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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/22/2004

File Folder NSC 00086 12 AUGUST 1983 [INTERMEDIATE RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES] (1/2)

FOIA

2000-002

Box Number 21285 Box 5

SKINNER

25

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1321	AGENDA	FOR NSC MEETING <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	8/12/1983	B1
1322	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE NSC MEETING <i>R 2/22/2008 F00-002</i>	2	ND	B1
1323	AGENDA	FOR NSC MEETING (ALMOST SAME TEXT AS ITEM 1321) <i>R 2/22/2008 F00-002</i>	1	8/12/1983	B1
1324	TALKING POINTS	FOR JUDGE CLARK <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	5	ND	B1
1325	AGENDA	ALMOST SAME TEXT AS 1321 <i>R 2/22/2008 F00-002</i>	1	8/12/1983	B1
1326	PAPER	RE INF STRATEGY - BASIC QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
1327	PAPER	RE TABLE OF OPTIONS <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
1328	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS 1322 <i>R 2/22/2008 F00-002</i>	2	ND	B1
1329	[PAPER	RE INF STRATEGY <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

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CAS 12/22/2004

File Folder NSC 00086 12 AUGUST 1983 [INTERMEDIATE RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES] (1/2)

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1330	PAPER	COPY OF ITEM 1327 <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
1331	PAPER	RE INF STRATEGY <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	16	ND	B1
1332	ANNEX	OF KEY EVENTS (ATTACHMENT TO ITEM 1331) <i>PAR 11/28/2012 M301/1</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

August 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM: ^{Kim} RON LEHMAN/^{SA}SVEN KRAEMER

SUBJECT: Revised Talking Points
for NSC Meeting on INF,
August 12, 1983

Attached for your use at this morning's NSC meeting are revised Talking Points reflecting the changed Agenda and framework for discussion devised at yesterday's Senior Arms Control Policy Group meeting. Also attached are three sheets being handed out to the NSC participants as follows:

1. Agenda
2. Basic Questions
3. Table of Options

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the attached Talking Points and attached three items.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

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SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By OLS NARA, Date 1/12/05

TALKING POINTS FOR JUDGE CLARK

NSC Meeting on INF

August 12, 1983 -- 10:30 A.M.

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (5 minutes)

- Mr. President, today we will be reviewing our strategy for Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations for the remainder of 1983. We have one more negotiating round before initial deployments of the Pershing II and the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) are in place in December. The negotiations resume on September 6. How we manage the negotiations will be crucial to our success in sustaining Allied and public support for the remainder of 1983 and in the years ahead.
- Our meeting today will be principally a discussion meeting. We will not be making final decisions today. But we will be seeking to establish the path we will be setting for the months ahead.
- Our discussion today will be based on the paper prepared by our new Senior Arms Control Policy Group. We have benefited from that Group's earlier discussion, including one yesterday with (Ambassador) Paul Nitze, and we appreciate Admiral Howe's fine work in coordinating this paper for us. Because the

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NLS FOO-002#1324

BY WJ NARA, DATE 6/6/06

issues involved are unusually sensitive from a NATO Alliance point of view, we have sought to keep the paper on a very close-hold basis.

-- Mr. President, the specific questions before us today (which are examined in the discussion paper) are these:

1. Should we change our negotiating approach for the fall round?
2. If so, which of the available substantive elements (such as aircraft, regional limits, and other steps) should we choose?
3. If we decide on one or more moves, how should they be introduced into the negotiations -- as a comprehensive package or as a series of individual steps?
4. What should be the timing of such a move or moves?
5. What quids should we seek from the Soviets?

-- As we address these questions and consider our options, we will need to take a number of factors into account: (1) U.S. goals and criteria; (2) the concerns of our Allies; (3) likely Soviet moves and their impact, especially on the FRG; and (4) key events outside the negotiations, which represent either potential opportunities to be exploited or dangers to be neutralized. (Annex I of paper has partial listing of such events.)

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-- As the discussion paper makes clear, all in the Senior Policy Group agreed that we will not wish to alter our basic criteria for agreement. They are good, and they have held up well. In particular, the Pershing II remains a fundamental element of our position, and we should not compensate the Soviets for UK and French strategic systems.

II. SCHULTZ/NITZE COMMENTS ON CONTEXT (10-15 minutes)

-- Before we consider the nature and possible timing of such changes in detail, I would like to ask George (Shultz) and Paul (Nitze) to lead off our discussion.

A. The Situation in Europe

-- George, would give us a summary of the current situation in Europe as you see it with regard to the INF negotiations and deployments.

[George Shultz comments -- 3-5 minutes]

-- Bill (Casey), you might want to make a short comment on George's presentation.

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B. The State of the Negotiations

-- Paul (Nitze), could you summarize the current state-of-play in the negotiations as you see it.

[Paul Nitze comments -- 3-5 minutes]

-- Thank you, Paul. These have been helpful introductory remarks in setting the context for our considerations today.

III. THE BASIC OPTIONS (40 minutes)

-- I propose that we now turn to the basic questions and major options we need to consider for our future approach to the negotiations. We have passed around a list of these questions and options. These options involve issues of possible substantive changes in our position on aircraft, on global limits, and on other elements. Such substantive changes could be combined in several illustrative packages as indicated in the discussion paper.

-- But as that paper points out, the options before us also involve complex diplomatic issues of tactics and timing, and these are likely to prove as important, or even more important, than the substantive issues themselves.

- Can we have your views about these basic questions and options, indicating which of these approaches and illustrative you favor and your views on toming. George (Shultz), will you begin? Paul (Nitze)? Cap (Weinberger)? Ken (Adelman)? Others?

[Discussion by principals -- 30 minutes]

IV. WRAP-UP (5 minutes)

- We have made good progress today in clarifying the issues and in setting the path for the next round.
- Our staff will prepare a recommendation/decision package framed in terms of today's discussion.

NSC MEETING ON INF

August 12, 1983

10:30-11:30 A.M.

AGENDA

- I. INTRODUCTION - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)
- II. THE DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT
 - A. The Situation in Europe - Secretary Shultz
(5 minutes)
 - B. The State of the Negotiations - Ambassador Nitze.
(5 minutes)
- III. BASIC QUESTIONS AND TABLE OF OPTIONS
 - A. Introduction - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)
 - B. Discussion - All
(30 minutes)
- IV. WRAP-UP - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)

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NLS FOO-002*1325

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 2/22/08

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NSC MEETING -- AUGUST 12, 1983

INF STRATEGY

Basic Questions for Consideration

1. Should we change our negotiating approach to the fall round?
2. If so, which of the available substantive elements (aircraft, regional limits, and other steps) should we choose?
3. If we decide on one or more moves, how should they be introduced into the negotiations: as a comprehensive package or as a series of individual steps?
4. What should be the timing of such a move or moves? When should we announce them publicly?
5. What quids should we seek from the Soviets?

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NLS F20-002 #1320

BY LOT NARA. DATE 6/6/06

TABLE OF OPTIONS: ILLUSTRATIVE* PACKAGES

Option 1. Maintain Current Position

Option 2. Table a Comprehensive Proposal

Illustrative Package:

--A specific number of U.S. missile warheads in Europe (e.g., 300); the same number of Soviet warheads in Europe (e.g., 300 warheads on 100 SS-20s);

--A specific limit on U.S. and Soviet missile warheads outside Europe below current Soviet levels (e.g., 240);

--A specific limit on F-111 and on Badger/Blinder in Europe (e.g., 150).

Option 3. Step-by-Step Presentation of Major Elements

Illustrative Approach #1:

Step 1: General offer to limit longer-range INF aircraft (U.S./Soviet only; equal, global ceilings);

Step 2: Offer to deploy in Europe less than the total number of missiles allowed under a global ceiling, provided the Soviets do the same;

Step 3: Offer to maintain a P-II to GLCM ratio of no more than 1:4 under any missile ceilings agreed in an arms control outcome.

Step 4: Present the above steps as a single package, specifying numbers of missiles and aircraft.

Illustrative Approach #2:

Step 1 (early September): Propose global limitation, at or above U.S. levels, on F-111, Badger, and Blinder if Soviets will agree to negotiate global ceilings on missiles. Offer to maintain P-II to GLCM ratio.

Step 2 (late-October): Propose regional subceilings on missiles and aircraft (specifying missile warhead and aircraft numbers), in exchange for the Soviets' dropping demand for compensation for UK/French systems. (France and UK indicate positions on their future strategic forces).

* The actual combination of elements, and the precise numbers, would be developed subsequently, depending on the option chosen.

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NLS FOO-002 #1327

BY LET NARA, DATE 6/6/06

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(Tentative -- Not Distributed to Agencies)

NSC MEETING ON INF

August 12, 1983

10:30-11:30 A.M.

AGENDA

- I. INTRODUCTION - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)

- II. THE DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT
 - A. The Situation in Europe - Secretary Shultz
(5 minutes)
 - B. The State of the Negotiations - Ambassador Nitze
(5 minutes)

- III. THE BASIC OPTIONS
 - A. Substantive Options
 - Outline - Ron Lehman
(5 minutes)
 - Discussion - All
(15 minutes)
 - B. Diplomatic Options
 - Outline - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)
 - Discussion - All
(15 minutes)

- IV. WRAP-UP - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)

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NLS F00-002#1321

BY LOI NARA, DATE 6/6/00

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on INF -- August 12, 1983, 10:30 A.M.

The NSC meeting on INF scheduled for August 12, 1983, at 10:30 a.m. will be a discussion meeting designed to review our strategy for the INF negotiations. We have one more negotiating round before initial deployments of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) are in place in December. How we manage the negotiations, which resume on September 6, will be crucial to our success in sustaining Allied and public support for the remainder of 1983 and in the years ahead.

The NSC meeting will be principally a discussion meeting, with no final decisions to be made today as we seek to establish the path we will be setting for the months ahead. The discussion will be based on a paper prepared by our new Senior Arms Control Policy Group. That Group has had extensive discussions on framing the issues, including a discussion yesterday with Ambassador Paul Nitze. At the NSC meeting, we will be looking at the questions of whether we should change our negotiation approach for the fall round, and if so, what substantive elements we should change and in what manner and for which Soviet quids we should present such changes.

Attached for your review in preparing for the NSC meeting are the Senior Arms Control Policy Group's discussion paper and other relevant items as follows:

- Tab A -- Proposed Agenda for the Meeting
- Tab B -- Executive Summary of the Discussion Paper
- Tab C -- Table of Options from the Discussion Paper
- Tab D -- Discussion Paper

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NLRR FOO-002 #1322

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 2/22/08

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SENSITIVE

The Discussion Paper provides considerable detail on the range of substantive and diplomatic options. In your review, we recommend that you focus, in particular, on the Executive Summary at Tab B and on the Table of Options at Tab C. Subsequent to the NSC meeting, NSC staff will prepare a recommendation and decision paper for your review based upon the discussions at the NSC meeting.

Recommendation

OK	NO	
—	—	That you review the attached items, with a special focus on the Executive Summary at Tab B and on the Table of Options at Tab C.

Attachments

Tab A	Proposed Agenda
Tab B	Executive Summary of the Discussion Paper
Tab C	Table of Options from the Discussion Paper
Tab D	Discussion Paper

Prepared by Sven Kraemer

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SENSITIVE

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A

NSC MEETING ON INF

August 12, 1983

10:30-11:30 A.M.

AGENDA

- I. INTRODUCTION - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)
- II. THE DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT
- A. The Situation in Europe - Secretary Shultz
(5 minutes)
- B. The State of the Negotiations - Ambassador Nitze
(5 minutes)
- III. THE BASIC OPTIONS
- A. Substantive Options
- modify*
- Outline - Ron Lehman
(5 minutes)
- Discussion - All
(15 minutes)
- B. Diplomatic Options
- Outline - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)
- Discussion - All
(15 minutes)
- IV. WRAP-UP - Judge Clark
(5 minutes)

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NLS F00-002# 1323
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 2/22/08

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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The President has seen _____

per NSC

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on INF -- August 12, 1983, 10:30 A.M.

The NSC meeting on INF scheduled for August 12, 1983, at 10:30 a.m. will be a discussion meeting designed to review our strategy for the INF negotiations. We have one more negotiating round before initial deployments of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) are in place in December. How we manage the negotiations, which resume on September 6, will be crucial to our success in sustaining Allied and public support for the remainder of 1983 and in the years ahead.

The NSC meeting will be principally a discussion meeting, with no final decisions to be made today as we seek to establish the path we will be setting for the months ahead. The discussion will be based on a paper prepared by our new Senior Arms Control Policy Group. That Group has had extensive discussions on framing the issues, including a discussion yesterday with Ambassador Paul Nitze. At the NSC meeting, we will be looking at the questions of whether we should change our negotiation approach for the fall round, and if so, what substantive elements we should change and in what manner and for which Soviet quids we should present such changes.

Attached for your review in preparing for the NSC meeting are the Senior Arms Control Policy Group's discussion paper and other relevant items as follows:

- Tab A -- Proposed Agenda for the Meeting
- Tab B -- Executive Summary of the Discussion Paper
- Tab C -- Table of Options from the Discussion Paper
- Tab D -- Discussion Paper

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NLS FOO-002 #1328

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 2/22/01

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2

The Discussion Paper provides considerable detail on the range of substantive and diplomatic options. In your review, we recommend that you focus, in particular, on the Executive Summary at Tab B and on the Table of Options at Tab C. Subsequent to the NSC meeting, NSC staff will prepare a recommendation and decision paper for your review based upon the discussions at the NSC meeting.

Recommendation

OK

NO

— That you review the attached items, with a special focus on the Executive Summary at Tab B and on the Table of Options at Tab C.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Agenda
Tab B Executive Summary of the Discussion Paper
Tab C Table of Options from the Discussion Paper
Tab D Discussion Paper

Prepared by Sven Kraemer

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

August 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: INF Strategy for the Remainder of 1983

Attached for your distribution is the paper for Friday's NSC meeting on INF strategy.

Barbara McKinley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Paper on "INF Strategy for the Remainder of 1983"

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 1/14/05

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

INF STRATEGY FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1983

SUMMARY

Only one more negotiating round remains before initial GLCM and P-II deployments are in place in late-December. How we manage forthcoming negotiations will be crucial to our success in sustaining Allied and public support for both tracks of the 1979 NATO decision during the remainder of 1983 and in the years ahead. We have growing confidence that we can manage our strategy in a way that will ensure deployments take place on schedule. We have less confidence that an acceptable negotiated solution can be achieved in 1983.

I. Possible Changes in our Position

If, for the time being, it is judged unnecessary or undesirable to make any substantive concessions, one option is simply to maintain our current negotiating position while continuing to develop it in measured fashion by filling in remaining gaps.

On the other hand, if movement is needed in order to sustain the momentum of the negotiations and to assist in managing the European political scene, several potential initiatives should be considered. It is assumed that we will not wish to alter our basic criteria for agreement. In particular, the P-II remains a fundamental element of our position and we should not compensate the Soviets for UK and French strategic systems.

Two major substantive changes to our negotiating position should be considered: the possible inclusion of INF aircraft and regional missile limitations within a global missile ceiling. In proposing either element we would seek an appropriate quid pro quo from the Soviets.

Aircraft: A proposal to negotiate aircraft could take one of several forms:

- a. A general offer to explore possible limitations on longer-range INF aircraft.

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BY LBJ NARA, DATE 6/6/06

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

- b. A global limitation, at or above the U.S. level, on F-111, Badger, and Blinder (plus possibly FB-111 and Backfire).
- c. A European subceiling within a global limitation on these systems.
- d. A European ceiling on F-111, Badger and Blinder (and possibly FB-111 and Backfire), the walk-in-the-woods approach.

Regional Missile Ceilings: The main variants of the regional subceilings concept are:

- a. Equal European subceilings within equal global ceilings.
- b. Separate ceilings on systems within range of Europe and those out of range of Europe, without freedom to transfer (the walk-in-the-woods formula).
- c. A unilateral U.S. undertaking not to deploy our full global quota of missiles in Europe (various formulas are possible, but would require further study).

Other Elements: Other substantive elements which might be introduced during the course of the next round include:

- a. Endorsing parallel French and British unilateral statements expressing willingness to limit or reduce the missile forces if there are major US and Soviet strategic force reductions;
- b. Expressing a preference for a specific warhead level;
- c. Offering to maintain a P-II to GLCM ratio of no more than 1:4 under any agreed missile ceiling*; and
- d. Allowing a higher proportion of GLCM to ballistic missile warheads (e.g., the 4:3 GLCM to ballistic missile ratio precedent established by the walk-in-the-woods) to reward emphasis on "slow-flying" systems.

* We currently plan to deploy 108 P-IIIs and 464 GLCMs, a 1:4.3 ratio.

II. Negotiating Tactics

Broadly speaking, the above elements could be introduced into the negotiations in one of two ways:

a. One option would be to place aircraft, regional ceilings, and perhaps other elements at Ambassador Nitze's disposal at the beginning of the round. He could table these elements in a single integrated package or present them in a web of linked moves. (Option Two in the attached table illustrates such a package.)

b. An alternative would be to introduce these elements step-by-step or in clusters, deciding on a first step while holding a decision on other possible moves in reserve, pending Soviet initiatives or other developments on the European political scene. (The two variants of Option Three in the attached table illustrate these possibilities.)

In substance, these two options are basically the same. The difference is that Option Two introduces all the elements close together, while Option Three lays them out in steps.

III. Public Handling

Our options for public handling will depend in large measure on which of the contrasting negotiating strategies is adopted. We could choose to maintain quiet negotiations for a considerable period during the round, saving a public announcement of any initiative for late October when we may need it most. However, if a comprehensive approach is selected (Option Two), we would have the opportunity near the start of the round for an announcement of more substantive significance and impact. If we adopt a step-by-step approach, we could make a series of announcements, though the dramatic-effect of these individual moves would be less. A possible alternative would be two public announcements: one around the beginning of the round, the other nearer the key Bundestag debate. The latter could be combined with announcement of a significant reduction in the nuclear stockpile in Europe.

IV. Decisions

The attached paper provides background for decisions on the following issues:

- (1) Should we change our negotiating approach to the fall round?
- (2) If so, which of the available substantive elements (aircraft, regional limits, and other steps) should we choose?
- (3) If we decide on one or more moves, how should they be introduced into the negotiations: as a comprehensive package or as a series of individual steps?
- (4) What should be the timing of such a move or moves? When should we announce them publicly?
- (5) What quids should we seek from the Soviets?

Whatever decisions are taken, it is important that we agree now on a basic negotiating strategy for the rest of this year.




TABLE OF OPTIONS: ILLUSTRATIVE* PACKAGES

Option 1. Maintain Current Position

Option 2. Table a Comprehensive Proposal

Illustrative Package:

--A specific number of U.S. missile warheads in Europe (e.g., 300); the same number of Soviet warheads in Europe (e.g., 300 warheads on 100 SS-20s);

--A specific limit on U.S. and Soviet missile warheads outside Europe below current Soviet levels (e.g., 240);

--A specific limit on F-111 and on Badger/Blinder in Europe (e.g., 150).

Option 3. Step-by-Step Presentation of Major Elements

Illustrative Approach #1:

Step 1: General offer to limit longer-range INF aircraft (U.S./Soviet only; equal, global ceilings);

Step 2: Offer to deploy in Europe less than the total number of missiles allowed under a global ceiling, provided the Soviets do the same;

Step 3: Offer to maintain a P-II to GLCM ratio of no more than 1:4 under any missile ceilings agreed in an arms control outcome.

Step 4: Present the above steps as a single package, specifying numbers of missiles and aircraft.

Illustrative Approach #2:

Step 1 (early September): Propose global limitation, at or above U.S. levels, on F-111, Badger, and Blinder if Soviets will agree to negotiate global ceilings on missiles. Offer to maintain P-II to GLCM ratio.

Step 2 (late-October): Propose regional subceilings on missiles and aircraft (specifying missile warhead and aircraft numbers), in exchange for the Soviets' dropping demand for compensation for UK/French systems. (France and UK indicate positions on their future strategic forces).

* The actual combination of elements, and the precise numbers, would be developed subsequently, depending on the option chosen.

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NLS F00-002 #1330

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INF STRATEGY FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1983

I. Introduction

An acceptable INF agreement in Geneva is unlikely before actual deployments begin in December. Nevertheless, how we conduct the negotiations during the round which begins on September 6 will be crucial to our success in maintaining Allied and public support for the dual-track decision. We need, therefore, a sound negotiating strategy to carry us to the end of the year.

This paper examines options for such a strategy and addresses the following key questions:

--Should we change our negotiating approach to the fall round?

--If so, which of the available substantive elements (aircraft, regional limits, and other steps) should we choose?

--If we decide on one or more moves, how should they be introduced into the negotiations: as a comprehensive package or as a series of individual steps?

--What should be the timing of such a move or moves?

--What quids should we seek from the Soviets?

II. Political Factors

Our strategy for the rest of the year should take into account:

--U.S. goals and criteria;

--The concerns of our allies;

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DECL: OADR

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NLS F00-002 #1331
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 6/6/06

--Likely Soviet moves and their impact, especially on the FRG; and

--Key events, outside the negotiations, which represent either potential opportunities to be exploited or dangers to be neutralized. (See Annex I for a partial list of such events.)

By demonstrating a serious, forthcoming and flexible attitude in Geneva and by frequent and visible consultations with our European Allies, we should be able to maintain Allied support for both tracks of the 1979 decision without compromising our basic negotiating principles. We must be in a position to show that the U.S. has made every reasonable effort to reach a satisfactory agreement in Geneva and will continue to do so beyond the end of the year.

Uncertainty about Soviet tactics is a major variable in our calculations. The Soviets probably will make at least one significant negotiating move designed to undermine Allied support for deployments. This could come as early as the beginning of the fall round. Therefore, we may need both a highly flexible approach and a major pre-emptive move early in the negotiations to avoid the appearance of merely reacting to Soviet initiatives.

The Soviets are likely to continue, as before, along three tracks simultaneously. By playing to Western European opinion they will try to make deployments as difficult and politically costly as possible for the U.S. and the Alliance. Second, they will continue negotiations in Geneva with the same objective. Finally, they will seek to place themselves in a position to cope, militarily and politically, with deployments. Moscow may well calculate that the consequences of U.S. deployments in the absence of an INF agreement would better serve their interests than an arms control outcome that sanctioned U.S. deployments, cooled passions in Western Europe, and radically reduced their own INF.*

We cannot, of course, predict exactly the timing and content of Soviet moves during the fall round, though we can make reasonable estimates about when the Soviets would consider us most vulnerable. Possibilities include:

*See the INF delegation's end of round assessment in Geneva 6740.

--forthcoming negotiating moves in Geneva designed to make the Soviet position more attractive to Europeans, such as offers to reduce European-based SS-20s substantially below the level of UK/French systems (162), e.g., to 54 SS-20s; to destroy reduced SS-20s; or to propose a freeze on aircraft rather than reductions;

--offers to reduce SS-20s unilaterally if U.S. deployments are postponed or cancelled;

--reaffirming their proposal for a moratorium on deployments by both sides while negotiations continue.

More ominous alternatives include:

--announcing or implementing counter-deployments against NATO and/or the U.S., including moving more short range INF systems into Warsaw Pact countries, deploying cruise missiles on submarines off the US coasts, or sending cruise missile capable aircraft to Cuba;

--putting direct pressure on the FRG (e.g., in Berlin, trade, or human contacts);

--breaking off INF (and perhaps START) negotiations when deployments begin.

Because of their domestic situations, a number of Allies would strongly prefer agreement to deployments without an agreement. For this reason, the Germans in particular will continue to press us to address and exhaust every possibility in the negotiations. The recent spate of high-level references to the walk-in-the-woods emanating from Bonn reflects this anxiety. At the same time, the FRG, UK, and Italy are holding firm on the deployment schedule and are likely to continue to do so. As indicated at the last Special Consultative Group meeting, the Allies are not pressing us to change our position in any fundamental way, but rather are pointing to a need to "flesh out" certain aspects of it. The Germans, for example, want the U.S. to show new flexibility on aircraft, regional subceilings, and shorter-range systems. Others, such as the British and the Belgians, would prefer to hold moves of this magnitude in reserve pending some Soviet initiative. Allied opinion is also divided on whether the next step in Geneva

should be a patient elaboration of our existing position, a series of offers on individual issues or a single comprehensive package. It appears, therefore, that if the U.S. were to reach a decision soon on a strategy for the next round we would be able to create an Allied consensus around that approach.

In devising our strategy, we must also look beyond the short-term goal of assuring a December missile initial operational capability (IOC) to the longer-term need to maintain the traditional broad consensus in Europe favoring security cooperation with the United States and NATO. We cannot afford to alienate responsible opposition parties and groups over the deployment issue. Deployments will continue through 1988. Moreover, opposition parties such as the German SPD are indispensable to maintaining the domestic consensus in their own countries and are potential partners with whom we may need to cooperate in the future. We cannot allow ourselves, therefore, to be perceived as merely stonewalling. If negotiations fail, it must be the Soviets who are to blame in Western European eyes.

Finally, we must be alert to three other considerations. First, we must be careful not to make proposals we are "certain" the Soviets will reject just to build our record; our proposals must be militarily sound in case the Soviets accept them as the basis for further negotiation. Second, we must be careful to avoid making proposals so lacking in substance that they will be perceived to be insincere and meant only for public relations. Third, we must keep in mind that our goal is to strengthen the political solidarity, deterrence and defense of NATO. Negotiations are a means, not an end; therefore, we must shape our proposals to contribute to these goals.

III. Substantive Elements

Should we decide to move, there are several potential changes in the substance of our negotiating position:

- aircraft;
- regional subceilings;
- other elements.

These elements are briefly discussed below:

A. Aircraft

Since the beginning of the year, the INF IG has examined a wide range of options for including aircraft in the negotiations.* Variables considered include: (1) appropriate aircraft types, (2) global or regional limitations, and (3) caps at existing levels on both sides, or ceilings at the U.S. or Soviet levels, or some other level.

Any move to bring aircraft into the negotiations entails several complications. Depending upon how our proposal is structured, substantive agreements on aircraft could limit our current and future flexibility, both in numerical increases and modernization and the ability to augment during crises. Moreover, we should anticipate that the Soviets are unlikely to accept a specific U.S. proposal, since they seek to capture dual-capable, third-country, and sea-based aircraft. Therefore, introducing aircraft may not advance progress toward an agreement or necessarily guarantee a favorable Soviet response to this U.S. "concession." Agreement to include aircraft, in principle, in the negotiations might, in fact, lead to reductions of dual capable aircraft in Europe. If we propose to limit only F-111, Badger, and Blinder, we may subsequently find the Europeans pressing us to add FB-111 and Backfire. We are likely to have differences with the Soviets over the number of Badger/Blinder we claim are nuclear-capable, and the number they claim are "weapons-delivery" aircraft (as opposed to support and training aircraft). If we adopt a regional approach we must make the number high enough to permit bringing additional aircraft into and through Europe for exercises and crisis response in and around Europe.

Aircraft options that might be considered include:

1. Authorize Ambassador Nitze to explore in general terms possible limitations on longer-range INF aircraft consistent with our basic criteria (i.e., global, equality, U.S.-Soviet only). This approach has the advantage of demonstrating flexibility on inclusion of aircraft while avoiding the complications of a specific proposal.

2. Consistent with our global approach to LRINF missiles, propose a global limitation, at or above U.S. levels,

*See latest IG paper on "Limitations on INF Aircraft," August 2, 1983 which updates options paper forwarded on January 23, 1983 for NSC consideration.

on F-111, Badger, and Blinder. (A more complicated approach, because of START implications, could be the inclusion of FB-111 and Backfire.) No further production of U.S. aircraft at these ranges is currently planned. This approach would require Soviet reductions because of the disparity in U.S. and Soviet numbers, and if Backfire were included, would impact on our START position which counts Backfires as heavy strategic bombers.

3. If, in the future, we move to a regional subceiling for LRINF missiles, we could propose a European subceiling within a global limitation on F-111, Blinder, Badger, plus possibly FB-111 and Backfire.

4. Propose equal aircraft ceilings in Europe only, including F-111s, Blinder, and Badger and possibly FB-111s and Backfire. The walk-in-the-woods imposed a 150 limit in Europe for all of these aircraft. Kvitsinskiy told Ambassador Nitze that there had been no real objection in Moscow to the aircraft part of the walk-in-the-woods proposal. However, a Europe-only ceiling would have limited military meaning.

B. Regional Missile Subceilings

Ambassador Nitze has suggested tying the aircraft issue closely to our global approach to INF missiles, making accommodation to the Soviet desire for inclusion of aircraft in negotiations dependent on a willingness to address limitations on Soviet SS-20s in the Far East.

From another perspective, the Germans have suggested some form of European regional limitation within the context of a global ceiling. However, any regional subceiling formula should account for the interests of both our European and Asian Allies. The Japanese are especially sensitive about any level which simply caps present Soviet LRINF deployments in Asia. They seek some sort of reduction. In addition, making explicit the concept of a separate Asian INF balance could complicate relations with Japan and the PRC and lead to pressures for U.S. action to correct the imbalance. Regional subceilings also raise the issue of equality, since the U.S. is not currently planning to deploy LRINF missiles outside Europe.

Options for movement include:

1. Equal European subceilings within equal global ceilings. This is the approach currently favored by the Germans*. Since we do not currently plan to deploy outside of Europe, this approach would implicitly compensate the Soviets for Chinese systems. Although unlikely given the current Soviet advantage in the Far East, it also would allow free movement of mobile SS-20s from Europe to Asia.

2. We could propose separate ceilings on systems in Europe and those out of range of Europe as in the walk-in-the-woods. Depending on the level of the ceilings, this approach would reduce SS-20s in both Europe and Asia, prevent missile transfers from one region to the other, and establish global equality. However, by implication this approach would pose the issue of regional LRINF missile balances in both Europe and Asia.

3. We might offer a unilateral U.S. commitment not to deploy in Europe more than a certain proportion (e.g, two-thirds) of the global level of LRINF missile warheads permitted under any agreement or not more than the number of Soviet LRINF missile warheads in range of Europe--whichever was greater. This formula would avoid setting an explicit Asian limit, while preserving the principle of global equality. On the other hand, it could be perceived as an arbitrary level dictated by the Soviets and would allow free movement of systems to Asia.

4. While establishing the right to have equal warhead levels in Europe, we might offer to deploy at least some of our systems in the U.S. (including Alaska) rather than Europe, with the right to Reforger-like movements of these systems to prepared sites in Europe. The technical and political feasibility of this approach would need to be determined. It would result, de facto, in fewer U.S. than Soviet warheads in Europe. If such a proposal were made, the German opposition might seize on it as a further argument for avoiding any U.S. deployments, or the Dutch or Belgian opposition might see an opportunity to avoid actual deployments. On the other hand, as a fallback position, it could be a way of

* The September 1979 Special Group report, which laid the foundation for NATO's INF Integrated Decision Document (IDD), concluded on balance that "the combination of a global ceiling and regional subceiling would contribute most to the predictability, stability, and manageability of the long-range theater nuclear missile situation facing NATO."

tacitly compensating for French and UK systems and at the same time establishing an INF missile capability to reach the Soviet Far East.

C. Other Elements

In addition to the major elements of aircraft and regional ceilings, a number of other modifications could be considered.

UK/French Forces: The Soviet demand to include UK and French strategic forces has been the most intractable issue in the negotiations, and we cannot yield on it. However, there may be other potential ways of dealing with this stalemate that do not compromise the principle of equal rights and limits and give an impression of reasonableness and flexibility to the public. Following are some possibilities, but there is no guarantee that we could obtain UK and French concurrence.

1. We could endorse carefully coordinated French and British unilateral statements announcing their willingness to adjust planned force levels downward in the context of a START agreement that significantly reduced Soviet strategic forces. Alternatively, they could indicate willingness to maintain their nuclear force levels at a fixed ratio to the Soviet level as of a given past date. We could couple either of these statements with an offer to negotiate a non-circumvention clause in INF using Salt II language.

2. We might offer a limitation on the duration of an INF treaty (e.g, to 1990) to give the parties an opportunity to reconsider agreed force levels in the light of possible UK/French modernization programs.

Missile Warhead Numbers: The interim proposal left unspecified the equal levels of warheads on LRINF missile launchers we proposed; the Nitze offer to discuss differing levels of warheads in multiples of 50 up to 450 left open a range of possibilities. These approaches have served us well. However, our negotiating position could appear more concrete, and therefore more credible, if we expressed a preference for a specific number. The preferred number should be as low as possible, consistent with the initial deployment level and the need to keep all five basing countries in the game, but should not rule out other possibilities.

P-II: We could offer to maintain a proportion of P-II's to GLCMs no higher, under the lowered ceiling of an arms control agreement, than we plan in our present deployment.

This approach would retain the P-II while imposing limits on its numbers. However, if the limit were very low, we could be vulnerable to the argument that if we can do it with such a small number, we can probably dispense with the force altogether. Moreover, we would be imposing a unilateral constraint on the U.S.

We might also propose a higher proportion of GLCM warheads to ballistic missile warheads (e.g., the 4:3 GLCM to ballistic missile ratio established by the walk-in-the-woods). Such an approach would allow us to vary the proportion of GLCM to Pershing deployments, and potentially to increase the number of our warheads.* It would provide an incentive for adopting "slow-flying" systems, but deviate from the principle of direct warhead equality.

SRINF: The Soviets have raised the issue of including the FRG P-Is under collateral constraints. In the course of the next round we will be able to decide, in consultation with the Germans, whether or not to freeze German P-Is and, if so, whether to do so in the treaty itself or through a unilateral German statement. A possible quid pro quo could be Soviet agreement to limit their SS-23s, something they have so far adamantly refused to consider.**

Verification: Specific U.S. proposals on verification are in an advanced state of preparation, and we should be able to table them during the next round in order to flesh out our own position more fully. The interagency Combined Verification Group has produced a comprehensive study of LRINF verification, and verification annexes are in preparation.

* For example, if the US and the Soviet Union were to agree to a limit of 300 ballistic missile warheads on each side, then either side would be permitted to deploy up to 400 cruise missile warheads if it deployed no ballistic missiles. Either side could deploy combinations in between, such as 225 ballistic missile warheads and 100 cruise missile warheads, for a total of 325.

** These issues are the subject of two studies by the INF IG: "INF: FRG Pershing I and SRINF" and "Considerations Affecting SRINF Range Floor."

IV. Negotiating Tactics

Decisions are needed on whether or not to prepare any of the substantive elements discussed above and, if so, how they should be packaged and presented in the negotiations. The following options should be weighed:

1. maintain our current position;
2. table a comprehensive proposal;
3. present major new elements, step-by-step.

Any move should conform to the basic criteria for an INF agreement laid down by the President: equality of rights and limits between the U.S. and USSR, no consideration of British and French strategic systems, global limits (i.e., no shifting of the threat from Europe to Asia), no adverse impact on NATO's conventional capability, and effective measures for verification.

Option 1. Maintain Current Position Without Making any Significant Substantive Moves this Fall.

We would maintain our current position in the negotiations without making any significant substantive concessions. As in the last round we could continue to fill in the gaps in our position in a measured fashion. For example, we could table verification annexes for our zero/zero and subsequently our interim treaties, and possibly deal, after appropriate consultations with the Germans and other Allies, with the question of SRINF (SS-23s and FRG P-Is).

Arguments for:

--Our current position is flexible and enjoys the support of all Allied governments. There are no overwhelming European public pressures on us at present to change. (Even the European left appears increasingly reconciled to the fact of U.S. deployments.)

--Major changes of substance in our position now might feed pressures for still more changes or for a moratorium on deployments to "give the negotiators a chance."

--The Soviets have made no significant concessions in the negotiations, and therefore we do not "owe" them a move.

Arguments against:

--We could appear inflexible and complacent, and run a higher risk of losing the initiative and Allied support.

--We would be narrowing our options for handling a forthcoming Soviet offer or responding to European pressures that might be increased by massive or violent demonstrations.

--We would be denying ourselves opportunities for continuing to build a constructive negotiating record and to demonstrate that we have made every reasonable effort to obtain an agreement. Failure to achieve agreement should be seen clearly to result from Soviet unreasonableness.

Option 2. Table a Comprehensive Proposal

We could give our negotiator maximum flexibility by making available to him at the beginning of the round a package of elements which he could table as a comprehensive proposal. This would also provide maximum impact for purposes of public handling.

Illustratively, we might propose specific equal limits in Europe of U.S. and Soviet missile warheads (e.g., 300), and separate limits outside Europe (e.g., 240 missile warheads), a limit of 150 U.S. F-111s (plus possibly FB-111s) in Europe, and an equal limit on Badger and Blinder (plus possibly Backfire) in Europe.

Obviously, other packages could be developed by varying the details or adding further elements. A comprehensive proposal should probably include specific numbers of warheads, a separate European subceiling, and aircraft constraints.

Arguments for

--A comprehensive proposal would be a substantial and credible negotiating move, allowing us to seize the high ground early. It would have a favorable public impact and demonstrate U.S. flexibility and goodwill in making one last effort to achieve agreement before IOC.

--Since time is now so short before the IOC, a comprehensive proposal may be the only plausible negotiating move available to us. Smaller moves, with one or more of the individual elements, will have relatively less public impact.

Arguments against:

--The walk-in-the-woods has become for many Europeans the standard against which all other proposals are measured. Any alternative package is likely to suffer, in the public view, by comparison, and there would almost certainly be increased pressure to move toward the original walk-in-the-woods proposal.

--Our current position still enjoys widespread support, and Allied governments are not really pressing us to make a comprehensive move.

--It might increase pressures for a moratorium on deployments while negotiations continue.

--Expending all or most of our potential negotiating flexibility in one step would leave little of significance to do subsequently if we had to respond to public or Allied pressures or deal with a succession of Soviet moves.

--To make a comprehensive move now could cast doubt on the seriousness of our past negotiating policy, and hence on our present policy as well.

Option 3. Step-by-Step Presentation of Major New Elements

We could present a series of new elements, one at a time during the course of the round, beginning in early September. Alternatively, we could concentrate the elements into two packages--one as the round opened and another in October if warranted.

At the end of November, we could present the elements thus individually introduced as a package, with specific numbers for any limits previously addressed in general terms. We would propose that negotiations continue in 1984 on the basis of this comprehensive offer, while deployments proceeded on schedule.

Arguments for

--This option offers maximum flexibility to play out each part of a package and react to Soviet moves. We can present elements at a pace that meets our political needs throughout the round, according to our judgment of what is required to influence the negotiations and Allied government attitudes.

--It would not be necessary to decide in advance the substance of more than the first step or two. Subsequent decisions could be taken as required.

--A step-by-step approach may help to avoid giving the "all or nothing" flavor of a package, presented early in the round as a "final offer." Whether or not the Soviets stage a walk-out in November or December, we will wish to appear reasonable, steady, and willing to continue negotiations in 1984 as deployments proceed.

--Introducing substantive proposals separately would enable us to obtain maximum attention for each of them, as against submerging them in a package.

Arguments against:

--Presenting elements step-by-step will have less public impact than a comprehensive proposal. The cumulative effect of a series of moves could be overwhelmed by publicity surrounding demonstrations, Soviet moves, the Bundestag debate, or SPD Congress, etc., unless a comprehensive move is presented later.

--If our moves were too obviously linked to Soviet initiatives or to negative developments outside the negotiations, we could be accused of merely seeking to manipulate opinion rather than negotiating seriously.

--At some point, the Soviets might convincingly claim that we had changed our substantive position so extensively that they must be given time to react. Therefore, deployments must be delayed.

V. Public Handling

Timing: The timing of introducing possible new initiatives is nearly as important as the content of the moves themselves. Conversely, the range of moves we are willing to make determines our public flexibility. In broad terms, the options are as follows:

Start of Round: We could seek to pre-empt the Soviets with a comprehensive move such as Option Two* at the start of the round, or shortly before or after the September 6 opening. This approach would attempt to maximize impact on Allied publics and the German political debate, seize the high ground, and minimize the risk of appearing merely to react to a Soviet move or to Allied pressures. On the other hand, an early initiative could lead to increasing pressure later in the round to make further moves, when we would have no real follow-on initiative.

Late September/Early October: We could delay making any move for a few weeks after the opening of the round, to allow time for assessing Soviet strategy (e.g., in the Gromyko meeting) and reactions to our quiet exploration of a comprehensive approach. By moving in late September/early October, we could still gain some high ground and influence the mass anti-deployment demonstrations in October and the Bundestag debate in November. On the other hand, we might appear to be reacting to pressure, and could be vulnerable to arguments that we were not leaving enough time to negotiate seriously on our new proposal.

Late October/Early November: We might choose to defer publicizing a move until still later in the round, shortly before the SPD Congress and the Bundestag debate--the most critical period in Germany. We would strive for maximum impact with a Presidential announcement at that time. Moreover, this could be coupled with anticipated NATO agreement at the October 27-28 NPG of a reduction in the nuclear stockpile in Europe of around 1,000 warheads (plus the 464 withdrawn to make room for GLCM warheads). This approach would not, however, allow us the flexibility we may need during the course of the round itself and could make us appear negative and rigid during that critical period. It would also allow the Soviets to argue that deployments must be delayed while they are given time to analyze and negotiate our offer.

* See Page 11

December IOC: We could consider a major new initiative at the time the December INF missile deployment IOC is announced.

Series vs Comprehensive: We could present a series of moves, one at a time, throughout the round, beginning in September along the lines of Option Three.* Such an approach would give us maximum flexibility to tailor our strategy to Soviet tactics. It would also enable us to exploit the public and negotiating value of the individual moves, and could be used to deflect pressures on us to make even greater concessions. On the other hand, a comprehensive package would have much greater public impact than individual moves and would avoid the possible European perception that a series of moves was only a means of cozening publics into accepting deployments. Nevertheless, once offered, a comprehensive package may--if not carefully crafted--leave us no further room for movement. Alternatively, by concentrating moves in two steps, e.g., one in September and one in mid-October, several significant announcements might be possible. However, the Soviets might find sympathetic European audiences by October for the claim that because we had changed our position so substantively they needed more time to react and, in the interim, deployments must be delayed.

Soviet Quids: Depending on our assessment of the value to the Soviets of each potential U.S. move, we will need to explore what specific Soviet quid pro quo we would require in exchange for each U.S. concession.

Quiet Exploration or Public Pressure: If we decide to take a new initiative, a basic tactical issue is whether to launch it publicly first, for example in a Presidential speech, or whether to explore it initially in private with the Soviets, and only subsequently announce it or background the media.

The advantage of publicizing a new move first is that we can make a direct appeal to public opinion in a manner and at a time of our own choosing. It both demonstrates U.S. leadership and gives Allied governments something they can exploit immediately. However, with a highly visible move we could be charged with engaging in a propaganda battle rather than a serious negotiation, as we have accused the Soviets of doing.

Negotiating a new proposal privately with the Soviets first has the advantage of both being, and probably appearing, more credible as a negotiating move. However, if a move is

* See Page 12

rejected by the Soviets in private, its subsequent public impact could be undercut, and the Soviets would have had time to prepare their public position in advance.

A possible middle position might be to reveal just the principles of a new proposal in public, saving the substantive details for private discussion with the Soviets, or to announce a proposal at nearly the same time we present it to the Soviets privately, as we did with the interim proposal earlier this year.

Allies: Before making a new move and prior to publicizing it, we will, of course, seek Allied support. Coordination with the leaders of the basing countries should precede discussions in the SCG. Close consultation between the President and Chancellor Kohl would be imperative. We should not overlook the Japanese, Chinese and other Asian friends. We also will need to take key members of Congress into our confidence.

Attachment:

Annex: Key Events

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

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E. O. 12958
~~As Amended~~
Sec. 3.3b(2)(c)
e.2a

ANNEX
KEY EVENTS

Key events this fall, relating to INF*, include:

- Opening of INF round VI on September 6, with no date for termination;
- High level meetings in September between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko;
- The extensive German SPD debate on INF which begins with an executive leadership conference in Berlin September 23 and culminates in the general party congress November 2-3;
- Major peace demonstrations in the FRG between October 15 and 22;
- Large peace demonstrations in other [redacted] as well (the UK, [redacted] October 24-30;
- The Nuclear Planning Group will meet in Ottawa, October 27-28, to approve a report by the High Level Group recommending reductions of battlefield nuclear systems;
- The FRG Bundestag debate on INF, November 10-12;
- Visible preparations for deployment in [redacted] during the October-November period (in early October, site clearing and vertical construction begins at [redacted] at the same time, the first GLCM TELs and LCCs will begin arriving at [redacted] in the first week of November, GLCM TELs, LCCs, and missiles will arrive at [redacted] in Britain; after November 15, pending the outcome of the [redacted]
- The DPC and NAC will meet in ministerial session in early December;
- First GLCM arrives in [redacted] in early December; GLCM and Pershings reach IOC in the UK and FRG between 15 and 31 December.

*See "Arms Control Calendar, July 25-December 1983" for other related events.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART:
NLRR MDA-301 #1332
BY RW NARA DATE 11/29/12

3:30 pm

John P. Dexter

This is package on NSC IAF
with memo to President revised
~~to indicate~~ eliminating Judge
Clark's Talking Points and
TAB B of first draft

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NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: Aug 11 3⁰⁰ pm
(Date/Time)

Judge,
Tab I is being re-typed but
you may want to start reviewing
this now.

Judge signed
and delivered
package to the
President. Judge
has a complete
copy.

3:30 pm

John R. Alexander

This is package on USC FIVE
with memo to President
~~to indicate~~ eliminating Judge
Clark's Talking Points ad
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[Signature]
H. Green