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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8390696)			
<del>1. NSC profile (1p)</del>	<del>R 11/9/05 M1347 #1</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>2. memo</del>	<del>from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer to W. Clark re: talking points, with handwritten notations (1p)</del>	<del>6/1/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>3. paper</del>	<del>R u u #2</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>4. memo</del>	<del>re: talking points (8pp)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>5. memo</del>	<del>R 2/17/2011 M1347 #4</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>6. paper</del>	<del>re: issues for discussion, with chart (17pp)</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>7. memo</del>	<del>R 11/9/05 M1347 #5</del>	<del>6/4/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>8. paper</del>	<del>re: issues for discussion (9pp)</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>9. chart (1p)</del>	<del>R 11/9/05 M1347 #6</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>10. draft</del>	<del>re: issues for discussion (9pp)</del>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>11. draft</del>	<del>R u u #8</del>	<del>6/3/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>12. draft</del>	<del>R u u #9</del>	<del>6/3/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
letter case (8390675)			
<del>10. NSC profile (1p)</del>	<del>R u u #10</del>	<del>5/25/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>11. memo</del>	<del>from S. Kraemer/R. Linhard to W. Clark re: discussions with the President, with hand written notations (3pp)</del>	<del>5/25/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
	<del>R u u #11</del>		
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER: NSC 00081 07Jun83 [5 of 5] Box 91285			12/9/94

(6 of 7) RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a))

- P-1 National security classified information ((a)(1) of the PRA).
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office ((a)(2) of the PRA).
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA).
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information ((a)(4) of the PRA).
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors ((a)(5) of the PRA).
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- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes ((b)(7) of the FOIA).
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TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 28 MAY 83

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NLS M1347 #1

LINHARD

01 JUN 83

BY GJS NARA, DATE 11/9/05

KRAEMER

01 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: START

ARMS CONTROL

USSR

NSC

SUBJECT: PRES ISSUES PAPERS FOR JUN 1 BRIEFING RE 7 JUN NSC MTG ON START

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRAEMER

LINHARD

COMMENTS

REF# 8316639

LOG 8390662

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	JUN 0 7 1983			
	JUN 0 7 1983			

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

June 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: BOB LINHARD <sup>BL</sup> / SVEN KRAEMER <sup>SK</sup>

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Presidential Briefing  
on June 1

Attached (Tab A) are a set of talking points which could form the basis of the briefing to the President on START scheduled for June 1. They are designed to walk the President through the agenda items that we anticipate will be discussed at the NSC meeting on START scheduled for June 7.

We have asked that two charts be prepared to support the briefing. One simply lists the agenda items referenced in the talking points. The other is a chart showing the various agency positions on the issues. A copy of this chart is at page 10 of Tab B.

Attached at Tab B is a copy of the current version of the Interagency paper developed to support the discussion of possible changes to our START position. We are still waiting for a companion paper on handling the build-down concept. We will provide both papers for the President's review and preparation later this week.

RECOMMENDATION

That Bud McFarlane, Ron Lehman, Sven Kraemer or Bob Linhard use the talking points and charts prepared to brief the President on START on June 1.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Concurrence: Ron Lehman <sup>RL</sup>

Attachments:

- TAB A - Talking Points (TS)
- TAB B - Interagency Paper (S/Sensitive)

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NLS M1347 #2  
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 11/9/05

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ON CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION DIRECTIVE NO. 1(32  
CFR PART 2001), SECTION 2001.13(E) CONCERNING RE-REVIEW OF  
PREVIOUSLY DECLASSIFIED RECORDS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NLRRM1347 #3 - ITEM #3 ON WITHDRAWAL SHEET



May 28, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Issues Paper for NSC Meeting on START

The Interdepartmental Group on START Policy has prepared the attached paper for discussion at the NSC meeting on June 7.

The first part of this paper summarizes the key considerations regarding the ceiling on deployed ballistic missiles, throw-weight limits and other issues. All agencies agree that, at a minimum, the issue of the deployed missile ceiling should be resolved at the NSC meeting.

The second part of the paper presents the recommendations from State, ACDA and the Chairman of the START Delegation regarding more comprehensive changes in our START proposal.

Recommendations from JCS and OSD will be provided prior to the NSC meeting. The JCS wish to note at this time that they believe that deployed ballistic missiles should be retained as a unit of account. It is not clear at this point that the US need for small ICBMs will require an increase in the 850 deployed ballistic missile ceiling. Before any decision is made to raise the limit of deployed ballistic missiles, the impact of higher limits on the relative military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union must be determined. The JCS are studying the need for and the military implications of an increase in the level of deployed ballistic missiles and will provide their views before the next meeting of the NSC on START.

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/17/09

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- 2 -

While all IG agencies have participated in the preparation of the issues paper, it is being forwarded without the concurrence of OSD. OSD believes that the paper should note that the Soviet initial position, from which they have not moved, would have blocked or sharply curtailed all the strategic force initiatives in the Strategic Modernization Program. On the other hand, the U.S. tabled a "Basic Elements" document in order to assure the Soviets of our willingness to discuss bombers and air-launched cruise missiles; this U.S. concession did not meet with corresponding movement by the Soviets. Finally, OSD notes that each package must be considered in its entirety, and that individual items cannot be considered except in the context of a total package and its goals and guiding principles.

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary


Attachment

As stated.

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Drafted by:PM/SNP:GSuchan:twm  
05/28/83:ext 632-8688

Clearance:

PM:JTHowe 



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May 28, 1983

START ISSUES FOR DECISION

Background

The START negotiations resume on June 8. During the last round, the US presented proposals for limiting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), tabled a draft treaty on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a document outlining the US "Basic Elements" of a START agreement. The basic framework of the US position remained as it had been presented in the summer of 1982.

The Soviets contended that US proposals would "emasculate" the Soviet ICBM force while permitting US modernization programs to proceed. They stated that the US proposal was not an acceptable basis for negotiation. They also rejected the idea of a separate agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs). They tabled a draft treaty based largely on SALT II, but with a 28 percent reduction in strategic delivery vehicles from the current force of about 2500 to 1800. They say they are prepared to accept significant cuts in warheads but only in the context of combining ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons in a single category. In short, the Soviets demonstrated no inclination to move the talks forward.

The US Delegation's view is that the Soviets apparently regard our present START proposal, particularly those aspects dealing with ICBM force restructuring, as unacceptable. They argue that our proposal is designed not to promote stability and equality, but to obtain strategic advantages for the US. We would expect the Soviets to continue dismissing our proposal in its present form.

The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission have stimulated considerable interest, both in the Congress and within the Administration, in reassessing our START position. Key members of Congress have made their support for MX contingent on modifications to our START proposal, and the President wrote to several Congressmen that we are now considering modifications to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

State, ACDA and the START negotiator believe that we should now alter our START proposal--not only to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for a modified approach and to respond to Congressional pressures, but also to improve prospects for productive negotiations. Moreover, there is agreement (except for JCS) that we move away from the ceiling of 850 deployed missiles.

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BY CH NARA, DATE 11/9/95

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Some believe we need to make changes now to our position that will bring us close to our final position. Others believe that our position now should retain considerable room for further bargaining.

### Issues

There are two principal issues. One is the extent to which we seek to reduce Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight--that is, should we seek (a) the level that is our goal for the second phase of the negotiations (1.9 million kilograms), or (b) the level that would result from our current proposal for the first phase (2.5 million kilograms), or (c) a higher level? The other issue is whether throw-weight should be constrained directly, or indirectly through collateral constraints. Our current position calls for indirect limits on throw-weight (i.e., sub-ceilings on heavy and medium ICBMs) in Phase I and direct limits (i.e., an aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight ceiling) in Phase II. Our current Phase I proposal was designed to achieve a goal of reduction in Soviet throw-weight of 55 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

One approach would seek a direct limit on throw-weight. The collateral constraints and the limit on deployed ballistic missiles would be dropped (leaving ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight as our two units of account). We would propose a direct throw-weight level (2.0 - 2.5 million kilograms) aimed at obtaining the large-scale reduction in Soviet throw-weight that our current proposal is designed to achieve.

An alternative approach would achieve throw-weight reductions indirectly as a consequence of reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads, and other collateral constraints (leaving deployed ballistic missiles and their warheads as the two units of account). Our current proposed limits on heavy and medium ICBMs would be replaced by less restrictive collateral constraints. Under this approach, Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would likely be about 3.0 million kilograms,\* about 46 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

\*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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The following sections discuss the main questions involved in modifying the US START position: whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed missiles, raise it, or drop it; what level we should propose for throw-weight limits; and whether to limit throw-weight directly or indirectly. Following that discussion are packages supported by various Agencies for a modified START position, accompanied by arguments for each package.

Finally, as an alternative to those packages, we could consider modifying the current position to the minimum extent necessary to reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft report. This would require, at a minimum, a decision now on whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it altogether. State, ACDA and the START negotiator recommend more basic changes to our position for substantive, political, and negotiating reasons.

I. Should we retain the limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it?

The report of the Scowcroft Commission states that arms control agreements should encourage deployment of small, single-warhead ICBMs. "This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments."

The report states that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles "should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single warhead ICBMs". The report does not make any recommendation whether or not to drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

1. Retain the 850 ceiling

The number of small ICBMs the United States might want to deploy would depend on the deployment mode chosen, cost, survivability, Congressional support, and the constraints on the number of Soviet warheads, and is, therefore, difficult to predict. Retention of the 850 limit would limit us to a deployment of no more than about 300 small, single warhead ICBMs

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in addition to 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs and planned SLBMs. This would appear inconsistent with the Commission's recommendation to promote a long-term evolution away from large highly fractionated ICBMs.

The JCS believes that it is not clear at this point whether the US need for small ICBMs will require an increase in the 850 deployed ballistic missile ceiling. Some believe that retaining the 850 limit may give us all the force structuring flexibility we need during the next decade since, in the context of US deployment of 100 MX under a ceiling of 5000 missile warheads, we are unlikely to deploy significantly more than 850 ballistic missiles. The Soviets, on the other hand, with a modern, single RV missile beginning flight testing are better placed over the next decade than we are to exploit the possibilities of large numbers of single RV ICBMs, which would increase their advantage in force survivability. The US could also pay a political price if the 850 limit is dropped since substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles are a prominent, popular, and readily understandable element of the US position. Finally, in view of Soviet stalling in Geneva, some would argue that the appropriate US negotiating response is to hold to our current position and not make modifications which could be considered movement toward the Soviet position.

## 2. Raise the ceiling on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would retain a limit on deployed ballistic missiles but raise it to provide more headroom for large numbers of small missiles. The ceiling could be: between 1050 and 1250; 1450 (which corresponds roughly to the number of deployed missiles the United States would have under the Soviet proposal); or 1600 (the current number of US deployed ballistic missiles). The representative limits cited above could permit from 500 to more than 1100 small missiles, depending on the limit chosen, the number of Peacekeeper ICBMs deployed, and the size of the US SLBM force.

Raising the limit would respond to the Scowcroft Commission's report by making room in our START proposal for the evolution to small, single warhead ICBMs. A level could be chosen with sufficient "headroom" to give us considerable force structuring flexibility in the future. At the same time, retaining a ceiling on missiles would avoid the potential political liability of appearing to abandon constraints in a category of strategic capability (i.e., missiles) that has

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previously been subject to constraints and that some still consider significant. It would also have the negotiating advantage of moving us closer to the Soviet proposal of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

One disadvantage of raising the limit is that this may appear contrary to our objective of deep reductions. In addition, the Scowcroft Commission report argued against reductions in the number of deployed missiles, and cited the negative aspects of relying on such limits in past agreements.

### 3. Drop limits on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would have flexibility to deploy a larger number of small ICBMs within the constraints on warhead numbers and destructive potential.

This approach would encourage an evolution in both the US and the USSR to smaller missiles and would provide substantial flexibility to exploit the advantages of small missiles to enhance survivability and stability. The START agreement would focus primarily on broad measures of capability (warheads and throw-weight). The Scowcroft Commission report makes clear the drawbacks of use of launcher limits in past agreements--i.e., agreements that rely primarily on launcher limits create incentives for large, highly fractionated missiles. Some believe this option corresponds most closely to the approach advocated in the Scowcroft Commission's report as more likely to be practical, stabilizing, and lasting than constraints on force structures. They believe that by following closely the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, dropping limits on deployed missiles could be useful in obtaining Congressional support for the development, production and deployment of the Peacekeeper and a small ICBM.

Dropping the limits on deployed missiles would emphasize the limits on warheads and destructive potential, but could lead to increased pressure to limit bomber weapons, which would not be in the US interest. In addition, if the Soviets deploy a large number of missiles and missile launchers, this could provide a potential to deploy additional warheads.

## II. What throw-weight level should we seek?

Our current proposal seeks to substantially reduce Soviet missile throw-weight in phase I indirectly to about 2.5 million

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kilograms through the limit of 5000 missile warheads, the sub-ceiling of 2500 ICBM warheads and a limit of 210 medium and heavy ICBMs of which no more than 110 could be heavy ICBMs. In Phase II Soviet missile throw-weight would be further reduced to a direct ceiling of 1.9 million kilograms. Since the US throw-weight level is currently at 1.9 million kilograms, and the Soviet level is at about 5.6 million kilograms, any throw-weight level which exceeds the US current level would require the Soviets to reduce unilaterally.

There are three options:

(1) A level of 2.0 million kilograms (64 percent below the estimated current Soviet level but above the US level) would be consistent with our proposal for the second phase. We could argue that we were accelerating achievement of what has always been our ultimate goal. A proposal for a low ceiling now could give us bargaining room.

(2) A ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms (55 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would be roughly equivalent to our current proposal for the first phase, and would allow both sides somewhat greater flexibility to structure forces. It is the level the US has proposed in conjunction with the ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads.

(3) Constraints that could result in about 3.0 million kilograms (46 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would permit the Soviets greater force structure flexibility than the other options, and hence such a throw-weight level could be more likely to lead to an agreement.

The illustrative force tables for the options describe representative Soviet forces for each of these levels. While all the options limit the Soviets to 5000 warheads, the higher the throw-weight, the larger could be the size and explosive power of Soviet warheads, and the greater could be the Soviet potential to deploy additional warheads.

### III. Should we seek direct or indirect limits on throw-weight?

The Scowcroft Commission report does not explicitly address this question. It does state that simple aggregate limits "are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization." Constraints on large missiles, however, would not be inconsistent with the Commission's emphasis on small missiles.

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The principal advantage of a direct throw-weight limit is that it would give each side more flexibility to structure its forces within the limit. It would directly constrain the overall potential of each side's missile forces, without dictating a particular force structure. This would undercut the Soviet complaint that our indirect throw-weight limits through medium and heavy ICBM constraints would require them to rebuild according to "US standards". Some believe that combining warhead and throw-weight ceilings would be the most straightforward way to constrain the sides to equal numbers of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. A direct limit would preclude growth in Soviet throw-weight that an indirect limit might permit if the Soviets chose to maximize throw-weight within the constraints. The Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets are likely not to maximize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces.

Some believe the principal drawback to a direct limit on throw-weight is that (depending on the level) it would undercut chances for an agreement, and as an initial objective could be perceived as a hardening of our position and a step away from achieving an agreement. Moreover, they believe the Soviets are less likely to accept throw-weight as a unit of account for START than collateral constraints. Some believe the level of throw-weight is not as significant a measure of military potential as warheads, and should not be assigned the same priority in our START proposal. Additionally, some believe that direct limits on throw-weight cannot be adequately verified. Others point out that indirect limits also require verification of the throw-weight of Soviet missiles.

#### IV. Other Issues

1. Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Our current position is to accept in Phase II a ceiling of 28 on the average number of ALCMs on heavy bombers, with a limit of 20 on the number of ALCMs on existing types of heavy bombers. One of the packages presented below recommends proposing a maximum limit of 20 for all heavy bombers (not just existing types) on the basis that (1) there are no projected US requirements for a bomber to carry more than 20 ALCMs, and (2) to counter the Soviet criticism that our present position would permit 11,000 ALCMs, a level we do not require. The other packages retain our existing position on ALCMs.

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-8-

2. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). Our current position does not contain limits on SLCMs. The current guidance to the Delegation instructs the Delegation to respond to any Soviet proposals to limit SLCMs by soliciting Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. Two of the packages presented below refer to limits on the number of SLCM platforms; the others do not address SLCMs.

3. Modernization constraints. Our current position contains a number of modernization constraints: limits on ICBM and SLBM fractionation, limits on the weight of re-entry vehicles on new types of missiles, and a ban on new heavy missiles. Our current proposal does not include limits on the number of new types of missiles. One of the packages proposes banning new types of heavy and medium ICBMs and restricting new types of light ICBMs to a single warhead during the first ten years of START. (The Peacekeeper and the SS-X-24 ICBMs would be permitted as existing types.) Other packages do not require limits on the number of new types of missiles.

4. Draft treaty. At the end of the last round, all Washington Agencies agreed in an instruction cable to the US START Delegation that we should be in a position to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The Soviets, for their part, tabled a draft treaty during Round III and, in the inter-round period, they have sought to make propaganda mileage by false charges that the US refused to discuss treaty language with them. In order to deprive the Soviets of this propaganda advantage and to further the negotiations by putting the US position on the table in a unified fashion, the US Delegation believes it should be authorized to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The START Delegation will incorporate changes to the US position arising from NSC decisions into the current draft text. The Delegation will send this revised draft back to Washington for prompt consideration by the US Government.

#### V. Packages

The following packages would: (a) retain our goal of a ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, (b) make no change in our proposal to limit heavy bombers, and (c) combine the phases of our current proposal. In addition, none of the packages would retain the current proposal's sub-limit of 2500 ICBM warheads or the Phase II ban on all heavy missiles.

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-9-

The packages differ in: (a) the throw-weight level they seek; (b) the way throw-weight is constrained; (c) whether the number of deployed missiles is limited; (d) the limits on ALCMs; and, (e) whether to seek platform limits on SLCMs.

OSD and JCS will provide packages at a later date.

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LIMITS	CURRENT POSITION	REVISED POSITION				
		STATE	OSD	ACDA	START NEGOTIATOR	JCS
Missile Warheads	5000	5000	TO BE PROVIDED	5000		
Heavy Bombers	350	350		350		
Deployed Missiles	850	1150		No limit		
Throw-weight	Phase I: 110/210 limit on heavy and medium ICBMs. 2.5 million kg of Soviet throw-weight as a goal  Phase II: Direct limit of 1.9 million kg of throw-weight	150 heavy ICBMs. Results in about 3.0* million kg of Soviet throw-weight		Direct limit of 2.5 million kg		
ALCMs	Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	20 per heavy bomber		Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber		
SLCMs	No limit	Platform limit		No limit	Platform limit	
New Types	Ban new types of heavy ICBMs	Ban new types of heavy/medium ICBMs & limit light ICBMs to single RVs		No limit		

\*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (upto 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize high throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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State Department Package

- o 5000 ballistic missile warheads; no ICBM RV subceiling
- o 1150 deployed missiles
- o Limit of 150 heavy ICBMs; no direct throw-weight limits
- o 350 heavy bombers
- o Maximum of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber
- o SLCM platform limit
- o Flight test/deployment ban on heavy/medium ICBMs, only 1-RV new light ICBMs in first 10 years (MX is existing type)
- o Warhead weight limit (225 kg) for new missiles, and at least half of new missile throw-weight must consist of RVs

The central objective of the State package is to draw the Soviets into the US negotiating framework without compromising our overall START objectives of substantial reductions, equality, stability and effective verification. The State package seeks to work within the structure of our current Phase I proposal to loosen the specific limits on ICBMs, while still requiring substantial reductions in Soviet ballistic missile forces (including ICBMs) and, indirectly, in throw-weight. This approach would provide a strong incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously on the basis of our proposal (or cause them significant difficulty in explaining why they would not) and would demonstrate conclusively to US and international public opinion that our START approach is serious, even-handed and flexible. Indeed, without a change in our proposal along the lines described above, we cannot realistically expect an agreement.

The State package retains the equal ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads as the most important element of our START proposal. State also believes that it is important to retain a ceiling on deployed missiles. Militarily, the USSR is in a better position than the US to expand its deployed missile force in the near future. Moreover, reductions in deployed missiles have been a prominent and generally popular element of our proposal. State supports raising the deployed missile ceiling to 1150, in order to allow for the deployment of a substantial number of the single-warhead ICBMs recommended by the Scowcroft Commission and to bring the US and Soviet positions closer together.

The major difference between the State package and that of some other agencies is the question of direct limits on throw-weight. State supports a single-phase framework for the US position but without a direct ceiling on throw-weight. The importance of throw-weight as a measure of strategic capability has declined sharply over the years. Moreover, because of the current asymmetry, any throw-weight ceiling low enough to constrain the Soviets would have an obviously unequal impact in the US favor. The USSR has rejected throw-weight as a unit of account in START, and a direct throw-weight ceiling would make serious negotiations on the basis of the US proposal highly unlikely. Moreover, a low direct ceiling on throw-weight would strongly undercut

domestic and international perceptions of the seriousness of US arms control policy and would more than negate any benefits which we would gain from incorporating "build-down" or the Scowcroft Commission recommendations in the US START proposal.

State agrees that the current indirect limits on throw-weight present a major obstacle to an agreement. State proposes that these limits be replaced by a simple limitation on heavy ICBMs which would require that heavies constitute no larger proportion of Soviet ballistic missiles in a START-limited force of 1150 deployed missiles than they do today (i.e., the USSR would be required to reduce from 308 to 150 heavy ICBMs). Because of the obvious destabilizing nature of heavy ICBMs (which the Soviets implicitly acknowledged by accepting direct limits on heavies in SALT I and II), such an approach would be easier to defend -- to the public, Congress, the Allies and the Soviets -- than direct limits on throw-weight. In the context of other START limitations, a limit of 150 heavy ICBMs would reduce Soviet throw-weight from 5.6 million kg to 3.0 million kg. The resulting difference between US and Soviet throw-weight levels would be about three times smaller than exists today.

State also points out that limits on heavy ICBMs can be verified with high confidence, but direct limits on throw-weight cannot. The uncertainty in our estimate of aggregate Soviet throw-weight amounts to 850,000 kg above or below the best estimate, which is equal to the throw-weight of more than 100 heavy ICBMs in either direction.

State also believes that:

- o Deleting the ICBM warhead subceiling would undercut Soviet criticism that the US seeks to "emasculate" the USSR's ICBM force and would be consistent with the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation that each side should be able to configure its forces within a warhead limit.
- o The lower ALCM loading limit is consistent with US programs and would limit possible future Soviet activity. It would also indicate that the US is willing to go beyond SALT II in limiting a weapon system in which we have a current advantage.
- o A SLCM platform ceiling would be the most verifiable way to limit SLCMs. Such a ceiling would close off a loophole for circumventing START limitations by prohibiting the Soviets from exploiting their current advantage in SLCM platforms.
- o Modernization constraints which move both sides toward small ICBMs would demonstrate support for the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and would preclude a "break-out" threat with future ICBM systems. This would also be consistent with the Senate "build-down" proposal.

ACDA Package

5000 ballistic missile warheads  
2.5 million kg ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight  
350 heavy bombers  
Single phase agreement  
Drop deployed ballistic missiles as a unit of account, drop  
210/110 collateral constraints and 2500 ICBM warhead sublimit

Scowcroft Commission

Policy Implications

"Not stabilizing to use arms control to require mutual reductions in the number of launching platforms or missiles."

Drop the 850 limit, and drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

"An approach [of] relatively simple agreements. . .to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons."

Retain equal warhead limits (5000) as a key element of US proposal, along with destructive power as second key element.

"Equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield."

Seek throwweight limits (2.5 million kilograms) as the second key element to reflect yield or destructive power.

"Simple aggregate limits" are "more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate detailed limits on force structure."

Drop the 210/110 collateral constraints on medium and heavy ICBMs, and drop the 2500 ICBM warhead sublimit.

Drop the artificial distinction between Phase I and Phase II, thereby putting cruise missiles into the negotiations now.

ACDA's position implements the Scowcroft Commission recommendations. This straightforward approach would conform most faithfully to the President's letters to Congress, and increase Congressional support for the MX missile now and for the small ICBM in coming years, while retaining maximum flexibility for the President to design future US strategic programs within negotiated constraints. This would also be consistent with the President's statement that everything is on the table in START.

Moreover, direct implementation of the Scowcroft Commission approach would be:

(a) simple and readily understandable by focusing attention on warheads and throwweight (as the best indicators of destructive capability) and by eliminating needlessly complicated factors such as various missile numbers, collateral constraints, constraints on new types of ICBMs,

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-13-

phases, and sublimits. Both the American public and Soviets have been confused by such complicating elements of our START proposal.

(b) more negotiable due to its simplicity, greater flexibility for each side to determine its own force structure, and the inclusion of cruise missile limits in return for deep warhead and throwweight reductions.

(c) stabilizing since each side would have incentive to move towards less valuable targets, thereby reducing incentives for a first strike by the other side.

(d) true to the Reagan Administration hallmark of deep reductions. Deleting the missile limit is preferable to raising it, and thereby giving the impression that we are no longer seeking deep reductions in strategic forces.

The Scowcroft Commission also states that "as long as launcher or missile limitations are seen, in and of themselves, as primary arms control objectives," there will not be incentives to move away from large missiles. In fact, movement on each side towards more deployed missiles, with fewer warheads and less throwweight overall, would enhance strategic stability. Limits on the number of deployed missiles may work against strategic stability.

The Commission calls for reducing destructive power of nuclear weapons, and the President has already decided to seek limits on destructive capability. The best measure of this is throwweight. Without limits on throwweight, the Soviets will retain the potential to deploy far more than 5000 warheads. Attempting to constrain destructive power indirectly (via collateral constraints) inevitably restricts force structuring flexibility. We should offer the Soviets the alternative of a more flexible and straightforward approach.

We should seek at this stage a throwweight ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms, about 50% below the current Soviet level. This is consistent with the 5,000 warhead limit and is also roughly equivalent to the level that would result from our current proposal. Adoption of a significantly higher throwweight level would compromise our goal of reducing the disparity in destructive capability. Adopting a lower throwweight level than 2.5 would be perceived as a hardening of the US position, which could

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undercut the broad consensus on arms control we are in the process of achieving. A lower level would also have a greater chance of being rejected by the Soviets without seriously considering throwweight as one of the two key units of account (the other being warheads).

The ACDA approach gives high priority to throwweight limits along with warhead limits. The US should not propose limits on deployed missiles, but later in the negotiations we could be flexible on accepting limits on the number of deployed missiles (at a level high enough to protect an option to deploy a significant number of small ICBMs) if the Soviets agree to the throwweight limits we seek. Missile limits would thus be considered as a dependent variable and not an independent variable (or goal in the US proposal).

May 24, 1983

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START Negotiator's Position

Package

5000 ballistic missile RVs.

2.5 million kg ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight.

350 heavy bombers, separate ceiling (Backfire included).

28/20 average/maximum ALCM loading limits.

Indicate willingness to consider equal, verifiable limits on nuclear SLCMs, through limits on platforms.

In the context of Soviet agreement to direct limits on throw-weight and ballistic missile RVs, drop the subceilings of 2500 ICBM RVs and 210/110 medium and heavy ICBMs.

Single phase agreement.

Drop deployed ballistic missiles as a unit of account. Later, if Soviets press for its retention, indicate willingness to agree to acceptable limits on the number of deployed ballistic missiles but only if the Soviets accept U.S. proposals on ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight.

Rationale

The START Negotiator's package implements the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for "simple aggregate limits" by making ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight the primary units of account. It continues to focus on reductions in the current destabilizing disparity between the U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile forces. At the same time, it also offers significant benefits to the Soviet Union and sets the stage for serious negotiation toward an agreement by indicating U.S. willingness to limit cruise missiles at the outset of an agreement. By bringing forward direct limits on throw-weight, it allows us to trade, at the negotiating table, a number of provisions to which the Soviets have strongly objected, particularly the concept of phasing, the 210/110 subceiling and the 2500 subceiling.

Recognizing, however, that the Soviets are unlikely to agree to a package which does not limit missiles and also that limits on deployed missiles have been a familiar and politically popular element of the U.S. START position, the START negotiator believes that our objective should be to place the Soviets in the demandeur role of seeking to reintroduce limits on ballistic missiles. In the context of Soviet willingness to accept our proposed limits on ballistic



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missile RVs and throw-weight, we would agree to limits on the number of deployed ballistic missiles which are acceptable to us. This would allow us to deploy several hundred small, single RV ICBMs and would also facilitate progress in the talks by retaining some common elements in the U.S. and Soviet position. This approach would also deny the Soviets the propaganda high ground of appearing to be the only party in favor of limiting missiles.

The START Negotiator's package allows considerable simplification of the U.S. position by substituting direct limits on throw-weight for the complex and constraining indirect limits currently in Phase I of the U.S. position. Direct limits on throw-weight will meet Soviet criticisms that the 210/110 subceilings have placed overly-severe constraints on Soviet force structuring. Raising the U.S. throw-weight objective from its current 1.9 million kg to 2.5 million kg should make it easier to engage the Soviets in a substantive discussion of throw-weight as a unit of account and still achieve sizeable (50%) reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight. Past Soviet objections to throw-weight have been based more on the level of reductions which the U.S. sought to achieve than on any intrinsic Soviet opposition to the principle of throw-weight limits. The Soviets will consider the acceptability of the U.S. throw-weight proposals in light of the effect they have on Soviet forces and the trade-offs they can obtain in limits on U.S. forces. In addition, as Soviet modernization proceeds, the Soviets will move toward smaller missiles which will tend to reduce Soviet opposition to limiting throw-weight. Direct limits on throw-weight also allow us to drop the current subceiling of 2500 ICBM RVs which will simplify our position and also helps in negotiability.

Moving to a direct limit on throw-weight from the outset allows us to drop the concept of phases which has been a major stumbling block to progress in the talks. By indicating willingness to limit ALCMs from the outset of an agreement and to consider equal verifiable limits on nuclear-armed SLCMs, we would offer the Soviets a strong incentive toward accepting the U.S. position on limits on ballistic missile RVs and throw-weight.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: START Papers for NSC Meeting

Attached is a revised version of the START issues paper sent to the NSC on May 28. The only change is a brief reference (on page 7) to the phasing issue. An OSD package for discussion at the NSC meeting may be submitted on Monday. JCS is not expected to provide a written position before the NSC meeting.

Also attached is an interagency approved draft START treaty text. This draft text will be modified on the basis of decisions made at the NSC meeting.

*Charles Hill*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

DECL: OADR

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/17/11

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May 28, 1983

START ISSUES FOR DECISION

Background

The START negotiations resume on June 8. During the last round, the US presented proposals for limiting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), tabled a draft treaty on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a document outlining the US "Basic Elements" of a START agreement. The basic framework of the US position remained as it had been presented in the summer of 1982.

The Soviets contended that US proposals would "emasculate" the Soviet ICBM force while permitting US modernization programs to proceed. They stated that the US proposal was not an acceptable basis for negotiation. They also rejected the idea of a separate agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs). They tabled a draft treaty based largely on SALT II, but with a 28 percent reduction in strategic delivery vehicles from the Soviet level at the time SALT II was signed, about 2500, to 1800. They say they are prepared to accept significant cuts in warheads but only in the context of combining ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons in a single category. In short, the Soviets demonstrated no inclination to move the talks forward.

The US Delegation's view is that the Soviets apparently regard our present START proposal, particularly those aspects dealing with ICBM force restructuring, as unacceptable. They argue that our proposal is designed not to promote stability and equality, but to obtain strategic advantages for the US. We would expect the Soviets to continue dismissing our proposal in its present form.

The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission have stimulated considerable interest, both in the Congress and within the Administration, in reassessing our START position. Key members of Congress have made their support for MX contingent on modifications to our START proposal, and the President wrote to several Congressmen that we are now considering modifications to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

State, ACDA and the START negotiator believe that we should now alter our START proposal--not only to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for a modified approach and to respond to Congressional pressures, but also to improve prospects for productive negotiations. Moreover, there is agreement (except for JCS) that we move away from the ceiling of 850 deployed missiles.

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Some believe we need to make changes now to our position that will bring us close to our final position. Others believe that our position now should retain considerable room for further bargaining.

### Issues

There are two principal issues. One is the extent to which we seek to reduce Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight--that is, should we seek (a) the level that is our goal for the second phase of the negotiations (1.9 million kilograms), or (b) the level that would result from our current proposal for the first phase (2.5 million kilograms), or (c) a higher level? The other issue is whether throw-weight should be constrained directly, or indirectly through collateral constraints. Our current position calls for indirect limits on throw-weight (i.e., sub-ceilings on heavy and medium ICBMs) in Phase I and direct limits (i.e., an aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight ceiling) in Phase II. Our current Phase I proposal was designed to achieve a goal of reduction in Soviet throw-weight of 55 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

One approach would seek a direct limit on throw-weight. The collateral constraints and the limit on deployed ballistic missiles would be dropped (leaving ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight as our two units of account). We would propose a direct throw-weight level (2.0 - 2.5 million kilograms) aimed at obtaining the large-scale reduction in Soviet throw-weight that our current proposal is designed to achieve.

An alternative approach would achieve throw-weight reductions indirectly as a consequence of reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads, and other collateral constraints (leaving deployed ballistic missiles and their warheads as the two units of account). Our current proposed limits on heavy and medium ICBMs could be replaced by other collateral constraints. Under this approach, Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would likely be about 3.0 million kilograms, about 46 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

\*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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The following sections discuss the main questions involved in modifying the US START position: whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed missiles, raise it, or drop it; what level we should propose for throw-weight limits; and whether to limit throw-weight directly or indirectly. Following that discussion are packages supported by various Agencies for a modified START position, accompanied by arguments for each package.

Finally, as an alternative to those packages, we could consider modifying the current position to the minimum extent necessary to reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft report. This would require, at a minimum, a decision now on whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it altogether. State, ACDA and the START negotiator recommend more basic changes to our position for substantive, political, and negotiating reasons.

I. Should we retain the limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it?

The report of the Scowcroft Commission states that arms control agreements should encourage deployment of small, single-warhead ICBMs. "This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments."

The report states that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles "should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single warhead ICBMs". The report does not make any recommendation whether or not to drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

1. Retain the 850 ceiling

The number of small ICBMs the United States might want to deploy would depend on the deployment mode chosen, cost, survivability, Congressional support, and the constraints on the number of Soviet warheads, and is, therefore, difficult to predict. Retention of the 850 limit would limit us to a deployment of no more than about 300 small, single warhead ICBMs

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in addition to 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs and planned SLBMs. This would appear inconsistent with the Commission's recommendation to promote a long-term evolution away from large highly fractionated ICBMs.

The JCS believes that it is not clear at this point whether the US need for small ICBMs will require an increase in the 850 deployed ballistic missile ceiling. Some believe that retaining the 850 limit may give us all the force structuring flexibility we need during the next decade since, in the context of US deployment of 100 MX under a ceiling of 5000 missile warheads, we are unlikely to deploy significantly more than 850 ballistic missiles. The Soviets, on the other hand, with a modern, single RV missile beginning flight testing are better placed over the next decade than we are to exploit the possibilities of large numbers of single RV ICBMs, which would increase their advantage in force survivability. The US could also pay a political price if the 850 limit is dropped since substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles are a prominent, popular, and readily understandable element of the US position. Finally, in view of Soviet stalling in Geneva, some would argue that the appropriate US negotiating response is to hold to our current position and not make modifications which could be considered movement toward the Soviet position.

## 2. Raise the ceiling on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would retain a limit on deployed ballistic missiles but raise it to provide more headroom for large numbers of small missiles. The ceiling could be: between 1050 and 1250; 1450 (which corresponds roughly to the number of deployed missiles the United States would have under the Soviet proposal); or 1600 (the current number of US deployed ballistic missiles). The representative limits cited above could permit from 500 to more than 1100 small missiles, depending on the limit chosen, the number of Peacekeeper ICBMs deployed, and the size of the US SLBM force.

Raising the limit would respond to the Scowcroft Commission's report by making room in our START proposal for the evolution to small, single warhead ICBMs. A level could be chosen with sufficient "headroom" to give us considerable force structuring flexibility in the future. At the same time, retaining a ceiling on missiles would avoid the potential political liability of appearing to abandon constraints in a category of strategic capability (i.e., missiles) that has

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previously been subject to constraints and that some still consider significant. It would also have the negotiating advantage of moving us closer to the Soviet proposal of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

One disadvantage of raising the limit is that this may appear contrary to our objective of deep reductions. In addition, the Scowcroft Commission report argued against reductions in the number of deployed missiles, and cited the negative aspects of relying on such limits in past agreements.

### 3. Drop limits on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would have flexibility to deploy a larger number of small ICBMs within the constraints on warhead numbers and destructive potential.

This approach would encourage an evolution in both the US and the USSR to smaller missiles and would provide substantial flexibility to exploit the advantages of small missiles to enhance survivability and stability. The START agreement would focus primarily on broad measures of capability (warheads and throw-weight). The Scowcroft Commission report makes clear the drawbacks of use of launcher limits in past agreements--i.e., agreements that rely primarily on launcher limits create incentives for large, highly fractionated missiles. Some believe this option corresponds most closely to the approach advocated in the Scowcroft Commission's report as more likely to be practical, stabilizing, and lasting than constraints on force structures. They believe that dropping limits on deployed missiles could be useful in obtaining Congressional support for the development, production and deployment of the Peacekeeper and a small ICBM.

Dropping the limits on deployed missiles would emphasize the limits on warheads and destructive potential, but could lead to increased pressure to limit bomber weapons, which would not be in the US interest. In addition, if the Soviets deploy a large number of missiles and missile launchers, this could provide a potential to deploy additional warheads.

## II. What throw-weight level should we seek?

Our current proposal seeks to substantially reduce Soviet missile throw-weight in phase I indirectly to about 2.5 million

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kilograms through the limit of 5000 missile warheads, the sub-ceiling of 2500 ICBM warheads and a limit of 210 medium and heavy ICBMs of which no more than 110 could be heavy ICBMs. In Phase II Soviet missile throw-weight would be further reduced to a direct ceiling of 1.9 million kilograms. Since the US throw-weight level is currently at 1.9 million kilograms, and the Soviet level is at about 5.6 million kilograms, any throw-weight level which exceeds the US current level would require the Soviets to reduce unilaterally.

There are three options:

(1) A level of 2.0 million kilograms (64 percent below the estimated current Soviet level but above the US level) would be consistent with our proposal for the second phase. We could argue that we were accelerating achievement of what has always been our ultimate goal. A proposal for a low ceiling now could give us bargaining room.

(2) A ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms (55 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would be roughly equivalent to our current proposal for the first phase, and would allow both sides somewhat greater flexibility to structure forces. It is the level the US has proposed in conjunction with the ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads.

(3) Constraints that could result in about 3.0 million kilograms (46 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would permit the Soviets greater force structure flexibility than the other options, and hence such a throw-weight level could be more likely to lead to an agreement.

The illustrative force tables for the options describe representative Soviet forces for each of these levels. While all the options limit the Soviets to 5000 warheads, the higher the throw-weight, the larger could be the size and explosive power of Soviet warheads, and the greater could be the Soviet potential to deploy additional warheads.

### III. Should we seek direct or indirect limits on throw-weight?

The Scowcroft Commission report does not explicitly address this question. It does state that simple aggregate limits "are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization." Constraints on large missiles, however, would not be inconsistent with the Commission's emphasis on small missiles.

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The principal advantage of a direct throw-weight limit is that it would give each side more flexibility to structure its forces within the limit. It would directly constrain the overall potential of each side's missile forces, without dictating a particular force structure. This would undercut the Soviet complaint that our indirect throw-weight limits through medium and heavy ICBM constraints would require them to rebuild according to "US standards". Some believe that combining warhead and throw-weight ceilings would be the most straightforward way to constrain the sides to equal numbers of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. A direct limit would preclude growth in Soviet throw-weight that an indirect limit might permit if the Soviets chose to maximize throw-weight within the constraints. The Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets are likely not to maximize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces.

Some believe the principal drawback to a direct limit on throw-weight is that (depending on the level) it would undercut chances for an agreement, and as an initial objective could be perceived as a hardening of our position and a step away from achieving an agreement. Moreover, they believe the Soviets are less likely to accept throw-weight as a unit of account for START than collateral constraints. Some believe the level of throw-weight is not as significant a measure of military potential as warheads, and should not be assigned the same priority in our START proposal. Additionally, some believe that direct limits on throw-weight cannot be adequately verified. Others point out that indirect limits also require verification of the throw-weight of Soviet missiles.

#### IV. Other Issues

1. Phasing. The current US proposal would reduce Soviet throw-weight indirectly in Phase I, and would place a lower direct ceiling on throw-weight in Phase II. The packages proposed by State, ACDA, and the START Negotiator would combine the current two-phased approach into a single phase.\*

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\* OSD position to be provided.

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2. Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Our current position is to accept in Phase II a ceiling of 28 on the average number of ALCMs on heavy bombers, with a limit of 20 on the number of ALCMs on existing types of heavy bombers. One of the packages presented below recommends proposing a maximum limit of 20 for all heavy bombers (not just existing types) on the basis that (1) there are no projected US requirements for a bomber to carry more than 20 ALCMs, and (2) to counter the Soviet criticism that our present position would permit 11,000 ALCMs, a level we do not require. The other packages retain our existing position on ALCMs.

3. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). Our current position does not contain limits on SLCMs. The current guidance to the Delegation instructs the Delegation to respond to any Soviet proposals to limit SLCMs by soliciting Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. Two of the packages presented below refer to limits on the number of SLCM platforms; the others do not address SLCMs.

4. Modernization constraints. Our current position contains a number of modernization constraints: limits on ICBM and SLBM fractionation, limits on the weight of re-entry vehicles on new types of missiles, and a ban on new heavy missiles. Our current proposal does not include limits on the number of new types of missiles. One of the packages proposes banning new types of heavy and medium ICBMs and restricting new types of light ICBMs to a single warhead during the first ten years of START. (The Peacekeeper and the SS-X-24 ICBMs would be permitted as existing types.) Other packages do not require limits on the number of new types of missiles.

5. Draft treaty. At the end of the last round, all Washington Agencies agreed in an instruction cable to the US START Delegation that we should be in a position to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The Soviets, for their part, tabled a draft treaty during Round III and, in the inter-round period, they have sought to make propaganda mileage by false charges that the US refused to discuss treaty language with them. In order to deprive the Soviets of this propaganda advantage and to further the negotiations by putting the US position on the table in a unified fashion, the US Delegation believes it should be

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authorized to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The START Delegation will incorporate changes to the US position arising from NSC decisions into the current draft text. The Delegation will send this revised draft back to Washington for prompt consideration by the US Government.

V. Packages

The following packages would: (a) retain our goal of a ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, (b) make no change in our proposal to limit heavy bombers, and (c) combine the phases of our current proposal. In addition, none of the packages would retain the current proposal's sub-limit of 2500 ICBM warheads or the Phase II ban on all heavy missiles.

The packages differ in: (a) the throw-weight level they seek; (b) the way throw-weight is constrained; (c) whether the number of deployed missiles is limited; (d) the limits on ALCMs; and, (e) whether to seek platform limits on SLCMs.

OSD and JCS will provide packages at a later date.

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LIMITS	CURRENT POSITION	REVISED POSITION			
		STATE	OSD	ACDA	START NEGOTIATOR
Missile Warheads	5000	5000	TO BE PROVIDED	5000	
Heavy Bombers	350	350		350	
Deployed Missiles	850	1150		No limit	
Throw-weight	Phase I: 110/210 limit on heavy and medium ICBMs. 2.5 million kg of Soviet throw-weight as a goal  Phase II: Direct limit of 1.9 million kg of throw-weight	150 heavy ICBMs. Results in about 3.0* million kg of Soviet throw-weight		Direct limit of 2.5 million kg	
ALCMs	Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	20 per heavy bomber		Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	
SLCMs	No limit	Platform limit		No limit	Platform limit
New Types	Ban new types of heavy ICBMs	Ban new types of heavy/medium ICBMs & limit light ICBMs to single RVs		No limit	

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\*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize high throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.