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## **Ronald Reagan Library**

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/10/2004

File Folder

NSC 00004 2/27/81 {POLAND, CARIBBEAN BASIN, F-15,

EL SALVADOR] (1/4)

FOIA

2000-002

**Box Number** 

91282

**SKINNER** 

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ID Doc Type	Doc	ument Description		No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
2430 MEMO		AUL BREMER TO RIC MEETING	CHARD ALLEN RE	1	2/24/1981	B1
	R	6/6/2006				
791 PAPER	RE E	L SALVADOR		9	ND	B1
	R	10/16/2012	M109/1			
792 PAPER	RE A	SSISTANCE TAB A		2	ND	B1
	R	6/6/2006				
2449 PAPER	RE C	ONGRESS TAB B		1	ND	B1
	<i>R R</i>	6/6/2006				
793 MEMO	TO A	PNSA RE CENTRAL	AMERICA	1	2/26/1981	B1
	D	6/6/2006	D UPHELD 2/7/20	711 M10	9 #793	
794 TABLE OF CONTENTS	RE C	ENTRAL AMERICA		1	ND	B1
	D	6/6/2006	D UPHELD 2/7/20	711 M10	9 #794	
795 PAPER	RE C	ENTRAL AMERICA		1	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
796 PAPER		ACHMENT TO ITEM CRICA	#795 RE CENTRAL	2	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID Doc Type	Doc	ument Description		No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
797 MEMO		MEMBERS OF THE RICA	NSC RE CENTRAL	7	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	F00-002; UPHELI M08-109 #797	D 11/16/	2011	
798 LIST	RE E	STIMATED COSTS	(ANNOTATED)	2	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	F00-002; UPHELI M08-109 #798	D 11/16/	2011	
2431 PAPER	RE E	STIMATED COSTS		2	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	F00-002; UPHELI M08-109 #2431	D 11/16/	2011	
799 PAPER	RE C	ENTRAL AMERICA		2	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
800 PAPER	RE C	OST DETAILS		4	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
801 MAP	RE C	ENTRAL AMERICA		1	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
802 PAPER	RE U	S CITIZENS		1	ND	B1
803 MAP		WITH ANNOTATIO		1	2/1/1981	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			

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ID Doc Type	Doc	ument Description		No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
804 MAP	MAP	WITH ANNOTATIO	NS	1	2/1/1981	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
2432 NOTE	RE PA	APER		1	ND	B1
	R	6/6/2006				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
2433 NOTES	RE PA	APER		1	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
805 MEMO	TO A	LLEN RE PROPOSA	<i></i> L	2	2/26/1981	B1
	D	6/6/2006	D UPHELD 2/7/20.	11 M10	9 #805	
806 MEMO		OMMITTEE MEMBE EM #805	ERS ATTACHMENT	4	6/20/1980	B1
	D	6/6/2006	D UPHELD 2/7/20.	11 M10	9 #806	
807 PAPER	ATTA	ACHMENT TO ITEM	#805	1	12/27/1979	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
808 MEMO	ATTA		#805 RE OPTION 3	2	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
809 PAPER	RE A	CTIVITIES		1	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
810 LIST	OF M	EETING PARTICIPA	NTS	1	ND	В3
	PAR	6/6/2006	PAR UPHELD 2/7/. #810	2011 M	109	

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2493 PAPER	RE C	ARIBBEAN		1	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			
811 PAPER	RE F	OUR OPTIONS		1	ND	B1
	D	6/25/2008	NLRRF00-002			

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#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

**PARTICIPANTS** 

2/27/81

Poland

Caribbean Basin

F-15

The President

The Vice President

State:

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Justice:

Attorney General Wm. French Smith

OMB:

Mr. William Schneider, Jr.

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey

Mr. John McMahon

USUN:

Amb Jeane Kirkpatrick

JCS:

General David C. Jones

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James A. Baker, III

Mr. Richard V. Allen

NCS:

Mr. Roger Fontaine

Maj RObert Kimmitt

Mr. Donald Gregg

Mr. Charles Tyson

Ms. Janet Colson

#### CONFIDENTIAL

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White Harm Burn 28, 1997

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CONFIDENTIAL

February 27, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JANET COLSON

FROM:

ALLEN J. LENZ AJV

SUBJECT:

Attendance List for NSC Meeting (U)

The following officials plan to attend the NSC Meeting which is scheduled for this afternoon at 4:00. (2)

The Vice President's Office:

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy (Chief of Staff)

The

State:

Secretary Alexander A. Haig, Jr. Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

PLUS THE ATTORNEY GENERA

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

OMB:

Mr. William Schneider, Jr. (Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs)

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey

USUN:

Amb Jeane Kirkpatrick

JCS:

General David C. Jones

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James A. Baker, III

Mr. Richard V. Allen

Mr. Roger Fontaine MNOR ROBBET KIMMIT MR. DONALD GREEGE

A Horney General William French Smith

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on February 27, 1982

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

STATE DEPARTMENT PAPER DISTRIBUTED AT NSC MEETING OF FEB. 27, 1981

1058

#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



February 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Paper for the NSC Meeting on El Salvador

Attached is a paper commissioned by the NSC Meeting on February 18 for the upcoming National Security Council Meeting on El Salvador. It was prepared by a senior level interagency group chaired by Deputy Secretary-designate Clark, attended by Dr. Ikle from DOD, General Pustay from JCS, General Schweitzer from the NSC and Mr. Jackson from CIA.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

#### Attachment:

"El Salvador: Interagency Options Paper for the NSC"

cc: DOD - Dr. Ikle

CIA - Admiral Inman JCS - General Pustay NSC - General Schweitzer VP's Office - Mrs. Dyke

SECRET

NLS FOO-002 # 2430 HOS FOO-002 # 2430

#### El Salvador: Interagency Options Paper for the NSC

#### I. Introduction

Our longer term goals in Central America are clear. They include:

- -- Support of moderate anti-Communist governments that will produce political change, social reform, and economic growth in an evolutionary way under peaceful and stable conditions.
- -- Preventing takeovers by radical Communist governments that, as local surrogates of Moscow and Cuba, could ultimately threaten Mexican and Venezuelan oil, as well as the security of the Panama Canal and the vital interests of the U.S.

The need for immediate additional steps in El Salvador is also clear, but in the case of El Salvador the choice is limited by uncertainties like the ease with which external support can be reduced. The need for an overall regional strategy is clear too, including development of better intelligence information and a comprehensive concept for dealing with the infiltration problem.

In the most optimistic scenario, the provision of ample U.S. military supplies and economic assistance might itself prove sufficient to permit the government to stabilize the situation. However, it may well be necessary for a collective effort, with U.S. assistance, to cut off external support for the guerrillas. To be successful, such an effort will have to go beyond El Salvador, using diplomatic, political, military, and special operations to stop the flow of arms at the source. It should be clear, however, that no repetition of the U.S. experience in Vietnam is proposed or even contemplated.

Although we do not have all the intelligence or all the details of the strategy for dealing comprehensively with the problem, we have enough in hand now to act responsibly on near term needs.

> SECRET RDS-3 2/23/2001 (Wolfowitz, Paul)

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#### II. Issues for Decision

#### A. Military Training

There are 23 US security assistance personnel currently in El Salvador, including the helicopter pilot and maintenance MTTs, the Operational Planning and Assistance Team (OPAT), and the permanent MILGP staff, all stationed in San Salvador or its environs. The NSC has approved the deployment of a six-man Naval MTT and the immediate augmentation of the MILGP staff with a five-man TDY group until permanent personnel can be assigned. That will bring the total number to 34.

While we intend to conduct as much training as possible out-of-country and are currently investigating the feasibility of doing so with selected units, the current emergency has forced the Salvadorans to suspend all out-of-country training temporarily. When we can persuade them to do so, we will emphasize this approach, especially with tactical The government has also agreed to reestablish a National Training Center but it will be some time before our training could be concentrated at such a facility. Accordingly, our Embassy, in consultation with Salvadoran military and civilian leaders, has recommended four additional Mobile Training Teams (MTTS), OPAT augmentation and 3 SUTS, bringing total personnel to 54, as the minimum required at this time to begin a basic program to improve Salvadoran military performance. We would assign these military instructors to garrison locations and would expressly prohibit them accompanying Salvadoran troops on combat operations, either offensive or defensive.

Deployment outside San Salvador will add a new dimension to US involvement. It means that US personnel will be brought closer to the areas of combat. Firm rules of engagement would be required to prevent any blurring of the distinction between "trainer" and "advisor." Nevertheless, inadvertent involvement would certainly still be a possibility. While we should be mindful of this possibility, we should also not forget that the MTTs will be in garrisoned areas, which are likely to be more secure than San Salvador. If US personnel do get caught up in direct hostilities, we might have to withdraw them or alternatively address the terms of the War Powers Resolution (see Tab B).

Decision: Deployment of MTT's

Option 1. Deploy the additional teams to the garrisons outside San Salvador as and where our Chief of Mission may direct.

Option 2. Deploy the additional teams but train only in the San Salvador area.

Option 3. Withhold further deployments of US military personnel to El Salvador.

Decision: Congressional Consultations

If Options 1 or 2 are chosen, there is interagency agreement that Congress should be consulted.

Option 1. Consult informally with Congress before deploying teams to the Salvadoran garrisons. The present circumstances indicate no need to characterize such consultations as being pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.

Option 2. Consult formally with Congress under Section 3 of War Powers Resolution.

#### B. Security Assistance Funding

The FY 81 FMS credit and the Sec. 506(a) grant for El Salvador have been fully committed. While the final level of additional funding will depend on the degree of external support for the insurgency, there is consensus that approximately \$50 million will probably be needed over the next 18 months. State has requested \$25 million in FMS financing in our revised FY 82 submission to OMB. However, there is a need for \$25 to \$30 million in additional FY 81 financing; e.g., there is consensus that four additional UH-1H helicopters costing \$7 million are urgently needed to improve GOES ability to move reaction forces. The issue is how to fund these requirements. Not more than \$5 million is available from reprogramming of FMS credits, and the mandatory 15-day notice to Congress of such reprogramming might well trigger Congressional hearings.

Decision: Funding Mechanisms

Option 1. Reprogram \$5 million in FY 81 FMS. Prepare a Sec. 506(a) determination to make \$20 to \$25 million available on a grant basis. The President would have to certify to the existence of an unforeseen emergency requiring immediate military assistance and that no other legal authority is available to meet it. Both the reprogramming and the determination would have to be notified to the Congress.

- Option 2. Seek an FY 81 authorization and supplemental appropriation for \$20 to \$25 million in direct (fully funded) FMS credits at concessional interest rates (3 to 6 percent) and extended repayment terms. Direct concessional credits are essential because of El Salvador's economic situation, and such credits are not available through reprogramming.
- Option 3. Consult with Congress, pointing out the immediate requirement for helicopters and other equipment, and determine whether greater support exists for Sec. 506(a) determination (which Congress would not have to vote on) or for a supplemental.

#### C. Immediate Measures to Improve Infiltration Intelligence

US intelligence on the insurgents' successful infiltration of men and material into El Salvador has been poor. However, the El Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalans may have a better grasp of the what and where of infiltration. Moreover, it is certain that once a combined regional operation and intelligence effort is pulled together, with US assistance, better information will result with regard to air landings as well as the coastal and land infiltration where current information is the poorest.

We also need improved intelligence to determine if the Nicaraguan Government is in fact honoring its commitment to cease its involvement. With only three weeks remaining of the 30-day testing period we gave the GRN, the requirement is urgent. Although we need more information on where and how infiltration is occuring, some sophisticated US equipment is clearly needed now to supplement training of the Salvadoran and Honduran armed forces.

The following decisions could be taken with regard to improving our intelligence on land and sea infiltration:

1) Direct the US operations planning team in El Salvador to work with the GOES in planning and executing

a program to increase intelligence on sea infiltration by establishing lookout posts along the coast. Communication and perhaps radar equipment might be needed from the US. The first stage would be to identify suspicious incoming boats. A second stage might be working with the Salvadoran military to interdict such boats. Besides these actions, we might also consider taking steps to improve the detection/interdiction capabilities of the Honduran navy in the Gulf of Fonseca.

Decision: Sea Surveillance:

Option 1: Approve intelligence advisory support to Salvadoran navy.

Option 2: In addition, approve intelligence advisory support to Honduran navy.

2) Deploy a briefing officer to Honduras to present to the US Ambassador and COMUSMILGP a new proposal for MTTs for the Honduran Armed Forces. Upon Embassy acceptance, deploy a survey team to determine training requirements and composition of follow-on MTTs. Effort will be designed to improve Honduran border patrol and interdiction techniques.

Decision: Land Surveillance:

Option 1: Approve development of surveillance strategy for Honduran Armed Forces.

3) Along with Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, we could establish a Combined Intelligence Operations Center (CIOC) in Honduras. Such a center would be responsible for intelligence-sharing, the monitoring of infiltration routes, and developments of plans for combined operations to counter Cuban-Soviet supported infiltration into the region and assist countries in correcting their deficiencies, including possible loan of secure communications equipment. The United States' role would be restricted to intelligence and advice. With the US taking the lead, other countries (Venezuela and Colombia) might support CIOC. Such a center might provide a psychological boost to the Latin American countries and would be a physical demonstration of US resolve to counter the threat. In developing such a center, however, care would need to be taken to conserve the limited skilled manpower and other resources of the Central American countries.

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- 6 -

Decision: Combined Intelligence Operations Center

Option 1: State/DOD should develop a consultation strategy for approaching Central American countries on establishing such a center or its functional equivalent.

 $\frac{\text{Option}}{\text{IG.}}$  The concept should be further refined by

## III. Issues Requiring Further Work and IG Consideration

#### A. Economic Issues

Present assistance programs of \$63 million for FY 81 are directed primarily at employment generation, support of private sector output, and agrarian reform. Preliminary study indicates that additional US FY 81 assistance in the rough order of magnitude of \$30-100 million will be essential. A team will be returning shortly from El Salvador with a further refinement of our estimates. The increase might include a combination of reprogrammed AID development assistance, supplemental ESF assistance and additional PL-480. We might urge the Export Import Bank to provide additional support.

# B. Strategies for the OAS, the UN and Other International Bodies

We would prefer discussion of Cuban and Nicaraguan interference in El Salvador in the OAS rather than the UN, but there are pros (e.g., OAS peacekeeping force) and in some cases serious cons (e.g., dissensus in the OAS and public Mexican oppositon) even to OAS consideration that require further consideration and consultation with the GOES. We should consult now with Honduras, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran members of the Inter-American Development Bank to determine how that forum might be used.

## C. Information Program for the US and Foreign Publics

A comprehensive public information program for US and foreign media and public opinion and for foreign governments and political leaders is needed and is being developed.

## D. Third Country Military Assistance

The feasibility of sharing the burden of military assistance to the GOES with the countries of the region that have similar security interests is under review. Although appropriate for the long term, it is unlikely that a "third country" will jump into the sitation now, when immediate actions are necessary. We should pursue obtaining the involvement of other Latin American nations but not in place of those actions we know must be taken immediately.

While a multilateral effort would give the US less control over the military situation, it would increase the morale of the GOES armed forces and could—depending on which countries provide assistance—give GOES efforts more regional and international credibility. The Latin American military has the advantage of language and, often, counter—insurgency experience. However, while many countries have the capability of rendering military aid to El Salvador, most of them now lack the political will and interest to do so. See Tab A.

#### E. Public Diplomacy and Informational Compaigns

An informational program must be developed to counter Cuban-Soviet efforts in the region. Concurrent with this effort, a program needs to be developed which is directed specifically at the Cuban people and which attributes their current miserable plight to Cuba's surrogate role, Castro's ineptness, etc."

#### IV. Future Uncertainties and Further Actions

It is the judgment of the interdepartmental group that the fall of the government of El Salvador would represent a major reversal for the United States. We might have been able to maintain a posture of indifference toward the fate of that government had it not been for the large scale and blatant external support for the insurgents. Given that support, it is essential that we not repeat a situation, particularly not in our own hemisphere, of permitting a government to fall because we have denied it legitimate means of self-help while the insurgents have received unlimited assistance from communist countries.

Provision of necessary supplies, training and economic assistance to the Government of El Salvador and serious efforts to curtail outside support to the insurgents, would at least mean that the odds would not be overwhelmingly on the side of the insurgents. Moreover, it would lay the basis for successfully opposing further Cuban advances and for eventually removing Cuban presence from Central America.

Guerrilla success could be damagin to our strategic position in this hemisphere and elsewhe a. For example, it could contribute to instability in cher areas along the US "southern flank," e.g., Mexico, Pana 1, Venezuela, etc. It could jeopardize critical oil and mi eral resources, as well as key transportation and commu ication links. It could eventually force us to tie dow forces and expend capital otherwise needed to cope with cher threats. a demonstration of US ineffectuality in lealing with threats close to our own shores could m ke it even more difficult for us to increase cooperatic and confidence among strategically placed countries may times more distant (for instance, in the Persian Gulf).

Although the actions proposed in t a paper are limited and urgently needed, it must be noted t at we still need to develop a strategy for the long term There is an additional urgent requirement to define clearly the goals we are prepared to commit outselves to, the costs we are willing to bear, and our options should initial actions prove less than successful.

The Senior Interagency Group, unde Deputy Secretary Clark, should develop for NSC considera ion a comprehensive military, political, and information st ategy for El Salvador, drawing as appropriate on the papers that have been prepared by the IG/ARA.

#### Third Country Military Assistance

#### 1. Increased El Salvador-Honduras Cooperation

Because El Salvador and Honduras have similar civilianmilitary regimes and share a clear perception of the insurgency
threat and the importance to both countries of defeating it,
increased cooperation between the two governments is primarily
a matter of adequate resources and advice in ordering their
priorities. There is consensus that increased Honduran and
Salvadoran radar and patrol surveillance of their land and sea
borders is essential, and proposals to improve their capabilities
and encourage their cooperation are being given high priority.
We are already planning counter-insurgency and interdiction
training for both the Honduran and Salvadoran armed forces.
Similar programs with Guatemala need to be considered as appropriate.

#### 2. Training and Material Assistance From Other Countries

The feasibility of sharing the burden of military assistance to the GOES with the countries of the region that have similar security interests is under review. While a multilateral effort would give the US less control over the military situation, it would increase the morale of the GOES armed forces and could - depending on which countries provide assistance - give GOES efforts more regional and international credibility. The Latin American military have the advantage of language and, often, counter-insurgency experience.

However, while many countries have the capabilities of rendering military aid to El Salvador, most of them now lack the political will and interest to do so. Should the US decide to seek third countries' military help for El Salvador it would have to expend a lot of diplomatic capital to get it and in some cases might have to indirectly underwrite the effort through increased aid to the third country. The following are examples of what might be done on a multilateral basis:

- combined regional intelligence operations center;
- reestablishment of CONDECA (the Central American regional defense association which has been largely inactive since 1969);
- counter-insurgency and interdiction training by such countries as Argentina, Venezuela or Chile.

Venezuela is already providing military advisers, and could be encouraged to increase their number. Because Venezuela is a democracy whose political parties have close ties to the Western DECLASSIFIED RELEASED

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European Christian and Social Democratic parties, there is little risk of adverse reaction to its assistance from El Salvador or among our allies. However, because of the sensitivity of Venezuelan public opinion to involvement in other peoples' wars, the GOV insists on keeping its help quiet, which could prevent significant increases in Venezuela's efforts.

Many of the other proposals have substantial risks and disadvantages which after study we may conclude outweigh the advantage of sharing the burden.

- -- Military cooperation by the GOES with conservative military governments such as Argentina, Chile and Guatemala, which are widely viewed in Western Europe and the United States as repressive, could hinder our efforts to characterize the GOES as a centrist, reformist regime.
- -- Such cooperation would also damage the GOES' own efforts to win support of the Salvadoran people by linking it with governments similar to the Romero regime overthrown in October 1979.
- -- CONDECA was viewed during its active life as an instrument of coordination among the military governments and intelligence services of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Somoza's Nicaragua. To revive it (presumably without Nicaragua) would feed the belief that the US is associated with the imposition of military dictatorships and in particular, that an invasion of Nicaragua is planned. Moreover, the governments are not as compatible as they were when CONDECA was established and all were under full military rule. The costs of some CONDECA activities were covered directly and indirectly by the U.S. and presumably would have to be again.
- -- One of the Salvadoran armed forces' most severe problems is logistics and maintenance. These difficulties would be increased by supplies of diverse manufacture, particularly if deliveries were not carefully coordinated. The GOES would much prefer a steady, reliable supply of US equipment and US training.

#### 3. Use of Third Country Troops

We are also examining the capabilities of friendly Latin American countries to provide troops for the defense of El Salvador, if required. However, none of the democratic countries is likely to be able to obtain public or legislative approval to send troops (even as part of an OAS force), and troops from the dictatorships would draw even greater criticism in and out of El Salvador than would be the case for advisers and trainers. The GOES may be opposed to the presence of foreign troops from any source. The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) requires that Congress be consulted before U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and that the President submit to Congress a report of such an introduction within 48 hours after it has occurred. In any case where such a report is filed (or should have been filed), the continued involvement of U.S. forces must be termined within 60 days\* if Congress has not enacted express statutory authorization by that time, and must be terminated at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

In the present circumstances, the proposed deployment of MTTs to regional commands in El Salvador does not appear to involve imminent risk of hostilities. However, such a deployment would increase the exposure of U.S. personnel to such a risk. In this regard, the U.S. personnel would be in close physical proximity to potential hostilities, and in the company of Salvadoran personnel who might become engaged in hostilities. The War Powers Resolution defines an "introduction" of U.S. Armed Forces as including the coordination or accompanying of foreign forces in hostile situations.

Prior consultations with Congress could be helpful in avoiding or responding to assertions that a War Powers Report should be filed immediately. Consultations might also gain Congressional support that will be needed in the event that a subsequent change of circumstances gives rise to the need for a War Powers Report and for legislation authorizing a continued U.S. military presence in El Salvador.

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<sup>\*</sup> The 60 day period may be extended to 90 days to permit the safe withdrawal of U.S. personnel.

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793 MEMO 1 2/26/1981 B1

TO APNSA RE CENTRAL AMERICA

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
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
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TO ALLEN RE PROPOSAL

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TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS ATTACHMENT TO ITEM #805

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# SUMMARY of 1978 SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICAN COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS HEARD IN CUBA

In August-September 1978 a survey of reception of Latin American commercial radio stations was done for the Havana and Santiago de Cuba areas. Good quality commercially available radio receivers with built-in antennas were used. Reception was tested for the evening housr: 1800-2400 hours local.

#### Reception in the Havana area:

- Bogota, Colombia: Radio Sutatenza (5075 KHZ); good to excellent reception; no interference.
- Caracas, Venezuela: Radio Rumbos (4970 KHZ): good reception; some interference from nearby stations on band.
- San Cristobal, Venezuela: Ecos del Torbes (4975 KHZ); fair to good reception; some interference.
- Barquisemeto, Venezuela: Radio Barquisemeto (4990 KHZ); poor to fair reception; some interference from stations nearby on band.
- Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Radio Clarin (11700 KHZ); poor reception; no interference.

## Reception in the Santiago de Cuba area:

- Bogota, Colombia: Radio Sutatenza (5075 KHZ and 5095 KHZ); good reception; no interference.
- Bogota, Colombia: Radio Sutatenza (810 KHZ); good to excellent reception; no interference
- Caracas, Venezuela: Radio Rumbos (4970 KHZ); fair to good reception; some interference.
- San Cristobal, Venezuela: Ecos del Torbes (4980 KHZ); fair to good reception; no interference.
- Barquisimeto, Venezuela: Radio Barquisimeto (4990 KHZ); fair to good reception; no interference.

- Barquisimeto, Venezuela: Radio Universo (4880 KHZ); fair to good reception; no interference.
- Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Radio Clarin (11700 KHZ); excellent to good on Sunday poor on weekdays receptions; no interference.
- George Towne, Cayman Islands: Radio Cayman (English) (1555 KHZ); progressively from excellent to good to fair to poor by 2400 hours reception; no interference.
- Port-au-Prince, Haiti: Radio Lumiere (French) (660 KHZ); good reception; no interference.

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**RE ACTIVITIES** 

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Subject: 1

Intelligence Operations

Participants:

State

Amb. David Newson .

Amb. David Mark

OSD

Acres Daniel Murchy ... ..

Arb. Robert Komer

JCS AND PRINTS

Gen. John Puscay

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski\*

David Aaron\*\*

NSC

Paul Henze (Notetaker)

Robert Pastor\*\*\*

Justice

Atty. General Benjamin Civiletti

Kenneth Bass III

0沿3

Edward Sanders

CIA

Acm: Stansfield Turner

Gen. John Pustay Amb. Frank Carlucci (

John McMahon

FOIA(b) (3)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F00-007 #816

By MARA Date 10/6/06

By \_\_\_\_\_, NARA, Date \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

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**RE FOUR OPTIONS** 

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