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Cuba and Central America Proposed US Peacekeeping Force  
in Chad, Military Assistance (2 of 2)]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

**Withdrawer**

DLB 10/16/2007

**File Folder** NSC 00026 11/16/1981 [STRATEGY TOWARD CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, PROPOSED US PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD, MILITARY ASSISTANCE ] (2 OF 2)

**FOIA**

M10-330

**Box Number** 2

DIRKS

18

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
43956	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: ASSISTING AN OAU PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION (PKO) FOR CHAD <b>R 10/26/2015 M330/1</b>	2	11/13/1981	B1
43957	MINUTES	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, NOVEMBER 16, 1981 - STRATEGY TOWARD CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA; PROPOSED UNITED STATES PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD <b>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</b>	7	11/16/1981	B1
43958	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO LIST, RE: PROPOSED UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR AN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD <b>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</b>	1	11/19/1981	B1
43959	MEMO	ROGER FONTAINE THRU JAMES NANCE TO RICHARD ALLEN, RE: NSC MEETING - NOVEMBER 16, 1981: DRAFT DECISION MEMORANDUM <b>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</b>	1	11/17/1981	B1
43960	MEMO	FOR THE RECORD - NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING NOVEMBER 16, 1981 <b>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</b>	2	11/19/1981	B1
43961	PAPER	RE: ACTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA <b>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</b>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**FOIA**

M10-330

**Box Number** 2

DIRKS

18

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
43962	PAPER	COPY OF #43961 MARKED "MEESE" - EDITED AND ANNOTATED <i>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</i>	1	ND	B1
43963	PAPER	COPY OF #43961, MARKED "VP" - SLIGHT ANNOTATION <i>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</i>	1	ND	B1
43964	PAPER	COPY OF #43961 MARKED "P" - EDITED <i>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</i>	1	ND	B1
43965	PAPER	COPY OF #43961, MARKED "ALLEN" - EDITED AND ANNOTATED <i>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</i>	1	ND	B1
43966	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #43961 <i>R 9/6/2019 M330/1</i>	1	ND	B1
43967	FORM	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD <i>PAR 7/15/2016 M330/1</i>	1	11/19/1981	B1 B3
43968	FORM	MATERIAL RECEIPT <i>R 7/15/2016 M330/1</i>	1	11/19/1981	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



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91 NOV 13 AM: 48

November 13, 1981

43956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.   
Caspar W. Weinberger 

Subject: Assisting an OAU Peacekeeping Organization  
(PKO) for Chad

We have been following a policy of supporting the OAU and the French call for rapid emplacement of a PKO in Chad to replace Libyan troops there. We have reliable reports that the Libyans have begun to withdraw. However, the French tell us the Libyans are taking everything with them to try to show the country cannot survive without them. Chad will need immediate help from abroad. As a first step, the OAU is expediting efforts to place a PKO in Chad, and Nigeria and Zaire have already asked us bilaterally for support. Once the OAU force is formally organized (probably within the next two weeks), we will most likely be called upon to provide immediate airlift for troop contingents and perhaps to contribute support items such as tents, cots, and food. The French have already offered to assist the OAU.

DOD and State have examined potential PKO support requirements (including airlift, bivouac materials, and rations). We consider those requirements which we reviewed to be manageable with existing assets. However, US airlift support for our military exercise Bright Star 82 (November 9 - December 16) could affect the scale of our support for an initial PKO deployment.

We have estimated that it should cost a modest \$12 million to support a 2000 man PKO contingent for 90 days. (Our assessment of what would be required is based on current evidence that the US airlift will arrive in a non-hostile environment.) Actual costs could, of course, vary substantially and can only be determined once firm requirements are known. However, as costs in excess of \$12 million would cut severely into other programs and priorities, we believe we should limit our commitment to \$12 million, with the prerogative of reevaluating the nature of our participation should cost proposals exceed that figure. We

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NLRR M330/1 #43956

BY hjt NARA DATE 10/26/15

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- 2 -

would also make clear that any assistance to be provided would be contingent on a) continuation of the Libyan withdrawal, b) Congressional approval of funds and c) our right to review the effectiveness of the operation after 90 days.

It is critical that the PKO move as quickly as possible in order to limit the possibility of renewed warfare among contending factions, to provide some stability in war torn Chad in the wake of the Libyan withdrawal, and to avoid giving Libya an excuse to return. In order to provide support quickly when needed, we believe we should initiate detailed discussions as soon as possible with France, the OAU, and others to pin down what is really required from us. This encouragement is also necessary, particularly for Nigeria, to keep the momentum going on organizing the PKO. Moreover, having vigorously encouraged the OAU to organize a PKO, we will be open to severe criticism should we refuse to contribute and the PKO ultimately fail. If necessary, we may want the JCS, through its designated command, to begin liaison with the appropriate parties.

We are confident that we can fund the operation up to \$12 million under the Peacekeeping Section of the Foreign Assistance Act. It may be necessary, however, for you to exercise your special authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act to respond quickly to a situation important to the security interests of the United States. This will be the subject of a separate memorandum, which, if necessary, will be sent to you shortly. In the meantime, we believe we should initiate consultations as soon as possible to ensure Congressional support for our proposed approach.

Action Requested

That you approve a) immediate initiation of consultations with the OAU and contributing African states, as well as with France and other potential donor states, to discuss assistance needed to insert a PKO into Chad expeditiously and b) consultations with Congress concerning sources of funding up to \$12 million for such assistance.

Approve

✓ RR

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

43957

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE, TIME November 16, 1981, 4:00-5:00 p.m.,  
 AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: Strategy Toward Cuba and Central America;  
 Proposed United States Peacekeeping Force  
 in Chad

PARTICIPANTS:

The President	<u>USUN</u> Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
The Vice President	
<u>State</u> Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Deputy Secretary William P. Clark	<u>JCS</u> General David C. Jones Lt. Gen. Paul F. Gorman
<u>OSD</u> Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci	<u>The White House</u> Mr. Edwin Meese III Mr. James A. Baker III Mr. Michael K. Deaver Mr. Richard V. Allen Admiral James W. Nance Ms. Janet Colson
<u>OMB</u> Mr. William Schneider	
<u>CIA</u> Director William J. Casey	<u>NSC</u> Mr. Roger W. Fontaine Mr. Fred Wattering

MINUTES

Mr. Allen stated the first agenda item would be discussion of the strategy toward Cuba and Central America. Consideration would be given to Phase One with implementation of steps and costs short of an ultimatum to Nicaragua and the commitment of U.S. forces in regard to Nicaragua. Other steps to be taken would also be considered.

Sec. Haig stated the first question to be asked is will the American people support vigorous action. His feeling is they will if we lead. If we don't, then they will not have the proper sense of alarm. If we start Phase One we must be prepared for the consequences if we are not willing to use Phase Two. We cannot afford failure in the form of a Bay of Pigs. We don't have to accept specific steps within Phase Two, but must accept conceptually the possible need to use force.

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Sec. Haig then reviewed the twelve steps listed under Phase One. Under step one, the commitment of money to Central America, the Secretary said \$100 million was earmarked for El Salvador, \$75 million for Costa Rica, \$25 million for Honduras, \$50 million for Jamaica, \$40 million for the Dominican Republic, and \$10 million for Belize.

In addition, another \$50 million in military assistance under Section 506 for El Salvador and Honduras should be requested. The good news, the Secretary added, was the El Salvador Defense Minister is willing now to train forces outside his country which is mentioned in step three. Under step four are actions to be carried out in Nicaragua. Step five which would cut off trade and credit should be carried out only if the private sector is completely wrapped up. Secretary Haig repeated that Nicaragua is moving toward a totalitarian regime.

The President asked about the Nicaraguan ambassador who just resigned.

Sec. Haig said he is a loyal Nicaraguan but uncomfortable with the Sandinista government.

Amb. Kirkpatrick interjected that Amb. Cruz was an original junta member although a businessman. He has a long history of collaborating with the Sandinistas and he will find it difficult to admit openly he was wrong.

The President then asked if there were divisions within the Sandinista leadership?

Mr. Casey said there were divisions and he reminded the NSC that covert action alone won't liberate Nicaragua. It was even more important to create a political force within the country. He mentioned a La Prensa poll that showed 64% of those polled were dissatisfied with the government. There is growing disenchantment within Nicaragua.

Mr. Carlucci reminded the NSC the FSLN was never monolithic, and we are seeing a falling out among the three original groups that made up the FSLN.

Sec. Haig added, however, that according to a Jesuit priest defector in Guatemala, the Cubans are already in charge in Nicaragua. At the same time, the Nicaraguan government has carried out a number of repressive actions and now seems prepared to appear to be letting up a bit. But the private sector won't participate in this process anymore.

The President asked if we can use this evidence regarding the Cubans if we decide to cut off trade and credit.

Sec. Haig said yes, but it was important to look at each credit and loan decision and decide who it hurts more, the government or the private sector.

The President asked how we would get help to the right people?

Sec. Haig said we must look at each specific loan.

Amb. Kirkpartick added that during the Carter Administration all loans went thru the nationalized banking system and no more than 30% went to the private sector. She believes it is probably less than that now.

Sec. Haig then went on to point out that currently the carrier task force in the Caribbean has raised Cuban fears to unprecedented heights. This is good, but the next time they may be less frightened. The Cuban government is trying to contact us in as many ways as possible. Meanwhile, we want the maximum pressure on them at the time we decide to talk with them.

The President asked shouldn't we negotiate with them while we are quite credible?

Sec. Haig agreed with that, and suggested we do so now but make it very tough. Either behave or else.

The President said the bottom line was would Cuba rejoin the American community or continue on its course.

Sec. Haig added that others do object to talking to them now -- they feel its premature. Furthermore, the Cubans are tough as nails, and won't back down now. The Secretary concluded, however, that we should talk now; it won't cost too much to try now.

The President asked what this would cost us?

Mr. Casey said it would lose time.

Sec. Haig added there was the danger of being strung along.

The President suggested we put limits on that.

Mr. Baker said we are still willing, meanwhile, to do these actions under Phase One.



Sec. Weinberger said we are agreed on the items presented. Defense's problem has been the prior commitment to use force without approval of the American people and the U.S. Congress. We could keep the carrier task force a little longer in the Caribbean if it is helpful in creating the right atmosphere for talks.

Sec. Haig said he had questions in regard to two add-ons. We needed to be careful about forming a Nicaraguan government-in-exile.

Sec. Weinberger said we would need a respectable group.

Mr. Casey said we should not proceed on this until the process in Nicaragua goes far enough.

The President added that there can be no taint of Somoza in this.

Sec. Weinberger pointed out that 1,500 guerrillas won't overthrow the FSLN but could do a lot of damage.

The President asked if there was a possibility of taking away cover for the El Salvador guerrillas?

Mr. Allen suggested it would be difficult and Gen. Jones said it would be very difficult because it is vital and difficult to pinpoint the guerrillas first.

Mr. Allen offered to have this checked out further, however.

(The Vice President joined the meeting at this point.)

Mr. Meese said that list point nine could be changed to encourage formation of exile organizations for Nicaraguans and mount a propaganda campaign against the Sandinista government. Regarding point eleven: support free radio station broadcasting to Nicaragua in English and Spanish.

Sec. Haig asked if point ten -- taking our case to the UN -- would be counter-productive?

Amb. Kirkpatrick said the UN was hopeless. We need others like the Venezuelans to sponsor it. We would still lose, however.

The President asked if we could get defectors or victims to go on speaking circuits in this country. The President then mentioned the defecting Jesuit priest.

Amb. Kirkpatrick mentioned that one of the wives of the arrested businessmen might be available. But our media has not published this kind of information.

Mr. Allen reminded the President that Pres. Herrera Campins had said the same thing at Cancun.

Amb. Kirkpatrick said the President must make a speech laying out what's happening in Central America.

The President emphasized it must be totally documented information.

Mr. Allen said an early December meeting in Miami under Prime Minister Seaga's chairmanship would be available.

Sec. Haig again reminded everyone that the hard question remained: if we go down this road, and when such things happen like Cuban troops going into Nicaragua, where will we be?

The President said that would depend on the climate of opinion we have created.

Sec. Haig added don't go into Phase One unless you are prepared to look at Phase Two.

Sec. Weinberger believed there were branches in this road, and that we should decide then. We should have the option to go or not without appearing to retreat. We should have para-military activity but deniability as well.

Mr. Schneider expressed his concern over resources. We cannot fit in this amount in our current FY 82 international account. We need approval for additional requests.

The President said we cannot afford not to and this request can follow the speech.

Mr. Allen said we can put these options in decision form.

Sec. Haig said that he would like to register a dissent. The point to be made was if Cubans react, we need the planning and the allocation of resources to meet their moves.

The President said if the Cubans do something overt, then we can make the decision. But we must have contingency planning.

Sec. Weinberger added that in the event of overt action by them -- land or sea -- we must be prepared and we must have contingency plans.

Sec. Haig said that what he wanted was a set of plans if Phase One doesn't work.

Sec. Weinberger said that contingency planning is one thing but a previous commitment to use force is another.

Sec. Haig said we are not asking the President to commit himself to the use of force. But before we go to Phase One, we must assemble our assets to do the planning and be ready.

Sec. Weinberger said we can do the contingency planning. But Phase One with its twelve points should go on.

Mr. Casey said our decision to act must be based on how blatant the Cubans are.

The President said if the Cubans were to intervene blatantly in Nicaragua, then a naval squadron could cut-off seaborne supplies, and we could knock down aerial support.

Sec. Weinberger agreed we should be ready to do it under those circumstances.

Gen. Jones said we could develop options -- some within hours. Others like interdicting supplies to guerrillas in El Salvador would take longer. He said too we need a much higher priority placed on human and technical intelligence in Central America. We need to share information with friendly governments.

The President said he supported that.

Mr. Casey said there was a long list of things we are doing.

The President then asked if instead of sending in a division of Marines into Vietnam, we helped the South Vietnamese logistically, and bombed the north, would there have been a Vietnam war?

All agreed no.

Sec. Haig added if Pres. Johnson had been prepared to do what the military said was necessary, the north would not have prevailed. We cannot permit Central America to go Marxist.

Amb. Kirkpatrick raised one matter on point four, namely, it should be "support and assist political and para-military forces from second, and third country nationals". But they should not be "our" army.

The Vice President asked if the Honduran elections will spoil any of this?

Mr. Casey said not likely.

But, Amb. Kirkpatrick added the Liberal Party has a longstanding association with the Sandinistas.

Mr. Allen said we can now refine the steps in Phase One, and start to lay out contingency plans, and that these all be passed around for approval.

Sec. Haig agreed to sit down with State, NSC, etc., and look at each one.

Mr. Meese said OMB should look at where the money can come from and we should do this before pushing on the supplemental.

Mr. Allen said we will also look into the speech proposal.

Mr. Allen summarized the joint request by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger for authority to begin consultations with the OAU and other states to discuss U.S. assistance to an African Peacekeeping Force for Chad, and to begin consultations with Congress concerning sources of funding up to \$12 million for this assistance.

Sec. Haig noted there was some danger here. He noted that we have been full supporters of replacing the Libyans in Chad with an OAU force and working very closely with the French in this effort. He stated that it was vital that the French see us as backing them up in this and added that they will be footing the heavy cost of this peacekeeping force.

The President stated he approved the action requested by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger.

SYSTEM II

THE WHITE HOUSE

90044

43958

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1981

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER  
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE DAVID A. STOCKMAN  
Director, Office of Management and Budget

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
Director of Central Intelligence

THE HONORABLE JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK  
Representative of the United States  
of America to the United Nations

GENERAL DAVID C. JONES  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Proposed United States Assistance for an African  
Peacekeeping Force in Chad

At the National Security Council meeting of November 16, 1981,  
the NSC approved as submitted a joint request by Secretaries  
Haig and Weinberger regarding United States support to an  
African Peacekeeping Force in Chad. (S)

The specific courses of action approved are: Approval to undertake  
consultations with African and other concerned states regarding  
assistance to an African Peacekeeping Force in Chad; approval to  
begin consultations with Congress concerning sources of funding  
up to \$12 million for a U.S. contribution to the peacekeeping  
effort in Chad. (S)

*Richard V. Allen*

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

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Review 11/16/87

NLRR M3301 #43958  
BY RW NARA DATE 9/6/19

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*dlb 10/14/02*

RECEIVED 18 NOV 81 09

TO ALLEN

FROM FONTAINE

DOC DATE 17 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: FMS CENTRAL AMERICA  
 CARIBBEAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
 EL SALVADOR HONDURAS

SUBJECT: NSC MEETING - NOV 16 1981 DRAFT DECISION MEMORANDUM

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ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

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FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
 ALLEN BAILEY  
 SHOEMAKER  
 NAU

COMMENTS CY OF TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING ATTACHED

REF# LOG 8190048 NSCIPID NSC00026 ( J / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
		<i>C/107/82 noted by Vance w/ comment</i>		

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

Dick - This was an agreed paper until Hais submitted his late recommendation.

I have attached the notes from the President, VP, Meese and Allen from the NSC meeting.

Bud

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II

90043

43959

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

November 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THRU: JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE *RW*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting -- November 16, 1981:  
Draft Decision Memorandum

Attached at Tab I is a draft NSC Decision Memorandum outlining the points agreed upon at the November 16 NSC meeting, and refined further at a Situation Room meeting on November 17, attended by Adm. Nance, Tom Enders, State ARA, Nestor Sanchez, DOD/OSD, Gen. Gorman, DOD/JCS, Duane Clarridge, CIA, and Roger Fontaine, NSC staff.

At the second meeting, it was decided to convert the sensitive items under point four into a single sentence general formula. In addition, a new point five on improving intelligence collection was added since that was the sense of the NSC meeting. Also, military pressures on Cuba now include the preparation of longer-term contingency planning for the same reason. The points on UN activity were dropped owing to its criticism at the NSC meeting. The point on radio broadcasting to Nicaragua was also dropped since that matter is already underway.

Attached at Tab A are the original talking points for the November 16 NSC meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Decision Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Decision Memorandum  
Tab A Talking Points

cc: Norman Bailey  
Chris Shoemaker  
Henry Nau

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Review Nov. 17, 1987

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M330/1 #43959  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/16/19



~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

43960

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 19, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting  
November 16, 1981

The following decisions have been made by the President based on discussion at the November 16, 1981 meeting of the National Security Council:

1. Economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean countries (estimate \$250 to \$300 million FY 1982 supplemental).
2. Agreement to use most of the \$50 million Section 506 authority to increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras. Reprogram additional funds as necessary.
3. Provide military training for indigenous units and leaders both in and out of country.
4. Support democratic forces in Nicaragua.
5. Step up intelligence collection in the Caribbean area.
6. Maintain trade and credit to Nicaragua as long as the government permits the private sector to operate effectively.
7. Improve military preparedness against Cuba and develop contingency plans for action against Cuba.
8. Create a public information task force to inform the public and Congress of the critical situation in the area.
9. Prepare appropriate military contingency plans for action against Cuban forces should they be introduced into Central America.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Review on November 18, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M330/1 #43960

~~TOP SECRET~~

BY RLW NARA DATE 9/6/19

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- 10. Expedite measures to tighten the economic sanctions against Cuba.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

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16  
43961

1. Economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean countries (estimate \$250 million to \$300 million FY 1982 supplemental).
2. Agreement to use most of the \$50 million Section 506 authority to increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras.
3. Train indigenous forces both in-country and in CONUS.
4. Attempt to develop a para-military force from third country nationals for covert actions in Nicaragua. Ultimate goal would be to "liberate" the country.
  - a. Destroy newly imported equipment in Nicaragua and/or mining or blockading its ports.
  - b. Destroy Cuban heavy weapons or aircraft by covert means.
  - c. Disrupt Sandinista activities.
  - d. Disrupt El Salvador supply operation.
5. Cut off Nicaraguan trade and credit, but only if the Sandinistas have already wrapped up the private sector opposition.
6. Institute short-term military pressures against Cuba.
7. Initiate a campaign within this country to inform the public and the Congress of the critical situation in the area and to get support for our actions.
8. Create a public information task force on Central America.
9. Form a government in exile for Nicaragua. With this government, mount a propaganda campaign against Sandinista government.
10. Initiate action in the United Nations against Cuban involvement in Central American revolutionary activities.
11. Develop a Free Radio Station broadcasting to Nicaragua both in English and Spanish.
12. Expedite economic warfare plans being developed against Cuba.

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M330/1 #43961  
BY RW NARA DATE 9/6/19

MIBEG

43962

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Phase I

43962

- 10 Belize
- 100 El Salvador
- 75 Costa Rica
- 25 Honduras
- 50 Jamaica
- 40

Source?

1000-man force

1. Economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean countries (estimate \$250 million to \$300 million FY 1982 supplemental).
2. Agreement to use most of the \$50 million Section 506 authority to increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras.
3. Train indigenous forces both in-country and in ~~CONUS~~ <sup>outside El Salvador</sup>.
4. ~~Attempt to develop a para-military forces from third country nationals for covert actions in Nicaragua. Ultimate goal would be to "liberate" the country.~~
  - a. Destroy newly imported equipment in Nicaragua and/or mining or blockading its ports.
  - b. Destroy Cuban heavy weapons or aircraft by covert means.
  - c. Disrupt Sandinista activities.
  - d. Disrupt El Salvador supply operation.
5. Cut off Nicaraguan trade and credit, but only if the Sandinistas have already wrapped up the private sector opposition.
6. Institute short-term military pressures against Cuba.
7. Initiate a campaign within this country to inform the public and the Congress of the critical situation in the area and to get support for our actions.
8. Create a public information task force on Central America.
9. <sup>Encourage formation of</sup> ~~Form a government in exile~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~for Nicaraguans~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~With this government, mount a propaganda campaign against Sandinista government.~~
10. Initiate action in the ~~United Nations~~ <sup>OAS</sup> against Cuban involvement in Central American revolutionary activities.
11. ~~Develop a~~ <sup>Support</sup> Free Radio Station broadcasting to Nicaragua both in English and Spanish.
12. Expedite economic warfare plans being developed against Cuba.

BY PLS NARA DATE 9/16/19  
NLRP M3381 #43962

DECLASSIFIED

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~~Phase II Contingency Planning~~  
(e.g., military action v. Cuba if they move into Nicaragua)

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V.P.

43963

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1. Economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean countries (estimate \$250 million to \$300 million FY 1982 supplemental).
2. Agreement to use most of the \$50 million Section 506 authority to increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras.
3. Train indigenous forces both in-country and in CONUS.
4. Attempt to develop a para-military force from third country nationals for covert actions in Nicaragua. Ultimate goal would be to "liberate" the country.
  - a. Destroy newly imported equipment in Nicaragua and/or mining or blockading its ports.
  - b. Destroy Cuban heavy weapons or aircraft by covert means.
  - c. Disrupt Sandinista activities.
  - d. Disrupt El Salvador supply operation.
5. Cut off Nicaraguan trade and credit, but only if the Sandinistas have already wrapped up the private sector opposition.
6. Institute short-term military pressures against Cuba.
7. Initiate a campaign within this country to inform the public and the Congress of the critical situation in the area and to get support for our actions.
8. Create a public information task force on Central America.
9. Form a government in exile for Nicaragua. With this government, mount a propaganda campaign against Sandinista government.
10. Initiate action in the United Nations against Cuban involvement in Central American revolutionary activities.
11. Develop a Free Radio Station broadcasting to Nicaragua both in English and Spanish.
12. Expedite economic warfare plans being developed against Cuba.

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NLRR M3301 #43963  
BY RW NARA DATE 9/6/19

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43964

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1. Economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean countries (estimate \$250 million to \$300 million FY 1982 supplemental).
2. Agreement to use most of the \$50 million Section 506 authority to increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras.
3. Train indigenous forces both in-country and in CONUS.
4. ~~Attempt to develop~~ <sup>Support to build</sup> ~~a~~ para-military forces <sup>from</sup> ~~from~~ third country nationals for covert actions in Nicaragua. Ultimate goal would be to "liberate" the country.
  - a. Destroy newly imported equipment in Nicaragua and/or mining or blockading its ports.
  - b. Destroy Cuban heavy weapons or aircraft by covert means.
  - c. Disrupt Sandinista activities.
  - d. Disrupt El Salvador supply operation.
5. Cut off Nicaraguan trade and credit, but only if the Sandinistas have already wrapped up the private sector opposition.
6. Institute short-term military pressures against Cuba.
7. Initiate a campaign within this country to inform the public and the Congress of the critical situation in the area and to get support for our actions.
8. Create a public information task force on Central America.
9. ~~Form a government in exile for~~ <sup>Promote an exile organization of</sup> Nicaraguans. With this government, mount a propaganda campaign against Sandinista government.
10. Initiate action in the United Nations against Cuban involvement in Central American revolutionary activities.
11. Develop a Free Radio Station broadcasting to Nicaragua both in English and Spanish.
12. Expedite economic warfare plans being developed against Cuba.

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NLRR M330/1 #43964

BY AW NARA DATE 9/6/19

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1. Economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean countries (estimate \$250 million to \$300 million FY 1982 supplemental).
2. Agreement to use most of the \$50 million Section 506 authority to increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras.
3. Train indigenous forces both in-country and in CONUS.
4. ~~Attempt to develop a para-military force~~ <sup>support and arms political and</sup> from third country nationals for covert actions in Nicaragua. <sup>Second and</sup>  
Ultimate goal would be to "liberate" the country
  - a. Destroy newly imported equipment in Nicaragua and/or mining or blockading its ports.
  - b. Destroy Cuban heavy weapons or aircraft by covert means.
  - c. Disrupt Sandinista activities.
  - d. Disrupt El Salvador supply operation.
5. Cut off Nicaraguan trade and credit, but only if the Sandinistas have already wrapped up the private sector opposition.
6. Institute short-term military pressures against Cuba.
7. Initiate a campaign within this country to inform the public and the Congress of the critical situation in the area and to get support for our actions.
8. Create a public information task force on Central America.
9. ~~Form a government in exile for Nicaragua.~~ <sup>Encourage formation of an exile organization</sup> With this government, mount a propaganda campaign against Sandinista government.
10. Initiate action in the United Nations against Cuban involvement in Central American revolutionary activities.
11. <sup>Support</sup> Develop a Free Radio Station broadcasting to Nicaragua both in English and Spanish.
12. Expedite economic warfare plans being developed against Cuba.

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NLRR M3301 #43965

BY FW NARA DATE 9/6/19

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1. Economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean countries (estimate \$250 million to \$300 million FY 1982 supplemental).
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12. Expedite economic warfare plans being developed against Cuba.

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BY AW NARA DATE 9/6/19

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Juan

01 NOV 19 P 4: 17

Needs to be  
dispatched via  
System II.

MM  
Shel

Subject: PROPOSED US ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD

CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED  
(check one)

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THE SECRETARY OF HHS 100 Independence Avenue, NW				
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MLB M330/1#43967

JOT WDA, Date 7/15/10

**SECRET**

Subject: PROPOSED US ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD

REMOVAL OF 11/12/07

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- Mr. Lenz
- Mr. Levine
- Mr. Lilley
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OMB  
THE DIRECTOR, CIA  
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THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20506

Orig. Office: NSC/S

Date Sent 11/19/81

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DATE: 11/19/81

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*John H. Owens*  
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(Please Print)

*Nov 19, 81*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date received)

*ODP*  
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(Agency)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OMB  
THE DIRECTOR, CIA  
✓ U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UN  
THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

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Date Sent 11/19/81

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U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UN  
THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20506

Orig. Office: NSC/S

Date Sent 11/19/81

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DATE: 11/19/81

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(Signature)

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James R. Pittman  
Chief, Executive Registry

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NLRR M330/i #43968

BY HJ NARA DATE 7/12/16

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

db  
10/17/07

RECEIVED 15 DEC 81 14

TO ALLEN

FROM FONTAINE

DOCDATE 23 NOV 81

WEITERING

23 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: MINUTES NSC CUBA  
CENTRAL AMERICA CHAD

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF 16 NOV NSC MTG RE US PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD & US  
STRATEGY TWDS CUBA & CENTRAL AMERICA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8190043 NSCID NSC00026 ( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 1/07/82 no decision made

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



81 0427 A 7: 41

JANET COLSON \_\_\_\_\_

BUD NANCE \_\_\_\_\_

DICK ALLEN \_\_\_\_\_

IRENE DERUS \_\_\_\_\_

JANET COLSON \_\_\_\_\_

BUD NANCE \_\_\_\_\_

PETER \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO VP \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEAVER \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

Comments:

MEMORANDUM

90048

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ACTION

November 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Meeting -- November 16

Attached at Tab A are the minutes of the November 16 NSC Meeting held in the Cabinet Room. Fred Wettering and I have incorporated our notes into one comprehensive report.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the minutes of the November 16 NSC meeting.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment

Tab A Minutes of November 16 NSC Meeting

cc: Fred Wettering

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 12/12/07

~~SECRET~~

Review Nov. 20, 1981