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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. list</del>	<del>of participants for NSC meeting (1p) CAS 2/8/81 with GUIDELINES</del>	<del>2/18/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>2. memo</del>	<del>from A. Lenz to J. Colson re: attendance at NSC meeting (1p) u u</del>	<del>2/18/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
letter case (8100544)			
<del>3. NSC profile</del>	<del>(1p) u</del>	<del>2/18/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>4. memo</del>	<del>from R. Allen to Sec. of Defense and Chairman, JCS re: NSC meeting (1p) R 10/28/05 M1268 # 717503</del>	<del>2/27/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>5. minutes</del>	<del>of NSC meeting (2pp) R 7/16/10 M1268 # 717501</del>	<del>2/18/81</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>6. minutes</del>	<del>of NSC meeting (8pp) R 7/16/10 M1268 # 717499</del>	<del>2/18/81</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>7. map</del>	<del>(1p) A 10/28/05 M1268 # 717497</del>	<del>2/-/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>8. map</del>	<del>(1p) P 10/28/05 M1268 # 717495</del>	<del>2/-/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>9. memo</del>	<del>from R. Allen to Sec. of Defense re: NSC meeting (1p) R 10/28/05 M1268 # 717493</del>	<del>2/21/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>10. memo</del>	<del>from R. Allen to Sec. of Defense, with handwritten notations (1p) R 10/28/05 M1268 # 717491</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>11. memo</del>	<del>from R. Schweitzer to R. Allen re: Decision (1p) R 10/28/05 M1268 # 717489</del>	<del>2/23/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>12. memo</del>	<del>from R. Fontaine to R. Allen re: decision (1p) A 10/28/05 M1268 # 717487</del>	<del>2/20/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>13. briefing paper</del>	<del>from R. Allen to the President re: NSC meeting (4pp) R 7/16/10 M1268 # 71795</del>	<del>2/18/81</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER: NSC 00003 18Feb81 [1 of 2] Box 91282			12/12/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(e)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) c

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8100502)			
<del>14. NSC profile</del>	<del>(1p) CAS 2/17/81 WH GUIDELINES</del>	<del>2/17/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>15. memo</del>	<del>from R. Allen to VP, et al re: NSC meeting (1p)</del>	<del>2/18/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>16. memo</del>	<del>from L. Bremer to R. Allen re: NSC meeting (1p)</del>	<del>2/17/81</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>17. paper</del>	<del>re: summary, NSC paper (2pp)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>18. paper</del>	<del>re: interagency options (9pp)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<del>19. paper</del>	<del>re: implications (6pp)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1, P-5</del>
<p style="text-align: center;">R 10/28/05 M1268 # 717483</p> <p style="text-align: center;">R 7/16/10 M1268 # 717481</p> <p style="text-align: center;">R 10/28/05 M1268 # 717479</p>			
COLLECTION:			
EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER:			
NSC 00003 18Feb81 [1 of 2] Box 91282			12/12/94

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

**PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233**  
**Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Records  
OA/Box: 91282  
File Folder: NSC 00003 2/18/81 (1)

Archivist: cas  
FOIA ID: M03-1268  
Date: 3/19/07

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>17. paper</del>	<del>re summary, NSC paper (2 p.) (717483)</del>	<del>mvH 3/26/08</del>	<del>nd</del>
<del>19. paper</del>	<del>Re implications (6 p.) (717479)</del>	<del>mvH 3/26/08</del>	<del>nd</del>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING:

DATE:

2/18/81

SUBJECT:

Caribbean Basin  
Poland  
F-15's

PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
Admiral Daniel Murphy  
State:  
Secretary Alexander A. Haig, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark  
USUN:  
Amb Jeane Kirkpatrick  
OSD:  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci  
DCI:  
Mr. John McMahon  
JCS:  
General David C. Jones  
White House:  
Mr. Edwin Meese, III  
Mr. James A. Baker, III  
Mr. Richard V. Allen  
NSC:  
Mr. Roger Fontaine (notetaker)  
Mr. Chalres P. Tyson II

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Exec Order, August 28, 1997 #1  
By CAS NARA, Date 7/8/01

00003

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 18, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: JANET COLSON

FROM: ALLEN J. LENZ *ATL*

SUBJECT: Attendance List for NSC Meeting *(U)*

The following officials plan to attend the nsc Meeting which is scheduled for today at 10:30 a.m. *(U)*

The Vice President

State:

Secretary Alexander A. Haig, Jr.  
 Deputy Secretary William Clark  
*Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick*

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
 Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci

DCI:

Mr. John McMahon (Deputy Director for Operations -- I understand CIA called and spoke with you regarding the fact that Mr. Casey is out of town and Admiral Inman is testifying on the Hill.)

JCS:

*Hance*  
 General David C. Jones

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III  
 Mr. James A. Baker, III  
 Mr. Richard V. Allen

NSC:

Mr. Roger Fontaine (Notetaker)

*ZLR*

APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_ AS AMENDED *J*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on February 18, 1982

*WHL*  
*AS*

*Just 28, 1997 #2*  
*2/18/01*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

February 18, 1981

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Time and Place: 10:42 - 11:45 a.m., The Cabinet Room, White House

Subject: Caribbean Basin - Poland - F-15s (S)

Participants:

The President

The Vice President  
Admiral Daniel Murphy

State  
Secretary Alexander A. Haig, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

USUN  
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

OSD  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci

DCI  
John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations

JCS  
General David C. Jones

White House  
Edwin Meese, III  
James A. Baker, III  
Richard V. Allen

NSC  
Roger Fontaine (notetaker)  
Charles P. Tyson, II

Summary of Conclusions

The meeting began with a detailed briefing for the National Security Council principals from the CIA on the situation in El Salvador. The focus was on the sources of outside support for the insurgents. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Review 2/18/1991  
Extended by Richard Allen  
Reason: NSC 1.13(g)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M1268 # 717501  
BY ~~FOJ~~ NARA DATE 7/16/10

Secretary Haig then detailed our responses so far and the results received from our Western European briefing tour. (S)

He also commented on Nicaragua's reaction to our private warning regarding Sandinista involvement in the Salvadorean insurgency. (S)

Secretary Haig also listed the IG consensus on short-term actions dealing with the Salvadorean situation. He also promised a study on long-term policy in approximately three weeks, and a White Paper for public release in about a week. (S)

The short-term measures involving a Naval MTT and an augmented MilGroup were agreed to by the President. (S)

The War Powers Act and its complications for US policy in El Salvador were also discussed but no final decision was reached. (S)

The meeting then turned to the F-15 question. (S)

Secretary Weinberger outlined the enhancement package for Saudi Arabia and expressed his willingness to accept most of the measures except one -- which remains under further consideration. (S)

The Israeli reaction was discussed and the means to dampen their concern was discussed; primarily, the supplying of another F-15 squadron to Israel on a grant or credit basis. But no decision on funding was made. The exact deal, however, has not yet been worked out. (S)

There was a general consensus that the Israelis would accept the Saudi deal as worked out provided they were compensated. The compensation involves F-15s for them and an understanding of the US's attitude toward the Israeli sale of Kfir fighters to third countries. The two packages should never be openly linked and should be separated by time.

Poland was not discussed at the meeting. (S)



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

February 18, 1981

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Time and Place: 10:42 - 11:45 a.m., The Cabinet Room, White House

Subject: Caribbean Basin - Poland - F-15s (S)

Participants:

The President

The Vice President  
Admiral Daniel Murphy

State  
Secretary Alexander A. Haig, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

USUN  
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

OSD  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci

DCI  
John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations

JCS  
General David C. Jones

White House  
Edwin Meese, III  
James A. Baker, III  
Richard V. Allen

NSC  
Roger Fontaine (notetaker)  
Charles P. Tyson, II

Summary of Conclusions

Mr. McMahon, representing DCI William Casey, presented a 10-minute briefing on the situation in El Salvador. He stated that there is good intelligence on external support for El Salvadorean revolutionaries. Human intelligence and captured documents reveal Soviet Union surrogates, including Ethiopia, supplying arms. The estimate is some 800 tons have been allocated for the war with

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Review 2/18/1991

Extended by Richard Allen  
Reason: NSC 1.13(g)

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1268 #717499

BY RW NARA DATE 7/16/10

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200 tons now in El Salvador. The remaining 600 tons are in Nicaragua awaiting transshipment. In early November, 400 tons were funneled into Nicaragua from Cuba. Meanwhile, Nicaragua has been trying to introduce into El Salvador 100 tons per month. We know from a good source that last November 60 tons of US weapons were sent to Nicaragua from Vietnam. The air flights from Cuba to Nicaragua have recently been doubled, and the arms once they have arrived are widely dispersed for storage. In the recent past, the arms have been airlifted out of Papalonal to El Salvador, but since its location was discovered by us, they are dispersing to several different airstrips. The Nicaraguans are also changing air routes followed into El Salvador and shadowing normal Nicaraguan commercial flights into El Salvador in order to disguise their operations. They also are moving by sea -- the Gulf of Fonseca, but the quantity of arms shipped by water is not known. The Nicaraguans are also using land routes, and some of them are being interdicted. Recently the arms flow has altered in character -- perhaps has even slowed down. The El Salvadorean military capabilities, however, have been eroded. Guerrillas can watch and even outshoot GOES security forces. The insurgents have approximately 4,000 men divided into five groups. Approximately 1,000 have received training in Cuba, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the Middle East. Their strategy was to establish a "liberated zone" but that failed in January. The shift now is to employ terrorist tactics to disrupt the economy. (S)

Meanwhile, the El Salvadorean army is on the decline. They have in all forces a total of 16,000 men which is half of what they need. It's mobility is limited, supplies are low, command and control is bad, and the NCO's are non-existent. The officer corps numbers only 500. It lacks basic equipment like radar and recruitment needed to maintain force levels. (S)

The Soviet role is one of low-profile support. It's surrogates are actively involved. Since 1979, the Soviets are encouraging the Central American Communist parties to cooperate in a common front with the revolutionary groups. There is a report that Arafat sent a PLO delegation to Managua in order to assess the Sandinista requirements. He then agreed to supply arms for the Nicaraguans and the Salvadorean insurgents. He also sent a secret message to Castro promising to work with the Cubans. Arafat is doing that to appease leftists in the PLO so they will cooperate with him on pushing his Palestinian policy. (S)

Recently, two small battles were fought near San Salvador. The army captured a guerrilla camp that had been used by 200 insurgents. Meanwhile, the guerrillas are destroying bridges, power plants, etc., to disrupt the economy. (S)

Secretary Haig added that this is in summary what we have been telling the Europeans, the OAS Ambassadors, our Latin American friends, and the Congress. The thrust is already a global Marxist

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grand strategy which includes such diverse elements at Vietnam, the PLO, and Libya. Moreover, this represents a shift in policy from sending arms after the revolution succeeds to one of shipping arms before the revolution succeeds. (S)

Mr. Meese asked for a breakdown of the security forces. (S)

Mr. McMahon said 16,000 was the figure for all forces. The army had 9,600 men, the rest included the treasury police, national guard, etc.

Secretary Haig stated that Ambassador Pezzullo had been instructed to be very firm with the Nicaraguan government and they were given the 30-day limit to cease the arms flow. The Sandinistas admitted to their involvement and guaranteed they will stop because the "revolution is more important to them than victory in El Salvador or friendship with Cuba." They want the money. (S)

There has been a change in tempo and style since Pezzullo's waring. We can't be sure -- there is some human intelligence on this -- but there seems to be a pause. At least the C-47s at Papalonal are still there. AWACs have revealed no suspicious tracks. Radio Liberscion -- a clandestine station in Nicaragua suspended broadcasts on February 6th. We don't know about sea infiltration, but we definitely have their attention. (S)

The Secretary then outlined the contents of the IG consensus on El Salvador. That consensus is the infiltration must be stopped; we need to help El Salvador; we must demonstrate US resolve; we must restore El Salvador's stability by broadening the GOES's popular support. The Secretary also reviewed our activities on the Hill, in Europe, and now in Latin America. The information we have provided has had a favorable impact in general. (S)

The Germans were hesitant and nervous. They show concern over the Socialist International's campaign of disinformation on US policy toward El Salvador. (S)

The French Foreign Minister was very supportive and is weighing a public endorsement of the Junta. (S)

The North Atlantic Council for once seemed impressed and surprised at the extent of Communist intervention in El Salvador. General Walters meanwhile is in Mexico and will go on to Brazil, Argentina and Chile. (S)

In general, there has been shock over the true nature of the situation, and sympathetic support. (S)

We hope to have a sanitized public report ready to go next week (S)

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Mr. Allen asked if this White Paper would be "illustrated" with photos to show the evidence. (S)

Secretary Haig replied that we are sorting this one out because we don't want to compromise sources, but we don't want a "thin gruel" either. The Secretary also said that strong Presidential support of the Duarte government would be useful. The previous Administration went up and down on the support. The Duarte government may not succeed, but it cannot succeed without our help. We also need to explain to the Roman Catholic Church in this country -- Bishop Kelley, for example -- our side of the issue. (S)

The Secretary then reviewed the GOES's military requirements. They included \$5 million in FMS, especially spare parts; four additional helicopters -- although there is a funding problem on this; six-man Naval MTT that would help on sea interdiction. (S)

The President asked if we were providing and manning the ships? (S)

Mr. McMahon said no. The boats were there but they needed new engines, radar would be added, and the crews would be trained by the MTT. Meanwhile, the Army lacks intelligence gathering capabilities and has poor command and control. (S)

Secretary Haig then listed other actions including eventually going to the OAS and looking at El Salvador's new economic needs. That must be costed out. (S)

In addition, there were two more issues. Mr. Chapin, our interim Charge in El Salvador, believes we need more MTTs -- 20 men -- to help train the army. The question is how to do it. How do we deploy them? Do we keep them in San Salvador or disperse them to the regions? We must be straight with Congress on this issue. (S)

The President expressed a concern that we do not do it in a heavy handed way. He feared a negative Latin reaction. (S)

Secretary Weinberger also brought up the War Powers Act problem connected to the training mission. The Vice President asked if other nationals could be involved. (S)

Mr. McMahon said no. (U)

Secretary Haig further emphasized the need for being open and straight on this matter. He then outlined the basic options in regard to the War Powers Act. First, we could avoid invoking it but consult with the Congress, or we could consult under the Act itself. The latter he felt was a mistake. The important thing, he stated, was to be consistent. (S)

The Secretary also discussed the funding problem -- whether to go with Section 506 or ask the Congress for a supplemental that remains to be decided. (S)

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Meanwhile, according to Secretary Haig, the Cubans are nervous. They have just pulled out 1,000 men from Ethiopia back to the home island. And the Europeans and Latin Americans know we mean business and they are generally reassured about our policy. (S)

Mr. McMahon mentioned the Soviets have mounted a massive propaganda campaign since January, criticizing the US in Central America. They are worried too. (S)

Secretary Haig added the Mexican government was leaning toward the revolution but General Walters will talk to them. (S)

Mr. Meese asked about the President calling Lopez Portillo on this subject. (S)

Secretary Haig recommended sending a letter rather than making a phone call. (S)

Mr. Meese asked if a decision on the MTTs needed to be made today. (S)

Secretary Haig said no. (U)

The President asked if the MTTs were at the request of the El Salvadoran government? (S)

Secretary Haig said yes. "There has been," he noted, "a considerable change in the dialogue after the previous Ambassador's recall." (S)

Mr. Allen then asked where will we be in a couple of months? Are we making the mistake of a step-by-step escalation a la Vietnam? (S)

Secretary Haig admitted to the danger but argued there was a four-part program. First, we are consulting with our friends and allies; we are being firm with Nicaragua; we are preparing short-term measures; and we are working on a long-term strategy, but we are two to three weeks away from finishing it. This will involve some difficult decisions for the President regarding Cuba, for example. How far will we go? (S)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick asked if we were going to use the Guatemalan and Honduran navies to interdict? Are we going to use some 1,500-2,000 mercenaries in Guatemala? On the question of training, can we use the Argentines? The Argentine military has a very good training capability and are active in Bolivia. The Argentines, he observed, might help if given the right signal. (S)

Secretary Haig said the DCI was considering it. The Argentine possibility is being looked at. General Walters will ask in Buenos Aires. (S)

As far as the Guatemalans are concerned, they are nervous about getting over committed. (S)

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The President reiterated his concern about high profile US involvement, but stressed we do have to win in Central America, but we don't want to get bogged down in that old Yankee interventionist question. (S)

Mr. Meese asked about support from the OAS. (S)

Secretary Haig said it was a mixed bag. They don't like US interventionism, but they do want US leadership. They like it when we talk about going to the source of the problem: Cuba. (S)

Mr. Meese asked when the public paper would come out -- would it coincide with the next NSC meeting. (S)

Secretary Haig thought it should be piggybacked. (S)

General Jones stated there was a consensus on the MilGroup and the Navy MTT. Could we move on this now -- rather than wait another week? (S)

Secretary Weinberger said there was no problem on this. (S)

The President said: "Fix the boats." (S)

Secretary Haig said we should move now on these two items. (S)

The NSC meeting then turned to the F-15 question involving Israel and Saudi Arabia. (S)

Mr. Allen pointed out that the joint memo deals with the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia and there are two issues. One is accelerated delivery and the other is F-15 enhancement, but that enhancement is the real issue. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that enhancement meant equipping the F-15s to increase their range, to prepare them for aerial combat. The Carter Administration formally said yes to these enhancements. They held off on the bomb racks. Naturally, the Israelis oppose all of this. (S)

The Secretary said also the basic considerations are that most of the requests are legitimate -- e.g., the fuel tanks, the air-to-air missiles and these requests are linked to the broader question of cooperation with the Saudis. We need to consider further the bomb rack question. The Israelis are concerned about this because it would give the F-15s an offensive capability. The Saudis meanwhile have accepted our deferral of the bomb rack matter. (S)

The Secretary continued that we figure out how to announce the enhancement package. We must figure out how to tell the Israelis. They are resigned to losing this one, they won't press us on the Hill. There is a feeling that the Saudis need something from us, and that this will improve the US's position in the Middle East.

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Meanwhile, the Israelis want more F-15s -- and fully enhanced F-15s at that. In general we can go with three or four enhancements including air-to-ground missiles. (S)

The President asked about the F-15s for Israel -- are they to be given or paid for? (S)

Secretary Weinberger stated the Israelis don't want to pay for them -- their economy is in bad shape. The 15 new F-15s would be a gift or credit extended. (S)

The President would like that checked with OMB. He observed that we don't want a domestic battle on this issue. We don't want pro-Israeli groups to start a campaign. Can Israel be encouraged to head off their supporters? (S)

Secretary Haig said we were moving on this. He believed the Israelis won't press us provided we improve their air defenses by furnishing another squadron. We can also help on their exporting of their Kfir fighter. We have approved the Mexican sale and we will consider Guatemala's request. Our O.K. is necessary because the Kfir is equipped with a US engine. (S)

The Israeli Foreign Minister will be meeting with Secretary Haig on Friday and wants to know the arrangement. Are we prepared to make a deal and on what basis. (S)

The President reiterated that we want Israeli support in return to discourage their supporters in this country. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said in regard to AWACs, we can go with that too. AWACs will be ultimately manned by the Saudis, but there is a three year delivery time. (S)

The Secretary also pointed out that because this is an election year, the Israelis -- government and opposition -- cannot be "happy" about the Saudi deal. (S)

Mr. McMahon pointed out that there must be no public link between the Saudi and Israeli deals. (S)

Secretary Weinberger agreed. (U)

Mr. McMahon went on and said the two cannot be announced together. (S)

Secretary Weinberger stated the announcements should be widely separated. (S)

The President recalled that Mr. Carter in a personal briefing said that we will offer the gas tanks but not the bomb racks. (S)

Secretary Haig said we should do more in order not to appear to be merely rubberstamping a Carter policy. (S)

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Secretary Weinberger stated we should study the air-to-ground missiles for the Saudis and they have agreed to that. (S)

General Jones offered some background on the F-15 question and pointed out that with the Saudis the important thing is to never say no in definitive fashion. (S)

Secretary Haig added that if we don't go through with a deal, we will have a serious break with the Saudis. (S)

He also said he needed to know what our funding procedure will be with the Israelis. He added the memo asks for approval of the game plan in dealing with the Israelis and Saudis. Public announcement can wait until after Easter. (S)

Mr. Allen then asked how do we get the Israelis aboard on Friday. We need a report for the President to study over the weekend. (S)

Secretary Haig said we need a decision on Israeli financing. He also pointed out that Egyptians won't ask for more. (S)

The President said let's move on the game plan outlined in the memo. (S)

Secretary Haig added that Kfir sales will be decided on a case-by-case basis. But that we will be helpful with the Israelis. He reiterated we cannot publicly link these deals. The Saudis won't accept any such tie. (S)

Mr. Allen said it is important for the Israelis to be quiet about it, even though in an election year, the Prime Minister wants a "win." (S)

Mr. Meese said that Sadat will be here in June and Begin in July. (S)

Mr. Allen added that Prince Fahd is also coming but after Begin's visit. (S)

The President closed with a question on the El Salvadorean decisions. (S)

Mr. Allen said we will strengthen the MilGroup and add the Naval MTT. Meantime, we will get reports from Eagleberger and Walters in their missions. (S)

Poland was not discussed at the meeting. (S)

~~SECRET~~



RECEIVED 19 FEB 81 13

TO PRES

FROM ALLEN

DOC DATE 18 FEB 81

FONTAINE

20 FEB 81

SCHWEITZER

23 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

NICARAGUA

POLAND

CARIBBEAN

SAUDI ARABIA

AVIATION

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 18 FEB NSC MTG RE CARIBBEAN & POLAND & D/R 058 & D/R 045 DECISIONS OF NSC MEETING OF 18 FEB & PRES TALKER

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS CD FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRES

LENZ

043

2/27/81 #3

COMMENTS DISPATCHED VIA LDX WITH HARD CPY TO FOLLOW 2/27

REF#

LOG

NSCIFIED NSC00003

( C / M )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	- 2/19	Noted by Pres		
Allen	X 2/20	reopen / Pres for sig		FO
	C 2/21	Allen sig memo to Weinberger		
Allen	X 2/23	reopen / for sig		
	C 2/27	Nance sig memo to Dodd JCS		
DISPATCHED	<u>MB</u> 2/27 8:00 pm		W/ATTCH FILE	(C)

FO Index

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Caribbean and F-15s (S)

The President at the NSC Meeting on February 18, 1981 decided:

- That a six-man naval MTT be sent to EL Salvador. (S)
- That the US MILGROUP should be augmented with a five-man TDY group until permanent personnel can be assigned.

  
 Richard V. Allen  
 Assistant to the President for  
 National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1268 # 717503

BY amf, NARA, DATE 10/28/05

**Overland Route of Comayagua Arms Network, January 1981**




**Secret**

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.6(d)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS M 1268 # 717495  
By awj, NARA, Date 10/28/05

# Current Arms Routes to Salvadoran Insurgents



Secret

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.6(d)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS M 1248 # 717497  
By Amf, NARA, Date 10/28/05

~~SECRET~~

544

*file copy*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 21, 1981

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Caribbean and F-15s ~~(S)~~

The President at the NSC Meeting on February 18, 1981 decided:

- That a six-man naval MTT be sent to El Salvador. ~~(S)~~
- That the US MILGROUP be increased from four to six personnel. ~~(S)~~



Richard V. Allen

bcc: The Vice President  
Edwin Meese  
James Baker

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1248 # 712493

BY smf, NARA, DATE 10/28/05

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review 2/20/1991

Extended by Richard Allen

Reason: NSC 1.13(g)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

544

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Caribbean and F-15s (S)

The President at the NSC Meeting on February 18, 1981 decided:

-- That a six-man naval MTT be sent to El Salvador. (S)

-- ~~That the US MILGROUP be increased from four to six personnel.~~ (S)

— That the US MILGROUP should be augmented with a five-man TOY group until permanent personnel can be assigned.

Richard V. Allen

1) Joint Chiefs  
2) Sec Def

W/ Jukes  
2/23/81

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1268 # 712491

BY anf, NARA, DATE 10/28/05

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review 2/20/1991  
Extended by Richard Allen  
Reason: NSC 1.13(g)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

ROBERT SCHWEITZER

*US 23*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Decision on El Salvador ~~(S)~~

Attached is a new version of the Presidential Directive.

An error was made in preparing the original action (Tab B).

Roger Fontaine is in a crash on another project. I have picked up the ball for him; the fixes are his. I called JCS on Secure to explain a corrected version would be coming.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached and transmit it ASAP to the Pentagon.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1268 # 717489

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 10/28/05

421

Logis Fontaine:

The attached  
was shown in  
the 1891 as  
well.

James

CURRENT INFORMATION

Re: 0544

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
2/23/81

James -  
Logis to Mueller,  
Baker & P.

J

2/23/81  
bcc's sent by JP



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

544 Add-On

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 20, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: ROGER FONTAINE **RF**  
SUBJECT: The President's Decisions on El Salvador ~~(S)~~

At Tab A is a Presidential directive to the Secretary of Defense implementing the decision taken at the NSC meeting, February 18, 1981. That decision called for a naval MTT to be dispatched to El Salvador and the augmentation of the MILGROUP in that country. ~~(S)~~

At today's Interagency Group meeting held at the State Department, the military representation were not sure what had been decided, and stated that no action could be taken until they received a memorandum from you. ~~(S)~~

Janet Colson said there was no formal mechanism yet, and suggested I draft a memorandum for your signature. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of Defense at Tab A. (U)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M 1268 # 72487

BY ANJ, NARA, DATE 10/28/05

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Review 2/20/1991

Extended by Richard Allen

Reason: NSC 1.13(g)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIV~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, February 18, 1981  
10:30 a.m. (60 Minutes)  
The Cabinet Room

FROM: Richard V. Allen

I. PURPOSE

Continue discussions of El Salvador, Nicaragua and Poland from the February 6 and February 11 meetings. In addition, the sale of the F-15 enhancement package to Saudi Arabia will be discussed. (S)

II. BACKGROUND

A. El Salvador

The consensus is the Junta can survive for the short term (three months at least) but guerrilla capabilities and intentions are still unknown at present after their failed January offensive. The Central Intelligence Agency will present a 10 minute briefing on the current flow of arms into El Salvador, as well as estimates of guerrilla and government troop strength. (S)

Meanwhile, the two most significant events this week: First, the first 200 land titles were handed out under Phase I of the Land Reform Program. The AFL-CIO/AIFLD are very pleased, and the Junta has gotten added support from the campesino's organization (UCS). Second, Planning Minister Vieytes has just painted a very gloomy picture of the economy by estimating that El Salvador will need \$500 million from all outside sources to survive in 1981. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 17, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1268 #717485

BY RW NARA DATE 7/16/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~B. Nicaragua

There is no current evidence that the Sandinistas are slowing down the flow of aid to the Salvadorean insurgents. While air flights may be reduced in the coming weeks because of bad weather, land and sea routes may be used instead. Internally, the Sandinistas are cracking down. The latest example of strong arm tactics, was the raid on the Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission in which the Commission's records were seized last week. The Sandinistas also organized a riot where the Commission's President, Jose Esteban Gonzalez, returned to Managua after a flight from Miami. The high level Sandinista leaders, including Borge, are taking pot shots at the US. They are feeling the pressure. Therefore, they appear unlikely to maintain a facade of pluralism for very much longer. (S)

C. Poland

The appointment of Defense Minister Jaruzelski as Premier had a temporary calming effect on the internal situation in Poland. A spokesman for Solidarity has welcomed the new government, and government and Solidarity representatives will meet later this week to discuss a wide range of issues. The union will likely approve Jaruzelski's call for a moratorium on strikes. In the meantime, farmers dropped their demands for an agricultural union -- at least for the moment. (C)

But student strikes threaten to poison the atmosphere. The strike at Lodz University, which seemed settled this past weekend, continues with government and student negotiators still at odds over key issues. As a result, the strikes spread today to eight new institutions, posing a major new test to the regime. (C)

Soviet forces are continuing to conduct exercises in and around Poland. Some general staff circuits that have been dormant since late December have just been reactivated. We have no new evidence of Soviet/Warsaw Pact military deployments on the Polish borders. (S)

D. F-15 Enhancement

Secretaries Haig and Weinberger have asked you to approve a favorable response to Saudi Arabia's

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~~SECRET~~

requests for equipment to improve its air defense capability. They also ask your approval of their ideas for dealing with the Israelis and for presenting the decision to the Congress. (S)

In early 1980, the Saudis requested that the United States sell them five items of defense equipment to enhance the capability of the F-15s which the Carter Administration had agreed to sell them in 1978:

- (a) conformal fuel tanks to extend the range and flying time of the F-15s,
- (b) AIM-9L air-to-air missiles to improve the F-15's ability to engage hostile aircraft,
- (c) Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to support the F-15s with better radar coverage,
- (d) aerial refueling tanker aircraft to further extend the F-15's range and flying time, and
- (e) multiple bomb racks, to improve the F-15's ability to attack targets on the ground. (S)

Israel's reaction to this sale will affect our future dealings with that country, as well as the Congressional and public attitudes. We expect the Israelis to complain about the decision, but we have received informal indications that they may be prepared to accept our decision, if we are prepared to do certain things for them. Therefore, we also recommend that specific steps be taken to demonstrate that we are sympathetic to Israeli security concerns. (S)

### III. ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

- Ask Secretary Haig for a status report on plans for U.S. action in El Salvador.
- Ask Secretary Haig if he has received details of European reactions to Ambassador Eagleburger's talks there on El Salvador.
- Ask Secretary Haig for an amplification of his written reports to you yesterday on the status of NATO plans for action in the event of an invasion of Poland. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

Concerning the F-15 decision, I recommend you take the following approach:

- Indicate your support for selling F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia and balancing the sale with increased assistance to Israel.
- Because of budget and other consequences, however, ask the Secretaries to provide further analysis of the Israeli program, in coordination with OMB.
- To avoid charges of favoritism, the final decisions on both the Saudi and Israeli programs will be held until the additional analysis is received. (S)

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 18 FEB 81 14

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 17 FEB 81

ALLEN

18 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

NSC

SUBJECT: PAPER FOR 18 FEB NSC MTG ON EL SALVADOR

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM ○

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

LENZ

043

2181801 #14

COMMENTS ALLEN MEMO W/ ATTACHMENT WAS DISTRIBUTED AT NSC MTG

REF# 3104534

LOG 8100403

8100497

NSCIFID NSC00003 ( C / C )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

NSC/S:

For your information the attached paper was distributed at the NSC Meeting, Feb 18, 198. A copy was also given to Admiral Daniel Murphy who attended from the Vice President's office.

Carol Cleveland

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


CONFIDENTIAL WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

February 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
 THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
 THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
 THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting (U)

Attached is a copy of a paper that was prepared by the State Department for the National Security Council Meeting scheduled for February 18, 1981 at 10:30 a.m. (U)



Richard V. Allen  
 Assistant to the President  
 for National Security Affairs

Attachment

cc: Jeane Kirkpatrick  
 William Clark  
 Frank Carlucci

CONFIDENTIAL WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

Review on February 17, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
 BY: CH DATE: 2/8/01 #15





S/S 8104684

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 17, 1981

~~SECRET~~ (Entire text)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Paper for the NSC Meeting on El Salvador

Attached is a paper for the upcoming National Security Council meeting on El Salvador.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Briefing paper entitled  
"El Salvador Interagency Options  
Paper for the NSC"

~~SECRET~~  
GDS 2/17/87

DECLASSIFIED

By: CTS Date: 2/08/01 #16

NOTE: THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DELIVERED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

~~SECRET~~

Summary NSC Paper on El Salvador

The level of future infiltration of materiel and men for the insurgents in El Salvador is unknown. Our information on the current strength and strategy of the guerrillas is spotty.

A comprehensive Interagency study on U.S. policy is currently underway. The U.S. Embassy has requested early action on a minimum package of additional helicopters, additional mobile training teams and US MILGP augmentation. Given the public attention to this issue, some preliminary decisions are required before completion of the basic study.

The Interagency Group recommends:

- The President should issue an unambiguous statement of our resolve to support the Salvadoran Government and oppose the Cuban-backed insurgents.
- Four additional UH-1H helicopters should be provided to El Salvador.
- A six-man naval MTT should be deployed to assist the Salvadoran Navy in interdiction techniques and maintenance.
- An additional \$5 million FMS guaranteed loan should be made available quickly through reprogramming (a 15 day Congressional Notification is required).
- The US should work closely with the GOES and its other principal supporter, Venezuela, in coordinating international strategy.

There are two issues requiring NSC decision.

(A) Training: The Embassy recommends we deploy 4 five-man training teams outside the capital. Our options, with Congressional/legislative constraints, are four:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1268 #717483

BY ANJ, NARA, DATE 10/28/05

~~SECRET~~

-2-

1. Deploy additional Military Training Teams (MTT) and authorize them to operate in the field; consult informally with Congress in advance, but not on a War Powers basis;
2. Deploy the MTT teams after formal consultation with Congress and, accepting the possibility of tripping the War Powers constraints, submit a War Powers report;
3. Deploy with the requirement that all training be conducted in the immediate vicinity of the capital to minimize visibility of U.S. presence and War Powers implications;
4. Provide training to Salvadoran instructor cadre at military facilities in the U.S. and Panama.

(B) Additional Materiel: While four additional helicopters are the immediate requirement, the funding option chosen for helicopters will set the pattern for additional requirements expected to total \$25-70 million over the next 12-18 months. Options for funding military assistance are:

1. Use Sec. 506 authority by certifying existence of an unforeseen emergency and that no other legal authority is available. Repeated decisions would be needed as requirements develop.
2. Seek a FY 81 supplemental appropriation for FMS credits on concessional terms.
3. Consult with Congress on whether to use Sec. 506 authority or a supplemental. Consensus in the Interagency Group favors this option.

The Interagency Group is still refining what level of economic assistance will be necessary to keep the hard-pressed Salvadoran economy afloat. The rough estimate is between \$30-100 million additional in a combination of reprogrammed AID, supplemental ESF and additional PL-480.

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El Salvador Interagency Options Paper for the NSC

I. U.S. Objectives

- To halt the infiltration to the insurgents from abroad;
- To help the Government of El Salvador (GOES) defeat the leftist insurgency;
- To minimize Soviet and Cuban influence both in El Salvador and in the region;
- To demonstrate U.S. resolve against international communist aggression;
- To restore Salvadoran stability by encouraging the Government to take measures to develop popular support including:
  - a) ending security force abuses and curtailing extreme-right terrorism;
  - b) proceeding with its economic and agrarian reforms; and
  - c) moving toward a peaceful political process and the promised 1982 elections.

II. Situation

A. Key Uncertainties

1. Current strength and future strategy of insurgents:  
Our knowledge of the guerrillas' strategy and current strength is not sufficient to allow us to predict their future actions. In the wake of their unsuccessful January offensive, the guerrillas appear to be regrouping and have at least temporarily reverted to classic hit-and-run tactics. Their immediate objective appears to be to keep government forces fully occupied while further disrupting the economy. We do not know if they will continue this tactic or will initiate a new offensive. We have no firm intelligence on the extent of casualties suffered by the guerrillas during the offensive or the size of their stock-piles.

2. Level of future infiltration of materiel and men for insurgents: Communist countries have established an international network to supply military weapons to the insurgents. We do not know how much materiel has already reached the guerrillas

~~SECRET~~

(GDS 2/16/87)

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NLRR M12108 #717481

BY RUS NARA DATE 7/16/10

or how much more awaits delivery. Most important, although major efforts are being made to stop the infiltration sources, it is impossible to predict their success. Thus, the infiltration might stop, or it might even be expanded to include infiltration of non-Salvadoran combatants.

#### B. Status of GOES

The Salvadoran civilian-military government has sapped the popular support of the Marxist left by beginning basic economic and political reforms. The radical left, now on the defensive politically, is forced to rely increasingly on terrorism, economic sabotage, propaganda and heavy outside support. The government has also met the military challenge of the left and has blocked several takeover moves by the extreme right. Despite nationwide terrorism and violence, the government has continued to provide vital services.

On the downside, the government has been plagued by dissension both within and between its civilian and military components. Its inability to control indiscriminate violence of the security forces has cost it badly needed internal and international support. The Christian Democrats have made little progress in revitalizing their anemic party. Although President Durate provides some leadership and civil servants remain on the job, the government's administrative performance is generally poor.

The high level of violence and political uncertainty have badly disrupted El Salvador's small but previously productive economy. Gross domestic product fell by over 10 percent in 1980 reflecting loss of confidence, capital flights and dislocations caused by the reforms. Unemployment is estimated at 40 percent as tourism, construction and much industry and commercial agriculture founder. The GOES will face a serious shortfall of foreign exchange in the coming months.

The Salvadoran armed forces, including police, total approximately 16,000. They are generally led by competent and highly motivated officers, but the individual soldier is poorly trained and equipped, and a professional NCO corps does not exist. These forces are thinly dispersed, and the critical support systems, such as logistics, transportation and communications, are grossly inadequate. Their intelligence system is ineffective. The Salvadoran forces have been organized, trained and equipped for defense against conventional attacks and internal population control. They lack the firepower and necessary preparation, especially training, for combating a major insurgency--especially one with significant external support. Relative to the size of the guerrilla force, they do not have the manpower to win.

Internationally the government faces near isolation. Only the U.S. and Venezuela provide any substantial diplomatic, economic and security support. The OAS and UN have both approved resolutions critical of the violence. The international financial institutions have responded slowly, if at all, to GOES needs.

### III. Issues

A comprehensive interagency study of U.S. policy and strategic options toward El Salvador is currently underway. However, because of its complexity, the study will require additional staffing before completion, and the U.S. Embassy has now requested a minimum package of helicopters, additional mobile training teams, and USMILGP augmentation. Given the public attention to the issue, some preliminary decisions will be required before completion of the basic study.

#### A. Policy

The President and the Secretary of State have indicated that U.S. policy toward El Salvador is to prevent the creation of another Marxist state in Central America and to insure the survival of a government in El Salvador compatible with U.S. worldwide objectives. However, no formal and public articulation of the policy has been made.

#### B. Military Issues

The U.S. should pursue a clear and specific military strategy toward El Salvador. The interagency study is considering three conceptual approaches to such a strategy:

-- Target U.S. military assistance primarily against infiltration - leaving the GOES to deal fairly independently with the internal aspects of the insurgency.

-- In addition to assistance against infiltration, provide some military assistance, on a low profile basis, to deal with the internal insurgency.

-- Give equal weight to providing interdiction and counter-insurgency assistance, including in-country operations training and major equipment upgrading for the Salvadoran armed forces.

The IG believes these options should be fully staffed before a decision is made.

~~SECRET~~

-4-

## 1. Additional Training

U.S. Security assistance personnel in El Salvador currently number 23, including the helicopter pilot and maintenance MTTs, the Operational Planning and Assistance Team (OPAT) working with the High Command, and the permanent MILGP staff, all stationed in San Salvador or its environs. Our Embassy, in consultation with Salvadoran military and civilian leaders and with the concurrence of President Durante, has recommended an additional 33 personnel as the minimum required at this time to begin a basic program to improve Salvadoran military performance. While it might be preferable to conduct some of this training abroad, the Salvadoran high command has suspended all out-of-country training at this time due to the strain on their existing resources. We have initiated discussions with the government on reestablishing a central military training institution, but it will be some time before our training could be concentrated at such a facility.

The IG has already recommended deployment of a six-man naval MTT. There is also IG consensus to ask Congress for legislation to permit a permanent increase in the El Salvador MILGP to a total of 10 U.S. military personnel. In the interim, we will seek to increase the permanent MILGP staff from four to six personnel and deploy immediately a five-man MTT to assist the MILGP in carrying out its increasing responsibilities. According to our Embassy, the minimum additional MTTs necessary in the immediate future are:

-- A 5-man OPAT augmentation. (To be located with the existing team in the capital but traveling to the regional command headquarters in the interior to assist regional commanders and their staffs in planning and improvement of intelligence, communication and logistics.)

-- Three 5-man Small Unit Training Teams. (One of these teams would initially provide instruction in patrolling, counter-guerrilla operations, air mobile operations, and individual skills to one battalion of the 4th Brigade in El Paraiso and two of these teams will provide similar instruction to the now forming quick reaction battalion at Sitio del Nino.)

Deployment outside of the capital, however, adds a new dimension to U.S. involvement. It brings U.S. personnel closer to areas that might be subject to attack by major hostile forces, increases U.S. visibility, blurs the distinction between "trainer" and "advisor," possibly undermines GOES efforts to project an independent image, could "legitimize" the introduction of Cuban and Nicaraguan "advisors" into El Salvador, and could also eventually bring us within the terms of the War Powers Resolution.

~~SECRET~~

While these teams will be instructed not to accompany Salvadoran units on combat missions, the insurgency is such that their inadvertent involvement in hostilities cannot be discounted.

## 2. Additional Materiel

The FY 81 FMS credit and Sec. 506 (a) grant for El Salvador have been fully committed. There is consensus in the IG that an additional \$5 million FMS guaranteed loan should be made available quickly through reprogramming. (A 15-day Congressional notification is required.) The loan would assist in interdiction of the arms flow into El Salvador through overhaul of aging patrol boats, purchase of commercial vehicles to improve mobility, and radar components. These items are not available from DOD stocks and, therefore, cannot be funded through Sec. 506 (a). Part of the \$5 million would fund ongoing spare parts and support requirements.

However, substantial equipment, beyond this immediate \$5 million, will be required in both FY 81 and 82. The kinds of equipment have been identified, but precise quantities and costs are still being refined. The need for additional funding will obviously be proportional to the degree of external support for the insurgency, but something between \$25 and \$70 million will be needed over the next 18 months.

In addition to the \$5 million loan, one materiel request requires immediate decision. The country team has recommended the provision of four additional UH-1H helicopters to improve GOES ability to move reaction forces. There is consensus this should be done. A decision is needed on how the helicopters should be funded, and that decision will provide guidance for future funding of other equipment needs.

There is consensus that the additional helicopters should not be leased, as were the first six. The Secretary of the Army (who would have to sign the lease), OMB and Congress are all concerned about the use of temporary leasing authority to meet long-term security assistance needs.

## C. Economic Issues

Present assistance programs of \$63 million for FY 81 are directed primarily at employment generation, support of private sector output, and agrarian reform. Preliminary study indicates that additional U.S. FY 81 assistance in the rough order of magnitude of \$30-100 million will be essential. A team will be in El Salvador the week of February 16 to refine our estimates. The increase might include a combination of reprogrammed AID development assistance, supplemental ESF assistance and additional



PL-480. The NSC might urge the Export Import Bank to provide additional funding. Because of the heavy external financing requirement to meet projected balance of payments needs our economic assistance program is predicated on maximizing IMF, IDB and other international financial institution participation.

#### D. International Support

Our major efforts to demonstrate Cuban and other Communist intervention in El Salvador should better enable governments in Western Europe and most of Latin America to resist popular pressures to support the leftist front. However, West European governments, Mexico and other skeptical Latin American governments, and international public opinion will continue to oppose the GOES until it controls security force abuses and demonstrates stronger popular support.

Action in the OAS. The U.S. could encourage the GOES to seek OAS consideration of Cuban and Nicaraguan intervention in its internal affairs under the Rio Treaty. If incontrovertible evidence can be presented publicly, El Salvador might be able to obtain a two-thirds vote for a resolution calling for cessation of clandestine military assistance to the insurgents. But it is not a sure thing, because many Latin American states including Mexico, are wary of any resolution which might seem to endorse U.S. military activity. Moreover, the GOES appears reluctant to proceed in the OAS because it fears exposure of its human rights record and the political and economic consequences of a complete break with Nicaragua.

#### IV. U.S. Public and Congressional Constraints

The full panoply of concerned activist and church groups (with the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the forefront) is beginning efforts to mobilize public opinion to demand an end to U.S. support for the Salvadoran government. This campaign can be expected to have growing effect--particularly in Congress--unless our intelligence on international communist intervention orchestrated by Moscow and Havana convinces the American public that the East-West factor and El Salvador's proximity to the U.S. have assumed overwhelming importance in determining U.S. interest.

Sustained U.S. support for El Salvador will obviously require the cooperation of the Congress. For the present, careful adherence to the applicable laws (see below) and extensive briefing and consultations should be sufficient to gain necessary support. For the longer term, however, (e.g., FY 1982 and beyond), if there has not been substantial improvement in the situation, Congressional support is likely to erode. This risk can be diminished by an intensive effort, beginning now, to build a

broad bipartisan base of support for administration policy objectives through involving the Congress directly in deciding how the U.S. should respond to this communist challenge close to the United States.

A. War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution requires that the President (1) consult with Congress prior to the introduction of U.S. armed forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," and (2) submit a written report to Congress within 48 hours after such an introduction setting forth its circumstances, legal authority, and estimated scope and duration. (The Resolution makes clear that this applies to the use of U.S. military personnel to "command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany" foreign forces involved in hostile situations.) The Resolution also requires the President to withdraw the forces introduced within 60 days if the Congress has not authorized the continued involvement, and to withdraw the forces at any time if so required by a concurrent resolution of Congress.

The deployments of those MTT and other non-combat military personnel which have already been completed or approved do not trigger the above requirements. The deployment of additional MTT personnel to provide operational training in regional commands in the countryside presents more serious War Powers questions, in part because of the greater likelihood of involvement in hostile insurgent actions, and in part because of the possibility of intimate involvement with Salvadoran units which may actually become engaged in combat.

If these deployments are authorized, the question of whether, and when, a report should be filed under the Resolution, could become a source of continuing controversy in Congress. The controversy might be diminished by prior consultations with Congressional leaders. At present, these deployments would not appear to require filing a report because there does not appear at this time to be an imminent threat of insurgent operations involving our personnel.

However, if the additional U.S. personnel are deployed, and if the circumstances deteriorate generally or an incident occurs in which U.S. personnel are involved in hostilities, we would be required to file a War Powers report. In that event, we will have to obtain Congressional authorization under the Resolution in those more adverse circumstances in order to continue the involvement of U.S. forces beyond 60 days. In this respect, this situation is unlike any other in which a War Powers report has been filed, all of which involved rescue operations which

had been completed even before the reports were filed. War Powers issues are dealt with in greater detail in Tab B.

B. Security Assistance Legislation

Proposals are under consideration to provide additional defense articles and services, including training, to the Salvadoran armed forces. The relevant authorities are at Tab C.

V. Recommendations:

It is the consensus of the IG that:

-- The President should issue an unambiguous statement of our resolve to support the Salvadoran Government and oppose the Cuban-backed insurgents as soon as possible. A draft statement is attached at Annex A.

-- Four additional UH-1H helicopters should be dispatched to El Salvador soon.

-- A six-man naval MTT should be deployed to assist the Salvadoran Navy in interdiction techniques and maintenance.

-- A five-man augmentation to the MILGRP should be deployed as soon as possible to be followed by a request to Congress to increase the size of the MILGRP permanently to ten.

-- An additional \$5 million FMS guaranteed loan should be made available quickly through reprogramming (a 15-day Congressional Notification is required).

-- The US should work closely with the GOES and its other principal supporter, Venezuela, in coordinating international strategy.

Other courses of action have varying options. They are:

Training:

Option 1. Deploy the OPAT and SUT MTTs and authorize them to carry out training as required with appropriate military units as approved by the country team; consult informally with Congress in advance, but not on a War Powers basis.

Option 2. Deploy the teams as above, but after formally consulting with Congress and submitting War Powers report.

Option 3. Deploy the OPAT and SUT MTTs with the requirement that all training be conducted in the immediate vicinity of

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the capital to minimize visibility of US presence and War Powers implications.

Option 4. Do not deploy the OPAT and SUT MTTs and provide training to Salvadoran instructor cadre at military facilities in the US and Panama. (This is the only option that would be consistent with a strategy limited to interdiction of external infiltration.)

#### Funding

Option 1. A Presidential determination under Sec. 506(a) to make approximately \$7 million available for helicopters and support equipment on a grant basis. The President would have to certify to the existence of an unforeseen emergency and that no other legal authority is available to meet it. As noted above, it is probable that additional Sec. 506(a) determinations would have to be made later as additional requirements are identified.

Option 2. Seek an FY 81 supplemental appropriation for direct (fully funded) FMS credits at concessional interest rates (3 to 6 percent) and extended repayment terms. If this Option is chosen, an appropriation sufficient to cover not only the helicopters but also other equipment needs for the remainder of FY 81, and possibly FY 82 as well, should be requested. Direct concessional credits are essential because of El Salvador's economic situation and such credits are not available through reprogramming.

Option 3. Consult with Congress, pointing out the immediate requirement for helicopters, and determining whether greater support exists for a Sec. 506(a) determination (which Congress would not have to vote on) or for a supplemental. There is consensus in the IG for this option, and for beginning consultations immediately.

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TAB A

White House Statement

The Government of El Salvador under the leadership of President Duarte last month withstood a major drive by leftist insurgents dominated by Communists to seize control of the country. The offensive was supported with arms, propaganda, and training from Communist states and others working through Cuba. The guerrillas and their outside supporters are continuing in their efforts to overthrow the Government of El Salvador through military force and terror.

The United States Government is ready to provide the necessary military and economic assistance to insure that the Government in El Salvador is able to meet the threat.

This Administration will be a consistent and reliable ally of the Government of El Salvador. We will consult closely and privately with the Duarte Government and will firmly support its struggle to implement political, agrarian, and economic reforms and end the violence that has plagued El Salvador.

War Powers Implications of the  
Deployment of Additional Mobile  
Training Teams (MTTs) to El Salvador

1. Requirements of the War Powers Resolution.

Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution<sup>1/</sup> requires the President to submit a written report to Congress within 48 hours after the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces: (1) "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances"; or (2) "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces" regardless of whether hostilities are imminent.<sup>2/</sup> This report must set forth the circumstances, legal authority, and estimated scope and duration of the introduction of U.S. forces; and similar reports must be submitted periodically so long as it continues.

Additional requirements apply in the first category of cases (introduction into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities) but not the second (introduction into foreign territory while equipped for combat). First, Section 3 requires the President to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" prior to the introduction of U.S. forces; in practice, this has involved consultation with the chairmen and ranking minority members of the foreign affairs and armed services committees, and with the leadership of the two houses. Second, Section 5 purports to require the President to withdraw the forces introduced within 60 days if the Congress has not acted to authorize the introduction,<sup>3/</sup> or at any time if so required by a concurrent resolution of Congress; the constitutionality of this provision has never been tested.

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1. P.L. 93-148; November 7, 1973.

2. The Resolution also requires a report to Congress in a third type of situation not relevant here: where U.S. forces are introduced "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation."

3. The 60-day period may be expanded to 90 days "if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces."

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To make clear that these requirements apply to the introduction into hostile situations of individual members of the armed forces acting as advisers, commanders or support personnel for foreign forces, Section 8(c) provides that the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes "the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities."

The precise meaning of the phrase "involvement in hostilities" is not entirely clear. Officials of the Ford Administration advised Congress that they had construed Section 4 of the Resolution as follows:

... "hostilities" was used to mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces, and "imminent hostilities" was considered to mean a situation in which there is a serious risk from hostile fire to the safety of United States forces. In our view, neither term necessarily encompasses irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a particular area.

It is difficult to apply these concepts to unconventional warfare, particularly since guerrilla attacks are often designed to inflict maximum surprise damage before opposing forces can be brought to the scene of action or organized to engage in an effective exchange of fire. It may be possible to argue that the Resolution was not intended to cover sporadic guerrilla attacks in localities where U.S. noncombat personnel happen to be present; but it is doubtful that Congress would accept such an argument where U.S. military personnel are training or advising government forces in an area where a sustained guerrilla campaign is taking place which has regularly involved substantial exchanges of fire, merely because the U.S. personnel threatened by hostile fire did not in themselves constitute a combat unit capable of conducting hostilities.

2. Will the MTTs be "equipped for combat"?

We understand that individual members of the MTTs will carry, or have access to, personal arms suitable for individual protection, but will not carry or operate any other weapons. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to treat these teams as forces "equipped for combat" for the

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purpose of Section 4 of the Resolution. The possession of personal arms for individual protection has never been treated as requiring a report under the Resolution in past cases involving personnel performing non-combat functions, such as aircrews and observers. (1)

3. Will the MTTs be introduced into situations "where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances"?

It was determined in mid-January that the current assignment of MTTs for helicopter pilot training and maintenance programs in San Salvador would not present such a clear indication of involvement of U.S. military personnel in hostilities as to require a report under the Resolution; contributing to this conclusion were the facts that those MTTs were to be restricted to areas of San Salvador not expected to be subject to military operations, and were not to receive hostile fire pay or otherwise be treated in a manner suggesting other than a peacetime assignment. (2)

The assignment of additional MTTs would require a similar determination about the likelihood of their involvement in hostilities in each location to which they will be assigned. In some cases, such as the assignment of additional MTTs to San Salvador or the assignment of a proposed naval MTT to an area outside the capital where we understand there has not been significant insurgent activity, this determination may essentially cover the same ground as the mid-January assessment. However, the same assessment about the assignment of MTTs to regional headquarters outside San Salvador will probably be more difficult to make (and to defend) because of the greater number of locations involved, the greater insecurity of these areas, and the mobile nature of the insurgency. If no report is filed and these MTT personnel subsequently become involved in such an incident, it will be more difficult to dismiss it as a random occurrence which was not reasonably foreseeable (as, for example, we were able to do in the case of an unexpected confrontation during the Shaba airlift involving a group of insubordinate Zairian soldiers). Two added complications in this respect are the decision of the Department of Defense to grant hostile fire pay to U.S. military personnel in El Salvador (since the statutory criteria for such pay include "imminent danger" of exposure to "hostile fire");<sup>4/</sup> and the characterization of the military situation in El Salvador as involving a "major offensive"

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4. 37 U.S.C. §310(a).



by rebel forces, marked by "intense, widespread" attacks which have "severely taxed" Government forces, which appeared in the justification sent forward to Congress on behalf of President Carter for his invocation of emergency authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act in January to permit immediate military assistance.<sup>5/</sup>

Therefore, it is important that a careful assessment be made of the likelihood of involvement of the MTTs in hostilities in each of the locations to which they would be assigned, that this assessment be appropriately documented for the record, and that this question be reviewed frequently. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the requirements of Sections 3 and 4 of the Resolution do not apply, it would be prudent to consult beforehand with the appropriate Congressional leaders concerning this and other relevant aspects of our plans in El Salvador, although of course we would not suggest or admit that these consultations were required by the Resolution.

An additional consideration in this regard relates to the character of the training to be provided by certain of these MTTs. As we understand it, some of the contemplated training (by the operational MTTs) may involve practical instruction in the conduct of military operations to Salvadoran personnel who may, during the course of the training, be involved in actual hostile operations. This might draw our MTT personnel uncomfortably close to the language of Section 8(c) of the Resolution (described above) which applies to U.S. personnel who "command" or "coordinate" foreign forces who are engaged in hostile situations, particularly if the MTT instructors were to become involved in commenting on or giving advice on the specific operational plans or techniques of Salvadoran combat forces. We have been able, in the past, to convince Congressional committees that Section 8(c) only applies if U.S. personnel provide the services mentioned at the same time and place that the foreign forces in question are involved in hostilities, but that was in the context of operations like the Shaba airlift where U.S. personnel remained many miles from any battle zone. It will be more difficult to maintain this distinction if U.S. personnel are in relatively

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5. Fortunately, the instructions issued by DOD to the MTTs in El Salvador were (in the end) not characterized as "rules of engagement", which might further have contributed to an impression that the MTTs were combat-capable forces proceeding into a potentially hostile situation.

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close proximity to the area of hostilities and are in frequent contact with the foreign personnel who are involved in combat. Therefore, at the same time that the assessment of the likelihood of the involvement of U.S. personnel in hostilities is made, we should also consider whether it is likely that the Salvadoran personnel to whom instruction or planning assistance is given may be making immediate combat use of this instruction in the same general area.

4. Consequences of the filing of a War Powers report.

If a formal report were submitted to Congress by the President under Section 4 of the Resolution, presumably on the grounds of imminent involvement of U.S. forces in hostilities, then Congress would expect the President to comply with the requirements of Section 5 concerning their withdrawal.<sup>6/</sup> If Congress does not enact a specific authorization for that use of U.S. forces within 60 calendar days, then (according to Section 5) the President must terminate that use of those forces, unless the Congress extends that 60-day period or the President determines and certifies that up to 30 more days are required to carry out safely the removal of those forces.<sup>7/</sup> Section 5 also purports to require the President to withdraw these forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

The constitutionality of these provisions has never been tested (the military operations on which reports have

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6. Presidents Ford and Carter were careful, in their reports, not to admit in so many words that the Resolution in fact compelled the filing of the report being submitted, but these reports were nonetheless generally regarded as having been formal War Powers reports. In the present case, whether or not the President's report specified that it was submitted under the Resolution, or that it was a case of imminent involvement of U.S. forces in hostilities, Congress would undoubtedly treat it as such for the purposes of Section 5. Indeed, the language of Section 5 specifically makes its provisions applicable in a case where a report is required under Section 4(a)(1) whether or not a report is, in fact, filed.

7. There are two other exceptions which are not relevant here: (1) where Congress has declared war; and (2) where Congress is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.

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been filed in the past were all rescue operations which were completed within days of their commencement). Nonetheless, the continuation of this MTT program in El Salvador would not be viable in any event in the face of a formal Congressional mandate for its termination, whatever the constitutionality of that action. Therefore, as a practical matter, if a War Powers report were filed, it would probably be necessary to obtain specific Congressional authorization within 60 calendar days for these MTT deployments (or at least an extension of the 60-day period) if these teams were to be maintained in the regional command areas.<sup>8/</sup> Congressional authorization, if obtained, might be made subject to detailed restrictions on the size, composition, location and type of training offered by the MTTs.

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8. The language of Section 5 does not literally provide for a situation in which U.S. forces become involved in hostilities which cease prior to the expiration of the 60-day period. It might be possible to persuade Congress that Section 5 would logically cease to apply in such a situation, and U.S. forces could then remain even in the absence of Congressional authorization. However, Congress would probably have to be convinced that a basic and reasonably permanent change had occurred in the situation before acquiescing in such an argument; certainly, Congress would not concede that the President could take advantage of a temporary lull in fighting to suspend or nullify the operation of Section 5.

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Security Assistance Legislation

A. Lease

Under 10 U.S.C. 2667, DOD can lease nonexcess, nonexpendable property to foreign governments. Any such lease of major defense equipment (e.g., helicopters) valued at \$7 million or more must be approved by the Secretary of State and justified to Congress 30 days in advance. The President may waive the 30-day period in an emergency in which the lease is required immediately by U.S. national security interests.

B. Drawdown of DOD Stocks and Services

Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to draw on DOD stocks and services of DOD personnel in unforeseen emergencies where no other authority exists to meet the emergency requirement. Advance notice to Congress is required, and the authority is limited to \$50 million per fiscal year. (Previous uses of Section 506, for El Salvador and Liberia, have reduced FY 1981 availability to \$44 million.) Because of the statute's stringent criteria-- emergency and no other available authority, it is necessary to assure that all other alternatives (including reprogramming) have been exhausted before resorting to this special authority, and to be sure that the need can be justified as urgent.

Congress is sensitive that this authority not be used as an alternative to requesting the authorization and appropriation of funds for military assistance or sales.

C. FMS

Additional sales of military equipment and services to El Salvador would have to be financed by U.S. credits or guaranties. Additional loan guaranties could be offered through reprogramming, but only at normal interest rates. (Repayment could be deferred while supplemental funding was being sought from Congress.) Low interest, direct credits would require supplemental authorization and appropriations legislation.