and sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the package to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

Concurrence: Chris Lehman (unavailable)

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President (S)
- A Proposed NSC Meeting Agenda (S)
- B Discussion Paper (S)

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