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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/10/2004

File Folder NSC 00004 2/27/81 [POLAND , CARIBBEAN BASIN, F-15, EL SALVADOR] (2/4)

FOIA

2000-002

Box Number 91282

SKINNER

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
827	MEMO	TO APNSA RE CENTRAL AMERICA WITH ANNOTATION <i>D 6/6/2006 D UPHELD 2/7/2011 M109 #827</i>	1	2/24/1981	B1
828	TABLE OF CONTENTS	RE CENTRAL AMERICA <i>D 2/7/2011 M109/1</i>	1	ND	B1
829	PAPER	RE CENTRAL AMERICA (SAME TEXT AS 795) <i>D 6/25/2008 NLRRF00-002</i>	1	ND	B1
830	PAPER	RE ACTIVITIES (SAME TEXT AS 796) <i>D 6/25/2008 NLRRF00-002</i>	2	ND	B1
831	MEMO	TO NSC MEMBERS RE CENTRAL AMERICA (SAME TEXT AS 797) <i>D 6/25/2008 NLRRF00-002</i>	7	ND	B1
832	LIST	OF ESTIMATED COSTS (SAME TEXT AS 798) <i>D 6/25/2008 NLRRF00-002</i>	2	ND	B1
2494	PAPER	OF ESTIMATED COSTS (SAME TEXT AS 2431) <i>D 6/25/2008 NLRRF00-002</i>	2	ND	B1
833	MEMO	FROM RICHARD ALLEN RE NSC MEETING <i>R 6/25/2008 NLRRF00-002</i>	2	2/24/1981	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
838	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO ALLEN RE PAPER FOR NSC MEETING R 6/6/2006	1	2/23/1981	B1 B3
839	PAPER	RE EL SALVADOR ATTACHMENT TO ITEM #838 R 6/6/2006	8	2/23/1981	B1
840	PAPER	RE ASSISTANCE TAB A (SAME TEXT AS 792 - UNANNOTATED) R 6/6/2006	2		B1
2495	PAPER	RE CONGRESS (TAB B) (SAME TEXT AS 2449) R 5/11/2010 M109/1	1	ND	B1
841	MEMO	FROM JAMES NANCE TO ROBERT SCHWEITZER ET AL RE BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR NSC MEETING PAR 6/6/2006 R 2/7/2011 M109 #841	1	2/25/1981	B1 B3
842	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS ITEM #827 D 6/6/2006	1	2/24/1981	B1
843	MEMO	ROBERT KIMMITT TO ALLEN RE NSC DISCUSSION RE F-15 R 5/11/2010 M109/1	1	2/24/1981	B1
844	TALKING POINTS	FOR NSC MEETING RE F-15 TAB A (ATTACHMENT TO #843) R 5/11/2010 M109/1	1	2/25/1981	B1

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845	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG AND CASPAR WEINBERGER TO THE PRESIDENT RE F-15 TAB B (ATTACHMENT TO #843) <i>R 5/11/2010 M109/1</i>	4	2/6/1981	B1
846	PAPER	RE BACGROUND ON F-15 <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B1
847	MEMO	HAIG TO RR RE MY MEETING WITH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR ON MILITRAY ISSUES FEB 23 <i>R 6/6/2006</i>	2	2/23/1981	B1

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828	TABLE OF CONTENTS RE CENTRAL AMERICA	1	ND	B1

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829	PAPER RE CENTRAL AMERICA (SAME TEXT AS 795)	1	ND	B1

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830	PAPER RE ACTIVITIES (SAME TEXT AS 796)	2	ND	B1

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831	MEMO TO NSC MEMBERS RE CENTRAL AMERICA (SAME TEXT AS 797)	7	ND	B1

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832	LIST OF ESTIMATED COSTS (SAME TEXT AS 798)	2	ND	B1

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2494	PAPER OF ESTIMATED COSTS (SAME TEXT AS 2431)	2	ND	B1

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TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 23 FEB 81

White House cr
CAS

just 28, 1997
11/2/11/81

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

NSC

SUBJECT: PRES TALKER FOR 25 FEB NSC MEETING

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

PRES

COMMENTS MEETING HELD 27 FEB

REF#

LOG 8100731

8100765

NSCIFID NSC00004

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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OBE per Allen

DISPATCH _____

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(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Burn

February 25, 1981

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached are for the NSC meeting.
Apologies for tardiness -- the
papers arrived this morning.

Richard G. Darman

RR did not
see since mtg.
was cancelled.

The attached is OBE.



~~SECRET~~

1031

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, February 25, 1981
11:00 a.m. (60 minutes)
The Cabinet Room

FROM: Richard V. Allen *for Allen*

I. PURPOSE

Continue discussions of El Salvador, F-15 enhancement package to Saudi Arabia and Poland will be discussed from the February 6, 11, and 18 meetings. (S)

II. BACKGROUND

A. El Salvador

With El Salvador, we are dealing with a situation that is going to require fast action. It is somewhat like the U.S. economy, we have inherited a mess in our own backyard. Just as the U. S. economy cannot be remedied with quick fixes in an '81 Supplemental or an '82 Amendment, a disaster in Latin America, and particularly Central America, will not be reversed with quick military fixes, essential as they are The paper before us today is a good paper, but it proposes only the initial quick fixes to prevent immediate failure. Regardless of the outcome, what is needed is to gear up for the longer haul; determine a long-term strategy; implement a comprehensive regional program; and establish a new relationship with our Latin neighbors. We will follow up on this in our subsequent meetings. (S)

B. Sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 Enhancement Items

I previously approved the proposal to sell F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia while providing Israel with additional security assistance. Prior to notifying Congress, however, we should be clear on all major components of the proposal. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review on February 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F00-002 * 833

BY CJ NARA DATE 6/25/08

Al (Haig), have the Israelis agreed to the actions you proposed to take for them, namely increased Foreign Military Sales credits in FY 83 and FY 84 and a more forthcoming approach on Kfir sales? (S)

- Has OMB cleared the additional FMS credits?
- How will U. S. aerospace companies such as Northrop and General Dynamics react to the Kfir decision? Won't this cost Northrop an F-5 sale in Ecuador? (S)

We should be prepared to ask the Saudis to be more helpful in a number of areas in return for this favorable decision. Specifically, we should ask what they intend to do in the energy and security fields, including whether they will resume security assistance to moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. (S)

Because there will be intense Congressional and public scrutiny of this decision, I believe that one person in State should be identified to coordinate Administration actions. Jim Buckley (Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance) may be such a person. (S)

C. Poland

With the settlement of the student strikes and assorted labor disputes, Poland is probably the nearest thing we have to good news on the agenda today. Although Brezhnev recently criticized the West for engaging in "subversive activity" in Poland and took a swipe at the past Polish leadership, he did somewhat balance his remarks with some favorable commentary about the party's new course in Poland and acknowledged that some workers' grievances were legitimate. (S)

Ask Secretary Haig about our participation in assisting the Poles financially. (S)

Poland is still potentially a real problem for us. Ask Casey not to relax on this problem. (S)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

1031
~~SECRET~~

February 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Paper for the NSC Meeting on El Salvador

Attached is a paper commissioned by the NSC Meeting on February 18 for the upcoming National Security Council Meeting on El Salvador. It was prepared by a senior level interagency group chaired by Deputy Secretary-designate Clark, attended by Dr. Ikle from DOD, General Pustay from JCS, General Schweitzer from the NSC and Mr. Jackson from CIA.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. "El Salvador: Interagency Options
Paper for the NSC"
2. List of Attendees

cc: DOD - Dr. Ikle
CIA - Admiral Inman
JCS - General Pustay
NSC - General Schweitzer

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-002#838

BY LOI NARA, DATE 6/6/06

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GDS 2/23/87

800711 2/23/57

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El Salvador: Interagency Options Paper for the NSC

I. Introduction

Our longer term goals in Central America are clear. They include:

-- Support of moderate anti-Communist governments that will produce political change, social reform, and economic growth in an evolutionary way under peaceful and stable conditions.

-- Preventing takeovers by radical Communist governments that, as local surrogates of Moscow and Cuba, could ultimately threaten Mexican and Venezuelan oil, as well as the security of the Panama Canal and the vital interests of the U.S.

The need for immediate additional steps in El Salvador is also clear, but in the case of El Salvador the choice is limited by uncertainties like the ease with which external support can be reduced. The need for an overall regional strategy is clear too, including development of better intelligence information and a comprehensive concept for dealing with the infiltration problem.

In the most optimistic scenario, the provision of ample U.S. military supplies and economic assistance might itself prove sufficient to permit the government to stabilize the situation. However, it may well be necessary for a collective effort, with U.S. assistance, to cut off external support for the guerrillas. To be successful, such an effort will have to go beyond El Salvador, using diplomatic, political, military, and special operations to stop the flow of arms at the source. It should be clear, however, that no repetition of the U.S. experience in Vietnam is proposed or even contemplated.

Although we do not have all the intelligence or all the details of the strategy for dealing comprehensively with the problem, we have enough in hand now to act responsibly on near term needs.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-002#839

BY LOJ

6/6/06

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Wolfevitz, Paul

II. Issues for Decision

A. Military Training

There are 23 US security assistance personnel currently in El Salvador, including the helicopter pilot and maintenance MTTs, the Operational Planning and Assistance Team (OPAT), and the permanent MILGP staff, all stationed in San Salvador or its environs. The NSC has approved the deployment of a six-man Naval MTT and the immediate augmentation of the MILGP staff with a five-man TDY group until permanent personnel can be assigned. That will bring the total number to 34.

While we intend to conduct as much training as possible out-of-country and are currently investigating the feasibility of doing so with selected units, the current emergency has forced the Salvadorans to suspend all out-of-country training temporarily. When we can persuade them to do so, we will emphasize this approach, especially with tactical units. The government has also agreed to reestablish a National Training Center but it will be some time before our training could be concentrated at such a facility. Accordingly, our Embassy, in consultation with Salvadoran military and civilian leaders, has recommended four additional Mobile Training Teams (MTTS), OPAT augmentation and 3 SUTS, bringing total personnel to 54, as the minimum required at this time to begin a basic program to improve Salvadoran military performance. We would assign these military instructors to garrison locations and would expressly prohibit them accompanying Salvadoran troops on combat operations, either offensive or defensive.

Deployment outside San Salvador will add a new dimension to US involvement. It means that US personnel will be brought closer to the areas of combat. Firm rules of engagement would be required to prevent any blurring of the distinction between "trainer" and "advisor." Nevertheless, inadvertent involvement would certainly still be a possibility. While we should be mindful of this possibility, we should also not forget that the MTTs will be in garrisoned areas, which are likely to be more secure than San Salvador. If US personnel do get caught up in direct hostilities, we might have to withdraw them or alternatively address the terms of the War Powers Resolution (see Tab B).

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-3-

Option 1. Deploy the additional teams to the garrisons outside San Salvador and where our Chief of Mission may direct.

Option 2. Withhold further deployments of US military personnel to El Salvador.

If Option 1 is chosen, there is interagency agreement that Congress should be consulted.

Option 1. Consult informally with Congress before deploying teams to the Salvadoran garrisons. The present circumstances indicate no need to characterize such consultations as being pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.

Option 2. Consult formally with Congress under Section 3 of War Powers Resolution.

B. Security Assistance Funding

The FY 81 FMS credit and the Sec. 506(a) grant for El Salvador have been fully committed. While the final level of additional funding will depend on the degree of external support for the insurgency, there is consensus that approximately \$30 million will probably be needed over the next 18 months. State has requested \$25 million in FMS financing in our revised FY 82 submission to OMB. However, there is a need for \$25 to \$30 million in additional FY 81 financing; e.g., there is consensus that four additional UH-1H helicopters costing \$7 million are urgently needed to improve GON capability to move reaction forces. The issue is how to fund these requirements. Not more than \$5 million is available from reprogramming of FMS credits, and the mandatory 15-day notice to Congress of such reprogramming might well trigger Congressional hearings.

Option 1. Reprogram \$5 million in FY 81 FMS. Prepare a Sec. 506(a) determination to make \$20 to \$25 million available on a grant basis. The President would have to certify to the existence of an unforeseen emergency requiring immediate military assistance and that no other legal authority is available to meet it. Both the reprogramming and the determination would have to be notified to the Congress.

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-4-

Option 2. Seek an FY 81 authorization and supplemental appropriation for \$20 to \$25 million in direct (fully funded) FMS credits at concessional interest rates (3 to 6 percent) and extended repayment terms. Direct concessional credits are essential because of El Salvador's economic situation, and such credits are not available through reprogramming.

Option 3.* Consult with Congress, pointing out the immediate requirement for helicopters and other equipment, and determine whether greater support exists for Sec. 506(a) determination (which Congress would not have to vote on) or for a supplemental. There is consensus in the IG for this option, and for beginning consultations immediately.

C. Immediate Measures to Improve Infiltration Intelligence

US intelligence on the insurgents' successful infiltration of men and materiel into El Salvador has been poor. However, the El Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalans may have a better grasp of the what and where of infiltration. Moreover, it is certain that once a combined regional operation and intelligence effort is pulled together, with US assistance, better information will result with regard to air landings as well as the coastal and land infiltration where current information is the poorest.

We also need improved intelligence to determine if the Nicaraguan Government is in fact honoring its commitment to cease its involvement. With only three weeks remaining of the 30-day testing period we gave the GRN, the requirement is urgent. Although we need more information on where and how infiltration is occurring, some sophisticated US equipment is clearly needed to supplement training of the Salvadoran and Honduran armed forces.

The following actions could be taken with regard to land and sea infiltration.

1) Direct the US operations planning team in El Salvador to work with the GOES in planning and executing

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a program to increase intelligence on sea infiltration by establishing lookout posts along the coast. Communication and perhaps radar equipment might be needed from the US. The first stage would be to identify suspicious incoming boats. A second stage might be working with the Salvadoran military to interdict such boats. Besides these actions, we might also consider taking steps to improve the detection/interdiction capabilities of the Honduran navy in the Gulf of Fonseca.

2) Deploy a briefing officer to Honduras to present to the US Ambassador and COMUSMILGP a new proposal for MTTs for the Honduran Armed Forces. Upon Embassy acceptance, deploy a survey team to determine training requirements and composition of follow-on MTTs. Effort will be designed to improve Honduran border patrol and interdiction techniques.

3) Along with Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, we could establish a Combined Intelligence Operations Center (CIOC) in Honduras. Such a center would be responsible for intelligence-sharing, the monitoring of infiltration routes, and developments of plans for combined operations to counter Cuban-Soviet supported infiltration into the region. Recognizing intelligence collecting deficiencies on the part of some of the Central American countries, concurrent actions would have to be taken to assist these countries in correcting their deficiencies. Secure communications equipment would also have to be loaned to these countries to effect the rapid dissemination of information between the CIOC and the nations involved. The United States' role would be restricted to providing real-time intelligence and operational advice. The Central American countries, possibly operating under the aegis of the Central American Defense Council (CONEDCA) would be responsible for committing forces to stop the infiltration. It is also envisioned that with the USG taking lead, other countries (Venezuela and Columbia) would support CIOC. Even though the center is not expected to achieve immediate operational success, its mere presence will provide a badly needed psychological boost to the Latin American countries and will be a physical demonstration of US resolve to counter the threat.

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III. Issues Requiring Further Work and IG Consideration

A. Economic Issues

Present assistance programs of \$63 million for FY 81 are directed primarily at employment generation, support of private sector output, and agrarian reform. Preliminary study indicates that additional US FY 81 assistance in the rough order of magnitude of \$30-100 million will be essential. A team will be returning shortly from El Salvador with a further refinement of our estimates. The increase might include a combination of reprogrammed AID development assistance, supplemental ESF assistance and additional PL-480. We might urge the Export Import Bank to provide additional support.

B. Strategies for the OAS, the UN and Other International Bodies

We would prefer discussion of Cuban and Nicaraguan interference in El Salvador in the OAS rather than the UN, but there are pros (e.g., OAS peacekeeping force) and in some cases serious cons (e.g., dissensus in the OAS and public Mexican opposition) even to OAS consideration that require further consideration and consultation with the GOES. We should consult now with Honduras, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran members of the Inter-American Development Bank to determine how that forum might be used.

C. Information Program for the US and Foreign Publics

A comprehensive public information program for US and foreign media and public opinion and for foreign governments and political leaders is needed and is being developed.

D. Third Country Military Assistance

The feasibility of sharing the burden of military assistance to the GOES with the countries of the region that have similar security interests is under review. Although appropriate for the long term, it is unlikely that a "third country" will jump into the situation now, when immediate actions are necessary. We should pursue obtaining the involvement of other Latin American nations but not in place of those actions we know must be taken immediately.

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While a multilateral effort would give the US less control over the military situation, it would increase the morale of the GOES armed forces and could--depending on which countries provide assistance--give GOES efforts more regional and international credibility. The Latin American military has the advantage of language and, often, counter-insurgency experience. However, while many countries have the capability of rendering military aid to El Salvador, most of them now lack the political will and interest to do so. See Tab A.

E. Public Diplomacy and Informational Campaigns

An informational program must be developed to counter Cuban-Soviet efforts in the region. Concurrent with this effort, a program needs to be developed which is directed specifically at the Cuban people and which attributes their current miserable plight to Cuba's surrogate role, Castro's ineptness, etc."

IV. Future Uncertainties and Further Actions

It is the judgment of the interdepartmental group that the fall of the government of El Salvador would represent a major reversal for the United States. We might have been able to maintain a posture of indifference toward the fate of that government had it not been for the large scale and blatant external support for the insurgents. Given that support, it is essential that we not repeat a situation, particularly not in our own hemisphere, of permitting a government to fall because we have denied it legitimate means of self-help while the insurgents have received unlimited assistance from communist countries.

Provision of necessary supplies, training and economic assistance to the Government of El Salvador and serious efforts to curtail outside support to the insurgents, would at least mean that the odds would not be overwhelmingly on the side of the insurgents. Moreover, it would lay the basis for successfully opposing further Cuban advances and for eventually removing Cuban presence from Central America.

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Guerrilla success could be damaging to our strategic position in this hemisphere and elsewhere. For example, it could contribute to instability in other areas along the US "southern flank," e.g., Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, etc. It could jeopardize critical oil and mineral resources, as well as key transportation and communication links. It could eventually force us to tie down forces and expend capital otherwise needed to cope with other threats. And a demonstration of US ineffectuality in dealing with threats close to our own shores could make it even more difficult for us to increase cooperation and confidence among strategically placed countries many times more distant (for instance, in the Persian Gulf).

Although the actions proposed in the paper are limited and urgently needed, it must be noted that we still need to develop a strategy for the long term. There is an additional urgent requirement to define clearly the goals: we are prepared to commit ourselves to, the costs we are willing to bear, and our options should initial actions prove less than successful.

The Senior Interagency Group, under Deputy Secretary Clark, should develop for NSC consideration a comprehensive military, political, and information strategy for El Salvador, drawing as appropriate on the papers that have been prepared by the IG/ARA.

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NLS FOO-002#840BY WET NARA, DATE 6/6/06Third Country Military Assistance1. Increased El Salvador-Honduras Cooperation

Because El Salvador and Honduras have similar civilian-military regimes and share a clear perception of the insurgency threat and the importance to both countries of defeating it, increased cooperation between the two governments is primarily a matter of adequate resources and advice in ordering their priorities. There is consensus that increased Honduran and Salvadoran radar and patrol surveillance of their land and sea borders is essential, and proposals to improve their capabilities and encourage their cooperation are being given high priority. We are already planning counter-insurgency and interdiction training for both the Honduran and Salvadoran armed forces. Similar programs with Guatemala need to be considered as appropriate.

2. Training and Material Assistance From Other Countries

The feasibility of sharing the burden of military assistance to the GOES with the countries of the region that have similar security interests is under review. While a multilateral effort would give the US less control over the military situation, it would increase the morale of the GOES armed forces and could - depending on which countries provide assistance - give GOES efforts more regional and international credibility. The Latin American military have the advantage of language and, often, counter-insurgency experience.

However, while many countries have the capabilities of rendering military aid to El Salvador, most of them now lack the political will and interest to do so. Should the US decide to seek third countries' military help for El Salvador it would have to expend a lot of diplomatic capital to get it and in some cases might have to indirectly underwrite the effort through increased aid to the third country. The following are examples of what might be done on a multilateral basis:

- combined regional intelligence operations center;
- reestablishment of CONDECA (the Central American regional defense association which has been largely inactive since 1969);
- counter-insurgency and interdiction training by such countries as Argentina, Venezuela or Chile.

Venezuela is already providing military advisers, and could be encouraged to increase their number. Because Venezuela is a democracy whose political parties have close ties to the Western

European Christian and Social Democratic parties, there is little risk of adverse reaction to its assistance from El Salvador or among our allies. However, because of the sensitivity of Venezuelan public opinion to involvement in other peoples' wars, the GOV insists on keeping its help quiet, which could prevent significant increases in Venezuela's efforts.

Many of the other proposals have substantial risks and disadvantages which after study we may conclude outweigh the advantage of sharing the burden.

-- Military cooperation by the GOES with conservative military governments such as Argentina, Chile and Guatemala, which are widely viewed in Western Europe and the United States as repressive, could hinder our efforts to characterize the GOES as a centrist, reformist regime.

-- Such cooperation would also damage the GOES' own efforts to win support of the Salvadoran people by linking it with governments similar to the Romero regime overthrown in October 1979.

-- CONDECA was viewed during its active life as an instrument of coordination among the military governments and intelligence services of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Somoza's Nicaragua. To revive it (presumably without Nicaragua) would feed the belief that the US is associated with the imposition of military dictatorships and in particular, that an invasion of Nicaragua is planned. Moreover, the governments are not as compatible as they were when CONDECA was established and all were under full military rule. The costs of some CONDECA activities were covered directly and indirectly by the U.S. and presumably would have to be again.

-- One of the Salvadoran armed forces' most severe problems is logistics and maintenance. These difficulties would be increased by supplies of diverse manufacture, particularly if deliveries were not carefully coordinated. The GOES would much prefer a steady, reliable supply of US equipment and US training.

3. Use of Third Country Troops

We are also examining the capabilities of friendly Latin American countries to provide troops for the defense of El Salvador, if required. However, none of the democratic countries is likely to be able to obtain public or legislative approval to send troops (even as part of an OAS force), and troops from the dictatorships would draw even greater criticism in and out of El Salvador than would be the case for advisers and trainers. The GOES may be opposed to the presence of foreign troops from any source.

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TO PRES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 25 FEB 81

White House Gi

August 28, 1997

CAS

11/2/84

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

SAUDI ARABIA

POLAND

NSC

SUBJECT: PRES BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR 27 FEB NSC MTG

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE:

STATUS C

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FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

SECRET/SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENTS

February 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RV*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting - Friday, February 27, 1981

Herewith the State Department's and CIA's briefing papers for tomorrow's NSC meeting.

Also included is the "talker" prepared by my office.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

SECRET/SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
By CRS Date 11/21/89
just 28, 1997

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The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) requires that Congress be consulted before U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and that the President submit to Congress a report of such an introduction within 48 hours after it has occurred. In any case where such a report is filed (or should have been filed), the continued involvement of U.S. forces must be terminated within 60 days* if Congress has not enacted express statutory authorization by that time, and must be terminated at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

In the present circumstances, the proposed deployment of MTTs to regional commands in El Salvador does not appear to involve imminent risk of hostilities. However, such a deployment would increase the exposure of U.S. personnel to such a risk. In this regard, the U.S. personnel would be in close physical proximity to potential hostilities, and in the company of Salvadoran personnel who might become engaged in hostilities. The War Powers Resolution defines an "introduction" of U.S. Armed Forces as including the coordination or accompanying of foreign forces in hostile situations.

Prior consultations with Congress could be helpful in avoiding or responding to assertions that a War Powers Report should be filed immediately. Consultations might also gain Congressional support that will be needed in the event that a subsequent change of circumstances gives rise to the need for a War Powers Report and for legislation authorizing a continued U.S. military presence in El Salvador.

* The 60 day period may be extended to 90 days to permit the safe withdrawal of U.S. personnel.

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NLRR M08-109 #2495

BY KML NARA DATE 5/20/10

RECEIVED 24 FEB 81 20

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 24 FEB 81

WEINBERGER, C

24 FEB 81

KIMMITT

24 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

FMS

NSC

White House Gt

CAS

A

D

just 28, 1987

11/21/88

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 25 FEB NSC MIG

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 25 FEB 81 STATUS C

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FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

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SCHWEITZER

COMMENTS RESCHEDULED TO 27 FEB

REF# 8103659

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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COPIES TO

- 2/25 Notice of memo to Staff

Schweitzer/Fontaine
Gregg

S 2/25 prepare memo for Allen

C 3/04 Sec 731 for final action

DISPATCH

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MEMORANDUM .

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 25, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT SCHWEITZER
ROGER FONTAINE
DON GREGG

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *JMN*

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for NSC Meeting
February 27, 1981 (U)

Attached are 1) the CIA paper on Central America and 2) the most recent version of the State Department paper on El Salvador. (C)

Please review the papers and prepare coordinated briefing memoranda for Dick Allen as appropriate. Since the papers will be forwarded to participants in the NSC meeting, please also prepare the necessary forwarding memoranda for his signature. (C)

All materials should be delivered to my office by noon, February 26. (U)

Attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on February 25, 1987

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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NLRR M109 # 841

BY KML NARA DATE 2/7/2011

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842	MEMO SAME TEXT AS ITEM #827	1	2/24/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0791

February 24, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*
SUBJECT: NSC Discussion of Saudi F-15 Enhancement

At Tab A are talking points for tomorrow's NSC discussion of the Saudi F-15 enhancement proposal. At Tab B is the original Haig-Weinberger memorandum on this subject.

I have drafted the talking points on the assumption that a decision to proceed has already been given to Secretary Haig, since he communicated the overall approach to Evron (Tab C), and, I assume, to Shamir. I should note, however, that the program and budgetary analysis of the Israeli component of the proposal has not been done. OMB, at the staff level, is still awaiting further analysis prior to agreeing to the \$300 million FMS credit increases in FY 83 and FY 84. Perhaps Stockman or Schneider has given the green light, but their program managers have not received any such word.

On balance, though, if Israeli agreement can be secured for a \$300 million per year increase in FMS credits, I believe we have struck a reasonably good deal. The increase may squeeze us in other countries, however, unless we get the major enhancement of security assistance that Haig currently is seeking. The Saudis, in return for this favorable decision, also could help by providing security assistance to moderate Arab countries.

One final note: Approving Kfir sales to Ecuador will raise major objections by U.S. aerospace companies, especially Northrop and General Dynamics. The Kfir sale will probably undercut a sale of Northrop's F-5s to Ecuador that is in the final stages of negotiations, and it will make it more difficult for Northrop and General Dynamics to market their new FX fighters, which are similar in capabilities to the Kfir. Israel already has a leg up in this competition, because it can deliver Kfirs quickly and still be assured of a steady flow of U.S. aid and aircraft.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

cc: Geoff Kemp
Gary Sick
Henry Nau
General Schweitzer

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Review February 24, 1987

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NLRR M08-109 #843BY KML NARA DATE 5/20/10

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NSC Meeting -- February 25, 1981

Sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 Enhancement Items

-- I previously approved the proposal to sell F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia while providing Israel with additional security assistance. Prior to notifying Congress, however, we should be clear on all major components of the proposal.

-- Al (Haig), have the Israelis agreed to the actions you propose to take for them, namely increased Foreign Military Sales credits in FY 83 and FY 84 and a more forthcoming approach on Kfir sales?

- Has OMB cleared the additional FMS credits?

- How will US aerospace companies such as Northrop and General Dynamics react to the Kfir decision? Won't this cost Northrop an F-5 sale in Ecuador?

-- We should be prepared to ask the Saudis to be more helpful in a number of areas in return for this favorable decision. Specifically, we should ask what they intend to do in the energy and security fields, including whether they will resume security assistance to moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia.

-- Because there will be intense congressional and public scrutiny of this decision, I believe that one person in State should be identified to coordinate Administration actions. Jim Buckley would appear to be the likely candidate for such a role.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-109 #844

BY KML NARA DATE 5/20/10



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
Caspar W. Weinberger 

Subject: F-15 Enhancement Package for Saudi Arabia

This memorandum asks you to approve a favorable response to Saudi Arabia's requests for equipment to improve its air defense capability. It also asks your approval of our ideas for dealing with the Israelis and for presenting the decision to the Congress.

In early 1980, the Saudis requested that we sell them five items of defense equipment to enhance the capability of the F-15s which the Carter Administration had agreed to sell them in 1978: (a) conformal fuel tanks to extend the range and flying time of the F-15s, (b) AIM-9L air-to-air missiles to improve the F-15's ability to engage hostile aircraft, (c) Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to support the F-15s with better radar coverage, (d) aerial refueling tanker aircraft to further extend the F-15's range and flying time, and (e) multiple bomb racks to improve the F-15's ability to attack targets on the ground.

At the time of the original F-15 sales in 1978, the Carter Administration specifically promised the Congress (and indirectly to Israel) that two of these items (bomb racks and fuel tanks) would not be sold to Saudi Arabia and that there were no plans to sell two others (AIM-9L and AWACS). Although President Carter publicly reaffirmed these commitments during the campaign, in private the Saudis were later told that the Carter Administration was favorably disposed to sell the first three items on this list. The Saudis have recently emphasized to us their hope for an early approval. Additional background on these requests is attached.

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NLRR M08-109 #845

BY KML NARA DATE 5/20/10

Although these requests affect our own domestic politics and the Middle East peace process, we believe they should principally be seen in the wider context of US efforts to strengthen our overall security position in the region. Over time, as we succeed in developing a solid military position and a coherent strategy in the region, we hope to escape the situation where countries require particular arms as evidence of our overall commitment.

We have reviewed the Saudi requests carefully and recommend that you approve the following response:

- We agree to move forward now with Congressional notification to sell the conformal fuel tanks and AIM-9L missiles, and indicate to the Saudis our agreement in principle to provide AWACS once we have determined together the type and number of aircraft they wish to buy. We will make clear to the Saudis that we want these sales to lead to broader US-Saudi cooperation across a range of security issues.

- We are prepared to be forthcoming about Saudi air refueling requirements (tankers) and will work with the Saudis to determine the most cost-effective means for the defense of Saudi Arabia.

- We will consider the Saudi requests for bomb racks, but defer a decision until after we have had an opportunity with the Saudis to study their air-to-ground requirements. (The Saudis have indicated that this would be satisfactory for now.)

After informing the Saudis of these decisions, we can then decide the timing and approach we should take in detailing to them the concrete measures that must be taken so that Saudi Arabia can make use of the outside help--from the US or other friends--that alone can provide security against threats that are much too big for Saudi Arabia to handle by itself.

While two of these decisions (fuel tanks and bomb racks) would go back on commitments that the previous Administration made to Congress in 1978, we believe that this decision can be justified on the basis of the enormous increase in the threat to the security of the region that has come about as a result of the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Israel's reaction to this sale will affect our future dealings with that country, as well as the Congressional and public attitudes. We expect the Israelis to complain about the decision, but we have received informal indications that they may be prepared to accept our decision, if we are prepared to do certain things for them. Therefore, we also recommend that specific steps be taken to demonstrate that we are sympathetic to Israeli security concerns:

- We would assure them that they have a role in our broader strategy for the region.

- We also would be prepared to offer Israel an additional squadron of F-15s and to provide credits (after FY 1982) to pay for them.

- In addition, we would in general take a more forthcoming attitude towards Israeli exports of their KFIR fighter aircraft (which contains US technology). The previous Administration had approved KFIR marketing to Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela and Columbia, but not to a number of other countries. I have recently informed the Israeli Ambassador that we would look sympathetically on their request to sell KFIR to Ecuador that had previously been turned down. I also indicated a general willingness to be forthcoming on this issue, since it is in the US interest for Israel to have a strong defense industry.

We would also be departing from the approach that the Carter Administration took during the earlier debate on the F-15s themselves, when it treated as negligible the potential problems for Israel. We, on the contrary, would be in a position to argue that any problems created would be more than made up by the offsetting actions that we propose to take with Israel.

Even if we are fully successful in reassuring the Israelis, we will still have a problem on Capitol Hill. Our posture in public and with the Congress would emphasize (1) that we are sympathetic to Israeli security concerns, and (2) that these sales are not isolated actions, but instead fit into our overall security strategy for Southwest Asia. To ensure that our reasons for the sale are given a fair hearing, we must consult closely and extensively with the Congress.

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We would personally carry out most of the discussions , but recommend that you be prepared to talk with certain leaders (e.g., Senators Baker and Byrd). If you approve this approach, we will recommend an appropriate time and we will provide you our suggested points to make on the subject.

Recommendation

That you approve the concept outlined above for responding to the Saudi requests, meeting Israeli concerns, and consulting with the Congress.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0791

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: NSC Discussion of Saudi F-15 Enhancement

At Tab A are talking points for your use during NSC discussion of the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 enhancement items. The original Haig-Weinberger memorandum on this subject is at Tab B, while Al's most recent memorandum on the Israeli component is at Tab C.

Recommendation

That you approve and use the proposed talking points at Tab A.

Attachment

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Review February 24, 1987

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Background on Saudi Arabia's F-15 Request

During the 1978 Congressional debate over the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, the Carter Administration stressed that the F-15 was primarily an air superiority fighter that would not threaten Israel. To underscore that assurance, Secretary Brown told Congress that we would not sell the Saudis multiple ejection bomb racks or conformal fuel tanks that would enhance the F-15's ground attack capabilities that existing Saudi air refueling tankers were not compatible with the F-15, and that there were no plans at the time to sell the Saudis the AIM-9L air-to-air missile or AWACS air surveillance radar aircraft. Congressional acceptance of the Saudi F-15 sales was premised on these assurances.

In early 1980, spurred by the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Saudis requested all five items. A January 28 letter from Prince Sultan to Secretary Weinberger makes clear that the Saudis are expecting a rapid and responsive answer.

The Carter Administration stated publicly that it would take no decision on F-15 enhancement items without consulting Congress. In late November, the Carter Administration also indicated to the Saudis it was favorably disposed to sell the fuel tanks, the AIM-9L, and AWACS (for 1985 delivery), before finally informing the Saudis that the matter was being turned over to the new Administration for decision.

The Saudis have insisted that they will not accept a negative answer, but there have recently been some indications that they would be willing to accept a delay in the decision on aerial refueling, and to consider alternatives to bomb racks for enhancing their air force's ground attack capability. The Saudis also are also prepared to participate in technical studies on alternative aerial tankers and air-to-ground requirements.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-002 #846

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 6/16/06

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 23, 1981

NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *(Signature)*

Subject: My Meeting with Israeli Ambassador on
Military Issues, February 23

At Ambassador Evron's urgent request, I met with him this afternoon. Evron brought up the military sales credits we had decided to provide Israel (\$300 million each in FY-83 and FY-84) in the context of our discussions on the Saudi F-15 issue with Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir, whom you will meet tomorrow. Evron said payments for these additional military credits would be added to an already high U.S. debt repayment burden and could perhaps impose almost intolerable strains on the Israeli economy, which is having great difficulties. He asked, therefore, whether we could consider making these additional credits a grant. In reply, I noted that we had preserved for Israel the full \$2.2 billion in assistance in FY-82 despite the very serious cuts we had made in our overall foreign assistance budget. It was not possible for us to agree to offer this additional credit as grant. I did note, however, that we were of course aware of and sympathetic to the problems posed by Israel's debt burden and that I would not exclude a willingness to look at the terms of these grants again as the appropriate fiscal years approach. Evron acknowledged that this was not a commitment but said that my comments would be well-received by his government.

Evron then recalled that President Nixon had stated to Israeli leaders that the U.S. supported a policy under which Israel would retain a qualitative edge in the military field vis-a-vis the Arab states. He asked that you reiterate these words to Foreign Minister Shamir tomorrow since they would be reassuring in the context of the Saudi F-15 issue. I replied that President Nixon's position represented standard United States policy and that I could assure Evron that this was

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also the position of the new Administration. I recommend that you also make this point to Foreign Minister Shamir.

At the conclusion of our conversation, Evron reiterated that his government would project a low-key posture of opposition on the Saudi F-15 enhancement package. Evron added that he would be encouraging Israel's friends in the Congress not to go beyond this posture.

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