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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re: U.S. policy (17pp) Part 12/9/05 M04020 #1 (Dupe)	n.d.	P-1, P-5
2. draft	treaty (12pp) R 11/9/05 M0346 #13	6/3/83	P-1
3. paper	re: background (2pp) R n #14	n.d.	P-1
letter case (8390701)			
4. memo	from S. Kraemer/R. Linhard to W. Clark re: NSC meeting (1p) M 11/09/05 M1346 #15	6/6/83	P-1, P-5
5. memo	from R. Kimmitt to D. Gregg, et al. re: NSC meeting (2pp)	6/6/83	P-1
6. paper	re: issues for discussion (9pp) R n #16	5/28/83	P-1, P-5
7. chart	(1p) R - #17	n.d.	P-1, P-5
8. draft	treaty (12pp) R n #18	6/3/83	P-1
	R n #19		
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FILE FOLDER: NSC 00081 07Jun83 [2 of 5] Box 91285			12/9/94

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File Folder NSC 00081 07 JUN 83 (2 OF 5)

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	PAPiR	US POLICY (M04 020 #1 DUPE)	17	ND
		<i>mva 3/25/08</i>		
4	HiHO	KIV\W.4iR/LI;)t.liARD-TO-CLARK-(M1346 #15)	1	676/1983
		<i>ffv/ M 3j&>s/01</i>		
6	MYER	START ISSUES (FIRST 9 PAGES SAME AS M1346 #10) M1346 #17	9	Sf28{1983
		<i>mva 3/25/08</i>		
1	CHART	CHART	1	ND
		<i>mva 3/25/08</i>		

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letter case (8290701)			
1. memo	from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer re: NSC meeting (1p) <i>R 11/09/05 M1346 #20</i>	6/6/83	P-1
2. memo	from W. Clark to the President re: NSC meeting (1p) <i>R ~ #21</i>	6/4/83	P-1
3. paper	re: U.S. Policy (17pp) <i>Part 12/19/05 M04-020 #1</i>	n.d.	P-1, P-5
4. memo	from B. Linhard/S. Kraemer re: NSC meeting (1p) <i>R 11/09/05 M1346 #23</i>	6/2/83	P-1
5. paper	re: talking points (8pp) <i>R ~ #24</i>	n.d.	P-1, P-5
6. paper	re: issues for discussion with charts (18pp) <i>R ~ #25</i>	5/28/83	P-1, P-5
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FOIA

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3 PAPER	US POLICY (M04 020 #1)	17	ND
5 PAPER	TALKING POINTS (M1346 #24)	8	ND
6 PAPER	ISSUES FOR DECISION SAME AS M1346 #10 (M1346 #25)	18	5/28/1983

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 9-701

JUN 0 6 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
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Bud McFarlane	_____	m	AL
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
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Sit Room	_____	_____	_____


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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER/ROBERT LINHARD ^{SK} *RL*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START -- Tuesday, June 7, 1983,
9:30 A.M.

BY *CLL*, NARA, DATE *11/09/05*
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MISPL #15

Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memorandum to the President summarizing the agenda and issues for the June 7 NSC meeting on START and forwarding the relevant IG papers and other appropriate attachments.

Following the morning's NSC meeting, we will prepare appropriate alternative Decision Directives for the President's consideration. In view of the Congressional consultations meetings scheduled for the same afternoon, and the Congressional leadership meeting scheduled for the next morning, we believe it important that no decisions be announced at the NSC meeting, and that the decision packages receive careful highest-level consideration prior to any announcement or summation of decisions at the Congressional leadership meeting.

We have not yet received the draft being prepared by ACDA (Joe Lehman) of a possible Presidential statement to be made some time after the NSC meeting, but we will work on such a statement as soon as it becomes available.

RL
Ron Lehman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached package and sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the package to the President.

Approve *RL* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
 - A Agenda
 - B Proposed Talking Points for NSC Discussion
 - C June 1 NSC Staff Briefing Talking Points
 - D START IG Paper on Scowcroft Commission Issues
 - E GAC Chairman's Letter to President
 - F Scowcroft Commission Recommendation on Arms Control
 - G START IG Paper on Build-Down
 - H President's Letter to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy
 - I Proposed Draft Text of a START Treaty

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June 6, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United States
Representative to the United
Nations

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Colonel George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
The Pentagon

Lieutenant Colonel W. Richard Higgins
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Dr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Joseph Presel
Executive Assistant
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Ambassador Edward Rowny
Chief Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START -- Tuesday, June 7, 1983 (S)

On June 3rd the papers supporting the NSC meeting on START scheduled for Tuesday, June 7th at 9:30 a.m. in the White House Cabinet room, were circulated. Attached (Tab A) is a revised version of one of these papers, the paper entitled START Issues for Decision. The only change is a brief reference (on Page 7) to the phasing issue. The second paper distributed on June 3rd, a paper entitled Approach to Handling Build-down, remains unchanged. (S)

Also attached (Tab B) is an interagency approved draft START Treaty Text. The draft text will be modified on the basis of the decisions made at the NSC meeting. The draft text itself will not be discussed at the meeting but it is provided for the information of those principals attending the meeting. (S)


Robert M. Kimmitt DEPUTY
Executive Secretary

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Attachments

Tab A Revised START Issues for Decision (S)
Tab B Draft START Treaty Text (S)

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May 28, 1983

START ISSUES FOR DECISION

Background

The START negotiations resume on June 8. During the last round, the US presented proposals for limiting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), tabled a draft treaty on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a document outlining the US "Basic Elements" of a START agreement. The basic framework of the US position remained as it had been presented in the summer of 1982.

The Soviets contended that US proposals would "emasculate" the Soviet ICBM force while permitting US modernization programs to proceed. They stated that the US proposal was not an acceptable basis for negotiation. They also rejected the idea of a separate agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs). They tabled a draft treaty based largely on SALT II, but with a 28 percent reduction in strategic delivery vehicles from the Soviet level at the time SALT II was signed, about 2500, to 1800. They say they are prepared to accept significant cuts in warheads but only in the context of combining ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons in a single category. In short, the Soviets demonstrated no inclination to move the talks forward.

The US Delegation's view is that the Soviets apparently regard our present START proposal, particularly those aspects dealing with ICBM force restructuring, as unacceptable. They argue that our proposal is designed not to promote stability and equality, but to obtain strategic advantages for the US. We would expect the Soviets to continue dismissing our proposal in its present form.

The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission have stimulated considerable interest, both in the Congress and within the Administration, in reassessing our START position. Key members of Congress have made their support for MX contingent on modifications to our START proposal, and the President wrote to several Congressmen that we are now considering modifications to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

State, ACDA and the START negotiator believe that we should now alter our START proposal--not only to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for a modified approach and to respond to Congressional pressures, but also to improve prospects for productive negotiations. Moreover, there is agreement (except for JCS) that we move away from the ceiling of 850 deployed missiles.

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Some believe we need to make changes now to our position that will bring us close to our final position. Others believe that our position now should retain considerable room for further bargaining.

Issues

There are two principal issues. One is the extent to which we seek to reduce Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight--that is, should we seek (a) the level that is our goal for the second phase of the negotiations (1.9 million kilograms), or (b) the level that would result from our current proposal for the first phase (2.5 million kilograms), or (c) a higher level? The other issue is whether throw-weight should be constrained directly, or indirectly through collateral constraints. Our current position calls for indirect limits on throw-weight (i.e., sub-ceilings on heavy and medium ICBMs) in Phase I and direct limits (i.e., an aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight ceiling) in Phase II. Our current Phase I proposal was designed to achieve a goal of reduction in Soviet throw-weight of 55 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

One approach would seek a direct limit on throw-weight. The collateral constraints and the limit on deployed ballistic missiles would be dropped (leaving ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight as our two units of account). We would propose a direct throw-weight level (2.0 - 2.5 million kilograms) aimed at obtaining the large-scale reduction in Soviet throw-weight that our current proposal is designed to achieve.

An alternative approach would achieve throw-weight reductions indirectly as a consequence of reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads, and other collateral constraints (leaving deployed ballistic missiles and their warheads as the two units of account). Our current proposed limits on heavy and medium ICBMs could be replaced by other collateral constraints. Under this approach, Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would likely be about 3.0 million kilograms, about 46 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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The following sections discuss the main questions involved in modifying the US START position: whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed missiles, raise it, or drop it; what level we should propose for throw-weight limits; and whether to limit throw-weight directly or indirectly. Following that discussion are packages supported by various Agencies for a modified START position, accompanied by arguments for each package.

Finally, as an alternative to those packages, we could consider modifying the current position to the minimum extent necessary to reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft report. This would require, at a minimum, a decision now on whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it altogether. State, ACDA and the START negotiator recommend more basic changes to our position for substantive, political, and negotiating reasons.

I. Should we retain the limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it?

The report of the Scowcroft Commission states that arms control agreements should encourage deployment of small, single-warhead ICBMs. "This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments."

The report states that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles "should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution towards small, single warhead ICBMs". The report does not make any recommendation whether or not to drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

1. Retain the 850 ceiling

The number of small ICBMs the United States might want to deploy would depend on the deployment mode chosen, cost, survivability, Congressional support, and the constraints on the number of Soviet warheads, and is, therefore, difficult to predict. Retention of the 850 limit would limit us to a deployment of no more than about 300 small, single warhead ICBMs

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in addition to 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs and planned SLBMs. This would appear inconsistent with the Commission's recommendation to promote a long-term evolution away from large highly fractionated ICBMs.

The JCS believes that it is not clear at this point whether the US need for small ICBMs will require an increase in the 850 deployed ballistic missile ceiling. Some believe that retaining the 850 limit may give us all the force structuring flexibility we need during the next decade since, in the context of US deployment of 100 MX under a ceiling of 5000 missile warheads, we are unlikely to deploy significantly more than 850 ballistic missiles. The Soviets, on the other hand, with a modern, single RV missile beginning flight testing are better placed over the next decade than we are to exploit the possibilities of large numbers of single RV ICBMs, which would increase their advantage in force survivability. The US could also pay a political price if the 850 limit is dropped since substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles are a prominent, popular, and readily understandable element of the US position. Finally, in view of Soviet stalling in Geneva, some would argue that the appropriate US negotiating response is to hold to our current position and not make modifications which could be considered movement toward the Soviet position.

2. Raise the ceiling on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would retain a limit on deployed ballistic missiles but raise it to provide more headroom for large numbers of small missiles. The ceiling could be: between 1050 and 1250; 1450 (which corresponds roughly to the number of deployed missiles the United States would have under the Soviet proposal); or 1600 (the current number of US deployed ballistic missiles). The representative limits cited above could permit from 500 to more than 1100 small missiles, depending on the limit chosen, the number of Peacekeeper ICBMs deployed, and the size of the US SLBM force.

Raising the limit would respond to the Scowcroft Commission's report by making room in our START proposal for the evolution to small, single warhead ICBMs. A level could be chosen with sufficient "headroom" to give us considerable force structuring flexibility in the future. At the same time, retaining a ceiling on missiles would avoid the potential political liability of appearing to abandon constraints in a category of strategic capability (i.e., missiles) that has

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-5-

previously been subject to constraints and that some still consider significant. It would also have the negotiating advantage of moving us closer to the Soviet proposal of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

One disadvantage of raising the limit is that this may appear contrary to our objective of deep reductions. In addition, the Scowcroft Commission report argued against reductions in the number of deployed missiles, and cited the negative aspects of relying on such limits in past agreements.

3. Drop limits on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would have flexibility to deploy a larger number of small ICBMs within the constraints on warhead numbers and destructive potential.

This approach would encourage an evolution in both the US and the USSR to smaller missiles and would provide substantial flexibility to exploit the advantages of small missiles to enhance survivability and stability. The START agreement would focus primarily on broad measures of capability (warheads and throw-weight). The Scowcroft Commission report makes clear the drawbacks of use of launcher limits in past agreements--i.e., agreements that rely primarily on launcher limits create incentives for large, highly fractionated missiles. Some believe this option corresponds most closely to the approach advocated in the Scowcroft Commission's report as more likely to be practical, stabilizing, and lasting than constraints on force structures. They believe that dropping limits on deployed missiles could be useful in obtaining Congressional support for the development, production and deployment of the Peacekeeper and a small ICBM.

Dropping the limits on deployed missiles would emphasize the limits on warheads and destructive potential, but could lead to increased pressure to limit bomber weapons, which would not be in the US interest. In addition, if the Soviets deploy a large number of missiles and missile launchers, this could provide a potential to deploy additional warheads.

II. What throw-weight level should we seek?

Our current proposal seeks to substantially reduce Soviet missile throw-weight in phase I indirectly to about 2.5 million

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kilograms through the limit of 5000 missile warheads, the sub-ceiling of 2500 ICBM warheads and a limit of 210 medium and heavy ICBMs of which no more than 110 could be heavy ICBMs. In Phase II Soviet missile throw-weight would be further reduced to a direct ceiling of 1.9 million kilograms. Since the US throw-weight level is currently at 1.9 million kilograms, and the Soviet level is at about 5.6 million kilograms, any throw-weight level which exceeds the US current level would require the Soviets to reduce unilaterally.

There are three options:

(1) A level of 2.0 million kilograms (64 percent below the estimated current Soviet level but above the US level) would be consistent with our proposal for the second phase. We could argue that we were accelerating achievement of what has always been our ultimate goal. A proposal for a low ceiling now could give us bargaining room.

(2) A ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms (55 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would be roughly equivalent to our current proposal for the first phase, and would allow both sides somewhat greater flexibility to structure forces. It is the level the US has proposed in conjunction with the ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads.

(3) Constraints that could result in about 3.0 million kilograms (46 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would permit the Soviets greater force structure flexibility than the other options, and hence such a throw-weight level could be more likely to lead to an agreement.

The illustrative force tables for the options describe representative Soviet forces for each of these levels. While all the options limit the Soviets to 5000 warheads, the higher the throw-weight, the larger could be the size and explosive power of Soviet warheads, and the greater could be the Soviet potential to deploy additional warheads.

III. Should we seek direct or indirect limits on throw-weight?

The Scowcroft Commission report does not explicitly address this question. It does state that simple aggregate limits "are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization." Constraints on large missiles, however, would not be inconsistent with the Commission's emphasis on small missiles.

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The principal advantage of a direct throw-weight limit is that it would give each side more flexibility to structure its forces within the limit. It would directly constrain the overall potential of each side's missile forces, without dictating a particular force structure. This would undercut the Soviet complaint that our indirect throw-weight limits through medium and heavy ICBM constraints would require them to rebuild according to "US standards". Some believe that combining warhead and throw-weight ceilings would be the most straightforward way to constrain the sides to equal numbers of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. A direct limit would preclude growth in Soviet throw-weight that an indirect limit might permit if the Soviets chose to maximize throw-weight within the constraints. The Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets are likely not to maximize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces.

Some believe the principal drawback to a direct limit on throw-weight is that (depending on the level) it would undercut chances for an agreement, and as an initial objective could be perceived as a hardening of our position and a step away from achieving an agreement. Moreover, they believe the Soviets are less likely to accept throw-weight as a unit of account for START than collateral constraints. Some believe the level of throw-weight is not as significant a measure of military potential as warheads, and should not be assigned the same priority in our START proposal. Additionally, some believe that direct limits on throw-weight cannot be adequately verified. Others point out that indirect limits also require verification of the throw-weight of Soviet missiles.

IV. Other Issues

1. Phasing. The current US proposal would reduce Soviet throw-weight indirectly in Phase I, and would place a lower direct ceiling on throw-weight in Phase II. The packages proposed by State, ACDA, and the START Negotiator would combine the current two-phased approach into a single phase.*

* OSD position to be provided.

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-8-

2. Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Our current position is to accept in Phase II a ceiling of 28 on the average number of ALCMs on heavy bombers, with a limit of 20 on the number of ALCMs on existing types of heavy bombers. One of the packages presented below recommends proposing a maximum limit of 20 for all heavy bombers (not just existing types) on the basis that (1) there are no projected US requirements for a bomber to carry more than 20 ALCMs, and (2) to counter the Soviet criticism that our present position would permit 11,000 ALCMs, a level we do not require. The other packages retain our existing position on ALCMs.

3. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). Our current position does not contain limits on SLCMs. The current guidance to the Delegation instructs the Delegation to respond to any Soviet proposals to limit SLCMs by soliciting Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. Two of the packages presented below refer to limits on the number of SLCM platforms; the others do not address SLCMs.

4. Modernization constraints. Our current position contains a number of modernization constraints: limits on ICBM and SLBM fractionation, limits on the weight of re-entry vehicles on new types of missiles, and a ban on new heavy missiles. Our current proposal does not include limits on the number of new types of missiles. One of the packages proposes banning new types of heavy and medium ICBMs and restricting new types of light ICBMs to a single warhead during the first ten years of START. (The Peacekeeper and the SS-X-24 ICBMs would be permitted as existing types.) Other packages do not require limits on the number of new types of missiles.

5. Draft treaty. At the end of the last round, all Washington Agencies agreed in an instruction cable to the US START Delegation that we should be in a position to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The Soviets, for their part, tabled a draft treaty during Round III and, in the inter-round period, they have sought to make propaganda mileage by false charges that the US refused to discuss treaty language with them. In order to deprive the Soviets of this propaganda advantage and to further the negotiations by putting the US position on the table in a unified fashion, the US Delegation believes it should be

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-9-

authorized to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The START Delegation will incorporate changes to the US position arising from NSC decisions into the current draft text. The Delegation will send this revised draft back to Washington for prompt consideration by the US Government.

V. Packages

The following packages would: (a) retain our goal of a ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, (b) make no change in our proposal to limit heavy bombers, and (c) combine the phases of our current proposal. In addition, none of the packages would retain the current proposal's sub-limit of 2500 ICBM warheads or the Phase II ban on all heavy missiles.

The packages differ in: (a) the throw-weight level they seek; (b) the way throw-weight is constrained; (c) whether the number of deployed missiles is limited; (d) the limits on ALCMs; and, (e) whether to seek platform limits on SLCMs.

OSD and JCS will provide packages at a later date.

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LIMITS	CURRENT POSITION	REVISED POSITION			
		STATE	OSD	ACDA	START NEGOTIATOR
Missile Warheads	5000	5000	TO BE PROVIDED	5000	
Heavy Bombers	350	350		350	
Deployed Missiles	850	1150		No limit	
Throw-weight	Phase I: 110/210 limit on heavy and medium ICBMs. 2.5 million kg of Soviet throw-weight as a goal Phase II: Direct limit of 1.9 million kg of throw-weight	150 heavy ICBMs. Results in about 3.0* million kg of Soviet throw-weight		Direct limit of 2.5 million kg	
ALCMs	Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	20 per heavy bomber		Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	
SLCMs	No limit	Platform limit		No limit	Platform limit
New Types	Ban new types of heavy ICBMs	Ban new types of heavy/medium ICBMs & limit light ICBMs to single RVs		No limit	

TO BE PROVIDED

BY ALS NARA, DATE 4/19/95
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*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize high throw-weight to the detriment of the total force. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

1

1

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating con-
sequences for all mankind,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the
interests of international security require the strengthening of
strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction of strategic
offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will reduce the risk
of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and
security,

Have agreed as follows:

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BY

GS

NARA, DATE

11/09/05

Article I

Each Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, reduce and limit strategic offensive arms and adopt the other measures provided for in this Treaty.

Article II

1. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that [eight] years after that date, and thereafter:

(a) the aggregate number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 5,000;

(b) the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs does not exceed 2,500;

(c) the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 850;

(d) the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs does not exceed 210;

(e) the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs does not exceed 110; and

(f) the number of its heavy bombers does not exceed 400.

2. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit the aggregate number of its ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs, that are not deployed, to ____ percent of the allowed aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.

3. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.

[Article III]*

[1. Beginning on _____, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that ____ years after that date, and thereafter:

(a) all of its heavy ICBMs shall have been destroyed;

(b) the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed ____ kilograms; and

(c) the number of its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) deployed on its heavy bombers does not exceed the product of ____ and the number of its heavy bombers, and the number of ALCMs deployed on any heavy bomber of an existing type does not exceed ____.

2. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.]

* Bracketed pending decision on modification of U.S. position.

Article IV

1. Neither Party shall have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms subject to the provisions of this Treaty in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule, as specified in Annex I of this Treaty.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) convert land-based ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(b) convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(c) develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy ICBMs that can be launched by land-based launchers other than ICBM launchers; nor

(d) develop, produce, test, or deploy land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs that also have the capability of launching ICBMs permitted by this Treaty.

3. Neither Party shall develop, produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of _____ kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles including free floating canister launchers. This Treaty shall

not require changes in current ballistic missile transport practices;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; or

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit, including fractional orbit, nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction.

4. Neither Party shall flight-test or deploy:

(a) ICBMs or ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 10;

(b) SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 14;

(c) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of ____*, with multiple reentry vehicles or with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, the weight of any one of which exceeds 225 kilograms, nor

(d) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of _____*, with a single reentry vehicle, the weight of which exceeds _____ kilograms.

5. Neither Party shall develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs, heavy ASBMs, or heavy ICBMs of types that were not deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty, nor produce or deploy additional such missiles of types that were deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modification, modernization, and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Within the limitations provided for in Articles II and III of this Treaty and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of its forces.

*A date earlier than the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. Each Party shall limit the number of its test and training launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed ____, all of which shall be located at test ranges designated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. ICBM and SLBM launchers at test ranges shall be constructed, converted, or used only for the purpose of testing and training, and not for deployment.

3. Each Party shall limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed ____ . Such missiles shall be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VII

1. ICBMs, SLBMs, ASBMs, and heavy bombers in excess of the limits provided in this Treaty shall be destroyed in accordance with the procedures specified in Annex IV, and shall remain subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they are so destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under the agreed procedures.

2. The Parties may store ___ ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs for use as space launch vehicles at designated space support centers, in accordance with the agreed measures set forth in Annex IV of this Treaty. Such missiles shall not be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VIII

1. Neither Party shall:

(a) develop, test, produce, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers;

(b) provide hardened storage facilities at ICBM launcher deployment areas;

(c) store more than two ICBMs at any ICBM launcher deployment area; or

(d) provide ground-support equipment at any ICBM launcher deployment area in excess of that required for normal deployment and maintenance.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 2 of Article VII and in subparagraph 1 (c) of this Article, each Party shall store all of its ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs, that are not deployed,

at designated storage facilities. Storage facilities for ICBMs that are not deployed shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM launcher deployment area.

3. Neither Party shall conduct training activities or exercises involving the rapid reload or simulated rapid reload of ICBM launchers, nor conduct any other activities or exercises that involve in any other manner rapid reload of any ICBM launcher after it has launched an ICBM.

Article IX

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall implement agreed measures as provided for in Annex IV; in addition, each Party may use national technical means of verification at its disposal, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall interfere with agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or with national technical means of verification.

3. Neither Party shall impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or by national technical means. In this connection, the obligation not to impede includes the obligation not to use concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at

concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

4. The encryption of telemetry on systems subject to the provisions of this Treaty is prohibited.

5. On board engineering test measurements shall be made, and all such measurements shall be broadcast using unencrypted telemetry, during each test flight or training flight of an ICBM, SLBM or ASBM.

Article X

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission, under regulations governing procedures to be agreed between the Parties.

2. The Parties agree that, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, they shall:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide such information as is necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) at least twice annually notify each other of the replacement dismantling, destruction, and conversion of strategic offensive arms performed in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) agree upon further measures contributing to the effectiveness of the verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

3. At least twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain and update by category the Agreed Data Base established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Strategic Offensive Arms of (date of signature of the Treaty).

Article XI

1. This Treaty shall be of (____) duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XII

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XIII

1. This Treaty, and its Annexes which form an integral part hereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at _____ on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United States
Representative to the United
Nations

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Colonel George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
The Pentagon

Lieutenant Colonel W. Richard Higgins
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Dr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Joseph Presel
Executive Assistant
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Ambassador Edward Rowny
Chief Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START -- Tuesday, June 7, 1983 (S)

On June 3rd the papers supporting the NSC meeting on START scheduled for Tuesday, June 7th at 9:30 a.m. in the White House Cabinet room, were circulated. Attached (Tab A) is a revised version of one of these papers, the paper entitled START Issues for Decision. The only change is a brief reference (on Page 7) to the phasing issue. The second paper distributed on June 3rd, a paper entitled Approach to Handling Build-down, remains unchanged. (S)

Also attached (Tab B) is an interagency approved draft START Treaty Text. The draft text will be modified on the basis of the decisions made at the NSC meeting. The draft text itself will not be discussed at the meeting but it is provided for the information of those principals attending the meeting. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
71 Robert M. Kimmitt DEPUTY
Executive Secretary

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Attachments

Tab A Revised START Issues for Decision (S)
Tab B Draft START Treaty Text (S)

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May 28, 1983

START ISSUES FOR DECISION

Background

The START negotiations resume on June 8. During the last round, the US presented proposals for limiting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), tabled a draft treaty on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a document outlining the US "Basic Elements" of a START agreement. The basic framework of the US position remained as it had been presented in the summer of 1982.

The Soviets contended that US proposals would "emasculate" the Soviet ICBM force while permitting US modernization programs to proceed. They stated that the US proposal was not an acceptable basis for negotiation. They also rejected the idea of a separate agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs). They tabled a draft treaty based largely on SALT II, but with a 28 percent reduction in strategic delivery vehicles from the Soviet level at the time SALT II was signed, about 2500, to 1800. They say they are prepared to accept significant cuts in warheads but only in the context of combining ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons in a single category. In short, the Soviets demonstrated no inclination to move the talks forward.

The US Delegation's view is that the Soviets apparently regard our present START proposal, particularly those aspects dealing with ICBM force restructuring, as unacceptable. They argue that our proposal is designed not to promote stability and equality, but to obtain strategic advantages for the US. We would expect the Soviets to continue dismissing our proposal in its present form.

The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission have stimulated considerable interest, both in the Congress and within the Administration, in reassessing our START position. Key members of Congress have made their support for MX contingent on modifications to our START proposal, and the President wrote to several Congressmen that we are now considering modifications to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

State, ACDA and the START negotiator believe that we should now alter our START proposal--not only to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for a modified approach and to respond to Congressional pressures, but also to improve prospects for productive negotiations. Moreover, there is agreement (except for JCS) that we move away from the ceiling of 850 deployed missiles.

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Some believe we need to make changes now to our position that will bring us close to our final position. Others believe that our position now should retain considerable room for further bargaining.

Issues

There are two principal issues. One is the extent to which we seek to reduce Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight--that is, should we seek (a) the level that is our goal for the second phase of the negotiations (1.9 million kilograms), or (b) the level that would result from our current proposal for the first phase (2.5 million kilograms), or (c) a higher level? The other issue is whether throw-weight should be constrained directly, or indirectly through collateral constraints. Our current position calls for indirect limits on throw-weight (i.e., sub-ceilings on heavy and medium ICBMs) in Phase I and direct limits (i.e., an aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight ceiling) in Phase II. Our current Phase I proposal was designed to achieve a goal of reduction in Soviet throw-weight of 55 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

One approach would seek a direct limit on throw-weight. The collateral constraints and the limit on deployed ballistic missiles would be dropped (leaving ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight as our two units of account). We would propose a direct throw-weight level (2.0 - 2.5 million kilograms) aimed at obtaining the large-scale reduction in Soviet throw-weight that our current proposal is designed to achieve.

An alternative approach would achieve throw-weight reductions indirectly as a consequence of reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads, and other collateral constraints (leaving deployed ballistic missiles and their warheads as the two units of account). Our current proposed limits on heavy and medium ICBMs could be replaced by other collateral constraints. Under this approach, Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would likely be about 3.0 million kilograms, about 46 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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The following sections discuss the main questions involved in modifying the US START position: whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed missiles, raise it, or drop it; what level we should propose for throw-weight limits; and whether to limit throw-weight directly or indirectly. Following that discussion are packages supported by various Agencies for a modified START position, accompanied by arguments for each package.

Finally, as an alternative to those packages, we could consider modifying the current position to the minimum extent necessary to reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft report. This would require, at a minimum, a decision now on whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it altogether. State, ACDA and the START negotiator recommend more basic changes to our position for substantive, political, and negotiating reasons.

I. Should we retain the limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it?

The report of the Scowcroft Commission states that arms control agreements should encourage deployment of small, single-warhead ICBMs. "This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments."

The report states that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles "should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution towards small, single warhead ICBMs". The report does not make any recommendation whether or not to drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

1. Retain the 850 ceiling

The number of small ICBMs the United States might want to deploy would depend on the deployment mode chosen, cost, survivability, Congressional support, and the constraints on the number of Soviet warheads, and is, therefore, difficult to predict. Retention of the 850 limit would limit us to a deployment of no more than about 300 small, single warhead ICBMs

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in addition to 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs and planned SLBMs. This would appear inconsistent with the Commission's recommendation to promote a long-term evolution away from large highly fractionated ICBMs.

The JCS believes that it is not clear at this point whether the US need for small ICBMs will require an increase in the 850 deployed ballistic missile ceiling. Some believe that retaining the 850 limit may give us all the force structuring flexibility we need during the next decade since, in the context of US deployment of 100 MX under a ceiling of 5000 missile warheads, we are unlikely to deploy significantly more than 850 ballistic missiles. The Soviets, on the other hand, with a modern, single RV missile beginning flight testing are better placed over the next decade than we are to exploit the possibilities of large numbers of single RV ICBMs, which would increase their advantage in force survivability. The US could also pay a political price if the 850 limit is dropped since substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles are a prominent, popular, and readily understandable element of the US position. Finally, in view of Soviet stalling in Geneva, some would argue that the appropriate US negotiating response is to hold to our current position and not make modifications which could be considered movement toward the Soviet position.

2. Raise the ceiling on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would retain a limit on deployed ballistic missiles but raise it to provide more headroom for large numbers of small missiles. The ceiling could be: between 1050 and 1250; 1450 (which corresponds roughly to the number of deployed missiles the United States would have under the Soviet proposal); or 1600 (the current number of US deployed ballistic missiles). The representative limits cited above could permit from 500 to more than 1100 small missiles, depending on the limit chosen, the number of Peacekeeper ICBMs deployed, and the size of the US SLBM force.

Raising the limit would respond to the Scowcroft Commission's report by making room in our START proposal for the evolution to small, single warhead ICBMs. A level could be chosen with sufficient "headroom" to give us considerable force structuring flexibility in the future. At the same time, retaining a ceiling on missiles would avoid the potential political liability of appearing to abandon constraints in a category of strategic capability (i.e., missiles) that has

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-5-

previously been subject to constraints and that some still consider significant. It would also have the negotiating advantage of moving us closer to the Soviet proposal of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

One disadvantage of raising the limit is that this may appear contrary to our objective of deep reductions. In addition, the Scowcroft Commission report argued against reductions in the number of deployed missiles, and cited the negative aspects of relying on such limits in past agreements.

3. Drop limits on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would have flexibility to deploy a larger number of small ICBMs within the constraints on warhead numbers and destructive potential.

This approach would encourage an evolution in both the US and the USSR to smaller missiles and would provide substantial flexibility to exploit the advantages of small missiles to enhance survivability and stability. The START agreement would focus primarily on broad measures of capability (warheads and throw-weight). The Scowcroft Commission report makes clear the drawbacks of use of launcher limits in past agreements--i.e., agreements that rely primarily on launcher limits create incentives for large, highly fractionated missiles. Some believe this option corresponds most closely to the approach advocated in the Scowcroft Commission's report as more likely to be practical, stabilizing, and lasting than constraints on force structures. They believe that dropping limits on deployed missiles could be useful in obtaining Congressional support for the development, production and deployment of the Peacekeeper and a small ICBM.

Dropping the limits on deployed missiles would emphasize the limits on warheads and destructive potential, but could lead to increased pressure to limit bomber weapons, which would not be in the US interest. In addition, if the Soviets deploy a large number of missiles and missile launchers, this could provide a potential to deploy additional warheads.

II. What throw-weight level should we seek?

Our current proposal seeks to substantially reduce Soviet missile throw-weight in phase I indirectly to about 2.5 million

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kilograms through the limit of 5000 missile warheads, the sub-ceiling of 2500 ICBM warheads and a limit of 210 medium and heavy ICBMs of which no more than 110 could be heavy ICBMs. In Phase II Soviet missile throw-weight would be further reduced to a direct ceiling of 1.9 million kilograms. Since the US throw-weight level is currently at 1.9 million kilograms, and the Soviet level is at about 5.6 million kilograms, any throw-weight level which exceeds the US current level would require the Soviets to reduce unilaterally.

There are three options:

(1) A level of 2.0 million kilograms (64 percent below the estimated current Soviet level but above the US level) would be consistent with our proposal for the second phase. We could argue that we were accelerating achievement of what has always been our ultimate goal. A proposal for a low ceiling now could give us bargaining room.

(2) A ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms (55 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would be roughly equivalent to our current proposal for the first phase, and would allow both sides somewhat greater flexibility to structure forces. It is the level the US has proposed in conjunction with the ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads.

(3) Constraints that could result in about 3.0 million kilograms (46 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would permit the Soviets greater force structure flexibility than the other options, and hence such a throw-weight level could be more likely to lead to an agreement.

The illustrative force tables for the options describe representative Soviet forces for each of these levels. While all the options limit the Soviets to 5000 warheads, the higher the throw-weight, the larger could be the size and explosive power of Soviet warheads, and the greater could be the Soviet potential to deploy additional warheads.

III. Should we seek direct or indirect limits on throw-weight?

The Scowcroft Commission report does not explicitly address this question. It does state that simple aggregate limits "are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization." Constraints on large missiles, however, would not be inconsistent with the Commission's emphasis on small missiles.

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-7-

The principal advantage of a direct throw-weight limit is that it would give each side more flexibility to structure its forces within the limit. It would directly constrain the overall potential of each side's missile forces, without dictating a particular force structure. This would undercut the Soviet complaint that our indirect throw-weight limits through medium and heavy ICBM constraints would require them to rebuild according to "US standards". Some believe that combining warhead and throw-weight ceilings would be the most straightforward way to constrain the sides to equal numbers of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. A direct limit would preclude growth in Soviet throw-weight that an indirect limit might permit if the Soviets chose to maximize throw-weight within the constraints. The Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets are likely not to maximize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces.

Some believe the principal drawback to a direct limit on throw-weight is that (depending on the level) it would undercut chances for an agreement, and as an initial objective could be perceived as a hardening of our position and a step away from achieving an agreement. Moreover, they believe the Soviets are less likely to accept throw-weight as a unit of account for START than collateral constraints. Some believe the level of throw-weight is not as significant a measure of military potential as warheads, and should not be assigned the same priority in our START proposal. Additionally, some believe that direct limits on throw-weight cannot be adequately verified. Others point out that indirect limits also require verification of the throw-weight of Soviet missiles.

IV. Other Issues

1. Phasing. The current US proposal would reduce Soviet throw-weight indirectly in Phase I, and would place a lower direct ceiling on throw-weight in Phase II. The packages proposed by State, ACDA, and the START Negotiator would combine the current two-phased approach into a single phase.*

* OSD position to be provided.

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-8-

2. Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Our current position is to accept in Phase II a ceiling of 28 on the average number of ALCMs on heavy bombers, with a limit of 20 on the number of ALCMs on existing types of heavy bombers. One of the packages presented below recommends proposing a maximum limit of 20 for all heavy bombers (not just existing types) on the basis that (1) there are no projected US requirements for a bomber to carry more than 20 ALCMs, and (2) to counter the Soviet criticism that our present position would permit 11,000 ALCMs, a level we do not require. The other packages retain our existing position on ALCMs.

3. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). Our current position does not contain limits on SLCMs. The current guidance to the Delegation instructs the Delegation to respond to any Soviet proposals to limit SLCMs by soliciting Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. Two of the packages presented below refer to limits on the number of SLCM platforms; the others do not address SLCMs.

4. Modernization constraints. Our current position contains a number of modernization constraints: limits on ICBM and SLBM fractionation, limits on the weight of re-entry vehicles on new types of missiles, and a ban on new heavy missiles. Our current proposal does not include limits on the number of new types of missiles. One of the packages proposes banning new types of heavy and medium ICBMs and restricting new types of light ICBMs to a single warhead during the first ten years of START. (The Peacekeeper and the SS-X-24 ICBMs would be permitted as existing types.) Other packages do not require limits on the number of new types of missiles.

5. Draft treaty. At the end of the last round, all Washington Agencies agreed in an instruction cable to the US START Delegation that we should be in a position to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The Soviets, for their part, tabled a draft treaty during Round III and, in the inter-round period, they have sought to make propaganda mileage by false charges that the US refused to discuss treaty language with them. In order to deprive the Soviets of this propaganda advantage and to further the negotiations by putting the US position on the table in a unified fashion, the US Delegation believes it should be

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-9-

authorized to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The START Delegation will incorporate changes to the US position arising from NSC decisions into the current draft text. The Delegation will send this revised draft back to Washington for prompt consideration by the US Government.

V. Packages

The following packages would: (a) retain our goal of a ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, (b) make no change in our proposal to limit heavy bombers, and (c) combine the phases of our current proposal. In addition, none of the packages would retain the current proposal's sub-limit of 2500 ICBM warheads or the Phase II ban on all heavy missiles.

The packages differ in: (a) the throw-weight level they seek; (b) the way throw-weight is constrained; (c) whether the number of deployed missiles is limited; (d) the limits on ALCMs; and, (e) whether to seek platform limits on SLCMs.

OSD and JCS will provide packages at a later date.

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LIMITS	CURRENT POSITION	REVISED POSITION				
		STATE	OSD	ACDA	START NEGOTIATOR	JCS
Missile Warheads	5000	5000	TO BE PROVIDED	5000		
Heavy Bombers	350	350		350		
Deployed Missiles	850	1150		No limit		
Throw-weight	Phase I: 110/210 limit on heavy and medium ICBMs. 2.5 million kg of Soviet throw-weight as a goal Phase II: Direct limit of 1.9 million kg of throw-weight	150 heavy ICBMs. Results in about 3.0* million kg of Soviet throw-weight		Direct limit of 2.5 million kg		
ALCMs	Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	20 per heavy bomber		Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber		
SLCMs	No limit	Platform limit		No limit	Platform limit	
New Types	Ban new types of heavy ICBMs	Ban new types of heavy/medium ICBMs & limit light ICBMs to single RVs	No limit			

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 BY: CJS NARS, DATE 11/29/85
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*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize high throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating con-
sequences for all mankind,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the
interests of international security require the strengthening of
strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction of strategic
offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will reduce the risk
of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and
security,

Have agreed as follows:

DECLASSIFIED

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BY

GS

NARA, DATE

11/09/05

Article I

Each Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, reduce and limit strategic offensive arms and adopt the other measures provided for in this Treaty.

Article II

1. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that [eight] years after that date, and thereafter:

(a) the aggregate number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 5,000;

(b) the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs does not exceed 2,500;

(c) the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 850;

(d) the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs does not exceed 210;

(e) the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs does not exceed 110; and

(f) the number of its heavy bombers does not exceed 400.

2. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit the aggregate number of its ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs, that are not deployed, to ____ percent of the allowed aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.

3. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.

[Article III]*

[1. Beginning on _____, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that ____ years after that date, and thereafter:

- (a) all of its heavy ICBMs shall have been destroyed;
- (b) the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed ____ kilograms; and
- (c) the number of its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) deployed on its heavy bombers does not exceed the product of ____ and the number of its heavy bombers, and the number of ALCMs deployed on any heavy bomber of an existing type does not exceed ____.

2. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.]

* Bracketed pending decision on modification of U.S. position.

Article IV

1. Neither Party shall have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms subject to the provisions of this Treaty in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule, as specified in Annex I of this Treaty.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) convert land-based ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(b) convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(c) develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy ICBMs that can be launched by land-based launchers other than ICBM launchers; nor

(d) develop, produce, test, or deploy land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs that also have the capability of launching ICBMs permitted by this Treaty.

3. Neither Party shall develop, produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of _____ kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles including free floating canister launchers. This Treaty shall

not require changes in current ballistic missile transport practices;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; or

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit, including fractional orbit, nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction.

4. Neither Party shall flight-test or deploy:

(a) ICBMs or ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 10;

(b) SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 14;

(c) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of ____*, with multiple reentry vehicles or with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, the weight of any one of which exceeds 225 kilograms, nor

(d) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of _____*, with a single reentry vehicle, the weight of which exceeds ____ kilograms.

5. Neither Party shall develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs, heavy ASBMs, or heavy ICBMs of types that were not deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty, nor produce or deploy additional such missiles of types that were deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modification, modernization, and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Within the limitations provided for in Articles II and III of this Treaty and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of its forces.

*A date earlier than the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. Each Party shall limit the number of its test and training launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed ____, all of which shall be located at test ranges designated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. ICBM and SLBM launchers at test ranges shall be constructed, converted, or used only for the purpose of testing and training, and not for deployment.

3. Each Party shall limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed ____ . Such missiles shall be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VII

1. ICBMs, SLBMs, ASBMs, and heavy bombers in excess of the limits provided in this Treaty shall be destroyed in accordance with the procedures specified in Annex IV, and shall remain subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they are so destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under the agreed procedures.

2. The Parties may store ___ ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs for use as space launch vehicles at designated space support centers, in accordance with the agreed measures set forth in Annex IV of this Treaty. Such missiles shall not be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VIII

1. Neither Party shall:

(a) develop, test, produce, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers;

(b) provide hardened storage facilities at ICBM launcher deployment areas;

(c) store more than two ICBMs at any ICBM launcher deployment area; or

(d) provide ground-support equipment at any ICBM launcher deployment area in excess of that required for normal deployment and maintenance.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 2 of Article VII and in subparagraph 1 (c) of this Article, each Party shall store all of its ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs, that are not deployed,

at designated storage facilities. Storage facilities for ICBMs that are not deployed shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM launcher deployment area.

3. Neither Party shall conduct training activities or exercises involving the rapid reload or simulated rapid reload of ICBM launchers, nor conduct any other activities or exercises that involve in any other manner rapid reload of any ICBM launcher after it has launched an ICBM.

Article IX

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall implement agreed measures as provided for in Annex IV; in addition, each Party may use national technical means of verification at its disposal, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall interfere with agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or with national technical means of verification.

3. Neither Party shall impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or by national technical means. In this connection, the obligation not to impede includes the obligation not to use concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at

concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

4. The encryption of telemetry on systems subject to the provisions of this Treaty is prohibited.

5. On board engineering test measurements shall be made, and all such measurements shall be broadcast using unencrypted telemetry, during each test flight or training flight of an ICBM, SLBM or ASBM.

Article X

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission, under regulations governing procedures to be agreed between the Parties.

2. The Parties agree that, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, they shall:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide such information as is necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) at least twice annually notify each other of the replacement dismantling, destruction, and conversion of strategic offensive arms performed in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) agree upon further measures contributing to the effectiveness of the verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

3. At least twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain and update by category the Agreed Data Base established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Strategic Offensive Arms of (date of signature of the Treaty).

Article XI

1. This Treaty shall be of (____) duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XII

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XIII

1. This Treaty, and its Annexes which form an integral part hereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at _____ on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

June 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: BOB LINHARD^{BL}/SVEN KRAEMER^{SK}

SUBJECT: Papers Supporting June 7th NSC Meeting on START

On June 3rd we circulated the papers developed to support the NSC meeting scheduled for Tuesday, June 7th. On June 4th we received a slightly revised version of one of the two papers. The only change is a brief reference (on Page 7) to the phasing issue.

On June 4th we also received an interagency approved draft START Treaty text. While this draft text will be modified on the basis of the decision made at the NSC meeting, we feel it is useful to circulate it to principals prior to the meeting.

Please sign the attached cover memorandum and make immediate distribution of the revised paper entitled START Issues for Decision and the Draft START Treaty Text.

Concurrence: Ron Lehman

Attachments

- Tab I Cover Memorandum Transmitting Papers (S)
- A Revised START Issues for Decision (S)
- B Draft START Treaty Text (S)

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NLS MIB#20
BY CU, NARA, DATE 11/09/05

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National Security Council
The White House

688

Package # 1515

1515
JUN 03 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>11</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Staff Secretary		<input type="checkbox"/>	
Sit Room		<input type="checkbox"/>	

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Copy to RCM/WPC -

Judge,

We have already sent Pres.

Tabs A & B. We should probably send him Tab C. If you agree I'll modify Tab I.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

June 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*SUBJECT: Papers for the NSC Meeting on START Scheduled
for June 7th ~~(S)~~

On Thursday I gave you some papers to read in preparation for the NSC Meeting on START scheduled for next Tuesday. At Tab A you will find a second interagency paper which addresses possible approaches on how we might handle the build-down concept in the context of our START position. ~~(S)~~

Attachment:

Tab A - Approach to Handling Build-down ~~(S)~~

Prepared by:
Bob Linhard
Sven Kraemer

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SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
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NLS M1346 #21
BY CU, NARA, DATE 11/09/05

Tab A

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TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVE FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT /CAMP DAVID/

2.

3.

4.

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

ATTACHED:

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCL. OR REF.

NSA 4/24/83

APPROACHES TO A U.S. POLICY ON THE BUILD-DOWN CONCEPT

I. Introduction

In response to the President's letters of May 12 to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy, the START Interagency initiated an intensive study of both the specific build-down proposal contained in S. Res. 57 and more generalized approaches following the guidance provided by the President in his May 12 letters. While this work has not been completed, significant progress has been achieved in assessing the factors that should be taken into account in analyzing build-down approaches. Specific approaches have already been analyzed to some degree, though much more work remains to be done.

This paper reviews interagency progress to date in studying the build-down and suggests a possible Administration stance on the issue. This paper:

- reviews the history of the build-down;
- states the important factors that affect possible build-down approaches;
- assesses possible Soviet reactions to a U.S. build-down initiative;
- lays out minimum acceptable requirements for a build-down approach;
- identifies subjects for further study;
- suggests certain steps the Administration should avoid; and
- recommends a Congressional and public stance covering our efforts to date.

II. (U) Background.

In February 1983, Senators Nunn and Cohen introduced S. Res. 57 which called for the elimination from operational forces of two nuclear warheads for each newly deployed nuclear warhead. The resolution has approximately 45 Senate cosponsors. Subsequent to S. Res. 57, Senators Nunn, Cohen and Percy sent a letter to the President calling for the US to accept a nuclear warhead build-down proposal. The Senators have indicated that the build-down was not tied to a specific two-for-one ratio because it might unnecessarily restrict the negotiations within the context of START. In response, the President supported the concept of a flexible mutual build-down in his 12 May 1983 letter to the

Senators. The letter states that the "Administration is currently examining the structure of a build-down proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces." In laying out the broad framework of a modified build-down, the President's letter states:

- "The principle of a mutual build-down, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek."
- "It would, if properly applied, reinforce the intent to cap the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads on both sides and to cause each side to reduce those levels steadily and substantially over time."
- "It could be implemented flexibly and with reasonable latitude for each side to balance the force it deploys and reduces. Variable ratios as appropriate, would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems."
- "It could be implemented in conjunction with an agreed floor which, when reached, would trigger the suspension of the build-down rule, subject to renegotiation."

The President stated that any build-down concept must recognize the importance of strategic modernization and the necessity of maintaining a balance during the reduction process to deal with asymmetries in US and Soviet forces. The process would also require agreement on effective verification measures and counting rules for all strategic nuclear systems.

On May 26, nineteen Senators wrote to the President and reminded him, inter alia, of his obligation to develop "within the next several weeks a meaningful build-down proposal for nuclear arms reductions."

III. (U) Factors Affecting any Build-down Approach.

There are several issues associated with a simple build-down proposal that must be addressed.

Equality. There currently is a significant difference in the age of the strategic forces of the US and the USSR; Soviet forces are significantly more modern. A simple build-down would make reductions contingent upon force modernization, in that force reductions would not be required until new warheads were added.

The Soviets with more modern forces could more easily delay their reductions by curtailing additional modernization and retaining existing forces. Three-fourths of Soviet warheads are on systems which are five years old or less. Three-fourths of US warheads are on systems that are 15 years old or more. Because of the potentially dangerous weapon-level asymmetries which would occur if only the United States modernized, for the build-down concept to function effectively any build-down must be part of a comprehensive mutual agreement to reduce strategic forces and not be based solely on modernization.

There are a number of ways to address this problem. One is to develop a build-down schedule that limits differences in weapons numbers between US and USSR. A schedule of reductions could be developed (incorporating a goal or floor and intermediate reduction levels) that would control developing inequalities by introducing the requirement to meet this schedule of reductions whether a side modernized or not.

Aggregation of Bomber Weapons and Ballistic Missile Warheads.
A simple build-down concept would aggregate all weapons, forcing bombs, cruise missiles, and ballistic missile warheads to be counted equally. Thus far in the START negotiations the United States has argued that some strategic systems (ballistic missiles) are more destabilizing than others (bombers and cruise missiles). If a build-down embraced aggregated weapons, the current US START negotiating position would be undermined. Also, deploying one new ALCM could mean building down two ballistic missile warheads or other accountable bomber weapons if a 2 to one ratio were used.

The problems associated with counting bomber weapons might be resolved by counting accountable bomber platforms* rather than their weapons. This is the approach the United States proposes in START and is similar to the way non-ALCM carrying heavy bombers were handled in the SALT II Treaty. Counting bomber platforms avoids the uncertainties associated with agreeing to and verifying bomber weapons loadings. This approach also would recognize that the United States has over 200 mothballed B-52 aircraft which count under SALT II. A 2 for 1 build-down of bomber platforms could not be accommodated if applied only to operationally deployed bombers.

However, the Soviets would be very unlikely to accept counting bombers on the basis of accountable platforms for several reasons. First, it allows the US well over 100 new bombers without retiring any operational bombers. Second, there is no provision for controlling ALCM deployment. Finally, the

* Accountable bomber platforms includes mothballed as well as operational bombers.

Soviets would have to either classify the Backfire as a heavy bomber or accept a limit of 75 on new heavy bombers (150 Bear/Bison currently deployed on a 2 for 1 build-down would allow a maximum of 75 new heavy bombers), or accept reductions in other systems.

Counting Rules. Although a build-down based on deployed ballistic missile warheads (excluding bomber weapons) might be acceptable to the US if properly constructed, a build-down based on accountable warheads* would clearly be preferable. At Geneva, however, we have proposed that each type of currently deployed missile be counted as having the maximum number of warheads actually deployed on a missile of that type. We must have the same counting rules applied to both our START reductions proposal and a build-down proposal to prevent the Soviets from exploiting this disparity in the negotiations. Switching to an accountable basis for currently deployed missiles would be inconsistent with our current START approach. This would credit the Poseidon C3 with 14, rather than the 10 with which it is operationally deployed. As pointed out above, however, a build-down of heavy bombers is only acceptable on an accountable basis. Using accountable numbers would also reduce the necessity for on site cooperative measures to insure verification.

Ballistic Missile Warhead Floor. The simple build-down concept as proposed in the Senate resolution does not identify a warhead floor. If modernization proceeded indefinitely, the strategic force levels would eventually reach zero. Therefore, the absence of a floor would limit the extent to which modernization could be carried out, assuming the US wished to retain some minimum warhead level.

Thus, a warhead floor (e.g., 5000) is a critical and essential element that must be adopted with any build-down proposal. When that floor is reached, the build-down requirement would end and the floor would become a ceiling. Thereafter, one could modernize on a 1 for 1 basis. Reductions below the ceiling would be subject to follow-on negotiations.

Qualitative Controls. The lack of qualitative controls in a build-down scheme could exacerbate force asymmetries because the concept does not account for different weapons types. For example, warheads on SS-18s would be counted no differently than smaller, less accurate warheads on SLBMs. As a result, there is nothing inherent in a simple build-down which automatically reduces destabilizing systems more quickly than other systems, or reduces the overall destructive potential of a side's arsenal. Under a simple build-down, a single very large warhead could replace two much smaller warheads on MIRVed systems. If it were

* Maximum number of warheads flight tested on a missile of a given type (except for MM III).

important to limit ICBMs, heavy missiles, medium ICBMs, or throw-weight, additional build-down constraints would be necessary.

The problem of controlling types of systems to be reduced can be resolved in several ways. Several different packages of constraints are currently being considered for the US START proposal. Any of these packages might be combined with a build-down and could provide the necessary additional constraints to insure adequate qualitative controls.

Build-down Ratio. The ratio which determines the rate at which old weapons are being retired for new ones is closely related to other variables:

- Starting warhead levels (both sides are increasing their warhead levels as they modernize, even though constraining launcher levels as a result of "no undercut" policies).
 - The weapons floor (level at which build-down terminates).
 - The interval between the starting date and the date the floor is reached.
-
- Planned modernization (new warheads) programmed over the specified period.
 - The choice of counting rules: accountable or deployed.
 - Any other START constraints.

When all the variables except the build-down ratio have been fixed (e.g., warhead level, build-down interval, modernization requirements, etc.), a build-down ratio would then be established. This is the only approach which has yet been examined in detail. Alternatively, the ratio could be arbitrarily selected (e.g., 2 for 1), with other variables changed as necessary to protect our modernization program. The weapons floor (5000 RVs) and planned modernization program are not variables that the US would wish to alter. However, it might be possible to alter the interval between starting date and the date the floor is reached. A build-down ratio of 3 for 2 instead of 2 for 1 might also be feasible. Neither of these alternative approaches have been analyzed in detail and should not yet be considered acceptable.

An additional complication exists in negotiating a ratio acceptable to both sides. Although modernization plans of the

Soviet Union are only projections, they are significantly different from ours. If a starting date, floor and interval are successfully negotiated with the Soviets, the build-down ratios that permit each side to continue programmed modernization would have to be different for the end result to be equal, since each side's programs introduce different numbers of new weapons at different times. Thus, it could be difficult to agree on the same mutually acceptable build-down ratio on this basis.

Before selecting a specific build-down ratio, one must also consider not only the degree of flexibility which might be desirable to allow possible changes in future force structures, but also the flexibility required to accommodate the inevitable changes which would result from the negotiating process.

As indicated in the President's letter of May Twelfth, the appropriate use of variable ratios would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems. For example, a lower build-down ratio could be applied to bombers than to ballistic missiles. The magnitude of this difference could also reflect other factors, such as unconstrained Soviet air defenses. On the other hand, the use of different build-down ratios for the different components of our strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers) could penalize the possibility of improving one component by reductions in another component.

IV. Provisional Cases Studied and Effect on US programs.

As noted earlier, no build-down proposal can assume a common rate of US and Soviet strategic modernization. Respective modernization rates will differ in the future and given the greater need for US modernization, the Soviets could reduce forces at a lower rate.

Some preliminary analysis has been performed of the compatibility of a build-down approach with presently planned US force modernization programs. This analysis rests on a number of specific assumptions about the factors already identified (starting ballistic missile warhead level, ballistic missile warhead floor, deployed ballistic missile limit, and drawdown period) that would critically affect the compatibility of a given build-down ratio with US programs. For each case studied, the US modernization program was assumed to be a given. Changes in any of these assumptions would change the results presented below. It should be noted that the analysis did not include other constraints in our present START proposal, such as sub-limits on ICBM warheads and heavy and medium ICBMs. It should be stressed that none of these cases has been analyzed to the point where it is ready for decision.

What follows in approaches A and B is a schedule of reductions calculated on the US rate of strategic modernization over an 8 year period and down to a level of 5000 warheads. On this basis, we conclude that a build-down ratio of about 1.9 to 1 on a deployed basis and 2 to 1 on an accountable basis, and keyed to the implementation of the US modernization program, would be acceptable. To reduce to 5000 warheads in 8 years, the Soviets would have to apply a higher build-down ratio because they start from a higher numerical base. Thus, were the Soviet Union to accept a floor of 5000, it might then place the US in the uncomfortable position of having to reject a Soviet proposal for a higher build-down ratio.

A. Build-down calculated on deployed ballistic missile warheads.

Given a ballistic missile warhead floor of 5000, a starting date of January 1985 and an eight-year build-down period, a build-down ratio of about 1.9 to 1 would accommodate both planned US force modernization and the deployment of 100 small missiles in 1993 (with room for 300 to 350 more following the termination of the build-down).

B. Build-down calculated on accountable ballistic missile warheads.

Given a ballistic missile warhead floor of 5000, a starting date of January 1985, and an eight-year build-down period, a build-down ratio of 2 for 1 would be compatible with planned US modernization programs. The 2 to 1 ratio (vice the 1.9 to 1 in A) is acceptable here because accountable numbers permit a higher starting base.

C. Build-down calculated on accountable bomber platforms.

Given an internal minimum floor of 350 bomber platforms (we have proposed a limit of 400 to the Soviet Union in the START negotiations), a 2 for 1 build-down ratio would accommodate planned US bomber force modernization.

D. Observations.

There are both positive and negative features associated with these approaches. On the positive side, since the numerical values selected for approaches A, B, and C above (5000 warheads, 8 year drawdown period, 400 heavy bombers)

coincide with those of the current US START proposal, these particular approaches are conceptually consistent with our existing START proposal. Also, combining the approaches outlined in A and C or B and C above would not adversely affect US modernization.

On the negative side, there are a number of significant problems associated with each of these approaches. First, none is likely to be acceptable to the Soviets. Second, the build-down ratios presented above oblige us to hold all the other variables constant. The approaches allow little flexibility in the negotiating process or for possible changes in future modernization programs. Third, combining approaches A and C is inconsistent since it would use accountable numbers for bomber platforms but deployed numbers for missile warheads. Combining approaches A and B, (using accountable numbers for both bomber platforms and ballistic missile warheads), on the other hand, might be seen as inconsistent with our present START approach which seeks to focus on deployed numbers. Finally, any build-down which focused only on reducing to 5000 warheads in a fixed period, and ignored other essential objectives of our START proposal, would not achieve our overall strategic goals in START.

Certification of Military Sufficiency. The forces associated with any build-down initiative must be analyzed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and certified by them as sufficient to meet military objectives.

V. Possible Soviet Reactions to the Nunn-Cohen Build-Down Concept.

OVERVIEW:

With the U.S. media attention that the build-down concept has received over the last two months, the Soviets understand our present interest in it. They would clearly interpret U.S. motivations in proposing a build-down as political and would recognize the important role the build-down plays in dampening freeze sentiment and marshalling support in Congress for Administration arms control policy, MX, and the defense budget more generally. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Soviets would either accept or reject a U.S. build-down proposal outright. A more probable Soviet response to a U.S. build-down proposal would be to try to exploit the general concept within START and in the larger political arena, to promote their own START negotiating position and strategic objectives more generally. Specifically, the Soviets might seize that part of a

U.S. build-down proposal that caps the number of strategic nuclear warheads, call it a freeze, and offer to proceed with their own START proposals. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviets may table either their own build-down concept or embrace the Nunn-Cohen proposal to gain the initiative in the negotiations.

Although the Soviets clearly want to restrict U.S. strategic modernization, it is unlikely that they would accept the build-down as an interim restraint measure on any basis that would be acceptable to us. It is possible that the Soviets would agree to some type of build-down as a mechanism for accomplishing the reductions required in a negotiated START agreement. However, they likely would only do this well after the immediate U.S. political need for it had passed, and then only in return for appropriate U.S. concessions.

The Soviets in theory probably would not be averse to the "build-down" concept if they could develop it to reflect their arms control goals. Their own START Treaty draft of March 1983 sets forth a staged schedule for reductions of the total number of nuclear warheads and bombs carried on all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Some Soviets have explored the idea of "de-MIRVing" and other ideas drawn from the Scowcroft Commission Report in informal and unofficial forums outside of START with U.S. counterparts. Moreover, the Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the unratified SALT II Treaty, which the Soviets agreed to, made clear that the provisions to be developed in the SCC for arms ceasing to be subject to the Treaty's limitations should include procedures for converting ICBM and SLBM launchers from launchers of MIRVed missiles to launchers of non-MIRVed missiles.

The Soviets, however, have long held that the U.S. possesses a larger number of total deliverable warheads--ballistic missile reentry vehicles (RVs), nuclear bombs, and cruise missiles --than the USSR. They have consistently linked the establishment of any warhead limits for ICBMs and SLBMs to restrictions on cruise missiles and their carriers, and have argued that the distinction that the U.S. has drawn between limiting ballistic missiles and their warheads immediately, and aircraft and cruise missiles in the future, is artificial and self-serving. Their current START proposal, which presumes a ban on all long-range cruise missiles, implies a method of counting other bomber armament.

Equality. If Soviet analysis of a U.S. build-down proposal suggests to them that the proposal would have the effect of requiring them to reduce their heavy or "medium" ICBM force


without significant concessions from the U.S., then Moscow will not respond favorably.

Aggregation. The Soviets would probably interpret the proposal in a way that would count bombs and cruise and ballistic warheads equally. They have long maintained that the U.S. proposal for two phases, in which limits on cruise missiles were postponed, is not an acceptable basis for negotiations.

Weapon Floor. A U.S. proposal that specified limits markedly inconsistent with the provisions of the Soviet START proposal would probably not be received favorably. The Soviet assessment of the number of warheads that they would need would be driven by their perception of the threat posed by U.S. force modernization programs (including possible basing modes for new U.S. missiles and the fractionation that the U.S. is considering).

Miscellaneous. The Soviets would probably respond negatively to any variable ratio scheme which they perceived, through their own analysis, as having an unfavorable and one-sided impact on their forces. The Soviets would also probably never enter into such a scheme without mutual agreement on a weapons floor.

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Forces Considerations. We believe the build-down proposal

as advanced by Senators Nunn and Cohen (though offering the Soviets some advantages vis-a-vis the U.S.) would require the Soviets to considerably alter what we believe to be their planned strategic forces. This concept was raised by the Soviets in past arms control negotiations and used as one of the primary arguments against U.S. START proposals. As such, we believe the Soviets will be reluctant to accept the build-down proposal. However, the Soviets might table a build-down proposal of their own if they see it is to their advantage.

ICBMs are the mainstay of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, constituting more than one-half of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and three-fourths of the nuclear warheads. Almost the entire currently deployed fourth generation of Soviet ICBMs is MIRVed. The build-down concept, however, to assure a survivable force would require deployment of a new, single-warhead, probable mobile force. Additionally, we believe that they are developing, and intend to deploy, additional versions of ~~the currently deployed SS-18s and SS-19s, and 10-warhead SS-X-24,~~ as well as a mobile variant of the single-warhead PL-5. The Soviets currently have roughly 6,000 warheads in their ICBM force.

VI. Minimum Requirements for any Build-Down Approach

Study of the build-down concept to date has shown that there are a number of interrelated variables which affect the desirability of any build-down approach. It, therefore, is not possible either to support or reject any specific build-down ratio in isolation from the other considerations identified earlier in this paper. In addition, IG study has identified a number of required features that any build-down approach must contain.

1. Floor. A build-down must have a weapons floor. This floor or floors would apply to whatever weapons are covered by the build-down, such as ballistic missile RVs, bomber platforms, etc. Once this floor is reached, the build-down ratio must become 1:1 unless a lower floor can be certified. To date this requirement has been generally accepted by most build-down supporters on the Hill.

2. Equality. Any build-down must permit the preservation of at least approximate equality during -- and after -- the build-down period. Several ways of accomplishing this are currently being examined.

3. Verifiability. Any build-down approach must be verifiable. At a minimum this would probably require a set of agreed counting rules and definition of modernization for missile

warheads.

4. Consistency with START. It is imperative that whatever build-down approach we might seek in the START negotiations be fully consistent with our START position. This would require, inter alia, that we keep ballistic missiles and bombers separate, that our counting rules be consistent, and that the reduction objectives be the same or at least not inconsistent, e.g., warhead floor no lower than 5000, bomber floor no lower than 350 (400 has been proposed in Geneva).

5. Accountable Bombers. If bombers are included in a build-down, SALT-accountable bombers, including mothballed ones must be included. With the retirement of the B-52D's, the U.S. is already below the long-term desired level for bombers.

6. Modernization. To be acceptable, any build-down must be part of a comprehensive mutual agreement to reduce strategic forces and not based solely on modernization. This is because respective US and Soviet rates of modernization will be different and in the latter case because we cannot know with any certainty what Soviet modernization plans are.

VII. Issues for Further Study.

This paper is necessarily only a first step in analyzing the build-down concept. However,, the work accomplished to date has identified three broad areas requiring further study: specific build-down alternatives, broader build-down issues, and build-down modalities. These are discussed briefly below.

A. Build-Down Alternatives

A number of possible build-down approaches have been identified for possible further study, and it is expected that more will be identified over the next several weeks. Once again, it should be noted that none of these approaches can depend solely upon rates of modernization.

1. Percentage annual reduction in ballistic missile warheads and bomber platforms.

This approach would drop the explicit link between reductions and modernization and would make reductions depend only upon the calendar. Preliminary work has been done on this approach, and it has been found that a 5% figure applied to both sides would be similar to the reductions schedule which we have proposed to the

Soviets in START. It does not link reductions to modernization, a linkage which some build-down supporters strongly seek, but it would, unlike the original build-down proposal, guarantee reductions if accepted. Some type of modernization constraints could be added if needed to offset this "delinkage."

2. 3 for 2 build-down for missile warheads only, based on either operational or accountable loadings.
3. 3 for 2 build-down for SLBM warheads and 2 for 1 for ICBM warheads based on either operational or accountable loadings.

This would incorporate the variable ratio concept referred to in the President's letters to Sens. Cohen, Nunn, and Percy. This could complicate our plans for MX deployment, however.

4. 2 for 1 build-down for warheads, 1 for 1 for bombers (where all B-52D's are counted whether retired or not).

5. Differing reduction ratios.

This approach would establish a 2 for 1 reduction ratio for US SLBM and Soviet ICBM warheads, and 3 to 2 for US ICBM and Soviet SLBM warheads. This recognizes that under the US START proposal we will be reducing more SLBM warheads than ICBM warheads and would encourage the Soviets to shift to SLBMs. On the other hand, it could undercut some of our arguments in START about stabilizing and destabilizing systems, since we would in effect be encouraging ourselves to shift to ICBMs.

6. 1 for 1 cap on ballistic missile RVs.
7. Build-down based on launchers.
8. 2 for 1, or 3 for 2, build-down based on either operational or accountable missile loadings but include bomber weapons on an accountable basis.

This approach would pose major problems for our current START position, which seeks to avoid numerical limits on bomber weapons.

9. Build-down of MIRVed ICBMs.

This approach would require that two MIRVed ICBMs be dismantled for each new one deployed. This would support the thrust of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and would be

consistent with our MX plans.

Broader Build-Down Issues.

1. Definition of a new weapon.

The question of exactly what constitutes a "modernized" weapon (or a "newly deployed nuclear warhead", using the language of S.Res 57) will be a complex matter of definition and negotiation. Specific guidelines will have to be established. Examples of the problems raised are:

- If a Trident I SLBM were moved from a Poseidon boat to a new Trident boat, would this count as the deployment of a new weapon?
- If an existing Mk-12A were moved from a Minuteman III to a new MX, would this count as deployment of a new warhead?
What about replacing Mk-12's with Mk-12A's?

-
- If the Soviets replaced warheads on existing missiles, such as an SS-18/Mod 3 with an SS-18/Mod 4, would this count as deployment of new warheads?
 - What if new SRAM's or gravity bombs replace old ones on B-52's?
 - What are the verification implications of monitoring missile warhead modifications?

2. Negotiability problems.

Attempting to reach agreement on at least five variables that affect the acceptability of a build-down, when a change in any one would necessitate change in the others, would pose enormous difficulties for the negotiators. Each change in one key variable would send us (not to mention the Soviets) back to the drawing board. The problems encountered to date in deciding within the US government what the effects of the build-down concept would be amply illustrate the negotiating difficulties that require further study.

- 3. Should accountable or deployed figures be used for warheads?

- 4. How should SLCM be handled?

SLCM poses important difficulties to any build-down approach,

as well as to START more generally. Even if we determined a way to account for nuclear SLCMs only, the introduction of 758 such SLCMs, which are not included in our SIOP plans, would require the removal of perhaps twice as many SIOP-committed weapons. If no acceptable way were found to distinguish non-nuclear from nuclear SLCM, under a 2 for 1 build-down the US would have to destroy virtually our entire strategic force just to accommodate them.

5. How do Soviet air-defenses relate to US bomber modernization and the build-down?
6. How would various build-down starting dates and the resulting changes in force structure affect the acceptability of build-down approaches?

Build-Down Modalities.

One important aspect of the build-down question is whether to incorporate a build-down proposal directly into our START position or to seek to reach a more limited interim agreement separate from a START treaty. In the latter case, the separate agreement would presumably still be negotiated by the START Delegation in Geneva. There are two broad alternatives:

1. Incorporate Build-Down Into our START Position.

This approach would provide a potentially suitable mechanism to achieve the reductions that would be part of such an agreement. This alternative need not interrupt our ability to reach a broad-based START agreement. This also would facilitate greater consistency between our START and build-down positions. On the other hand, build-down sponsors have expressed some opposition to this type of approach and are looking for something that would achieve reductions sooner than what they fear might be several years before a START agreement.

2. Negotiate Build-Down as a Separate Agreement.

Some of the build-down sponsors regard the build-down concept as an interim measure which could operate until a START agreement was concluded. A separate interim agreement would thus respond to this segment of Hill sentiment but at the cost of diverting negotiations on a complete START agreement. The Soviets would have no incentive to help us with our political problems by reaching an early build-down agreement that would be consistent with our security requirements.

It would also give the Soviets the perfect vehicle for delay in START, which may be their objective in START until they have a clearer picture of the INF outcome. The Soviets could also turn our equality arguments back on us by proposing something similar to the original Senate build-down proposal, which would include bomber weapons, a long-time goal of theirs. They also would argue publicly that it was inconsistent to propose a build-down from present levels on the one hand but reject a freeze at current levels on the other. Finally, from our own domestic bureaucratic point of view, getting agreement on the elements of a separate build-down proposal would be a difficult task at a time when we have much work remaining on START.

VIII. Features that Should not be Part of a Build-Down Proposal.

From its assessment to date, the IG finds the following elements to be unacceptable based on our national security requirements:

- Any build-down that has no floors on warheads and bombers; without such floors, we either would be driven below weapons levels needed to meet our nuclear targeting requirements or would be forced to retain aging and/or vulnerable weapons.
- Any build-down that uses only operational bombers.
- Any build-down that does not guarantee mutual reductions and does not prevent large force asymmetries from resulting.

IX. Recommended Congressional and Public Stance.

The Administration posture on the build-down to date has been to praise the build-down's recognition of the need for both modernization and reductions, acknowledge the potential utility of a build-down concept if implemented flexibly, and emphasize some of the ambiguities and problems with S. Res. 57, as well as with implementing the concept.

In addition to our current public posture, we should consider striking the following additional themes:

- The build-down concept is being intensively studied.
- Our study to date continues to confirm the need for modernization as we pursue reductions. Our START proposal

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lends itself to this concept.

- We are developing a number of criteria which should guide our assessment of any build-down approach.

With regard to the Congress, we should strive to advance our work to the point where we could provide a preliminary briefing to the Congress before the August recess.

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