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WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC

Country File

OA/Box:

File Folder: Japan (02/10/83 - 04/06/83)

Archivist: mjd

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer

Date: 02/02/2004

4.1.	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE			
1. Cable	100543Z FEB 82, 2p D 7/24/06 F00-037/1#478	2/10/83	B1
2. Cable	150859Z FEB 82, 9p R 11 4479	2/15/83	Bri
3. Cable	231008Z FEB 83, 1p R 4 480	2/23/83	BN
4. Cable	081047Z MAR 83, 3p	3/8/83	RI
5. Memo	Gaston Sigur to William Clark re Cancellation Ambassador Okawara's Request	3/22/83	RI
6. Memo	R #482 Sigur to Clark re Ambassador's Visit, 2p	3/11/83	B1
7. Cable	110010Z MAR 83, 1p #483 R 4 #484	3/11/83	B 1
8. Cable	170937Z MAR 83, 2p	3/17/83	BL
9. Cable	170959Z MAR 83, 1p	3/17/83	BL
10. Cable	192036Z MAR 83, 1p	3/19/83	81
11. Cable	262008Z MAR 83, 2p #487	3/26/83	BL
12. Cable	300259Z MAR 83, 3p #488	3/30/83	BI
13. Cable	010340Z APR 83, 4p	4/1/83	B1
14. Cable	060050Z APR 83, 2p R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 +491	4/6/83	BL

RESTRICTIONS

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]. B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].

B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA]

B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].

B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].

B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOLA].

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C Closed in accordance with rectrictions contained in danage 4-1-1-5-0

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 7/20/2007

File Folder

JAPAN (02/10/1983-04/06/1983)

FOIA

F00-037 (F1539)

Box Number

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date		
6—MEMO	SIGUR TO CLARK RE AMBASSADOR'S VISIT (F00-037/1#483)		-3/11/1983 -	- mH	5/41/08

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THIS FORM MARKS THE PILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE022 UTS0194 OO RUEHC

DE RUEHKO #2920/01 0460904

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9722

INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 6782

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5758

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 02920

PASS USTR ELECTRONICALLY

USEC, FOR USTR DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: 2/15/95

TAGS: ETRD JA OVIP (BROCK)

SUBJ: USTR BROCK'S MEETINGS IN TOKYO, FEBRUARY 10-13

. (A - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THIS CABLE REPORTS ON USTR BROCK'S MEETINGS DURING HIS VISIT TO TOKYO FEBRUARY 10-13.

3. MOFA. BROCK MET WITH MINISTER ABE FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF ON FRIDAY MORNING. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS INFORMING EACH OTHER OF THE ADOPTION BY EACH GOVERNMENT OF THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY HORK GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS.

HIGH TECHNOLOGY WORK GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS.
CONVERSATION THEN TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE SUMMIT,
STEEL, AND NTT. BROCK SAID THE PROBLEM WITH NTT
WAS LACK OF SALES, EMPHASIZING THAT IT WAS BOTH A
SUBSTANTIVE AND SYMBOLIC ISSUE. BROCK THEN
RAISED THE ISSUE OF THOUSAND INVESTMENTS.

RAISED THE ISSUE OF TWO-WAY INVESTMENTS, THE NEED FOR INCREASES, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED INVESTMENTS AS A LONG TERM SOLUTION TO BILATERAL

TRADE AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, WITH WHICH ABE AGREED.

ON AUTOS, BROCK SUMMARIZED THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE AND ASKED FOR ABE'S ADVICE. ABE REPLIED THAT A THIRD YEAR AT CURRENT LEVELS WAS POSSIBLE, BUT THAT A FOURTH YEAR AT THIS TIME WAS NOT FEASIBLE. ABE RAISED THE TOYOTA/GM JOINT VENTURE AS AN EXAMPLE OF JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN THE U.S. BROCK CAUTIONED THAT THE DEAL FACED POSSIBLE ANTI-TRUST PROBLEMS AND THE OPPOSITION OF OTHER U.S. AUTO COMPKNIES. ABE THEN RAISED AGRICULTURE. HE SAID THE PRIME

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/14479

BY 105 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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DATE 02/16/83//047

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MINISTER IS CONCERNED AND HAS INSTRUCTED THE MAFF MINISTER TO LOOK INTO SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM ABE SAID THAT BEEF AND CITRUS WAS A IN DETAIL. VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM, AND WITH ELECTIONS ON THE WAY (LOCAL ELECTIONS IN APRIL, BOTH HOUSES THIS SUMMER) THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE GOJ TO MAINTAIN A STRONG POSITION FOR NOW. BROCK SAID THAT BOTH SIDES ARE COMMITTED TO RESUMING EXPERT LEVEL DISCUSSIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT THAT WE NEED AN INDICATION THAT THE GOJ IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE WE WILL BE WILLING TO RETURN TO THE TABLE. ABE SAID THAT THAT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING BEFORE THE RESUMPTION OF TALKS WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE SOON, BUT THAT THIS FACT MUST REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL FOR NOW. ABE SAID ON OTHER AGRICULTURAL QUOTAS (THE SIX ITEMS) THAT THE JAPANESE SIDE WAS CONSIDERING ITS POSITION AND WOULD PROBABLY BE IN A POSITION BY THE END OF MARCH TO MAKE A NEW PROPOSAL THAT WOULD INCLUDE INCREASED QUOTAS. 4. MITI. BROCK MET WITH MITI MINISTER YAMANAKA FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS ON FRIDAY, AND TWO AND A HALF HOURS ON SATURDAY EVENING. --NTT. BROCK RAISED THE ISSUE OF LACK OF SALES AND EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM THIS CAUSED. YAMANAKA TOOK NOTE OF BROCK'S POINTS BUT MADE NO REPLY. -- STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION REVIEW. BROCK ENDORSED THE REVIEW, NOTED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO IT, AND ASKED THAT THE GOJ CONSULT WITH USG EXPERTS IN TIME TO TAKE OUR VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT. YAMANAKA AGREED TO BROCK'S PROPOSAL. --LEATHER . YAMANAKA RAISED THE ISSUE AND EXPLAINED THAT BECAUSE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS, THERE WAS NOTHING THE GOJ COULD DO TO BE HELPFUL ON THIS ISSUE. BROCK ASKED IF WE COULD EXPECT A NEW OR IMPROVED PROPOSAL ON LEATHER, TO WHICH YAMANAKA REPLIED "NO." BROCK SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE OUR GATT CASES AND WOULD SOON BE PROCEEDING TO ARTICLE XXIII: 2. YAMANAKA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE AGREE TO DISAGREE AND TRY NOT TO LET LEATHER AFFECT OUR RELATIONS ON OTHER ISSUES. RI #2920

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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DATE 02/16/83//047

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE025 UTS0198 OO RUEHC

DE RUEHKO #2920/02 0460905

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9723

INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 6783

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5759

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 TOKYO 02920

PASS USTR ELECTRONICALLY

USEC, FOR USTR DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: 2/15/95

TAGS: ETRD JA OVIP (BROCK)

SUBJ: USTR BROCK'S MEETINGS IN TOKYO, FEBRUARY 10-13
--STEEL. BOTH BROCK AND YAMANAKA ENDORSED THE
JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT ON WORLD STEEL TRADE PROBLEMS
AND AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE RELEASED AFTER THE
MEETING. BROCK EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS
WOULD RESOLVE OUR BILATERAL STEEL PROBLEMS.
YAMANAKA STRESSED THAT THE USG SHOULD TAKE STEPS
TO OVERCOME DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO THE SOLUTION
ANNOUNCED.

--HOUDAILLE. BROCK EXPLAINED THE STATUS OF THE CASE NOTING THAT AN INFORMAL DETERMINATION ON THE FACTS HAD BEEN REACHED. BUT THAT A DECISION DN THE REMEDY HAD BEEN DELAYED PENDING HIS VISIT TO TOKYO. YAMANAKA AGREED TO CONSULT AT THME WORKING LEVEL IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE ON REMEDIES. -- AUTOS. BROCK SUMMARIZED THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE AUTOMOBILE PROBLEM, AND SOUGHT YAMANAKA'S ADVICE. YAMANAKA SAID THAT THEY HAD DECIDED ON A THIRD YEAR AT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF 1.68 MILLION. HE SAID THAT A FOURTH YEAR WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT, LEAVING THE IMPRESSION THAT A NEW ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE NEXT YEAR.

--INDUSTRIAL POLICY. BROCK SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A DISCUSSION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND TARGETING IN THE CONTEXT OF AVOIDING TRADE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OUR TWO COUNTRIES MANAGE OUR ECONOMIES. YAMANAKA AGREED.
--DOLLAR/YEN. BROCK RAISED THE DOLLAR/YEN

--DOLLAR/YEN. BROCK RAISED THE DOLLAR/YEN EXCHANGE RATE ISSUE TO WHICH YAMANAKA DID NOT RESPOND.

5. MHW. AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD HOSTED A
BREAKFAST SATURDAY MORNING FOR BROCK AND
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND WELFARE HAYASHI. HAYASHI
STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HIGH STANDARDS FOR
DRUGS, AND STRESSED THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS
ISSUE WITH THE JAPANESE PUBLIC AND DIET. BROCK
EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR HAYASHI'S PROBLEM,
BUT POINTED TO THE TRADE EFFECTS THAT STANDARDS
AND THEIR APPLICATION COULD HAVE. HE EMPHASIZED
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
HARMONIZATION OF STANDARDS, AND THE NECESSITY
THAT STANDARDS SYSTEMS NOT AFFECT THE FREE FLOW
OF TRADE.

GOTDDA. BROCK MET WITH CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY GOTODA FOR AN HOUR ON SATURDAY THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED INCLUDED THE MORNING . RECENT STRENGTHENING OF OTO AND THE REVIEW OF ALL STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS ANNOUNCED JANUARY 13. BROCK OFFERED TO PROVIDE IN WRITING USG VIEW ON ISSUES WE HOPED WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION REVIEW, AND OFFERED TO SEND USG EXPERTS TO CONSULT ON THE REVIEW. GOTODA ACCEPTED BROCK'S OFFER. DETAILS WERE TO BE AGREED TO ON THE WORKING LEVEL, HOWEVER TIME IS SHORT SINCE PLANS ARE TO COMPLETE THE INITIAL REVIEW BY THE END OF MARCH. GOTODA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN PROBLEMS WITH OTO. HE SAID THAT DECISIONS FROM THE TOP SOMETIMES DID NOT FILTER DOWN TO THE WORKING LEVEL. HE SAID HE HOPED THE NEW OTO COUNCIL MIGHT MAKE A DIFFERENCE, AND THAT THE GOJ WAS CONSIDERING DVERSIGHT OF OTO BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT OFFICE AS A WAY TO IMPROVE ITS FUNCTIONING.

7. NTT. USTR BROCK MET WITH PRESIDENT SHINTO OF NTT FDR AN HOUR AND A HALF ON SATURDAY MORNING. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING WAS COLD AND STRAINED. BROCK EMPHASIZED THE VERY SERIOUS NATURE OF PROBLEM (LACK OF PROCUREMENT) AND SAID

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT A PUBLIC AGREEMENT SUCH AS THE NTT AGREEMENT RAISED THE LEVEL OF EXPECTATIONS, BT #2920 NNNN

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE026
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OO RUEHC
DE RUEHKO #2920/03 0460907
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150859Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9724

INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 6784
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5760
BT
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 63 TOKYO 029

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF C3 TOKYO 02920 PASS USTR ELECTRONICALLY USEC, FOR USTR DEL E.O. 12356: DECL: 2/15/95 TAGS: ETRD JA OVIP (BROCK) SUBJ: USTR BROCK'S MEETINGS IN TOKYO, FEBRUARY 10-13 ESPECIALLY IN AN INDUSTRY WHERE U.S. COMPANIES ARE FULLY COMPETITIVE. HE TOLD SHINTO THAT THE ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF SALES THREATENED THE CONTINUATION OF THE AGREEMENT BEYOND THREE BROCK SAID THAT IF U.S. FIRMS ARE NOT YEARS. COMPETITIVE, THERE IS NO NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT. AND THAT IF U.S. FIRMS ARE COMPETITIVE, BUT ARE NOT MAKING SALES EITHER BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT TRIED HARD ENOUGH OR BECAUSE OF THE UNWILLINGNESS OF NTT TO PURCHASE FOREIGN GOODS. THERE IS ALSO NO NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT. ONE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS TO CONVINCE U.S. FIRMS THAT SALES ARE POSSIBLE AND THAT IT IS THEREFORE WORTH THE EFFORT TO TRY. THIS BROCK SAID IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF SOME ACTUAL SALES TAKE PLACE. SHINTO SPENT A LARGE PORTION OF THE MEETING MAKING EXCUSES FOR THE LACK OF PURCHASES SO FAR AND EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTY FOR AN OUTSIDER

AND EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTY FOR AN OUTSIDER LIKE HIMSELF TO SEIZE CONTROL OF A MONOPOLY LIKE NTT. HE WAS CLEARLY FRUSTRATED, BUT SAID THAT HE BELIEVED HE HAD NOW CONVINCED THE NTT BUREAUCRACY OF THE NECESSITY TO PURCHASE COMPETITIVE FOREIGN PRODUCTS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE THIRD YEAR OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE BETTER THAN THE FIRST TWO. SHINTO EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF U.S. FIRMS ADAPTING THEIR

PRODUCTS TO NTT SPECIFICATIONS AND ALSO SAID

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DATE 02/16/83//047

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT THEY SHOULD DIRECT GREATER EFFORTS AT THE VERY LARGE INTERCONNECT MARKET OVER WHICH NTT HAS NO CONTROL. HE ALSO DETAILED IMPROVEMENTS HE WAS MAKING IN PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES, SUCH AS THE USE OF ENGLISH FOR IMPORT TRANSACTIONS. BROCK AGAIN STRESSED TO SHINTO THAT TIME WAS NOW VERY SHORT AND THAT SALES WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE AGREEMENT.

8. ESAKI MEETING: AMB. BROCK HAD DINNER WITH ECONOMIC POLICY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ON FEBRUARY 11. ESAKI AGAIN AFFIRMED HIS WILLINGNESS TO OVERCOME BOTH THE IMAGE AND THE REALITY OF JAPAN AS A CLOSED MARKET, NOTING ESPECIALLY THE WORK OF THE OTO ADVISORY COUNCIL AND THE GOTODA CABINET LEVEL COMMITTEE TO REVISE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES REGULATING IMPORTS. BROCK WELCOMED THAT COMMITMENT AND URGED ESAKI TO USE HIS POLITICAL AND LEADERSHIP SKILLS TO CHANGE OUTDATED ATTITUDES OF EXCLUSIVENESS IN JAPAN.

USHIBA MEETING: AMB. BROCK MET N. USHIBA. FORMER AMBASSADOR AND CHAIRMAN OF OTO ADVISORY COUNCIL, AND OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR LUNCH ON FEBRUARY 13. USHIBA SOLICITED BROCK'S SUGGESTIONS ON ACTIONS HIS GROUP SHOULD TAKE. BROCK EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO MAKE OTO EFFECTIVE IN SOLVING PROBLEMS AND OVERCOMING WIDESPREAD IMPRESSION THAT OTO IS POWERLESS TO DO MORE THAN PASS COMPLAINTS ALONG TO BUREAUCRATS WHO CAUSED THEPROBLEM IN FIRST PLACE. BROCK AGREED TO GIVE USHIBA SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS. (EMBASSY WILL PREPARE DRAFT AND FORWARD TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSIDERATION.) Y. UCHIMURA, MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL AND A FORMER VICE MINISTE OF AGRICULTURE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR IMPORT FACILITATING MEASURES, EXCEPT THOSE RELATING TO BEEF AND CITRUS QUOTAS WHICH HE JUSTIFIED WITH THE USUAL ARGUMENTS. IN REPLY BROCK SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SENSITIVITY OF AGRICULTURE IN JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES, AND ADDING THAT NEVERTHELESS WE LOOKED TO THE GOJ TO MAKE POSITIVE PROPOSALS TO SOLVE THE PROPLEM. BROCK ALSO USED THE OCCASION TO ASK FOR A CONTINUING EFFORT TO CORRECT JAPAN'S IMAGE AS A CLOSED MARKET WHICH ITSELF DISCOURAGES COMPANIES WHICH SHOULD BE EXPORTING

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SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO JAPAN.

MANSFIELD

aT.

#2920

NNNN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 SIT986 TOKYO 3374

DATE 03/06/83

Ø4768 DTG: 231ØØ8Z FEB 83 PSN: Ø57854

TOR: Ø54/1037Z

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WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP NORT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTECKLISTNED WITH BRUSSELS 2629 ACTION.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUEHKO #3374 Ø541ØØ9 0 231008Z FEB 83 EM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9957

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 2252 AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 3486 AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 4541 AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6181 AMEMBASSY MANILA 4882 AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 3487

40 0 N F + D E N T + A L TOKYO Ø3374

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, VM, JA, TH, CB, ASEAN, VN SUBJECT: JAPANESE INVITATION TO VIETNAMESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER REF: A. STATE 47759 B. TOKYO 3149

1. K-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON FEB. 23 POLCOUNS RAISED GOJ PLANS TO INVITE HA VAN LAU TO JAPAN WITH MOFA ASIAN BUREAU DEP. DIR. GEN. FUJII. FUJII SAID THAT THE VIETNAMESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE COMING TO JAPAN BUT STRESSED THAT THE GOJ WOULD TREAT THE VISIT AS PRIVATE AND SAID THAT THE GOJ WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN 'POLITICAL TALKS" WITH HIM. POLCOUNS RESPONDED THAT THE VISIT WOULD INEVITABLY ATTRACT ATTENTION AND WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL TO VIETNAM, ASEAN, AND THE COALITION. POLCOUNS ASKED IF THE GOJ HAD INFORMED THE THAIS AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

OTHER ASEAN STATES TO WHICH FUJII REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE BUT "THOUGHT SO." FUJII SAID THAT THE VIETNAMESE FULLY UNDERSTOOD "HOW TOUGH JAPAN WAS" AND THERE WAS NO RISK THAT HARO! WOULD MISINTERPRET THE INVITATION TO HA VAN LAL. POLCOUNS RESPONDED THAT WHETHER OR NOT THE VIETNAMESE UNDERSTOOD, THE ASEAN STATES AND THE COALITION WOULD QUITE LIKELY MISUNDERSTAND. FUJII ACKNOWLEDGED THIS RISK AND SAID THAT THE GOJ WOULD HAVE TO INFOR WIT EXPLAIN TO THE ASEAN STATES THE BASIS FOR THE INVITATION TO HA VAN LAU.

3. UPON COMPLETION OF MEETING WITH FUJII, POLCOUNG NOTICED VIETNAMESE EMBASSY OFFICIAL (WE BELIEVE THE DCM) WAITING IN THE ANTEROOM TO SEE FUJII (FUJII HAD EARLIER MENTIONED THAT HE HAD A LATE AFTERNOON MEETING WITH THE VIETNAMESE WITHOUT REFRENCE TO THE SUBJECT).

4. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO CALL IN AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL A JAPANESE EMBASSY OFFICIAL TO EMPHASIZE OUR CONCERNS. MANSFIELD

TOKYO 3374

Ø4768 DTG: 231ØØ8Z FEB 83 PSN: Ø57854

NLS 100-037/14 480

BY 121 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 SIT126 TOKYO 4323 DATE Ø3/25/83 97251 DTG: 0810472 MAR 83 PSN: 901945

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EOB: //TK//

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTISE ON FURTHER DISSEM-ION) Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHKO #4323/Ø1 Ø671Ø52
O Ø81Ø472 MAR 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE Ø394

S E D R E T SECTION Ø1 OF Ø3 TOKYO Ø4323

NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MARR, JA, US SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TRANSIT REF: 82 TOKYO 18087

1. (STENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: MOFA NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL CALLED IN DCM MARCH 7 TO INFORM USG THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ABE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A FORMAL EXCHANGE FOR THE PUBLIC RECORD WITH THE AMBASSADOR WHICH WOULD REAFFIRM THE USG INTENTION TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS TO JAPAN ON PRIOR CONSULTATION UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY OF THE US INTENDS TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPAN. FOREIGN MINISTER ABE, AND APPARENTLY THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF, HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH AN EXCHANGE IS REQUIRED IN ADVANCE OF THE ENTERPRISE VISIT TO JAPAN IN ORDER TO PRE-EMPT QUESTIONS FROM OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE PRESS ABOUT WHETHER THIS VISIT CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF JAPAN'S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. EMBASSY BELIEVES, FOR THE REASONS STATED BELOW, THAT SUCH AN EXCHANGE, PARTICULARLY BEFORE THE VESSEL ARRIVES AND WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC UPROAR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OVER THE ISSUE, WOULD SET A BAD PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE VISITS BY NUCLEAR-POWERED SURFACE VESSELS, AND WOULD, IN ANY CASE, RAISE MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT WOULD ANSWER. WE HAVE CONVEYED THIS VIEW STRONGLY TO MOFA. NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPARENT PERSONAL INTEREST IN SUCH AN EXCHANGE, IT MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THEREFORE, THE EMBASSY PROPOSES LANGUAGE IN PARAS 7 AND 8 BELOW FOR DEPARTMENT'S CLEARANCE AND FURTHER GUIDANCE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON MARCH 7, MOFA NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL KITAMURA CALLED IN DCM TO CONVEY FOREIGN MINISTER ABE'S DESIRE FOR A FORMAL EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND

AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD RECONFIRMING US INTENTIONS TO MEET ITS "OBLIGATIONS" TO JAPAN TO ENGAGE IN PRIOR CONSULTATION UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY IN CASE IT INTENDS TO "INTRODUCE" NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPANESE TERRITORY. HE EXPLAINED THAT, DURING DIET DEBATE LAST OCTOBER. IN LAST DAYS OF SUZUKI ADMINISTRATION. NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL MATSUDA, IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSION OF THE F-16 DEPLOYMENT TO MISAWA (REFTEL), HAD COMMITTED THE GOJ TO RECONFIRM UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE US ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS "AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME". FOLLOWING UP IN THIS. JSP DIET MEMBER DOI ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER ABE DURING RECENT LOWER HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE HEARING WHETHER HE HAD SOUGHT SUCH ASSURANCES FROM THE USG WHEN HE ACCOMPANIED PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY, WHEN ARE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT, DOI PRESSED FOR A RENEWAL OF MATSUDA'S PROMISE TO DO SO. KITAMURA SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ABE AVOIDED MAKING SUCH A COMMITMENT IN DIET DEBATE. UPON REFLECTION HE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR HIM TO SEEK RECONFIRMATION FROM THE US BEFORE THE ENTERPRISE VISIT. KITAMURA EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY SHARED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW.

4. KITAMURA SAID THAT, AS A RESULT, HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK USG AGREEMENT TO A MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER ABE AND THE AMBASSADOR ON MARCH 14

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(AFTER THE MARCH 11 PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE IMPENDING ENTERPRISE VISIT, BUT BEFORE THE VISIT ITSELF) IN WHICH, IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION OF SEVERAL ISSUES, THE AMBASSADOR WOULD REAFFIRM OUR LONG-STANDING ASSURANCES ON THIS SUBJECT. KITAMURA INDICATED THAT THE EXCHANGE ON THE SUBJECT WOULD BE INTENDED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION AND HE PROVIDED DCM WITH DRAFT LANGUAGE (FORWARDED SEPTEL). KITAMURA ARGUED THAT A NEW EXCHANGE AT THIS TIME WOULD LAY THE ISSUE TO REST BUT HIS PRESENTATION LEFT NO DOUBT THE ENTERPRISE VISIT WAS BEHIND THE REQUEST.

S. DCM TOLD KITAMURA THAT ANOTHER EXCHANGE WITH THE GOJ ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE THE ENTERPRISE VISIT WOULD, INSTEAD OF LAYING THE ISSUE TO REST, ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR THE GOJ TO SEEK RECONFIRMATION EVERY TIME A MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERED VESSEL ENTERED A JAPANESE PORT. DCM ALSO SAID THAT MAKING THE EXCHANGE PUBLIC HERE, IN THE MIDST OF A PERIOD OF RELATIVE CALM ON THE SUBJECT, WOULD AROUSE RATHER THAN ALLAY

TOKYO 4323

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BY NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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PAGE Ø1 S1T124

TOKYO 4323 DATE Ø3/25/83

97251 DTG: Ø81047Z MAR 83 PSN: ØØ1950

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTISE ON FURTHER DISSEM-ION) Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE Ø395

S E O R E T SECTION Ø2 OF Ø3 TOKYO Ø4323

NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MARR, JA, US SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TRANSIT

MEDIA AND OPPOSITION SPECULATION AND SKEPTICISM. HE NOTED THAT THIS SESSION OF THE DIET HAD SEEN NOTHING MORE EXCITING ON THE ISSUE THAN THE USUAL QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THE GOJ CONSIDERED TRANSIT OF VESSELS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO CONSTITUTE "INTRODUCTION" AND THAT THE MEDIA HAD NOT REALLY FOCUSED ON THE ISSUE EVEN WITH THE ENTERPRISE VISIT ONLY A FEW WEEKS OFF.

6. COMMENT: WE SUSPECT SOME OVER REACTION ON THIS ISSUE ON THE PART OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AND PERHAPS NAKASONE HIMSELF, BECAUSE OF THEIR FEARS THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION'S EARLIER VERY HIGH POSTURE ON DEFENSE ISSUES MAKES IT PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO ATTACK ON THIS EXTRAORDINARILY SENSITIVE ONE IF IT APPEARS TO BE LESS FAITHFUL THAN PAST LDP GOVERNMENTS. KITAMURA WAS VISIBLY UNCOMFORTABLE WHEN HE RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH THE DCM. SUGGESTING THAT THE MOFA BUREAUCRACY IS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM ABE AND THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. WE BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT ULTIMATELY WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO AVOID YET ANOTHER PUBLIC GO-AROUND ON THE QUESTION. WE EXPECT THE GOJ TO PRESS STRONGLY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS BEFORE THE ENTERPRISE VISIT, VISTPROBABLY ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE GOJ HAD TAKEN A POLITICAL RISK IN COOPERATING TO FACILITATE THE VISIT. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD RESIST, HOWEVER, ANY PUBLIC EXCHANGE BEFORE THE ENTERPRISE ENTERS SASEBO. WITH THIS IN MIND WE HAVE PREPARED, FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S REVIEW AND COMMENTS, THE FOLLOWING DRAFT, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GOJ DRAFT, FORWARDED SEPTEL, WHICH WE BELIEVE TRACKS WITH THE MANSFIELD-SONODA EXCHANGE OF MAY 1981 (AT THE TIME OF THE REISCHAUER STATEMENT INCIDENT).

BEGIN TEXT OF STATEMENT BY MOFA FOR PRESS BRIEFING:

THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD THE RECENT CONCERN IN OUR COUNTRY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO JAPAN IN CONNECTION WITH VARIOUS DEPLOYMENTS OF US FORCES IN THIS AREA. HE NOTED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO UPHOLD FIRMLY THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NOT POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NOT PRODUCING THEM AND NOT PERMITTING THEIR INTRODUCTION INTO JAPAN. HE RECALLED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, INCLUDING ITS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THE DIET, THAT, IF THE US GOVERNMENT, WITHINTHE FRAMEWORK OF PRIOR CONSULTATION UNDER THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY, WERE TO SEEK PERMISSION TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN WOULD REPLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS POLICY OF UPHOLDING THESE THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. HE SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS BEING RAISED IN SOME QUARTERS, THE GOJ WOULD RESPOND THAT THE USG WAS FAITHFULLY HONORING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGE-MENTS.

AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD REPLIED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE SPECIAL SENTIMENT OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE OPPOSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND HE ASSURED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT, AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED TO FM SONODA ON MAY 20, 1981, THE US GOVERNMENT HAS FAITHFULLY HONORED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO JAPAN UNDER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

8. STATEMENT TO BE RELEASED BY US EMBASSY:

FOREIGN MINISTER ABE CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD THE RECENT CONCERN IN JAPAN THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO JAPAN IN CONNECTION WITH VARIOUS DEPLOYMENTS OF US FORCES IN THIS AREA. THE AMBASSADOR ASSURED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT WHILE US POLICY IS NEITHER TO CONFIRM NOR TO DENY THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, THE UNITED STATES HAS HONORED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO JAPAN UNDER THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. END TEXT OF GOJ AND USG STATEMENTS.

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, JA, US

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TRANSIT

9. WE WOULD ENVISAGE EMPLOYING THIS GUIDANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR ARRANGED TO DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS. MANSFIELD



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RECEIVED 11 MAR 83 19

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DOCDATE 11 MAR 83

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11 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

TO

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NIKAIDO, SUSUMU

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CLARK

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PRES MTG W/ GEN NIKAIDO

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 14 MAR 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

NSCIFID REF# LOG (J /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE

DISPATCH

For Admiral Poindexter NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3/11/83

John:

The Judge has approved this verbally.

Gaston

National Security Council 576 The White House Package # 1618

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John Poindexter	/		61
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Judge Clark	4	0	H
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National Security Council 59/ The White House

Package # 1618

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For Admiral Poindexter NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 3/11/83	11 5%.
John: The Judge has approved this verbally. Gaston	ACTION ACTION ACTION

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other____

COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONF PENTIAL

March 22, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

GASTON J. SIGUR

SUBJECT:

Cancellation of Japanese Ambassador Okawara's Request to Have LDP Secretary General Nikaido

Meet with the President (Tab A)

Ambassador Okawara called me yesterday to thank us for everything we had done to arrange a brief meeting between LDP Secretary General Susumu Nikaido and the President during the latter half of April, and to say that because of the "political situation" in Japan Nikaido cannot come to the United States this Spring. This may mean that the Prime Minister has decided to dissolve the Lower House of the Diet and call for dual elections at the time of the voting for Upper House Seats in June or July. Just a guess.

cc: Charles Tyson

NLS <u>F00-037/1#482</u> BY <u>MT</u>, NARA. DATE <u>7/24/06</u>

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 11, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH:

CHARLES P. TYSON J.

FROM:

GASTON J. SIGUR

SUBJECT:

Japanese Ambassador's Visit Requesting Presidential

Meeting for Liberal-Democratic Party Secretary

General Susumu Nikaido

In his conversation with you of March 10, Ambassador Okawara reviewed the political difficulties facing Prime Minister Nakasone. While Nakasone has gained some respite from opposition attacks, both from within and from without his Party thanks to the passage of the budget a few days ago, he is still in rough political waters with the April local elections and the June or July Upper House elections coming soon. Part of Nakasone's troubles are based on the fact that back in Washington in January, and since his return to Japan, he has been taking a strong posture on the need to cooperate more with the United States in defense matters. This involves the transfer of military technology and greater defense spending. The polls indicate that the Prime Minister's personal popularity, and that of his Cabinet, are declining.

According to Okawara, one of the things Nakasone needs to show is that his relations with the U.S. continue to be excellent. In other words, the success of his January trip needs to be followed up in the weeks and months ahead.

Okawara suggests that the Secretary General of the Liberal-Democratic Party, Susumu Nikaido, visit the United States in April, hopefully between April 10 and 20, and that he have the opportunity to meet with the President. This need not be a lengthy meeting. Okawara said that this idea is his only, but that if we needed it, he could get a letter from Prime Minister Nakasone requesting that the President see Nikaido. This suggests to me that Nakasone and Nikaido have asked for this but want to save face by not receiving a turndown if it can't be done.

I believe that we should accede to Ambassador Okawara's request for the following reasons:

1) Nakasone has acted, in a number of ways, to take steps that we have long believed were important to bolster the U.S.-Japan alliance

CONTIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR

FIDENTIAL BY 121 NARA, DATE 7/24/06





structure. He has done this at considerable political risk. We should indicate our continuing support of him and his government as frequently as we can but without suffocating him with our embrace.

2) By meeting with Nikaido, the President would show that he wants to continue the kind of personal relationship with the Prime Minister that began in January. Nikaido would then return to Japan and report to LDP leaders of all factions that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet remain in a strong position to "manage" the U.S.-Japan relationship.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you take Nikaido in to see the President at a 9:30 a.m. meeting on a day to be determined between April 10 and 20 for a five or ten minute photo opportunity and brief chat.

Approve ______lullout_______

That you forward the Schedule Proposal to Bill Sadleir for scheduling on the President's calendar.

Annaces	1/	Digannava
Approve		Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I Schedule Proposal

CONFIDENTIAL





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

March 11, 1983

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR

PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK 1

REQUEST: Brief meeting with the Secretary General of the

Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan, Susumu Nikaido

PURPOSE: To indicate the importance the President attaches

to our relationship with Japan and to his personal relationship with the Prime Minister that began

in January.

BACKGROUND: The Secretary General of the Liberal-Democratic

Party, Mr. Nikaido, is a close confident of former Prime Minister Tanaka, as well as one of the highest ranking party officials, second only

to the Prime Minister.

DATE AND TIME: Between April 10 and 20. DURATION: 5 or 10

minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary General Susumu Nikaido,

Ambassador Yoshio Okawara

William P. Clark

Gaston Sigur

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Photo opportunity and brief exchange

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief talking points

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: William P. Clark

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Gaston Sigur

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 5229

S E C R E T STATE 066620 NODIS E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MARR, JA, US SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TRANSIT

REF: TOKYO Ø4323

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE, TOO, WOULD STRONGLY PREFER NOT TO HAVE ANY EXCHANGE ON THIS SUBJECT; IF WE MUST HAVE ONE, WE DO NOT WISH TO LINK IT WITH A SPECIFIC EVENT, SUCH AS THE ENTERPRISE VISIT, OR F-16 DEPLOYMENT. NONETHELESS, IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT PERSONAL INTEREST EXPRESSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO HAS BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING ON DEFENSE ISSUES, AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN LONG-STANDING US POLICY INVOLVED IN SATISFYING THE GOJ REQUEST, WE-BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE. IF THE PRIME MINISTER FEELS STRONGLY ABOUT TIMING, WE SHOULD AGREE TO THE; EXCHANGE-OF STATEMENTS BEFORE THE VISIT--THERE COULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN NOT HAVING ANY STATEMENT APPEAR AS A RESPONSE TO REACTION TO THE VISIT, AND INSTEAD HAVING IT IN PLACE FOR NECESSARY REFERENCE. EMBASSY SHOULD FIRMLY MAKE POINT TO GOJ, HOWEVER, THAT THIS EXCHANGE, SHOULD IT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OCCUR, IS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS PRECEDENT, AND THAT WE ARE ACCOMMODATING GOJ IN THIS INSTANCE ONLY BECAUSE OF EXPRESSED INTEREST OF THE PRIME MINISTER.
EMBASSY DRAFTS. WE SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT SECOND SENTENCE OF US STATEMENT SHOULD BE SHORTENED, AND FINAL SENTENCE ADDED, SO THAT FOLLOWING THE FIRST SENTENCE, THE US STATEMENT WOULD READ, "THE AMBASSADOR INFORMED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT US POLICY HAS ALWAYS BEEN NEITHER TO CONFIRM NOR DENY THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO ASSURED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE US HAS HONORED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO JAPAN UNDER THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO."

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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O 17Ø937Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE Ø75Ø

S E B E T SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 TOKYO Ø5Ø49

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MARR, JA, US

SUBJECT: 78% AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 17 MEETING WITH

FOREIGN MINISTER

1. (SL ENTIRE TEXT.

- 2. ON MARCH 17, AMBASSADOR MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABE OVER LUNCH TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF ISSUES, AS REPORTED SEPTELS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PURPOSE IN REQUESTING THIS MEETING, HOWEVER, WAS TO GAIN REAFIRMATION OF U.S. INTENTIONS TO UPHOLD ITS OBLIGATIONS TO JAPAN UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO U.S. JAPANESE UNDERSTANDINGS THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD SEEK PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IF IT PLANNED TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPANESE TERRITORY. THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS SUBJECT FOLLOWS:
- 3. FOREIGN MINISTER ABE REAFFIRMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN WAS MAKING UTMOST EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY SYSTEM AND ITS DETERRENT CAPABILITY, BECAUSE THIS CONSTITUTED THE BASIS OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY. HE NOTED THAT THERE HAD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BEEN CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION IN THE DIET RECENTLY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO JAPAN IN CONNECTION WITH FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. FORCES IN THIS REGION, ESPECIALLY THE UPCOMING VISIT OF THE ENTERPRISE AIRCRAFT CARRIER TO SASEBO AND THE PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. F-16'S TO MISAWA. HE REITERATED THE JAPANESE GDVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO UPHOLD FIRMLY JAPAN'S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES AND SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE GOJ WAS FULLY AWARE THAT THE USG HAD BEEN FAITHFULLY HONORING ITS TREATY ARRANGEMENTS, IT WAS NEVERTHELESS NECESSARY TO SEEK REASSURANCE FROM THE U.S. IN ORDER FOR HIM TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO THESE DIET INQUIRIES.

4. AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD REPLIED THAT WHILE IT WAS U.S.
POLICY TO NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY THE PRESENCE OR AB-

SENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT ANY LOCATION ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SPECIAL SENTIMENT OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE RECALLED HIS CONVERSATION WITH THEN-FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA TWO YEARS AGO AND ASSURED ABE THAT THE USG HAD FAITHFULLY HONORED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO JAPAN UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. HE CONCLUDED BY ADVISING THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT, BECAUSE THIS WAS A VERY SENSITIVE ISSUE WITH MANY POSSIBILITIES FOR MISINTERPRETATION, HE PLANNED TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN DISCUSSING THIS MEETING WITH OTHERS, AS HE HOPED THE GOJ WOULD BE.

- 5. AFTER THE MEETING A FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN (SECURITY DIVISION DIRECTOR KATO) BRIEFED THE PRESS ON THE BASIS OF TEXT QUOTED BELOW. THE TEXT ITSELF IS NOT REPEAT NOT BEING RELEASED TO THE PRESS. THE STATEMENT FOR USE BY THE EMBASSY IS BEING USED ON AN "IF ASKED" BASIS ONLY.
- 6. BEGIN TEXT: MOFA STATEMENT -THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
 THE RECENT CONCERN IN OUR COUNTRY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS
 MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO JAPAN IN CONNECTION WITH
 VARIOUS ACTIVITIES OF US FORCES IN THIS AREA. HE NOTED
 THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO UPHOLD FIRMLY
 THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NOT POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
 NOT PRODUCING THEM AND NOT PERMITTING THEIR INTRODUCTION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTO JAPAN. HE RECALLED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, INCLUDING ITS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THE DIET, THAT, IF THE US GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF PRIOR CONSULTATION UNDER THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY, WERE TO SEEK PERMISSION TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN WOULD REPLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS POLICY OF UPHOLDING THESE THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. HE SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS BEING RAISED IN SOME QUARTERS, THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN WOULD RESPOND THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS FAITHFULLY HONORING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS.

AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE SPECIAL SENTIMENT OF
THE JAPANESE PEOPLE OPPOSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. REFERRING
TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT VIEW SET FORTH AT THE TIME OF
HIS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA ON MAY 20, 1981,

TOKYO 5Ø49

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BY <u>191</u>, NARA, DATE <u>7/24/08</u>

PAGE 01 TOKYO 5049 SIT926 DATE 03/25/83

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AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION. HE ASSURED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS FAITH-FULLY HONORED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO JAPAN UNDER THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

7. U.S. EMBASSY STATEMENT:
FOREIGN MINISTER ABE CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
THE RECENT CONCERN IN JAPAN THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT
BE INTRODUCED INTO JAPAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE VARIOUS
ACTIVITIES OF US FORCES IN THIS AREA. THE AMBASSADOR
REMINDING THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT US POLICY HAS ALWAYS
BEEN NEITHER TO CONFIRM NOR DENY THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, ASSURED HIM
THAT THE US HAS FAITHFULLY HONORED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO
JAPAN UNDER THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

END TEXT.
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 5053 S1T921 DATE 03/25/83 98962 DTG: 170959Z MAR 83 PSN: 015523

TOR: 076/1309Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHITS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB: //TK//

PAGE 61

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTHECKLISTST----SEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE .

IMMEDIATE DE RUEHKO #5Ø53 Ø76Ø959 O 1709597 MAR 83 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE Ø753

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO Ø5Ø53

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MARR, JA, US

SUBJECT: EFFECTS OF CNO REMARKS ON USN ACTIVITIES IN

JAPAN

de ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY. ADMIRAL WATKINS' RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT ON U.S. NAVAL ACTIVITY IN AND AROUND JAPAN IS RECEIVING MAJOR ATTENTION IN THE JAPANESE PRESS (SEE USIS SEPTEL) AND DIET.

THE INTERPRETATION MEDIA IS GIVING IT COULD DELAY PROGRESS HERE IN SEVERAL AREAS. OUR MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERNS, DESCRIBED BELOW, ARE THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE ENTERPRISE VISIT AND ON OUR DESIRE TO HOMEPORT ADDITIONAL SHIPS IN YOKOSUKA AND SASEBO. TO PRECLUDE THE GOJ BEING FORCED TO TAKE A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD HOMEPORTING IN THE PROCESS OF DISTANCING ITSELF FROM

EMBASSY IS WORKING WITH THE GOJ TO DECOUPLE THE ISSUE FROM THE ENTERPRISE VISIT AND FROM LOCAL ELECTION POLITICS IN SASEBO AND YOKOSUKA, END SUMMARY.

3. ENTERPRISE VISIT:

THE GOJ, AND THE PRIME MINISTER IN PARTICULAR, HAVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TAKEN CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL RISKS IN WELCOMING THE ENTERPRISE. BECAUSE OF ITS ASSOCIATIONS WITH THE VIETNAM WAR WHICH WAS WIDELY UNPOPULAR HERE, AND WITH ONE OF THE LARGEST ANTI-U.S. MILITARY DEMONSTRA-TIONS EVER MOUNTED HERE, THE ENTERPRISE REMAINS A SYMBOL CAPABLE OF REVIVING BOTH ANTI-AMERICAN AND ANTI-GOJ SENTIMENT. THE VISIT IS BEING USED AS SUCH IN CURRENT PRE-ELECTION POSTURING BY THE OPPOSITION PARTIES. ALTHOUGH WE ARE CONFIDENT THIS VISIT WILL GO BETTER THAN THE ONE IN 1968, WE STILL ESTIMATE THAT DEMONSTRATORS WILL TURN OUT, AND WE HAVE AL-READY EXPERIENCED AN INDIVIDUAL TERRORIST INCIDENT WHICH MALFUNCTIONED. IN THIS CONTEXT, MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE GOJ HAD ACTUALLY TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN ASKING THE ENTERPRISE TO

CALL AT SASEBO CONTINUES TO BE WIDELY VIEWED HERE

AS GRATUITOUSLY COMPOUNDING GOJ DIFFICULTIES, DESPITE DENIALS IN TOKYO AND WASHINGTON. FURTHERMORE, WE AND OUR MILITARY COLLEAGUES HERE. AS WELL AS THE GOJ. HAVE BEEN TRYING TO PLAY DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ENTERPRISE VISIT AND ITS POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE BASING OF US FORCES IN JAPAN. JAPANESE PRESS AND OPPOSITION PARITES ARE DETERMINED TO CAST IT AS THE HARBINGER OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN US FORWARD DE-PLOYMENTS TO JAPAN.

4. ADDITIONAL HOMEPORTING:

IN TOKYO 4003 (DTG 030843Z MAR 83), WE POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE GOJ SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE ADDITIONAL HOMEPORTINGS PROPOSED FOR YOKOSUKA AND SASEBO IN STATE 53120 (DTG 260109Z FEB 83), TO ENSURE ACCEPTANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL WE WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THESE PLANS WERE INTRODUCED IN LIGHT OF THE ENTERPRISE VISIT AND LOCAL ELECTIONS. STATEMENT HAS COMPOUNDED THESE PROBLEMS AND COULD DELAY GOJ ACCEPTANCE BY DRAWING PREMATURE ATTENTION TO ADDITIONAL HOMEPORTING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ENTERPRISE VISIT. THE HOMEPORTING PROPOSALS ARE PRESENTED PUBLICLY AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI BEFORE THE SUBJECT BROACHED WITH GOJ. NOW THE GOJ WOULD LIKE TO GET THE ENTERPRISE VISIT BEHIND IT BEFORE BEING ASKED TO CONSIDER NEW PROPOSALS FOR U.S. FORCE DEPLOYMENTS TO JAPAN, AND IS CURRENTLY

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DENYING CATEGORICALLY THAT SASEBO WILL BECOME A "NEW HOMEPORT FOR THE SEVENTH FLEET."

5. EMBASSY IS TAKING STEPS TO MINIMIZE EFFECT OF CURRENT FUROR ON USG PLANS TO INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL HOMEPORTING IN JAPAN. WE BEGAN BY DISCUSSING INFORMALLY WITH MOFA THE PROPOSED HOMEPORTING SCHEDULE FOR BOTH YOKOSUKA AND SASEBO. MOFA OFFICIALS ARE BASICALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE PROPOSALS, BUT EMPHASIZE THAT TO INTRODUCE THEM INTO THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE WOULD JEOPARDIZE PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE. THEY ALSO POINT OUT THAT, UNTIL THE APRIL ELECTIONS ARE BEHIND US, NAKASONE AND HIS POLITICAL ADVISERS ARE UNLIKELY TO ENDORSE NEW HOMEPORTING INITIATIVES. EMBASSY, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS THAT NO FORMAL PROPOSAL FOR HOMEPORTING BE TAKEN TO THE GOJ UNTIL LATER IN APRIL, WHEN THE YOKOSUKA AND SASEBO ELECTIONS ARE OVER, AND THE ISSUE CAN BE DISTANCED FROM ENTERPRISE VISIT AND HANDLED IN A MORE SOBER FASHION. MANSFIELD

TOKYO 5Ø53

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NLS F00-037/14486

BY 101 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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SECSTATE WASHDC 64029962 DTG: 192036Z MAR 83 PSN: 019504

DATE Ø3/25/83 TOR: Ø78/2249Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOBWHLR JP VP SIT EOB KEMP

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTSTTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE.

IMMEDIATE DE RUEHC #6402 0782044 0 P 192036Z MAR 83 EM SECSTATE WASHDO

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 5562

INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY 2065 USMISSION USNATO 5592 BT

SECRET STATE Ø764Ø2 EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, JA, MARR, MNUC

SUBJECT: JAPANESE VIEWS ON INF POSITION

- 1. JAPANESE POLITICAL MINISTER WATANABE CALLED ON PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEAN ON FRIDAY, MARCH 18 TO INFORM US THAT THE GOJ HAD DIRECTED ITS EMBASSIES IN NATO CAPITALS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO NATO GOVERNMENTS.
- -- THE GOJ HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE ZERO. OUTCOME ON A GLOBAL BASIS BECAUSE IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF JAPAN AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT.
- -- THE GOJ CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT NATO COUNTRIES SUPPORT THIS U.S. POSITION.
- --WITH RESPECT TO SPECULATION ABOUT FORTHCOMING PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERIM SOLUTION, GOJ HAS TOLD NATO GOVERNMENTS THAT IT CANNOT ACCEPT ANY INF SOLUTION REACHED AT THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SACRIFICE OF ASIAN INTERESTS. FROM TOKYO'S POINT OF VIEW, IT IS "OUT OF THE QUESTION" THAT SS-20S BE TRANSFERRED TO FAR EAST. IN ADDITION, A FREEZE OF SS-2ØS IN THE FAR EAST IS NOT DESIRABLE.

- 2. WATANABE INDICATED THAT THESE GOJ CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN REACHED IN THE CONTEXT OF BROADER QUESTIONS: -- THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING AN EAST-WEST POLITICAL MILITARY BALANCE CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY BE DEALT WITH WHEN THE US, JAPAN, AND EUROPE ARE "UNITED AS A WHOLE."
- -- EVEN SS-2ØS DEPLOYED IN ASIA HAVE A RELEVANCE TO WESTERN EUROPE BECAUSE OF THEIR MOBILITY AND RANGE.

- 3. WATANABE ADDED TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS TO BE CONVEYED TO THE US GOVERNMENT:
- -- SHOULD IT APPEAR THAT LESS CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO THE ASIAN ASPECT OF THE INF ISSUE THAN TO THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM, GOJ ANTICIPATES THE EMERGENCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO US-JAPANESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
- --SS-20S DEPLOYED IN THE FAR EAST WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE AND DIRECT EFFECT ON U.S. SECURITY, INASMUCH AS THEY COULD BE POSITIONED IN RANGE OF THE U.S. ITSELF.
- 4. WATANABE WAS REASSURED THAT ANY DELIBERATIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE MOVES IN THE U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PRESIDENT'S CRITERIA AS SET FORTH IN HIS AMERICAN LEGION SPEECH, AND IN PARTICULAR THE STIPULATION THAT ANY INF AGREEMENT NOT RESULT IN TRANSFERRING EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS TO ASIA.
- 5. JAPAN'S DEMARCHES IN EUROPE REFLECT GOJ'S OBVIOUS CONCERN THAT NATO GOVERNMENTS, IN PRESSING FOR NEW NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. WILL URGE US TO ADOPT A REGIONAL APPROACH TO THE INF PROBLEM. WE WILL BE ONSIDERING OW WE MIGHT DEAL WITH GOJ CONCERNS IN A WAY WHICH ASSURES

SECSTATE WASHDC 64029962 DTG: 192036Z MAR 83 PSN: 019504 MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE THEM INTO FULL ACCOUNT. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY THOUGHTS THE EMBASSY MIGHT HAVE. AS IS USUAL, PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEAN WILL BRIEF WATANABE NEXT WEEKON FRIDAY'S SCG WITH EA AND EUR REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT.

SRULT7

SECSTATE WASHDC 64029962 DTG: 192036Z MAR 83 PSN: 019504

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 5802

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NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADMR MANSFIELD

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS:PARM, INF, JA

SUBJECT: INF INITIATIVE

- 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. POLITICAL COUNSELOR WATANABE MET WITH PM DIRECTOR HOWE AND EA ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ AND HANDED OVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER YASUHIRO NAKASONE TO THE PRESIDENT.
- 3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER.

"DEAR RON,

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER TRANSMITTED BY AMBASSA-DOR MANSFIELD ON MARCH 23 INFORMING ME OF YOUR VIEWS ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

I APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS IN EXPLORING EVERY POSSIBILITY TO SEEK A PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE MAINTAINING THE UNITED POSITION OF THE WEST.

JAPAN HAS SUPPORTED THE ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL, SINCE WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSAL WILL ALSO PROVIDE THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE SECURITY OF ASIA.

WHILE COMMITTING OURSELVES TO THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION AS THE FINAL GOAL, I CAN FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR INTENTION IN PROPOSING TO THE SOVIET SIDE AN INTERIM SOLUTION AT THIS STAGE, IN ORDER TO COUNTER VARIOUS SOVIET EFFORTS TO BLOCK ANY PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE PRESENT POLITICO-MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE EAST

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NLS <u>F00 - 037/1#488</u>

NARA, DATE 7/24/06

PAGE 1 - 787 SITUATION LISTING

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND THE WEST CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVELY MAINTAINED ONLY WHEN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND THE WESTERN EUROPE FACE THE SOVIET UNION IN UNITY. AS FOR THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. I BELIEVE THAT THE SOLUTION SHOULD ALSO BE PURSUED FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY OF THE WEST AS A WHOLE. ANY OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT MIGHT INVOLVE TRANSFER OF SS-20S FROM EUROPE TO THE FAR EAST, AT THE SACRIFICE OF ASIA, IS THEREFORE. TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

FURTHERMORE, EVEN IF THE INTERIM SOLUTION WILL NOT INVOLVE TRANSFER OF SS-20S TO THE FAR EAST, IT IS IMPOR-TANT THAT DUE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE SECURITY OF ASIA. COMPARABLE TO THAT GIVEN TO EUROPE.

I HOPE THAT CLOSE CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THIS MATTER.

SINCERELY.

YASU

END TEXT OF LETTER. YY SHULTZ BT #3712 NNNN

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

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FOR AMBASSADOR AND ASST. SECY. WOLFOWITZ
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA
SUBJECT: BRIEFING JAPANESE AMBASSADOR OKAWARA ON INF

- 1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS EAGLEBURGER CALLED IN JAPANESE AMBASSADOR OKAWARA THIS AFTERNOON, MARCH 29 TO BRING THE AMBASSADOR UP TO DATE ON INF. HE BEGAN BY NOTING THAT WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WHETHER WE SHOULD MAKE SOME CHANGES IN OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN GENEVA, AND PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS BEEN IN COMMUNICATION WITH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE ON THE SUBJECT. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW DECIDED TO PROPOSE AN INTERIM MEASURE.
- 3. TODAY IN GENEVA AMBASSADOR NITZE PUT BEFORE THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR KVITSINSKY THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL: "THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ENTER AN INTERIM AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE US WOULD ACCEPT A LIMIT AT SOME FINITE, AGREED NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED, LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE LAUNCHERS, PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION REDUCES THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN ITS LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILE LAUNCHERS TO THE SAME LEVEL. THIS LEVEL WOULD BE EQUAL FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR AND WOULD INCLUDE ALL US AND SOVIET WEAPONS OF THIS CLASS, WHEREVER THEY ARE LOCATED." NITZE EXPLAINED THAT THE US VIEWS THE PROPOSAL AS A SIGNIFICANT INTERIM STEP TOWARD THE ELIMINATION OF THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS AND HOPES THE SOVIET UNION WILL JOIN WITH US IN THIS ENDEAVOR. OUR ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL ALSO REMAINS ON THE TABLE. THE NEW PROPOSAL IS AN INITIAL STEP. BUT THE OBJECT IS TO REACH A ZERO-ZERO POSITION AT SOME POINT.
- 4. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE USSR BUT PROBABLY WILL

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NLS F00-037/1#489

BY 190 , NARA, DATE 1/24/06

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NOT SAY SO PUBLICLY, THAT THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME IS NOT A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATION OF THE INTERIM PROPOSAL.

- 5. EAGLEBURGER EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAVE NOT CHANGED OUR POSITION ON SEEKING A GLOBAL LIMITATION. WE ARE STILL FOCUSING ON ALL THE LRINF, NOT JUST THOSE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM TO STRESS THIS GLOBAL ASPECT, WHICH HE RECOGNIZES IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO JAPAN. NO NUMBER HAS BEEN GIVEN, AND THIS WAS DONE DELIBERATELY. THIS WILL PUT THE BURDEN ON THE USSR TO COME UP WITH NUMBERS AND MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO REJECT SUMMARILY THE US POSITION. WE DO NOT EXCLUDE PROPOSING A NUMBER AT A LATER DATE, BUT AS OF NOW, WE ARE NOT INTRODUCING ONE.
- 6. WE ALSO HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIA-TIONS BEGIN EARLIER, AND THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED MAY 17.
- 7. KVITSINSKIY IN EFFECT TOLD NITZE THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT FOR MOSCOW'S REACTION, BUT HIS INITIAL REACTION WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT AGREE TO THE PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, BY REFUSING TO PICK A NUMBER, THIS WOULD BE IN EFFECT REJECTING NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE THESE WEAPONS.
- 8. AMBASSADOR OKAWARA SAID THE JAPANESE APPRECIATED BEING KEPT INFORMED, AND WELCOMED THE FACT THAT IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER THE GLOBAL ASPECT HAD BEEN STRESSED. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT ONE OF THE MESSAGES POINTED OUT THAT THERE WILL NOT BE AN INCREASE IN THE THREAT TO JAPAN. IF THERE WERE A FREEZE IN ASIA. HE SPECULATED, THIS COULD BE READ AS NO INCREASE IN THE THREAT, BUT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD STILL BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BECAUSE A REDUCTION WOULD OCCUR IN EUROPE BUT NOT IN ASIA. EAGLEBURGER EXPLAINED THAT THIS PROPOSAL IS NOT A FREEZE PROPOSAL; WE ARE NEGOTIATING A LIMIT OF A GLOBAL NATURE. ONE COULD NOT SAY THAT THERE WOULD NEVER BE ANY CONSIDERATION OF A FREEZE, BUT IT WAS NOT PART OF THIS PROPOSAL. PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEAN NOTED THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS OF REFERRING TO A REDUCTION IN ASIA WAS THAT IT RISKED BEING DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION ABOUT REGIONAL BALANCES PATHER THAN A GLOBAL APPROACH.
- 9. OKAWARA EXPRESSED THE NEED FOR SOME VISIBLE GESTURE THAT THE GOJ HAD BEEN INFORMED IN ADVANCE AND ASKED AT WHAT

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

POINT THE GOJ MIGHT MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. EAGLEBURGER SUGGESTED THAT A FULL STATEMENT MIGHT BE MADE AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN LOS ANGELES ON MARCH 31. EAGLEBURGER POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE NATO AMBASSADORS (SCHEDULED FOR THE MORNING OF MARCH 30 WASHINGTON TIME) AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH WILL FOLLOW, THE GOJ COULD REFER PUBLICLY TO THE CLOSE CON-SULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, NOTING THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE AND THAT AMBASSADOR OKAWARA HAD BEEN CALLED INTO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON. THE JAPANESE CAN ALSO POINT TO THE CONSULTATIONS WHICH ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ IS HAVING IN TOKYO. IN THE PRESS BACKGROUNDER GIVEN MARCH 30 TO THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS, MACFARLANE WILL POINT OUT THAT JAPAN IS AMONG THE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CONSULTATIONS. WE UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE AS SOON AS AVAILABLE A COPY OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS PREPARED FOR THAT OCCASION.

SHULTZ

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DATE 04/11/83//101

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 6121

INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8841

AT.

S E C R E T STATE 092966

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SUBJECT: PREL, EG, IS, JO, PLO

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK URGENT APPOINTMENT WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK, OR PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR OSAMA EL-BAZ, TO RELAY THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY:

UPDATE ON HUSSEIN-ARAFAT TALKS FOR MUBARAK

QUOTE GIVEN EGYPT'S ROLE AS OUR FULL PARTNER IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST MIDDLE EAST PEACE, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS WITH YASSIR ARAFAT. FRANKLY, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT CRITICAL DECISIONS STILL HAVE TO BE MADE. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE HEARTENED BY WHAT WE KNOW OF THE TALKS THUS FAR AND BELIEVE THERE IS REASON TO HOPE THAT KING HUSSEIN MAY BE ABLE TO GET WHAT HE NEEDS FROM ARAFAT TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS.

OBVIOUSLY THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE KING'S EFFORTS. AS ONE WHO HAS BEEN THROUGH SIMILAR NEGOTIATIONS, YOU CAN FULLY APPRECIATE THE SENSITIVITY OF THE MOMENT. WE WILL BE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT HIM AND I AM SURE YOU ARE PREPARED TO DO WHAT YOU CAN, AS WELL. YOUR STATEMENT IN BEIJING IN SUPPORT OF HUSSEIN'S ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS WAS VERY HELPFUL. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO SEND THAT MESSAGE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, BOTH TO THE PLO AND TO THOSE WHO CAN INFLUENCE THE PLO AND SUPPORT THE KING.

THE PRESIDENT AND I APPRECIATE YOUR STRONG SUPPORT OF HIS

SENSITIVE

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NLS F00-037/1#491

HOT NARA DATE 7/24/6

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SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PEACE INITIATIVE. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO REALIZE OUR GOAL OF A PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU WHEN WE HAVE MORE INFORMATION ON KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS. END QUOTE.

 IF MUBARAK OR EL-BAZ ASK FOR MORE INFORMATION, AMBASSADOR SHOULD REITERATE THAT WE WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH WHEN THERE IS MORE TO REPORT. SHULTZ BT #2966 NNNN