

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files
Folder Title: NSC0004 27 Feb 1981 [Poland,
Caribbean Basin, F-15, El Salvador] (4 of 4)

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/13/2004

File Folder NSC 00004 2/27/81 [POLAND, CARIBBEAN BASIN, F-15,
EL SALVADOR] (4/4)

FOIA

2000-002

Box Number 91282

SKINNER

6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
2498	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE VICE PRESIDENT ET AL RE NSC MEETING <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	2/25/1981	B1
910	MEMO	ROBERT SCHWEITZER ET AL TO RICHARD ALLEN RE NSC MEETING 25 FEBRUARY: SIG PAPER ON EL SALVADOR <i>R 5/11/2010 M109/1</i>	3	2/24/1981	B1
911	MEMO	ROBERT KIMMITT TO ALLEN THROUGH SCHWEITZER RE F-15 <i>R 2/22/2008 F00-002</i>	1	2/26/1981	B1
912	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE F-15 <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
913	TALKING POINTS	RE F-15 (ATTACHMENT TO ITEM #912) <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
914	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG, CASPAR WEINBERGER TO THE PRESIDENT RE F-15 (ATTACHMENT TO ITEM #912) <i>R 5/11/2010 M109/1</i>	4	ND	B1
915	BRIEFING PAPER	RE F-15 (ATTACHMENT TO ITME #914) <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/13/2004

File Folder NSC 00004 2/27/81 [POLAND, CARIBBEAN BASIN, F-15,
EL SALVADOR] (4/4)

FOIA

2000-002

Box Number 91282

SKINNER

6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
916	MEMO	SCHWEITZER, ROGER FONTAINE TO ALLEN RE BRIEFING MATERIALS RE NSC MEETING PAR 11/16/2011 M109/1	3	12/26/1981	B1
917	MEMO	KIMMITT TO ALLEN THROUGH SCWEITZER RE F-15 R 2/22/2008 F00-002	1	3/2/1981	B1
918	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO ALLEN RE F-15 (ATTACHMENT TO ITEM #917) R 6/6/2006	2	2/28/1981	B1
919	TALKING POINTS	RE F-15 R 6/6/2006	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: ROBERT L. SCHWEITZER *RIS*

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

SUBJECT: Saudi F-15 Enhancement

State has forwarded an update on its activities regarding Saudi F-15 enhancement (Tab A). It recommends a White House announcement of the decision this week, preceded by calls to key Jewish leaders.

State proposes that the White House announcement be made this Thursday, March 5 (after initial congressional consultations are completed), and a draft announcement is included. However, the informal notification to Congress of the sale might not be sent for two weeks or more. I suggest holding the White House announcement until just before notification, because time is on our side once the notification period begins and is with our opponents until then.

Also included in the State package are proposed talking points for use with key leaders of the American Jewish community. The points are good, but a bit long, and I have prepared a shorter version (Tab B). I believe these calls should be made now, so that these individuals feel they are being consulted on, rather than only advised of, this decision.

NB
 One last point: State and Defense sent their cables to Saudi Arabia on Friday without our having reviewed them, though we asked. In my view, Presidential decisions made in the NSC context should not be announced formally without our participation. I think that you should make this point to the Secretaries at an early opportunity.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (1) That the White House announcement at Tab A be held until immediately prior to congressional notification.
- (2) That the talking points at Tab B be used to brief key supporters in the American Jewish community.
- (3) That you ask the Secretaries to have their staffs consult with the NSC staff on formal announcements of Presidential decisions made in the NSC context.

gk/rnk

Geoff Kemp concurs

cc: Phyllis Kamirsky

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F00-002# 917BY NOJ, NARA, DATE 2/22/08~~SECRET~~

Review March 2, 1981

RECEIVED 24 FEB 81 12

TO	AGENCIES	FROM ALLEN	DOCDATE 24 FEB 81
		ALLEN	25 FEB 81
		ALLEN	21 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: CARIBBEAN POLAND
 SAUDI ARABIA FMS
 NSC

White House Gt

CAS

just 28, 1997

11/21/89

SUBJECT: D/R 048 NOTIFICATION OF 25 FEB NSC MTG & D/R 049 NOTIFICATION OF 27 FEB / 3 MAR & 12 MAR NSC MTGS & SCHEDULING PROCEDURES FOR NSC MTGS

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: STATUS CD FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

FONTAINE

PIPES

KEMP

KIMMITT

LENZ

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8100731 3100758 NSC/FID NSC00004 (C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
--------------------	----------	-----------------	-----	-----------

	- 2/21	Allen sgd memo to agencies		Some
	- 2/22	Allen sgd memo to agencies		"
	C 2/25	Allen sgd memo to agencies		"

DISPATCH ed by RA's ofc W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 25, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting (U)


The President will chair a meeting of the National Security Council on Friday, February 27, 1981, at 11:00 A.M. The meeting will last an hour. Principals only will attend. (U)

Agenda items will include El Salvador and the Caribbean Basin, Poland, and the F-15 Enhancement Package for Saudi Arabia. (U)

The President also will chair a meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, March 4, 1981, at 11:15 A.M. The meeting will last an hour. Principals only will attend and will be notified of agenda items. (U)

Commencing March 12, 1981, and thereafter, the President will chair a meeting of the National Security Council every Thursday at 2:00 p.m. Meetings will last an hour. Principals only will attend and will be advised of the agenda. (U)

All briefing materials are to be submitted to James W. Nance, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, by the close of business two days prior to the meeting date. (U)



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on February 25, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-002 # 2498
BY LOT 6/6/06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0815

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


February 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting (U)

The President will chair an NSC Meeting on Wednesday, February 25 at 11:00 a. m. The meeting will last an hour. Principals only will attend. (C)

Agenda items will include the Caribbean Basin, Poland, and the F-15 enhancement package for Saudi Arabia. (C)


Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on February 24, 1987

White House Ct
oas

just 28, 1987
11/7/1/87

FEBRUARY 1981

11:15 am

SHFAX RECEIPT
THE WHITE HOUSE

per Kay, this has been LDX'd to State/
Defense/CIA/JCS. I tubed the VP's to
John Owens, and hand-delivered the ones
for Counsellor to the President and
Chief of Staff. Kay says that Carole
Chavira
Foster needs a copy of this, since
she is "working on the meeting."
* Both memos



2:52 PM

B
T

MESSAGE NO. 951 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. PAGES 1

FROM Richard W. Allen (Name) (Extension) (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Unrec'd of 10/21/81

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Dept/Room No.	Extension
CIA			
State	see page 1		
DOD			

REMARKS:

OF UP COVAL RE(S)
CAS 11/21/81

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



CIA

FEB 25 2 37 PM '81

31

MESSAGE NO. 951 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. PAGES 1

FROM Richard W. Allen (Name) (Extension) (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Corrected copy

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Dept/Room No.	Extension
CIA			
State	see page 1		
DOD			

REMARKS:

UNCL OF CLASS: UPON MOVAL OSURE(S)

CAS 11/21/04

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASH FAX



25 FEB 1981 14

DOD

MESSAGE No. 951

CLASSIFICATION Confidential

No. PAGES 1

FROM Richard V. Allen
(Name)

(Extension)

(Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

16 copies of report

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Dept/Room No.

Extension

CIA
State
DOD

release


REMARKS:

UNCL
OF CLASSIF.

UPON REMOVAL
ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 11/21/04

WASHFAX RECEIPT
THE WHITE HOUSE



815
copy Couried
out to DCI
23 Feb 80
A.M.
JRO

MESSAGE NO. 932 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. PAGES 1
FROM Richard V. Allen (Name) (Extension) (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION National Security Council Meeting

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Dept/Room No.	Extension
<u>State</u>	<u>Secretary of State</u>	<u>received 22 Feb</u>	<u>1348</u>
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Sec Def</u>	<u>received 22 Feb</u>	<u>1354</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>DCI</u>	<u>notified by phone - will be couried Monday AM</u>	
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Chairman JCS</u>	<u>received 22 Feb</u>	<u>1354</u>

REMARKS:

copy in Meese/Baker folders

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFICATION CLOSURE(S)

CS 11/21/04

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting (U)

The National Security Council Meeting scheduled for Monday, February 23 at 11:00 a.m. has been cancelled and will be rescheduled for later this week.



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on February 21, 1987

White House Ct
CS

FEB 23, 1987
11/21/87

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

815
~~497~~

CONFIDENTIAL


February 21, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting (U)

The President will chair an NSC Meeting on Monday, February 23 at 11:00 a.m. The meeting will last an hour. Principals only will attend. (C)

Agenda items will include the Caribbean Basin, Poland, and the F-15 enhancement package for Saudi Arabia. (C)



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on February 21, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

By Cfc 11/21/04
August 28, 1997

RECEIVED 25 FEB 81 14

TO ALLEN

FROM SCHWEITZER

DOCDATE 24 FEB 81

FONTAINE

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

NSC

White House Gt
by CA

August 28, 1997
e 11/21/04

SIG

SUBJECT: SIG PAPER FOR 25 FEB NSC MTG ON EL SALVADOR

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 25 FEB 81 STATUS C FILES FM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LENZ

COMMENTS RESCHEDULED TO 27 FEB

REF#

LOG

NSCID NSC00004 (C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<u>C 3/2</u>	<u>OBE per Carlson</u>		<u>L2, SC, FO</u>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

0796

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OBEID
3/2/81

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROBERT L. SCHWEITZER
ROGER FONTAINE *RF*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting 25 February; SIG Paper
on El Salvador

The attached SIG is a good paper, but the mice are at it and last-minute changes are being made which we do not have. The changes come from OSD (State is now aboard, albeit reluctantly in ARA). Behind the changes is SecDef Weinberger's worry that someone may get killed and that that will lead to either another Vietnam or political criticism of the President. We share these concerns, but it is not possible to find a no-risk solution and still have any hope of preventing the overthrow of the moderates by the Marxist Left. The President will be criticized more at home and abroad if another Central American nation is taken over by the Communists while the USG stands by. It will be very hard to then rally our Latin neighbors to take a stand in the next case -- which will be Honduras.

The first area of concern is an effort by CJCS (who is trying to find a way out for SecDef) to keep the Military Training Teams out of country. The CJCS proposal is to train trainers outside of El Salvador instead of the Army directly -- the cadre approach. Here are the objections:

-- Presence of even a few small U.S. Training Teams (augmented eventually by other nations) will have an uplifting psychological and morale effect. The moral significance of external support is the greatest single hope for any reversal.

-- U.S. presence at brigade locations will also have an important disciplining effect on the Salvadorean troops. The sense of despair and fear when you are in combat alone and losing sometimes leads to acts of brutality and even barbarism. Conversely, any group of soldiers in the world tries to "show" better in the presence of military "observers" from another nation.

-- El Salvador, like most poor nations, would have to provide TDY funds and pay differentials for training beyond their own borders. They can ill afford to do so; will not send all they should.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review February 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-109 #910

BY KML NARA DATE 5/21/10

-- Good Salvadorean units are held together by a few key officers and NCOs. Extremely unlikely any Commander would part with his most "gung ho" leaders in an adverse combat situation; yet it is precisely this group of key leaders that most needs the U.S. training.

-- But the clincher is that the timing for an out of country program has long passed its time. The country is in extremis. The guerilla offensive began one month ago. The first wave of Phase III Mobile Warfare failed; another is clearly building. This is not the time to start drawing down the overstretched El Salvadorean Army to send their key middle-level leaders out of country. One and a half years ago the idea was a good one; it is not so today.

-- We had a game plan -- which the El Salvadoreans have wanted very much for over a year. Our Ambassador urges it; OSD was once aboard. Now we are starting to vacillate, and in a way characteristic of the last administration. Consider the consequences of backing off from a bit of decisive, non-combat action at the last minute -- for the El Salvadoreans, other Latins, and ourselves.

The second area is a tendency to walk away from the CONDECA concept as an attainable dream. The paper says (on page 5, paragraph 3) that the combined Intelligence Operations Center could be set up "possibly operating under the aegis of CONDECA". (Note: CONDECA is a Council of Central American States, (Consejo de Defensa Centroamericana) of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Only Nicaragua is not currently participating.) CONDECA is not a dream. It was set up as an organization of Central American States to defeat counterinsurgency; operates out of Guatemala City, and, while not very well because of recent U.S. undercutting, offers an umbrella in being under which to begin gathering collective support. CONDECA is not a sine qua non; it is a touchstone through which we can more easily make the contacts which can produce the organization we need -- if the original model does not serve.

Accompanying the walk away from CONDECA is a tendency to reduce the Combined Operations Intelligence Center to a study concept. The Center is the single most important part of the package -- if we are serious about stopping infiltration. Even SecDef Brown approved it nearly one year ago, adding marginalia that it should be broadened beyond Central America. It would be incredible if the Reagan Administration would not support a concept to collect, share and react to intelligence in a war where infiltrators are crossing borders of many nations to reach El Salvador. The concept had JCS, service, and inter-intelligence agreement one year ago. Today, its creation is more urgent than it was in 1980.

To be sure, approval and support for the Center must be obtained from each nation. A team headed by CINCSO, including Washington agency reps would be the best one to secure the necessary support. A combined State-Defense approach would quickly gain acceptance.

Other weakening changes may be inserted. You should seek to reverse these and try to allay SecDef's fears. We certainly are not going to have another Vietnam -- on any scale. We may not succeed, but as the proposed remarks for the President suggest, this is not the end. We need to get ready for other El Salvadors where we are not yet behind the power curve.

RECOMMENDATION:

- Support the paper. (TAB A)
- Support MTTs in country.
- Support an effort to build on or from the CONDECA organization, but widened to include other Latin nations -- Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela.
- Urge acceptance of the Combined Operations Intelligence Center which will serve us and the Latins well, not only in the instant case of El Salvador but for future contingencies.
- Ask that DOD start the long-term planning effort for all of Central America and the rest of Latin America.

I still have my reservations about ultimate workability of CONDECA which hasn't functioned well since '69 Salvadoran / Honduran war -- but it's worth a try.
R.F.

RECEIVED 27 FEB 81 12

TO ALLEN

FROM KIMMITT

DOCDATE 26 FEB 81

White House Ct

26 FEB 1981

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

FMS

ISRAEL

NSC

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR PRES 27 FEB NSC MTG RE SAUDI F-15 ENHANCEMENT

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION DUE: 26 FEB 81 STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

KEMP

NAU

SCHWEITZER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8100768

NSCIFIED NSC00004 (H / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 3/2	OBE per Carlson		LZ, PK

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

81 - 23 P 7: 44

Be'd

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

[A large diagonal line is drawn across the list of names.]

*3/1
return to
Fiscutinal
RVP has copy*

[Handwritten signature]


SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 26, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: ROBERT L. SCHWEITZER *RLS / 1920 / 26 Feb (time rec'd)*

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMETT *Bob*

SUBJECT: Saudi F-15 Enhancement

The sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 enhancement items is scheduled for discussion at tomorrow's NSC. State's recent actions, however, may leave little room for discussion.

Secretary Haig last night made calls to key legislators outlining the comprehensive proposal; he took this action even though his February 24 memorandum indicated he would do so only after the President called the congressional leadership. Further, Jim Buckley and Fred Ikle today briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee in closed sessions. Finally, State intended to send a cable to Saudi Arabia late today announcing the decision, but we have told them it should not be released without NSC concurrence. We have yet to receive it in draft.

State clearly is moving ahead as if a final decision has been made on all features of the initial Haig-Weinberger proposal. Your staff is of the opinion that the process may be advancing further than Presidential guidance thus far would allow, and that this embarrassing fact could surface in subsequent congressional testimony. Thus, the cable to Saudi Arabia should be held until after tomorrow's NSC meeting, at which a number of loose ends could be cleared up before the proposal is finally approved.

At Tab I is a memorandum to the President, forwarding proposed talking points (Tab A) for his use at the NSC meeting. Bill Schneider plans to attend the meeting to raise OMB's continuing concerns about the near- and long-term budgetary consequences of the Israeli component of the package.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

GK/RMK *HN/RMK*
 Geoff Kemp and Henry Nau concur.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Review February 26, 1987

NLRR FOO-002# 911
 BY LOJ, INARA, DATE 2/27/88

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: Saudi F-15 Enhancement

One of the topics for discussion at the NSC meeting is the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 enhancement items.

Since our discussion of this issue at the last NSC, State has taken a number of actions based on the belief that you had approved all aspects of the initial Haig-Weinberger proposal (Tab B). Before further, final action is taken, however, certain points should be cleared up.

I recommend, therefore, that you approve and use the talking points at Tab A during NSC consideration of this issue.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-002 #912

BY LOT 6/6/06

~~SECRET~~

Review February 26, 1987

NSC Meeting -- February 26, 1981

Sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 Enhancement Items

-- Al (Haig), would you please bring us up to date on actions taken regarding the Saudi F-15 issue?

-- One of your proposals for Israel is that we take a more "forthcoming" attitude on exports of their Kfir fighter aircraft. Does this mean that we will be promoting Kfir sales or only that the Israelis will be allowed to compete with US manufacturers for sales? The former position would cause major difficulties with US aerospace firms, while the latter would be only a reiteration of past policy.

-- I believe it important for the Saudis to understand that we are making a difficult political decision on their behalf. This action should form the basis for further support from them on a wide variety of issues, rather than being viewed as merely removing an old irritant in the relationship. How do you intend to proceed with the Saudis?

-- To avoid problems encountered by the last Administration on the initial F-15 sale, I believe we should designate one person to coordinate our day-to-day actions. Al, you and Cap should work out who that person will be.

-- We need to have clearly in mind a diplomatic strategy for dealing with Egyptian demands for parity when we announce our increases for Israel. State and Defense should prepare such a strategy, including some concrete measures we might take to respond to Egyptian requests.

-- We need also to agree upon the terms we will offer Israel for the additional credits we will extend over the next several years. We obviously want to avoid a situation in which we end up paying a high economic price in order to provide the F-15 equipment to Saudi Arabia.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F00-002 #913



BY WAT DATE 6/16/06

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
Caspar W. Weinberger 

Subject: F-15 Enhancement Package for Saudi Arabia

This memorandum asks you to approve a favorable response to Saudi Arabia's requests for equipment to improve its air defense capability. It also asks your approval of our ideas for dealing with the Israelis and for presenting the decision to the Congress.

In early 1980, the Saudis requested that we sell them five items of defense equipment to enhance the capability of the F-15s which the Carter Administration had agreed to sell them in 1978: (a) conformal fuel tanks to extend the range and flying time of the F-15s, (b) AIM-9L air-to-air missiles to improve the F-15's ability to engage hostile aircraft, (c) Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to support the F-15s with better radar coverage, (d) aerial refueling tanker aircraft to further extend the F-15's range and flying time, and (e) multiple bomb racks to improve the F-15's ability to attack targets on the ground.

At the time of the original F-15 sales in 1978, the Carter Administration specifically promised the Congress (and indirectly to Israel) that two of these items (bomb racks and fuel tanks) would not be sold to Saudi Arabia and that there were no plans to sell two others (AIM-9L and AWACS). Although President Carter publicly reaffirmed these commitments during the campaign, in private the Saudis were later told that the Carter Administration was favorably disposed to sell the first three items on this list. The Saudis have recently emphasized to us their hope for an early approval. Additional background on these requests is attached.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

RDS-2 2/6/90

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1M08-109 #914

BY KML NARA DATE 5/20/10

Although these requests affect our own domestic politics and the Middle East peace process, we believe they should principally be seen in the wider context of US efforts to strengthen our overall security position in the region. Over time, as we succeed in developing a solid military position and a coherent strategy in the region, we hope to escape the situation where countries require particular arms as evidence of our overall commitment.

We have reviewed the Saudi requests carefully and recommend that you approve the following response:

- We agree to move forward now with Congressional notification to sell the conformal fuel tanks and AIM-91 missiles, and indicate to the Saudis our agreement in principle to provide AWACS once we have determined together the type and number of aircraft they wish to buy. We will make clear to the Saudis that we want these sales to lead to broader US-Saudi cooperation across a range of security issues.

- We are prepared to be forthcoming about Saudi air refueling requirements (tankers) and will work with the Saudis to determine the most cost-effective means for the defense of Saudi Arabia.

- We will consider the Saudi requests for bomb racks, but defer a decision until after we have had an opportunity with the Saudis to study their air-to-ground requirements. (The Saudis have indicated that this would be satisfactory for now.)

After informing the Saudis of these decisions, we can then decide the timing and approach we should take in detailing to them the concrete measures that must be taken so that Saudi Arabia can make use of the outside help--from the US or other friends--that alone can provide security against threats that are much too big for Saudi Arabia to handle by itself.

While two of these decisions (fuel tanks and bomb racks) would go back on commitments that the previous Administration made to Congress in 1978, we believe that this decision can be justified on the basis of the enormous increase in the threat to the security of the region that has come about as a result of the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Israel's reaction to this sale will affect our future dealings with that country, as well as the Congressional and public attitudes. We expect the Israelis to complain about the decision, but we have received informal indications that they may be prepared to accept our decision, if we are prepared to do certain things for them. Therefore, we also recommend that specific steps be taken to demonstrate that we are sympathetic to Israeli security concerns:

- We would assure them that they have a role in our broader strategy for the region.

- We also would be prepared to offer Israel an additional squadron of F-15s and to provide credits (after FY 1982) to pay for them.

- In addition, we would in general take a more forthcoming attitude towards Israeli exports of their KFIR fighter aircraft (which contains US technology). The previous Administration had approved KFIR marketing to Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela and Columbia, but not to a number of other countries. I have recently informed the Israeli Ambassador that we would look sympathetically on their request to sell KFIR to Ecuador that had previously been turned down. I also indicated a general willingness to be forthcoming on this issue, since it is in the US interest for Israel to have a strong defense industry.

We would also be departing from the approach that the Carter Administration took during the earlier debate on the F-15s themselves, when it treated as negligible the potential problems for Israel. We, on the contrary, would be in a position to argue that any problems created would be more than made up by the offsetting actions that we propose to take with Israel.

Even if we are fully successful in reassuring the Israelis, we will still have a problem on Capitol Hill. Our posture in public and with the Congress would emphasize (1) that we are sympathetic to Israeli security concerns, and (2) that these sales are not isolated actions, but instead fit into our overall security strategy for Southwest Asia. To ensure that our reasons for the sale are given a fair hearing, we must consult closely and extensively with the Congress.

We would personally carry out most of the discussions , but recommend that you be prepared to talk with certain leaders (e.g., Senators Baker and Byrd). If you approve this approach, we will recommend an appropriate time and we will provide you our suggested points to make on the subject.

Recommendation

That you approve the concept outlined above for responding to the Saudi requests, meeting Israeli concerns, and consulting with the Congress.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Background on Saudi Arabia's F-15 Request

During the 1978 Congressional debate over the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, the Carter Administration stressed that the F-15 was primarily an air superiority fighter that would not threaten Israel. To underscore that assurance, Secretary Brown told Congress that we would not sell the Saudis multiple ejection bomb racks or conformal fuel tanks that would enhance the F-15's ground attack capabilities that existing Saudi air refueling tankers were not compatible with the F-15, and that there were no plans at the time to sell the Saudis the AIM-9L air-to-air missile or AWACS air surveillance radar aircraft. Congressional acceptance of the Saudi F-15 sales was premised on these assurances.

In early 1980, spurred by the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Saudis requested all five items. A January 28 letter from Prince Sultan to Secretary Weinberger makes clear that the Saudis are expecting a rapid and responsive answer.

The Carter Administration stated publicly that it would take no decision on F-15 enhancement items without consulting Congress. In late November, the Carter Administration also indicated to the Saudis it was favorably disposed to sell the fuel tanks, the AIM-9L, and AWACS (for 1985 delivery), before finally informing the Saudis that the matter was being turned over to the new Administration for decision.

The Saudis have insisted that they will not accept a negative answer, but there have recently been some indications that they would be willing to accept a delay in the decision on aerial refueling, and to consider alternatives to bomb racks for enhancing their air force's ground attack capability. The Saudis also are also prepared to participate in technical studies on alternative aerial tankers and air-to-ground requirements.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-002#915

BY hjt , NARS, DATE 6/6/06

RECEIVED 25 FEB 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM SCHWEITZER

DOCDATE 25 FEB 81

FONTAINE

25 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

NSC

White House Gr
CAC

just 28/1997
11/21/04

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR ALLEN FOR NSC MTG RE CENTRAL AMERICA ON FEB 27

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 27 FEB 81 STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8100731

8100791

NSCID NSC00004

(M / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 3/2

OK per Colson

LZ, FO, SC

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE _____

(C)

Ne: 0768

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/1

Return to NSC Secretariat

RVA has copy.

J DBE'd

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

8759
768
OBE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

ROBERT SCHWEITZER ^{RF}
ROGER FONTAINE

SUBJECT:

Briefing materials for the NSC Meeting on Central America (C)

The focus of each of the three discussion papers offered for the 27 February NSC Meeting is rather different, and several basic issues are raised by them, including (by CIA) recommendations for actions in other countries. In particular, CIA's suggestion that covert destabilization efforts be undertaken in Nicaragua seems premature. At this point we should focus initial efforts and attention on El Salvador, while broadening to a regional effort now and increasing our efforts for the longer term.

135246
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

The merits of this program should be addressed at the NSC meeting.

The line between overt and covert US involvement in El Salvador needs to be carefully determined. A key question is the degree to which the United States should openly commit its prestige and resources to a situation in El Salvador which may be beyond recall. If our effort is carefully orchestrated and presented, we should be able to show all parties that we are so late come to the Salvadorean crisis that it may be too late to turn it around. At the same time that we do not propose an escalating, open-ended commitment, we will not stand by and do nothing, nor should we -- albeit our immediate response will be a carefully measured one.

Each principal may well come to the NSC meeting with strong ideas and new inputs. The net result could easily weaken an already minimalist paper. It is not possible to find a no-risk solution and still have any hope of preventing the overthrow of the moderates by the Marxist Left. The President will be criticized more at home and abroad if another Central American nation is taken over by the Communists while the USG stands by. It will be very hard to then rally our Latin neighbors to take a stand in the next case -- which will be Honduras.

One area of concern is that Defense may propose to train Salvadorean trainers outside of the country. A defensive brief follows which you may need to draw from during the meeting to salvage the in-country MTT concept:

~~SECRET~~

Review Feb. 26, 1987

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR 108-109 #916
BY RW NARA DATE 11-16-11

- The presence of even a few small US Training Teams (augmented eventually by other nations) will have an uplifting psychological and morale effect. The moral significance of external support is the greatest single hope for any reversal.
- US presence at brigade locations will also have an important disciplining effect on the Salvadorean troops. The sense of despair and fear when you are in combat alone and losing sometimes leads to acts of brutality and even barbarism. Conversely, any group of soldiers in the world tries to "show" better in the presence of military "observers" from another nation.
- El Salvador, like most poor nations, would have to provide TDY funds and pay differentials for training beyond their own borders. They can ill afford to do so; will not send all they should.
- Good Salvadorean units are held together by a few key officers and NCOs. Extremely unlikely any Commander would part with his most "gung ho" leaders in an adverse combat situation; yet it is precisely this group of key leaders that most needs the US training.
- But the clincher is that the timing for an out-of-country program has long passed its time. The country is *in extremis*. The guerrilla offensive began one month ago. The first wave of Phase III Mobile Warfare failed; another is clearly building. This is not the time to start drawing-down the overstretched El Salvadorean Army to send their key middle-level leaders out of country. One and a half years ago the idea was a good one; it is not so today.
- We had a game plan -- which the El Salvadoreans have wanted very much for over a year. Our Ambassador urges it; OSD was once aboard. Now we are starting to vacillate, and in a way characteristic of the last administration. Consider the consequences of backing off from a bit of decisive, non-combat action at the last minute -- for the El Salvadoreans, other Latins, and ourselves.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Support the State paper; weigh in for the stronger option in each instance.
- Support MTTs in country.

- Ask that DOD start the long-term planning effort for all of Central America and the rest of Latin America.
- CIA [REDACTED] should be discussed and authorized in whole or in part.
- Overt military and economic programs in El Salvador need to be outlined and weighed with regard to the amount of US prestige they commit.
- Urge caution [REDACTED] at this time. (Note: The CIA paper is so new that none of us have had time to study it, dialog with CIA. Same will be true for NSC members.)

RECEIVED 02 MAR 81 11

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 28 FEB 81

KIMMITT

02 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: FMS

SAUDI ARABIA

White Hou: CAK

ust 28, 1997
11/21/04

CONGRESSIONAL

MEDIA

SUBJECT: WH ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAUDI F-15 ENHANCEMENT ITEMS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 03 MAR 81 STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

SCHWEITZER

KEMP

COMMENTS

REF# 8106317

LOG 8100731

8100768

NSCIFID NSC00004

(C / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<u>Allen</u>	<u>IX 3/2</u>	<u>for info</u>		<u>KE, PK</u>
	<u>@ 3/6</u>	<u>OK'd / noted by R/A</u>		<u>RLC, SC, ICE, PK</u>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

March 3, 1981

RVA:

You used the attached as a talker
for your meeting with Kemp, et. al.

There are still some actions which
need your attention.

J
Janet

96E
3/6/81
* RAY SETTE CALLED 3/3 8:00pm
TO SAY IT WAS TO BE A
STATE DEPT. NOT WHITE HOUSE
ANNOUNCEMENT. THERE IS NOTHING
IN THE MINUTES RE: WHO SHOULD
MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT. I HAVE
CALL IN TO KIMMITT

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILES:
RECORDS

Withdrawer

CAS 12/13/2004

File Folder

NSC 0004 2/27/81 [POLAND, CARIBBEAN BASIN, F-15, EL
SALVADOR] (4/4)

FOIA

2000-002
SKINNER

Box Number

91282

6

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
917	MEMO KIMMITT TO ALLEN THROUGH SCWEITZER RE F- 15	1	3/2/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C. 20520

February 28, 1981

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Saudi F-15 Enhancement Items

We are continuing our contacts with the Congress and the Saudis regarding our plans to strengthen U.S. security in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region. I want to summarize our present plans for these contacts and for dealing with the press and public and to convey as attachments briefing materials that the White House might find useful in the days ahead.

The Congress

Under Secretary Buckley held extensive discussions with the foreign affairs committees in both Houses on Thursday. Most of the members were guarded although some took predictable positions. Several of the Senate Democrats urged that we extend the period of consultation to give them and absent members a chance to express further views. We think it is wise to do so, particularly as there was genuine appreciation in both Houses for this first authentic consultation on an important foreign policy initiative. We will continue our consultation in meetings with individual members at least through Wednesday, March 4.

We hope next week to arrange a DIA briefing on the Soviet threat to the region for members of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees of both Houses.

The Saudis

John West is attempting to reach the Saudi leadership this weekend to inform them of our plans and to seek their concurrence. We hope to have his report in hand by Monday.

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1,3 - 2/28/01

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-002-918BY LOI NARA, DATE 6/6/06

~~SECRET~~

-2-

In the letters from Secretaries Haig and Weinberger cabled on Friday, we refer in general terms to future US-Saudi cooperation on regional security. When in March we inform the Saudis of our definite decision to proceed with the sale we will instruct Ambassador West to state more directly our interest in resuming discussions on security cooperation. The Chief, USMTM, would then take the next steps with his counterpart suggesting specific measures (e.g., overbuilding, facilities) that might be taken to augment regional security. The Secretary would give the discussions a further momentum during his visit and General Jones would follow through with more detailed high level talks shortly thereafter.

Announcement

We suggest that an announcement effectively closing off the preliminary Congressional consultations be made by the White House on Thursday, March 5, assuming that our talks with the Saudis go well. A suggested text of such an announcement is at Attachment 1. A day prior to the announcement the White House may wish to be in touch with some influential private citizens regarding our plans. Suggested talking points are at Attachment 2.

The Press

We plan to background the press, at a time geared to the announcement, on the strategic thinking behind our proposals, the separate nature of our proposals for Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the importance of our proposals to our overall relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Congressional Notification

Possibly within the next two weeks we would submit the informal notification of the sale of conformal fuel tanks and AIM-9L missiles to the Congress for the stipulated 20-day period of review. After the April recess on/about April 21 we would give formal notification to Congress of the sales and begin the 30-day period of review. During that period we could expect hearings and will wish to press for an early resolution and vote on the issue.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

Saudi F-15 Enhancement Items

We have consulted closely with the Congress during the past week regarding the serious deterioration in security conditions in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region and the growing threat to our friends there from Soviet and other pressures. We have benefited from the Congressional views expressed and plan to continue to work closely with the Congress on steps to protect our interests in that vital region. The first step is to help our friends defend themselves and to rebuild their confidence in our reliability.

The Administration will shortly give notification to Congress of our intention to sell military equipment to Saudi Arabia. We propose to sell to the Saudis conformal fuel tanks and AIM-9L air-to-air missiles which will augment the defensive role of their F-15 aircraft. We have also agreed to sell to Saudi Arabia aerial surveillance aircraft, subject to further determination of their specific requirements, and to be responsive on providing a refueling capability.

We, of course, are aware of the assurances the previous Administration gave to the Congress in 1978 regarding these items. The critical fact today is that circumstances in the region have changed dramatically. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the turmoil of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia underscore the instability in the region and the dangers of Soviet penetration and exploitation.

These proposals for military sales are a sign of our determination that the United States will move decisively and quickly to protect its interests, and those of its friends and allies, when they are threatened.

(In response to questions)

The dangers to the region from instability and the Soviet Union also threaten Israel's security. This Administration will assure that Israel's defenses remains strong. We are planning to seek Congressional approval to provide Israel with additional credits of \$300 million each in fiscal years 1983 and 1984 which will enable the Israelis to purchase air defense aircraft or other equipment that they have deferred because of their difficult financial position. And we will increasingly work with Israel to counter the Soviet threat.

~~SECRET~~

BY

LDT

NARA, DATE

6/6/06Saudi F-15 Enhancement Items -- Talking Points

-- The Administration has completed intensive consultations with the Congress on the sale of military equipment requested by Saudi Arabia for its air defense, including enhancement of the capability of its F-15 aircraft. Our discussions were perhaps the most meaningful consultations ever with the Congress on a matter of this importance.

-- We heard differing views, of course, but there is absolute agreement on all sides that the US must act decisively to halt the erosion in our security posture in the region and to block Soviet penetration and exploitation. The Congress fully understands that we must strengthen our own position and that we must move through several stages in doing so.

-- The first step is to help countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel improve their own defenses. Only in that way can we help restore their confidence in our reliability and determination. Only in that way can we give them the confidence to proceed with further steps to strengthen the Western position in the region.

-- We will announce tomorrow our intention to notify the Congress of the sale of conformal fuel tanks and AIM-9L air-to-air missiles for the Saudi F-15s. We will also announce our willingness to sell, after further determination of Saudi needs, aerial surveillance aircraft and to be responsive on providing a refueling capability to further increase the defensive capabilities of the F-15s. We are deferring a decision

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

on the Saudi request for bomb racks.

-- These moves will put the Saudis in a better position to defend against an attack on the oil fields from across the Persian Gulf. We have seen in the Iran-Iraq war that belligerents in the region have no compunction against destroying the vital resources of their neighbors. The equipment we propose for sale will help deter or combat an attack from that quarter as well as from the Soviet-armed Marxist state in South Yemen.

-- It is a fact that this new equipment will also increase potential Saudi capabilities against Israel and Israeli planners will have to take that into account. We think the actual risk to Israel is relatively small, given Israel's powerful air defense and the Saudi awareness of their own serious vulnerability should they engage the Israelis in combat.

-- This Administration is determined that Israel will remain militarily strong, with our help. Thus, we will propose to Congress to extend to Israel \$300 million per year in credits in both fiscal 1983 and 1984. These funds will enable Israel to purchase F-15s or other equipment which they have deferred because of their financial squeeze. This will be on top of an already substantial military and economic assistance program of over \$2.2 billion in Fiscal 1982 alone. (Because

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

of past undertakings connected with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the actual funding flow will be \$2.8 billion approximately in FY 1982.)

-- We are fully aware of Israel's difficult financial position and are monitoring it very closely. We are in close touch with Israeli officials on the subject.

-- We will also consult fully with the Israelis on our strategic approach to the region, and we have assured them that we are determined that Israel will maintain its qualitative edge.

-- We are aware of the assurances the previous Administration gave to the Congress in 1978-regarding these items. The critical fact today is that circumstances in the region have changed dramatically. The Soviet Union is energetically pursuing its strategic goals. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the turmoil of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet presence in South Yemen underscore the instability in the region and the dangers of Soviet penetration and exploitation.

-- We hope we can count on your support for these proposals in the recognition of their importance for the overall US security posture in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Failure to move ahead could have profoundly destabilizing effects on Saudi Arabia's defenses, on our other friends in the region--including Israel--and on our own vital interests.

~~SECRET~~

Talking Paper

Sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 Enhancement Items

-- The President believes, as does the Congress, that we must act decisively to halt the erosion in our security posture in the Middle East and to block Soviet penetration and exploitation. The first step is to help countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel improve their own defenses, and we would like to receive your views on our proposed course of action.

-- We will notify Congress soon of our intent to sell Saudi Arabia conformal fuel tanks and AIM-9L air-to-air missiles for their F-15s. We will also announce our willingness to sell aerial surveillance aircraft (AWACS) and to provide a refueling capability for the F-15s. We are deferring a decision on the Saudi request for bomb racks.

-- In our view, these moves will put the Saudis in a better position to defend against an attack on its oil fields from across the Persian Gulf. At the same time, we realize this new equipment will increase potential Saudi capabilities against Israel. We intend, therefore, also to provide additional military assistance to Israel, in keeping with this country's commitment to Israel's security and our determination to maintain Israel's qualitative edge.

-- We will propose to Congress an increase of \$300 million per year in military credits in fiscal years 1983 and 1984. These funds will enable Israel to purchase additional F-15s and other equipment deferred because of their economic situation, and will be on top of an overall assistance program of over \$2.2 billion.

-- We are aware of the assurances given to Congress by the previous Administration in 1978, but we believe, as does the Congress, that circumstances in the region have changed so dramatically as to warrant a reevaluation of those assurances. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the turmoil of the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, and the Soviet presence in both Yemens underscore the instability in the region and the potential for additional Soviet penetration and exploitation.

-- We hope we can count on your support for these proposals in recognition of their importance for the overall US security posture in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Failure to move ahead could have profoundly destabilizing effects on Saudi Arabia's defense, on our other friends in the region -- including Israel -- and on our own vital interests.