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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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File Folder: Japan (1/6/83 – 1/14/83)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	060835Z JAN 83, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #405</i>	1/6/83	B1
2. Cable	070116Z JAN 83, 2p <i>R " " #406</i>	1/7/83	B1
3. Cable	070918Z JAN 3, 2p <i>R " " #407</i>	1/7/83	B1
4. Memo	Gaston Sigur to William Clark re Minutes of Meeting with Ambassador Okawara, 2p <i>R " " #408</i>	1/7/83	B1
5. Cable	120343Z JAN 83, 1p <i>R " " #409</i>	1/12/83	B1
6. Cable	140954Z JAN 83, 1p <i>R " " #410</i>	1/14/83	B1
7. Cable	142153Z JAN 83, 1p <i>R " " #411</i>	1/14/83	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 0201 7050 DTG: 060835Z JAN 83 PSN: 065525
SIT782 DATE 01/10/83 TOR: 006/1301Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUEHKO #0201 0060835

P 060835Z JAN 83

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8376

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 0201

E.O. 12356: DECL: 1/6/89

TAGS: OTRA, JA

SUBJECT: VISIT OF SPECIAL ENVOY TOSHIKAZU KASE

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. TOSHIKAZU KASE, FORMER JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO UN AND CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR TO PRIME MINISTER, INFORMED AMBASSADOR JAN 6 THAT HE WOULD DEPART JAN 10 FOR WASHINGTON AS "SPECIAL ENVOY" OF NAKASONE IN ORDER TO LEND ASSISTANCE TO EFFORTS TO MAKE PM'S VISIT A SUCCESS. HE LEFT WITH AMBASSADOR COPY OF LETTER FROM PM TO PRESIDENT (TEXT IN PARA 4) WHICH HE HOPED TO DELIVER PERSONALLY TO THE PRESIDENT (HE INDICATED THAT AMBASSADOR OKAWARA WAS ALREADY SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT FOR HIM). HE INDICATED THAT HIS VISIT WOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED SINCE HE PREFERRED "QUIET DIPLOMACY." HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD STAY IN THE U.S. UNTIL AFTER NAKASONE DEPARTED AND WOULD BE SEEING HIS FRIEND IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA.

3. IN COMMENTING ON NAKASONE'S VISIT ITSELF, KASE SAID PM IS DETERMINED TO DEMONSTRATE HIS DEDICATION TO IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP TO SOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. IN AN ASIDE TO POLITICAL COUNSELOR, KASE SAID THAT PM HOPED TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXPLORE GENERAL THEMES IN HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, LEAVING DETAILS OF SPECIFIC BILATERAL ISSUES AND MULTILATERAL CONCERNS TO FOREIGN MINISTER ABE. KASE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE JAPANESE PRESS WOULD ATTEMPT TO DISTORT THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT AND SAID THAT THE PM SHARED THIS CONCERN SINCE HE KNEW THAT HIS ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE U.S. WILL BE JUDGED IN JAPAN ON THE BASIS OF MEDIA COVERAGE.

4. FOLLOWING IS LETTER FROM PM NAKASONE TO PRESIDENT CARRIED BY KASE:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

- ALLOW ME TO WRITE THESE FEW LINES IN ORDER TO PAY MY WARM RESPECTS TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND ALSO TO RECOMMEND AMBASSADOR TOSHIKAZU KASE, MY TRUSTED

FRIEND AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE, FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION. I AM SENDING HIM TO AMERICA AHEAD OF ME TO HELP PREPARE MY FORTHCOMING VISIT. AS HE ENJOYS MY FULL CONFIDENCE, I WOULD, INDEED, BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD POSSIBLY SPARE YOUR PRECIOUS TIME EVEN BRIEFLY FOR HIM.

- LOOKING KEENLY FORWARD TO OUR MEETING.

END TEXT.

MANSFIELD

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NLS FOO-037/1#405

BY hcs NARA DATE 7/24/06

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 4374054 DTG: 070116Z JAN 83 PSN: 067028
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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #4374 0070604
O 070116Z JAN 83
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TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000

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COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JAPAN IMMEDIATE
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 004374
EXDIS MILADS HANDLE AS SPECAT, CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: HARR, PREL, JA, US
SUBJECT: NEW JAPANESE POLICY ON TRANSFER OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AS DESCRIBED TO US BY JAPANESE EMBASSY COUNSELLOR WATANABE JANUARY 6, REFORMULATED GOJ POLICY ON DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER REFLECTS THE SPIRIT OF THE US-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE IN THAT IT SATISFIES MAJOR US CONCERNS ABOUT FULL RECIPROCITY AND CONTINUITY OF TRANSFERS. WATANABE STATED THAT DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING EXPORTS HAD NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT AND THAT THE GOJ WOULD CONSULT CLOSELY WITH US AS THESE PROCEDURES ARE FORMULATED. HE NOTED THAT THE POLICY WOULD COVER ONLY WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND NOT WEAPONS THEMSELVES, BUT THAT THE GOJ WOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO FORECLOSE THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE POLICY THAT WOULD PERMIT WEAPONS EXPORTS. THE GOJ WOULD NOT RESTRICT THE EXPORT OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES TO THE US. WATANABE SAID THE GOJ EXPECTED TO TAKE CONSIDERABLE HEAT FROM THE MEDIA AND THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENT FORMULATION WAS THE MAXIMUM THE GOJ COULD DO TO MEET US DESIRES. WE TOLD WATANABE THAT OUR INITIAL

IMPRESSION OF THE POLICY WAS FAVORABLE AND THAT WE WERE ESPECIALLY PLEASED BY THE POSITIVE WAY THE GOJ NOW APPROACHED THE ISSUE. WE STATED WE WOULD CONSULT IMMEDIATELY WITH DOD AND PROVIDE A MORE CONSIDERED, FORMAL USG REACTION TO THE NEW FORMULATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.

3. JAPANESE EMBASSY COUNSELLOR WATANABE BRIEFED EA/J

DIRECTOR JANUARY 6 ON THE GOJ'S REFORMULATED POLICY ON DEFENSE-TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE US. HE SAID THAT THE POLICY WOULD BE FORMALLY PUT BEFORE FOREIGN MINISTER ABE JANUARY 9, AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE; FINAL INTER-MINISTERIAL CLEARANCE WOULD BE OBTAINED JANUARY 12-13; AND THE CABINET WOULD APPROVE THE POLICY JANUARY 14, AFTER WHICH IT WOULD BE ANNOUNCED. ACCORDINGLY WATANABE ASKED, WITH APOLOGIES FOR THE TIGHT DEADLINE, THAT WE PROVIDE OUR REACTION BY COB JANUARY 7 (EST).

4. IN INTRODUCTION, WATANABE NOTED THAT NAKASONE HAD CONFIDENTIALLY INSTRUCTED THE CONCERNED MINISTERS SHORTLY AFTER HE TOOK OFFICE TO DEVISE A POLICY THAT WOULD SQUARELY MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR MUTUALITY AND CONTINUITY, IN LINE WITH THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE POLICY DESCRIBED BY WATANABE WHO HAD NOT YET HAD TIME TO PREPARE THE CUSTOMARY "NON-PAPER," WERE AS FOLLOWS: (1) JAPAN'S THREE PRINCIPLES AND RELATED GUIDELINES BANNING MILITARY EXPORTS WOULD BE PARTIALLY ADJUSTED SO AS NOT TO APPLY TO WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES REQUIRED BY THE US, EVEN IF THE US BECAME OR WAS LIKELY TO BECOME PARTY TO AN ARMED CONFLICT. (WATANABE ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THE GOJ WOULD AUTOMATICALLY APPROVE ALL REQUESTS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS. FOR JAPAN, RECIPROCITY MEANT THAT THE GOJ MUST HANDLE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS ON A

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, JUST AS THE US DID WITH RESPECT TO SUCH TRANSFERS TO JAPAN.) GOJ DETERMINATIONS IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE MADE WITH FULL ATTENTION TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY AS LAID DOWN IN THE MST AND THE MDA. THE GOJ BELIEVED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY AND THE NEED FOR CONTINUITY OF TRANSFERS WERE SERVED BY THIS POLICY. (2) THE GOJ ANTICIPATED THAT TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGES BETWEEN PRIVATE FIRMS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND EXCHANGES OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES WILL BE ENHANCED. (3) DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING EXPORT APPLICATIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT. WATANABE SAID THAT THE GOJ WOULD CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE US AS THESE PROCEDURES ARE FORMULATED TO ASSURE THAT THEY DID NOT IMPEDE TIMELY TRANSFERS. THERE WOULD BE NO RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES.

WITH RESPECT TO WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY, THE GOJ WOULD BASE ITS LEGAL POSITION AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES ON ARTICLE 1.1 OF THE MDA, I.E., AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENT COMPARABLE TO THOSE CONCLUDED WHEN JAPAN RECEIVED TECHNOLOGY FOR LICENSED PRODUCTION. THE GOJ WAS WILLING TO EXPLORE WITH US THE POSSIBILITY OF UMBRELLA ARRANGEMENTS COVERING ENTIRE CLASSES OF TECHNOLOGY AND ALLOWING TRANSFERS OF FOLLOW-ON TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT REQUIRING NEW AGREEMENTS IN EACH CASE. DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE EXAMINED THOROUGHLY WITH CONSIDERATION FOR SPECIFIC US INTERESTS. (4) IN EXPLAINING THE POLICY TO THE DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, THE GOJ INTENDED TO INDICATE THAT ARRANGEMENTS WERE IN ACCORD WITH ARTICLE 1.1, 2, AND 4 OF THE MDA: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE US WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE U.N. CHARTER; WOULD PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY; AND TRANSFERS OF JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY BY THE US TO THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO GOJ APPROVAL. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE GOJ TO ARGUE THAT THE "SPIRIT OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES" WAS BEING RESPECTED. (5) WATANABE SAID THAT THE GOJ POLICY WOULD COVER ONLY WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND NOT WEAPONS THEMSELVES. HOWEVER, EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO MAKE MEANINGFUL THE TRANSFER OF A GIVEN TECHNOLOGY (SUCH

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AS SAMPLES, TEST EQUIPMENT, AND "BLACK BOXES") WOULD BE TREATED AS PART OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND NOT AS "WEAPONS." THE GOJ WOULD ALSO BE CAREFUL NOT TO FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADJUSTMENTS IN THE FUTURE TO PERMIT WEAPONS EXPORTS.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. WATANABE CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT THE GOJ EXPECTED A VOCAL OUTPOURING OF PUBLIC CONCERN AND CRITICISM WHEN THE POLICY WAS ANNOUNCED. THE GOJ BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENT FORMULATION WAS THE MAXIMUM THE GOJ COULD DO TO MEET US DESIRES ON DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND THAT IF WE MISSED THIS OPPORTUNITY, "WE WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO SQUARE ONE." WATANABE ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE NEW PROCEDURES HAD BEEN CRAFTED TO REDUCE DRASTICALLY MITI'S ROLE IN APPROVING CASE-BY-CASE TRANSFERS, BUT HE DID NOT SPELL OUT JUST HOW THE CONTEMPLATED PROCEDURES MIGHT WORK.

6. WE TOLD WATANABE THAT OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION OF THE NEW FORMULATION WAS FAVORABLE. WE WERE ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT THE PRESENT GOJ APPROACH EMBODIED AN ATTITUDE OF TRUST AND COOPERATION REFLECTING THE SPIRIT OF THE US-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE. NATURALLY THE QUESTION OF DETAILED PROCEDURES WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH DOD BEFORE WE COULD GIVE A CONSIDERED ANSWER. IF THE PROCEDURES WERE

WORKABLE IN DOD'S VIEW AND WERE APPROACHED IN THE SAME OPEN AND POSITIVE MANNER APPARENT IN WATANABE'S EXPOSITION OF THE GENERAL LINES OF THE NEW POLICY, THE POLICY AS A WHOLE WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN OUR ALLIANCE IN BOTH THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SPHERES. WE UNDERTOOK TO DO OUR BEST TO PROVIDE A USG REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT. WE UNDERSTAND A SIMILAR PRESENTATION IS BEING MADE TO THE EMBASSY. WE WILL PROVIDE STATE-DEFENSE REACTION AS SOON AS FEASIBLE, AND IN THE INTERIM WILL WELCOME ANY THOUGHTS EMBASSY MAY HAVE.

SHULTZ

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 0297 4054 DTG: 070918Z JAN 83 PSN: 066955
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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHKO #0297/01 0070921

O 070918Z JAN 83

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8421

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 00297

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ETRD, PREL, MARR, JA

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD AND
PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE, JANUARY 7, 1983

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. SUMMARY: THE AMBASSADOR, AT HIS REQUEST, MET WITH PRIME MINISTER FOR 30 MINUTES ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 1983. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE PM'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS DURING HIS FIRST SIX WEEKS IN OFFICE--PARTICULARLY REGARDING JAPANESE-AMERICAN TRADE AND DEFENSE ISSUES. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN SPECIFIC AREAS TO AID IN DEVELOPING SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR ANY PRESIDENTIAL VETO THAT MIGHT HAVE TO BE USED ON PROTECTIONIST LEGISLATION. THE PM SAID HE APPRECIATED SUPPORT FROM THE AMBASSADOR, AND HE LOOKED FORWARD TO FRANK DISCUSSION AND ADVICE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS STILL PROGRAMMING THE FUTURE COURSE OF HIS ADMINISTRATION AND SUCH ADVICE WOULD BE INVALUABLE. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. THE AMBASSADOR, AT HIS REQUEST, MET WITH PRIME MINISTER FOR 30 MINUTES ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 1983, AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICIAL RESIDENCE. ALSO PRESENT WERE CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY GOTODA AND OTHERS FROM THE PM'S STAFF, THE DCM AND AN FSO INTERPRETER.

4. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH HOW MUCH PM NAKASONE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH DURING ONLY SIX WEEKS IN OFFICE. HE CITED NAKASONE'S EFFORTS TO OPEN THE JAPANESE MARKET AND ON DEFENSE ISSUES; THE COMMUNICATIONS THAT HAD BEEN DEVELOPED WITH BEIJING AND THE ASEAN NATIONS AND THE PM'S STATED INTENTION TO VISIT THE ASEAN NATIONS PROBABLY IN THE SPRING; THE VISIT TO EUROPE BY FOREIGN

MINISTER ABE, NOW IN PROGRESS; AND THE DECISION TO VISIT SEOUL NEXT WEEK. THE AMBASSADOR CHARACTERIZED SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS FORMING A PATTERN WHICH IS HOPEFUL FOR JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WHICH POINTS TOWARD A GREATER ROLE FOR JAPAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AS ONE OF THE MAJOR NATIONS OF THE WORLD.

5. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT, CENTERING ON TRADE, 1983 WOULD BE A DIFFICULT YEAR IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT JAPAN ALREADY BUYS 40 PERCENT OF AMERICAN CITRUS EXPORTS AND 60 PERCENT OF BEEF EXPORTS, TRADE HAS GONE BEYOND BEING AN ECONOMIC ISSUE TO BECOME AN EMOTIONAL AND POLITICAL ISSUE. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT MEN OF GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES WOULD WORK TOGETHER FOR A SOLUTION OF MUTUAL BENEFIT. THE AMBASSADOR STATED HIS PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH TRADE HAS BECOME A POLITICAL ISSUE. DURING THE RECENT SPECIAL SESSION OF CONGRESS, THE LOCAL CONTENT BILL WAS PASSED BY THE HOUSE, AND THE SENATE PASSED TWO PROTECTIONIST-ORIENTED RESOLUTIONS. IF UNEMPLOYMENT REMAINS AT CURRENT HIGH LEVELS OR THE SITUATION IN THE FARM SECTOR DETERIORATES FURTHER, IT WILL BE VERY POSSIBLE FOR A LOCAL CONTENT BILL OR OTHER PROTECTIONIST LEGISLATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO PASS BOTH HOUSES DURING THE NEXT REGULAR SESSION. THE AMBASSADOR SAID IT WAS IRONIC THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY ADVOCATED FREE TRADE, ARE NOW AVOWING PROTECTIONISM, WHILE THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, WHICH IN THE PAST HAS CALLED FOR HIGHER TARIFFS AND STRICTER QUOTAS, IS NOW UPHOLDING FREE TRADE AND SEEKING TO BLOCK PROTECTIONIST TRENDS IN CONGRESS.

6. THE AMBASSADOR SAID IT WAS GOOD THAT THE PM HAD BEEN ABLE TO USE HIS PERSONAL PRESTIGE TO ACHIEVE SOME CONCESSIONS ON TRADE. SUCH EFFORTS ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS SEEKING TO DEVELOP SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FROM THE TOBACCO, CITRUS, AND BEEF STATES TO UPHOLD ANY POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL VETO OF PROTECTIONIST LEGISLATIONS. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE LOCAL CONTENT BILL CALLS TO HIS MIND THE 1930'S AND THE SHOOT-HAWLEY BILL, WHICH RAISED TARIFFS AND STRENGTHENED QUOTAS, THEREBY WORSENING AN ALREADY BAD DEPRESSION AND PERHAPS

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O 070918Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8422

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 00297
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ETRD, PREL, MARR, JA
SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD AND
PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE, JANUARY 7, 1983
EVEN PAVING THE WAY TO WORLD WAR TWO. SUCH A
COURSE SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE FOLLOWED, HE SAID.
-

7. PM NAKASONE STATED THAT ANY SUCCESSES WHICH HAD
BEEN ACHIEVED WERE DUE NOT SO MUCH TO HIS
PERSONAL PRESTIGE AS TO A SUCCESSFUL COMBINATION
OF EFFORTS BETWEEN THE LDP AND THE CABINET.
HE SPECIFICALLY CITED THE ROLE OF LDP SECRETARY
GENERAL MIKAI DO IN SUCH EFFORTS. DURING THE
RECENT VACATION, THE PM HAD THE CHANCE TO READ
THREE SPEECHES BY AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD. IT
WAS CLEAR THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS VERY FAVORABLY
DISPOSED TOWARD JAPAN AND THE PM APPRECIATES
HIS ADVICE ON THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP.
HE REQUESTED THAT THE AMBASSADOR TALK WITH
SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BAKER AND OTHER CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERS ABOUT JAPAN'S SITUATION AND SAID THAT HE
WAS SURE THAT THESE LEADERS WOULD ALSO PROFIT
BY THE AMBASSADOR'S ADVICE. SINCE IT IS THE
PM'S DESIRE THAT JAPAN BE A GOOD TEAM MEMBER
AMONG THE NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD, AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SINCE THE PM IS STILL PROGRAMMING THE COURSE
OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, WHICH IS ONLY SOME SIX
WEEKS OLD, HE STATED THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO
A FRANK DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND TO
RECEIVING HIS ADVICE. HE REQUESTED THE
AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY TO THE PRESIDENT THAT
THE JAPANESE DIET WILL "ENTER A TYPHOON" TOWARD
THE END OF THE MONTH WITH ITS CONSIDERATION
OF PROPOSALS BY NAKASONE; THE-TIMING OF A DECISION
IN THE TANAKA CASE WILL ALSO POSSIBLY COMPLICATE
MATTERS FOR THE NAKASONE ADMINISTRATION.
-

8. COMMENT: THE PRIME MINISTER APPEARED RELAXED
AND IN COMMAND OF THE FAST PACE OF THE FIRST FEW
WEEKS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION. HE IS AWARE THAT

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 08 JAN 83 10

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 07 JAN 83

172604

TO CLARK

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

MINUTES

OKAWARA, YOSHIO

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF CLARK MTG W/ JAPANESE AMB 6 JAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>JAN 1 1 1983</i>	<i>Clark note</i>		<i>50</i>

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 7, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GS*

SUBJECT: Minutes of Your Meeting with Ambassador Yoshio Okawara of Japan, January 6

WPC HAS SEEN

In attendance, in addition to you, Okawara and myself, were Charles Tyson and Makoto Watanabe, Political Counselor of the Japanese Embassy.

Ambassador Okawara began the substantive part of the conversation by emphasizing the Prime Minister's commitment to the US-Japan relationship and by saying that the Prime Minister had made this commitment central to his overall policies. It is because of this that Nakasone has acted positively in the area of defense spending and tariff reduction.

The Prime Minister's actions, however, have caused some friction within his own party. Some LDP members oppose the increase of the defense budget at what they consider to be the expense of important domestic programs. Also, farming and other interests oppose tariff and quota reduction actions.

The Ambassador went on to say that the LDP will be facing upper house elections in June and Nakasone may decide to hold lower house elections at the same time. These must go well if Nakasone is to remain a Prime Minister and, more importantly, if the LDP is to sustain its working majority in both Houses of the Diet.

Therefore, the visit to Washington is critical in a political sense. The Prime Minister and the LDP need a success, if they are to win in the coming elections.

You commented that you and your staff will understand the situation as outlined by the Ambassador. We, too, need a success from the visit. We also know that we must treat Prime Minister Nakasone in a balanced manner. As one West German newspaper said about Chancellor Kohl's recent visit to Washington prior to the German election, "the U.S. should neither embrace the German Chancellor too much nor be too distant from him."

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BY HAT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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You stressed that we are aware of the several issues that will be of critical concern during the Prime minister's visit and the proper options will be presented to the President.

Okawara stated that February and March are crucial times for the Prime Minister because of the budgetary deliberations in the Diet. Both the high defense budget and the tariff reductions will come under careful scrutinizing in the Diet. It will be helpful if the U.S. side is not too critical of what the Prime Minister has done, that is, high-ranking officials saying publicly that the Prime Minister's actions are not significant. This could hurt him in the Diet debates. The coming three months are therefore very critical.

The Ambassador mentioned the possibility of our taking Japan before GATT over agricultural quotas and said that this could harm the Prime Minister's position.

You then thanked the Ambassador for his heads-up information and told him that he had given us guidance for us to study and possibly develop.

Okawara referred to Nakasone's wish to discuss global issues with the President, East-West relations, and China. He wants to cooperate in the coming months in as broad a way as possible.

Just before leaving, Okawara brought up the matter of the projected high-speed train between San Diego and Los Angeles, and the second Panama Canal project.

You answered that we are aware of these matters and will form our own position on them.

After you left the meeting, Okawara discussed the visit of former Ambassador Kase who will be arriving in Washington on January 10 as a special pre-trip envoy of the Prime Minister. He will be carrying a letter from Nakasone asking that the President grant Kase a few minutes of his time. Chuck Tyson told him that, both for reasons of policy and timing, the President would not be able to see him.

**National Security Council
The White House**

492

Package # 0178

1/7/83
8:42 pm

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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COMMENTS

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MESSAGE:

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TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 3371

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (NAKASONE, YASUHIRO), JA

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR OKAWARA'S DISCUSSION OF NAKASONE VISIT WITH THE SECRETARY, JANUARY 10, 1983

1. AMBASSADOR OKAWARA CALLED ON THE SECRETARY JANUARY 10 TO REVIEW SOME OF THE STEPS PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE HAS TAKEN TO PAVE THE WAY FOR HIS WASHINGTON VISIT: THE DECEMBER TARIFF REDUCTIONS, WHERE HE HAD TO OVERCOME OPPOSITION WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY; THE DEFENSE BUDGET DECISION, WHICH WAS CRITICAL FOR AN INCREASE "OUT OF PROPORTION"; AND HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO KOREA, WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE RESUMPTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. IN THE LATTER INSTANCE AS WELL, NAKASONE WAS MOTIVATED BY HIS DESIRE TO CLEAR AWAY OBSTACLES TO HIS PURSUING A FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON THE CLOSEST ALLIANCE WITH UNITED STATES. OKAWARA SAID THAT ON JANUARY 13 THE CABINET WOULD ANNOUNCE ANOTHER PACKAGE OF MEASURES TO SIMPLIFY TESTING, INSPECTION, AND STANDARDS PROCEDURES, AND THAT ON THE FOLLOWING DAY THE CABINET WOULD APPROVE A POLICY FOR TWO-WAY FLOW OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY. THE DEFENSE-TECHNOLOGY POLICY WOULD PROBABLY INVITE STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, BUT NAKASONE WAS DETERMINED TO DO THE THINGS JAPAN SHOULD DO AS A CLOSE, TRUSTED ALLY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. OKAWARA SAID THAT NAKASONE LOOKED FORWARD NOT ONLY TO DISCUSSING BILATERAL ISSUES WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUT ALSO US-CHINA RELATIONS, US-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND US EFFORTS TO REACH A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. THE SECRETARY ASKED THAT AS THE DEVELOPMENTS SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 13 AND 14 TRANSPIRED, THE AMBASSADOR KEEP US INFORMED SO WE COULD WORK THEM INTO PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT; OKAWARA SAID HE WOULD TRY TO GIVE US A PREVIEW.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE KEY TRADE BARRIERS SEEMED TO BE IN THE AGRICULTURAL AREA ON THE ONE HAND, AND

INSPECTION AND OTHER PROCEDURES ON THE OTHER, WHERE THE WAY IN WHICH MEASURES WERE IMPLEMENTED WAS AS IMPORTANT AS DECISIONS THEMSELVES. IN THE DEFENSE AREA, IT WAS NECESSARY TO COMPARE EFFORT WITH MISSIONS UNDERTAKEN AND JAPAN'S DEFENSE PLANS TO SEE WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE. WHILE WE COULD UNDERSTAND PROBLEMS WHERE SPENDING OF ANY KIND WAS CONCERNED, THERE WAS STILL QUITE A GAP. THOSE OPPOSED TO THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH WAS NECESSARY FOR THIS TO BE A TWO-WAY AFFAIR.

5. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WANTED BOTH IN THE COURSE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, AND THE VISIT HE WOULD BE MAKING TO TOKYO SHORTLY AFTERWARDS TO EXPAND THE OPERATIONAL BASE OF OUR COLLABORATION. WE RECOGNIZED JUST AS THE PRIME MINISTER DID, THAT THERE WERE MANY ASPECTS TO THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP. WE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WE SAW WITH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE SOVIETS. THIS HAD A BEARING ON OUR ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT COCOM RECOMMENDATIONS; IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR BEHAVIOR, THERE WAS NO POINT IN GIVING THE SOVIETS TECHNOLOGY THAT HELPED THEM MILITARILY OR STRATEGICALLY.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WELCOMED THE LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ABE IN REGARD TO STUDIES ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE NATO STUDY ON SECURITY POSED SOME PROBLEMS, BUT GIVEN THE PRECEDENT OF BRINGING JAPAN INTO DISCUSSIONS ON POLAND, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SOLVE THESE. IT WAS A VERY POSITIVE MESSAGE WITHOUT ANY SECOND THOUGHTS. ASKED BY OKAWARA HOW WE PLANNED TO PROCEED, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE RESULTS OF HIS DECEMBER CONSULTATIONS IN EUROPE. HE WAS A BIT SURPRISED TO FIND THAT MITTERAND INSISTED THAT NATO WAS THE BEST FORUM FOR TREATING SECURITY MATTERS, BUT HE HAD ALSO

AGREED A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND SO THAT JAPAN COULD TAKE PART. WE WANTED TO WORK THIS OUT CLOSELY TOGETHER WITH THE GOJ. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD FOLLOW THROUGH WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABE TO BE SURE THAT WHATEVER WE DID WAS SATISFACTORY. THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH OKAWARA THAT THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED FOR WORKING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OECD OR USING THE FORUM OF AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON WERE GOOD, BUT IN THE END THESE ALTERNATIVES WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FRENCH. SIMILAR PROBLEMS CONCERNED AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND--PERHAPS A PACIFIC GROUP COULD BE WORKED OUT. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH CURRENTLY OPPOSED THE IDEA OF REPORTING TO THE SUMMIT MEETING, IN THE END THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

SHULTZ

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, JA, KS, KN, CH, SF

SUBJECT: NAKASONE-CHUN SUMMIT: THE CROSS-RECOGNITION ISSUE

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. DURING JANUARY 14 BRIEFING ON THE NAKASONE-CHUN SUMMIT, HOFA NORTHEAST ASIAN DIVISION DIRECTOR OGURA TOLD EMBOFF THAT DURING THE TETE-A-TETE BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER ABE AND FOREIGN MINISTER LEE BUM SUK, LEE EXPLICITLY RAISED THE IDEA OF JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF THE DPRK IN EXCHANGE FOR CHINESE RECOGNITION OF THE ROK, AND HE ASKED ABE TO PURSUE THIS WITH THE CHINESE. LEE ALSO SAID THAT DURING SECRETARY SHULTZ'S VISIT TO SEOUL IN FEBRUARY, HE INTENDED TO SUGGEST THAT THE US PURSUE THE IDEA OF RECOGNIZING THE DPRK IN RETURN FOR SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE ROK.

3. OGURA SAID THAT ABE HAD SIMPLY RESPONDED THAT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS THE IDEA WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ BEFORE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

COMMENTING. OGURA ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE, HOWEVER, HOW DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE HANDLED DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON HE SAID HE PLANNED TO BRIEF FULLY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER NAKAJIMA WHO WILL ACCOMPANY THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER TO WASHINGTON AND SUGGEST THAT NAKAJIMA TAKE IT UP WITH "THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN OFFICIALS." CLARK

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EXDIS, MANILA FOR USADB AND AMBASSADOR BOHN
E.O. 12356: DLLL OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECIN, EFIN, EAID, ADB, TW, CH, JA, US
SUBJECT: PRC MEMBERSHIP IN THE ADB - TAIWAN ASPECTS

REFS: A) 82 TAIPEI 6533, B) STATE 330265

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS YOU KNOW, ON DECEMBER 28, THE GOJ DELAYED ITS RESPONSE TO THE NOVEMBER 27 DEMARCHE OF THE PRC ON ADB MEMBERSHIP AT OUR REQUEST IN ORDER TO CONSULT WITH US ON THIS ISSUE. NEVERTHELESS, IT ATTACHES URGENCY TO PROVIDING ITS RESPONSE TO THE PRC BEFORE THE JANUARY 17TH ARRIVAL OF PM NAKASONE IN THE U.S. THE COMPLEXITY AND SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUES THE PRC DEMARCHE RAISES ARE SUCH THAT HIGH LEVEL INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED BY-THAT TIME.. THEREFORE, IT IS NOT - APPROPRIATE TO ASK THE GOJ FOR FURTHER DELAY. WE SHOULD,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HOWEVER, CONVEY U.S.G. EXPECTATION THAT JAPAN WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH US IN ATTEMPTING, AS FEASIBLE, TO PROVIDE FOR SOME FORM OF PARTICIPATION BY TAIWAN IN THE ADB AS WELL AS TO DISCOURAGE ANY PRC EXPECTATIONS ON BORROWING DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NEXT GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE (1983-87).

3. FYI - WE WILL BE EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SOME SORT OF CONTINUING ADB PARTICIPATION FOR TAIWAN. IN DOING SO, WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT, A) THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THE PRC AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND WE ANTICIPATE SUPPORTING CHINA'S APPLICATION TO THE ADB; B) BUT WE MUST CONSULT OTHER MEMBERS AND BANK MANAGEMENT AS TO HOW THIS BEST CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED; C)

THIS QUESTION POSES DIFFICULTY IN ITS POTENTIAL FOR CHANGING THE TRADITIONAL CHARACTER OF THE BANK AND IN TERMS OF OUR DOMESTIC LEGISLATION; AND D) IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, THE SIZE OF THE GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE FORESEEN WILL PRECLUDE LENDING TO CHINA DURING THE GCI PERIOD 1983-87 . END FYI.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: THAT EMBASSY INFORM GOJ THAT TIME DOES NOT PERMIT CONSOLIDATION OF A HARD U.S. POSITION WITHIN JAPAN'S TIME CONSTRAINTS. IF IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO DELAY FURTHER, WE URGE, IN RESPONDING TO THE PRC THAT THE GOJ WILL STATE THAT IT WILL SUPPORT THE PRC REQUEST FOR MEMBERSHIP, BUT THAT THIS ISSUE PRESENTS PRACTICAL MATTERS FOR THE OTHER MEMBERS AND FOR THE BANK ITSELF WHICH MUST BE DEALT WITH BEFORE MEMBERSHIP COULD BE EFFECTED. WE ALSO HOPE THAT JAPAN WILL NOTE (OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. PL 96-259) THAT CARE MUST BE EXERCISED SO AS NOT TO HARM THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE ADB. EMBASSY SHOULD CONVEY CLEARLY U.S. EXPECTATIONS OF CONTINUED JAPANESE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT IN EFFORTS TO SEEK SOME KIND OF PARTICIPATION IN THE BANK FOR THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN. ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD, OF NECESSITY, BE CONSISTENT WITH RECOGNITION BY ADB MEMBERS OF THE PRC AS THE SOLE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ WILL CONVEY SUBSTANCE PARA 4 ORALLY TO AMBASSADOR OKAWARA ON JANUARY 14.
SHULTZ

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