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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re: U.S. policy (17pp) <b>Part 12/19/05 M04020 #1 (dupe)</b>	n.d.	P-1, P-5
<del>2. draft</del>	<del>treaty (12pp)</del> <b>R 11/9/05 M0346 #13</b>	<del>6/3/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>3. paper</del>	<del>re: backgrounder (2pp)</del> <b>R ~ ~ #14</b>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<b>letter case (8390701)</b>			
<del>4. memo</del>	<del>from S. Kraemer/R. Linhard to W. Clark re: NSC meeting (1p)</del> <b>M 11/09/05 M1346 #15</b>	<del>6/6/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>5. memo</del>	<del>from R. Kimmitt to D. Gregg, et al. re: NSC meeting (2pp)</del> <b>R ~ ~ #16</b>	<del>6/6/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>6. paper</del>	<del>re: issues for discussion (9pp)</del> <b>R ~ ~ #17</b>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>7. chart</del>	<del>(1p)</del> <b>R ~ ~ #18</b>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>8. draft</del>	<del>treaty (12pp)</del> <b>R ~ ~ #19</b>	<del>6/3/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
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<del>4 MEMO</del>	<del>KRAEMER/LINHARD TO CLARK (M1346 #15)</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>6/6/1983</del>
		<i>MVA 3/25/08</i>	
<del>6 PAPER</del>	<del>START ISSUES (FIRST 9 PAGES SAME AS M1346 #10) M1346 #17</del>	<del>9</del>	<del>5/28/1983</del>
		<i>MVA 3/25/08</i>	
<del>7 CHART</del>	<del>CHART</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
		<i>MVA 3/25/08</i>	

# REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON STRATEGIC FORCES

APRIL 1983

## VI. Arms Control.

It is a legitimate, ambitious, and realistic objective of arms control agreements to channel the modernization of strategic forces, over the long term, in more stable directions than would be the case without such agreements. Such stability supports deterrence by making aggression less likely and by reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. The strategic modernization program recommended herein and the arms control considerations contained in this report are consistent with an important aspect of such stability. In light of the developments in technology set forth at in Section IV.B. above, they seek to enhance survivability by moving both sides, in the long term, toward strategic deployments in which individual targets are of lower value. The recommended strategic program thus proposes an evolution for the U.S. ICBM force in which a given number of ballistic missile warheads would, over time, be spread over a larger number of launchers than would otherwise be the case.

This evolution is important for long-term strategic stability, but it is not without its costs. Spreading a given number of ICBM warheads, whatever the number, over greater numbers of ICBM launchers would normally mean added operating costs, for

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<sup>1</sup> Constant FY 1982 dollars are used in this comparison, since these were the units used in December 1982 to present CSB costs to the Congress. Using either constant dollars of a later fiscal year or "then-year" dollars would show higher numbers for all alternatives. Figures were provided by the Department of Defense. FY 1983 costs are not included.

<sup>2</sup> All involve significant costs beyond the five-year period.

example. But in the judgment of the Commission, permitting our forces to evolve in this direction and encouraging the Soviets to do likewise is worth such costs. Moreover, if such programs can lead to mutually agreed lower levels of warhead deployments in time, then ultimately the net cost may be less.

Such an evolution marks a sound principle to guide our own long-term strategic force modernization and arms control proposals, but it is neither necessary nor wise to move precipitously in that direction. In part this is because time is required to develop such new systems properly, in part it is because continued efforts on our current strategic programs are needed to encourage the Soviets to move in a stabilizing direction. Absent such encouragement there is no realistic hope that the Soviets will join such an evolution and forego the current advantages they have in the ability to attack hard targets and to barrage large areas with their preponderance in throw-weight.

Over the long run, stability would be fostered by a dual approach toward arms control and ICBM deployments which moves toward encouraging small, single-warhead ICBMs. This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments.

Arms control agreements of this sort—simple and flexible enough to permit stabilizing development and modernization programs, while imposing quantitative limits and reductions—can make an important contribution to the stability of the strategic balance. An agreement that permitted modernization of forces and also provided an incentive to reduce while modernizing, in ways that would enhance stability, would be highly desirable. It would have the considerable benefit of capping both sides' strategic forces at levels that would be considerably lower than they would otherwise reach over time. It would also recognize, realistically, that each side will naturally desire to configure its own strategic forces. Simple aggregate limits of this sort are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization whose ultimate consequences cannot be confidently anticipated.

Encouraging stability by giving incentives to move toward less vulnerable deployments is more important than reducing quickly the absolute number of warheads deployed. Reductions in warhead numbers, while desirable for long-term reasons of limiting the cost of strategic systems, should not be undertaken at the expense of influencing the characteristics of strategic deployments. For example, warhead reductions, while desirable, should not be proposed or undertaken at a rate that leads us to limit the number of launching platforms to such low levels that their survivability is made more questionable.

For a variety of historical, technical, and verification reasons, both the SALT II unratified treaty and the current START proposal contain proposals to limit or reduce the number of ICBM launchers or missiles. Unfortunately this has helped produce the tendency to identify arms control with launcher or missile limits, and to lead some to identify successful arms control with low or reduced launcher or missile limits. This

has, in turn, led to an incentive to build launchers and missiles as large as possible and to put as many warheads as possible into each missile. Such an incentive has been augmented by the cost savings involved in putting a given number of warheads on a few large missiles rather than on a number of smaller ones. Although reasonable efforts have been made to constrain warheads through arms control (e.g. by the payload fractionation limits in the negotiated SALT II treaty), these types of limits have still not produced an incentive mutually to move away from large land-based missiles. They will not do so as long as launcher or missile limitations are seen, in and of themselves, as primary arms control objectives.

We will have for some time strategic forces in which the number of launchers on one side are outnumbered many times over by the number of warheads on the other. Under such circumstances, it is not stabilizing to use arms control to require mutual reductions in the number of launching platforms (e.g. submarines or ICBM launchers) or missiles. Such a requirement further increases the ratio of warheads to targets. It does not promote deterrence and reduce the risk of war for the Soviets to have many more times the number of accurate warheads capable of destroying hard targets than the U.S. has ICBM launchers.

In time we should try to promote an evolution toward forces in which—with an equal number of warheads—each side is encouraged to see to the survivability of its own forces in a way that does not threaten the other. But if the Soviet Union chooses to retain a large force of large missiles, each with many warheads, the U.S. must be free to match this by the sort of deployment it chooses. Any arms control agreement equating SS-18s and small single-warhead ICBMs because each is one missile or because each is on one launcher would be destabilizing in the extreme.

The approach toward arms control suggested by the Commission, moreover, is compatible with the basic objectives and direction of several other current arms control proposals.

For example, the negotiated SALT II treaty indirectly limited warheads by its limits on launchers and on the fractionation of payloads. It also barred deployments of new large ICBMs or the construction of additional fixed launchers. And it pointed toward further reductions in a follow-on SALT III agreement. These broad purposes of SALT II are wholly compatible with the arms control approach suggested here.

However, it should be noted that, as a method of restricting ICBM modernization, the negotiated SALT II Treaty, which would have expired in 1985, would have prohibited testing of more than one new ICBM. The two-part ICBM modernization program suggested by the Commission would not violate that negotiated agreement because testing of a small, single-warhead ICBM could not begin before this expiration date. Of more long-term importance, however, the approach toward arms control and force modernization suggested here is fundamentally compatible with the sort of stability that SALT II sought to achieve. SALT II specifically contemplated the negotiation of extension agreements with improved terms, and there is no reason to doubt that future extension agreements would have allowed the testing and deployment of a second new ICBM missile with the stabilizing potential of a small, single-warhead ICBM. Moreover, the Soviets have tested two new ICBMs since October 1982.

The current Administration's START proposal is centered on warhead limitations and reductions, with some attention to throw-weight limitations. These are consistent with the Commission's recommended program. It also contains a proposed limit on launchers that the Commission believes should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs.

Some current arms control proposals in Congress concentrate on warhead limitations in which reductions are forced in warhead numbers as a price of modernization; others seek explicitly to encourage movement toward small, single-warhead ICBMs on both sides. These general directions are also consistent with the approach suggested in this report.

The Commission urges the continuation of vigorous pursuit of arms control; it is beyond the scope of this report, however, for the Commission to recommend specific arms control proposals, the size of numerical limits, or the pace and scope of reductions. Of course any arms control proposal must be carefully designed with a view to compliance and verification—often particularly difficult questions in agreements with the Soviets. Some proposals may require innovation in verification techniques.

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Finally, the Commission is particularly mindful of the importance of achieving a greater degree of national consensus with respect to our strategic deployments and arms control. For the last decade, each successive Administration has made proposals for arms control of strategic offensive systems that have become embroiled in political controversy between the Executive branch and Congress and between political parties. None has produced a ratified treaty covering such systems or a politically sustainable strategic modernization program for the U.S. ICBM force. Such a performance, as a nation, has produced neither agreement among ourselves, restraint by the Soviets, nor lasting mutual limitations on strategic offensive weapons.

The Commission realizes that its recommendations will probably not fully satisfy any one of the many contending groups and individuals, inside and outside government, that have staked out claims to particular approaches to strategic modernization or arms control—much less all of them. In the interest of producing a national consensus on these two large issues, however, the Commission has developed an approach that is different in kind from what has gone before.

The Commission believes that all of the difficult issues discussed in this report—including the devastating nature of modern war and the totalitarian and expansive character of the Soviet system—must be considered fairly in trying to reach a national consensus about a broad approach to strategic force modernization and arms control that can set a general direction for a number of years. Clearly there will be, and should be, many different views about specific elements in that approach. But the Commission unanimously believes that such a new consensus—requiring a spirit of compromise by all of us—is essential if we are to move toward greater stability and toward reducing the risk of war. If we can begin to see ourselves, in dealing with these issues, not as political partisans or as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set

of problems, but rather as citizens of a great nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in the long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, a common perspective may finally be found.



APPROACHES TO A U.S. POLICY ON THE BUILD-DOWN CONCEPT

I. Introduction

In response to the President's letters of May 12 to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy, the START Interagency initiated an intensive study of both the specific build-down proposal contained in S. Res. 57 and more generalized approaches following the guidance provided by the President in his May 12 letters. While this work has not been completed, significant progress has been achieved in assessing the factors that should be taken into account in analyzing build-down approaches. Specific approaches have already been analyzed to some degree, though much more work remains to be done.

This paper reviews interagency progress to date in studying the build-down and suggests a possible Administration stance on the issue. This paper:

- reviews the history of the build-down;
- states the important factors that affect possible build-down approaches;
- assesses possible Soviet reactions to a U.S. build-down initiative;
- lays out minimum acceptable requirements for a build-down approach;
- identifies subjects for further study;
- suggests certain steps the Administration should avoid; and
- recommends a Congressional and public stance covering our efforts to date.

II. (U) Background.

In February 1983, Senators Nunn and Cohen introduced S. Res. 57 which called for the elimination from operational forces of two nuclear warheads for each newly deployed nuclear warhead. The resolution has approximately 45 Senate cosponsors. Subsequent to S. Res. 57, Senators Nunn, Cohen and Percy sent a letter to the President calling for the US to accept a nuclear warhead build-down proposal. The Senators have indicated that the build-down was not tied to a specific two-for-one ratio because it might unnecessarily restrict the negotiations within the context of START. In response, the President supported the concept of a flexible mutual build-down in his 12 May 1983 letter to the

Senators. The letter states that the "Administration is currently examining the structure of a build-down proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces." In laying out the broad framework of a modified build-down, the President's letter states:

- "The principle of a mutual build-down, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek."
- "It would, if properly applied, reinforce the intent to cap the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads on both sides and to cause each side to reduce those levels steadily and substantially over time."
- "It could be implemented flexibly and with reasonable latitude for each side to balance the force it deploys and reduces. Variable ratios as appropriate, would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems."
- "It could be implemented in conjunction with an agreed floor which, when reached, would trigger the suspension of the build-down rule, subject to renegotiation."

The President stated that any build-down concept must recognize the importance of strategic modernization and the necessity of maintaining a balance during the reduction process to deal with asymmetries in US and Soviet forces. The process would also require agreement on effective verification measures and counting rules for all strategic nuclear systems.

On May 26, nineteen Senators wrote to the President and reminded him, inter alia, of his obligation to develop "within the next several weeks a meaningful build-down proposal for nuclear arms reductions."

### III. (U) Factors Affecting any Build-down Approach.

There are several issues associated with a simple build-down proposal that must be addressed.

Equality. There currently is a significant difference in the age of the strategic forces of the US and the USSR; Soviet forces are significantly more modern. A simple build-down would make reductions contingent upon force modernization, in that force reductions would not be required until new warheads were added.

The Soviets with more modern forces could more easily delay their reductions by curtailing additional modernization and retaining existing forces. Three-fourths of Soviet warheads are on systems which are five years old or less. Three-fourths of US warheads are on systems that are 15 years old or more. Because of the potentially dangerous weapon-level asymmetries which would occur if only the United States modernized, for the build-down concept to function effectively any build-down must be part of a comprehensive mutual agreement to reduce strategic forces and not be based solely on modernization.

There are a number of ways to address this problem. One is to develop a build-down schedule that limits differences in weapons numbers between US and USSR. A schedule of reductions could be developed (incorporating a goal or floor and intermediate reduction levels) that would control developing inequalities by introducing the requirement to meet this schedule of reductions whether a side modernized or not.

Aggregation of Bomber Weapons and Ballistic Missile Warheads.  
A simple build-down concept would aggregate all weapons, forcing bombs, cruise missiles, and ballistic missile warheads to be counted equally. Thus far in the START negotiations the United States has argued that some strategic systems (ballistic missiles) are more destabilizing than others (bombers and cruise missiles). If a build-down embraced aggregated weapons, the current US START negotiating position would be undermined. Also, deploying one new ALCM could mean building down two ballistic missile warheads or other accountable bomber weapons if a 2 to one ratio were used.

The problems associated with counting bomber weapons might be resolved by counting accountable bomber platforms\* rather than their weapons. This is the approach the United States proposes in START and is similar to the way non-ALCM carrying heavy bombers were handled in the SALT II Treaty. Counting bomber platforms avoids the uncertainties associated with agreeing to and verifying bomber weapons loadings. This approach also would recognize that the United States has over 200 mothballed B-52 aircraft which count under SALT II. A 2 for 1 build-down of bomber platforms could not be accommodated if applied only to operationally deployed bombers.

However, the Soviets would be very unlikely to accept counting bombers on the basis of accountable platforms for several reasons. First, it allows the US well over 100 new bombers without retiring any operational bombers. Second, there is no provision for controlling ALCM deployment. Finally, the

\* Accountable bomber platforms includes mothballed as well as operational bombers.

Soviets would have to either classify the Backfire as a heavy bomber or accept a limit of 75 on new heavy bombers (150 Bear/Bison currently deployed on a 2 for 1 build-down would allow a maximum of 75 new heavy bombers), or accept reductions in other systems.

Counting Rules. Although a build-down based on deployed ballistic missile warheads (excluding bomber weapons) might be acceptable to the US if properly constructed, a build-down based on accountable warheads\* would clearly be preferable. At Geneva, however, we have proposed that each type of currently deployed missile be counted as having the maximum number of warheads actually deployed on a missile of that type. We must have the same counting rules applied to both our START reductions proposal and a build-down proposal to prevent the Soviets from exploiting this disparity in the negotiations. Switching to an accountable basis for currently deployed missiles would be inconsistent with our current START approach. This would credit the Poseidon C3 with 14, rather than the 10 with which it is operationally deployed. As pointed out above, however, a build-down of heavy bombers is only acceptable on an accountable basis. Using accountable numbers would also reduce the necessity for on site cooperative measures to insure verification.

Ballistic Missile Warhead Floor. The simple build-down concept as proposed in the Senate resolution does not identify a warhead floor. If modernization proceeded indefinitely, the strategic force levels would eventually reach zero. Therefore, the absence of a floor would limit the extent to which modernization could be carried out, assuming the US wished to retain some minimum warhead level.

Thus, a warhead floor (e.g., 5000) is a critical and essential element that must be adopted with any build-down proposal. When that floor is reached, the build-down requirement would end and the floor would become a ceiling. Thereafter, one could modernize on a 1 for 1 basis. Reductions below the ceiling would be subject to follow-on negotiations.

Qualitative Controls. The lack of qualitative controls in a build-down scheme could exacerbate force asymmetries because the concept does not account for different weapons types. For example, warheads on SS-18s would be counted no differently than smaller, less accurate warheads on SLBMs. As a result, there is nothing inherent in a simple build-down which automatically reduces destabilizing systems more quickly than other systems, or reduces the overall destructive potential of a side's arsenal. Under a simple build-down, a single very large warhead could replace two much smaller warheads on MIRVed systems. If it were

\* Maximum number of warheads flight tested on a missile of a given type (except for MM III).

important to limit ICBMs, heavy missiles, medium ICBMs, or throw-weight, additional build-down constraints would be necessary.

The problem of controlling types of systems to be reduced can be resolved in several ways. Several different packages of constraints are currently being considered for the US START proposal. Any of these packages might be combined with a build-down and could provide the necessary additional constraints to insure adequate qualitative controls.

Build-down Ratio. The ratio which determines the rate at which old weapons are being retired for new ones is closely related to other variables:

- Starting warhead levels (both sides are increasing their warhead levels as they modernize, even though constraining launcher levels as a result of "no undercut" policies).
  - The weapons floor (level at which build-down terminates).
  - The interval between the starting date and the date the floor is reached.
- 
- Planned modernization (new warheads) programmed over the specified period.
  - The choice of counting rules: accountable or deployed.
  - Any other START constraints.

When all the variables except the build-down ratio have been fixed (e.g., warhead level, build-down interval, modernization requirements, etc.), a build-down ratio would then be established. This is the only approach which has yet been examined in detail. Alternatively, the ratio could be arbitrarily selected (e.g., 2 for 1), with other variables changed as necessary to protect our modernization program. The weapons floor (5000 RVs) and planned modernization program are not variables that the US would wish to alter. However, it might be possible to alter the interval between starting date and the date the floor is reached. A build-down ratio of 3 for 2 instead of 2 for 1 might also be feasible. Neither of these alternative approaches have been analyzed in detail and should not yet be considered acceptable.

An additional complication exists in negotiating a ratio acceptable to both sides. Although modernization plans of the

Soviet Union are only projections, they are significantly different from ours. If a starting date, floor and interval are successfully negotiated with the Soviets, the build-down ratios that permit each side to continue programmed modernization would have to be different for the end result to be equal, since each side's programs introduce different numbers of new weapons at different times. Thus, it could be difficult to agree on the same mutually acceptable build-down ratio on this basis.

Before selecting a specific build-down ratio, one must also consider not only the degree of flexibility which might be desirable to allow possible changes in future force structures, but also the flexibility required to accommodate the inevitable changes which would result from the negotiating process.

As indicated in the President's letter of May Twelfth, the appropriate use of variable ratios would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems. For example, a lower build-down ratio could be applied to bombers than to ballistic missiles. The magnitude of this difference could also reflect other factors, such as unconstrained Soviet air defenses. On the other hand, the use of different build-down ratios for the different components of our strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers) could penalize the possibility of improving one component by reductions in another component.

#### IV. Provisional Cases Studied and Effect on US programs.

As noted earlier, no build-down proposal can assume a common rate of US and Soviet strategic modernization. Respective modernization rates will differ in the future and given the greater need for US modernization, the Soviets could reduce forces at a lower rate.

Some preliminary analysis has been performed of the compatibility of a build-down approach with presently planned US force modernization programs. This analysis rests on a number of specific assumptions about the factors already identified (starting ballistic missile warhead level, ballistic missile warhead floor, deployed ballistic missile limit, and drawdown period) that would critically affect the compatibility of a given build-down ratio with US programs. For each case studied, the US modernization program was assumed to be a given. Changes in any of these assumptions would change the results presented below. It should be noted that the analysis did not include other constraints in our present START proposal, such as sub-limits on ICBM warheads and heavy and medium ICBMs. It should be stressed that none of these cases has been analyzed to the point where it is ready for decision.

What follows in approaches A and B is a schedule of reductions calculated on the US rate of strategic modernization over an 8 year period and down to a level of 5000 warheads. On this basis, we conclude that a build-down ratio of about 1.9 to 1 on a deployed basis and 2 to 1 on an accountable basis, and keyed to the implementation of the US modernization program, would be acceptable. To reduce to 5000 warheads in 8 years, the Soviets would have to apply a higher build-down ratio because they start from a higher numerical base. Thus, were the Soviet Union to accept a floor of 5000, it might then place the US in the uncomfortable position of having to reject a Soviet proposal for a higher build-down ratio.

A. Build-down calculated on deployed ballistic missile warheads.

Given a ballistic missile warhead floor of 5000, a starting date of January 1985 and an eight-year build-down period, a build-down ratio of about 1.9 to 1 would accommodate both planned US force modernization and the deployment of 100 small missiles in 1993 (with room for 300 to 350 more following the termination of the build-down).

B. Build-down calculated on accountable ballistic missile warheads.

Given a ballistic missile warhead floor of 5000, a starting date of January 1985, and an eight-year build-down period, a build-down ratio of 2 for 1 would be compatible with planned US modernization programs. The 2 to 1 ratio (vice the 1.9 to 1 in A) is acceptable here because accountable numbers permit a higher starting base.

C. Build-down calculated on accountable bomber platforms.

Given an internal minimum floor of 350 bomber platforms (we have proposed a limit of 400 to the Soviet Union in the START negotiations), a 2 for 1 build-down ratio would accommodate planned US bomber force modernization.

D. Observations.

There are both positive and negative features associated with these approaches. On the positive side, since the numerical values selected for approaches A, B, and C above (5000 warheads, 8 year drawdown period, 400 heavy bombers)

coincide with those of the current US START proposal, these particular approaches are conceptually consistent with our existing START proposal. Also, combining the approaches outlined in A and C or B and C above would not adversely affect US modernization.

On the negative side, there are a number of significant problems associated with each of these approaches. First, none is likely to be acceptable to the Soviets. Second, the build-down ratios presented above oblige us to hold all the other variables constant. The approaches allow little flexibility in the negotiating process or for possible changes in future modernization programs. Third, combining approaches A and C is inconsistent since it would use accountable numbers for bomber platforms but deployed numbers for missile warheads. Combining approaches A and B, (using accountable numbers for both bomber platforms and ballistic missile warheads), on the other hand, might be seen as inconsistent with our present START approach which seeks to focus on deployed numbers. Finally, any build-down which focused only on reducing to 5000 warheads in a fixed period, and ignored other essential objectives of our START proposal, would not achieve our overall strategic goals in START.

Certification of Military Sufficiency. The forces associated with any build-down initiative must be analyzed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and certified by them as sufficient to meet military objectives.

V. Possible Soviet Reactions to the Nunn-Cohen Build-Down Concept.

OVERVIEW:

With the U.S. media attention that the build-down concept has received over the last two months, the Soviets understand our present interest in it. They would clearly interpret U.S. motivations in proposing a build-down as political and would recognize the important role the build-down plays in dampening freeze sentiment and marshalling support in Congress for Administration arms control policy, MX, and the defense budget more generally. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Soviets would either accept or reject a U.S. build-down proposal outright. A more probable Soviet response to a U.S. build-down proposal would be to try to exploit the general concept within START and in the larger political arena, to promote their own START negotiating position and strategic objectives more generally. Specifically, the Soviets might seize that part of a



U.S. build-down proposal that caps the number of strategic nuclear warheads, call it a freeze, and offer to proceed with their own START proposals. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviets may table either their own build-down concept or embrace the Nunn-Cohen proposal to gain the initiative in the negotiations.

Although the Soviets clearly want to restrict U.S. strategic modernization, it is unlikely that they would accept the build-down as an interim restraint measure on any basis that would be acceptable to us. It is possible that the Soviets would agree to some type of build-down as a mechanism for accomplishing the reductions required in a negotiated START agreement. However, they likely would only do this well after the immediate U.S. political need for it had passed, and then only in return for appropriate U.S. concessions.

The Soviets in theory probably would not be averse to the "build-down" concept if they could develop it to reflect their arms control goals. Their own START Treaty draft of March 1983 sets forth a staged schedule for reductions of the total number of nuclear warheads and bombs carried on all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Some Soviets have explored the idea of "de-MIRVing" and other ideas drawn from the Scowcroft Commission Report in informal and unofficial forums outside of START with U.S. counterparts. Moreover, the Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the unratified SALT II Treaty, which the Soviets agreed to, made clear that the provisions to be developed in the SCC for arms ceasing to be subject to the Treaty's limitations should include procedures for converting ICBM and SLBM launchers from launchers of MIRVed missiles to launchers of non-MIRVed missiles.

The Soviets, however, have long held that the U.S. possesses a larger number of total deliverable warheads--ballistic missile reentry vehicles (RVs), nuclear bombs, and cruise missiles --than the USSR. They have consistently linked the establishment of any warhead limits for ICBMs and SLBMs to restrictions on cruise missiles and their carriers, and have argued that the distinction that the U.S. has drawn between limiting ballistic missiles and their warheads immediately, and aircraft and cruise missiles in the future, is artificial and self-serving. Their current START proposal, which presumes a ban on all long-range cruise missiles, implies a method of counting other bomber armament.


Equality. If Soviet analysis of a U.S. build-down proposal suggests to them that the proposal would have the effect of requiring them to reduce their heavy or "medium" ICBM force

without significant concessions from the U.S., then Moscow will not respond favorably.

Aggregation. The Soviets would probably interpret the proposal in a way that would count bombs and cruise and ballistic warheads equally. They have long maintained that the U.S. proposal for two phases, in which limits on cruise missiles were postponed, is not an acceptable basis for negotiations.

Weapon Floor. A U.S. proposal that specified limits markedly inconsistent with the provisions of the Soviet START proposal would probably not be received favorably. The Soviet assessment of the number of warheads that they would need would be driven by their perception of the threat posed by U.S. force modernization programs (including possible basing modes for new U.S. missiles and the fractionation that the U.S. is considering).

Miscellaneous. The Soviets would probably respond negatively to any variable ratio scheme which they perceived, through their own analysis, as having an unfavorable and one-sided impact on their forces. The Soviets would also probably never enter into such a scheme without mutual agreement on a weapons floor. 1.4(c)



Forces Considerations. We believe the build-down proposal

as advanced by Senators Nunn and Cohen (though offering the Soviets some advantages vis-a-vis the U.S.) would require the Soviets to considerably alter what we believe to be their planned strategic forces. This concept was raised by the Soviets in past arms control negotiations and used as one of the primary arguments against U.S. START proposals. As such, we believe the Soviets will be reluctant to accept the build-down proposal. However, the Soviets might table a build-down proposal of their own if they see it is to their advantage.

ICBMs are the mainstay of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, constituting more than one-half of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and three-fourths of the nuclear warheads. Almost the entire currently deployed fourth generation of Soviet ICBMs is MIRVed. The build-down concept, however, to assure a survivable force would require deployment of a new, single-warhead, probable mobile force. Additionally, we believe that they are developing, and intend to deploy, additional versions of ~~the currently deployed SS-18s and SS-19s, and 10-warhead SS-X-24,~~ as well as a mobile variant of the single-warhead PL-5. The Soviets currently have roughly 6,000 warheads in their ICBM force.

#### VI. Minimum Requirements for any Build-Down Approach

Study of the build-down concept to date has shown that there are a number of interrelated variables which affect the desirability of any build-down approach. It, therefore, is not possible either to support or reject any specific build-down ratio in isolation from the other considerations identified earlier in this paper. In addition, IG study has identified a number of required features that any build-down approach must contain.

1. Floor. A build-down must have a weapons floor. This floor or floors would apply to whatever weapons are covered by the build-down, such as ballistic missile RVs, bomber platforms, etc. Once this floor is reached, the build-down ratio must become 1:1 unless a lower floor can be certified. To date this requirement has been generally accepted by most build-down supporters on the Hill.

2. Equality. Any build-down must permit the preservation of at least approximate equality during -- and after -- the build-down period. Several ways of accomplishing this are currently being examined.

3. Verifiability. Any build-down approach must be verifiable. At a minimum this would probably require a set of agreed counting rules and definition of modernization for missile

warheads.

4. Consistency with START. It is imperative that whatever build-down approach we might seek in the START negotiations be fully consistent with our START position. This would require, inter alia, that we keep ballistic missiles and bombers separate, that our counting rules be consistent, and that the reduction objectives be the same or at least not inconsistent, e.g., warhead floor no lower than 5000, bomber floor no lower than 350 (400 has been proposed in Geneva).

5. Accountable Bombers. If bombers are included in a build-down, SALT-accountable bombers, including mothballed ones must be included. With the retirement of the B-52D's, the U.S. is already below the long-term desired level for bombers.

6. Modernization. To be acceptable, any build-down must be part of a comprehensive mutual agreement to reduce strategic forces and not based solely on modernization. This is because ~~respective US and Soviet rates of modernization will be different and in the latter case because we cannot know with any certainty what Soviet modernization plans are.~~

## VII. Issues for Further Study.

This paper is necessarily only a first step in analyzing the build-down concept. However,, the work accomplished to date has identified three broad areas requiring further study: specific build-down alternatives, broader build-down issues, and build-down modalities. These are discussed briefly below.

### A. Build-Down Alternatives

A number of possible build-down approaches have been identified for possible further study, and it is expected that more will be identified over the next several weeks. Once again, it should be noted that none of these approaches can depend solely upon rates of modernization.

#### 1. Percentage annual reduction in ballistic missile warheads and bomber platforms.

This approach would drop the explicit link between reductions and modernization and would make reductions depend only upon the calendar. Preliminary work has been done on this approach, and it has been found that a 5% figure applied to both sides would be similar to the reductions schedule which we have proposed to the

Soviets in START. It does not link reductions to modernization, a linkage which some build-down supporters strongly seek, but it would, unlike the original build-down proposal, guarantee reductions if accepted. Some type of modernization constraints could be added if needed to offset this "delinkage."

2. 3 for 2 build-down for missile warheads only, based on either operational or accountable loadings.
3. 3 for 2 build-down for SLBM warheads and 2 for 1 for ICBM warheads based on either operational or accountable loadings.

This would incorporate the variable ratio concept referred to in the President's letters to Sens. Cohen, Nunn, and Percy. This could complicate our plans for MX deployment, however.

4. 2 for 1 build-down for warheads, 1 for 1 for bombers (where all B-52D's are counted whether retired or not).

5. Differing reduction ratios.

This approach would establish a 2 for 1 reduction ratio for US SLBM and Soviet ICBM warheads, and 3 to 2 for US ICBM and Soviet SLBM warheads. This recognizes that under the US START proposal we will be reducing more SLBM warheads than ICBM warheads and would encourage the Soviets to shift to SLBMs. On the other hand, it could undercut some of our arguments in START about stabilizing and destabilizing systems, since we would in effect be encouraging ourselves to shift to ICBMs.

6. 1 for 1 cap on ballistic missile RVs.
7. Build-down based on launchers.
8. 2 for 1, or 3 for 2, build-down based on either operational or accountable missile loadings but include bomber weapons on an accountable basis.

This approach would pose major problems for our current START position, which seeks to avoid numerical limits on bomber weapons.

9. Build-down of MIRVed ICBMs.

This approach would require that two MIRVed ICBMs be dismantled for each new one deployed. This would support the thrust of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and would be

consistent with our MX plans.

Broader Build-Down Issues.

1. Definition of a new weapon.

The question of exactly what constitutes a "modernized" weapon (or a "newly deployed nuclear warhead", using the language of S.Res 57) will be a complex matter of definition and negotiation. Specific guidelines will have to be established. Examples of the problems raised are:

- If a Trident I SLBM were moved from a Poseidon boat to a new Trident boat, would this count as the deployment of a new weapon?
- If an existing Mk-12A were moved from a Minuteman III to a new MX, would this count as deployment of a new warhead? What about replacing Mk-12's with Mk-12A's?

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- If the Soviets replaced warheads on existing missiles, such as an SS-18/Mod 3 with an SS-18/Mod 4, would this count as deployment of new warheads?
- What if new SRAM's or gravity bombs replace old ones on B-52's?
- What are the verification implications of monitoring missile warhead modifications?

2. Negotiability problems.

Attempting to reach agreement on at least five variables that affect the acceptability of a build-down, when a change in any one would necessitate change in the others, would pose enormous difficulties for the negotiators. Each change in one key variable would send us (not to mention the Soviets) back to the drawing board. The problems encountered to date in deciding within the US government what the effects of the build-down concept would be amply illustrate the negotiating difficulties that require further study.

- 3. Should accountable or deployed figures be used for warheads?
- 4. How should SLCM be handled?

SLCM poses important difficulties to any build-down approach,

as well as to START more generally. Even if we determined a way to account for nuclear SLCMs only, the introduction of 758 such SLCMs, which are not included in our SIOP plans, would require the removal of perhaps twice as many SIOP-committed weapons. If no acceptable way were found to distinguish non-nuclear from nuclear SLCM, under a 2 for 1 build-down the US would have to destroy virtually our entire strategic force just to accommodate them.

5. How do Soviet air-defenses relate to US bomber modernization and the build-down?
6. How would various build-down starting dates and the resulting changes in force structure affect the acceptability of build-down approaches?

Build-Down Modalities.

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One important aspect of the build-down question is whether to incorporate a build-down proposal directly into our START position or to seek to reach a more limited interim agreement separate from a START treaty. In the latter case, the separate agreement would presumably still be negotiated by the START Delegation in Geneva. There are two broad alternatives:

1. Incorporate Build-Down Into our START Position.

This approach would provide a potentially suitable mechanism to achieve the reductions that would be part of such an agreement. This alternative need not interrupt our ability to reach a broad-based START agreement. This also would facilitate greater consistency between our START and build-down positions. On the other hand, build-down sponsors have expressed some opposition to this type of approach and are looking for something that would achieve reductions sooner than what they fear might be several years before a START agreement.

2. Negotiate Build-Down as a Separate Agreement.

Some of the build-down sponsors regard the build-down concept as an interim measure which could operate until a START agreement was concluded. A separate interim agreement would thus respond to this segment of Hill sentiment but at the cost of diverting negotiations on a complete START agreement. The Soviets would have no incentive to help us with our political problems by reaching an early build-down agreement that would be consistent with our security requirements.

It would also give the Soviets the perfect vehicle for delay in START, which may be their objective in START until they have a clearer picture of the INF outcome. The Soviets could also turn our equality arguments back on us by proposing something similar to the original Senate build-down proposal, which would include bomber weapons, a long-time goal of theirs. They also would argue publicly that it was inconsistent to propose a build-down from present levels on the one hand but reject a freeze at current levels on the other. Finally, from our own domestic bureaucratic point of view, getting agreement on the elements of a separate build-down proposal would be a difficult task at a time when we have much work remaining on START.

VIII. Features that Should not be Part of a Build-Down Proposal.

From its assessment to date, the IG finds the following elements to be unacceptable based on our national security requirements:

- Any build-down that has no floors on warheads and bombers; without such floors, we either would be driven below weapons levels needed to meet our nuclear targeting requirements or would be forced to retain aging and/or vulnerable weapons.
- Any build-down that uses only operational bombers.
- Any build-down that does not guarantee mutual reductions and does not prevent large force asymmetries from resulting.

IX. Recommended Congressional and Public Stance.

The Administration posture on the build-down to date has been to praise the build-down's recognition of the need for both modernization and reductions, acknowledge the potential utility of a build-down concept if implemented flexibly, and emphasize some of the ambiguities and problems with S. Res. 57, as well as with implementing the concept.

In addition to our current public posture, we should consider striking the following additional themes:

- The build-down concept is being intensively studied.
- Our study to date continues to confirm the need for modernization as we pursue reductions. Our START proposal



lends itself to this concept.

- We are developing a number of criteria which should guide our assessment of any build-down approach.

With regard to the Congress, we should strive to advance our work to the point where we could provide a preliminary briefing to the Congress before the August recess.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1983

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your recent letter on our strategic modernization program and its relationship to our arms control proposals. Your letter represents the bi-partisan spirit which I believe will help achieve our common goals of ensuring effective deterrent forces and equitable and verifiable arms reductions.

The fundamental U.S. goal in negotiations concerning arms reduction, and especially in our approach to the START negotiations, is to seek agreements that would enhance security and stability by reducing overall force levels while permitting modernization of U.S. forces necessary for a credible deterrent. As you know, the Scowcroft Commission noted that elements of our START proposal are consistent with and supportive of the Commission's findings. I agree wholeheartedly with the essential theme of the Scowcroft Commission's approach to arms control: the attainment of stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

The Scowcroft Commission's recommendations on modernization and arms control are integrally related. Our action with respect to these recommendations must be equally comprehensive. That is why I am now reviewing our START proposal in order to develop such modifications as are necessary to reflect the Commission's approach, which I share. To cite just one example, the Commission report recommended that the proposed limit on deployed ballistic missiles currently contained in the U.S. START position be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs. There are a number of alternative approaches available to integrate this and the other Commission recommendations into our approach to arms reductions. As modifications are made to our START proposal, I will continue to seek stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

The planned deployment of the Peacekeeper missile as proposed by my Administration is compatible with the long-term objective of the Scowcroft Commission Report. The Peacekeeper missile, deployed in a mix with small single-warhead ICBMs, would permit us to maintain the effectiveness of our deterrent and enhance stability.

At the same time, let me emphasize that we do not seek a first strike capability. To this end, we will constrain the number of Peacekeeper missiles to the minimum number needed to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent and no more. Our task, of course, would be much easier if the Soviets would agree to work with us to reduce the ratio of accurate warheads to missile silos. Clearly, consistent with our national security requirements, the overall level of Peacekeeper deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reductions agreements.

In addition, I fully recognize the central role that the small, single-warhead ICBM plays in the overall modernization program recommended by the Scowcroft Commission Report. We will promptly undertake a major effort to bring the proposal of a small, single-warhead ICBM to fruition on a high priority basis.

In considering the implementation of the essential ICBM modernization program, the Scowcroft Commission also recognized that a series of decisions involving both the Executive Branch and the Congress would be necessary in the months ahead in order to determine the future shape of our ICBM force. Further, it noted that not all of these decisions can or should be made in 1983. The deliberate approach to decision making proposed by a number of members of Congress is fully in keeping with the intent of the Scowcroft Commission Report. I fully recognize that a lasting consensus on such an important issue must be built up carefully and I intend to take the time necessary to forge that lasting consensus.

I urge all concerned, however, to keep in mind that if we draw out critical elements of the decision-making process unnecessarily, we encourage the Soviets to delay in negotiations while continuing apace in their own weapons modernization programs.

To avoid this, I am seeking a clear show of support from Congress to signal U.S. resolve. A case in point is the clear necessity of approving funds promptly to procure Peacekeeper missiles. Working together, this should be achievable while simultaneously meeting our mutual desire to deal with deployment issues, whenever possible, in a careful, deliberate manner.

You have suggested that certain additional initiatives could be helpful in moving us toward our goals of security and stability at reduced levels of forces. One of the most prominent of these initiatives is the idea of a "guaranteed build-down."

The principle of a mutual build-down, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek.

It would, if properly applied, reinforce our intent to cap the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads on both sides and to cause each side to reduce those levels steadily and substantially over time.

It could be implemented flexibly and with reasonable latitude for each side to balance the forces it deploys and reduces. Variable ratios as appropriate, would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems.

It could be implemented in conjunction with an agreed floor which, when reached, would trigger the suspension of the build-down rule, subject to renegotiation.

As you have acknowledged, any build-down concept must recognize the importance of strategic modernization and the necessity of maintaining a balance during the reduction process to deal with asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet forces. It would, of course, require agreement on effective verification measures, including counting rules for all systems.


My Administration is currently examining the structure of a build-down proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START

agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces. I will work with you and your colleagues to develop such a proposal.

Finally, I want to stress the extraordinary contribution made by the Scowcroft Commission. It provided an opportunity for non-partisan analysis of an exceptionally difficult issue as a prelude to obtaining necessary bi-partisan support for critically needed modernization of our strategic forces. While not prescribing the details or the timing, the Commission report suggested certain directions that the continued evolution of our complementary strategy for arms reduction could take. Over the short term, follow-on arrangements involving members of the Commission, as well as close coordination with the Congress, will be extremely helpful both technically and politically in thinking through this evolution. However, we are giving careful consideration to determining which follow-on arrangements best meet our common objectives.

In this regard, I do see merit in a panel with bi-partisan composition and with staggered terms of membership to provide advice and continuity in this area. I will work with the Congress, building upon the experience of the Scowcroft Commission, to strengthen and supplement our consultative and advisory processes to assure a lasting, national, bi-partisan consensus concerning arms control initiatives -- a consensus which will deserve to be sustained from one Administration to the next.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is centered below the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable William S. Cohen  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

~~SECRET~~

D R A F T  
6/3/83

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating con-  
sequences for all mankind,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the  
interests of international security require the strengthening of  
strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction of strategic  
offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will reduce the risk  
of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and  
security,

Have agreed as follows:

DECLASSIFIED

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BY

AS

NARA, DATE

11/09/05

~~SECRET~~

Article I

Each Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, reduce and limit strategic offensive arms and adopt the other measures provided for in this Treaty.

Article II

1. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that [eight] years after that date, and thereafter:

(a) the aggregate number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 5,000;

(b) the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs does not exceed 2,500;

(c) the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 850;

(d) the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs does not exceed 210;

(e) the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs does not exceed 110; and

(f) the number of its heavy bombers does not exceed 400.

2. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit the aggregate number of its ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs, that are not deployed, to \_\_\_\_ percent of the allowed aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.

3. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.

[Article III]\*

[1. Beginning on \_\_\_\_\_, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that \_\_\_\_ years after that date, and thereafter:

- (a) all of its heavy ICBMs shall have been destroyed;
- (b) the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed \_\_\_\_ kilograms; and
- (c) the number of its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) deployed on its heavy bombers does not exceed the product of \_\_\_\_ and the number of its heavy bombers, and the number of ALCMs deployed on any heavy bomber of an existing type does not exceed \_\_\_\_.

2. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.]

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\* Bracketed pending decision on modification of U.S. position.



Article IV

1. Neither Party shall have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms subject to the provisions of this Treaty in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule, as specified in Annex I of this Treaty.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) convert land-based ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(b) convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(c) develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy ICBMs that can be launched by land-based launchers other than ICBM launchers; nor

(d) develop, produce, test, or deploy land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs that also have the capability of launching ICBMs permitted by this Treaty. —

3. Neither Party shall develop, produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of      kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles including free floating canister launchers. This Treaty shall

not require changes in current ballistic missile transport practices;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; or

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit, including fractional orbit, nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction.

4. Neither Party shall flight-test or deploy:

(a) ICBMs or ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 10;

(b) SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 14;

(c) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of \_\_\_\_\_\*, with multiple reentry vehicles or with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, the weight of any one of which exceeds 225 kilograms, nor

(d) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of \_\_\_\_\_\*, with a single reentry vehicle, the weight of which exceeds \_\_\_\_\_ kilograms.

5. Neither Party shall develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs, heavy ASBMs, or heavy ICBMs of types that were not deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty, nor produce or deploy additional such missiles of types that were deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modification, modernization, and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Within the limitations provided for in Articles II and III of this Treaty and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of its forces.

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\*A date earlier than the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. Each Party shall limit the number of its test and training launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed \_\_\_\_, all of which shall be located at test ranges designated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. ICBM and SLBM launchers at test ranges shall be constructed, converted, or used only for the purpose of testing and training, and not for deployment.

3. Each Party shall limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed \_\_\_\_ . Such missiles shall be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VII

1. ICBMs, SLBMs, ASBMs, and heavy bombers in excess of the limits provided in this Treaty shall be destroyed in accordance with the procedures specified in Annex IV, and shall remain subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they are so destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under the agreed procedures.

2. The Parties may store \_\_\_ ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs for use as space launch vehicles at designated space support centers, in accordance with the agreed measures set forth in Annex IV of this Treaty. Such missiles shall not be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VIII

1. Neither Party shall:

(a) develop, test, produce, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers;

(b) provide hardened storage facilities at ICBM launcher deployment areas;

(c) store more than two ICBMs at any ICBM launcher deployment area; or

(d) provide ground-support equipment at any ICBM launcher deployment area in excess of that required for normal deployment and maintenance.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 2 of Article VII and in subparagraph 1 (c) of this Article, each Party shall store all of its ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs, that are not deployed,

at designated storage facilities. Storage facilities for ICBMs that are not deployed shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM launcher deployment area.

3. Neither Party shall conduct training activities or exercises involving the rapid reload or simulated rapid reload of ICBM launchers, nor conduct any other activities or exercises that involve in any other manner rapid reload of any ICBM launcher after it has launched an ICBM.

#### Article IX

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall implement agreed measures as provided for in Annex IV; in addition, each Party may use national technical means of verification at its disposal, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall interfere with agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or with national technical means of verification.

3. Neither Party shall impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or by national technical means. In this connection, the obligation not to impede includes the obligation not to use concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at

concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

4. The encryption of telemetry on systems subject to the provisions of this Treaty is prohibited.

5. On board engineering test measurements shall be made, and all such measurements shall be broadcast using unencrypted telemetry, during each test flight or training flight of an ICBM, SLBM or ASBM.

#### Article X

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission, under regulations governing procedures to be agreed between the Parties.

2. The Parties agree that, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, they shall:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide such information as is necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) at least twice annually notify each other of the replacement dismantling, destruction, and conversion of strategic offensive arms performed in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) agree upon further measures contributing to the effectiveness of the verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

3. At least twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain and update by category the Agreed Data Base established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Strategic Offensive Arms of (date of signature of the Treaty).

#### Article XI

1. This Treaty shall be of (\_\_\_\_) duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.



Article XII

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XIII

1. This Treaty, and its Annexes which form an integral part hereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

*Darman*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1983

*THE PRESIDENT*

TO: DICK DARMAN


FROM: KEN DUBERSTEIN

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Attached are supplements to the Briefing Paper for the meeting Tuesday, June 7, at 1:00 p.m.:

Tab A - Talking Points (provided by NSC)

Tab B - Additional Backgrounder (provided by NSC)



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B

Backgrounder on Gore/Dicks/Aspin START Meeting

- When you meet with a small group of House Democrats and a few Republicans (at 1:00 p.m. on June 7) led by Congressmen Gore, Dicks and Aspin to discuss START and the Scowcroft Commission Report, they will be aware that you held a National Security Council meeting that morning to discuss possible changes in our START position to take into account the Scowcroft Commission Report. The purpose of the Congressional meeting is to continue the process of consultations which was agreed to as part of their support for the MX missile.
- The Gore/Dicks/Aspin group agreed to support funding for the MX missile as proposed by the Scowcroft Commission with the understanding that the Commission's recommendations for development of a small single warheaded intercontinental ballistic missile and for adjustments in our START position would be accepted.
- Each of the members of this House group has slightly different views with respect to the small missile and changes in our START position. However, they would all stress the need for the Administration to:
  - show commitment to early flight testing of the small missile and to keeping the missile small enough to be mobile.

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- show flexibility in negotiations and commitment to consultations with the Congress.
- continue the Scowcroft Commission to advise on both the small missile program and our START negotiations.
- In addition, in their June 3 letter to you they express their concern that we not base our new position in START on "...an unrealistic demand for equal throwweight...", particularly direct limitations on throwweight. Because of the large advantage in throwweight possessed by the Soviets, these House members fear that equal and direct limits on throwweight would prevent negotiation of an agreement. Instead they believe that "...concerns about throwweight would be alleviated by agreed reductions of existing systems and by constraints on the throw-weight of follow-on systems..."
- The group shares the Administration's desire to create a more stable nuclear balance through arms control agreements. They believe that we must move from the deployed missile limit of 850. Some favor an explicit higher number, others have said that we should not be too concerned about the level of deployed missiles. All agree that our goal of limiting ballistic warheads to 5000 on each side should be retained.

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