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**Folder Title:** Japan (04/07/1983-05/31/1983)  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:  
File Folder: Japan (04/07/83 - 05/31/83)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
Date: 02/02/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	070759Z APR 83, 2p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #492</i>	4/7/83	<del>B1</del>
2. Cable	080548Z APR 83, 1p <i>R " "</i>	4/8/83	<del>B1</del>
3. Cable	090236Z APR 83, 5p <i>R " "</i>	4/9/83	<del>B1</del>
4. Cable	Douglas McMinn to William Clark re The Houdaille Case, 3p <i>R " "</i>	4/19/83	<del>B1</del>
5. Note	Caspar Weinberger to Judge Clark re Attached, 1p <i>R " "</i>	5/6/83	<del>B1</del>
6. Memo	Clark to the President re Memorandum from Weinberger, 1p <i>R " "</i>	5/16/83	<del>B1</del>
7. Memo	Gaston Sigur to Clark re Memorandum from Weinberger, 1p	5/10/83	B1
8. Memo	Weinberger to the President re Japan's Defense Efforts, 1p <i>PART 1/9/07 F00-037/1 #499</i>	5/6/83	B1, <b>B3</b>
9. Memo	Sigur to Clark re Meeting with Ambassador Okawara, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #500</i>	5/17/83	<del>B1</del>
10. Memo	Same as Item # 8, 1p <i>PART 1/9/07 F00-037/1 #501</i>	5/6/83	B1, <b>B3</b>
11. Memo	Clark to the President re Proposed Visit to Japan, 2p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #502</i>	nd	<del>B1</del>
12. Memo	Charles Tyson/Sigur to Clark re Proposed Visit, 1p <i>R " " #503</i>	5/18/83	<del>B1</del>
13. Memo	Clark to the President re Proposed Visit, 2p <i>R " " #504</i>	nd	<del>B1</del>
14. Memcon	President - PM Nakasone Meeting, 2p <i>R " " #505</i>	nd	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
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- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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SITUATION: CHECK  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE538

UTS1034

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHKO #6477 0970801

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY

O 070759Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 149Z

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ TOKYO 06477

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD

DEPT PLS PASS TO CAIRO FOR AMB

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, JO, PLO

SUBJECT UP-DATE ON HUSSEIN-MUBARAK TALKS: AMBASSADOR'S

APRIL 7 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

REF: A) STATE 92966; B) TOKYO 6404

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. I MET FOR 15 MINUTES MORNING OF APRIL 7 WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S STATE GUEST HOUSE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS RECEPTION FOR THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. ALSO ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE MUBARAK'S ADVISOR, EL-BAZ AND EMBASSY POL/C.

3. I PASSED THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO MUBARAK, AND ADDED THAT HIS COMMENT STOPRIME MINISTER NAKASONE YESTERDAY, AS REPORTED BY THE PRESS, FAVORING HUSSEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WERE VERY HELPFUL. MUBARAK REPLIED THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO ENCOURAGE KING HUSSEIN BUT THAT HUSSEIN WOULD NEED MORE TIME TO MAKE UP HIS MIND.

4. MUBARAK THEN SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY SENT A MESSAGE TO ARAFAT WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN TURN HAD RECEIVED FROM HIM A MESSAGE WHICH ARAFAT WISHED TO HAVE PASSED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. ACCORDING TO MUBARAK, ARAFAT SAID THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO BE POSITIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN HIS TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN BUT THAT, BECAUSE OF SYRIAN PRESSURE AND LACK OF FIRMNESS ON THE PART OF THE SAUDIS, HE FOUND IT IMPERATIVE TO CALL FOR A CONVENING OF THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A COVER FOR PLO MOVEMENT ON THIS QUESTION. THIS SUMMIT IS NOW TENTATIVELY SET FOR RIYADH ON APRIL 16. AFAFAT ALSO SAID THAT AS SYRIA HAD NOT

SENSITIVE

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NLS FDO-037/1#492

BY LRS, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

YET REPLIED, HE WAS UNSURE WHETHER IT WOULD ATTEND. ARAFAT WANTED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KNOW THAT HE WAS NOT RESORTING TO DELAYING TACTICS BUT SIMPLY WAS TRYING TO AVOID A SPLIT IN THE PLO RANKS. AGAIN ACCORDING TO MUBARAK, ARAFAT WOULD LIKE THE US TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUARANTEES (FYI: NOT SPECIFIED TO ME: END FYI) IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION. MUBARAK ADVISED ARAFAT TO MOVE FORWARD WITHOUT WAITING FOR SUCH GUARANTEES.

5. MUBARAK THEN TOLD ME HE WOULD AGAIN MAKE CONTACT WITH KING HUSSEIN AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE SAUDIS AS WELL. HE CHARACTERIZED THE SAUDIS' POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS AS EQUIVOCAL AND HESITANT BECAUSE THE SAUDIS FEEL THEY CANNOT IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON ARAFAT. MUBARAK ADDED THAT, AS A RESULT, THEIR APPROACH TO THE PLO IS TO SAY "...WHATEVER YOU PALESTINIANS WANT, WE WILL SUPPORT IT."

6. AT THE DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION ITSELF, PRESIDENT MUBARAK TOOK ME ASIDE FOR A COUPLE OF MINUTES TO REQUEST THAT THE USG KEEP UP THE PRESSURE IN ORDER TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON. HE SAID THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS THE KEY AND THAT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD PROVIDE A CHANCE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND MORE RAPID RESULTS.

7. I ASSURED PRESIDENT MUBARAK THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MUBARAK. I ALSO PROMISED THAT I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM AGAIN DURING HIS STAY IN JAPAN IF THERE WAS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM WASHINGTON ON KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION. MUBARAK WELCOMED THAT SUGGESTION.

MANSFIELD

BT

#6477

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE860  
STU7736  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHKO #6550 0980548  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY  
O 080548Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1521  
BT  
S E C R E T TOKYO 06550  
NODIS  
DEPARTMENT PLS PASS CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR  
E.O. 12356: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, JO, PLO  
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON HUSSEIN-ARAFAT TALKS FOR MUBARAK  
REF: TOKYO 6494  
DR. OSAMA EL BAZ, ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER AND  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR POLITICAL  
AFFAIRS, JUST CALLED ME ON THE PHONE TO INFORM ME THAT,  
AS A RESULT OF OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH THE  
PRESIDENT, HE HAS BEEN DELEGATED BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO LEAVE TODAY, APRIL 8, TO MEET WITH KING HUSSEIN AND  
POSSIBLY ARAFAT TO DISCUSS UPCOMING MEETING TENTATIVELY  
SET FOR APRIL 16. MANSFIELD  
BT  
#6550  
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#493

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE369  
 OO RUEHC  
 DE RUEHC #7325 0990542  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 O 890236Z APR 83  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000  
 INFO RUEKJCS/DOD IMMEDIATE  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUHQHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIAT 0000  
 BT  
 S E ~~C~~ R E T STATE 097325  
 EXDIS CINCPAC FOR POLAD ONLY, HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR  
 TAGS:JA, MARR, MNUC, PGOV, ETRD  
 SUBJECT:JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SENDS SECRETARY COPY OF PRIME  
 MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON APRIL 7, AMBASSADOR OKAWARA CALLED ON THE SECRETARY TO DELIVER A COPY OF A MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE TO THE PRESIDENT. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD INSTRUCTED THAT, IN ADDITION TO COMMUNICATING IT TO THE WHITE HOUSE, THE AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY MAKE A PRESENTATION OF THE MESSAGE TO BOTH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND SECRETARY WEINBERGER. THE MESSAGE PROVIDED AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND A SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS BILATERAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY SECURITY ISSUES. IN ADDITION, IT RECOUNTED JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES INF POSITIONS AND ASKED FOR GUIDANCE IT COULD USE

ON THAT SUBJECT IN APRIL 12-13 VICE MINISTERIAL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATION WAS DRAWN DIRECTLY FROM THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING NON-PAPER.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

WITH THE APPROVAL BY THE DIET OF FY 1983 BUDGET BILL ON APRIL 4 (WHICH MEANS ONE DAY EARLIER THAN THE APPROVAL OF FY 1982 BUDGET), A MOST DIFFICULT PERIOD IN OUR INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IS NOW ALL BUT OVER, AND THE STABILITY OF MY CABINET IS FURTHER ENHANCED. THE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/14494

BY MDI, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PRESENT DIET PROCEEDINGS ARE INDEED FILLED WITH AN UNPRECEDENTED SERIES OF DIFFICULT ISSUES INCLUDING THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TO THE US. AT THE INITIAL STAGE, THE DIET DELIBERATIONS HAD TO GO THROUGH VERY TURBULENT AIR, AS MY GOVERNMENT ENCOUNTERED SEVERE CRITICISM CONCERNING ITS POLICY STANCE TOWARD DEFENSE ISSUES AS WELL AS JAPAN-US RELATIONS. (OFTEN TIMES SUCH CRITICISM WAS BASED UPON THE LACK OF PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF THE PRESS.)

AS THE TIME WENT BY, HOWEVER, CLEAR AND STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE DIET QUESTIONING GRADUALLY EVOKED THE UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHY OF OUR PEOPLE. FROM AMONG INTELLECTUALS, IN PARTICULAR, STRONG SUPPORT AND ENDORSEMENT TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ARE BEING OBTAINED. AS A RESULT, THE RECOGNITION IS GETTING INCREASINGLY STRONGER THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS THE ONE WITH CONVICTION AND LEADERSHIP FIRMER THAN EVER.

ALSO, LOCAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS ARE PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY. (ALTHOUGH A RESPONSIBLE PREDICTION CANNOT BE MADE UNTIL THE VERY FINAL STAGE,) THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION IN HOKKAIDO IS WITNESSING THE CANDIDATE FROM LDP SIDE GAINING A SLIGHT EDGE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT OVER THE CANDIDATE FROM OPPOSITION SIDE WHO HAD ONCE BEEN VIEWED AS RUNNING AHEAD. SIMILARLY, IN FUKUOKA PREFECTURE, THE LDP CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR HAS CAUGHT UP AND IS KEEPING ABREAST WITH OPPOSITION CANDIDATE WHO AT ONE TIME HAD BEEN ENJOYING AN OVERWHELMING MARGIN IN HIS FAVOR.

IN CONCLUSION, I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE US SIDE CAN REST ASSURED AS-FAR AS OUR INTERNAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY ARE CONCERNED. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR KEEN INTEREST AND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO MY CABINET.

4. WHEN I MADE MY STATEMENTS ON JAPAN-US RELATIONS AS WELL AS DEFENSE MATTERS, AT THE EARLY STAGE OF THE CURRENT DIET SESSION, IT WAS WITH A CLEAR POLITICAL INTENT AS MENTIONED BELOW. ALSO, I MADE THEM WITH UTMOST CARE SO THAT THEY MAY NOT INVITE ANXIETIES FROM OUR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ON OUR DEFENSE EFFORTS. THAT IS TO SAY, WHEREAS PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE LEFT THEIR POSTURE RATHER AMBIGUOUS ON THE QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY, I HAVE TRIED TO DEFINE MY ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IN CLEAR TERMS, THUS IDENTIFYING JAPAN'S ROLES UNDER THE JAPAN-US



SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AS WELL AS SEEKING A SOLID UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PEOPLE FOR WHAT WE SHOULD DO AND WHAT WE ARE NOT ALLOWED TO DO.

TO THIS END, MY ADMINISTRATION HAS ACCOMPLISHED THE FOLLOWING IN THE DIET DELIBERATIONS:

5 I MADE A FINAL DECISION ON THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TO THE UNITED STATES, TO WHICH THE PREVIOUS CABINET HAD COMMITTED ITSELF, DESPITE THE DISSENTING VIEWS HELD NOT ONLY BY OPPOSITION PARTIES BUT ALSO BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE LDP.

6 JAPANESE POLITICIANS HAVE THUS FAR TENDED NOT TO TOUCH UPON THE ISSUE OF THE CONTROL OF THE STRAITS SINCE IT MIGHT CAUSE ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. BUT I STAGED ACTIVE DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT, AND, AS A RESULT, MADE IT CLEAR THAT (A) IN THE CASE OF AN ARMED ATTACK ON JAPAN, JAPAN WILL, AS NECESSARY FOR ITS OWN SELF DEFENSE, CONTROL THE JAPANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS AS WELL AS THE ADJACENT WATERS OF THE HIGH SEAS OF THE SO-CALLED THREE STRAITS, AND THAT (B) JAPAN WILL ALLOW THE US TO CONTROL THE STRAITS IF AN EMERGENCY SO NECESSITATES, EVEN WHEN ARMED ATTACK IS YET TO TAKE PLACE AGAINST JAPAN.

7. I ALSO LED THE SUBSTANTIAL DEBATE ON THE ISSUE OF SEA-LANES DEFENSE WITH-A VIEW TOWARD CREATING NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THIS SUBJECT.

8. I CLEARLY EXPRESSED OUR POSITION THAT WHEN JAPAN IS UNDER AN ARMED ATTACK, THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES MAY, AS NECESSARY, COUNTER THE ATTACKS ON THE US NAVAL VESSELS WHICH HAVE COME TO JAPAN'S RESCUE.

9. SIMILARLY, I MADE IT CLEAR THAT, WHEN JAPAN IS UNDER AN ARMED ATTACK, JAPAN MAY, AS NECESSARY, COUNTER THE

ATTACKS ON FOREIGN VESSELS WHICH ARE ENGAGED IN TRANSPORT OF INDISPENSABLE MATERIALS FOR JAPAN.

10. THESE STATEMENTS I MADE IN THE COURSE OF DIET DELIBERATIONS CAUSED A GREAT DEAL OF REPERCUSSIONS IN JAPAN. HOWEVER, I MADE THESE STATEMENTS WITH CLEAR INTENT TO MAKE THE JAPANESE PEOPLE ACCUSTOMED TO THESE POLICIES AND TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL CONSENSUS AMONG THE JAPANESE PEOPLE. THERE IS NO BACKING DOWN ON THIS SCORE.

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THESE STATEMENTS WERE MADE WITH CLEAR CONCIUSNESS OF THE NEED FOR THE DEFENSE OF OUR OWN COUNTRY AND WITH THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE JAPAN-US SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH IS THE VERY KEY TO THE VIABILITY AND SURVIVAL OF JAPAN.

BY VIRTUE OF THE FREE AND ACTIVE DEBATES IN THE DIET DELIBERATIONS, BOTH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE DEFENSE AGENCY RENEWED THEIR CONFIDENCE, AND THE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THESE ISSUES IS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASING. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH IF YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD OBSERVE THESE DEVELOPMENTS QUIETLY FOR THE TIME BEING.

11. ON THE SOVIET NEGATIVE REPLY TO THE US PROPOSAL OF AN "INTERIM AGREEMENT" IN INF NEGOTIATIONS, I PROMPTLY EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE AND DISAPPOINTMENT IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN FUKUOKA WHERE I WAS CAMPAIGNING FOR OUR CANDIDATE IN THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION. IN RESPONSE TO THE REMARKS BY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, I QUICKLY INDICATED; "THE SATO ADMINISTRATION REALIZED THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF OKINAWA WITH STRENUOUS EFFORTS. IF FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IS SERIOUS IN HIS REMARKS THAT JAPAN IS NOW IN FACT TRANSFORMED INTO A US NUCLEAR BASE, SUCH BELIEF OF HIS MUST BE RECTIFIED. SUCH UNFOUNDED REMARKS AIMING TO GREAT POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS IN JAPAN ARE UNPLEASANT INDEED. I THINK THEY WERE MADE AS THE SOVIETS' NEGOTIATION TACTICS WITH THE WHOLE PROCESS OF INF NEGOTIATIONS IN MIND.

I HOPE THAT APPROPRIATE COMPROMISE WILL BE MADE BY THE SOVIETS IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES ON THE GROMYKO REMARKS IN THE FORTHCOMING JAPAN-USSR TALKS IN MID-APRIL."

ON 4 APRIL, FOREIGN MINISTER ABE ALSO REITERATED THE SAME VIEW OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN THE DIET SESSION. IN THE JAPAN-USSR TALKS, I SHALL HAVE;MY PEOPLE STATE IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THE ABOVEMENTIONED VIEW-OF-THE GOVERNMENT, AND IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY NEW INFORMATION, ADVICE OR POLICIES THAT YOU-MAY - CONVEY TO US PRIOR TO THE TALKS.

12. REGARDING STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS,

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WHICH ARE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN, A DRAFT LEGISLATION IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE SYSTEMS WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE DIET IMMEDIATELY UPON ITS APPROVAL BY THE CABINET ON APRIL 19. END TEXT.

13. IN RESPONSE, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WERE CONSISTENTLY IMPRESSED BY THE WAY PRIME MINISTER - NAKASONE AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WERE CONDUCTING THEMSELVES. HE ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE, IN OUR PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE EUROPEANS, POINTING OUT THESE POSITIVE TRENDS. CERTAINLY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT COULD BE ASSURED OF OUR SUPPORT FOR WHAT IT WAS DOING. - PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE, THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED, WAS THE WAY THAT NAKASONE WAS FOLLOWING THROUGH ON HIS COMMITMENTS, BOTH THE EFFORT ON STANDARDS AND PROGRESS ON DEFENSE SERVING AS GOOD EXAMPLES. -

14. SO FAR AS THE JAPANESE-SOVIET TALKS ON APRIL 12-13 WERE CONCERNED, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE JAPANESE WERE FAMILIAR WITH OUR STATED POSITION ON INF, UNDERSCORING THE FACT THAT A "GLOBAL BASIS" WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE U.S. APPROACH. NONETHELESS, HE SAID, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE THE GOJ A FULL -READ-OUT ON WHERE WE WERE ON INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE CURRENT STATUS OF START WAS ALSO RELEVANT, HE SAID, AND TOLD THE AMBASSADOR, THAT IF POSSIBLE, WE WOULD TRY TO PREPARE A PACKAGE ON BOTH FOR THE GOJ BEFORE THE VICE MINISTERIAL TALKS.

15. -AS THE AMBASSADOR WAS LEAVING, HE HANDED THE SECRETARY A RESPONSE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ABE TO THE SECRETARY'S MOST RECENT COMMUNICATION ON INF. THE SECRETARY ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE SOON-TO-BE - ANNOUNCED U.S.-JAPAN ADVISORY GROUP, CITING AS EVIDENCE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, THE HIGH CALIBRE OF THOSE WHO WERE WILLING ON BOTH SIDES TO GIVE UP THEIR TIME TO SERVE.

EAGLEBURGER  
BT  
#7325  
NNNN

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8302635

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 19 APR 83 12

*MSH  
2/2/04*

TO CLARK

FROM MCMINN

DOCDATE 19 APR 83

KEYWORDS: INTL TRADE

JAPAN

SUBJECT: THE HOUDAILLE CASE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*C 5/17 noted by Clark*

*MC*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*(PA) (C)*

628

**National Security Council  
The White House**

1245  
APR 19 1983

Package # 2635

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<del>✓</del>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MW

2635

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

April 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DOUGLAS W. MCMINN 

SUBJECT: The Houdaille Case

Ed Harper held an interagency, cabinet-level meeting last Friday to try again to reach a consensus on what action should be recommended to the President on the Houdaille case. The agencies could not agree and remain split substantively and philosophically. As a result, Harper has asked that an information memo be drafted for the President on Houdaille, briefly outlining the issue and requesting a meeting with the President to discuss the case.

The Houdaille petition has been pending for almost a year now and the lack of action is becoming an embarrassment to the Administration. This case has received a great deal of attention in the press, private sector and Congress because of its precedential nature vis-a-vis Japan's industrial targeting policies. It is the single most important trade case the Administration has faced and it is highly charged politically.

Background

Houdaille Industries, a U.S. manufacturer of numerically controlled machine tools, has alleged that Japan has targeted its machine tool industry which has resulted in an unjustifiable restriction of U.S. commerce. Houdaille has asked that the U.S. investment tax credit (10%) be denied to certain Japanese numerically controlled machine tools. This action would be taken under an obscure provision of the Revenue Act of 1971.

Interagency review of the Houdaille case has brought allegations that the Government of Japan has engaged in a variety of trade-distortive acts which, taken as a whole, form a pattern of government assistance inconsistent with free trade principles. This Japanese policy is characterized by the creation of a risk-free environment in the Japanese market through limitations on market access for imports and direct/collusive assistance to the Japanese industry.

Our response to the Houdaille petition is being monitored closely because it takes dead aim at the highly successful Japanese industry targeting process. Japan and other foreign governments are, thus,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#495

BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

watching it closely. It is also being watched by many U.S. capital-goods industries that believe that Japan's target industry policies have adversely affected their own competitive U.S. position.

Congressionally, a sense of the Senate resolution urging immediate Presidential action to grant the relief requested in the Houdaille petition was passed by unanimous consent in December of last year. This month, the machine tool industry formally filed a Section 232, national security, investigation on machine tools. The Democrats have used this case in their political rhetoric leading to 1984.

What Action Should the President Take?

There is a consensus among all agencies that the remedy being requested by Houdaille (denial of the investment tax credit) is not appropriate. All agree that it would be a dangerous precedent to begin to use tax policy as a trade remedy. Where disagreement reigns supreme is over the type and scope of an alternative remedy.

The major interagency controversy is whether or not the President should decide that the Japanese have been following unfair and/or unreasonable practices that affect adversely our domestic machine tool industry.

I believe the Japanese have been acting in an unreasonable way and, therefore, action should be taken by the President under the unfair trade statute of our domestic trade law (Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974).

Section 301 is the appropriate vehicle because:

- Such a finding is trade liberalizing in nature, not protectionist.
  - Section 301 was created and designed to eliminate unfair and unreasonable trade practices burdening U.S. commerce.
- Such a finding is needed politically.
  - Sentiment on the Hill is running very high on this case that something must be done on the Japanese targeting issue.
  - Without such a finding, those in Congress will be strengthened who are arguing that existing trade laws are inadequate to protect U.S. industry from unfair trade practices.
    - The end result of trade law changes could be more protectionism and a loss of Presidential discretion in trade cases.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Such a case is legally defensible under Section 301.
  - All agencies agree that Section 301 could apply in this instance.
  - To not invoke Section 301 will eviscerate the relevance of the statute.
- Such a case gives the President latitude to consider a wide range of possible remedies, including bilateral negotiations.
- Such a case is necessary to make clear our serious concern with Japanese industrial targeting.
  - This does not mean our bilateral relations will be endangered as a result.
  - Our bilateral relations and Nakasone's political stability in Japan could be worsened without meaningful action in this case on our part.

Treasury, OMB and CEA are opposed to using Section 301. They believe that the complained of practices are not of a sufficient magnitude to send a formal signal to the Japanese. They believe such a finding would set a dangerous precedent and have the effect of calling into question the entire Japanese industrial system. ?

State is prepared to follow the Section 301 route, if necessary, but would prefer quiet, bilateral negotiations to resolve the case.

USTR, Commerce, Labor and the Office of Policy Development support using Section 301.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM WEINBERGER, C *MSP 2/2/04*

RECEIVED 06 MAY 83 19

DOCDATE 06 MAY 83

TO CLARK

KEYWORDS: JAPAN  
VISIT

DEFENSE POLICY  
CM

NAKASONE, YASUHIRO

SUBJECT: SELF DEFENSE ISSUE FOR BILATERAL W/ NAKASONE 27 MAY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 09 MAY 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

MYER

KRAEMER

CHILDRESS

RUSSELL

DUR

TYSON

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( J / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i> <i>Pres</i>	<i>x 5/17</i> <i>1P MAY 16 1983</i>	<i>send to Pres for info</i>		
	<i>c 5/17</i>	<i>Noted by Pres</i>		<i>SA</i>

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE *Ja* (C/M/3)

National Security Council  
The White House

657

Package # 3132

'83 MAY 11 A9:53

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information   A-Action   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP   Meese   Baker   Deaver   Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~  
WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

3132

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


6 May 1983

Memo For JUDGE CLARK

Y 6:57

Bill:

If you think the attached is  
satisfactory, I'd appreciate your  
sending it on to the President.



Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1 #496

BY hds, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

3132

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 16, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to You From Secretary Weinberger on  
Japan's Defense Efforts

Issue:

Prime Minister Nakasone will be meeting with you at breakfast on May 27 and, in addition to Summit issues, will want to discuss with you specific bilateral matters. Defense will obviously be one of them.

Facts:

Cap Weinberger has written you the attached memorandum (Tab A) about how he believes you should approach the defense issue in your conversations with Nakasone. He suggests that you make certain points with the Prime Minister in private which he may or may not use publicly, as he sees fit.

Discussion:

Cap's views will be included in the talking points now being prepared for your May 27 meeting with Nakasone. I send his memorandum on to you now for informational purposes only.

Attachment:

Tab A Weinberger ltr

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1-#497

BY LOJ, NARA, TE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3132

ul

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 10, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *G. Sigur*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President from Secretary Weinberger on Japan's Defense Efforts

In the attached memorandum to the President, Cap Weinberger makes recommendations about how the President should approach the defense issue with Prime Minister Nakasone during his pre-Summit meeting with the President on May 27. The Secretary suggests that the President make certain points with the Prime Minister in private which the latter may use or not use publicly as he sees fit. I think this memorandum is sound and the Secretary's views will be included in the talking points now being prepared for the President's May 27 meeting with the Prime Minister.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the Weinberger letter to the President for his information.

Approve   *C*   Disapprove           

Attachments:

- Tab I Clark memo to President
- Tab A Weinberger ltr to President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-137/1 #498

BY   *LOT*   N'   *2/7/07*  

~~SECRET~~

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3132

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA




6 MAY 1983

22 MAY 83 6:57  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Japan's Defense Efforts (U)

WORLD AFFAIRS  
SITUATION ROOM

(S) During your upcoming bilateral on May 27 with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, you should be aware that Japan's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told Ambassador Mansfield that defense was the most sensitive subject politically in Japan at present, and the Vice Minister hoped that you would not give defense "high visibility" during your bilateral.



FOIA(b)(1)  
FOIA(b)(3)

(S) I recommend that you make the following points to Nakasone privately but emphatically during your breakfast on May 27.

(1) A rational division of labor in defense among Japan, the U.S., and our NATO allies is the only way to provide for local self-defense, regional security, and global deterrence against the Soviet threat.

(2) The U.S. completely supports the Prime Minister's goals for Japan's defense. They are sound and reasonable.

(3) Japan's present defense capability is inadequate to meet Japanese goals.

(4) To help deterrence, their goals should be met by 1990. Significantly greater efforts are thus required by Japan beginning next year.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F00-037/1 #499

By LOS, NARA, Date 11/9/07

CLASSIFIED BY SEC DEF  
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

~~SECRET~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. X25334

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8303373

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 17 MAY 83 28

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 17 MAY 83

*MSP  
2/2/04*

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

AC

OKAWARA, YOSHIO

SUBJECT: CLARK MTG W/ OKAWARA ON MAY 19

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

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( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 5/19</i>	<i>noted by Clark</i>		<i>Su</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

*PA* *JA*

National Security Council  
The White House

666

Package # 3373

1820

MAY 17 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS



~~SECRET~~

3373

KMD

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 17, 1983

WPC HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR

SUBJECT: Meeting with Japanese Ambassador Yoshio Okawara,  
May 19 at 3:00 p.m.

1  
You will meet with Ambassador Okawara at his request on May 19 at 3:00 p.m. He has asked to see you in order to discuss Prime Minister Nakasone's visit. While I don't know specifically what he will want to say to you, I think he may ask that the defense issue not be a major subject for discussion between the Prime Minister and the President, or, at least, that there be no public emphasis on defense. As you are aware, the Prime Minister wants to downplay his strong views on defense because of the Upper House elections in late June. Polls indicate that Nakasone stands to lose a significant portion of the women's vote if he comes across as too much of a "hawk."

I think we can accommodate the Japanese on this by simply having the President follow the scenario on defense outlined in Cap Weinberger's memo, Tab A.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

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NLS F00-037/1#500  
BY LJI NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3132



WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


6 MAY 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Japan's Defense Efforts (U)

WINT HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

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(2) The U.S. completely supports the Prime Minister's goals for Japan's defense. They are sound and reasonable.

(3) Japan's present defense capability is inadequate to meet Japanese goals.

(4) To help deterrence, their goals should be met by 1990. Significantly greater efforts are thus required by Japan beginning next year.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS EOD-0371 # 501

By LOS, NARA, Date 11/9/07

CLASSIFIED BY SEC DEF  
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

~~SECRET~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. X25334

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8303422

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 19 MAY 83 12

TO CLARK

FROM TYSON

*msn 2/2/04*

DOC DATE 18 MAY 83

SIGUR

18 MAY 83

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRES TRIP TO JAPAN

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION DUE: 20 MAY 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 7/7</i>	<i>Mtg Scheduled</i>		
		<i>for Row per Signi</i>		
	<i>E 7/7</i>	<i>ONR</i>		

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE *PD* (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Revised*  
**SUSPENSE**

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK  
SUBJECT: Proposed Visit to Japan

With Prime Minister Nakasone due to arrive in Washington for a meeting with you late next week, it is appropriate to reconsider the possibility of a visit by you to Tokyo. We can assume that the Prime Minister will once again invite you to visit Japan.

There is a strong case to be made for you to go to Tokyo within the next several months:

1. In your major foreign policy address to the American Legion in February, you said, "The US-Japanese relationship remains the centerpiece of our Asian policy". A trip to Japan by you would underline the importance of this fact.

2. Because of the depth and breadth of the US-Japan alliance in almost every conceivable area, e.g., defense, economic, political -- how the US manages or mismanages relations with Japan will seriously affect our country and our society.

3. In negative terms, if we are unable to sustain and build a strong partnership with the Japanese in the years ahead, we can anticipate a growing danger to the well-being of the United States. In very immediate terms, a weakening of the US-Japan alliance structure would be of enormous benefit to the Soviet Union.

4. In a positive sense, if we are able to move forward with the Japanese as our partners, we will create a firm foundation for peace and stability around the globe which will frustrate Soviet ambitions -- and to use your words again from your American Legion address, "Together the United States and Japan can make an enormous contribution to the economic dynamism and technological progress needed for economic growth and development throughout the world."

5. In Prime Minister Nakasone, we have a leader who sees the world much as you do, and who wants to cooperate with us in every way possible. He is doing his best, within the constraints of the Japanese political system, to take the necessary steps to open Japan's markets and to increase Japan's self-defense role under the US-Japan Mutual Security

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F00-037/1-502  
BY LOI NARA, DATE 7/24/06

Treaty. A Presidential visit to Japan would show your support of these policies of the Japanese government and would be a great boost to Nakasone's own political fortunes, particularly where such a boost counts -- that is, within the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP).

The case is clear. You should go to Japan at the earliest opportunity. September would be a good month, but this can be worked out here and with the Japanese. The trip should not be conditioned on a concurrent visit to China. On the contrary, the preferable scenario would be a trip to Japan followed by a later trip to China. This would allow Japan to be seen, as you put it, as "the centerpiece of our Asian policy".

If you were to visit Japan, it could be possible to add China, if Premier Zhao comes to the United States sometime prior to your departure. Certainly you should not go to the PRC before Zhao pays a call on you.

Also, we should give top consideration to a Presidential stopover in Seoul. The Koreans would be greatly hurt if you traveled to Northeast Asia and did not go to South Korea. This would be damaging to the critical relationship that we have with them.

But, I repeat, the key element in this proposal is a visit to Tokyo, and this should be at the heart of our consideration of your trip to Asia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve, in principle, a trip to Japan in September of this year.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1983

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *CP*  
GASTON SIGUR

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Visit to Japan.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum for the President outlining the importance of a visit to Japan -- but at the same time noting that it should not necessarily be tied to a trip to the PRC.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab A: Memo for President

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F00-037/1#503  
BY WJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify: OADR

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit to Japan

With Prime Minister Nakasone due to arrive in Washington for a meeting with you late next week, it is appropriate to reconsider the possibility of a visit by you to Tokyo. We can assume that the Prime Minister will once again invite you to visit Japan.

There is a strong case to be made for you to go to Tokyo within the next several months:

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2. Because of the depth and breadth of the US-Japan alliance in almost every conceivable area, e.g., defense, economic, political -- how the US manages or mismanages relations with Japan will seriously affect our country and our society.

3. In negative terms, if we are unable to sustain and build a strong partnership with the Japanese in the years ahead, we can anticipate a growing danger to the well-being of the United States. In very immediate terms, a weakening of the US-Japan alliance structure would be of enormous benefit to the Soviet Union.

4. In a positive sense, if we are able to move forward with the Japanese as our partners, we will create a firm foundation for peace and stability around the globe which will frustrate Soviet ambitions -- and to use your words again from your American Legion address, "Together the United States and Japan can make an enormous contribution to the economic dynamism and technological progress needed for economic growth and development throughout the world."

5. In Prime Minister Nakasone, we have a leader who sees the world much as you do, and who wants to cooperate with us in every way possible. He is doing his best, within the constraints of the Japanese political system, to take the necessary steps to open Japan's markets and to increase Japan's self-defense role under the US-Japan Mutual Security

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED  
 NLS Foo-037/14504  
 BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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The case is clear. You should go to Japan at the earliest opportunity. September would be a good month, but this can be worked out here and with the Japanese. The trip should not be conditioned on a concurrent visit to China. On the contrary, the preferable scenario would be a trip to Japan followed by a later trip to China. This would allow Japan to be seen, as you put it, as "the centerpiece of our Asian policy".

If you were to visit Japan, it could be possible to add China, if Premier Zhao comes to the United States sometime prior to your departure. Certainly you should not go to the PRC before Zhao pays a call on you.

Also, we should give top consideration to a Presidential stopover in Seoul. The Koreans would be greatly hurt if you traveled to Northeast Asia and did not go to South Korea. This would be damaging to the critical relationship that we have with them.

But, I repeat, the key element in this proposal is a visit to Tokyo, and this should be at the heart of our consideration of your trip to Asia.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve, in principle, a trip to Japan in September of this year.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: Charles P. Tyson  
Gaston Sigur



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 31 MAY 83 18

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

*M37  
2/2/04*

DOCDATE 31 MAY 83

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

NAKASONE, YASUHIRO

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF LUNCHEON MTG BTW PRES & NAKASONE ON MAY 27

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>JUN 06 1983</i>	<i>Form letter noted</i>		<i>50</i>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C) *ms*

*js*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED  
w/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

May 31, 1983

INFORMATION

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *JS*

SUBJECT: Minutes of Luncheon Meeting Between the President  
and Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan on May 27, 1983

Attached at Tab A are minutes of the luncheon meeting which took place  
between the President and Prime Minister Nakasone.

Attachment:  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED  
w/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*rvjn  
6/2/83*

~~SECRET~~

3737

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

The President

George Shultz, Secretary of State

Donald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury

Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense

Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce

William Brock, U.S. Trade Representative

Edwin Meese III, Counsellor to the President

William P. Clark, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs

Michael Mansfield, U.S. Ambassador to Japan

Allan Wallis, Under Secretary of State for  
Economic Affairs

Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State  
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Gaston Sigur, Senior Director of Asian Affairs  
(NSC) and Special Assistant to the President

Charles Tyson, Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs (Coordination)

Cornelius Iida, State Department Interpreter

Japan

Yasuhiro Nakasone, Prime Minister

Shintaro Abe, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Noboru Takeshita, Minister of Finance

Sadanori Yamanaka, Minister for International  
Trade and Industry

Takao Fujinami, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary

Yoshio Okawara, Ambassador to the United States

Moriyuki Motono, Personal Representative of the  
Prime Minister for the Summit

Hiroshi Kitamura, Director-General of U.S. Affairs,  
MOFA

Akitaka Saiki, Interpreter

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, May 27, 1983

12:15-1:15 p.m.

PLACE:

State Dining Room

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-D37/1#505

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

BY LTI NAR

7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting - President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone

The President made background remarks emphasizing the importance of the US-Japan alliance, the progress that has been made in settling some of the issues between us, especially in the trade area. He expressed his pleasure at the establishment of the US-Japan Advisory Board and said that he hoped the U.S. and Japan could cooperate in the development of energy resources (oil, gas, coal) in Alaska. He then dealt briefly with the Williamsburg Summit and asked Secretary Shultz to handle this in more detail. (S)

Secretary Shultz referred to the success of his morning meeting with Foreign Minister Abe and then went on to describe the main issues to be discussed at Williamsburg. (U)

Secretary Regan continued on with the Williamsburg Summit, laying stress on the question of international debt, the plight of the developing countries and unemployment. (U)

Secretary Baldrige gave a brief report on the highly satisfactory visit he made to Tokyo earlier this month. (U)

Ambassador Brock congratulated the Japanese on moving decisively on the standards and certification legislation. He spoke of the importance of the dialogue begun on industrial policy and said that while many trade problems remain, we are making progress. (U)

Prime Minister Nakasone said that he would do everything he could to work with the President for the success of the Williamsburg Summit. He would be the "catcher" and the President the "pitcher." Of course, sometimes the "catcher" calls the signals. He said that he wanted Williamsburg remembered as a "town of hope." He made a point of the need for joint research on cancer by the industrialized countries. He then said that next spring he hoped that the NTT, salt and tobacco monopolies would be turned over to the private sector. He noted with pleasure that the public opinion polls in the U.S. were showing the increasing strength of the President and that polls in Japan showed the same thing about him. (S)

Foreign Minister Abe, Finance Minister Takeshita and MITI Minister Yamanaka echoed the remarks of the Prime Minister. (U)

The luncheon was interrupted briefly for the singing of Happy Birthday on the occasion of the Prime Minister's 65th birthday. At the same time, a large birthday cake was brought into the room. The Prime Minister and his colleagues were obviously delighted at this personal touch which symbolizes the relationship built up between the President and the Prime Minister. (U)

The luncheon ended at 1:30 p.m. (U)