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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8390696)			
<del>1. NSC profile (1p)</del>	<del>R 11/9/05 M1347 #1</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>2. memo</del>	<del>from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer to W. Clark re: talking points, with handwritten notations (1p)</del>	<del>6/1/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>3. paper</del>	<del>R u #2</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>4. memo</del>	<del>re: talking points (8pp)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>5. memo</del>	<del>R u #3</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>6. paper</del>	<del>from C. Hill to W. Clark re: NSC meeting (3pp)</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>7. paper</del>	<del>R 2/17/2011 M1347 #4</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>8. memo</del>	<del>re: issues for discussion, with chart (17pp)</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>9. memo</del>	<del>R 11/9/05 M1347 #5</del>	<del>6/4/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>10. paper</del>	<del>from C. Hill to W. Clark re: NSC meeting (1p)</del>	<del>6/4/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>11. paper</del>	<del>R 2/17/2011 M1347 #6</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>12. chart</del>	<del>re: issues for discussion (9pp)</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>13. draft</del>	<del>R 11/9/05 M1347 #7</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>14. draft</del>	<del>u u #8</del>	<del>6/3/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>15. draft</del>	<del>treaty (12pp)</del>	<del>6/3/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>16. draft</del>	<del>R u u #9</del>		
letter case (8390675)			
10. NSC profile (1p)	R u u #10	5/25/83	P-1
11. memo	from S. Kraemer/R. Linhard to W. Clark re: discussions with the President, with hand written notations (3pp)	5/25/83	P-1
	R u - #11		
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER: NSC 00081 07Jun83 [5 of 5] Box 91285			12/9/94

(20/9)

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**
- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
  - P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
  - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
  - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
  - P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
  - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**
- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
  - F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
  - F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
  - F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
  - F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
  - F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
  - F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
  - F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8390662)			
<del>12. NSC profile (1p)</del>	<del>R 11/9/05 M1347 #12</del>	<del>5/21/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>13. memo</del>	<del>from W. Clark to G. Shultz and C. Weinberger (2pp)</del>	<del>5/27/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>14. memo</del>	<del>R 2/17/11 M1347 #13</del>	<del>5/27/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>15. memo</del>	<del>from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer to W. Clark re: NSC meeting (2pp)</del>	<del>5/21/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
	R 11/9/05 M1347 #14		
	from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer to W. Clark re: NSC meeting, with handwritten notations (2pp)	5/21/83	P-1, P-5
	R " " " #15		
COLLECTION:			
EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER:			
NSC 00081 07Jun83 [5 of 5] Box 91285			12/9/94

(7 of 7)

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(e)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating con-  
sequences for all mankind,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the  
interests of international security require the strengthening of  
strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction of strategic  
offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will reduce the risk  
of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and  
security,

Have agreed as follows:

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS M1347 #9  
BY CS NARA, DATE 11/09/05

Article I

Each Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, reduce and limit strategic offensive arms and adopt the other measures provided for in this Treaty.

Article II

1. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that [eight] years after that date, and thereafter:

(a) the aggregate number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 5,000;

(b) the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs does not exceed 2,500;

(c) the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 850;

(d) the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs does not exceed 210;

(e) the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs does not exceed 110; and

(f) the number of its heavy bombers does not exceed 400.

2. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit the aggregate number of its ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs, that are not deployed, to \_\_\_\_ percent of the allowed aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.

3. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.

[Article III]\*

[1. Beginning on \_\_\_\_\_, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that \_\_\_\_ years after that date, and thereafter:

(a) all of its heavy ICBMs shall have been destroyed;

(b) the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed \_\_\_\_ kilograms; and

(c) the number of its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) deployed on its heavy bombers does not exceed the product of \_\_\_\_ and the number of its heavy bombers, and the number of ALCMs deployed on any heavy bomber of an existing type does not exceed \_\_\_\_.

2. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.]

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\* Bracketed pending decision on modification of U.S. position.

Article IV

1. Neither Party shall have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms subject to the provisions of this Treaty in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule, as specified in Annex I of this Treaty.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) convert land-based ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(b) convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(c) develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy ICBMs that can be launched by land-based launchers other than ICBM launchers; nor

(d) develop, produce, test, or deploy land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs that also have the capability of launching ICBMs permitted by this Treaty.

3. Neither Party shall develop, produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles including free floating canister launchers. This Treaty shall

not require changes in current ballistic missile transport practices;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; or

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit, including fractional orbit, nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction.

4. Neither Party shall flight-test or deploy:

(a) ICBMs or ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 10;

(b) SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 14;



(c) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of \_\_\_\_\_\*, with multiple reentry vehicles or with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, the weight of any one of which exceeds 225 kilograms, nor

(d) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of \_\_\_\_\_\*, with a single reentry vehicle, the weight of which exceeds \_\_\_\_\_ kilograms.

5. Neither Party shall develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs, heavy ASBMs, or heavy ICBMs of types that were not deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty, nor produce or deploy additional such missiles of types that were deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modification, modernization, and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Within the limitations provided for in Articles II and III of this Treaty and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of its forces.

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\*A date earlier than the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. Each Party shall limit the number of its test and training launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed \_\_\_\_, all of which shall be located at test ranges designated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. ICBM and SLBM launchers at test ranges shall be constructed, converted, or used only for the purpose of testing and training, and not for deployment.

3. Each Party shall limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed \_\_\_\_ . Such missiles shall be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VII

1. ICBMs, SLBMs, ASBMs, and heavy bombers in excess of the limits provided in this Treaty shall be destroyed in accordance with the procedures specified in Annex IV, and shall remain subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they are so destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under the agreed procedures.

2. The Parties may store \_\_\_ ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs for use as space launch vehicles at designated space support centers, in accordance with the agreed measures set forth in Annex IV of this Treaty. Such missiles shall not be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VIII

1. Neither Party shall:

(a) develop, test, produce, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers;

(b) provide hardened storage facilities at ICBM launcher deployment areas;

(c) store more than two ICBMs at any ICBM launcher deployment area; or

(d) provide ground-support equipment at any ICBM launcher deployment area in excess of that required for normal deployment and maintenance.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 2 of Article VII and in subparagraph 1 (c) of this Article, each Party shall store all of its ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs, that are not deployed,

at designated storage facilities. Storage facilities for ICBMs that are not deployed shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM launcher deployment area.

3. Neither Party shall conduct training activities or exercises involving the rapid reload or simulated rapid reload of ICBM launchers, nor conduct any other activities or exercises that involve in any other manner rapid reload of any ICBM launcher after it has launched an ICBM.

#### Article IX

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall implement agreed measures as provided for in Annex IV; in addition, each Party may use national technical means of verification at its disposal, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall interfere with agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or with national technical means of verification.

3. Neither Party shall impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or by national technical means. In this connection, the obligation not to impede includes the obligation not to use concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at

concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

4. The encryption of telemetry on systems subject to the provisions of this Treaty is prohibited.

5. On board engineering test measurements shall be made, and all such measurements shall be broadcast using unencrypted telemetry, during each test flight or training flight of an ICBM, SLBM or ASBM.

Article X

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission, under regulations governing procedures to be agreed between the Parties.

2. The Parties agree that, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, they shall:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide such information as is necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) at least twice annually notify each other of the replacement dismantling, destruction, and conversion of strategic offensive arms performed in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) agree upon further measures contributing to the effectiveness of the verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

3. At least twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain and update by category the Agreed Data Base established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Strategic Offensive Arms of (date of signature of the Treaty).

#### Article XI

1. This Treaty shall be of (\_\_\_\_) duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XII

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XIII

1. This Treaty, and its Annexes which form an integral part hereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. —

Done at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

RECEIVED 26 MAY 83 08

TO CLARK

FROM KRAEMER

DOCDATE 25 MAY 83

LINHARD

25 MAY 83

TYSON

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M1347 #10

BY CH NARA DATE 11/09/05

KEYWORDS: START

ARMS CONTROL

ROWNY, E

AP

ADELMAN, K

SUBJECT: START DISCUSSIONS W/ PRES JUN 1 RE 7 JUN NSC MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390662 8390696 NSCIFID NSC00081 ( C / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	JUN 2 1983			



National Security Council  
The White House

679

Rec'd 5/25/83  
9:30 p-

Package # 90675


	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS



MEMORANDUM

RESTRICTED INFORMATION TO STAFF

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

May 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER / ROBERT LINHARD

SUBJECT: START Discussions with the President -- June 1

The NSC meeting on new START decisions has been postponed from June 1 to June 7, because Secretary Weinberger will be out of town on the former date. However, we understand that the June 1 NSC hour (2:00 to 3:00 p.m.) has been retained for Presidential-level discussion of START issues, and that the President desires to have a private meeting for part of that hour with Ambassador Rowny and ACDA Director Adelman. After discussion among ourselves and with Jon Howe, Ed Rowny, and Richard Perle, we are making the following recommendation for the best use of the June 1 session.

*Handwritten:* Best?

ROWNY-ADELMAN MEETING

We believe the private meeting involving the President, Rowny, and Adelman should involve about 20 minutes, to include a brief photo opportunity. The session would highlight the President's interest in this important arms control issue, prior to Rowny's departure on the evening of June 7 for the next round of the START negotiations in Geneva. It would also parallel a similar session held with AMB Nitze prior to his departure. Immediately following this meeting, Rowny would meet briefly with the White House media.

NSC STAFF BRIEFING

We believe the remaining 40 minutes should be an NSC staff briefing previewing the START issues that will be the subject of the June 7 decision meeting: (1) should we make a minor or a major change in the START negotiating position; (2) what should we do about the deployed ballistic missile number (raise or remove?) and emphasis on direct or indirect limits on throw-weight; and (3) what are the implications of the "Build-Down" concept for our START position?

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M1347 #11

BY CL, NARA, DATE 11/09/05

~~SECRET~~

2

In order to help define these issues and possible options more concretely, the IG has been developing various "packages" that reflect agency views. These could be briefed/discussed at the June 1 meeting. The packages include consensus elements and variants proposed by Rowny, State, OSD, and JCS. They involve some complex elements and relationships including numbers of deployed missiles, bombers and bomber weapons, and cruise missiles and would benefit from an NSC-level briefing/discussion session prior to an NSC decision meeting. At the same time, several initial illustrative paths for applying the "Build-Down" concept to the US START negotiation position would also benefit from discussion prior to an NSC decision meeting.

State (Howe), ACDA (Adelman) and Rowny favor convening the June 1 discussion time as an NSC meeting. OSD (Perle and Smith) is opposed because Secretary Weinberger desires to be present at such meetings, and because Perle would have to cancel the important HLG meeting he is scheduled to chair in Brussels at that time. An alternative, therefore, would be to have NSC staff brief the President on the issues to provide a more focused NSC discussion on June 7.

In terms of the papers involved, the IG paper is due on Friday afternoon, May 27, but we expect delay and will probably not have the paper until after the Memorial Day weekend, on Tuesday morning, May 31. We would propose to forward the IG papers to the President as soon as we receive them prior to June 1. However, we would not propose to circulate the IG papers formally to NSC principals until later in the week, in conjunction with the NSC decision meeting scheduled for June 7.

#### GAC CHAIRMAN PARTICIPATION

You will recall that during the May 20 briefing you received from the Chairman of the GAC, Dr. William Graham, you agreed to having Dr. Graham occasionally join an NSC meeting on arms control matters, particularly on START. Dr. Graham has telephoned us to request such attendance at the next NSC meeting on START.

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the use of the 2:00-3:00 p.m. time on June 1 for a 20-minute private meeting of the President with Ambassador Rowny and Ken Adelman, to be followed by a 40-minute NSC staff briefing on START led by Bud McFarlane.

*We are working on a 20 min Rowny-Adelman mtg and a 40 min NSC staff briefing for 1 June*

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That if you approve, Bob Kimmitt be authorized to inform the appropriate agencies of the fact that there will be no NSC meeting on START on June 1.

Approve J

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you approve Dr. Graham's attendance at the June 7 NSC meeting on START.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Judge also approved Brent Hewcroft for meeting*

*Cap's schedule*

*0800 29 MAY - 1200 7 JUN Europe*

*George's schedule*

*2 - 1800 5 JUN Mass*

*0830 7 JUN - 1200 10 JUN Europe*

*1200 11 JUN - PM 12 JUN Start*

RECEIVED 23 MAY 83 09

TO CLARK FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 21 MAY 83

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M1347 #12

KRAEMER

21 MAY 83

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 11/09/05

LINHARD

27 MAY 83

KEYWORDS: START

ARMS CONTROL

USSR

NSC

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF BUILD DOWN PROPOSALS FOR 7 JUN NSC MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390675 8390696 NSCIFID NSC00081 ( C / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

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~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

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MODE

PAGES TWO SYSTEM II  
90662  
RELEASER MAD

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 42

DTG 272314Z MAY 83

PRIORITY

03 MAY 27 P 7: 43

DEX # \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTINE

TTY # \_\_\_\_\_

WILLIAMS BURG  
SITUATION ROOM

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. RADM JOHN POINDEXTER FOR JUDGE CLARK/WILLIAMSBURG/

2. RADM JOHN POINDEXTER/WILLIAMSBURG/

TOR: 272328Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

ATTACHED: #90662 "ALSO LDX" TO SECSTATE, SECDEF, DCI, JCS,  
ACDA, GEN ROWNY.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

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*MP 4/24/83*

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THE WHITE HOUSE



MAY 27 P7: 46

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MAY 1983 20 12

J

MESSAGE NO. 232 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 2  
 FROM BUD MCFARLANE X2292  
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION START

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
STATE	SECSTATE		
DOD	SECDEF		
CIA	DCI		
DOD	CJCS		
STATE	Dir ACDA		
STATE	GEN Rowny		

REMARKS:

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 OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
 1044248

WASHFAX

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MAY 1983 19

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MAY 27 17: 46

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MESSAGE NO. 232 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2  
 FROM BUD MCFARLANE X2292  
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION START

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>SECSTATE</u>		
<u>DOD</u>	<u>SECDEF</u>		
<u>CIA</u>	<u>DCI</u>		
<u>DOD</u>	<u>CJES</u>		
<u>STATE</u>	<u>DIR ACDA</u>		
<u>STATE</u>	<u>GEN Rowny</u>		

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MJD  
4/2/96





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SYSTEM II  
90662

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

BY RW NARA DATE 2/7/11  
NLRR M1347 #13

~~SECRET~~

May 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Analysis of Build-down Proposals (U)

In his May 12 letter to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy, the President indicated his conditional endorsement of the build-down concept and his commitment to work with them to develop a concrete proposal reflecting this endorsement. (U)

The START Interagency Group should produce an analysis which identifies and evaluates alternative build-down proposals which satisfy the criteria listed in the President's May 12 letter. It should also offer its critical assessment of alternatives, whether meeting the President's criteria or not, which have or which it anticipates may be proposed to the Administration for consideration in the upcoming weeks. (U)

This analysis should address the following questions with regard to build-down and START: (U)

- Are there alternatives/options that are clearly in the US national security interest and that could be implemented now? (C)
- Are there alternatives/options that appear promising and worthy of additional study? (C)
- Are there alternatives/options that have been proposed that should be rejected and eliminated at this time from further consideration? (C)
- How would alternatives/options that are under consideration relate to our position in START? Would they complement our achievement of our fundamental objectives in START or detract from, or delay the achievement of these objectives? (S)
- And, based on the above, what should be the stance that the Administration should take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable alternative/option is developed and implemented? (C)

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An initial version of the paper documenting this analysis should be provided no later than May 31. This initial version will be used to support the discussion of this area at the June 7th NSC meeting on START. A more complete version of the same paper reflecting the NSC discussion and further analysis as tasked should be completed as soon as possible following the NSC meeting. (U)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

*Robert C. Neill*  
William R. Clark

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Chairman U.S. START Delegation

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6x2

**National Security Council  
The White House**

Package # 1-2

1753

MAY 27 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>		<u>7</u>
Bud McFarlane		<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room	<u>2</u>		

DACOM  
to  
 ① JP for WP  
 ② Sec State  
 ③ Sec Def  
 Action  
 ④ DCI  
 ⑤ CJCS

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

⑥ Dir. ACDA  
 ⑦ Gen Bowry

file

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SYSTEM II  
90662 follow-on *[initials]*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

May 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: BOB LINHARD *[initials]* SVEN KRAEMER *[initials]* **SIGNED**

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START

On May 21, we sent you a memorandum which expressed our concern that we may not get as much out of the upcoming critical meeting on START as we absolutely need. The purpose of this follow-up memorandum is to recommend that you issue the memorandum at Tab I which formalizes additional tasking we now feel is needed to ensure that necessary preparatory work is completed thoroughly and in a timely fashion to support the NSC meeting.

When we wrote our last memorandum to you on this subject, the Interagency paper that was under development by the START IG at that time dealt primarily with two main issues: whether to retain any limit on ballistic missiles (i.e., our current 850 limit or some other, higher limit); and whether to emphasize direct limits on ballistic missile throwweight. The paper included the translation of agency positions on these issues into specific "packages" which agencies would support -- an element absolutely necessary if we are to prepare the NSC for a concrete, decision oriented discussion. However, the focus of the START IG work was totally on whether to make minor or major adjustments to our current position to bring it into line with the Scowcroft Commission Report.

In addition to the incorporation of Scowcroft, it is essential that the June 7th NSC meeting also discuss the stance that the Administration should take with the Congress concerning the incorporation of the positive elements of a "mutual build-down" concept into our arms control position in the context of the START negotiations. The concern expressed in our May 21 memorandum centered on the following judgements:

-- NSC principals must have the opportunity to consult on the build-down implications, to clarify the Administration's approach, prior to the mid-June Peacekeeper votes in the Congress.

-- It is very likely that the June 7th NSC meeting will provide the only such opportunity.

-- As of May 21st, the START IG was not preparing any material to support a discussion of this subject.

To address this concern, we recommended that you authorize us to describe, in your name, an agenda for the upcoming NSC meeting and to request the START IG to prepare suitable papers to support all three items on the proposed NSC agenda. With your authorization the following agenda was, therefore, provided to the START IG on Monday, May 23.

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NLS 111347 #14  
~~SECRET~~ BY 015 NARA, DATE 11/09/05

- Item 1: A discussion of the three main general issues involved in adjusting our current START negotiating position:
  - Should a change be major or minor at this time?
  - Should we emphasize direct limits on throwweight?
  - Should we retain limits on ballistic missiles?
- Item 2: A discussion of the main issues in terms of specific alternative packages.
- Item 3: A discussion of the incorporation of "mutual build-down" into the START position in terms of the packages just discussed and with the intent of identifying:
  - alternatives/options that could be implemented now,
  - alternatives/options that are worthy of additional study,
  - alternatives/options that should be rejected from further consideration,

and

- the stance that the Administration should take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option is implemented.

While IG work is now progressing to provide the necessary paper to support item 3 on the above agenda, we feel it would be useful to formalize the tasking with respect to this area, both to ensure that work is completed as necessary, and to document our commitment to this analysis. The memorandum provided at Tab I for your signature is designed to accomplish these aims.

The memorandum calls for two products: an initial version of an options paper, due no later than May 31, to support the discussion of "build-down" issues at the June 7th NSC meeting; and a more complete version of the same paper reflecting the NSC discussion and further analysis as tasked as soon as possible following the NSC meeting. The early initial due date (May 31, some 6 days prior to the NSC meeting) is needed to maintain the momentum of the IG's current work on this issue, to support our (NSC staff) discussion of this subject with the President as appropriate on June 1, and to provide some time to direct additional work on the paper prior to the June 7th NSC meeting if needed.

We have discussed the possibility of such tasking with Jon Howe and he understands its purpose and agrees with the suspenses proposed.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and transmit the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Concurrence: Ron Lehman *RL*

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense (S)

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 90662

MAY 2 3 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information   A-Action   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP   Meese   Baker   Deaver   Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Judge,  
 Bud has responded  
 positively to Kraemer / Lind  
 J

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II

90662

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

May 21, 1983

FROM: BOB LINHARD / SVEN KRAEMER

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START

*changed to first*  
We are beginning to become concerned that we may not get as much out of the June NSC meeting on START as we absolutely need. We can't afford to not use this opportunity to the fullest, and we will have no time to recover from a meeting that falls short of its objectives. The next negotiating round will begin within 2 days after the meeting on June 8. (We could, of course, delay opening of the round if absolutely necessary.)

*document*  
*and*  
*summary*  
We have been pressing the IG to complete its work on the papers needed to support the meeting by Friday, May 24. We have told them that the absolute deadline for receipt of the needed material is COB Tuesday, May 21.

The papers under development focus on whether to make minor or major adjustments to our current position to bring it into line with Scowcroft. The two main issues that drive the discussion are: whether to retain any limit on ballistic missiles; and whether to emphasize direct limits on ballistic missile throwweight. At NSC staff (Kraemer and Linhard) urging, the papers go beyond a general discussion of these main issues to include the translation of agency positions on these general issues into specific "packages" which agencies would support. It is our view that unless we move the discussion from the general to the concrete, the NSC meeting will not form the basis for the decisions we will need in early June.

In addition to the incorporation of Scowcroft, the June NSC must also discuss:

- how the Administration plans to incorporate a "mutual build-down" into its START position, and
- what the Administration should tell Congress about its plans in this area.

There is some reluctance to address this issue at all at this time. OSD feels that it is premature to go further than we have in meeting Congressional concerns at this time. Without some additional NSC staff urging, it is likely that this subject will not be well prepared for the NSC meeting. While the IG is preparing a general background paper on US and Soviet deployment plans, it is currently not preparing a paper addressing:

(1) options we could study further or implement immediately that address Congressional interest in a "mutual build-down"; and

(2) alternative stances we could take with Congress on this subject until we are ready to implement an acceptable option.

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Declassify on: OADR

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M1347 #15

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BY

CU

NARA, DATE

11/09/05



We have START IGs now scheduled for Monday, May 23, and Thursday, May 26. It would be very useful if we could outline for the IG the likely agenda for the NSC meeting to ensure that the IG uses its remaining preparation time to the best advantage.

The outline we would recommend is as follows:

- Item 1: A discussion of the three main general issues involved in adjusting our current START negotiating position:
  - Should a change be major or minor at this time?
  - Should we emphasize direct limits on throwweight?
  - Should we retain limits on ballistic missiles?
- Item 2: A discussion of the main issues in terms of specific alternative packages.
- Item 3: A discussion of the incorporation of "mutual build-down" into the START position in terms of the packages just discussed and with the intent of identifying:
  - alternatives/options that could be implemented now,
  - alternatives/options that are worthy of additional study,
  - alternatives/options that should be rejected from further consideration,

and

- the stance that the Administration should take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option is implemented.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to describe in your name the outline for the upcoming NSC meeting as presented above at the START IG on Monday, May 23.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you authorize us to request the START IG to prepare a suitable paper to support the third item on the NSC agenda outline above.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_