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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8290701)			
1. memo	from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer re: NSC meeting (1p) <i>R 11/09/05 M1346 #20</i>	6/6/83	P-1
2. memo	from W. Clark to the President re: NSC meeting (1p) <i>R ~ ~ #21</i>	6/4/83	P-1
3. paper	re: U.S. Policy (17pp) <i>Part 12/19/05 M04-020 #1</i>	n.d.	P-1, P-5
4. memo	from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer re: NSC meeting (1p) <i>R 11/09/05 M1346 #23</i>	6/2/83	P-1
5. paper	re: talking points (8pp) <i>R ~ ~ #24</i>	n.d.	P-1, P-5
6. paper	re: issues for discussion with charts (18pp) <i>R ~ ~ #25</i>	5/28/83	P-1, P-5
COLLECTION:			
EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER:			
NSC 00081 07Jun83 [3-15] Box 91285			12/9/94

(4 of 7) RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 4/2/2007

File Folder NSC 00081 07 JUN 83 (3 OF 5)

FOIA

M1346

Box Number 91285

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
3	PAPER	US POLICY (M04 020 #1)	17	ND
			<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>	
5	PAPER	TALKING POINTS (M1346 #24)	8	ND
			<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>	
6	PAPER	ISSUES FOR DECISION SAME AS M1346 #10 (M1346 #25)	18	5/28/1983
			<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>	

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8390701)			
1. paper	re: U.S. policy (17pp) <i>Part 12/19/05 M04-020 #1 (DWR)</i>	n.d.	P-1, P/5
2. memo	from W. Clark to the President re: NSC meeting with handwritten notations <i>R 11/09/05 M1346 #27</i>	n.d.	P-1
3. memo	from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer to W. Clark re: NSC meeting (1p) <i>R #28</i>	6/1/83	P-1
4. memo	from R. Kimmitt to D. Gregg, et al. re: NSC meeting (1p) <i>R #29</i>	6/3/83	P-1
5. memo	from R. Kimmitt to D. Gregg re: NSC meeting with handwritten notations (1p) <i>R #30</i>	6/3/83	P-1
6. agenda	for NSC meeting (1p) <i>R #31</i>	6/7/83	P-1
7. paper	re: issues for discussion with charts (18pp) <i>R #32</i>	5/28/83	P-1, P/5
8. paper	re: U.S. policy (17pp) <i>Part. 12/19/05 M04-020 #1 (DWR)</i>	n.d.	P-1, P/5
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER: NSC 00081 07Jun83 4 of 5 Box 91285 <i>(4 of 5)</i>			12/9/94

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Withdrawer

SMF 4/2/2007

File Folder NSC 00081 07 JUN 83 (4 OF 5)

FOIA

M1346

Box Number 91285

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	PAPER	US POLICY (M04 020 #1 DUPE)	17	ND
			<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>	
7	PAPER	SAME AS M1346 #10 (M1346 #32)	18	5/28/1983
			<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>	
8	PAPER	SAME AS DOC #1 (M04 020 # 1 DUPE)	17	ND
			<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>	

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SYSTEM II
90701

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

June 2, 1983

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: BOB LINHARD/SVEN SMKRAEMER

SUBJECT: Papers to Prepare the President for the
June 7th NSC Meeting on START

Attached at Tab I is a short memorandum to the President forwarding three papers for his review prior to the NSC meeting on START scheduled for June 7th.

-- Tab A is a copy of the Talking Points developed to support the briefing given to the President on June 1st. We have included this in the package because it can serve as a good summary of the issues to be discussed at the NSC meeting.

-- Tab B is the interagency issue paper covering the first two items on the planned NSC agenda on deployed missiles and throwweight. It basically discusses how the current U.S. START position could be changed as a result of the Scowcroft Commission Report.

-- Tab C is the interagency paper developed to support the third item on our planned NSC agenda. It discusses alternative ways of incorporating a build-down concept into our START position.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I and forward the papers attached for the President's reading while at Camp David.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President (TS)
- A Talking Points used at 1 June meeting with President (TS)
- B START Issues for Decision (S)
- C Approach to Handling Build-down (S)

Concurrence: ^{RJ}Ron Lehman

DECLASSIFIED

NIS M1346 #23

BY CM NARA, DATE 11/09/05

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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Tab A

RECORDS TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE (ISOO) INTERIM GUIDELINES
ON CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION DIRECTIVE NO. 1(32
CFR PART 2001), SECTION 2001.13(E) CONCERNING RE-REVIEW OF
PREVIOUSLY DECLASSIFIED RECORDS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NLRRM1346 #24 - ITEM #5 ON WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Tab B

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May 28, 1983

START ISSUES FOR DECISION

Background

The START negotiations resume on June 8. During the last round, the US presented proposals for limiting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), tabled a draft treaty on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a document outlining the US "Basic Elements" of a START agreement. The basic framework of the US position remained as it had been presented in the summer of 1982.

The Soviets contended that US proposals would "emasculate" the Soviet ICBM force while permitting US modernization programs to proceed. They stated that the US proposal was not an acceptable basis for negotiation. They also rejected the idea of a separate agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs). They tabled a draft treaty based largely on SALT II, but with a 28 percent reduction in strategic delivery vehicles from the Soviet level at the time SALT II was signed, about 2500, to 1800. They say they are prepared to accept significant cuts in warheads but only in the context of combining ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons in a single category. In short, the Soviets demonstrated no inclination to move the talks forward.

The US Delegation's view is that the Soviets apparently regard our present START proposal, particularly those aspects dealing with ICBM force restructuring, as unacceptable. They argue that our proposal is designed not to promote stability and equality, but to obtain strategic advantages for the US. We would expect the Soviets to continue dismissing our proposal in its present form.

The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission have stimulated considerable interest, both in the Congress and within the Administration, in reassessing our START position. Key members of Congress have made their support for MX contingent on modifications to our START proposal, and the President wrote to several Congressmen that we are now considering modifications to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

State, ACDA and the START negotiator believe that we should now alter our START proposal--not only to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for a modified approach and to respond to Congressional pressures, but also to improve prospects for productive negotiations. Moreover, there is agreement (except for JCS) that we move away from the ceiling of 850 deployed missiles.

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NLS M1346 #25

BY CS NARA, DATE 11/09/05

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-2-

Some believe we need to make changes now to our position that will bring us close to our final position. Others believe that our position now should retain considerable room for further bargaining.

Issues

There are two principal issues. One is the extent to which we seek to reduce Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight--that is, should we seek (a) the level that is our goal for the second phase of the negotiations (1.9 million kilograms), or (b) the level that would result from our current proposal for the first phase (2.5 million kilograms), or (c) a higher level? The other issue is whether throw-weight should be constrained directly, or indirectly through collateral constraints. Our current position calls for indirect limits on throw-weight (i.e., sub-ceilings on heavy and medium ICBMs) in Phase I and direct limits (i.e., an aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight ceiling) in Phase II. Our current Phase I proposal was designed to achieve a goal of reduction in Soviet throw-weight of 55 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

One approach would seek a direct limit on throw-weight. The collateral constraints and the limit on deployed ballistic missiles would be dropped (leaving ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight as our two units of account). We would propose a direct throw-weight level (2.0 - 2.5 million kilograms) aimed at obtaining the large-scale reduction in Soviet throw-weight that our current proposal is designed to achieve.

An alternative approach would achieve throw-weight reductions indirectly as a consequence of reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads, and other collateral constraints (leaving deployed ballistic missiles and their warheads as the two units of account). Our current proposed limits on heavy and medium ICBMs could be replaced by other collateral constraints. Under this approach, Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would likely be about 3.0 million kilograms, about 46 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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-3-

The following sections discuss the main questions involved in modifying the US START position: whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed missiles, raise it, or drop it; what level we should propose for throw-weight limits; and whether to limit throw-weight directly or indirectly. Following that discussion are packages supported by various Agencies for a modified START position, accompanied by arguments for each package.

Finally, as an alternative to those packages, we could consider modifying the current position to the minimum extent necessary to reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft report. This would require, at a minimum, a decision now on whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it altogether. State, ACDA and the START negotiator recommend more basic changes to our position for substantive, political, and negotiating reasons.

I. Should we retain the limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it?

The report of the Scowcroft Commission states that arms control agreements should encourage deployment of small, single-warhead ICBMs. "This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments."

The report states that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles "should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single warhead ICBMs". The report does not make any recommendation whether or not to drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

1. Retain the 850 ceiling

The number of small ICBMs the United States might want to deploy would depend on the deployment mode chosen, cost, survivability, Congressional support, and the constraints on the number of Soviet warheads, and is, therefore, difficult to predict. Retention of the 850 limit would limit us to a deployment of no more than about 300 small, single warhead ICBMs

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-4-

in addition to 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs and planned SLBMs. This would appear inconsistent with the Commission's recommendation to promote a long-term evolution away from large highly fractionated ICBMs.

The JCS believes that it is not clear at this point whether the US need for small ICBMs will require an increase in the 850 deployed ballistic missile ceiling. Some believe that retaining the 850 limit may give us all the force structuring flexibility we need during the next decade since, in the context of US deployment of 100 MX under a ceiling of 5000 missile warheads, we are unlikely to deploy significantly more than 850 ballistic missiles. The Soviets, on the other hand, with a modern, single RV missile beginning flight testing are better placed over the next decade than we are to exploit the possibilities of large numbers of single RV ICBMs, which would increase their advantage in force survivability. The US could also pay a political price if the 850 limit is dropped since substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles are a prominent, popular, and readily understandable element of the US position. Finally, in view of Soviet stalling in Geneva, some would argue that the appropriate US negotiating response is to hold to our current position and not make modifications which could be considered movement toward the Soviet position.

2. Raise the ceiling on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would retain a limit on deployed ballistic missiles but raise it to provide more headroom for large numbers of small missiles. The ceiling could be: between 1050 and 1250; 1450 (which corresponds roughly to the number of deployed missiles the United States would have under the Soviet proposal); or 1600 (the current number of US deployed ballistic missiles). The representative limits cited above could permit from 500 to more than 1100 small missiles, depending on the limit chosen, the number of Peacekeeper ICBMs deployed, and the size of the US SLBM force.

Raising the limit would respond to the Scowcroft Commission's report by making room in our START proposal for the evolution to small, single warhead ICBMs. A level could be chosen with sufficient "headroom" to give us considerable force structuring flexibility in the future. At the same time, retaining a ceiling on missiles would avoid the potential political liability of appearing to abandon constraints in a category of strategic capability (i.e., missiles) that has

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-5-

previously been subject to constraints and that some still consider significant. It would also have the negotiating advantage of moving us closer to the Soviet proposal of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

One disadvantage of raising the limit is that this may appear contrary to our objective of deep reductions. In addition, the Scowcroft Commission report argued against reductions in the number of deployed missiles, and cited the negative aspects of relying on such limits in past agreements.

3. Drop limits on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would have flexibility to deploy a larger number of small ICBMs within the constraints on warhead numbers and destructive potential.

This approach would encourage an evolution in both the US and the USSR to smaller missiles and would provide substantial flexibility to exploit the advantages of small missiles to enhance survivability and stability. The START agreement would focus primarily on broad measures of capability (warheads and throw-weight). The Scowcroft Commission report makes clear the drawbacks of use of launcher limits in past agreements--i.e., agreements that rely primarily on launcher limits create incentives for large, highly fractionated missiles. Some believe this option corresponds most closely to the approach advocated in the Scowcroft Commission's report as more likely to be practical, stabilizing, and lasting than constraints on force structures. They believe that dropping limits on deployed missiles could be useful in obtaining Congressional support for the development, production and deployment of the Peacekeeper and a small ICBM.

Dropping the limits on deployed missiles would emphasize the limits on warheads and destructive potential, but could lead to increased pressure to limit bomber weapons, which would not be in the US interest. In addition, if the Soviets deploy a large number of missiles and missile launchers, this could provide a potential to deploy additional warheads.

II. What throw-weight level should we seek?

Our current proposal seeks to substantially reduce Soviet missile throw-weight in phase I indirectly to about 2.5 million

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-6-

kilograms through the limit of 5000 missile warheads, the sub-ceiling of 2500 ICBM warheads and a limit of 210 medium and heavy ICBMs of which no more than 110 could be heavy ICBMs. In Phase II Soviet missile throw-weight would be further reduced to a direct ceiling of 1.9 million kilograms. Since the US throw-weight level is currently at 1.9 million kilograms, and the Soviet level is at about 5.6 million kilograms, any throw-weight level which exceeds the US current level would require the Soviets to reduce unilaterally.

There are three options:

(1) A level of 2.0 million kilograms (64 percent below the estimated current Soviet level but above the US level) would be consistent with our proposal for the second phase. We could argue that we were accelerating achievement of what has always been our ultimate goal. A proposal for a low ceiling now could give us bargaining room.

(2) A ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms (55 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would be roughly equivalent to our current proposal for the first phase, and would allow both sides somewhat greater flexibility to structure forces. It is the level the US has proposed in conjunction with the ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads.

(3) Constraints that could result in about 3.0 million kilograms (46 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would permit the Soviets greater force structure flexibility than the other options, and hence such a throw-weight level could be more likely to lead to an agreement.

The illustrative force tables for the options describe representative Soviet forces for each of these levels. While all the options limit the Soviets to 5000 warheads, the higher the throw-weight, the larger could be the size and explosive power of Soviet warheads, and the greater could be the Soviet potential to deploy additional warheads.

III. Should we seek direct or indirect limits on throw-weight?

The Scowcroft Commission report does not explicitly address this question. It does state that simple aggregate limits "are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization." Constraints on large missiles, however, would not be inconsistent with the Commission's emphasis on small missiles.

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The principal advantage of a direct throw-weight limit is that it would give each side more flexibility to structure its forces within the limit. It would directly constrain the overall potential of each side's missile forces, without dictating a particular force structure. This would undercut the Soviet complaint that our indirect throw-weight limits through medium and heavy ICBM constraints would require them to rebuild according to "US standards". Some believe that combining warhead and throw-weight ceilings would be the most straightforward way to constrain the sides to equal numbers of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. A direct limit would preclude growth in Soviet throw-weight that an indirect limit might permit if the Soviets chose to maximize throw-weight within the constraints. The Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets are likely not to maximize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces.

Some believe the principal drawback to a direct limit on throw-weight is that (depending on the level) it would undercut chances for an agreement, and as an initial objective could be perceived as a hardening of our position and a step away from achieving an agreement. Moreover, they believe the Soviets are less likely to accept throw-weight as a unit of account for START than collateral constraints. Some believe the level of throw-weight is not as significant a measure of military potential as warheads, and should not be assigned the same priority in our START proposal. Additionally, some believe that direct limits on throw-weight cannot be adequately verified. Others point out that indirect limits also require verification of the throw-weight of Soviet missiles.

IV. Other Issues

1. Phasing. The current US proposal would reduce Soviet throw-weight indirectly in Phase I, and would place a lower direct ceiling on throw-weight in Phase II. The packages proposed by State, ACDA, and the START Negotiator would combine the current two-phased approach into a single phase.*

* OSD position to be provided.

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-8-

2. Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Our current position is to accept in Phase II a ceiling of 28 on the average number of ALCMs on heavy bombers, with a limit of 20 on the number of ALCMs on existing types of heavy bombers. One of the packages presented below recommends proposing a maximum limit of 20 for all heavy bombers (not just existing types) on the basis that (1) there are no projected US requirements for a bomber to carry more than 20 ALCMs, and (2) to counter the Soviet criticism that our present position would permit 11,000 ALCMs, a level we do not require. The other packages retain our existing position on ALCMs.

3. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). Our current position does not contain limits on SLCMs. The current guidance to the Delegation instructs the Delegation to respond to any Soviet proposals to limit SLCMs by soliciting Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. Two of the packages presented below refer to limits on the number of SLCM platforms; the others do not address SLCMs.

4. Modernization constraints. Our current position contains a number of modernization constraints: limits on ICBM and SLBM fractionation, limits on the weight of re-entry vehicles on new types of missiles, and a ban on new heavy missiles. Our current proposal does not include limits on the number of new types of missiles. One of the packages proposes banning new types of heavy and medium ICBMs and restricting new types of light ICBMs to a single warhead during the first ten years of START. (The Peacekeeper and the SS-X-24 ICBMs would be permitted as existing types.) Other packages do not require limits on the number of new types of missiles.

5. Draft treaty. At the end of the last round, all Washington Agencies agreed in an instruction cable to the US START Delegation that we should be in a position to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The Soviets, for their part, tabled a draft treaty during Round III and, in the inter-round period, they have sought to make propaganda mileage by false charges that the US refused to discuss treaty language with them. In order to deprive the Soviets of this propaganda advantage and to further the negotiations by putting the US position on the table in a unified fashion, the US Delegation believes it should be

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-9-

authorized to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The START Delegation will incorporate changes to the US position arising from NSC decisions into the current draft text. The Delegation will send this revised draft back to Washington for prompt consideration by the US Government.

V. Packages

The following packages would: (a) retain our goal of a ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, (b) make no change in our proposal to limit heavy bombers, and (c) combine the phases of our current proposal. In addition, none of the packages would retain the current proposal's sub-limit of 2500 ICBM warheads or the Phase II ban on all heavy missiles.

The packages differ in: (a) the throw-weight level they seek; (b) the way throw-weight is constrained; (c) whether the number of deployed missiles is limited; (d) the limits on ALCMs; and, (e) whether to seek platform limits on SLCMs.

OSD and JCS will provide packages at a later date.

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LIMITS	CURRENT POSITION	REVISED POSITION				
		STATE	OSD	ACDA	START NEGOTIATOR	JCS
Missile Warheads	5000	5000	TO BE PROVIDED	5000		
Heavy Bombers	350	350		350		
Deployed Missiles	850	1150		No limit		
Throw-weight	Phase I: 110/210 limit on heavy and medium ICBMs. 2.5 million kg of Soviet throw-weight as a goal Phase II: Direct limit of 1.9 million kg of throw-weight	150 heavy ICBMs. Results in about 3.0* million kg of Soviet throw-weight		Direct limit of 2.5 million kg		
ALCMs	Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	20 per heavy bomber		Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber		
SLCMs	No limit	Platform limit		No limit	Platform limit	
New Types	Ban new types of heavy ICBMs	Ban new types of heavy/medium ICBMs & limit light ICBMs to single RVs		No limit		
				TO BE PROVIDED		

*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize high throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

CURRENT START PROPOSAL

STATE

2.0 MKG TW LIMIT

ACDA/NEGOTIATOR

CURRENT START PROPOSAL				STATE				2.0 MKG TW LIMIT				ACDA/NEGOTIATOR			
U.S.	#s	RVs	TW	U.S.	#s	RVs	TW	U.S.	#s	RVs	TW	U.S.	#s	RVs	TW
SICBM	294	294	.176	SICBM	618	618	.371	SICBM	644	644	.386	SICBM	736	736	.442
MX	100	1000	.377	MX	100	1000	.377	MX	100	1000	.377	MX	100	1000	.377
ICBMs	394	1294	0.553	ICBMs	718	1618	0.748	ICBMs	744	1644	0.763	ICBMs	836	1736	0.819
TRIDENT	19/456	3648	1.256	TRIDENT	18/432	3356	1.190	TRIDENT	18/432	3356	1.190	TRIDENT	17/408	3264	1.124
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>4942</u>	<u>1.809 MKG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1150</u>	<u>4974 2/</u>	<u>1.938 MKG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1176 6/</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>1.953 MKG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1244 6/</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>1.943 MKG 10/</u>
SOVIET*	#s	RVs	TW	SOVIET	#s	RVs	TW	SOVIET	#s	RVs	TW	SOVIET	#s	RVs	TW
PL-5	304	304	.365	PL-5	572	572	.686	PL-5	692	692	.830	PL-5	892	892	1.070
SS-X-24	100	1000	.250	SS-19 CL	120	720	.420	SS-X-24	210	2100	.525	SS-X-24	140	1400	.350
SS-18	110	1100	.902	SS-18	150	1500	1.230	SS-18	50	500	.410	SS-18	50	500	.410
ICBMs	514	2404	1.517	ICBMs	842	2792	2.336	ICBMs	902	2792	1.355	ICBMs	1082	2792	1.830
DELTA III	16/256	1792	.512	DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448	DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448	DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448
TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.264	TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.264	TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.184	TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.184
SLEMs	20/336	2432	0.776	SLEMs	18/304	2208	0.712	SLEMs	18/304	2208	0.632	SLEMs	18/304	2208	0.632
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>4836</u>	<u>2.293 MKG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1146</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>3.048 MKG 3/</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1206</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>1.987 MKG 7/</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1386</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>2.462 MKG 11/</u>
				OR								OR			
				PL-5	560	560	.672	PL-5	292	292	.350	PL-5	292	292	.350
				SS-19 CL	250	1500	.875	SS-X-24	200	2000	.500	SS-X-24	100	1000	.250
				SS-18	150	1500	1.230	SS-18	50 8/	500	.410	SS-18	150 12/	1500	1.230
				ICBMs	960	3560	2.777	ICBMs	452	2792	1.260	ICBMs	542	2792	1.830
				TYPHOON CL	9/180 5/	1440	.594	DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448	DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448
								TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.184	TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.184
								SLEMs	18/304	2208	0.632	SLEMs	18/304	2208	0.632
				<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1140</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>3.371 MKG 4/</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>756 9/</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>1.892 MKG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>846 9/</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>2.462 MKG</u>

* Combination of Force 3 and Force 4 from NIE 11-3/8-82.

- 1/ Since US small ICBM deployment does not begin until the early 1990s, 199X is used as the end-year in order to show full US force modernization under each package.
- 2/ Given planned MX and Trident deployments, the deployed ballistic missile limit of 1150 does not allow the US to reach the overall warhead limit, and thus slightly constrains the number of small ICBMs the US could deploy.
- 3/ A Soviet force which retains 150 SS-18s and includes emphasis on deployment of a small ICBM (PL-5) would have about 3.0 MKG throw-weight level.
- 4/ If the Soviets choose to utilize all the throw-weight potential of existing missiles as projected in the current NIE, they can increase the throw-weight of the SS-NX-20 from 2300 KG to 3300 KG. This could result in a throw-weight level of about 3.4 MKG.
- 5/ In emphasizing SLEM throw-weight, the Soviets could reduce the number of Delta IIIs in favor of Typhoon SSBMs.
- 6/ Without a limit on deployed ballistic missiles, the US could reach the warhead limit and could deploy additional small ICBMs (see footnote 2).
- 7/ The Soviets can modernize their ICBM force with a large number of small ICBMs and a new medium ICBM, while still remaining under a direct throw-weight limit of 2.0 MKG.
- 8/ If the Soviets choose to retain 50 SS-18s under a direct throw-weight limit of 2.0 MKG, it would result in a slight decrease in medium ICBMs and a large decrease of 400 small ICBMs.
- 9/ The number of deployed ballistic missiles significantly decreases if SS-18s are retained, resulting in an increased ratio of warheads to airpoints.
- 10/ Under a direct limit on throw-weight of 2.5 MKG, the US would have the flexibility to increase throw-weight above the level shown in order to improve the combination of yield and accuracy for greater capability against hardened targets.
- 11/ The Soviets can retain 50 SS-18s and modernize their ICBM force with a large number of small ICBMs and a new medium ICBM, while still remaining under a direct throw-weight limit of 2.5 MKG.
- 12/ If the Soviets choose to retain 150 SS-18s under a direct throw-weight limit of 2.5 MKG, it would result in a slight decrease in medium ICBMs and a large decrease of 600 small ICBMs.

State Department Package

- o 5000 ballistic missile warheads; no ICBM RV subceiling
- o 1150 deployed missiles
- o Limit of 150 heavy ICBMs; no direct throw-weight limits
- o 350 heavy bombers
- o Maximum of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber
- o SLCM platform limit
- o Flight test/deployment ban on heavy/medium ICBMs, only 1-RV new light ICBMs in first 10 years (MX is existing type)
- o Warhead weight limit (225 kg) for new missiles, and at least half of new missile throw-weight must consist of RVs

The central objective of the State package is to draw the Soviets into the US negotiating framework without compromising our overall START objectives of substantial reductions, equality, stability and effective verification. The State package seeks to work within the structure of our current Phase I proposal to loosen the specific limits on ICBMs, while still requiring substantial reductions in Soviet ballistic missile forces (including ICBMs) and, indirectly, in throw-weight. This approach would provide a strong incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously on the basis of our proposal (or cause them significant difficulty in explaining why they would not) and would demonstrate conclusively to US and international public opinion that our START approach is serious, even-handed and flexible. Indeed, without a change in our proposal along the lines described above, we cannot realistically expect an agreement.

The State package retains the equal ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads as the most important element of our START proposal. State also believes that it is important to retain a ceiling on deployed missiles. Militarily, the USSR is in a better position than the US to expand its deployed missile force in the near future. Moreover, reductions in deployed missiles have been a prominent and generally popular element of our proposal. State supports raising the deployed missile ceiling to 1150, in order to allow for the deployment of a substantial number of the single-warhead ICBMs recommended by the Scowcroft Commission and to bring the US and Soviet positions closer together.

The major difference between the State package and that of some other agencies is the question of direct limits on throw-weight. State supports a single-phase framework for the US position but without a direct ceiling on throw-weight. The importance of throw-weight as a measure of strategic capability has declined sharply over the years. Moreover, because of the current asymmetry, any throw-weight ceiling low enough to constrain the Soviets would have an obviously unequal impact in the US favor. The USSR has rejected throw-weight as a unit of account in START, and a direct throw-weight ceiling would make serious negotiations on the basis of the US proposal highly unlikely. Moreover, a low direct ceiling on throw-weight would strongly undercut

domestic and international perceptions of the seriousness of US arms control policy and would more than negate any benefits which we would gain from incorporating "build-down" or the Scowcroft Commission recommendations in the US START proposal.

State agrees that the current indirect limits on throw-weight present a major obstacle to an agreement. State proposes that these limits be replaced by a simple limitation on heavy ICBMs which would require that heavies constitute no larger proportion of Soviet ballistic missiles in a START-limited force of 1150 deployed missiles than they do today (i.e., the USSR would be required to reduce from 308 to 150 heavy ICBMs). Because of the obvious destabilizing nature of heavy ICBMs (which the Soviets implicitly acknowledged by accepting direct limits on heavies in SALT I and II), such an approach would be easier to defend -- to the public, Congress, the Allies and the Soviets -- than direct limits on throw-weight. In the context of other START limitations, a limit of 150 heavy ICBMs would reduce Soviet throw-weight from 5.6 million kg to 3.0 million kg. The resulting difference between US and Soviet throw-weight levels would be about three times smaller than exists today.

State also points out that limits on heavy ICBMs can be verified with high confidence, but direct limits on throw-weight cannot. The uncertainty in our estimate of aggregate Soviet throw-weight amounts to 850,000 kg above or below the best estimate, which is equal to the throw-weight of more than 100 heavy ICBMs in either direction.

State also believes that:

- o Deleting the ICBM warhead subceiling would undercut Soviet criticism that the US seeks to "emasculate" the USSR's ICBM force and would be consistent with the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation that each side should be able to configure its forces within a warhead limit.
- o The lower ALCM loading limit is consistent with US programs and would limit possible future Soviet activity. It would also indicate that the US is willing to go beyond SALT II in limiting a weapon system in which we have a current advantage.
- o A SLCM platform ceiling would be the most verifiable way to limit SLCMs. Such a ceiling would close off a loophole for circumventing START limitations by prohibiting the Soviets from exploiting their current advantage in SLCM platforms.
- o Modernization constraints which move both sides toward small ICBMs would demonstrate support for the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and would preclude a "break-out" threat with future ICBM systems. This would also be consistent with the Senate "build-down" proposal.

5000 ballistic missile warheads
2.5 million kg ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight
350 heavy bombers
Single phase agreement
Drop deployed ballistic missiles as a unit of account, drop
210/110 collateral constraints and 2500 ICBM warhead sublimit

Scowcroft Commission

"Not stabilizing to use arms control to require mutual reductions in the number of launching platforms or missiles."

"An approach [of] relatively simple agreements. . .to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons."

"Equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield."

"Simple aggregate limits" are "more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate detailed limits on force structure."

Policy Implications

Drop the 850 limit, and drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

Retain equal warhead limits (5000) as a key element of US proposal, along with destructive power as second key element.

Seek throwweight limits (2.5 million kilograms) as the second key element to reflect yield or destructive power.

Drop the 210/110 collateral constraints on medium and heavy ICBMs, and drop the 2500 ICBM warhead sublimit.

Drop the artificial distinction between Phase I and Phase II, thereby putting cruise missiles into the negotiations now.

ACDA's position implements the Scowcroft Commission recommendations. This straightforward approach would conform most faithfully to the President's letters to Congress, and increase Congressional support for the MX missile now and for the small ICBM in coming years, while retaining maximum flexibility for the President to design future US strategic programs within negotiated constraints. This would also be consistent with the President's statement that everything is on the table in START.

Moreover, direct implementation of the Scowcroft Commission approach would be:

(a) simple and readily understandable by focusing attention on warheads and throwweight (as the best indicators of destructive capability) and by eliminating needlessly complicated factors such as various missile numbers, collateral constraints, constraints on new types of ICBMs,

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-13-

phases, and sublimits. Both the American public and Soviets have been confused by such complicating elements of our START proposal.

(b) more negotiable due to its simplicity, greater flexibility for each side to determine its own force structure, and the inclusion of cruise missile limits in return for deep warhead and throwweight reductions.

(c) stabilizing since each side would have incentive to move towards less valuable targets, thereby reducing incentives for a first strike by the other side.

(d) true to the Reagan Administration hallmark of deep reductions. Deleting the missile limit is preferable to raising it, and thereby giving the impression that we are no longer seeking deep reductions in strategic forces.

The Scowcroft Commission also states that "as long as launcher or missile limitations are seen, in and of themselves, as primary arms control objectives," there will not be incentives to move away from large missiles. In fact, movement on each side towards more deployed missiles, with fewer warheads and less throwweight overall, would enhance strategic stability. Limits on the number of deployed missiles may work against strategic stability.

The Commission calls for reducing destructive power of nuclear weapons, and the President has already decided to seek limits on destructive capability. The best measure of this is throwweight. Without limits on throwweight, the Soviets will retain the potential to deploy far more than 5000 warheads. Attempting to constrain destructive power indirectly (via collateral constraints) inevitably restricts force structuring flexibility. We should offer the Soviets the alternative of a more flexible and straightforward approach.

We should seek at this stage a throwweight ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms, about 50% below the current Soviet level. This is consistent with the 5,000 warhead limit and is also roughly equivalent to the level that would result from our current proposal. Adoption of a significantly higher throwweight level would compromise our goal of reducing the disparity in destructive capability. Adopting a lower throwweight level than 2.5 would be perceived as a hardening of the US position, which could

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-14-

undercut the broad consensus on arms control we are in the process of achieving. A lower level would also have a greater chance of being rejected by the Soviets without seriously considering throwweight as one of the two key units of account (the other being warheads).

The ACDA approach gives high priority to throwweight limits along with warhead limits. The US should not propose limits on deployed missiles, but later in the negotiations we could be flexible on accepting limits on the number of deployed missiles (at a level high enough to protect an option to deploy a significant number of small ICBMs) if the Soviets agree to the throwweight limits we seek. Missile limits would thus be considered as a dependent variable and not an independent variable (or goal in the US proposal).

May 24, 1983

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START Negotiator's Position

Package

5000 ballistic missile RVs.

2.5 million kg ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight.

350 heavy bombers, separate ceiling (Backfire included).

28/20 average/maximum ALCM loading limits.

Indicate willingness to consider equal, verifiable limits on nuclear SLCMs, through limits on platforms.

In the context of Soviet agreement to direct limits on throw-weight and ballistic missile RVs, drop the subceilings of 2500 ICBM RVs and 210/110 medium and heavy ICBMs.

Single phase agreement.

Drop deployed ballistic missiles as a unit of account. Later, if Soviets press for its retention, indicate willingness to agree to acceptable limits on the number of deployed ballistic missiles but only if the Soviets accept U.S. proposals on ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight.

Rationale

The START Negotiator's package implements the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for "simple aggregate limits" by making ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight the primary units of account. It continues to focus on reductions in the current destabilizing disparity between the U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile forces. At the same time, it also offers significant benefits to the Soviet Union and sets the stage for serious negotiation toward an agreement by indicating U.S. willingness to limit cruise missiles at the outset of an agreement. By bringing forward direct limits on throw-weight, it allows us to trade, at the negotiating table, a number of provisions to which the Soviets have strongly objected, particularly the concept of phasing, the 210/110 subceiling and the 2500 subceiling.

Recognizing, however, that the Soviets are unlikely to agree to a package which does not limit missiles and also that limits on deployed missiles have been a familiar and politically popular element of the U.S. START position, the START negotiator believes that our objective should be to place the Soviets in the demandeur role of seeking to reintroduce limits on ballistic missiles. In the context of Soviet willingness to accept our proposed limits on ballistic

missile RVs and throw-weight, we would agree to limits on the number of deployed ballistic missiles which are acceptable to us. This would allow us to deploy several hundred small, single RV ICBMs and would also facilitate progress in the talks by retaining some common elements in the U.S. and Soviet position. This approach would also deny the Soviets the propaganda high ground of appearing to be the only party in favor of limiting missiles.

The START Negotiator's package allows considerable simplification of the U.S. position by substituting direct limits on throw-weight for the complex and constraining indirect limits currently in Phase I of the U.S. position. Direct limits on throw-weight will meet Soviet criticisms that the 210/110 subceilings have placed overly-severe constraints on Soviet force structuring. Raising the U.S. throw-weight objective from its current 1.9 million kg to 2.5 million kg should make it easier to engage the Soviets in a substantive discussion of throw-weight as a unit of account and still achieve sizeable (50%) reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight. Past Soviet objections to throw-weight have been based more on the level of reductions which the U.S. sought to achieve than on any intrinsic Soviet opposition to the principle of throw-weight limits. The Soviets will consider the acceptability of the U.S. throw-weight proposals in light of the effect they have on Soviet forces and the trade-offs they can obtain in limits on U.S. forces. In addition, as Soviet modernization proceeds, the Soviets will move toward smaller missiles which will tend to reduce Soviet opposition to limiting throw-weight. Direct limits on throw-weight also allow us to drop the current subceiling of 2500 ICBM RVs which will simplify our position and also helps in negotiability.

Moving to a direct limit on throw-weight from the outset allows us to drop the concept of phases which has been a major stumbling block to progress in the talks. By indicating willingness to limit ALCMs from the outset of an agreement and to consider equal verifiable limits on nuclear-armed SLCMs, we would offer the Soviets a strong incentive toward accepting the U.S. position on limits on ballistic missile RVs and throw-weight.

Tab C



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SYSTEM 11
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

JUN 3 1983

June 2, 1983

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UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL Attachment

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Revised Build-Down Paper for START NSC
Meeting

As indicated in my memorandum of June 1, attached is the final version of the START IG paper "Approaches to a U.S. Policy on the Build-Down Concept."


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROACHES TO A U.S. POLICY ON THE BUILD-DOWN CONCEPT

I. Introduction

In response to the President's letters of May 12 to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy, the START Interagency initiated an intensive study of both the specific build-down proposal contained in S. Res. 57 and more generalized approaches following the guidance provided by the President in his May 12 letters. While this work has not been completed, significant progress has been achieved in assessing the factors that should be taken into account in analyzing build-down approaches. Specific approaches have already been analyzed to some degree, though much more work remains to be done.

This paper reviews interagency progress to date in studying the build-down and suggests a possible Administration stance on the issue. This paper:

- reviews the history of the build-down;
- states the important factors that affect possible build-down approaches;
- assesses possible Soviet reactions to a U.S. build-down initiative;
- lays out minimum acceptable requirements for a build-down approach;
- identifies subjects for further study;
- suggests certain steps the Administration should avoid; and
- recommends a Congressional and public stance covering our efforts to date.

II. (U) Background.

In February 1983, Senators Nunn and Cohen introduced S. Res. 57 which called for the elimination from operational forces of two nuclear warheads for each newly deployed nuclear warhead. The resolution has approximately 45 Senate cosponsors. Subsequent to S. Res. 57, Senators Nunn, Cohen and Percy sent a letter to the President calling for the US to accept a nuclear warhead build-down proposal. The Senators have indicated that the build-down was not tied to a specific two-for-one ratio because it might unnecessarily restrict the negotiations within the context of START. In response, the President supported the concept of a flexible mutual build-down in his 12 May 1983 letter to the

Senators. The letter states that the "Administration is currently examining the structure of a build-down proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces." In laying out the broad framework of a modified build-down, the President's letter states:

- "The principle of a mutual build-down, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek."
- "It would, if properly applied, reinforce the intent to cap the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads on both sides and to cause each side to reduce those levels steadily and substantially over time."
- "It could be implemented flexibly and with reasonable latitude for each side to balance the force it deploys and reduces. Variable ratios as appropriate, would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems."
- "It could be implemented in conjunction with an agreed floor which, when reached, would trigger the suspension of the build-down rule, subject to renegotiation."

The President stated that any build-down concept must recognize the importance of strategic modernization and the necessity of maintaining a balance during the reduction process to deal with asymmetries in US and Soviet forces. The process would also require agreement on effective verification measures and counting rules for all strategic nuclear systems.

On May 26, nineteen Senators wrote to the President and reminded him, inter alia, of his obligation to develop "within the next several weeks a meaningful build-down proposal for nuclear arms reductions."

III. (U) Factors Affecting any Build-down Approach.

There are several issues associated with a simple build-down proposal that must be addressed.

Equality. There currently is a significant difference in the age of the strategic forces of the US and the USSR; Soviet forces are significantly more modern. A simple build-down would make reductions contingent upon force modernization, in that force reductions would not be required until new warheads were added.

The Soviets with more modern forces could more easily delay their reductions by curtailing additional modernization and retaining existing forces. Three-fourths of Soviet warheads are on systems which are five years old or less. Three-fourths of US warheads are on systems that are 15 years old or more. Because of the potentially dangerous weapon-level asymmetries which would occur if only the United States modernized, for the build-down concept to function effectively any build-down must be part of a comprehensive mutual agreement to reduce strategic forces and not be based solely on modernization.

There are a number of ways to address this problem. One is to develop a build-down schedule that limits differences in weapons numbers between US and USSR. A schedule of reductions could be developed (incorporating a goal or floor and intermediate reduction levels) that would control developing inequalities by introducing the requirement to meet this schedule of reductions whether a side modernized or not.

Aggregation of Bomber Weapons and Ballistic Missile Warheads.
A simple build-down concept would aggregate all weapons, forcing bombs, cruise missiles, and ballistic missile warheads to be counted equally. ~~Thus far in the START negotiations the United States has argued that some strategic systems (ballistic missiles) are more destabilizing than others (bombers and cruise missiles).~~ If a build-down embraced aggregated weapons, the current US START negotiating position would be undermined. Also, deploying one new ALCM could mean building down two ballistic missile warheads or other accountable bomber weapons if a 2 to one ratio were used.

The problems associated with counting bomber weapons might be resolved by counting accountable bomber platforms* rather than their weapons. This is the approach the United States proposes in START and is similar to the way non-ALCM carrying heavy bombers were handled in the SALT II Treaty. Counting bomber platforms avoids the uncertainties associated with agreeing to and verifying bomber weapons loadings. This approach also would recognize that the United States has over 200 mothballed B-52 aircraft which count under SALT II. A 2 for 1 build-down of bomber platforms could not be accommodated if applied only to operationally deployed bombers.

However, the Soviets would be very unlikely to accept counting bombers on the basis of accountable platforms for several reasons. First, it allows the US well over 100 new bombers without retiring any operational bombers. Second, there is no provision for controlling ALCM deployment. Finally, the

* Accountable bomber platforms includes mothballed as well as operational bombers.

Soviets would have to either classify the Backfire as a heavy bomber or accept a limit of 75 on new heavy bombers (150 Bear/Bison currently deployed on a 2 for 1 build-down would allow a maximum of 75 new heavy bombers), or accept reductions in other systems.

Counting Rules. Although a build-down based on deployed ballistic missile warheads (excluding bomber weapons) might be acceptable to the US if properly constructed, a build-down based on accountable warheads* would clearly be preferable. At Geneva, however, we have proposed that each type of currently deployed missile be counted as having the maximum number of warheads actually deployed on a missile of that type. We must have the same counting rules applied to both our START reductions proposal and a build-down proposal to prevent the Soviets from exploiting this disparity in the negotiations. Switching to an accountable basis for currently deployed missiles would be inconsistent with our current START approach. This would credit the Poseidon C3 with 14, rather than the 10 with which it is operationally deployed. As pointed out above, however, a build-down of heavy bombers is only acceptable on an accountable basis. Using accountable numbers would also reduce the necessity for on site cooperative measures to insure verification.

Ballistic Missile Warhead Floor. The simple build-down concept as proposed in the Senate resolution does not identify a warhead floor. If modernization proceeded indefinitely, the strategic force levels would eventually reach zero. Therefore, the absence of a floor would limit the extent to which modernization could be carried out, assuming the US wished to retain some minimum warhead level.

Thus, a warhead floor (e.g., 5000) is a critical and essential element that must be adopted with any build-down proposal. When that floor is reached, the build-down requirement would end and the floor would become a ceiling. Thereafter, one could modernize on a 1 for 1 basis. Reductions below the ceiling would be subject to follow-on negotiations.

Qualitative Controls. The lack of qualitative controls in a build-down scheme could exacerbate force asymmetries because the concept does not account for different weapons types. For example, warheads on SS-18s would be counted no differently than smaller, less accurate warheads on SLBMs. As a result, there is nothing inherent in a simple build-down which automatically reduces destabilizing systems more quickly than other systems, or reduces the overall destructive potential of a side's arsenal. Under a simple build-down, a single very large warhead could replace two much smaller warheads on MIRVed systems. If it were

* Maximum number of warheads flight tested on a missile of a given type (except for MM III).

important to limit ICBMs, heavy missiles, medium ICBMs, or throw-weight, additional build-down constraints would be necessary.

The problem of controlling types of systems to be reduced can be resolved in several ways. Several different packages of constraints are currently being considered for the US START proposal. Any of these packages might be combined with a build-down and could provide the necessary additional constraints to insure adequate qualitative controls.

Build-down Ratio. The ratio which determines the rate at which old weapons are being retired for new ones is closely related to other variables:

- Starting warhead levels (both sides are increasing their warhead levels as they modernize, even though constraining launcher levels as a result of "no undercut" policies).
 - The weapons floor (level at which build-down terminates).
 - The interval between the starting date and the date the floor is reached.
-
- Planned modernization (new warheads) programmed over the specified period.
 - The choice of counting rules: accountable or deployed.
 - Any other START constraints.

When all the variables except the build-down ratio have been fixed (e.g., warhead level, build-down interval, modernization requirements, etc.), a build-down ratio would then be established. This is the only approach which has yet been examined in detail. Alternatively, the ratio could be arbitrarily selected (e.g., 2 for 1), with other variables changed as necessary to protect our modernization program. The weapons floor (5000 RVs) and planned modernization program are not variables that the US would wish to alter. However, it might be possible to alter the interval between starting date and the date the floor is reached. A build-down ratio of 3 for 2 instead of 2 for 1 might also be feasible. Neither of these alternative approaches have been analyzed in detail and should not yet be considered acceptable.

An additional complication exists in negotiating a ratio acceptable to both sides. Although modernization plans of the

Soviet Union are only projections, they are significantly different from ours. If a starting date, floor and interval are successfully negotiated with the Soviets, the build-down ratios that permit each side to continue programmed modernization would have to be different for the end result to be equal, since each side's programs introduce different numbers of new weapons at different times. Thus, it could be difficult to agree on the same mutually acceptable build-down ratio on this basis.

Before selecting a specific build-down ratio, one must also consider not only the degree of flexibility which might be desirable to allow possible changes in future force structures, but also the flexibility required to accommodate the inevitable changes which would result from the negotiating process.

As indicated in the President's letter of May Twelfth, the appropriate use of variable ratios would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems. For example, a lower build-down ratio could be applied to bombers than to ballistic missiles. The magnitude of this difference could also reflect other factors, such as unconstrained Soviet air defenses. On the other hand, the use of different build-down ratios for the different components of our strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers) could penalize the possibility of improving one component by reductions in another component.

IV. Provisional Cases Studied and Effect on US programs.

As noted earlier, no build-down proposal can assume a common rate of US and Soviet strategic modernization. Respective modernization rates will differ in the future and given the greater need for US modernization, the Soviets could reduce forces at a lower rate.

Some preliminary analysis has been performed of the compatibility of a build-down approach with presently planned US force modernization programs. This analysis rests on a number of specific assumptions about the factors already identified (starting ballistic missile warhead level, ballistic missile warhead floor, deployed ballistic missile limit, and drawdown period) that would critically affect the compatibility of a given build-down ratio with US programs. For each case studied, the US modernization program was assumed to be a given. Changes in any of these assumptions would change the results presented below. It should be noted that the analysis did not include other constraints in our present START proposal, such as sub-limits on ICBM warheads and heavy and medium ICBMs. It should be stressed that none of these cases has been analyzed to the point where it is ready for decision.

What follows in approaches A and B is a schedule of reductions calculated on the US rate of strategic modernization over an 8 year period and down to a level of 5000 warheads. On this basis, we conclude that a build-down ratio of about 1.9 to 1 on a deployed basis and 2 to 1 on an accountable basis, and keyed to the implementation of the US modernization program, would be acceptable. To reduce to 5000 warheads in 8 years, the Soviets would have to apply a higher build-down ratio because they start from a higher numerical base. Thus, were the Soviet Union to accept a floor of 5000, it might then place the US in the uncomfortable position of having to reject a Soviet proposal for a higher build-down ratio.

A. Build-down calculated on deployed ballistic missile warheads.

Given a ballistic missile warhead floor of 5000, a starting date of January 1985 and an eight-year build-down period, a build-down ratio of about 1.9 to 1 would accommodate both planned US force modernization and the deployment of 100 small missiles in 1993 (with room for 300 to 350 more following the termination of the build-down).

B. Build-down calculated on accountable ballistic missile warheads.

Given a ballistic missile warhead floor of 5000, a starting date of January 1985, and an eight-year build-down period, a build-down ratio of 2 for 1 would be compatible with planned US modernization programs. The 2 to 1 ratio (vice the 1.9 to 1 in A) is acceptable here because accountable numbers permit a higher starting base.

C. Build-down calculated on accountable bomber platforms.

Given an internal minimum floor of 350 bomber platforms (we have proposed a limit of 400 to the Soviet Union in the START negotiations), a 2 for 1 build-down ratio would accommodate planned US bomber force modernization.

D. Observations.

There are both positive and negative features associated with these approaches. On the positive side, since the numerical values selected for approaches A, B, and C above (5000 warheads, 8 year drawdown period, 400 heavy bombers)

coincide with those of the current US START proposal, these particular approaches are conceptually consistent with our existing START proposal. Also, combining the approaches outlined in A and C or B and C above would not adversely affect US modernization.

On the negative side, there are a number of significant problems associated with each of these approaches. First, none is likely to be acceptable to the Soviets. Second, the build-down ratios presented above oblige us to hold all the other variables constant. The approaches allow little flexibility in the negotiating process or for possible changes in future modernization programs. Third, combining approaches A and C is inconsistent since it would use accountable numbers for bomber platforms but deployed numbers for missile warheads. Combining approaches A and B, (using accountable numbers for both bomber platforms and ballistic missile warheads), on the other hand, might be seen as inconsistent with our present START approach which seeks to focus on deployed numbers. Finally, any build-down which focused only on reducing to 5000 warheads in a fixed period, and ignored other essential objectives of our START proposal, would not achieve our overall strategic goals in START.

Certification of Military Sufficiency. The forces associated with any build-down initiative must be analyzed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and certified by them as sufficient to meet military objectives.

V. Possible Soviet Reactions to the Nunn-Cohen Build-Down Concept.

OVERVIEW:

With the U.S. media attention that the build-down concept has received over the last two months, the Soviets understand our present interest in it. They would clearly interpret U.S. motivations in proposing a build-down as political and would recognize the important role the build-down plays in dampening freeze sentiment and marshalling support in Congress for Administration arms control policy, MX, and the defense budget more generally. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Soviets would either accept or reject a U.S. build-down proposal outright. A more probable Soviet response to a U.S. build-down proposal would be to try to exploit the general concept within START and in the larger political arena, to promote their own START negotiating position and strategic objectives more generally. Specifically, the Soviets might seize that part of a

U.S. build-down proposal that caps the number of strategic nuclear warheads, call it a freeze, and offer to proceed with their own START proposals. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviets may table either their own build-down concept or embrace the Nunn-Cohen proposal to gain the initiative in the negotiations.

Although the Soviets clearly want to restrict U.S. strategic modernization, it is unlikely that they would accept the build-down as an interim restraint measure on any basis that would be acceptable to us. It is possible that the Soviets would agree to some type of build-down as a mechanism for accomplishing the reductions required in a negotiated START agreement. However, they likely would only do this well after the immediate U.S. political need for it had passed, and then only in return for appropriate U.S. concessions.

The Soviets in theory probably would not be averse to the "build-down" concept if they could develop it to reflect their arms control goals. Their own START Treaty draft of March 1983 sets forth a staged schedule for reductions of the total number of nuclear warheads and bombs carried on all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Some Soviets have explored the idea of "de-MIRVing" and other ideas drawn from the Scowcroft Commission Report in informal and unofficial forums outside of START with U.S. counterparts. Moreover, the Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the unratified SALT II Treaty, which the Soviets agreed to, made clear that the provisions to be developed in the SCC for arms ceasing to be subject to the Treaty's limitations should include procedures for converting ICBM and SLBM launchers from launchers of MIRVed missiles to launchers of non-MIRVed missiles.

The Soviets, however, have long held that the U.S. possesses a larger number of total deliverable warheads--ballistic missile reentry vehicles (RVs), nuclear bombs, and cruise missiles --than the USSR. They have consistently linked the establishment of any warhead limits for ICBMs and SLBMs to restrictions on cruise missiles and their carriers, and have argued that the distinction that the U.S. has drawn between limiting ballistic missiles and their warheads immediately, and aircraft and cruise missiles in the future, is artificial and self-serving. Their current START proposal, which presumes a ban on all long-range cruise missiles, implies a method of counting other bomber armament.

Equality. If Soviet analysis of a U.S. build-down proposal suggests to them that the proposal would have the effect of requiring them to reduce their heavy or "medium" ICBM force

without significant concessions from the U.S., then Moscow will not respond favorably.

Aggregation. The Soviets would probably interpret the proposal in a way that would count bombs and cruise and ballistic warheads equally. They have long maintained that the U.S. proposal for two phases, in which limits on cruise missiles were postponed, is not an acceptable basis for negotiations.

Weapon Floor. A U.S. proposal that specified limits markedly inconsistent with the provisions of the Soviet START proposal would probably not be received favorably. The Soviet assessment of the number of warheads that they would need would be driven by their perception of the threat posed by U.S. force modernization programs (including possible basing modes for new U.S. missiles and the fractionation that the U.S. is considering).

Miscellaneous. The Soviets would probably respond negatively to any variable ratio scheme which they perceived, through their own analysis, as having an unfavorable and one-sided impact on their forces. The Soviets would also probably never enter into such a scheme without mutual agreement on a weapons floor.

1.4(c)



Forces Considerations. We believe the build-down proposal

as advanced by Senators Nunn and Cohen (though offering the Soviets some advantages vis-a-vis the U.S.) would require the Soviets to considerably alter what we believe to be their planned strategic forces. This concept was raised by the Soviets in past arms control negotiations and used as one of the primary arguments against U.S. START proposals. As such, we believe the Soviets will be reluctant to accept the build-down proposal. However, the Soviets might table a build-down proposal of their own if they see it is to their advantage.

ICBMs are the mainstay of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, constituting more than one-half of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and three-fourths of the nuclear warheads. Almost the entire currently deployed fourth generation of Soviet ICBMs is MIRVed. The build-down concept, however, to assure a survivable force would require deployment of a new, single-warhead, probable mobile force. Additionally, we believe that they are developing, and intend to deploy, additional versions of ~~the currently deployed SS-18s and SS-19s, and 10-warhead SS-X-24,~~ as well as a mobile variant of the single-warhead PL-5. The Soviets currently have roughly 6,000 warheads in their ICBM force.

VI. Minimum Requirements for any Build-Down Approach

Study of the build-down concept to date has shown that there are a number of interrelated variables which affect the desirability of any build-down approach. It, therefore, is not possible either to support or reject any specific build-down ratio in isolation from the other considerations identified earlier in this paper. In addition, IG study has identified a number of required features that any build-down approach must contain.

1. Floor. A build-down must have a weapons floor. This floor or floors would apply to whatever weapons are covered by the build-down, such as ballistic missile RVs, bomber platforms, etc. Once this floor is reached, the build-down ratio must become 1:1 unless a lower floor can be certified. To date this requirement has been generally accepted by most build-down supporters on the Hill.

2. Equality. Any build-down must permit the preservation of at least approximate equality during -- and after -- the build-down period. Several ways of accomplishing this are currently being examined.

3. Verifiability. Any build-down approach must be verifiable. At a minimum this would probably require a set of agreed counting rules and definition of modernization for missile

warheads.

4. Consistency with START. It is imperative that whatever build-down approach we might seek in the START negotiations be fully consistent with our START position. This would require, inter alia, that we keep ballistic missiles and bombers separate, that our counting rules be consistent, and that the reduction objectives be the same or at least not inconsistent, e.g., warhead floor no lower than 5000, bomber floor no lower than 350 (400 has been proposed in Geneva).

5. Accountable Bombers. If bombers are included in a build-down, SALT-accountable bombers, including mothballed ones must be included. With the retirement of the B-52D's, the U.S. is already below the long-term desired level for bombers.

6. Modernization. To be acceptable, any build-down must be part of a comprehensive mutual agreement to reduce strategic forces and not based solely on modernization. This is because ~~respective US and Soviet rates of modernization will be different and in the latter case because we cannot know with any certainty what Soviet modernization plans are.~~

VII. Issues for Further Study.

This paper is necessarily only a first step in analyzing the build-down concept. However,, the work accomplished to date has identified three broad areas requiring further study: specific build-down alternatives, broader build-down issues, and build-down modalities. These are discussed briefly below.

A. Build-Down Alternatives

A number of possible build-down approaches have been identified for possible further study, and it is expected that more will be identified over the next several weeks. Once again, it should be noted that none of these approaches can depend solely upon rates of modernization.

1. Percentage annual reduction in ballistic missile warheads and bomber platforms.

This approach would drop the explicit link between reductions and modernization and would make reductions depend only upon the calendar. Preliminary work has been done on this approach, and it has been found that a 5% figure applied to both sides would be similar to the reductions schedule which we have proposed to the

Soviets in START. It does not link reductions to modernization, a linkage which some build-down supporters strongly seek, but it would, unlike the original build-down proposal, guarantee reductions if accepted. Some type of modernization constraints could be added if needed to offset this "delinkage."

2. 3 for 2 build-down for missile warheads only, based on either operational or accountable loadings.
3. 3 for 2 build-down for SLBM warheads and 2 for 1 for ICBM warheads based on either operational or accountable loadings.

This would incorporate the variable ratio concept referred to in the President's letters to Sens. Cohen, Nunn, and Percy. This could complicate our plans for MX deployment, however.

4. 2 for 1 build-down for warheads, 1 for 1 for bombers (where all B-52D's are counted whether retired or not).

5. Differing reduction ratios.

This approach would establish a 2 for 1 reduction ratio for US SLBM and Soviet ICBM warheads, and 3 to 2 for US ICBM and Soviet SLBM warheads. This recognizes that under the US START proposal we will be reducing more SLBM warheads than ICBM warheads and would encourage the Soviets to shift to SLBMs. On the other hand, it could undercut some of our arguments in START about stabilizing and destabilizing systems, since we would in effect be encouraging ourselves to shift to ICBMs.

6. 1 for 1 cap on ballistic missile RVs.
7. Build-down based on launchers.
8. 2 for 1, or 3 for 2, build-down based on either operational or accountable missile loadings but include bomber weapons on an accountable basis.

This approach would pose major problems for our current START position, which seeks to avoid numerical limits on bomber weapons.

9. Build-down of MIRVed ICBMs.

This approach would require that two MIRVed ICBMs be dismantled for each new one deployed. This would support the thrust of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and would be

consistent with our MX plans.

Broader Build-Down Issues.

1. Definition of a new weapon.

The question of exactly what constitutes a "modernized" weapon (or a "newly deployed nuclear warhead", using the language of S.Res 57) will be a complex matter of definition and negotiation. Specific guidelines will have to be established. Examples of the problems raised are:

- If a Trident I SLBM were moved from a Poseidon boat to a new Trident boat, would this count as the deployment of a new weapon?
- If an existing Mk-12A were moved from a Minuteman III to a new MX, would this count as deployment of a new warhead? What about replacing Mk-12's with Mk-12A's?

- If the Soviets replaced warheads on existing missiles, such as an SS-18/Mod 3 with an SS-18/Mod 4, would this count as deployment of new warheads?
- What if new SRAM's or gravity bombs replace old ones on B-52's?
- What are the verification implications of monitoring missile warhead modifications?

2. Negotiability problems.

Attempting to reach agreement on at least five variables that affect the acceptability of a build-down, when a change in any one would necessitate change in the others, would pose enormous difficulties for the negotiators. Each change in one key variable would send us (not to mention the Soviets) back to the drawing board. The problems encountered to date in deciding within the US government what the effects of the build-down concept would be amply illustrate the negotiating difficulties that require further study.

- 3. Should accountable or deployed figures be used for warheads?
- 4. How should SLCM be handled?

SLCM poses important difficulties to any build-down approach,

as well as to START more generally. Even if we determined a way to account for nuclear SLCMs only, the introduction of 758 such SLCMs, which are not included in our SIOP plans, would require the removal of perhaps twice as many SIOP-committed weapons. If no acceptable way were found to distinguish non-nuclear from nuclear SLCM, under a 2 for 1 build-down the US would have to destroy virtually our entire strategic force just to accommodate them.

5. How do Soviet air-defenses relate to US bomber modernization and the build-down?
6. How would various build-down starting dates and the resulting changes in force structure affect the acceptability of build-down approaches?

Build-Down Modalities.

One important aspect of the build-down question is whether to incorporate a build-down proposal directly into our START position or to seek to reach a more limited interim agreement separate from a START treaty. In the latter case, the separate agreement would presumably still be negotiated by the START Delegation in Geneva. There are two broad alternatives:

1. Incorporate Build-Down Into our START Position.

This approach would provide a potentially suitable mechanism to achieve the reductions that would be part of such an agreement. This alternative need not interrupt our ability to reach a broad-based START agreement. This also would facilitate greater consistency between our START and build-down positions. On the other hand, build-down sponsors have expressed some opposition to this type of approach and are looking for something that would achieve reductions sooner than what they fear might be several years before a START agreement.

2. Negotiate Build-Down as a Separate Agreement.

Some of the build-down sponsors regard the build-down concept as an interim measure which could operate until a START agreement was concluded. A separate interim agreement would thus respond to this segment of Hill sentiment but at the cost of diverting negotiations on a complete START agreement. The Soviets would have no incentive to help us with our political problems by reaching an early build-down agreement that would be consistent with our security requirements.

It would also give the Soviets the perfect vehicle for delay in START, which may be their objective in START until they have a clearer picture of the INF outcome. The Soviets could also turn our equality arguments back on us by proposing something similar to the original Senate build-down proposal, which would include bomber weapons, a long-time goal of theirs. They also would argue publicly that it was inconsistent to propose a build-down from present levels on the one hand but reject a freeze at current levels on the other. Finally, from our own domestic bureaucratic point of view, getting agreement on the elements of a separate build-down proposal would be a difficult task at a time when we have much work remaining on START.

VIII. Features that Should not be Part of a Build-Down Proposal.

From its assessment to date, the IG finds the following elements to be unacceptable based on our national security requirements:

- ~~Any build-down that has no floors on warheads and bombers;~~ without such floors, we either would be driven below weapons levels needed to meet our nuclear targeting requirements or would be forced to retain aging and/or vulnerable weapons.
- Any build-down that uses only operational bombers.
- Any build-down that does not guarantee mutual reductions and does not prevent large force asymmetries from resulting.

IX. Recommended Congressional and Public Stance.

The Administration posture on the build-down to date has been to praise the build-down's recognition of the need for both modernization and reductions, acknowledge the potential utility of a build-down concept if implemented flexibly, and emphasize some of the ambiguities and problems with S. Res. 57, as well as with implementing the concept.

In addition to our current public posture, we should consider striking the following additional themes:

- The build-down concept is being intensively studied.
- Our study to date continues to confirm the need for modernization as we pursue reductions. Our START proposal

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lends itself to this concept.

- We are developing a number of criteria which should guide our assessment of any build-down approach.

With regard to the Congress, we should strive to advance our work to the point where we could provide a preliminary briefing to the Congress before the August recess.

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