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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 10/23/2008

File Folder NSC 00088 10 SEP 1983 (1)

FOIA

M2008-098/9

Box Number 91285

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1.	56483 AGENDA	RE NSC MTG <i>R 10/31/2008 M2008-098/9</i>	1	ND	B1
3.	56484 MEMO	LEHMAN TO CLARK RE. TALKING PTS FOR NSC MTG. <i>R 5/19/2010 M098/9</i>	1	9/9/1983	B1
4.	56485 AGENDA	RE NSC MTG [COPY OF DOC 56483] <i>R 10/31/2008 M2008-098/9</i>	1	ND	B1
5.	56486 TALKING PTS.	FOR JUDGE CLARK <i>R 5/19/2010 M098/9</i>	3	9/10/1983	B1
6.	56487 PAPER	RE BUILD-DOWN <i>R 5/19/2010 M098/9</i>	1	ND	B1
7.	56488 PAPER	RE RELATED ISSUES <i>R 5/19/2010 M098/9</i>	1	ND	B1
8.	56489 PAPER	RE PRINCIPLES <i>R 5/19/2010 M098/9</i>	1	ND	B1
9.	56490 CABLE	090104Z SEP 83 [ANNOTATED] <i>PAR 10/27/2001 F98-018/1 #1; UPHELD 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56490</i>	5	9/9/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
 NSC Meeting Files
 File Folder: NSC0088 10 Sep 1983 (1) Box 91285

Archivist: mjd
 FOIA ID: F98-018
 Date: 08/31/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. agenda	re: NSC meeting, 1p	nd	P1/F1
2. discussion paper	re: START, 10p	nd	P1/F1
3. memo	R 11/9/05 MO3-1348 #2 Ron Lehman to William Clark re: Talking points for NSC meeting, 1p	9/9/83	P1/F1
4. agenda	text same as item # 1, 1p	nd	P1/F1
5. talking points	for Judge Clark, 3p	9/10/83	P1/F1
6. paper	re: build down, 1p	nd	P1/F1
7. paper	re: related issues, 1p	nd	P1/F1
8. paper	re: principles, 1p	nd	P1/F1
9. cable	090104Z SEP 83, 5p Part F98-018/1 #1 10/27/01	9/9/83	P1/F1
10. routing slip	(partial), 1p P F98-018/1 #2 9/25/00	9/9/83	P1/F1 P3
11. memo	William Clark to George Shultz et al. re: papers, 1p	9/9/83	P1/F1
12. cable	R 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #3 090104Z SEP 83, 5p Part F98-018/1 #4 10/27/01	9/9/83	P1/F1
13. paper	re: Lebanon, 3p PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #5	nd	P1/F1
14. paper	re: Lebanon, 4p PART " " #6	nd	P1/F1
15. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 6p PART " " #7	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder: NSC0088 10 Sep 1983 (1) Box 91285

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F98-018
Date: 08/31/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. agenda	re: NSC meeting, 1p	nd	P1/F1
2. discussion paper	re: START, 10p <i>R 11/9/05 M03-1348 #2</i>	nd	P1/F1
3. memo	Ron Lehman to William Clark re: Talking points for NSC meeting, 1p	9/9/83	P1/F1
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7. paper	re: related issues, 1p	nd	P1/F1
8. paper	re: principles, 1p	nd	P1/F1
9. cable	090104Z SEP 83, 5p <i>Part F98-018/1 #1 10/27/01</i>	9/9/83	P1/F1
10. routing slip	(partial), 1p <i>P F98-018/1 #2 9/25/00</i>	9/9/83	P1/F1 P3
11. memo	William Clark to George Shultz et al. re: papers, 1p <i>R 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #3</i>	9/9/83	P1/F1
12. cable	090104Z SEP 83, 5p <i>Part F98-018/1 #4 10/27/01</i>	9/9/83	P1/F1
13. paper	re: Lebanon, 3p <i>PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #5</i>	nd	P1/F1
14. paper	re: Lebanon, 4p <i>PART " #6</i>	nd	P1/F1
15. draft paper	re: Lebanon, 6p <i>PART " #7</i>	nd	P1/F1

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CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING:

<u>DATE:</u>	<u>SUBJECT:</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS:</u>
9/10/83 Cabinet Room 11:00am	START/ Lebanon	<u>The President</u> <u>OVP:</u> The Vice President Admiral Daniel J. Murphy Mr. Donald Gregg <u>State:</u> Secretary George P. Shultz Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger (Under Secretary for Political Affairs) Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs) <u>Defense:</u> Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Dep Sec W. Paul Thayer Mr. Richard N. Perle (Asst Sec for Int'l Security Affairs) Mr. William H. Taft, IV (General Counsel) <u>OMB:</u> Mr. David Stockman Dr. Alton Keel (Assoc Director for Nat'l Security and Int'l Affairs) <u>CIA:</u> Mr. William J. Casey Mr. Douglas George (Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff) Mr. Graham Fuller (NIO Near East/South Asia) <u>USUN:</u> Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick <u>JCS:</u> General John W. Vessey, Jr. Admiral Arthur S. Moreau <u>ACDA:</u> Mr. Kenneth L. Adelman Mr. Michael A. Guhin (Counselor) <u>START:</u> Amb Edward L. Rowny (Chief U.S. START Delegation Negotiator)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By msm NARA, Date 8/26/04

CONFIDENTIAL

100 78

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 9, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: CAROL CLEVELAND

SUBJECT: Attendance List for National Security Council Meeting, September 10, 1983 (U)

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council Meeting on START/Build-down which is scheduled for September 10, 1983 at 11:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. ~~et~~

The Vice President
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

State:

State Secretariat will be confirming attendees with Sec Shultz who is in flight. The expected attendees are:

- Secretary George P. Shultz
- Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger (Under Secretary for Political Affairs)
- Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)

Defense:

- Deputy Secretary W. Paul Thayer
- Mr. Richard N. Perle (Asst Secretary for International Security Affairs)

OMB:

Dr. Alton Keel (Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs)

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey

USUN:

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

ACDA:

Mr. Kenneth L. Adelman
Mr. Michael A. Guhin (Counselor)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By M27 NARA, Date 8/26/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

2

START Delegation:

Ambassador Edward L. Rowny (Chief U.S. START Delegation)

Commission on Strategic Forces:

General Brent Scowcroft

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James A. Baker, III

Mr. Michael K. Deaver

Judge William P. Clark

Mr. Richard G. Darman

Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:

Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt

Mr. Ronald F. Lehman, II

Col Robert E. Linhard

Mr. Sven F. Kraemer

Approved ___ Disapproved ___

Attached is a proposed seating plan for this meeting. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Guhin

Howe

Poindexter

Darman

Kirkpatrick

Eagleburger

Shultz

President

Thayer Perle

Keel

Adelman

Rowny

Vessey

Casey

Clark

Vice President

Meese

Baker

Deaver

Murphy

Moreau

Lehman

Kraemer

Linhard

Kimmitt

NSC. Mtg

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Sept 9

1100-1200

Cabinet Rm

Principal 1

VP.

-697-6064-

Kramer

Meese

Baker

Peaver

Dorman



EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on September 10, 1983, 19 83

for The President of White House:
(Name of person to be visited) (Agency)

The Vice President ✓
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy ✓

Mr. Donald Gregg

State:
Secretary George P. Shultz ✓
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger ✓
Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe ✓

Defense:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger ✓
Deputy Secretary W. Paul Thayer ✓
Mr. Richard N. Perle ✓
Mr. William H. Taft, IV ✓

OMB:
Mr. David Stockman
Dr. Alton Keel ✓

CIA:
Mr. William J. Casey ✓
Mr. Douglas George - START ✓
Mr. Graham Fuller - Lebanon ✓

USUN:
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick ✓

JCS:
General John W. Vessey, Jr. ✓
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau ✓

ACDA:
Mr. Kenneth L. Adelman ✓
Mr. Michael A. Guhin ✓
MEETING LOCATION

START Delegation:
Ambassador Edward L. Rowny ✓

Commission on Strategic Forces:
General Brent Scowcroft ✓

White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese, III ✓
Mr. James A. Baker, III ✓
Mr. Michael K. Deaver ✓
Judge William P. Clark ✓
Mr. Richard G. Darman ✓
Admiral John M. Poindexter ✓
Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein ✓

NSC:
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt ✓
Mr. Ronald F. Lehman, II ✓
Col Robert E. Linhard ✓
Mr. Sven F. Kraemer ✓
Mr. Howard Teicher
Cdr Philip Dur
Chris Lehman ✓

Davis Robinson
Robert Pelletreau

Building West Wing White House

Requested by Rosie Andreatta

Room No. Cabinet Room

Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Time of Meeting 11:00am

Date of request September 9, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

DO NOT DUPLICATE THIS FORM

NSC Mtg

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

11⁰³ - 11⁵² START
11⁵² - 12¹³ Lebanon (P)
12 - 12¹³ Lebanon (w/ot
12¹³ - 1⁰³ Lebanon (P)

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on September 10, 1983, 19 83
for ✓The President of White House :
(Name of person to be visited) (Agency)

- ✓The Vice President
- ✓Admiral Daniel J. Murphy
- ✓Gregg
State:
- ✓Secretary George P. Shultz
- ✓Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger
- ✓Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe

START Delegation:
* ✓ Ambassador Edward L. Rowny

Commission on Strategic Forces:
* ✓ General Brent Scowcroft

- White House:
- ✓ Mr. Edwin Meese, III
 - ✓ Mr. James A. Baker, III
 - ✓ Mr. Michael K. Deaver
 - ✓ Judge William P. Clark
 - * ✓ Mr. Richard G. Darman
 - ✓ Admiral John M. Poindexter
 - * ✓ Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein

- Defense:
- ✓ Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
 - ✓ Deputy Secretary W. Paul Thayer
 - * ✓ Mr. Richard N. Perle
 - ** ✓ Mr. William H. Taft, IV

- NSC:
- ✓ Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
 - * ✓ Mr. Ronald F. Lehman, II
 - * ✓ Col Robert E. Linhard
 - * ✓ Mr. Sven F. Kraemer
 - ** ✓ Mr. Howard Teicher
 - ** ✓ Cdr Philip Dur

- OMB:
- ✓ Mr. David Stockman
 - ✓ Dr. Alton Keel

- CIA:
- ✓ Mr. William J. Casey
 - * ✓ Mr. Douglas George - START
 - ** ✓ Mr. Graham Fuller - Lebanon
 - ✓ Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

* ✓ Mr. Chris Lehman

- JCS:
- ✓ General John W. Vessey, Jr.
 - ✓ Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

~~David Robertson~~ → not
** ✓ Robert Pelletreau

- ACDA:
- * ✓ Mr. Kenneth L. Adelman
 - * ✓ Mr. Michael A. Guhin

* START only
** Lebanon only

Building West Wing White House
Room No. Cabinet Room
Time of Meeting 11:00am

Requested by Rosie Andreatta
Room No. 372 Telephone 3044
Date of request September 9, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

DO NOT DUPLICATE THIS FORM

NSC Meeting
September 9-10
11-12
Cabinet Room
CH: The President

Subject: START/Build-down

VP Meeting
P → 2 → T one

- VP - Stephanie → Phyliss Phyliss
- State - Sharon → Sheila Sheila
- Defense - Betty → Rich → Rich Higgins Richard Perle
- CIA - Ann → Kathy → Anne
- JCS - Seargent Orr → Sgt Orr
- OMB - Diana → Amy Diana
- ACDA - Mary → Kenneth Adelmar / Michael Gubin - 632-4766
Mary → Jim & David L. Posing
Chief of State Dept.
- START Delegation - Virginia → 3612 Virginia → Virginia
- Meese - Carol → Carol Kathy
- Baker - Cathy K. → Cathy K. Cahn
- Deaver - Cathy F. → Donna Nancy
- Darman - Jo → Jan Jan
- NSC, Kraemer - → O/D Sandy
Lehman / Kraemer - → Richard → Jeanne Hoss
Clark - → Kathleen Kathleen

Scowcroft - 86 - 0006 ✓

Dun Teicher → Jennie

Agenda - START/Lebanon
45 min | 15 min → done

VP may chair after 12:00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 9, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: CAROL CLEVELAND

SUBJECT: Attendance List for National Security Council Meeting, September 10, 1983 (U)

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Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger (Under Secretary for Political Affairs)
Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)

Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger ✓
Deputy Secretary W. Paul Thayer
* Mr. Richard N. Perle ✓ (Asst Secretary for International Security Affairs)
H. T. T. J. N. - [unclear]

OMB:

Dr. Alton Keel (Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs)

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey

USUN:

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

ACDA:

* Mr. Kenneth L. Adelman
* Mr. Michael A. Guhin (Counselor)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By M-27 NARA, Date 8/26/94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

START Delegation:

* Ambassador Edward L. Rowny (Chief U.S. START Delegation)

Commission on Strategic Forces:

* General Brent Scowcroft

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James A. Baker, III

Mr. Michael K. Deaver

Judge William P. Clark

* Mr. Richard G. Darman

Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:

Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt

* Mr. Ronald F. Lehman, II

* Col Robert E. Linhard

* Mr. Sven F. Kraemer

** Mr. Howard Teicher

** Cdr Philip An

Approved _____ Disapproved _____

Attached is a proposed seating plan for this meeting. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM HILL, C *MAN 8/26/94*

RECEIVED 08 SEP 83 16

TO CLARK

DOCDATE 08 SEP 83

LINHARD

08 SEP 83

KRAEMER

08 SEP 83

KEYWORDS START

ARMS CONTROL

AGENDA

NSC

SUBJECT. AGENDA & PAPER FOR 10 SEP NSC MTG ON BUILD DOWN CONCEPT

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: STATUS S FILES IF

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8327236

LOG

NSCIFID *NSC00088* (B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

[Handwritten entries in table]
SEP 0 8 1983
SEP 0 8 1983

DISPATCH *ed Cox & D Sheet* SEP 0 6 1983 W/ATTCH FILE (C)

9/8
7:40

Please LDX
ASAP.

Thank you,
Rosie

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 91063

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Date SEP 08 1983

Subject: AGENDA & PAPER FOR 10 SEPT NSC MTG

M 308/26/144

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Judge Clark	_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Mr. Lord	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Mr. Brazil	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Col. Myer	_____ Capt. Sims	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Ltc. Cobb	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Shull	_____ NSC MSG Center
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Poe	_____ Mr. Teicher	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT	1	SEP 08 1983		
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	LDX			
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	LDX 1	9/9/83	1245	Miss R. Hall
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State	LDX			
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State	LDX			
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup	LDX			
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon	LDX 1	9/9/83	1245	Miss R. Hall
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOP	1	9/9/83	11/10 am	Penny Morgan
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.	LDX			
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOP				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

~~SECRET~~

VIA LDX

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
91063

~~SECRET~~

September 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Dr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United States
Representative to the United
Nations

Brig Gen George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
The Pentagon

Mr. William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Ambassador Edward Rowny
Chief Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Build-Down -- Saturday, September 10, 1983 (S)

The attached paper on the Build-Down concept has been prepared by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group for discussion at the National Security Council meeting to be held in the White House Cabinet Room on Saturday, September 10, 1983 at 11:00 a.m. Given the sensitive nature of this meeting, limit distribution of the attached paper to attendees only. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
for Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment as Noted

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MSP NARA, Date 8/26/97

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

56483

~~SECRET~~

AGENDA
FOR
NSC MEETING ON BUILD-DOWN

- A. Introduction -- Judge Clark
- B. Build-Down -- All Principals

Discussion of the basic approach and strategy implementing the build-down concept outlined in the Senior Arms Control Policy Group discussion paper. Discussion should focus on the following questions:

1. What should be the Administration's final position on implementing the build-down concept? When and how should the full bottom-line be revealed?
2. Given the current political environment, what should be the thrust and level of detail of the Administration presentations made at Congressional hearings scheduled for the week of September 12?
3. What additional steps need the Administration be prepared to take prior to key votes later in the month?

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M2008-098/9 456483

BY af NARA DATE 10/31/08

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START Discussion Paper

I. Introduction

There has been interest in the Congress in seeing modifications to our START position -- combined with a build-down proposal -- as evidence of the Administration's seriousness on arms control and as the quid pro quo for support of the President's strategic modernization program. The signals from the Hill, however, are mixed and in many ways contradictory. Moreover, the current US negotiating position is fundamentally sound and the Soviets have given us little ground for believing that additional modifications at this time will result in progress.

On balance, we see no need at this time to adopt fundamental changes to our current START position. However, our current understanding of the situation on the Hill is that some form of a build-down proposal must be forthcoming from the Administration to assure support for defense programs in the upcoming appropriations cycle.

It is apparent, moreover, that there is not a good understanding of our current negotiating proposal -- on the Hill or with the public -- or of the magnitude and significance of the changes made in the last round to bring the US position into line with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. Therefore, we should undertake a major educational effort on the Hill, stressing that in fact our current START position is commensurate with and responsive to the recommendations of the Commission and that it offers a solid chance for making progress toward reaching agreement with the Soviets -- provided they are interested in reaching agreement.

The issue for decision is what form of build-down we should propose, and how, if at all, it should be augmented by changes in our START position. This decision must be based on an assessment of our national security requirements and of the actual political situation on the Hill -- a situation which is fluid and subject to change over the next two weeks. This paper presents a basic build-down proposal within the START

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negotiations as well as elements that are more extensive with respect to build-down and some possible adjustments to our current START position.

II. Basic Position

A. Current US START Position

Prior to Round IV President Reagan announced a number of fundamental changes to the US START position. These changes reflect the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces and respond to concerns the Soviets had expressed during the first three rounds of the negotiations. During Round IV the US tabled a draft treaty which embodies this new, more flexible approach while, at the same time, preserving the central element of the US START approach -- mutual reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads.

Following are the major changes to the US position introduced in Round IV:

- We relaxed the limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles in order to allow the deployment of additional single-RV ICBMs, as recommended by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.
- We proposed a single-phase agreement, in place of our previous two-phase approach, to make it clear that all systems, including ALCMs, would be limited from the outset of an agreement.
- We proposed limits on heavy bombers (400) and on ALCMs (a maximum of 20 per heavy bomber) which are well below SALT II levels.
- On throw-weight, we offered to withdraw the collateral constraints (the 2500/210/110 subceilings) in favor of a direct limit on aggregate missile throw-weight, if the Soviets prefer. We told the Soviets that we are not insisting on reductions to US levels, but made clear that the level would be a matter of negotiation. We also discussed a variety of other possible approaches to resolving the throw-weight issue and said we would be receptive to any serious Soviet proposals.

- We made it clear to the Soviets that the substantial reductions we seek in the strategic forces of both nations would be implemented over time. We stressed -- in accordance with the recommendation of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces -- that our objective is to channel the modernization of both sides in a direction which will enhance stability and reduce the first strike threat.

- One of the ways we seek to do this is by reductions in the weight -- and hence the destructive power -- of warheads on new ballistic missile systems. We have proposed separate weight ceilings for RVs on MIRV and single-RV systems. We left the specific ceilings blank in our draft treaty in order to demonstrate our desire to take into account Soviet views on what the levels should be.

During the last round, the Soviets also modified some of their previous proposals which were so obviously one-sided that it was clear that they had been made primarily for negotiating purposes: the Soviets expressed a willingness to drop their proposed ban on all ALCMs while maintaining a ban on "long-range" GLCMs and SLCMs, and to modify provisions whose effect would have been to stop deployment of Trident submarines and the D-5 missile. We welcomed these Soviet moves.

However, the Soviets did not respond to our flexibility with any equivalent willingness to modify the central elements of their position. Moreover, they tabled subceilings for MIRV missiles under their 1,800 SNDV aggregate which would, if fully implemented, allow them to deploy over 11,000 ballistic missile warheads and 6,800 warheads on MIRV ICBMs; substantial increases over the already high Soviet levels.

B. Basic Build-Down Position

Within the context of START, the US could seek a guaranteed mutual build-down of ballistic missile warheads (to a floor of 5,000) as a means of achieving reductions. The US could accept ballistic missile warhead reductions of approximately 5% per year (based on entry-in-force warhead levels) which equates to a certain, constant number of warheads guaranteed to be retired each year during the treaty's period of reduction. The US would propose to count warheads according to SALT counting and type rules. This would mean that the starting level for US and Soviet forces would be approximately equal. (The Poseidon C-3 would be credited with 14 RVs.)

From equal accountable entry in force levels, both sides could reduce to a 5,000 floor in slightly over eight years, a guaranteed annual build-down of approximately 440 accountable warheads.

There is an apparent contradiction between the actual deployed warhead figures we have used (7,300 for the US and 7,900 for the Soviets) and the accountable warheads on which the build-down would be based (8,800 on both sides). This could cause the credibility of this approach to be questioned; i.e., the charge could be leveled that we were proposing to build-down 1,500 non-existing warheads (the difference between 8,800 US SALT accountable warheads and 7,300 now deployed). The contradiction would be explained as follows:

- For existing types of missiles the maximum number of warheads tested must be used to enable verification, and to deny the Soviets any possibility of actually increasing their current advantage over the number of US deployed warheads during the reduction period.
- This counting method would be consistent with figures and counting concepts used in the past with the Soviets and should be relatively easy to negotiate.
- Our START position has as its focus achieving a reduced number of actual deployed warheads. This is constant with the build-down formula. The issue is not how we get to 5,000, but actually achieving the goal of 5,000 deployed RVs.
- Finally, using the 7,300/7,900 figures would expose us to charges that the Soviets were obliged unfairly to build-down at a faster rate than the US, or that the Soviets were permitted a longer period to reach the floor level.

C. Strategy for Pursuing Basic Build-Down Position

Packaging the incorporation of build-down in our START position will be key to its acceptability by the Congress. This will involve a clear exposition of how our START position, modernization program and build-down fit into a comprehensive approach to a more secure strategic environment. We would make clear that our approach to build-down represented a seriously considered, firm Administration position.

o The US strategic modernization program and the US arms control position as modified during the last round of negotiations to fully incorporate the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces are designed to complement each other in an overall framework designed to promote long-term strategic stability.

o Our modernization program includes modernizing our aging bomber forces and ALCMs, the B-1 bomber and the Stealth bomber, to achieve greater survivability and penetration of Soviet air defenses. Modernization of the SLBM force with Trident II will permit greater use of wide-ocean areas so as to reduce the effectiveness of Soviet ASW against the SSBN fleet and, thus, ensure its long-term survivability. All of these changes are designed to promote long-term stability of our strategic forces.

o Our modernization program also includes a limited number of MX missiles designed to counterbalance Soviet hard-target kill capability and, thereby, to increase near-term stability. It also serves to encourage, in combination with the D-5 SLBM, Soviet movement from large silo-based ICBMs toward smaller mobile ICBMs while we, ourselves, pursue, on an urgent basis, development of a small single-warhead ICBM adaptable to a number of more survivable basing modes, to replace Minuteman. Again, the goal is maintaining and enhancing the contribution of the ICBM force to deterrence and long-term stability.

o Complementary to this program, our START position focuses on deep reductions in the destructive capability and potential of the strategic forces of the US and Soviet Union and to channel residual deterrent capability into more survivable and, thus, more stable systems, that is, toward greater dependence on small single-RV ICBMs, on SLBMs and on second-strike bomber forces.

o This position has as its central element reduction by roughly one-third in the numbers of deployed ballistic missile warheads of both sides, a key measure of destructive capability.

o It also calls for significant reductions in the throw-weight of Soviet missiles. Throw-weight is an important measure of destructive capability and potential because in an agreement limiting both sides to equal numbers of warheads, the side with the greater throw-weight can deploy larger warheads or in a breakout deploy more warheads.

o We have also indicated wide flexibility on the ceiling for deployed ballistic missiles, which, in combination with our proposed missile RV and throw-weight reductions, should further encourage Soviet movement toward more survivable and, thus, more stabilizing single-RV missiles.

o To this position we now intend to add a new major element suggested by the US Congress -- a mutual, verifiable, guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads.

o We have studied the concept intensively over the past months to see how it could be integrated in and complementary to our START position and the US objectives in START. These objectives include significant reductions leading to increased stability, equality in key measures of destructive capability and potential, and verifiability. A number of alternatives were examined and discarded because they failed in one way or another to meet these essential objectives.

o The build-down we will propose will be an integral part of our START proposal, taken in concert with reductions in all other elements of our proposal.

o Specifically, it will call for both sides to reduce from their approximately equal current levels by about 5% per year (about 440 warheads) over an eight-year period to a level of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads.

o We have chosen percentage reductions in ballistic missile warheads to an agreed floor rather than tying it to modernization because of the obvious and serious verification and compliance problems we have with regard to differentiating Soviet modernization of existing systems from new systems, a key element in any build-down tied to modernization.

The percentage reduction formula has the same effect on ballistic missile warheads as a two-for-one build-down but would ensure a guaranteed Soviet build-down.

o We believe that this significant addition to our current highly-flexible START position involving deep reductions in strategic destructive capability and potential provides a sound and fair basis for an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, one that promotes long-term stability while allowing each side great latitude to configure its forces to meet its strategic needs.

o This modified position, in combination with our planned strategic modernization program, form the two key building blocks upon which, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, we can build a more secure and stable strategic environment, one that reduces the risk of war.

o Given this overall framework and a consensus of the Congress and the US public behind this coordinated and comprehensive approach to arms control and national security, we provide the clearest mandate to the US negotiating team to seek an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement at lower, more stable levels. We can only hope that the Soviet Union can exhibit equal flexibility and desire to achieve such an agreement.

D. Soviet Reaction to Basic Build-Down Position

1. Initial reactions

The initial Soviet reaction to the build-down is likely to be negative mainly on the ground that it does not address bomber weapons in aggregation with ballistic missile warheads. A second objection to the proposal, possibly not voiced, is that the Soviets have indicated that they desire to retain significantly more than 5,000 warheads in their ballistic missile inventory.

However, it is unlikely that they will either accept or reject the proposal outright. They have been following closely the internal US debate on arms control policy and could possibly see advantage in encouraging Congressional advocates of the proposal by evidencing some interest in it.

The initial Soviet reaction will also be influenced by the current state of US-USSR relations, especially the public flavor, which does not appear to provide a climate for, much less allow, the Soviets to compromise on central issues. Moreover, we know of no apparent internal pressures on the Soviet leadership to negotiate seriously.

2. Possible Soviet Actions--After Round V

In the absence of an outright rejection, the Soviets at least may attempt to modify a build-down proposal to minimize its effect on their force modernization programs. Some actions the Soviets could take to protect their forces while appearing to accept the basic build-down concept include (in each case the Soviet proposal would include all strategic offensive systems):

- proposing an agreement where modernization triggers build-down; this would enable them to defer modernization for a number of years since their strategic forces are generally more modern than ours;
- proposing an agreement in which modernization of existing deployed systems was exempted; this would allow them to deploy follow-on systems without triggering build-down;

- proposing an agreement where modernization restrictions apply only to those systems first flight-tested after the agreement goes into effect; this would protect weapons like the SS-X-24, PL-5 and SS-N-18 follow-on, which are in a late stage of development.

The Soviets may chose to make a direct counter build-down proposal rather than negotitate a US proposal. Some key elements of proposals they could make to promote their START position while undermining ours include:

- aggregating bomber weapons and cruise missiles with ballistic missile RVs;
- proposing a build-down ratio higher than the US would accept;
- proposing different rules for a build-down that impact more heavily on the US.

It is possible that after a lengthy negotiating process, and then only in return for appropriate US concessions, the Soviets would agree to some type of build-down as a mechanism for the reductons required in a negotiated START agreement.

III. Modifications to the Basic Build-Down Position

If it is decided that we must augment the basic build-down position, the following elements could be considered. Adoption of these elements should be avoided if possible.

A. Percent Reductions "Build-down" Tied to Modernization

This variant would add the link between modernization and force reductions to the percentage annual build-down in START. Under this concept, there would be two mechanisms for reductions. First, a percent annual reduction would be in effect. Second, for every new, modern warhead deployed, a certain number would have to be withdrawn. The preferred formulation would require 1.5 older warheads to be withdrawn for each new warhead deployed. This would represent a 3:2 across-the-board build-down for ballistic missile warheads. An alternative of 2:1 build-down for ICBM warheads and 3:2 build-down for SLBM warheads could also be considered, if necessary. In any event, the actual reductions would be the greater required by either the modernization schedule or the specified percent annual reductions.

The central problem with linking the build-down to modernization is the difficulty in defining, negotiating and effectively verifying "modernization". A build-down with modernization would also be particularly sensitive to the definition of new warheads. The ambiguities inherent in this approach would prolong negotiations and bedevil an actual build-down.

B. Inclusion of Heavy Bombers in Build-Down

This variant would build-down heavy bombers in addition to ballistic missile RVs by reducing heavy bombers in the force on the basis of a negotiated schedule. As long as retired B-52s (in storage) are counted as well as operational bombers and a floor consistent with our current position in START (400/350) is used, a variety of build-down ratios for bombers would not adversely affect our force plans. A reduction schedule that is similar to that proposed for missile warheads would be easiest to negotiate and explain publicly. A build-down of bomber weapons would not be acceptable to the US.

IV. Adjustments to the START Position

Some believe that pressures on the Hill to adopt build-down and to change our START position are deeply held and transcend the current international political circumstances. This is clearly not the time for fundamental changes or major initiatives in our START position. Nevertheless, pressures may be such that we will need now to take the steps which could propitiate the condition for achieving progress in START in the coming months.

On the other hand, it is a widespread interagency view that since our position is fundamentally sound and that recent significant changes have not been adequately responded to by the Soviets, changes to our START position are now unnecessary and would be perceived by the Soviets as a lack of resolve. Moreover, the Soviets are unlikely to make major moves in START until the situation in INF becomes more clear.

The following adjustments to the current US position could be added to the basic build-down proposal to demonstrate additional flexibility in our negotiating stance. Additional analysis on each of these changes would be needed before a decision is made to adopt any of them.

1. Unconditionally Drop 2,500 Sub-Limit on ICBM Warheads. This could be seen by some critics of the current START position as a major move in our START position. Under the current 5,000 ballistic missile warhead limit, the Soviets probably would not deploy more than about 3,400 ICBM warheads in any event.

2. Adopt 2,500 MIRV ICBM Sub-Limit. This change could be portrayed as an additional step toward consistency with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. It would represent an intermediate step between our current position and unconditionally dropping the 2,500 sub-limit as discussed above.

3. ALCM Limits Close to Our Requirements. The current US position would theoretically permit 8,000 ALCM warheads, well over twice the size of current US force plans. We have not proposed sub-limits on ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. We could propose a direct limit on ALCMs of 3,000-4,000, in line with current US plans. This could be implemented by offering a sub-ceiling of 200 on ALCM carriers. Proposing either of these limits would undercut critics' charges that the US is not willing to discuss reasonable limits on its bomber forces.

4. Ban New Types of MIRVed ICBMs. A ban on new types of MIRVed ICBMs would be consistent with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces that encourage greater reliance on single-RV missiles. It would also insure that future types of mobile ICBMs are single-RV missiles. Presumably, this ban would allow no new MIRV ICBMs beyond the MX and the SS-X-24. The US would need to decide first whether it needs to protect the option of a new type of MIRV ICBM after the MX. This type of ban would also raise the difficult problem of rules concerning modernization of existing types.

National Security Council
The White House

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Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
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Judge Clark	<u>OK. Send us 2 copies</u>	_____	_____
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Adm Poindexter

Please review and I will
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

September 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM:

BOB LINHARD ^{RKC} SVEN KRAEMER ^{SK}

SUBJECT:

Papers Supporting Sept 10th NSC Meeting on
Build-down

Please sign the attached cover memorandum and make immediate distribution of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group paper and proposed meeting agenda in support of Saturday's NSC meeting.

Concurrence: Ron Lehman ^{Not Available}

Attachments

- Tab I Cover Memorandum Transmitting Papers (S)
 A Arms Control Policy Group Paper (S)
 B Proposed Agenda (S)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NJP NARA, Date 8/26/97

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Dr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United States
Representative to the United
Nations

Brig Gen George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
The Pentagon

Mr. William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Ambassador Edward Rowny
Chief Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Build-Down -- Saturday, September 10, 1983 (S)

The attached paper on the Build-Down concept has been prepared by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group for discussion at the National Security Council meeting to be held in the White House Cabinet Room on Saturday, September 10, 1983 at 11:00 a.m. (S)

↑
Insert

Thomas Hill
for Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment as Noted

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By WJG NARA, Date 6/26/97

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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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SENSITIVE Attachment

September 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Discussion Paper for September 10 NSC Meeting

Attached is the requested START discussion paper, in preparation for the NSC meeting now scheduled on Saturday, September 10.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By WJH NARA, Date 8/24/99

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SENSITIVE Attachment

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

September 9, 1983

FROM: *RL*
RON LEHMAN

SUBJECT: Talking Points for NSC Meeting on Build Down

The following attached material is designed to support you in the NSC meeting on build down:

- Tab A - NSC Meeting Agenda (S)
- Tab B - Draft Talking Points for Your Use (S)
- Tab C - Charts Developed for Use at the Meeting (S)
- Tab D - Senior Arms Control Group Discussion Paper (S)
- Tab E - Letter from Nunn/Cohen/Percy to Scowcroft and Related Press Release (U)

The charts provided at Tab C were developed for use at the meeting to support your talking points and the general discussion if needed. They are being developed this evening and will be available on poster board prior to the meeting.

The letter to the Scowcroft Commission from Senators Nunn, Cohen and Percy which was received only today, and a press release (Tab E) announcing the letter may well represent the most difficult aspect of the meeting. Senator Nunn intends to provide the press release for media use on Monday. It will clearly generate some attention, and whatever posture we take with the Congress over the next few weeks, it must reflect a judgment on how we should treat this letter. We should certainly expect Senator Percy to press Jon Howe on the Administration's view of the letter when Howe testifies before the SFRC on September 14.

It is likely that all of the other NSC principals will be familiar with the letter. We would recommend that you show it to the President or at least describe it to him prior to the meeting. The letter is only briefly addressed in your talking points. When we meet with you prior to the meeting (10 a.m.), we will brief you further on this evolving situation.

Recommendation

That you review the attached materials and use the talking points provided to frame discussion at the NSC meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Chris Lehman (unavailable), Sven Kraemer, Bob Linhard

Attachments as noted above (S)

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BY *RL* NARA DATE 5-14-10

TAB A

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AGENDA
FOR
NSC MEETING ON BUILD-DOWN

- A. Introduction -- Judge Clark
- B. Build-Down -- All Principals

Discussion of the basic approach and strategy implementing the build-down concept outlined in the Senior Arms Control Policy Group discussion paper. Discussion should focus on the following questions:

1. What should be the Administration's final position on implementing the build-down concept? When and how should the full bottom-line be revealed?
2. Given the current political environment, what should be the thrust and level of detail of the Administration presentations made at Congressional hearings scheduled for the week of September 12?
3. What additional steps need the Administration be prepared to take prior to key votes later in the month?

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TAB B

Proposed Talking Points for Judge Clark
National Security Council
September 10, 1983

ITEM 1: Introductory Remarks

- For some time now, the Interagency Group has been studying various approaches to the concept of a guaranteed mutual build-down in strategic forces. The concept of the build-down in nuclear forces has proven very attractive in the Congress, especially in the Senate where Senators Cohen, Percy, and Nunn are the primary sponsors.

- Many of you have spent time with advocates of the build-down, and the Senior Arms Control Policy Group met with the primary co-sponsors before the August recess. In the weeks ahead, there are several milestones with respect to the build-down issue.
 - In the next three weeks we will have MX votes in subcommittees, full committees and possibly on the floor in the House and in the Senate.

 - In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be marking up an arms control resolution and voting on the nuclear freeze resolution on the 20th of September and will be hearing from the Administration on its arms control efforts next Wednesday, the 14th.

 - On the sixth of October, Ambassador Rowney returns to Geneva for the next round of START, and many advocates of the build-down would like to see us return to the negotiations with a build-down proposal.

- The build-down involves many complex issues, both technical and political. If improperly implemented a build-down could cause great harm to the national security of the United States. At the same time, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group has reviewed ways in which a build-down might safely be structured.

- In preparation for this meeting, an interagency group has produced a paper which outlines a Basic Build-down position and discusses some possible modifications to that position. At this time, I would like to call upon Ron Lehman to briefly highlight the contents of that paper.

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ITEM 2: Lehman Briefing on Paper

((Ron Lehman briefs on paper))

ITEM 3: Congressional Dimension

- Given the importance of the Congressional dimension in our consideration of the build-down, I think it is important to gauge the current state of thinking on the Hill. This is especially true in light of the recent tragedies which have affected everyone and because the Congress is only now returning from the recess.

- We have all been consulting closely with the Congress and I am sure each of us has developed some impressions. Before and during the recess, we received numerous ideas and proposals from the Congress and these have been under review. In addition, the President's Commission on Strategic Modernization has received some proposals.

- I wonder if Brent Scowcroft could start us off with a short summary of what he has seen with respect to build-down on Capitol Hill. I understand that you have just received a letter from the three major sponsors of the build-down in the Senate, Senators Cohen, Percy, and Nunn. I understand that the Senators' letter is to be made public on Monday. Brent, how do you think all of this will affect us?

((Brent Scowcroft speaks))

- Ken Duberstein, would you like to comment on the Hill situation?

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ITEM 3: Discussion

- The issues before us, then, are set out in the agenda:
 1. What should be our bottom-line on the build-down and how should it be implemented with respect both to the Congress and the Geneva negotiations?
 2. What should the Administration say in the Hearings beginning next week?
 3. What additional steps do we need to take prior to key votes and other milestones prior to Ed Rowney's return to Geneva.

- George ((Shultz)), perhaps you could begin the discussion?
 - Paul ((Thayer))?
 - Ken Adelman?
 - Ed Rowny?
 - etc.

- George ((Shultz)), because Jon Howe heads the Interagency Group and will be testifying on Wednesday, I wonder if he might have a few comments on how he sees the situation?

Paul ((Thayer)), I suspect that Richard ((Perle)) will also be called to testify fairly soon, especially on the military aspects of the build-down. Richard, you know the Hill well, do you have any comments?

ITEM 4: Wrap-up

- This has been a very useful discussion. As the paper indicated, there is a great deal of consensus on how we should view the build-down concept. I take it that we all agree that we could agree to a build-down that was within the START framework and that we could so inform key members of Congress if necessary. I think we would also agree that more work needs to be done, both in our analysis and in our consultations with the Congress.

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BUILD-DOWN

Basic Position on Build-Down

"Could seek a guaranteed mutual build-down of ballistic missile warheads"

- 1. Integral to START
- 2. Annual reduction of approximately 5%
- 3. SALT Counting rules

Modifications to Basic Build-Down Position

- 1. Link RV reductions to modernization with ratio of 3:2
- 2. Different ratios for warheads (e.g., 2:1 for ICBMs and 3:2 for SLBMs)
- 3. Build-down of bomber platforms to START levels

Adjustments to START Position (additional analysis needed)

- 1. Drop 2500 ICBM warhead sublimit
- 2. Adopt 2500 MIRV ICBM warhead sublimit
- 3. -ALCM limits closer to U.S. requirements
- 4. Ban on new type MIRVed ICBMs

S E C R E T

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BY RW NARA DATE 5-14-10

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Related Issues Studied or Under Study

- IG Throwweight Study
- SLCM limitations
- Warhead/platform cap
- Build-down precursor
- Missile/Bomber Aggregates
- SNDV/Warhead Sublimits
- Weighted Counting methods

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NLRR MOA-099/9 #56488

BY RW NARA DATE 5-19-10

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NUNN - COHEN - PERCY PRINCIPLES

1. An immediate ceiling on the number of ballistic missile warheads.
2. An immediate ceiling on the overall destructive capacity.
3. A guaranteed annual build-down in the number of ballistic missile warheads.
4. Build-down rules should create incentives favoring stabilizing systems -- in particular, small, single warhead ICBMs -- and should penalize destabilizing systems such as MIRVed ICBMs (e.g., by requiring the destruction of three warheads for each new warhead on a MIRVed ICBM).
5. A second guaranteed annual build-down in the overall destructive capacity of the strategic forces, missiles and bombers, of both sides.
6. Not prohibit or discourage measures which enhance survivability.
7. An immediate agreement with the USSR on a build-down as a framework and precursor for a detailed START treaty.

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NLRR MDA-DAR/9 #56489
BY RW NARA DATE 5-19-10

→ Carol

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/7/83

MEMORANDUM

TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: National Security Council Meeting

DATE: September 10, 1983

TIME: 11:00 am

DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

REMARKS REQUIRED: Agenda to be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

CC:	A. Bakshian	C. McCain	C. Tyson
	R. Darman	J. Rosebush	R. Kimmitt
	R. Deprospero	B. Shaddix	
	K. Duberstein	W. Sittmann	
	D. Fischer	L. Speakes	
	C. Fuller	WHCA Audio/Visual	
	W. Henkel	WHCA Operations	
	E. Hickey	A. Wrobleski	
	G. Hodges	Nell Yates	

Slide

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

9.9.83

Judge: ✓

Attached is the attendance roster for tomorrow's START NSC.

As you well know, the congressional/public affairs follow-up to this meeting is critical. Dick Darman has thus been listed as an attendee.

I might note that Dick's non-participation in Lebanon NSC/NSPG meetings had no effect on the massive leaks from that process -- all bylined out of Defense.

Bob Kinnitt

CHRON FILE

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By GA, NARA, Date 10/27/01

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WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
SECSTATE PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF AND CJCS
FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS

~~SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: WORST-CASE STRATEGY FOR
LEBANON~~

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. WHILE IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEKEND I EXPRESSED, IN NSC MEETINGS AND IN THE BRIEFING TO THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, MY VIEW THAT THE CENTRAL FACTOR IN THE LEBANON CONFLICT IS SYRIA'S DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN AN ENDURING INFLUENCE OVER LEBANESE POLICY. GIVEN HER OVERWHELMING MILITARY POWER RELATIVE TO LEBANON, AND ABSENT MAJOR THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY INTERVENTION IN BEHALF OF LEBANON, SYRIA CAN ACHIEVE HER GOAL. SHE CAN EXERCISE HER INFLUENCE TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE BY MAINTAINING OCCUPATION FORCES IN THE COUNTRY AND/OR RELYING UPON LEBANESE POLITICANS IN THE CABINET WHO ARE SENSITIVE TO SYRIAN CONCERNS. FACED WITH THIS PROBLEM, OUR POLICY HAS BEEN

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TO INSIST UPON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON BUT TO AGREE TO THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, ACCEPTING THAT IT WILL SURELY INCLUDE FIGURES BEHOLDEN TO SYRIA (E, 7&, FRANJIYYEH, KARAMI AND BARRI). OUR POLITICAL STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO DEVELOP THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S FORMAL CALL FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS AND (IN THE DAYS AHEAD) THE UNITED NATIONS

CONCURRENTLY WE HAVE ENDORSED THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, AN IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF THE LEADERS FOR THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE, MINOR REDEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE ULTIMATE DEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE ARMY FORCES TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE SHUF AND BEYOND. TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO THIS POSITION WE, AND OUR ALLIES, HAVE GRADUALLY EXPANDED OUR MILITARY FORCE PRESENCE IN THE AREA. IT HAS BEEN OUR HOPE THAT SYRIA WILL RESPOND TO THIS COLLECTIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE AND ACCEDE TO THE CEASEFIRE, THE FORMATION OF THE GNU, AND WITHDRAW HER FORCES, ETC. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS RECEIVED WITHIN THE PAST TWO DAYS AND

JUSTIFY A REVIEW OF OUR STRATEGY AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT SYRIA HAS NOT YET FOUND OUR STRATEGY CREDIBLE. WE BELIEVE FURTHER THAT PROPOSALS SUCH AS ARE CONTAINED IN THE STRATEGY PAPER AND DRAFT NSDD FOR THE GRADUAL EXPANSION OF FORCE PRESENCE TO RESOLVE THE LEBANESE CRISIS COULD BE AT BEST IRRELEVANT, AND AT WORST CATASTROPHIC UNLESS APPLIED IN THE CONTEXT OF A SPECIFIC STRATEGY DESIGNED TO BRING AN EARLY POSITIVE CHANGE IN SYRIAN BEHAVIOR. ON THE OTHER HAND WE BELIEVE THAT THE STRATEGIC ESCALATION -- IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS -- COULD ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT.

3. IN PRACTICAL TERMS WE BELIEVE THERE ARE THREE CRITICAL CONDITIONS WHICH SHOULD APPLY BEFORE SUCH AN ESCALATION IS CONTEMPLATED. FIRST, THAT WE ARE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ABOUT OUR OWN POLICY AND ITS LIMITS AND CONDITIONS; SECOND, THAT WE HAVE THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF OUR MNF PARTNERS; THIRD, THAT THE KEY MODERATE ARAB STATES, PARTICULARLY

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SAUDI ARABIA, BACK UP OUR STRATEGY AND OPPOSE SYRIA. THE STRATEGY WOULD BE BASED UPON THE PREMISE THAT SYRIA HAS NO INTENTION OF AGREEING EITHER TO A CEASEFIRE, TO THE SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL DIALOGUE IN LEBANON OR TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF HER OWN FORCES BUT ASSUMES THAT WHILE SHE MAY TAKE A POSITIVE POSITION ON THESE ELEMENTS PUBLICLY SHE WILL CONCURRENTLY PROPOSE SUCH PRECONDITIONS AS TO MAKE HER REALIZATION IMPOSSIBLE WHILE. ON THE GROUND, SHE SUPPORTS AND ULTIMATELY CONSTRICTS (THROUGH THE PSP) THE ENCLAVE OF BEIRUT LEADING TO THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

4. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL POSITION WOULD BE A QUADRIPARTITE CALL FOR: AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE; MINOR LAF REDEPLOYMENTS WITHIN BEIRUT; COMMENCEMENT OF AN IMMEDIATE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN X MONTHS; AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE ULTIMATE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY VIA GRADUAL LAF PRESENCE IN EVACUATED AREAS. WE WOULD IN ADDITION TAKE THE POSITION THAT NO COUNTRY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SUBVERT THIS PROCESS AND THAT TO ENSURE AGAINST THIS CONTINGENCY THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WOULD POSITION UNITS AT STRATEGIC LOCATIONS (I.E., NOTABLY AT THE PASSES LEADING WESTWARD FROM THE BEKKA ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY.) IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE FOUR FLAGS ACCOMPANIED BY A MODEST FORCES WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUFFICIENT DETERRENT TO SYRIAN AND/OR PALESTINIAN INFILTRATION.

5. WE BELIEVE THAT A JOINT US-UK-FRENCH-ITALIAN DEMARCHE TO SYRIA WITH AT LEAST PARALLEL, STRONG SAUDI AND OTHER MODERATE ARAB BACKING, ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE, COULD HAVE THE DESIRED

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EFFECT. OUR POINT IS THAT THERE IS NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED BY INCRIMENTALLY ESCALATING THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN AND OTHER MILITARY POWER WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT GO WITH IT UNLESS IT IS CLEAR THAT IT HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THE DESIRED PURPOSE (I.E., A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES). IN SHORT IT SEEMS TO US THAT WE MAY BE FALLING INTO A TRAP OF INCRIMENTAL ESCALATION WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY BE EXPOSED AS A BLUFF. WE ARE VERY MINDFUL OF THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A STRATEGY FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THE CONGRESS, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS CLEAR THAT SYRIA IS A KEY ELEMENT IN SOVIET NEAR EAST STRATEGY AND WE MUST CONSIDER A SPECTRUM OF SOVIET RESPONSES TO ANY ESCALATORY MEASURES WE MIGHT CONSIDER. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE ENORMOUS STRATEGIC STAKES FOR THE US AND THE WESTERN WORLD IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE NEAR EAST IN ADDITION TO BUT NOT SEPARATE FROM LEBANON, THAT WOULD CERTAINLY JUSTIFY THE POSSIBLE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER. IT IS THIS FACTOR -- WHICH ADMITTEDLY, IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONVEY TO A CONGRESS WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE BY PUBLIC SPEECHES AND FREQUENT TESTIMONY -- WHICH IS OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

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6. IT MAY BE THAT TOMORROW MORNING SYRIA WILL AGREE TO OUR FOUR POINT STRATEGY, CEASEFIRE WILL BE ESTABLISHED, THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE WILL TAKE PLACE AND ALL WILL BE WELL IN LEBANON. QUITE HONESTLY, HOWEVER, I DOUBT IT. (WE HAVE JUST HAD A CALL [REDACTED] [REDACTED] TO THE EFFECT THAT [REDACTED] TALKS HAVE GONE BADLY AND THAT NEW PRECONDITIONS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY SYRIA. THIS SIGNALS MY WORST FEARS THAT SYRIA IS PURSUING A STRATEGY OF DELAYING TACTICS WHILE CHANGING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.) AS A CONSEQUENCE WE URGE YOUR CONSIDERATION OF WORST CASE SCENARIOS AND, BASED UPON YOUR CONCLUSIONS, PROMPT CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES TO BE FOLLOWED BY COORDINATED COLLECTIVE ACTION. DILLON

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