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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 10/16/2007

File Folder NSC 00024 11/10/1981 [STRATEGY TOWARD CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, EL SALVADOR] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F95-042-4

Box Number 2

ORR, ROBERT

16

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
43940	TALKING POINTS	NSC MEETING <i>R 2/13/2017 M465/1</i>	1	11/10/1981	B1
43941	FORM	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD	1	11/9/1981	B1 B3
43942	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #43932; A STRATEGY FOR CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA	8	11/9/1981	B1
43943	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #43933; BUILDING SUPPORT AT HOME AND ABROAD <i>PAR 2/13/2017 M465/1</i>	2	11/7/1981	B1
43944	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #43934; PROBABLE SOVIET AND CUBAN RESPONSES	3	ND	B1
43945	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #43935; US MILITARY FORCES <i>D 2/13/2017 M465/1</i>	3	ND	B1
43946	MINUTES	NSC MEETING, NOVEMBER 10, 1981 - STRATEGY TOWARD CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, PARTIAL, PAGE 2, 3 <i>PAR 10/9/2012 M232/1</i>	6	11/10/1987	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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Box Number 2

ORR, ROBERT

16

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
43947	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: FOLLOW-UP TO NOVEMBER 10 NSC MEETING ON CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA	2	ND	B1

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

November 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting - November 10, 1981
4:00 - 5:00 p.m., Cabinet Room

Again, I have developed talking points for the President to start the meeting. He will then pass the meeting to you to keep on track.

-- On the opposite page are talking points for you. In your talking points you tell everyone generally what is in each phase and ask for comments. About three minutes each is all we can afford.

-- At Tab I are Presidential Talking Points.

-- At Tab II is the State paper. It is generally the same paper we had previously but shows the different points of disagreement. I have marked in yellow the disagreed sections.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review on November 9, 1982

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 10/14/01

43940

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

II-90037
Add-on

NSC Meeting - November 10, 1981

TALKING POINTS

As all of you know, I have made Central and South America one of the main points of interest in this Administration. For that reason, I have been especially disturbed at the downward trends in that area which appear to have accelerated over the last few months.

At the 20th Party Congress in 1961 in Moscow and the Tri-Continental Conference in January 1966 in Havana, Central America was designated as a special target for communism through revolution.

We have done little or nothing to counter the slow communist moves until now we are reaching a critical stage where we are going to have to take specific action to reverse the trend.

I have read the papers in detail and know there are disagreements as to our recommended courses of action. I would like for each to express his disagreements as we go through the two phases. From this discussion, I would like for the NSC staff to develop an action plan.

Dick (Allen), would you lead off and walk us through each of the phases.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Review on November 10, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR/M465 #43940
BY FW NARA DATE 2/13/17

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

II-90037

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
November 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting on Tuesday,
November 10, 1981 - 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

There will be a National Security Council meeting from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, November 10, 1981, in the Cabinet Room of the White House. There will be one subject, "A Strategy for Cuba and Central America." The papers for this agenda item are attached.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

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Review on November 9, 1983

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 10/16/02

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NSC 00024 11/10/1981 [STRATEGY TOWARD CUBA AND
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43941	FORM NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD	1	11/9/1981	B1 B3

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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Subject: NSC Meeting

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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 10TH/Const. NW, Room 5119.....				
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE Exec. Sec/Room 7241.....				
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NSC 00024 11/10/1981 [STRATEGY TOWARD CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, EL SALVADOR] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F95-042-4
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
43942	PAPER DUPLICATE OF #43932; A STRATEGY FOR CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA	8	11/9/1981	B1

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~Building Support at Home and Abroad

We must move urgently to build support for our policy among the American public, in the Congress, and with other governments.

Phase I. Reinforcing El Salvador, [REDACTED]
Creating a Climate of Insecurity Around Cuba.

At home, we should avoid dramatizing the situation. Public involvement by the President and Secretary of State should be clear, particularly with the Congressional leadership, but limited.

Our public emphasis would be on:

- Political and economic support (i.e. supplemental aid and Caribbean Basin Program) for democratic regimes in the region (Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Dominica Republic) and regimes in El Salvador and Honduras where we seek to strengthen the political center.
- Support for reforms in El Salvador and the search for a political solution.
- Using the Sandinista move to a totalitarian state as the inevitable alternative to our support for the center. (i.e. Duarte) in El Salvador.
- Letting the deployments around Cuba speak for themselves, avoiding action forcing steps, and continuing our public exposition of Castro's export of subversion in a firm but non-strident fashion.

As soon as our own decisions are made, we would begin putting together the local consortium of countries to contain Nicaragua. We should start with Colombia (the presence of one of the Latin democracies is a political imperative), then adding Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. We can perhaps add Costa Rica after their elections in May 1982. We will have to convince these countries that we will back them with US force if there is fighting and provide substantial additional FMS and economic assistance to Colombia and Honduras.

Venezuela will do more to help in El Salvador (economic aid and military advisors) but will not overtly join the consortium:

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR M4105 #43943
BY RW NARA DATE 2/17

If substantial numbers of Cuban troops are introduced into Central America, we can get the required two-thirds vote to intervene under the Rio Treaty; otherwise not. Mexico will oppose in either case.

Phase II: Coercing Cuba

The US public and Congress will support the use of coercion against Cuba only if convinced that US security is at risk and that the Administration is acting in a cautious and prudent manner. The Secretary of State would make the basic security case.

Simultaneously, we would propose to Castro a private negotiation in which in return for the withdrawal of Cuban troops and advisors from Central America and Africa we would offer full normalization of relations. After the effort fails (in a credible time frame), we would make the record public.

The President would then announce our coercive action against Cuba. He would describe Cuba as a heavily armored Soviet proxy and stress the strategic threat to the US. In consultations with Congress under the War Powers Resolution, we would realistically describe possible Soviet countermoves and how we propose to contain them. We would make clear to the Congress -- and to the Soviets -- that we will stay the course until the problem of Cuba is settled.

Most countries in the Hemisphere will support us privately but few would join us openly. Colombia, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and some Central Americans are possible exceptions.

11/7/81

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43944	PAPER DUPLICATE OF #43934; PROBABLE SOVIET AND CUBAN RESPONSES	3	ND	B1

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43945	PAPER DUPLICATE OF #43935; US MILITARY FORCES	3	ND	B1

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81

JANET COLSON

[Handwritten signature]

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEAVER

CY TO BRADY

Bud

SHOW CC

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Comments:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

11/5/81

TO: RICHARD ALLEN
FROM: GREGORY J. NEWELL
SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

PLEASE IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING AND NOTIFY AND CLEAR ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE BRIEFING PAPER AND REMARKS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO RICHARD DARMAN BY 3 P.M. OF THE PRECEDING DAY.

MEETING: NSC Time

DATE: November 12, 1981

TIME: 4:00 pm

DURATION: 60 mins

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

REMARKS REQUIRED:

MEDIA COVERAGE:

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION:

cc: M. Brandon J. Parr
R. Darman B. Shaddix
D. Fischer L. Speakes
M. Friedersdorf Speechwriting and Research
C. Fuller S. Studdert
C. Gerrard N. Wormser
E. Hickey WHCA Audio/Visual
P. McCoy WHCA Operations
L. Nofziger
C. Tyson

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90049

25

43946

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE, TIME November 10, 1981, 4:00-5:00 p.m.,
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room
SUBJECT: Strategy Toward Cuba and Central America

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush

JCS
General David C. Jones
Lt. Gen. Paul F. Gorman

State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

The White House
Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Mr. Richard V. Allen
Admiral James W. Nance
Ms. Janet Colson

OSD
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

NSC
Mr. Roger W. Fontaine

OMB
Mr. William Schneider

The Vice President's Office
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

CIA
Director William J. Casey

USUN
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

MINUTES

Mr. Allen opened the meeting by pointing out the two papers in front of us: the State Department paper and a DOD submission (which arrived this morning). He then outlined each phase and its component parts. Mr. Allen then asked Secretary Haig to make his presentation.

Secretary Haig explained the State paper was an interdepartmental effort over an extended period, and it faces up to the fundamental issue; namely, a deteriorating situation in Central America. If we wait much longer to act, then the price will be much higher.

~~SECRET~~

Review Nov. 10, 1987

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M08-232 #43946
BY RW NARA DATE 10/9/12

Real problems between State, DOD, and CIA are this: the steps outlined in Phase One are not enough. This plan -- all of it -- is designed to set up credible pressures on Castro to get him to talk. This is in contrast to the Carter approach which promised negotiations if he ceased and desisted his revolutionary efforts. The Secretary pointed out that what will be decided here will be known to the Cubans within weeks. Therefore, the message we must get to them is this: we mean business. If we don't do that, then we should not do anything. What we are deciding now is taking a course of action that is designed to stop Cuban adventures and we are willing to use any kind of pressures to succeed. This must be decided before we decide to do anything else. The Soviet threshold on Cuba meanwhile is very clear: it is the 1962 accords, the promise not to invade is the line. Invasion is the trigger for a serious Soviet response. Up to that point there is a free play area. Meanwhile, we are at a high point of Cuban and Nicaraguan concern and that is the result of only a few words from me, and some press stories. The Cubans are worried. They have made countless overtures to talk. Their vice president would like to talk to me or General Walters in Havana. The Secretary believes that is worth thinking about. Moreover, we can raise their anxiety levels further through phoney military communications traffic.

Secretary Weinberger then made his presentation. He opened by saying he believed that there was agreement on the nature and seriousness of the problem. There is a narrow point of difference between DOD and State. DOD cannot accept the decision to use unilateral force now. We must go step by step. We must prepare public opinion, and we must work on getting a coalition of Latin American countries to work with us. The Secretary emphasized that we should not make the up front commitment without doing the above first.

But we should:

- train El Salvadoran officers out of country; and
-



But we cannot today accept a unilateral commitment of force. That is the basic disagreement.

Mr. Casey added that a step by step approach would include for Nicaragua the following elements:

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)
 FOIA
 135216

~~SECRET~~

--

--

and

-- no employment of U.S. forces unless Cuban troops come in.

Mr. Casey

General Jones said there is a need to build a coalition of support. He mentioned that even the Mexican officers at the recent American Army conference were concerned about the situation. Castro knows the President needs congressional support. General Jones also pointed out that General Woerner, who has been in El Salvador, is working on a strategy paper. That paper is designed to strengthen El Salvador's military forces. But the March elections also must take place. Colonel Garcia has assured JCS that the winner will be respected. Meanwhile, it is the belief of General Woerner if we do nothing, the junta is doomed to a slow defeat. We can, however, stabilize the situation indefinitely if our economic and security assistance is increased. We need to improve intelligence, command and control. We need to form a new quick reaction battalion out of country. We need to offer out of country training for officers. We need to give them basic interdiction equipment like metal detectors. We need to put pressure on Nicaragua that does not require a quarantine on the landing of U.S. forces. Of course, if the Cubans move in troops, then we are forced to do more.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick argued that the situation was deteriorating and action must be taken. What to do? Some decisions are more urgent than others. Decisions should have been taken months ago -- but clearly El Salvador is the first priority. The present government will collapse if the guerrillas continue to destroy the economy. Weak governments cannot survive that kind of action indefinitely. We do not have time to build coalitions. We can cooperate with individual countries, but they will never work together in time. We cannot wait for public opinion either to form. All of the items in Phase One without a commitment to use U.S. military force can be done. We need to focus on El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala in that order. We can use covert action. We can employ proxy forces.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Allen then asked for questions.

Mr. Meese asked how are we to operate politically with the government in El Salvador?

Secretary Haig observed in response to Ambassador Kirkpatrick that there was a lot of agreement around the table. Coalition simply meant getting anybody to help us. And we need congressional support. The Secretary further observed that any plan we adopt will leak therefore, we must not get onto any track unless we are ready to do something. If we do not and instead have a set of actions that merely do some damage -- they will leak too and Castro will use that against us. We cannot start another Vietnam in our hemisphere.

Mr. Allen then asked why can't we use Phase One actions and wait on Phase Two.

Secretary Weinberger further asked can we pull back at any time?

Secretary Haig said the President can stop at any point. But if you are not prepared to move right up to the threshold, then don't start down the path in the first place. We should go back and look at it again and do only the easy actions.

Mr. Casey then reiterated the principal target is Nicaragua.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick disagreed. She argued that El Salvador had to be stabilized first. Then we should move onto Nicaragua and let others do the work for us.

Secretary Weinberger added that lots of Phase One can be done. Let's begin with that.

Secretary Haig agreed. But he warned against creating an insurgency in Nicaragua unless you are prepared to go all the way.

Mr. Allen observed that Cubans in Nicaragua do create opportunities for us. That's very different than going directly to Cuba with warlike actions.

Mr. Meese then summarized the situation. The key element is whether U.S. land forces and naval actions are to be contemplated. Would we use them?

The President then asked should everyone -- Americans, Cubans, Nicaraguans -- feel that the U.S. will commit its forces?

The President then observed that what worries him most is this: if the people won't support the leader and the cause, then there will be failure. The President then said it was clear the press would like to accuse us of getting into another Vietnam. How can we solve this problem with Congress and public opinion being what they are? We are talking about an impossible option. Are there other things we can do? Can covert actions be traced back to us. How do we deal with the image in Latin America of the Yankee colossus?

Secretary Haig responded that the members of the OAS really want and need a sign of determination from you. All of them want action, and we must not give the Cubans an incentive to jump in.

Mr. Allen said one component could be the President making a statement to build consensus prior to taking action.

Mr. Baker said warnings have already been given.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick agreed and said President Carter tried that approach. But a speech on the nature of the problem and the character of the threat can be given. She also rejected the Vietnam analogy. The Vietnam war did not involve direct national security interests. The loss of Central America does.

The President said but then what. People will want to know, what are you going to do?

Mr. Meese then said it seems agreed that we do those things already listed to help El Salvador. As for Nicaragua, we can do political, military, propaganda/covert actions that do not require U.S. forces.

The Vice President asked if we could mine Nicaraguan east coast ports.

Mr. Allen said yes, but other shipping was involved.

Secretary Weinberger said that everything Mr. Meese outlined can be done without a prior commitment to use force.

Mr. Meese then said the dividing line is the use of naval forces to interdict Nicaragua.

Secretary Haig said the dividing line is whether any plan will succeed.

The President then asked to hear more (at the next meeting) about various alternatives including mining. He added I don't want to back down. I don't want to accept defeat.

Mr. Meese then said we must continue the meeting on Thursday. He suggested we take each item short of the ultimatum to Nicaragua and the employment of U.S. forces against Nicaragua and find out what it takes to implement each action in terms of money and bureaucratic follow-up. He then said we should discuss what other steps could also be contemplated. Then finally we can go and discuss further the most serious actions both pros and cons.

The President then asked what other covert actions could be taken that would be truly disabling and not just flea bites?

Mr. Allen reiterated what were short-term demonstration steps to show our seriousness aside from mining.

The President asked can we take more training exercises? Can we introduce a few battalions into Panama or Honduras? Have we ever done that in Central America?

General Gorman said no, we have never done that.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS

RECEIVED 13 NOV 81 18

DOC DATE 10 NOV 81

TO ALLEN

FROM FONTAINE

KEYWORDS: CUBA

CENTRAL AMERICA

NSC

SUBJECT: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION & DECISION AT 12 NOV NSC MTG

ACTION: TRANSFERRED TO SYSTEM II DUE: STATUS C FILES IF

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID NSC 80024 (D/D)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

VAM

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[Handwritten mark resembling a large 'L' or bracket]

Carol C.

Transfer to
System II

advise Fontana

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35

MEMORANDUM

6580

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

November 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE

SUBJECT: Topics for Discussion and Decision at
November 12 NSC Meeting

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President on what will be discussed at Thursday's NSC meeting on Cuba and Central America.

RECOMMENDATION


That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President



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Review No. v 10, 1987

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

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NSC 00024 11/10/1981 [STRATEGY TOWARD CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, EL SALVADOR] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F95-042-4
ORR, ROBERT

Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
<i>Document Description</i>				
43947	MEMO	2	ND	B1
RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: FOLLOW-UP TO NOVEMBER 10 NSC MEETING ON CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA				

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF RECEIVED 15 DEC 81 14
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

TO ALLEN

FROM FONTAINE

alb
10/17/07 DCCDATE 24 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR CUBA
CENTRAL AMERICA MINUTES
NSC

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF 10 NOV NSC MTG RE US STRATEGY TWDS CUBA & EL SALVADOR

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
ALLEN


COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8190037 NSC IFID NSC00024 (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DJE COPIES TO

C 1/07 *no decision made*

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PETER	_____		
CY TO VP	_____	SHOW CC	_____
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CY TO BRADY	_____	SHOW CC	_____

Comments:

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SYSTEM II

MEMORANDUM

JL 90049

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

November 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Meeting -- November 10

Attached at Tab A are the minutes of the November 10 NSC Meeting held in the Cabinet Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the minutes of the November 10 NSC meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Minutes of November 10 NSC Meeting

~~SECRET~~
Review Nov. 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By *dh* NARA, Date *10/16/07*

~~SECRET~~