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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. list</del> letter case (8390701)	<del>of participants for NSC meeting (1p)</del> <i>R 11/09/05 M1346 #1</i>	<del>6/7/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>2. NSC profile</del>	<del>(1p)</del>	<del>6/1/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>3. NSC profile</del>	<del>(1p)</del> <i>R " " #2</i>	<del>6/1/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>4. memo</del>	<del>from W. Clark to the President re: NSC meeting (3pp)</del> <i>R " " #3</i>	<del>6/7/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>5. agenda</del>	<del>for NSC meeting (1p)</del> <i>R " " #4</i>	<del>6/7/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>6. paper</del>	<del>re: suggested talking points (6pp)</del> <i>R " " #5</i>	<del>6/7/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>7. agenda</del>	<del>for NSC meeting, with handwritten notations (1p)</del> <i>R " " #6</i>	<del>6/7/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>8. chart</del>	<del>(1p)</del> <i>R " " #7</i>	<del>3/28/83</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>9. paper</del>	<del>re: talking points and agenda items (8pp)</del> <i>R " " #8</i>	<del>6/1/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>10. paper</del>	<del>re: issues for discussion with charts (18pp)</del> <i>R " " #9</i>	<del>5/28/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>11. letter</del>	<del>from W. Graham to the President re: positions (4pp)</del> <i>R " " #10</i>	<del>5/26/83</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
	<i>R " " #11</i>		
COLLECTION: <b>EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)</b>			dd
FILE FOLDER: <b>NSC 00081 07Jun83 [1 of 5] Box 91285</b>			12/9/94

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 4/2/2007

**File Folder** NSC 00081 07 JUN 83 (1 OF 5)

**FOIA**

M1346

**Box Number** 91285

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
<del>4</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT (M1346 #4)</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>6/6/1983</del>
		<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>		
<del>6</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS (M1346 #6)</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>6/7/1983</del>
		<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>		
<del>10</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>START ISSUES FOR DECISION (M1346 #10)</del>	<del>18</del>	<del>5/28/1983</del>
		<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>		
<del>11</del>	<del>LETTER</del>	<del>GRAHAM TO THE PRESIDENT (M1346 #11)</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>5/26/1983</del>
		<i>MVH 3/25/08</i>		

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TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 01 JUN 83

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02 JUN 83

NLS M1346 #2

KRAEMER

01 JUN 83

BY CAJ NAPA, DATE 11/09/05

KEYWORDS: START

ARMS CONTROL

AGENDA

NSC

SUBJECT: PAPERS FOR 7 JUN NSC MTG RE APPROACHES TO US POLICY ON BUILD DOWN CONCEPTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

REF# 8316867 8317164 LOG 8390662 8390675 NSCIFID NSC00081 ( C / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	JUN 0 6 1983			
	JUN 0 7 1983			

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING:

DATE:

6/7/83  
Cabinet Room  
9:40-10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT:

START

PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

State:  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Dep Sec Kenneth Dam

Defense:  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Dr. Fred C. Ikle (Under Secretary  
for Policy)

OMB:  
Mr. David A. Stockman  
Mr. Joseph Wright (Deputy Director)  
Dr. Alton Keel (Associate Director  
for National Security and Internatio  
Affairs)

CIA:  
Mr. William J. Casey

USUN:  
No representative

ACDA:  
Mr. Kenneth Adelman  
Mr. Michael Guhin (Counsellor)

START Delegation:  
General Edward Rowny

JCS:  
General John W. Vessey, Jr.  
Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr.  
(Special Assistant to the Chairman)

White House:  
Mr. Edwin Meese III  
Mr. James A. Baker III  
Judge William P. Clark  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Mr. Richard G. Darman

NSC:  
Mr. Robert Kimmitt  
Mr. Sven Kraemer  
Col Robert Kimmitt  
Mr. Ronald Lehman

Dr. William Graham  
General Brent Scowcroft

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NLS M1346 #1  
BY CU 11/09/05

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8390701

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TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 01 JUN 83

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NSM 17346 #3

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/09/05

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL START

NSC

SUBJECT: PAPERS FOR 7 JUN NSC MTG RE APPROACHES TO US POLICY ON BUILD DOWN CONCEPTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS IP FILES IF

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

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<i>[Handwritten Name]</i>	P JUN 0 4 1983	<i>[Handwritten]</i>		
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SYSTEM II  
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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ACTION

June 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*  
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START -- Tuesday, June 7, 1983

Issue

To what degree should the US negotiation position on START be changed at this time in view of the Scowcroft Commission report and the Cohen-Nunn "mutual build-down" concept? With regard to the Scowcroft Commission, should the US retain, raise, or delete the current 850 limit on deployed missiles, and should we retain, alter, or drop indirect and/or direct limits on throw-weight? Concerning a build-down, what possible alternative options could be implemented or rejected now, which require further study, and what stance should the Administration take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option can be developed?

Facts

The Administration needs to address the above issues prior to the resumption of the START negotiations on June 8 and prior to the MX-related Senate vote on the 1984 Authorization Bill during the week of June 13. Following the last NSC meeting on START, on May 7, you indicated to the appropriate members of Congress that the Administration's START position would reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission and would seek to develop a flexible approach to the "build-down" concept for START (letter at Tab H). Subsequently, the START Interdepartmental Group (IG) undertook an intensive work program on these issues and has produced two papers on Scowcroft Commission implications and options (Tab D) and on mutual build-down implications (Tab G).

In addition to the IG's work to be considered at the June 7 NSC meeting, the meeting will also provide an opportunity to hear directly from General Scowcroft (arms control recommendations at Tab E) and from the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee Arms Control and Disarmament, Dr. William Graham, who has forwarded a separate proposal for a START package (Tab F).

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

cc Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

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BY CS NARA, DATE 11/09/05

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Discussion

We believe the most useful means of framing the discussion of the Scowcroft Commission issues relating to the number of deployed missiles and the issue of direct or indirect limits on throw-weight, would be through a focus on the two charts on: (1) the Agenda and (2) alternative START "packages," as briefed to you by NSC staff on June 1.

On the deployed missile number, the current 850 missile limit would permit the US to deploy MX and Trident missiles as planned and still field some 300 new small ICBMs or Midgetmen. We feel that it may be prudent to raise the 850 number at this time, but that we should probably not eliminate the number entirely at this time. A number remains an understandable counting and verification principle (although similar to SALT), offers some protection against direct limits on US bomber weapons, and may be necessary if, as is likely, we cannot agree now on the nature of a substitute approach focused entirely on warheads and direct throw-weight limits.

Concerning throw-weight, we believe further discussion and study are probably required before a major shift should be undertaken. In this regard, special consideration should also be given to verification and build-down factors.

Concerning build-down, we do not believe it is possible at this time to define any one or two clear options for our START position. However, the IG believes that, with a comprehensive IG work program current underway, we will be in a position to brief appropriate members of Congress on possible alternative approaches before the August recess.

NSC Package

For your use at the NSC meeting and for background information, we have prepared the comprehensive package attached with the following items:

- Tab A -- Agenda;
- Tab B -- My suggested Talking Points at the NSC meeting inviting discussion of the agenda issues; copies of two IG charts;
- Tab C -- The Scowcroft Commission-related Talking Points that we provided for your information earlier for your June 1 briefing;
- Tab D -- The IG paper on the Scowcroft Commission issues;
- Tab E -- GAC Chairman William Graham's letter to you proposing a specific START package related to the Scowcroft Commission;

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- Tab F -- The Scowcroft Commission recommendations on Arms Control;
- Tab G -- The IG paper on Mutual Build-Down;
- Tab H -- Your letter to Senators, Cohen, Nunn, and Percy on a build-down; and
- Tab I -- The proposed draft text of a START treaty, to be updated on the basis of decisions to be made.

Following the NSC meeting in the morning, you are scheduled to have consultations with appropriate Senate and House members later, in the afternoon, to be followed by a meeting the next morning with the Congressional leadership. Based on the NSC meeting discussion, we will prepare recommendations and alternative decision memoranda for your consideration prior to your meeting with the leadership.

Recommendation

OK	NO	
—	—	That you review the attached package, particularly the summary Talking Points and charts for the NSC meeting at Tab B, the comprehensive Talking Points prepared for your June 1 briefing by NSC staff at Tab C, and the START IG papers on Scowcroft Commission at Tab D and on the "Build-Down" at Tab G.
—	—	That you not announce any decisions at the NSC meeting, pending consideration of the afternoon's Congressional consultations and of alternative decision directives to be prepared by NSC staff.

Attachments

Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	My Proposed Talking Points for NSC Discussion
Tab C	June 1 NSC Staff Briefing Talking Points
Tab D	START IG Paper on Scowcroft Commission Issues
Tab E	GAC Chairman's Letter to You
Tab F	Scowcroft Commission Recommendations on Arms Control
Tab G	START IG Paper on Build-Down
Tab H	Your Letter to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy
Tab I	Proposed Draft Text of a START Treaty

Prepared by: Sven Kraemer/Robert Linhard

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AGENDA  
FOR  
NSC MEETING ON START

June 7, 1983

1. Introduction: Judge Clark
2. Should we change our START position now? Discussion of the following questions by NSC Principals:
  - Is a shift really the price of continued Congressional support for MX? And, given Soviet intransigence, would a shift really be in the US interest?
  - If we shift, should a change be major or minor at this time?
  - Should we retain limits on ballistic missiles?
  - Should we emphasize direct limits on throwweight?
3. If changed, what should our new position be. A discussion of alternative START packages by NSC Principals?
4. How do we incorporate a "mutual build-down" concept into the U.S. approach to START. Discussion of the following questions by NSC Principals.
  - What alternatives/options could be implemented now?
  - What alternatives/options are worthy of additional study?
  - What alternatives/options should be rejected from further consideration?
  - What stance should the Administration take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option is implemented?

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BY CIS NARA, DATE 11/09/05

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Suggested Talking Points for Judge Clark's use at June 7 NSC Meeting on START

- Our purpose today is to discuss two main topics:
  - first, how should we modify our current START position to reflect the work of the Scowcroft Commission; and,
  - second, what should be the Administration stance with respect to other Congressional initiatives, and especially the build-down concept.
- The chart displayed outlines the agenda for today's meeting.
- Given the amount of material on that agenda, Mr. President, I propose we wade into our discussion without further delay.

Agenda Item 1: Should we change our START position?

- The first item on the agenda is the question "should we change our START position now?"
- We have listed a number of questions to structure our discussion of the main issues involved in adjusting our current START negotiating position.
  - The first two questions listed on our agenda chart address the larger issue of how much of a shift is necessary at this time.
  - The last two address the two major substantive items, the treatment of limits on deployed ballistic missiles and throwweight, that are at the heart of the alternative ways we choose to make such a shift.
- I am sure that we will have much to discuss concerning both the limit on ballistic missiles and on throwweight. But, before we turn to these substantive topics, Mr. President, I would propose that we start our discussion by initially focusing only on the first two questions.
  - We'll get to the two major substantive issues after we have set the stage for them by discussing the larger issue.
- George (Secretary Shultz), perhaps you could lead off our discussion. What, in your opinion, should be our objectives in shifting our position at this time? And, should the shift be major or minor?

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BY GL, NARA, DATE 11/09

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(After a discussion of the first two questions, move to the next topic, the treatment of the 850 limit on deployed missiles.)

The Treatment of the 850 Deployed Missile Limit

- Could we now turn to the two substantive issues that define many of our options for shifting our current START position.
- I think that most of us would agree that, as a minimum and no matter what else we do, we need to address the issue of our current 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles.
- I would propose that we reorder our agenda slightly and address this item next.
- Cap (Secretary Weinberger), perhaps you could get us started on this item.

(If the impact of totally dropping the deployed missile limit on the bomber weapon issue is not raised in the discussion, use the next point.)

- If we do drop totally the deployed missile limit, and focus very heavily on missile warheads and not on missiles, we will be able to sustain a focus on bombers and not on bomber weapons later?

(If the discussion does not raise the issue that retaining limits on deployed missile limits could make our START position look like a SALT approach, use the next point.)

- If we do retain the limit on deployed ballistic missiles, albeit at some higher level than 850, how do we answer the criticism that we are simply moving back to SALT II?

(After a discussion of the deployed missile limit, move on to the next topic, the treatment of throwweight.)

The Treatment of Throwweight

- The second major substantive issue involves the treatment of throwweight.
- Our current START position attempts to reduce Soviet throwweight during the first phase of START to 2.5 million kilograms by indirect limits. It calls for a further reduction of Soviet throwweight to below 2.0 million kilograms in phase two by the application of direct and equal limits on throwweight.
- At issue now is whether we should change the current US approach to the treatment of throwweight at this time.
- As we approach this discussion, we must keep in mind the amount of Congressional interest we have recently had on this subject.
- In light of that interest, any proposed changes should be tied directly to the objectives of a change in the current US position outlined by our earlier discussion.
- Ed (Rowny), perhaps you would like to start off this part of our discussion by providing us your views on this topic including negotiability aspects?

(If the discussion does not address the linkage of a change in the US position on throwweight to the upcoming MX vote in Congress, use the following point.)

- Given that we face another critical MX vote in the near future, how would a major change in our position affect that vote?

(As the discussion of this issue nears completion, use the next point.)

- If we do not make a major shift on throwweight at this time, when should we return to this critical issue?

(After the discussion is completed, turn to the next item on the agenda, a discussion of the alternative packages proposed.)

Agenda Item 2: Proposed Packages

- Let's now turn to the second agenda item listed for today.
- The IG paper included a number of agency packages that incorporated the positions agencies took with respect to the issues we have just discussed under our first agenda item.
- The chart displayed shows a comparison of the packages that were provided to the IG.
- Given the discussion that we have just had, perhaps we could have those agencies who have offered packages quickly summarize them, or alter them if they wish, and give us their view as to whether they still support changing the US position to one like their proposed package at this time.
- George (Secretary Shultz), would you like to start?

(After State, ask the other agencies who have provided packages -- ACDA, Ken Adleman and the Negotiator, Ed Rowny -- for their views.)

(Once State, ACDA and the Negotiator have responded, use the next point to get the views of those who have not yet provided packages.)

- Other agencies have not provided packages. Perhaps they would like to offer their views now?

- Cap (Secretary Weinberger), what do think? Do you now have a package?

(After SecDef, also ask General Vessey for his views.)

(With all agencies given the opportunity to talk, use the next point to get the views of the other guests. Dr. Graham has proposed his own package to the President.)

- Does anyone else have anything to add? Gen Scowcroft and Dr Graham, perhaps you have an alternative view?

(As discussion nears completion, use the next point.)

- If we don't now make a major shift as suggested by some of the packages proposed, when should we next return to this issue and what work should be done in the interim?

(After discussion is complete, go to the last agenda item.)

Agenda Item 3: Handling the "Build-down"

- The last item on today's agenda may be the most difficult of all for us to handle over the next few critical days and weeks.
- We are all familiar with the President's letters sent to key Senate and House members prior to the beginning of the cycle of votes on the MX.
- At issue is what stance the Administration should now take with respect to a variety of Congressional initiatives, but especially the "build-down" concept, in light of the commitments made by the President in his letters.
  - As a minimum, how do we discuss with Congress the incorporation of "mutual build-down" into our START position, and especially in terms of the packages just discussed.
- The chart with our meeting agenda lists a number of questions about this issue.
- Perhaps it would be best to discuss all of these questions at one time.
- However, the primary focus of our discussion should be the last question:
  - "What stance should the Administration take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option is implemented?"
- The IG has suggested that we indicate that we are seriously studying the issue and that we should offer Congress a briefing on our progress before the August recess.
- Cap (Secretary Weinberger), would you like to start us on this topic and give us your views on the IG's suggestion?  
(As the discussion nears completion, use the following point.)
- We have tasked the IG to continue to work this issue. Is there any additional work related to this subject that we should ask from them?
- How does this work on the build-down concept alter our other options for changing our START position discussed earlier today?

(After discussion is completed, use the following points to close the meeting.)

- The most important point we must all remember is that it is essential over the next few days and weeks that we all sign from the same sheet of music on this topic -- and, for that matter, on all the topics that we have discussed today. If we do not, our problems with Congress will only multiply.

- Mr. President, do you have any additional remarks on this or on any of the other topics of today's agenda, or any concluding remarks?



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AGENDA FOR NSC MEETING ON START

June 7, 1983

- Item 1: Should we change our START position now? A discussion of the main issues involved in adjusting our current START negotiating position:
  - Is a shift really the price of continued Congressional support for M? And, given Soviet intransigence, would a shift really be in the US interest?
  - If we shift, should a change be major or minor at this time?
  - Should we emphasize direct limits on throwweight?
  - Should we retain limits on ballistic missiles?
  
- Item 2: If changed, what should our new position be? A discussion of the main issues in terms of alternative packages.
  
- Item 3: How do we handle the "mutual build-down"? A discussion of the incorporation of "mutual build-down" into the START position in terms of the packages just discussed.
  - What alternatives/options could be implemented now?
  - What alternatives/options are worthy of additional study?
  - What alternatives/options should be rejected from further consideration?
  - What stance should the Administration take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option is implemented?

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BY

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NARA, DATE

11/05/05

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COMPARISON OF START LIMITS

March 28, 1983

BY C/S NARA, DATE 11/09/05  
DECLASSIFIED  
M/S 011346 #8

LIMITS	CURRENT POSITION	REVISED POSITION				
		STATE	OSD	ACDA	START NEGOTIATOR	JCS
Missile Warheads	5000	5000	TO BE PROVIDED	5000		
Heavy Bombers	350	350		350		
Deployed Missiles	850	1150		No limit		
Throw-weight	Phase I: 110/210 limit on heavy and medium ICBMs. 2.5 million kg of Soviet throw-weight as a goal  Phase II: Direct limit of 1.9 million kg of throw-weight	150 heavy ICBMs. Results in about 3.0 <sup>a</sup> million kg of Soviet throw-weight		Direct limit of 2.5 million kg		
AICBs	Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	20 per heavy bomber		Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber		
SICBs	No limit	Platform limit		No limit	Platform limit	
New Types	Ban new types of heavy ICBMs	Ban new types of heavy/medium ICBMs & limit light ICBMs to single RVs		No limit		
				TO BE PROVIDED		

<sup>a</sup>This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize high throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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ON CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION DIRECTIVE NO. 1(32  
CFR PART 2001), SECTION 2001.13(E) CONCERNING RE-REVIEW OF  
PREVIOUSLY DECLASSIFIED RECORDS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NLRRM1346 #9 - ITEM #9 ON WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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May 28, 1983

START ISSUES FOR DECISION

Background

The START negotiations resume on June 8. During the last round, the US presented proposals for limiting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), tabled a draft treaty on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a document outlining the US "Basic Elements" of a START agreement. The basic framework of the US position remained as it had been presented in the summer of 1982.

The Soviets contended that US proposals would "emasculate" the Soviet ICBM force while permitting US modernization programs to proceed. They stated that the US proposal was not an acceptable basis for negotiation. They also rejected the idea of a separate agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs). They tabled a draft treaty based largely on SALT II, but with a 28 percent reduction in strategic delivery vehicles from the Soviet level at the time SALT II was signed, about 2500, to 1800. They say they are prepared to accept significant cuts in warheads but only in the context of combining ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons in a single category. In short, the Soviets demonstrated no inclination to move the talks forward.

The US Delegation's view is that the Soviets apparently regard our present START proposal, particularly those aspects dealing with ICBM force restructuring, as unacceptable. They argue that our proposal is designed not to promote stability and equality, but to obtain strategic advantages for the US. We would expect the Soviets to continue dismissing our proposal in its present form.

The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission have stimulated considerable interest, both in the Congress and within the Administration, in reassessing our START position. Key members of Congress have made their support for MX contingent on modifications to our START proposal, and the President wrote to several Congressmen that we are now considering modifications to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

State, ACDA and the START negotiator believe that we should now alter our START proposal--not only to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for a modified approach and to respond to Congressional pressures, but also to improve prospects for productive negotiations. Moreover, there is agreement (except for JCS) that we move away from the ceiling of 850 deployed missiles.

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BY CIS NARA, DATE 11/09/05

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Some believe we need to make changes now to our position that will bring us close to our final position. Others believe that our position now should retain considerable room for further bargaining.

### Issues

There are two principal issues. One is the extent to which we seek to reduce Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight--that is, should we seek (a) the level that is our goal for the second phase of the negotiations (1.9 million kilograms), or (b) the level that would result from our current proposal for the first phase (2.5 million kilograms), or (c) a higher level? The other issue is whether throw-weight should be constrained directly, or indirectly through collateral constraints. Our current position calls for indirect limits on throw-weight (i.e., sub-ceilings on heavy and medium ICBMs) in Phase I and direct limits (i.e., an aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight ceiling) in Phase II. Our current Phase I proposal was designed to achieve a goal of reduction in Soviet throw-weight of 55 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

One approach would seek a direct limit on throw-weight. The collateral constraints and the limit on deployed ballistic missiles would be dropped (leaving ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight as our two units of account). We would propose a direct throw-weight level (2.0 - 2.5 million kilograms) aimed at obtaining the large-scale reduction in Soviet throw-weight that our current proposal is designed to achieve.

An alternative approach would achieve throw-weight reductions indirectly as a consequence of reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads, and other collateral constraints (leaving deployed ballistic missiles and their warheads as the two units of account). Our current proposed limits on heavy and medium ICBMs could be replaced by other collateral constraints. Under this approach, Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would likely be about 3.0 million kilograms, about 46 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

\*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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The following sections discuss the main questions involved in modifying the US START position: whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed missiles, raise it, or drop it; what level we should propose for throw-weight limits; and whether to limit throw-weight directly or indirectly. Following that discussion are packages supported by various Agencies for a modified START position, accompanied by arguments for each package.

Finally, as an alternative to those packages, we could consider modifying the current position to the minimum extent necessary to reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft report. This would require, at a minimum, a decision now on whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it altogether. State, ACDA and the START negotiator recommend more basic changes to our position for substantive, political, and negotiating reasons.

I. Should we retain the limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it?

The report of the Scowcroft Commission states that arms control agreements should encourage deployment of small, single-warhead ICBMs. "This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments."

The report states that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles "should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single warhead ICBMs". The report does not make any recommendation whether or not to drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

1. Retain the 850 ceiling

The number of small ICBMs the United States might want to deploy would depend on the deployment mode chosen, cost, survivability, Congressional support, and the constraints on the number of Soviet warheads, and is, therefore, difficult to predict. Retention of the 850 limit would limit us to a deployment of no more than about 300 small, single warhead ICBMs

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in addition to 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs and planned SLBMs. This would appear inconsistent with the Commission's recommendation to promote a long-term evolution away from large highly fractionated ICBMs.

The JCS believes that it is not clear at this point whether the US need for small ICBMs will require an increase in the 850 deployed ballistic missile ceiling. Some believe that retaining the 850 limit may give us all the force structuring flexibility we need during the next decade since, in the context of US deployment of 100 MX under a ceiling of 5000 missile warheads, we are unlikely to deploy significantly more than 850 ballistic missiles. The Soviets, on the other hand, with a modern, single RV missile beginning flight testing are better placed over the next decade than we are to exploit the possibilities of large numbers of single RV ICBMs, which would increase their advantage in force survivability. The US could also pay a political price if the 850 limit is dropped since substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles are a prominent, popular, and readily understandable element of the US position. Finally, in view of Soviet stalling in Geneva, some would argue that the appropriate US negotiating response is to hold to our current position and not make modifications which could be considered movement toward the Soviet position.

## 2. Raise the ceiling on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would retain a limit on deployed ballistic missiles but raise it to provide more headroom for large numbers of small missiles. The ceiling could be: between 1050 and 1250; 1450 (which corresponds roughly to the number of deployed missiles the United States would have under the Soviet proposal); or 1600 (the current number of US deployed ballistic missiles). The representative limits cited above could permit from 500 to more than 1100 small missiles, depending on the limit chosen, the number of Peacekeeper ICBMs deployed, and the size of the US SLBM force.

Raising the limit would respond to the Scowcroft Commission's report by making room in our START proposal for the evolution to small, single warhead ICBMs. A level could be chosen with sufficient "headroom" to give us considerable force structuring flexibility in the future. At the same time, retaining a ceiling on missiles would avoid the potential political liability of appearing to abandon constraints in a category of strategic capability (i.e., missiles) that has

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previously been subject to constraints and that some still consider significant. It would also have the negotiating advantage of moving us closer to the Soviet proposal of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

One disadvantage of raising the limit is that this may appear contrary to our objective of deep reductions. In addition, the Scowcroft Commission report argued against reductions in the number of deployed missiles, and cited the negative aspects of relying on such limits in past agreements.

### 3. Drop limits on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would have flexibility to deploy a larger number of small ICBMs within the constraints on warhead numbers and destructive potential.

This approach would encourage an evolution in both the US and the USSR to smaller missiles and would provide substantial flexibility to exploit the advantages of small missiles to enhance survivability and stability. The START agreement would focus primarily on broad measures of capability (warheads and throw-weight). The Scowcroft Commission report makes clear the drawbacks of use of launcher limits in past agreements--i.e., agreements that rely primarily on launcher limits create incentives for large, highly fractionated missiles. Some believe this option corresponds most closely to the approach advocated in the Scowcroft Commission's report as more likely to be practical, stabilizing, and lasting than constraints on force structures. They believe that dropping limits on deployed missiles could be useful in obtaining Congressional support for the development, production and deployment of the Peacekeeper and a small ICBM.

Dropping the limits on deployed missiles would emphasize the limits on warheads and destructive potential, but could lead to increased pressure to limit bomber weapons, which would not be in the US interest. In addition, if the Soviets deploy a large number of missiles and missile launchers, this could provide a potential to deploy additional warheads.

## II. What throw-weight level should we seek?

Our current proposal seeks to substantially reduce Soviet missile throw-weight in phase I indirectly to about 2.5 million

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kilograms through the limit of 5000 missile warheads, the sub-ceiling of 2500 ICBM warheads and a limit of 210 medium and heavy ICBMs of which no more than 110 could be heavy ICBMs. In Phase II Soviet missile throw-weight would be further reduced to a direct ceiling of 1.9 million kilograms. Since the US throw-weight level is currently at 1.9 million kilograms, and the Soviet level is at about 5.6 million kilograms, any throw-weight level which exceeds the US current level would require the Soviets to reduce unilaterally.

There are three options:

(1) A level of 2.0 million kilograms (64 percent below the estimated current Soviet level but above the US level) would be consistent with our proposal for the second phase. We could argue that we were accelerating achievement of what has always been our ultimate goal. A proposal for a low ceiling now could give us bargaining room.

(2) A ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms (55 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would be roughly equivalent to our current proposal for the first phase, and would allow both sides somewhat greater flexibility to structure forces. It is the level the US has proposed in conjunction with the ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads.

(3) Constraints that could result in about 3.0 million kilograms (46 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would permit the Soviets greater force structure flexibility than the other options, and hence such a throw-weight level could be more likely to lead to an agreement. —

The illustrative force tables for the options describe representative Soviet forces for each of these levels. While all the options limit the Soviets to 5000 warheads, the higher the throw-weight, the larger could be the size and explosive power of Soviet warheads, and the greater could be the Soviet potential to deploy additional warheads.

### III. Should we seek direct or indirect limits on throw-weight?

The Scowcroft Commission report does not explicitly address this question. It does state that simple aggregate limits "are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization." Constraints on large missiles, however, would not be inconsistent with the Commission's emphasis on small missiles.

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The principal advantage of a direct throw-weight limit is that it would give each side more flexibility to structure its forces within the limit. It would directly constrain the overall potential of each side's missile forces, without dictating a particular force structure. This would undercut the Soviet complaint that our indirect throw-weight limits through medium and heavy ICBM constraints would require them to rebuild according to "US standards". Some believe that combining warhead and throw-weight ceilings would be the most straightforward way to constrain the sides to equal numbers of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. A direct limit would preclude growth in Soviet throw-weight that an indirect limit might permit if the Soviets chose to maximize throw-weight within the constraints. The Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets are likely not to maximize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces.

Some believe the principal drawback to a direct limit on throw-weight is that (depending on the level) it would undercut chances for an agreement, and as an initial objective could be perceived as a hardening of our position and a step away from achieving an agreement. Moreover, they believe the Soviets are less likely to accept throw-weight as a unit of account for START than collateral constraints. Some believe the level of throw-weight is not as significant a measure of military potential as warheads, and should not be assigned the same priority in our START proposal. Additionally, some believe that direct limits on throw-weight cannot be adequately verified. Others point out that indirect limits also require verification of the throw-weight of Soviet missiles.

#### IV. Other Issues

1. Phasing. The current US proposal would reduce Soviet throw-weight indirectly in Phase I, and would place a lower direct ceiling on throw-weight in Phase II. The packages proposed by State, ACDA, and the START Negotiator would combine the current two-phased approach into a single phase.\*

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\* OSD position to be provided.

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2. Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Our current position is to accept in Phase II a ceiling of 28 on the average number of ALCMs on heavy bombers, with a limit of 20 on the number of ALCMs on existing types of heavy bombers. One of the packages presented below recommends proposing a maximum limit of 20 for all heavy bombers (not just existing types) on the basis that (1) there are no projected US requirements for a bomber to carry more than 20 ALCMs, and (2) to counter the Soviet criticism that our present position would permit 11,000 ALCMs, a level we do not require. The other packages retain our existing position on ALCMs.

3. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). Our current position does not contain limits on SLCMs. The current guidance to the Delegation instructs the Delegation to respond to any Soviet proposals to limit SLCMs by soliciting Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. Two of the packages presented below refer to limits on the number of SLCM platforms; the others do not address SLCMs.

4. Modernization constraints. Our current position contains a number of modernization constraints: limits on ICBM and SLBM fractionation, limits on the weight of re-entry vehicles on new types of missiles, and a ban on new heavy missiles. Our current proposal does not include limits on the number of new types of missiles. One of the packages proposes banning new types of heavy and medium ICBMs and restricting new types of light ICBMs to a single warhead during the first ten years of START. (The Peacekeeper and the SS-X-24 ICBMs would be permitted as existing types.) Other packages do not require limits on the number of new types of missiles.

5. Draft treaty. At the end of the last round, all Washington Agencies agreed in an instruction cable to the US START Delegation that we should be in a position to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The Soviets, for their part, tabled a draft treaty during Round III and, in the inter-round period, they have sought to make propaganda mileage by false charges that the US refused to discuss treaty language with them. In order to deprive the Soviets of this propaganda advantage and to further the negotiations by putting the US position on the table in a unified fashion, the US Delegation believes it should be

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authorized to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The START Delegation will incorporate changes to the US position arising from NSC decisions into the current draft text. The Delegation will send this revised draft back to Washington for prompt consideration by the US Government.

V. Packages

The following packages would: (a) retain our goal of a ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, (b) make no change in our proposal to limit heavy bombers, and (c) combine the phases of our current proposal. In addition, none of the packages would retain the current proposal's sub-limit of 2500 ICBM warheads or the Phase II ban on all heavy missiles.

The packages differ in: (a) the throw-weight level they seek; (b) the way throw-weight is constrained; (c) whether the number of deployed missiles is limited; (d) the limits on ALCMs; and, (e) whether to seek platform limits on SLCMs.

OSD and JCS will provide packages at a later date.

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LIMITS	CURRENT POSITION	REVISED POSITION				
		STATE	OSD	ACDA	START NEGOTIATOR	JCS
Missile Warheads	5000	5000	TO BE PROVIDED	5000		
Heavy Bombers	350	350		350		
Deployed Missiles	850	1150		No limit		
Throw-weight	Phase I: 110/210 limit on heavy and medium ICBMs. 2.5 million kg of Soviet throw-weight as a goal  Phase II: Direct limit of 1.9 million kg of throw-weight	150 heavy ICBMs. Results in about 3.0* million kg of Soviet throw-weight		Direct limit of 2.5 million kg		
ALCMs	Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	20 per heavy bomber		Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber		
SLCMs	No limit	Platform limit		No limit	Platform limit	
New Types	Ban new types of heavy ICBMs	Ban new types of heavy/medium ICBMs & limit light ICBMs to single RVs		No limit		

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\*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize high throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

199X ILLUSTRATIVE US AND SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURES (INCLUDING THROW-WEIGHT LEVELS) 1/

CURRENT START PROPOSAL

STATE

2.0 MKG TW LIMIT

ACDA/NEGOTIATOR

U.S.	#s	RVs	TW
SICM	294	294	.176
MX	100	1000	.377
ICBMs	394	1294	0.553
TRIDENT	19/456	3648	1.256
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>4942</u>	<u>1.809 MKG</u>

U.S.	#s	RVs	TW
SICM	618	618	.371
MX	100	1000	.377
ICBMs	718	1618	0.748
TRIDENT	18/432	3356	1.190
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1150</u>	<u>4974 2/</u>	<u>1.938 MKG</u>

U.S.	#s	RVs	TW
SICM	644	644	.386
MX	100	1000	.377
ICBMs	744	1644	0.763
TRIDENT	18/432	3356	1.190
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1176 5/</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>1.953 MKG</u>

U.S.	#s	RVs	TW
SICM	736	736	.442
MX	100	1000	.377
ICBMs	836	1736	0.819
TRIDENT	17/408	3264	1.124
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1244 6/</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>1.943 MKG 10/</u>

U.S.	#s	RVs	TW
PL-5	304	304	.365
SS-X-24	100	1000	.250
SS-18	110	1100	.902
ICBMs	514	2404	1.517
DELTA III	16/256	1792	.512
TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.264
SLBMs	20/336	2432	0.776
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>4836</u>	<u>2.293 MKG</u>

SOVIET	#s	RVs	TW
PL-5	572	572	.686
SS-19 CL	120	720	.420
SS-18	150	1500	1.230
ICBMs	842	2792	2.336
DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448
TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.264
SLBMs	18/304	2208	0.712
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1146</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>3.048 MKG 3/</u>

SOVIET	#s	RVs	TW
PL-5	692	692	.830
SS-X-24	210	2100	.525
ICBMs	902	2792	1.355
DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448
TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.184
SLBMs	18/304	2208	0.632
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1206</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>1.987 MKG 7/</u>

SOVIET	#s	RVs	TW
PL-5	892	892	1.070
SS-X-24	140	1400	.350
SS-18	50	500	.410
ICBMs	1082	2792	1.830
DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448
TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.184
SLBMs	18/304	2208	0.632
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1386</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>2.462 MKG 11/</u>

OR

OR

OR

PL-5	560	560	.672
SS-19 CL	250	1500	.875
SS-18	150	1500	1.230
ICBMs	960	3560	2.777
TYPHOON CL	9/180 5/	1440	.594
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1140</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>3.371 MKG 4/</u>

PL-5	292	292	.350
SS-X-24	200	2000	.500
SS-18	50 8/	500	.410
ICBMs	452	2792	1.260
DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448
TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.184
SLBMs	18/304	2208	0.632
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>756 9/</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>1.892 MKG</u>

PL-5	292	292	.350
SS-X-24	100	1000	.250
SS-18	150 12/	1500	1.230
ICBMs	542	2792	1.830
DELTA III	14/224	1568	.448
TYPHOON	4/ 80	640	.184
SLBMs	18/304	2208	0.632
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>846 9/</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>2.462 MKG</u>

• Combination of Force 3 and Force 4 from NIE 11-3/8-82.

- 1/ Since US small ICBM deployment does not begin until the early 1990s, 199X is used as the end-year in order to show full US force modernization under each package.
- 2/ Given planned MX and Trident deployments, the deployed ballistic missile limit of 1150 does not allow the US to reach the overall warhead limit, and thus slightly constrains the number of small ICBMs the US could deploy.
- 3/ A Soviet force which retains 150 SS-18s and includes emphasis on deployment of a small ICBM (PL-5) would have about 3.0 MKG throw-weight level.
- 4/ If the Soviets choose to utilize all the throw-weight potential of existing missiles as projected in the current NIE, they can increase the throw-weight of the SS-X-24 from 2100 KG to 3300 KG. This could result in a throw-weight level of about 3.4 MKG.
- 5/ In emphasizing SLBM throw-weight, the Soviets could reduce the number of Delta IIIs in favor of Typhoon SSBNs.
- 6/ Without a limit on deployed ballistic missiles, the US could reach the warhead limit and could deploy additional small ICBMs (see footnote 2).
- 7/ The Soviets can modernize their ICBM force with a large number of small ICBMs and a new medium ICBM, while still remaining under a direct throw-weight limit of 2.0 MKG.
- 8/ If the Soviets choose to retain 50 SS-18s under a direct throw-weight limit of 2.0 MKG, it would result in a slight decrease in medium ICBMs and a large decrease of 400 small ICBMs.
- 9/ The number of deployed ballistic missiles significantly decreases if SS-18s are retained, resulting in an increased ratio of warheads to airpoints.
- 10/ Under a direct limit on throw-weight of 2.5 MKG, the US would have the flexibility to increase throw-weight above the level shown in order to improve the combination of yield and accuracy for greater capability against hardened targets.
- 11/ The Soviets can retain 50 SS-18s and modernize their ICBM force with a large number of small ICBMs and a new medium ICBM, while still remaining under a direct throw-weight limit of 2.5 MKG.
- 12/ If the Soviets choose to retain 150 SS-18s under a direct throw-weight limit of 2.5 MKG, it would result in a slight decrease in medium ICBMs and a large decrease of 600 small ICBMs.

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State Department Package

- o 5000 ballistic missile warheads; no ICBM RV subceiling
- o 1150 deployed missiles
- o Limit of 150 heavy ICBMs; no direct throw-weight limits
- o 350 heavy bombers
- o Maximum of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber
- o SLCM platform limit
- o Flight test/deployment ban on heavy/medium ICBMs, only 1-RV new light ICBMs in first 10 years (MX is existing type)
- o Warhead weight limit (225 kg) for new missiles, and at least half of new missile throw-weight must consist of RVs

The central objective of the State package is to draw the Soviets into the US negotiating framework without compromising our overall START objectives of substantial reductions, equality, stability and effective verification. The State package seeks to work within the structure of our current Phase I proposal to loosen the specific limits on ICBMs, while still requiring substantial reductions in Soviet ballistic missile forces (including ICBMs) and, indirectly, in throw-weight. This approach would provide a strong incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously on the basis of our proposal (or cause them significant difficulty in explaining why they would not) and would demonstrate conclusively to US and international public opinion that our START approach is serious, even-handed and flexible. Indeed, without a change in our proposal along the lines described above, we cannot realistically expect an agreement.

The State package retains the equal ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads as the most important element of our START proposal. State also believes that it is important to retain a ceiling on deployed missiles. Militarily, the USSR is in a better position than the US to expand its deployed missile force in the near future. Moreover, reductions in deployed missiles have been a prominent and generally popular element of our proposal. State supports raising the deployed missile ceiling to 1150, in order to allow for the deployment of a substantial number of the single-warhead ICBMs recommended by the Scowcroft Commission and to bring the US and Soviet positions closer together.

The major difference between the State package and that of some other agencies is the question of direct limits on throw-weight. State supports a single-phase framework for the US position but without a direct ceiling on throw-weight. The importance of throw-weight as a measure of strategic capability has declined sharply over the years. Moreover, because of the current asymmetry, any throw-weight ceiling low enough to constrain the Soviets would have an obviously unequal impact in the US favor. The USSR has rejected throw-weight as a unit of account in START, and a direct throw-weight ceiling would make serious negotiations on the basis of the US proposal highly unlikely. Moreover, a low direct ceiling on throw-weight would strongly undercut

domestic and international perceptions of the seriousness of US arms control policy and would more than negate any benefits which we would gain from incorporating "build-down" or the Scowcroft Commission recommendations in the US START proposal.

State agrees that the current indirect limits on throw-weight present a major obstacle to an agreement. State proposes that these limits be replaced by a simple limitation on heavy ICBMs which would require that heavies constitute no larger proportion of Soviet ballistic missiles in a START-limited force of 1150 deployed missiles than they do today (i.e., the USSR would be required to reduce from 308 to 150 heavy ICBMs). Because of the obvious destabilizing nature of heavy ICBMs (which the Soviets implicitly acknowledged by accepting direct limits on heavies in SALT I and II), such an approach would be easier to defend -- to the public, Congress, the Allies and the Soviets -- than direct limits on throw-weight. In the context of other START limitations, a limit of 150 heavy ICBMs would reduce Soviet throw-weight from 5.6 million kg to 3.0 million kg. The resulting difference between US and Soviet throw-weight levels would be about three times smaller than exists today.

State also points out that limits on heavy ICBMs can be verified with high confidence, but direct limits on throw-weight cannot. The uncertainty in our estimate of aggregate Soviet throw-weight amounts to 850,000 kg above or below the best estimate, which is equal to the throw-weight of more than 100 heavy ICBMs in either direction.

State also believes that:

- o Deleting the ICBM warhead subceiling would undercut Soviet criticism that the US seeks to "emasculate" the USSR's ICBM force and would be consistent with the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation that each side should be able to configure its forces within a warhead limit.
- o The lower ALCM loading limit is consistent with US programs and would limit possible future Soviet activity. It would also indicate that the US is willing to go beyond SALT II in limiting a weapon system in which we have a current advantage.
- o A SLCM platform ceiling would be the most verifiable way to limit SLCMs. Such a ceiling would close off a loophole for circumventing START limitations by prohibiting the Soviets from exploiting their current advantage in SLCM platforms.
- o Modernization constraints which move both sides toward small ICBMs would demonstrate support for the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and would preclude a "break-out" threat with future ICBM systems. This would also be consistent with the Senate "build-down" proposal.



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5000 ballistic missile warheads  
 2.5 million kg ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight  
 350 heavy bombers  
 Single phase agreement  
 Drop deployed ballistic missiles as a unit of account, drop  
 210/110 collateral constraints and 2500 ICBM warhead sublimit

Scowcroft Commission

"Not stabilizing to use arms control to require mutual reductions in the number of launching platforms or missiles."

"An approach [of] relatively simple agreements. . .to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons."

"Equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield."

"Simple aggregate limits" are "more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate detailed limits on force structure."

Policy Implications

Drop the 850 limit, and drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

Retain equal warhead limits (5000) as a key element of US proposal, along with destructive power as second key element.

Seek throwweight limits (2.5 million kilograms) as the second key element to reflect yield or destructive power.

Drop the 210/110 collateral constraints on medium and heavy ICBMs, and drop the 2500 ICBM warhead sublimit.

Drop the artificial distinction between Phase I and Phase II, thereby putting cruise missiles into the negotiations now.

ACDA's position implements the Scowcroft Commission recommendations. This straightforward approach would conform most faithfully to the President's letters to Congress, and increase Congressional support for the MX missile now and for the small ICBM in coming years, while retaining maximum flexibility for the President to design future US strategic programs within negotiated constraints. This would also be consistent with the President's statement that everything is on the table in START.

Moreover, direct implementation of the Scowcroft Commission approach would be:

(a) simple and readily understandable by focusing attention on warheads and throwweight (as the best indicators of destructive capability) and by eliminating needlessly complicated factors such as various missile numbers, collateral constraints, constraints on new types of ICBMs,

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phases, and sublimits. Both the American public and Soviets have been confused by such complicating elements of our START proposal.

(b) more negotiable due to its simplicity, greater flexibility for each side to determine its own force structure, and the inclusion of cruise missile limits in return for deep warhead and throwweight reductions.

(c) stabilizing since each side would have incentive to move towards less valuable targets, thereby reducing incentives for a first strike by the other side.

(d) true to the Reagan Administration hallmark of deep reductions. Deleting the missile limit is preferable to raising it, and thereby giving the impression that we are no longer seeking deep reductions in strategic forces.

The Scowcroft Commission also states that "as long as launcher or missile limitations are seen, in and of themselves, as primary arms control objectives," there will not be incentives to move away from large missiles. In fact, movement on each side towards more deployed missiles, with fewer warheads and less throwweight overall, would enhance strategic stability. Limits on the number of deployed missiles may work against strategic stability.

The Commission calls for reducing destructive power of nuclear weapons, and the President has already decided to seek limits on destructive capability. The best measure of this is throwweight. Without limits on throwweight, the Soviets will retain the potential to deploy far more than 5000 warheads. Attempting to constrain destructive power indirectly (via collateral constraints) inevitably restricts force structuring flexibility. We should offer the Soviets the alternative of a more flexible and straightforward approach.

We should seek at this stage a throwweight ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms, about 50% below the current Soviet level. This is consistent with the 5,000 warhead limit and is also roughly equivalent to the level that would result from our current proposal. Adoption of a significantly higher throwweight level would compromise our goal of reducing the disparity in destructive capability. Adopting a lower throwweight level than 2.5 would be perceived as a hardening of the US position, which could

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undercut the broad consensus on arms control we are in the process of achieving. A lower level would also have a greater chance of being rejected by the Soviets without seriously considering throwweight as one of the two key units of account (the other being warheads).

The ACDA approach gives high priority to throwweight limits along with warhead limits. The US should not propose limits on deployed missiles, but later in the negotiations we could be flexible on accepting limits on the number of deployed missiles (at a level high enough to protect an option to deploy a significant number of small ICBMs) if the Soviets agree to the throwweight limits we seek. Missile limits would thus be considered as a dependent variable and not an independent variable (or goal in the US proposal).

May 24, 1983

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START Negotiator's Position

Package

5000 ballistic missile RVs.

2.5 million kg ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight.

350 heavy bombers, separate ceiling (Backfire included).

26/20 average/maximum ALCM loading limits.

Indicate willingness to consider equal, verifiable limits on nuclear SLCMs, through limits on platforms.

In the context of Soviet agreement to direct limits on throw-weight and ballistic missile RVs, drop the subceilings of 2500 ICBM RVs and 210/110 medium and heavy ICBMs.

Single phase agreement.

Drop deployed ballistic missiles as a unit of account. Later, if Soviets press for its retention, indicate willingness to agree to acceptable limits on the number of deployed ballistic missiles but only if the Soviets accept U.S. proposals on ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight.

Rationale

The START Negotiator's package implements the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for "simple aggregate limits" by making ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight the primary units of account. It continues to focus on reductions in the current destabilizing disparity between the U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile forces. At the same time, it also offers significant benefits to the Soviet Union and sets the stage for serious negotiation toward an agreement by indicating U.S. willingness to limit cruise missiles at the outset of an agreement. By bringing forward direct limits on throw-weight, it allows us to trade, at the negotiating table, a number of provisions to which the Soviets have strongly objected, particularly the concept of phasing, the 210/110 subceiling and the 2500 subceiling.

Recognizing, however, that the Soviets are unlikely to agree to a package which does not limit missiles and also that limits on deployed missiles have been a familiar and politically popular element of the U.S. START position, the START negotiator believes that our objective should be to place the Soviets in the demandeur role of seeking to reintroduce limits on ballistic missiles. In the context of Soviet willingness to accept our proposed limits on ballistic

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missile RVs and throw-weight, we would agree to limits on the number of deployed ballistic missiles which are acceptable to us. This would allow us to deploy several hundred small, single RV ICBMs and would also facilitate progress in the talks by retaining some common elements in the U.S. and Soviet position. This approach would also deny the Soviets the propaganda high ground of appearing to be the only party in favor of limiting missiles.

The START Negotiator's package allows considerable simplification of the U.S. position by substituting direct limits on throw-weight for the complex and constraining indirect limits currently in Phase I of the U.S. position. Direct limits on throw-weight will meet Soviet criticisms that the 210/110 subceilings have placed overly-severe constraints on Soviet force structuring. Raising the U.S. throw-weight objective from its current 1.9 million kg to 2.5 million kg should make it easier to engage the Soviets in a substantive discussion of throw-weight as a unit of account and still achieve sizeable (50%) reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight. Past Soviet objections to throw-weight have been based more on the level of reductions which the U.S. sought to achieve than on any intrinsic Soviet opposition to the principle of throw-weight limits. The Soviets will consider the acceptability of the U.S. throw-weight proposals in light of the effect they have on Soviet forces and the trade-offs they can obtain in limits on U.S. forces. In addition, as Soviet modernization proceeds, the Soviets will move toward smaller missiles which will tend to reduce Soviet opposition to limiting throw-weight. Direct limits on throw-weight also allow us to drop the current subceiling of 2500 ICBM RVs which will simplify our position and also helps in negotiability.

Moving to a direct limit on throw-weight from the outset allows us to drop the concept of phases which has been a major stumbling block to progress in the talks. By indicating willingness to limit ALCMs from the outset of an agreement and to consider equal verifiable limits on nuclear-armed SLCMs, we would offer the Soviets a strong incentive toward accepting the U.S. position on limits on ballistic missile RVs and throw-weight.

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GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Washington, D.C. 20451

May 26, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

For several months, the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament has been analyzing the arms control implications of the U.S. strategic modernization program. We have met several times with ACDA Director Adelman; the Chairman of your Commission on Strategic Forces, General Scowcroft; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey; the Vice President; and with other knowledgeable persons both in and out of government. Their views have been invaluable, and while the following opinions and recommendations are those of the General Advisory Committee, we would like to acknowledge the counsel provided by these persons.

For more than a decade, the U.S. has deliberately avoided deploying any ICBM system that would severely threaten Soviet land-based ICBMs, even though such systems were well within our ability to develop. This restraint was exercised in the hope that the Soviet Union would conduct its missile system development activities with equal restraint.

Unfortunately, our unilateral restraint has not been reciprocated. Because of the central role ICBMs have in our strategic policy, the greatest threat to

The Honorable  
Ronald Reagan,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

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strategic nuclear stability today is the increasing vulnerability of this leg of the triad. This vulnerability has come about not through some inevitable process, but through deliberate, long-term, large-scale Soviet efforts to threaten the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force.

As you have so clearly stated, it would be both irresponsible and dangerous to world peace for the U.S. to further delay responding to this threat.

The recommendations of your Commission on Strategic Forces have major implications for arms control. It is the consensus of your General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, itself a bipartisan body, that the Commission's arms control recommendations be vigorously pursued. To support and add specificity to your Commission's recommendations, we suggest that the following be incorporated in our START position.

#### U.S. START Position

Combine Phase I and Phase II;  
Retain the limit of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads and the 2,500 sublimit on ICBM warheads;  
Limit both sides to 1.9 million kilograms of ballistic missile throwweight and a .5 million kilogram sublimit on MIRVed ICBM throwweight;  
Limit future ballistic missile warheads to approximately 300 kilograms per warhead (payload) weight;  
Bombers should be treated separately; limits on bombers and ALCMs should take into account Soviet air defenses.

1. Retain the 5,000 ballistic missile warhead limit. This unit of account and level, when combined with a throwweight limit, moves both sides toward greater strategic nuclear stability while preserving flexibility for structuring forces.

2. Eliminate the 850 limit on deployed missiles and seek a phased build-down, over a specified period of time, to direct limits on ballistic missile throwweight at 1.9 million kilograms. A direct limit on throwweight is paramount to a sound START agreement. In contrast to limits

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on deployed missiles or launchers, throwweight limits would move both sides away from less stabilizing deployments of large MIRVed missiles toward more stabilizing deployments of small single warhead missiles. Throwweight remains the key indicator of strategic missile capability and strategic missile potential. As U.S. and Soviet technologies converge, a Soviet throwweight advantage would permit the Soviets to deploy accurate warheads with greater destructive capability than U.S. warheads.

Direct limits on throwweight would also limit Soviet breakout potential, that is, the ability to deploy more warheads clandestinely or following abrogation of an agreement. The 1.9 million kilogram limit would be based on the decision to combine the two phases of START; this level provides negotiating flexibility for seeking this major reduction in throwweight. Finally, a throwweight limit would permit dropping the collateral constraints on Soviet heavy and medium ICBMs, thereby simplifying our approach.

3. Direct limits on throwweight should be accompanied by seeking direct limits on future warhead weight or payload. Such payload limits would prevent the Soviets from deploying missiles having a relatively large amount of throwweight with a relatively small warhead, which could give them a substantial breakout capability with such deployed missiles.

4. A sublimit on MIRVed ICBM throwweight at .5 million kilograms should be sought in order to limit these most destabilizing Soviet weapons as we make the transition from MIRVed missiles to less lucrative targets, single warhead missiles. Such a limit would encourage a transition to smaller missiles as both sides' forces are reduced.

5. The sublimit of 2,500 ICBM warheads should be retained as this limit makes the important distinction between ICBM and SLBM warheads. It would also aid in the transition to lower warhead levels, and it would bound the Soviet ICBM threat to U.S. ICBMs. In addition, it would limit Soviet counterforce potential, when combined with the throwweight limits.

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6. Limit both sides to a 20 per cent margin above the throwweight limit to cover logistics, flight test missiles, and maintenance requirements. This should be the U.S. internal position.

7. Bombers should continue to be treated separately from ballistic missiles. There should be no bomber equivalent payload aggregated in a missile throwweight ceiling. The aggregation of bombers and ballistic missiles would blur the important distinction between first-strike weapons (Soviet ICBMs) and second-strike retaliatory weapons (U.S. bombers).

8. Numerical limits on bombers and ALCMs should be addressed in the context of limits on Soviet air defenses. The Soviets have the most extensive air defense system in the world while the U.S. has minimal air defenses. U.S. bombers and cruise missiles that survive a Soviet attack must be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses. Limits on U.S. bombers and air-launched cruise missiles without corresponding limits on Soviet air defenses would reduce the effectiveness of our bomber force in an inequitable manner.

The General Advisory Committee believes this package of limitations would meet our objectives of seeking deep reductions in strategic forces, equality in capabilities, and greater strategic stability. These limits could be verified with appropriate cooperative measures. And this package preserves flexibility for both sides to design future strategic programs within these constraints. We hope you find this useful in your deliberations concerning the arms control aspects of the strategic modernization program and START.

Respectfully yours,

*William R. Graham*

William R. Graham  
Chairman

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