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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

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File Folder NSC 00088 10 SEP 1983 ~~10~~ (2)

FOIA

M2008-098/9

Box Number 91285

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10.	56491 FORM	ROUTING SLIP [PARTIAL] PAR 9/25/2008 F98-018/1 #2; UPHELD 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56491	1	9/9/1983	B1 B3
12.	56492 CABLE	090104Z SEP 83 [ANNOTATED, COPY OF DOC 56490] PAR 10/27/2001 F98-018/1 #4; UPHELD 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56492	5	9/9/1983	B1
13.	56493 PAPER	RE LEBANON [PARTIAL] R 5/19/2010 M098/9	3	ND	B1
14.	56494 PAPER	RE LEBANON R 5/19/2010 M098/9	4	ND	B1
15.	56495 PAPER	RE LEBANON R 5/19/2010 M098/9	6	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
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Archivist: mjd
 FOIA ID: F98-018
 Date: 08/31/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. agenda	re: NSC meeting, 1p	nd	P1/F1
2. discussion paper	re: START, 10p R 11/9/05 M03-1348 #2	nd	P1/F1
3. memo	Ron Lehman to William Clark re: Talking points for NSC meeting, 1p	9/9/83	P1/F1
4. agenda	text same as item # 1, 1p	nd	P1/F1
5. talking points	for Judge Clark, 3p	9/10/83	P1/F1
6. paper	re: build down, 1p	nd	P1/F1
7. paper	re: related issues, 1p	nd	P1/F1
8. paper	re: principles, 1p	nd	P1/F1
9. cable	090104Z SEP 83, 5p PART F98-018/1 #1 10/27/01	9/9/83	P1/F1
10. routing slip	(partial), 1p P F98-018/1 #2 9/25/00	9/9/83	P1/F1 P3
11. memo	William Clark to George Shultz et al. re: papers, 1p R 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #3	9/9/83	P1/F1
12. cable	090104Z SEP 83, 5p PART F98-018/1 #4 10/27/01	9/9/83	P1/F1
13. paper	re: Lebanon, 3p PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #5	nd	P1/F1
14. paper	re: Lebanon, 4p PART " " #6	nd	P1/F1
15. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 6p PART " " #7	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

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 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

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 File Folder: NSC0088 10 Sep 1983 (2) Box 91285

Archivist: mjd
 FOIA ID: F98-018
 Date: 08/31/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re: Lebanon, 6p PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #9, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56499	nd	P1/F1
2. paper	re: Lebanon, 4p PART " " #10, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56500	nd	P1/F1
3. agenda	re: NSC meeting, 1p R " " #11	nd	P1/F1
4. notes	re: NSC meeting, 2p R " " #12	9/10/83	P1/F1
5. memo	William Clark to the President re: Lebanon, 1p R " " #13	9/9/83	P1/F1
6. cable	09104Z SEP 83, 5p PART. F98-018/1 #14 10/27/01, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56501 upheld	9/9/83	P1/F1
7. paper	re: Lebanon, 3p PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #15, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56502	nd	P1/F1
8. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 4p PART " " #16, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56503	nd	P1/F1
9. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 6p PART " " #17, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56504	9/8/83	P1/F1
10. talking points	re: Lebanon, 10p 3p PART " " #18, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56505	nd	P1/F1
11. memo	William Clark to the President re: NSC meeting, 2p R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56506	9/9/83	P1/F1
12. paper	re: START, 10p R 11/9/05 M03-1348 #26	nd	P1/F1
13. memo	Ron Lehman/Sven Kraemer/Bob Linhard to Clark re: NSC meeting, 1p R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56507	9/9/83	P1/F1

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File Folder: NSC0088 10 Sep 1983 (2) Box 91285

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F98-018
Date: 08/31/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re: Lebanon, 6p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #9, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56499</i>		
2. paper	re: Lebanon, 4p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART " " #10, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56500</i>		
3. agenda	re: NSC meeting, 1p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>R " " #11</i>		
4. notes	re: NSC meeting, 2p	9/10/83	P1/F1
	<i>R " " #12</i>		
5. memo	William Clark to the President re: Lebanon, 1p	9/9/83	P1/F1
	<i>R " " #13</i>		
6. cable	09104Z SEP 83, 5p	9/9/83	P1/F1
	<i>PART. F98-018/1 #14 10/27/01, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56501 upheld</i>		
7. paper	re: Lebanon, 3p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #15, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56502</i>		
8. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 4p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART " " #16, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56503</i>		
9. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 6p	9/8/83	P1/F1
	<i>PART " " #17, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56504</i>		
10. talking points	re: Lebanon, 10p 5p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>PART " " #18, R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56505</i>		
11. memo	William Clark to the President re: NSC meeting, 2p	9/9/83	P1/F1
	<i>R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56506</i>		
12. paper	re: START, 10p	nd	P1/F1
	<i>R 11/9/05 M03-1348 #26</i>		
13. memo	Ron Lehman/Sven Kraemer/Bob Linhard to Clark re: NSC meeting, 1p	9/9/83	P1/F1
	<i>R 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56507</i>		

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

CHRON FILE

Date September 9, 1983
SEP 09 1983

Subject: LEBANON

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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By *CAS* NARA Date *2/25/08*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
91072

September 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence


GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Staff Papers on Lebanon (S)

In view of the current situation in Lebanon, we have added the strategy for Lebanon to the agenda for tomorrow's meeting. At Tab A is a reporting cable from Bud McFarlane which discusses "worst case" scenarios and requests a high-level review of our strategy for dealing with Syrian intervention in the reconstruction of Lebanon. At Tab B is a staff paper which outlines three broad policy options we have in light of Syrian intransigence and forcible intervention. Tab C is a staff paper which describes two concepts for near-term management of the Lebanon crisis. (S)

The discussion tomorrow might begin with the issue of whether we need to make a decision soon on the preferred strategy as Bud suggests, or whether we can defer a decision on the optional strategies for several weeks to allow more study of the pros and cons. If we decide to defer a decision, Tab C provides interim measures we could adopt as we deliberate on the longer-term strategy. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT


William P. Clark

Attachments
as stated

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BY LOI NARA, DATE 4/27/06

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WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
SECSTATE PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF AND CJCS
FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: WORST CASE STRATEGY FOR
LEBANON.

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1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. WHILE IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEKEND I EXPRESSED, IN NSC MEETINGS AND IN THE BRIEFING TO THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, MY VIEW THAT THE CENTRAL FACTOR IN THE LEBANON CONFLICT IS SYRIA'S DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN AN ENDURING INFLUENCE OVER LEBANESE POLICY. GIVEN HER OVERWHELMING MILITARY POWER RELATIVE TO LEBANON, AND ABSENT MAJOR THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY INTERVENTION IN BEHALF OF LEBANON, SYRIA CAN ACHIEVE HER GOAL. SHE CAN EXERCISE HER INFLUENCE TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE BY MAINTAINING OCCUPATION FORCES IN THE COUNTRY AND/OR RELYING UPON LEBANESE POLITICANS IN THE CABINET WHO ARE SENSITIVE TO SYRIAN CONCERNS. FACED WITH THIS PROBLEM, OUR POLICY HAS BEEN

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By CJS NARA, Date 10/27/01

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TO INSIST UPON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON BUT TO AGREE TO THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, ACCEPTING THAT IT WILL SURELY INCLUDE FIGURES BEHOLDEN TO SYRIA (E, 7&, FRANJIYYEH, KARAMI AND BARRI). OUR POLITICAL STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO DEVELOP THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S FORMAL CALL FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS AND (IN THE DAYS AHEAD) THE UNITED NATIONS

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CONCURRENTLY WE HAVE ENDORSED THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, AN IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF THE LEADERS FOR THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE, MINOR REDEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE ULTIMATE DEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE ARMY FORCES TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE SHUF AND BEYOND. TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO THIS POSITION WE, AND OUR ALLIES, HAVE GRADUALLY EXPANDED OUR MILITARY FORCE PRESENCE IN THE AREA. IT HAS BEEN OUR HOPE THAT SYRIA WILL RESPOND TO THIS COLLECTIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE AND ACCEDE TO THE CEASEFIRE, THE FORMATION OF THE GNU, AND WITHDRAW HER FORCES, ETC. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS RECEIVED WITHIN THE PAST TWO DAYS AND

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[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

JUSTIFY A REVIEW OF OUR STRATEGY AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT SYRIA HAS NOT YET FOUND OUR STRATEGY CREDIBLE. WE BELIEVE FURTHER THAT PROPOSALS SUCH AS ARE CONTAINED IN THE STRATEGY PAPER AND DRAFT NSDD FOR THE GRADUAL EXPANSION OF FORCE PRESENCE TO RESOLVE THE LEBANESE CRISIS COULD BE AT BEST IRRELEVANT, AND AT WORST CATASTROPHIC UNLESS APPLIED IN THE CONTEXT OF A SPECIFIC STRATEGY DESIGNED TO BRING AN EARLY POSITIVE CHANGE IN SYRIAN BEHAVIOR. ON THE OTHER HAND WE BELIEVE THAT THE STRATEGIC ESCALATION -- IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS -- COULD ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT.

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3. IN PRACTICAL TERMS WE BELIEVE THERE ARE THREE CRITICAL CONDITIONS WHICH SHOULD APPLY BEFORE SUCH AN ESCALATION IS CONTEMPLATED. FIRST, THAT WE ARE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ABOUT OUR OWN POLICY AND ITS LIMITS AND CONDITIONS; SECOND, THAT WE HAVE THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF OUR MNF PARTNERS; THIRD, THAT THE KEY MODERATE ARAB STATES, PARTICULARLY

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DTG: 090104Z SEP 83 PSN: 065566

SAUDI ARABIA, BACK UP OUR STRATEGY AND OPPOSE SYRIA. THE STRATEGY WOULD BE BASED UPON THE PREMISE THAT SYRIA HAS NO INTENTION OF AGREEING EITHER TO A CEASEFIRE, TO THE SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL DIALOGUE IN LEBANON OR TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF HER OWN FORCES BUT ASSUMES THAT WHILE SHE MAY TAKE A POSITIVE POSITION ON THESE ELEMENTS PUBLICLY SHE WILL CONCURRENTLY PROPOSE SUCH PRECONDITIONS AS TO MAKE HER REALIZATION IMPOSSIBLE WHILE, ON THE GROUND, SHE SUPPORTS AND ULTIMATELY CONSTRICTS (THROUGH THE PSP) THE ENCLAVE OF BEIRUT LEADING TO THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

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4. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL POSITION WOULD BE A QUADRIPARTITE CALL FOR: AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE; MINOR LAF REDEPLOYMENTS WITHIN BEIRUT; COMMENCEMENT OF AN IMMEDIATE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN X MONTHS; AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE ULTIMATE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY VIA GRADUAL LAF PRESENCE IN EVACUATED AREAS. WE WOULD IN ADDITION TAKE THE POSITION THAT NO COUNTRY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SUBVERT THIS PROCESS AND THAT TO ENSURE AGAINST THIS CONTINGENCY THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WOULD POSITION UNITS AT STRATEGIC LOCATIONS (I.E., NOTABLY AT THE PASSES LEADING WESTWARD FROM THE BEKKA ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY.) IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE FOUR FLAGS ACCOMPANIED BY A MODEST FORCES WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUFFICIENT DETERRENT TO SYRIAN AND/OR PALESTINIAN INFILTRATION.

5. WE BELIEVE THAT A JOINT US-UK-FRENCH-ITALIAN DEMARCHE TO SYRIA WITH AT LEAST PARALLEL, STRONG SAUDI AND OTHER MODERATE ARAB BACKING, ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE, COULD HAVE THE DESIRED

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EFFECT. OUR POINT IS THAT THERE IS NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED BY INCRIMENTALLY ESCALATING THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN AND OTHER MILITARY POWER WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT GO WITH IT UNLESS IT IS CLEAR THAT IT HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THE DESIRED PURPOSE (I.E., A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES). IN SHORT IT SEEMS TO US THAT WE MAY BE FALLING INTO A TRAP OF INCRIMENTAL ESCALATION WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY BE EXPOSED AS A BLUFF. WE ARE VERY MINDFUL OF THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A STRATEGY FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THE CONGRESS, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS CLEAR THAT SYRIA IS A KEY ELEMENT IN SOVIET NEAR EAST STRATEGY AND WE MUST CONSIDER A SPECTRUM OF SOVIET RESPONSES TO ANY ESCALATORY MEASURES WE MIGHT CONSIDER. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE ENORMOUS STRATEGIC STAKES FOR THE US AND THE WESTERN WORLD IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE NEAR EAST IN ADDITION TO BUT NOT SEPARATE FROM LEBANON, THAT WOULD CERTAINLY JUSTIFY THE POSSIBLE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER. IT IS THIS FACTOR -- WHICH ADMITTEDLY, IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONVEY TO A CONGRESS WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE BY PUBLIC SPEECHES AND FREQUENT TESTIMONY -- WHICH IS OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

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6. IT MAY BE THAT TOMORROW MORNING SYRIA WILL AGREE TO OUR FOUR POINT STRATEGY, CEASEFIRE WILL BE ESTABLISHED, THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE WILL TAKE PLACE AND ALL WILL BE WELL IN LEBANON. QUITE HONESTLY, HOWEVER, I DOUBT IT. (WE HAVE JUST HAD A CALL [REDACTED] TO THE EFFECT THAT [REDACTED] TALKS HAVE GONE BADLY AND THAT NEW PRECONDITIONS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY SYRIA. THIS SIGNALS MY WORST FEARS THAT SYRIA IS PURSUING A STRATEGY OF DELAYING TACTICS WHILE CHANGING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.) AS A CONSEQUENCE WE URGE YOUR CONSIDERATION OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS AND, BASED UPON YOUR CONCLUSIONS, PROMPT CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES TO BE FOLLOWED BY COORDINATED COLLECTIVE ACTION. DILLON

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WORST CASE STRATEGIES FOR LEBANON

Background:

Our stated objectives in Lebanon have consistently been:

- restoring the sovereignty of the government of Lebanon throughout its territory;
- obtaining the withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- ensuring the security of Lebanon's borders especially the northern border of Israel.

Ambassador McFarlane's recent cable on this subject underscores the point that we may be at a watershed in our efforts to promote U.S. objectives in Lebanon. The problem simply put is apparent Syrian determination to impede the process of national reconciliation, maintain a zone of influence in Lebanon and force the withdrawal of the multi-national peacekeeping forces in Beirut. Our efforts to date including measures to augment our offshore presence and to undertake a more aggressive self-defense of our MNF contingent may not have persuaded the SARG that we are prepared to confront Syria directly in furtherance of our stated objectives and in our support of the GOL. Furthermore, the precipitous Israeli withdrawal to the Awwali River--owing largely to domestic political pressure and the refusal of the GOL to implement the Lebanon-Israel agreement--may have encouraged the SARG to pursue its objectives in Lebanon in a manner that does not cross redrawn Israeli "red lines" and thereby incur serious risk of Israeli reprisals.

The Core Problem:

If McFarlane's analysis is correct, we have stark choices to make. In short:

- Retain our stated objectives and escalate our involvement in the Lebanon problem, politically and militarily, to bring an early and positive change in Syrian behavior.
- Retain our stated objectives but disengage from the active effort to promote national reconciliation and restore Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Syrian intransigence. At the same time, work in other arenas to encourage international and Arab opprobrium for Syrian behavior.
- Modify our objectives for Lebanon and realign our strategy to what is feasible and doable without incurring the risk of a direct confrontation with Syria.

The first option obviously entails a high risk of military confrontation with Syria and a serious crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. It also entails a clear prospect for worsened U.S.

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relations with certain other Arab countries, although the reaction of moderate Arab powers will depend fundamentally on the degree of pressure which is ultimately needed to force a change in Syrian behavior. To mitigate the adverse reactions from the Arab world, McFarlane stipulates the need for prior assurances of support from the key Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Given traditional Arab concern for U.S.-Israeli collusion, McFarlane has made a multilateral approach by the U.S., France, Italy, and the UK an indispensable condition for a strategy of escalating pressure on Syria.

The second option leaves open the question of what we would do with the MNF in the face of continued Syrian (surrogate) pressure to force its withdrawal. We could buy time and reduce the risk of casualties by continuing a policy of aggressive self-defense although the question of how we treat the provisions of the War Powers Resolution might eventually require the withdrawal of the USMNF. The most significant risk if we choose this option is a serious erosion of U.S. credibility in the Middle East and beyond. There is also some possibility that the tentative policy implicit in this choice will lead to an expanded civil war which culminates in a defacto partition of Lebanon into Muslim, Druze, and Christian entities and Syrian and Israeli spheres of influence.

The third option is in reality a grouping for a variety of sub-options. For example, we could settle for a partitioned Lebanon and cut our losses by actively supporting a new political entity comprised of Greater Beirut and the Maronite heartland. Depending on the success of our efforts with the LAF, there might be some possibility that the dominantly Shia districts in southern Lebanon could ultimately be incorporated into such a Lebanese entity, if Israel was persuaded that security of her border could be assured. The common denominator in these sub-options is acceptance of a Syrian zone of influence in the areas currently occupied by the Syrian Army in addition to the Alayh and Shouf Districts. The precise role of the MNF in the various possibilities grouped under this option is not clear. However, provided the Syrians acquiesced in a partition of the type discussed above, there is a good possibility that U.S. forces could be withdrawn as the situation on the ground stabilized-- although we might continue a residual training and support effort for the LAF. As true with the second option, this option could also lead to an erosion in U.S. credibility.

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The Press of Time:

McFarlane's cables stress that the situation in Alayh and the Shouf is very fluid and that the trends are adverse (massacres, continued shelling, presence of PLO, etc.). While we would ideally prefer more time to thoroughly study and sort through the costs and benefits which attend these options (especially the first one), we need to act promptly, if we decide to continue with our present objectives.

Elements of McFarlane's Recommended Strategy

The critical element is a multilateral approach to Syria which for simplicity's sake would be limited to objectives which are ostensibly shared already. The immediate objectives of this collective strategy would be:

- an immediate ceasefire in place
- minor LAF redeployments within Beirut
- commencement of an immediate process of withdrawing all foreign forces to be completed by a date certain
- restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in areas evacuated via a gradual extension of the LAF presence.

The approach would feature common determination to restore Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity supported by a demonstrated willingness to halt Syrian interference by MNF deployments to "strategic locations" adjacent to Syrian positions. Our chances for persuading the other MNF countries to join in this approach will be enhanced if we describe the alternatives as we see them. In the final analysis, they must be made to see that a coordinated multilateral approach to Syria is the only alternative to the partition of Lebanon and the failure of our respective efforts thus far.

Inasmuch as the objectives are already included in the "Bandar Plan," we might expect Saudi (and other moderate Arab) support for this multilateral approach although the "muscle" would have to be provided by the MNF countries. The recent crisis in Saudi-Syrian relations owing to Syrian rejection of Bandar's four elements, provides us with an opportunity to capitalize on Saudi frustration, if we move quickly before possible Syrian counterpressure can be brought to bear and the Saudis back away from their commitment to Gemayel.

TWO CONCEPTS FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE LEBANON CRISIS OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS

I. Concept A. [where we can easily be]:

A measured response to the current crisis, this option buys time for a sober review of US interests in the maelstrom of Lebanese politics and in the Middle East. Help GOL/LAF control Beirut, hasten Lebanese Reconciliation Process, and send forceful signal to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Soviets, etc, through increased MNF aggressive self-defense and deterrence, with LAF taking lead role in pushing out from Beirut and expanding GOL/controlled perimeter.

A. Immediate Objectives:

1. Buttress LAF to carry out its duties
2. Deter Syria and Lebanese factions from firing at MNF
3. Enhance MacFarlane mission leverage on Damascus.

B. Basic Concept

1. Obtain greater international support through increased participation and commitment by other MNF contributors.
2. Lebanese Government Legitimacy Reinforced
3. US role continues to be supportive although more active.

C. Illustrative Measures

1. LAF training and supply is tailored towards aggressively pushing out from Beirut perimeter.
2. All MNF countries [France, UK, Italy, US] loosely coordinate response to hostile fire with immediate, violent, but prudent and proportional response. Share intelligence and maximize impact
3. All MNF forces mutually support each other's areas of responsibility, eg EISENHOWER responds to shelling of UK positions in West Beirut.
4. More aggressive measures to defeat artillery including, as appropriate, naval bombardment, counter-battery fire, and air strikes.
5. US/French carriers on scene [Eisenhower, Foch, Iwo Jima and Tarawa] and British land-based aircraft provide immediate support. UK Harrier carrier INVINCIBLE arrives in area. Italian cruiser on way.
6. Second USN attack carrier and New Jersey prepare to sail.

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D. Area of Operations

1. National MNF forces stay in present areas but cooperate and reach out together to sting those who dare hit MNF.
2. LAF, with its rear better covered by more powerful MNF defense, expands GOL controlled perimeters, aggressively seeking out by most appropriate means and silencing artillery positions threatening Beirut. [Knives could be most effective.]

E. Implications

1. New situation leads to more explicit expression of war powers, opening way for sharing intelligence, hostile fire pay, and essential training of LAF.
2. Low risk of direct confrontation with Syria
3. Opportunity for GOL to continue its consultations for Lebanese consensus and for Bud to work solution.

F. Rationale: to gain time

1. Time is needed for US policy makers to make considered decision on importance of Lebanon to US policy in the region and critical consequences of potential next steps.
2. Gemayel needs time, and a substantially strengthened hand, if he is to pursue a policy of national reconciliation and consolidate.
3. Mandate for MNF in 1982 stretches like rubber band but does not break. With this with this concept we can generate Congressional and public support.

II. CONCEPT B. [Significant Step]

US now assumes responsibility for defense of city of Beirut if it becomes obvious LAF unable to defend itself. US now willing, as bottom line, to ensure survival of GOL and city [State] of Beirut. A watershed option to be taken only as a consequence of review of global requirements at the highest level.

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A. Immediate Objectives

1. Prevent final collapse of GOL and destabilizing effect that would have on region and future peace prospects
2. Maintain minimum semblance of order in Lebanon.
3. Deter Syrian advance to occupy all of Lebanon.

B. Basic Concept

1. Maximum effort to sustain international support through MNF partners. We sink or swim together.
2. Active US and European military action to deter or defeat attempt to overrun Beirut and establish Lebanese Government hostile to western interests.
3. Accept that preservation of Beirut city is imperative US national interest if GOL is legitimate by our definition. We would do the job alone [ie - without MNF] if necessary.

C. Illustrative Measures

1. Keep LAF out front [and controlling internal factions] but resume MNF patrols in the city of Beirut
2. Expand USMC contingent and widen USMC perimeter round city and airport. French, Italians and UK take similar steps.
3. Increased defensive artillery, naval and air support as required. MNF "reaches out to sting well beyond city limits".
4. Massive international buildup offshore; second carrier and NEW JERSEY speed to Lebanon.

D. Area of Operations

1. MNF would assume active defense of city extending area to cover approaches to Beirut.
2. Air and Naval activity extended to any area of Lebanon where necessary to silence hostile fire. Commando raids could be expected.
3. Possible Strikes against Syrian artillery positions inside sovereign Syrian territory could not be excluded. [Soviet Sa-5's].

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E. Implications

1. Imperative requirement is strong bipartisan congressional support as well as backing from our MNF partners.
2. Rubber band mandate of original purpose stretches immediately beyond breaking point.
3. Premature unless LAF collapses and even then still imprudent without intense scrutiny.
4. Potential for disruption of Middle East peace efforts. Polarization of friend and radicals.
5. Possible Alienation of Moderate Arab Governments but might unite key friends.
6. Preservation of Symbol of Lebanese Independence.
7. Big spin-offs for Bud.

F. Rationale

1. Even with collapse of GOL, Middle East interests of the US would continue. Preservation of US presence in Lebanon may prove to be overriding consideration.
2. Independence of Lebanon has been pledged by succeeding American administrations since Eisenhower.
3. Israelis are still dominant local force.
4. Can an unpredictable situation lead to instant and lasting success.

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Near-Term Lebanon Strategy
Concept for Management of the Next Few Weeks

We have reached a critical juncture in our Lebanon policy. The prospects for further casualties among U.S. Marines and other MNF contributors, the evident weakness of the GOL and the restricted operational area of the LAF, the GOL's difficulties in forming a government of national union, the intransigent hostility of Syria, and the Israeli pullback have combined to force immediate decisions with far-reaching consequences affecting our presence in Lebanon and our future role both in the Middle East and throughout the globe. In considering the options for immediate action we must not only keep in mind the four objectives which determined our decision to intervene: move to a cessation of Syrian/PLO/Israeli hostilities; strengthen the central government to make possible eventual control throughout Lebanon; departure of foreign forces from Lebanon; and securing the Northern border of Israel but how our overall objectives in the Middle East are best served.

U.S. credibility is also at a critical point. Can we use our military power to help a friendly but weak government in a manner which will not jeopardize our larger interests in the Middle East? The answer turns on (a) military effectiveness, (b) broad acceptability of our political goals for Lebanon to the Lebanese, our Allies, and to moderate Arab friends as well, and (c) prospects for stabilization in the region as a whole.

To achieve these objectives we must decide whether to expand operations within the limits we have defined for ourselves thus far, or whether we should take actions that would cross military and political thresholds requiring a major new commitment of U.S. force and prestige. We will also have to consider at some point, the possibility that events on the ground and our larger interests in the Middle East and elsewhere could cause us to reduce or withdraw our MNF contingent despite it not having fully achieved its objective.

Where we are Now

US marines of the MNF and offshore support forces have in the last few days been given more latitude for aggressive but for prudent self defense measures, and have already begun to implement those instructions; including carrier air reconnaissance and naval gunfire support directed at artillery firing into the airport. Additional forces are being deployed by us, the French and the UK to provide further muscle for the MNF.

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Otherwise, our basic mandate remains unchanged: providing spine to the GOL by our static military presence and deterring external attacks against that Government. These recent measures can buy some time, possibly as much as several weeks, while we consider future options. This paper describes two concepts for management of this problem over the next few weeks until basic US policy objectives can be defined and an overall policy decided given the fluid situation created by recent events such as the Israeli withdrawal, Begin's death and factional fighting.

Two Basic Concepts

Pending a fuller review of the crisis in all its dimensions and solutions extending from extraction of US forces, possibly under cover of a UNIFIL flag all the way up through confrontation with Soviets in Syria, we should consider two basic concepts to support US policy in Lebanon. The most important military contributions in support of this policy have been: (a) an MNF presence to help deter hostile actions against GOL/LAF authority in Beirut; and (b) an accelerated military assistance program to rebuild the LAF.

The first concept would involve a more aggressive employment of these military instruments (within their current mandate) to provide increased assistance and support for the GOL and LAF as the legitimate authority in Lebanon. It would envisage a further more aggressive defense of the MNF, including both the Marines and our European partners, as well as a dramatic expansion of the MNF offshore to bolster our deterrent posture in the region.

The second concept would involve a major change in the mandate for U.S. forces. This approach would continue the steps undertaken in the first concept but would go significantly further. It would mean that the US could well find itself responsible for the defense of Beirut. Support by the Congress, our MNF allies and key Middle East governments would be imperative.

I. Option A: Aggressive Defense by the MNF within the Limits We have Defined for Ourselves

(Note: Sequence of steps indicated by letters have a certain logical sequence reflecting level of intensity but numbers are simply illustrations, a menu of ideas of which there are hundreds more needing professional refining and the most sophisticated political-military coordination.)

A. Strengthen GOL Forces:

- 1 Continued resupply of LAF: This would finish out the massive ammunition effort which we have already begun through Egypt.

2. Accelerated training of new LAF units to increase the viability of the LAF and its capabilities to defend Beirut in new circumstances.
3. Increased supply to the LAF of weapons to deal with the current threat to the MNF, including long range artillery and armor.
4. Provision of tactical intelligence to the LAF in real time.
5. Tactical reconnaissance support by carrier aircraft and other U.S. assets minimizing risks.
6. Consider armed reconnaissance in support of MNF permitting U.S. aircraft to counter hostile fire.
7. Carefully consider direct artillery support for LAF operations initiated in retaliation for fire at MNF positions.

B. More Aggressive Self-Defense by Entire MNF and Marines:

1. Improve MNF ability to locate and identify sources of hostile fire through intelligence, reconnaissance and the provision of additional equipment and intensify intelligence sharing to deal with artillery. Maximize from satellite to humint. Share results immediately among MNF.
2. Discrete but responsive artillery, air and naval bombardment actions to silence hostile fire directed against any MNF positions.
3. Mount armed reconnaissance of Syrian controlled zone in Lebanon both to identify units firing at the MNF and to lend credibility to our warnings to Syria.
4. Consider retaliatory action against discrete Syrian artillery positions in Lebanon.

C. Expand MNF Offshore:

1. Carefully coordinate and build up mobile international forces offshore with the French, who now have the Carrier FOCH on station, and British, who have sent six attack aircraft to Cyprus and who could have the Harrier carrier HMS INVINCIBLE off Lebanon on September 22, to maximize the air strike and naval gunfire capability to intimidate those planning hostile action against the MNF and to broaden the base of Western involvement. At the same time Syrians and others who manipulate surrogates have strong signal. Convince Italian Navy to play a more substantial role in support of MNF and LAF ground forces.

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2. Move another U.S. carrier battle group to Mediterranean.
3. Send New Jersey from Western Central America through Panama Canal to Lebanon.

II. Concept B. US willingness now (as bottom line) to ensure survival of the GOL in City (State) of Beirut

This is a logical extension of the above activities pushing the LAF as a priority but ultimately willing to apply U.S. combat power to defend Beirut and actively to protect the GOL in the city. The sequence of steps needed in this approach would involve a continuation and intensification of the military measures plus actions along the lines of the following:

A. First, skillfully build maximum bi-partisan Congressional support. In moving forward on an increased U.S. commitment in Lebanon, clearly some action with the Hill beyond War Powers notification would be necessary. In any case, before proceeding further with this option as a first step we should astutely calculate support in the Congress.

B. Resuming MNF patrols in the city of Beirut and manning keycheck points would release LAF assets for operations in the Shuf and on the coastal road. Well defended patrols would send messages and would have maximum counterbattery capability.

C. Enlarging the size of the USMC contingent to enable it to play a larger role in the defense of Beirut. Necessarily, this would widen the defensive perimeters around USMC positions in the city and would require augmented defense and defense support activities by all elements of the MNF.

D. At a minimum permitted defensive artillery, naval and air support would have to be extended to enable the Marines to properly defend themselves. Retaliatory fire, and direct and indirect actions would be executed against any forces (including Syrian) which initiated attacks against the GOL/LAF in this area, as well as the MNF.

III. Building Allied Support and GOL Base

A. If our initial actions are to lead to success, we must skillfully nurture the support of our partners in the MNF. We should undertake a complementary consultative effort with Western allies in Europe. The Secretary of State has already reinforced these efforts with MNF nations while in Madrid.

B. We should work to keep the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt engaged in supporting our efforts. Moderate Arab backing is a key ingredient both in isolating Syria and in gluing together a new Lebanese consensus.

C. We should consult closely with Israel regarding its current posture in the region after withdrawal from the Shuf. An unhealthy perception is emerging of Israeli strategic vulnerability and diminished will, particularly among the Syrians. This is something both we and the Israelis need to redress.

D. We should accelerate efforts to maintain and strengthen the Lebanese central government, concentrating in the short term on achievement of a political agreement which includes a ceasefire, movement of the LAF into the Shuf and initiation of a process to broaden the base of the GOL.

E. In the longer term, we should continue to strive for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces, including the Syrians. At the same time, while a broadened government would want to review the Agreement with Israel and freeze implementation, we would make clear that we do not support abrogation since it is an instrument through which Israel's eventual withdrawal can be achieved.

IV. Other Activities to Study Urgently

A. Implications of undertaking more direct and indirect action against Syrian forces both in terms of our sustained military effectiveness and consequences for our relations with other Arab states.

B. Whether to defend a perimeter beyond Beirut targets in Lebanon, its dimensions (e.g. interlocking confederation with capital in Beirut that coexists with Israeli and Syrian dominated areas) and the forces that would be required to defend it.

C. Trends and realistic possibilities over the next few months.

D. The longer-term Lebanon problem in the broad global context of the next two years. Where we, Israel, Arab friends, Europeans, Soviets, etc., are going.

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V. The Need for Urgent High Level Study

Having said all of the above, the fact remains that with concepts A or B we are simply buying a brief time to give the NSC an opportunity to study our goals and objectives in the entire Middle East. Success or failure in Lebanon will have a crucial effect on overall solutions to the Middle East question. Will the cost of achieving success in Lebanon be failure of our overall regional goals or will failure to achieve success be even worse? Decisions on Lebanon policy beyond the next few weeks must be considered in this context.

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Concept for Management of the Next Few Weeks

We have reached a critical juncture in our Lebanon policy. The prospects for further casualties among U.S. Marines and other MNF contributors, the evident weakness of the GOL and the restricted operational area of the LAF, the GOL's difficulties in forming a government of national union, the intransigent hostility of Syria, and the Israeli pullback have combined to force immediate decisions with far-reaching consequences affecting our presence in Lebanon and our future role both in the Middle East and throughout the globe. In considering the options for immediate action we must not only keep in mind the four objectives which determined our decision to intervene: move to a cessation of Syrian/PLO/Israeli hostilities; strengthen the central government to make possible eventual control throughout Lebanon; departure of foreign forces from Lebanon; and securing the Northern border of Israel but how our overall objectives in the Middle East are best served.

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B. We should work to keep the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt engaged in supporting our efforts. Moderate Arab backing is a key ingredient both in isolating Syria and in gluing together a new Lebanese consensus.

C. We should enhance our consultations with Israel regarding its current posture in the region after withdrawal from the Shuf. An unhealthy perception is emerging of Israeli strategic vulnerability and diminished will, particularly among the Syrians. This is something both we and the Israelis need to redress. We might want to encourage a military buildup and show of force by Israel to deter Syria and the PLO from farther intensifying the crisis.

D. We should accelerate efforts to maintain and strengthen the Lebanese central government, concentrating in the short term on achievement of a political agreement which includes a ceasefire, movement of the LAF into the Shuf and initiation of a process to broaden the base of the GOL.

E. In the longer term, we should continue to strive for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces, including the Syrians. At the same time, while a broadened government would want to review the Agreement with Israel and freeze implementation, we would make clear that we do not support abrogation since it is an instrument through which Israel's eventual withdrawal can be achieved.

IV. Other Activities to Study Urgently

A. Implications of undertaking more direct and indirect action against Syrian forces both in terms of our sustained military effectiveness and consequences for our relations with other Arab states.

B. The implications for the defense of Beirut by the MNF is a seriously deteriorating situation where muslim uprisings in west and south Beirut are most likely. With LAF loss of control MNF responsibility for city defense during urban guerrilla warfare differs greatly from defense from external threats.

C. Whether to defend a perimeter beyond Beirut targets in Lebanon, its dimensions (e.g. interlocking confederation with capital in Beirut that coexists with Israeli and Syrian dominated areas) and the forces that would be required to defend it.

~~SECRET~~ D. Trends and realistic possibilities over the next few months.

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- 6 -

E. In the longer term, we should continue to strive for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces, including the Syrians. At the same time, while a broadened government would want to review the Agreement with Israel and freeze implementation, we would make clear that we do not support abrogation since it is an instrument through which Israel's eventual withdrawal can be achieved.

V. The Need for Urgent High Level Study

Having said all of the above, the fact remains that with concepts A or B we are simply buying a brief time to give the NSC an opportunity to study our goals and objectives in the entire Middle East. Success or failure in Lebanon will have a crucial effect on overall solutions to the Middle East question. Will the cost of achieving success in Lebanon be failure of our overall regional goals or will failure to achieve success be even worse? Decisions on Lebanon policy beyond the next few weeks must be considered in this context.

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TWO CONCEPTS FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE LEBANON CRISIS OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS

I. CONCEPT A. [where we can easily be]:

A measured response to the current crisis, this option buys time for a sober review of US interests in the maelstrom of Lebanese politics and in the Middle East. Help GOL/LAF control Beirut, hasten Lebanese Reconciliation Process, and send forceful signal to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Soviets, etc, through increased MNF aggressive self-defense and deterrence, with LAF taking lead role in pushing out from Beirut and expanding GOL controlled perimeter.

A. Immediate Objectives

1. Buttress LAF to carry out its duties
2. Deter Syria and Lebanese factions from firing at MNF
3. Enhance McFarlane mission leverage on Damascus.

B. Basic Concept

1. Obtain greater international support through increased participation and commitment by other MNF contributors.
2. Lebanese Government legitimacy reinforced
3. US role continues to be supportive although more assertive.

C. Illustrative Measures

1. LAF training and supply is tailored towards aggressively pushing out from Beirut perimeter.
2. All MNF countries [France, UK, Italy, US] loosely coordinate response to hostile fire with immediate, violent, but prudent and proportional response. Share intelligence and maximize impact.
3. All MNF forces mutually support each others' areas of responsibility, e.g. EISENHOWER responds to shelling of UK positions in West Beirut.
4. More aggressive measures to defeat artillery including, as appropriate, naval bombardment, counter-battery fire, and air strikes.
5. US/French carriers on scene [EISENHOWER, FOCH, IWO JIMA and TARAWA] and British land-based aircraft provide immediate support. UK Harrier carrier INVINCIBLE arrives in area. Italian cruiser on way.
6. Second USN attack carrier and New Jersey prepare to sail.

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- 2 -

D. Area of Operations

1. National MNF forces stay in present areas but cooperate and reach out together to sting those who dare hit MNF.
2. LAF, with its rear better covered by more powerful MNF defense expands GOL controlled perimeters, aggressively seeking out by most effective means and silencing artillery positions threatening Beirut. [Para-military raids, for example, could be most effective.]

E. Implications

1. New situation leads to more explicit expression of war powers, opening way for sharing intelligence, hostile fire pay, and essential training of LAF.
2. Low risk of direct confrontation with Syria but will get their attention.
3. Opportunity for GOL to continue its consultations building Lebanese consensus and for Bud to work solution.

F. Rationale: to gain time and send a strong signal

1. Time is needed for US policy makers to make considered decision on importance of Lebanon to US policy in the region and critical consequences of potential next steps.
2. Gemayel needs time, and a substantially strengthened hand, if he is to pursue a policy of national reconciliation and consolidate.
3. Mandate for MNF in 1982 stretches like rubber band but does not break. With this concept we can generate Congressional and public support.

II. CONCEPT B. [much more significant step]

US now assumes responsibility for defense of City of Beirut if it becomes obvious LAF unable to defend itself. US now willing, as bottom line, to ensure survival of GOL and city [State] of Beirut. A watershed option to be taken only as a consequence of review of global requirements at the highest level.

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- 3 -

A. Immediate Objectives

1. Prevent final collapse of GOL and destabilizing effect that would have on region and future peace prospects
2. Maintain minimum semblance of order in Lebanon.
3. Deter Syrian advance to occupy all of Lebanon.

B. Basic Concept

1. Maximum effort to sustain international support through MNF partners. We sink or swim together.
2. Active US and European military action to deter or defeat attempt to overrun Beirut or repress internal uprising and establish Lebanese Government hostile to western interests.
3. Accept that preservation of Beirut city is imperative US national interest if GOL is legitimate by our definition. We would do the job alone [ie - without MNF] if necessary.

C. Illustrative Measures

1. Keep LAF out front [and controlling internal Beirut factions] but resume MNF patrols in the city of Beirut
2. Expand USMC contingent and widen USMC perimeter around city and airport. French, Italians and UK take similar steps.
3. Increased defensive artillery, naval and air support as required. MNF "reaches out to sting well beyond city limits".
4. Massive international buildup offshore; second carrier and NEW JERSEY speed to Lebanon.

D. Area of Operations

1. MNF would assume active defense of city extending area to cover approaches to Beirut.
2. Air and Naval activity extended to any area of Lebanon where necessary to silence hostile fire. Commando raids could be expected.
3. Possible Strikes against Syrian artillery positions inside sovereign Syrian territory could not be excluded. [Soviet SA-5's].

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- 4 -

E. Implications

1. Imperative requirement is strong bipartisan congressional support as well as backing from our MNF partners.
2. Rubber band mandate of original purpose stretches immediately beyond breaking point.
3. Premature unless LAF collapses and even then still imprudent without intense scrutiny.
4. Potential for disruption of Middle East peace efforts. Polarization of friends and radicals.
5. Possible alienation of moderate Arab governments but might unite key friends.
6. Preservation of symbol of Lebanese independence.
7. Big spin-offs for Bud.

F. Rationale

1. Even with collapse of GOL, Middle East interests of the US would continue. Preservation of US presence in Lebanon may prove to be overriding consideration.
2. Independence of Lebanon has been pledged by succeeding American administrations since Eisenhower.
3. Israelis are still dominant local force.
4. Can an unpredictable situation lead to instant and lasting success?

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____
per NSC
CHRON FILE

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91072

INFORMATION

September 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Lebanon

Attached are several papers on Lebanon which provide a background for a discussion of what we should do in Lebanon. In view of the situation, I recommend we discuss the subject following tomorrow's meeting on START. We could continue the discussion after you leave the meeting for your noon radio address.

At Tab A is a cable from Bud which requests a high-level review of our strategy for dealing with Syria. Bud has recommended that we give serious and urgent consideration to pressuring Syria with our MNF co-contributors.

Tab B is a staff paper which discusses the stark choices we have for dealing with Syrian intransigence and intervention in Lebanon. Finally, on the assumptions that we decide to defer the tough decisions on Syria to allow more study, Tab C discusses two options we can consider as interim concepts.

cc: The Vice President
Mr. Baker
Mr. Meese
Mr. Deaver
Mr. Stockman

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DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-018/1 #13
BY LST NARA, DATE 4/27/06

AGENDA FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON
BUILD-DOWN AND LEBANON

- A. Introduction -- Judge Clark
- B. Build-Down -- All Principals

Discussion of the basic approach and strategy implementing the build-down concept outlined in the Senior Arms Control Policy Group discussion paper. Discussion should focus on the following questions:

1. What should be the Administration's final position on implementing the build-down concept? When and how should the full bottom-line be revealed?
2. Given the current political environment, what should be the thrust and level of detail of the Administration presentations made at Congressional hearings scheduled for the week of September 12?
3. What additional steps need the Administration be prepared to take prior to key votes later in the month?

- C. Lebanon

NSC ltr 10 Sept 83

Brent feels that build-down should not be handled separately from other possible changes to START.

Lebanon

Shultz -
aggressive defense
Cool it with Assad

Shultz is happy to let Pentagon act on aggressive defense and just inform him.

Desney -

Should we protect off-loading of ammo and military supplies.

We are providing protection to other MNF units.

Shultz

1. Don't want to declare war on Syria
2. Should not pull out
3. Have to conduct ourselves so that we are identified with one faction or the other

- A. Aggressive self defense of MNF
with care prudently preventive
- B. Relief for towns by air after cease fire
- C. Cooler toward Syrians
- D. Consult with Israelis
- E. Consult with Congress - impossible
to say we aren't in hostilities.

President agrees with relief after cease fire.

Baker

Working on a free standing
resolution on Lebanon.

President agrees with max UN effort.

Vessey

PA guidance: Returned fire against unknown battery.

President

Send New Jersey through Canal.

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WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
SECSTATE PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF AND CJCS
FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: WORST CASE STRATEGY FOR
LEBANON

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1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. WHILE IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEKEND I EXPRESSED, IN NSC MEETINGS AND IN THE BRIEFING TO THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, MY VIEW THAT THE CENTRAL FACTOR IN THE LEBANON CONFLICT IS SYRIA'S DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN AN ENDURING INFLUENCE OVER LEBANESE POLICY. GIVEN HER OVERWHELMING MILITARY POWER RELATIVE TO LEBANON, AND ABSENT MAJOR THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY INTERVENTION IN BEHALF OF LEBANON, SYRIA CAN ACHIEVE HER GOAL. SHE CAN EXERCISE HER INFLUENCE TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE BY MAINTAINING OCCUPATION FORCES IN THE COUNTRY AND/OR RELYING UPON LEBANESE POLITICANS IN THE CABINET WHO ARE SENSITIVE TO SYRIAN CONCERNS. FACED WITH THIS PROBLEM, OUR POLICY HAS BEEN

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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By CJS, NARA, Date 10/27/01

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO INSIST UPON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON BUT TO AGREE TO THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, ACCEPTING THAT IT WILL SURELY INCLUDE FIGURES BEHOLDEN TO SYRIA (E, 7 & ., FRANJIYYEH, KARAMI AND BARRI). OUR POLITICAL STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO DEVELOP THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S FORMAL CALL FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS AND (IN THE DAYS AHEAD) THE UNITED NATIONS

CONCURRENTLY WE HAVE ENDORSED THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, AN IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF THE LEADERS FOR THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE, MINOR REDEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE ULTIMATE DEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE ARMY FORCES TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE SHUF AND BEYOND. TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO THIS POSITION WE, AND OUR ALLIES, HAVE GRADUALLY EXPANDED OUR MILITARY FORCE PRESENCE IN THE AREA. IT HAS BEEN OUR HOPE THAT SYRIA WILL RESPOND TO THIS COLLECTIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE AND ACCEDE TO THE CEASEFIRE, THE FORMATION OF THE GNU, AND WITHDRAW HER FORCES, ETC. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS RECEIVED WITHIN THE PAST TWO DAYS AND

JUSTIFY A REVIEW OF OUR STRATEGY AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT SYRIA HAS NOT YET FOUND OUR STRATEGY CREDIBLE. WE BELIEVE FURTHER THAT PROPOSALS SUCH AS ARE CONTAINED IN THE STRATEGY PAPER AND DRAFT NSDD FOR THE GRADUAL EXPANSION OF FORCE PRESENCE TO RESOLVE THE LEBANESE CRISIS COULD BE AT BEST IRRELEVANT, AND AT WORST CATASTROPHIC UNLESS APPLIED IN THE CONTEXT OF A SPECIFIC STRATEGY DESIGNED TO BRING AN EARLY POSITIVE CHANGE IN SYRIAN BEHAVIOR. ON THE OTHER HAND WE BELIEVE THAT THE STRATEGIC ESCALATION -- IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS -- COULD ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT.

3. IN PRACTICAL TERMS WE BELIEVE THERE ARE THREE CRITICAL CONDITIONS WHICH SHOULD APPLY BEFORE SUCH AN ESCALATION IS CONTEMPLATED. FIRST, THAT WE ARE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ABOUT OUR OWN POLICY AND ITS LIMITS AND CONDITIONS; SECOND, THAT WE HAVE THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF OUR MNF PARTNERS; THIRD, THAT THE KEY MODERATE ARAB STATES, PARTICULARLY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SAUDI ARABIA, BACK UP OUR STRATEGY AND OPPOSE SYRIA. THE STRATEGY WOULD BE BASED UPON THE PREMISE THAT SYRIA HAS NO INTENTION OF AGREEING EITHER TO A CEASEFIRE, TO THE SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL DIALOGUE IN LEBANON OR TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF HER OWN FORCES BUT ASSUMES THAT WHILE SHE MAY TAKE A POSITIVE POSITION ON THESE ELEMENTS PUBLICLY SHE WILL CONCURRENTLY PROPOSE SUCH PRECONDITIONS AS TO MAKE HER REALIZATION IMPOSSIBLE WHILE, ON THE GROUND, SHE SUPPORTS AND ULTIMATELY CONSTRICTS (THROUGH THE PSP) THE ENCLAVE OF BEIRUT LEADING TO THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

4. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL POSITION WOULD BE A QUADRIPARTITE CALL FOR: AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE; MINOR LAF REDEPLOYMENTS WITHIN BEIRUT; COMMENCEMENT OF AN IMMEDIATE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN X MONTHS; AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE ULTIMATE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY VIA GRADUAL LAF PRESENCE IN EVACUATED AREAS. WE WOULD IN ADDITION TAKE THE POSITION THAT NO COUNTRY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SUBVERT THIS PROCESS AND THAT TO ENSURE AGAINST THIS CONTINGENCY THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WOULD POSITION UNITS AT STRATEGIC LOCATIONS (I.E., NOTABLY AT THE PASSES LEADING WESTWARD FROM THE BEKKA ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY.) IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE FOUR FLAGS ACCOMPANIED BY A MODEST FORCES WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUFFICIENT DETERRENT TO SYRIAN AND/OR PALESTINIAN INFILTRATION.

5. WE BELIEVE THAT A JOINT US-UK-FRENCH-ITALIAN DEMARCHE TO SYRIA WITH AT LEAST PARALLEL, STRONG SAUDI AND OTHER MODERATE ARAB BACKING, ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE, COULD HAVE THE DESIRED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EFFECT. OUR POINT IS THAT THERE IS NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED BY INCRIMENTALLY ESCALATING THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN AND OTHER MILITARY POWER WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT GO WITH IT UNLESS IT IS CLEAR THAT IT HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THE DESIRED PURPOSE (I.E., A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES). IN SHORT IT SEEMS TO US THAT WE MAY BE FALLING INTO A TRAP OF INCRIMENTAL ESCALATION WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY BE EXPOSED AS A BLUFF. WE ARE VERY MINDFUL OF THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A STRATEGY FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THE CONGRESS, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS CLEAR THAT SYRIA IS A KEY ELEMENT IN SOVIET NEAR EAST STRATEGY AND WE MUST CONSIDER A SPECTRUM OF SOVIET RESPONSES TO ANY ESCALATORY MEASURES WE MIGHT CONSIDER. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE ENORMOUS STRATEGIC STAKES FOR THE US AND THE WESTERN WORLD IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE NEAR EAST IN ADDITION TO BUT NOT SEPARATE FROM LEBANON, THAT WOULD CERTAINLY JUSTIFY THE POSSIBLE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER. IT IS THIS FACTOR -- WHICH ADMITTEDLY, IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONVEY TO A CONGRESS WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE BY PUBLIC SPEECHES AND FREQUENT TESTIMONY -- WHICH IS OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

6. IT MAY BE THAT TOMORROW MORNING SYRIA WILL AGREE TO OUR FOUR POINT STRATEGY, CEASEFIRE WILL BE ESTABLISHED, THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE WILL TAKE PLACE AND ALL WILL BE WELL IN LEBANON. QUITE HONESTLY, HOWEVER, I DOUBT IT. (WE HAVE JUST HAD A CALL [REDACTED] TO THE EFFECT THAT [REDACTED] TALKS HAVE GONE BADLY AND THAT NEW PRECONDITIONS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY SYRIA. THIS SIGNALS MY WORST FEARS THAT SYRIA IS PURSUING A STRATEGY OF DELAYING TACTICS WHILE CHANGING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.) AS A CONSEQUENCE WE URGE YOUR CONSIDERATION OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS AND, BASED UPON YOUR CONCLUSIONS, PROMPT CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES TO BE FOLLOWED BY COORDINATED COLLECTIVE ACTION. DILLON
BT

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