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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (9/8/82 – 10/18/82)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Gaston Sigur to William Clark re Proposed Meeting with Defense Minister, 1p <i>R 2/7/07 F00-037/1 #345</i>	9/8/82	B1
2. Memo	Francis West to Caspar Weinberger re Visit of Japanese Defense Minister, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #346</i>	8/10/82	B1
3. PAPER	1p <i>D " " #347</i>	Nd	B1, B3
4. Note	For Sigur re Meeting, 1p <i>R " " #348</i>	9/7/82	B1
5. Memo	Sigur to Clark re Visit of Motoo Shiina, 1p <i>R " " #349</i>	9/8/82	B1
6. Memo	Sigur to Clark re Talking Points for Meeting, 1p <i>R 2/7/07 " #350</i>	9/30/82	B1
7. Talking Points	Re Clark – Ito Meeting, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #351</i>	Nd	B1
8. Memo	Philip Dur to Clark re Visit of General Ito, 1p <i>R " " #352</i>	9/29/82	B1
9. Talking Points	Re Clark – Ito Meeting, 1p <i>R " " #353</i>	Nd	B1
10. Report	6p <i>D " " #354</i>	9/23/82	B1, B3
11. Memo	Sigur to Clark re You meeting with Shintaro Abe, 1p <i>R " " #355</i>	10/4/82	B1
12. Memo	Sigur to Clark re Meeting with Abe, 1p <i>R " " #356</i>	10/4/82	B1
13. Cable	070624Z OCT 82, 4p <i>R " " #357</i>	10/7/82	B1
14. Cable	090130Z OCT 82, 1p	10/9/82	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (9/8/82 – 10/18/82)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
15. Cable	090419Z OCT 82, 1p	10/9/82	B1
16. Cable	100118Z OCT 82, 2p	10/10/82	B1
17. Cable	150552Z OCT 82, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #361</i>	10/15/82	B1
18. Memo	Bud McFarlane to Ken Duberstein re Ryiochi Sasakawa, 1p <i>R " " #362</i>	10/25/82	B1
19. Memo	Sigur to Clark re Sasakawa, 1p <i>R " " #363</i>	10/19/82	B1
20. Draft Memo	McFarlane to Duberstein re Sasakawa, 1p <i>R " " #364</i>	Nd	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 7/20/2007

File Folder JAPAN (09/08/1982-10/18/1982)

FOIA

F00-037 (F1539)

Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
18	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO DUBERSTEIN RE RYIOCHI SASAKAWA (F00 037/1#362)	1	10/25/1982	MVN 5/21/08
19	MEMO	SIGUR TO CLARK, RE SASAKAWA (F00 037/1#363)	1	10/19/1982	MVN 5/21/08
20	DRAFT MEMO	MCFARLANE TO DUBERSTEIN, RE SASAKAWA (F00 037/1#364)	1	ND	MVN 5/21/08

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8206156

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 08 SEP 82 13

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

*M37
1/26/04*

DOCDATE 08 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

AC

ITO, SOICHIRO

DEFENSE

SUBJECT: PROPOSED CLARK MTG W/ JAPANESE DEFENSE MIN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 10 SEP 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Bovene</i>	<i>S</i> SEP 13 1982	<i>for comment</i>		
	<i>9/14</i>	<i>Concurred per Bovene</i>		
<i>Sigur</i>	<i>S</i> SEP 20 1982	<i>for further action</i>	<i>9/22</i>	
	<i>c</i> 9/29	<i>ABT Per Sigur</i>		<i>RB</i>
		<i>OB</i>		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C*)

MW

~~SECRET~~

6156

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 8, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *G. Sigur*

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with Japanese Defense Minister

Mr. Soichiro Ito, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (Defense Minister) since 1981, will be in Washington late this month until early October. Through the Department of Defense, he is requesting a meeting with you either late in the day on September 30 or during the day on October 1.

Ito is a friend of Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi and works well with him on defense issues. When Prime Minister Suzuki reshuffles his Cabinet later this year, it is expected that Ito will be dropped. However, he can bring a message back to Tokyo from this trip and that is significant in itself. He will also be given heavy Japanese press coverage during his visit.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the efforts we are making to have the Japanese increase their defense budget for the coming year and to work more closely with us in defense matters, I recommend that you meet with the Japanese Defense Minister during his stay in Washington.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Please coordinate w/ Dick Boverie.

Concur. Boverie 9/14

*I don't see how schedule will allow; if he meets V.P., Dick B. could join in my behalf -
let's see if V.P. will schedule in*

Attachments

- Tab I Internal Defense Memo dated 8/5/82
- Tab II Bio Data on Soichiro Ito

[Signature]

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-137/1-345

~~SECRET~~

BY LOT NARA, DATE 2/7/07

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SEC DEF HAS SEEN

AUG 10 1982

05 AUG 1982

In reply refer to I-24037/82

AUG 10 1982

DEP SEC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *FJ*

SUBJECT: Visit of Japanese Defense Minister *(U)* -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

07 AUG 1982

(U) During your visit to Japan in March, you invited Defense Minister Ito to visit Washington in September. Ito has proposed the following schedule to our Defense Attache in Tokyo:

Sunday	September 26	Visit Hawaii
Monday	September 27	Visit Fort Bliss
Tuesday	September 28	Visit Colorado Springs
Wednesday	September 29	Visit NORAD
Thursday	September 30	Visit Washington
Friday	October 1	Visit Washington
Saturday	October 2	Depart USA

Such a schedule could call for an honors ceremony, substantive business meeting and lunch, and evening social function here on Thursday, September 30. Ambassador Okawara would probably host a dinner in the Minister's honor on Friday, October 1.

(S) Since Prime Minister Suzuki will likely reshuffle his Cabinet in either November or December, Ito is virtually a lame-duck already. Moreover, as he showed in the recent negotiations with the Ministry of Finance over 1983 budget ceiling increases, he is not a forceful or influential politician. Nonetheless, he can carry our message back to Tokyo; and therefore his visit will not be without significance. There will be no final decision on next year's budget until late December, and Ito can be expected to bring an army of Japanese press with him. Thus every aspect of his visit to the United States will receive prominent press coverage throughout Japan.

(U) Please indicate your decisions below.

Classified by DIR, EAPR
Declassify on 2 Aug 88

FJ West
FRANCIS J. WEST, JR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-0271#346

BY HOI, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont No. 21200

Japanese MOD Visit

September 30 Date (Meeting/Lunch)

Approve _____ ✓ 10 AUG 1982

Disapprove _____

Honors Ceremony prior to meeting

Approve _____ ✓

Disapprove _____

~~Social Function~~ hosted by SECDEF September 30

Approve _____ ✓

Disapprove _____

Social Function hosted by Japanese October 1

Accept _____

Regret _____ ✓

Coordination: OSD Protocol has been advised.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 3 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Memo For Dr. Siger September 7, 1982

Per your request attached is a bio on Ito. FYI I also enclose a copy of the memorandum to sent to Secretary Weinberger re the visit. You might want to use some of the rationale in the second last paragraph.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ✓/R,
NLS Foo-037/1 #348 Jim Owen
BY LOJ 1/24/06

240

National Security Council The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 6156

RED TAG

82 SEP 14 P 3: 26

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	✓	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	m	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	✓	A
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	✓	
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>SIGUR</u>	<u>6</u>		A

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Boxing concerned

O B E

[Signature]

**National Security Council
The White House**

332

RECEIVED

Package # 6156

82 SEP 8 P12:59

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

BOVERIE 2 Commit

I-Information A-Action B-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

[Faint handwritten notes]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

*man
1/26/04*

RECEIVED 08 SEP 82 13

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 08 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

AC

SHIINA, MOTOO

SUBJECT: CLARK VISIT W/ MEMBER OF JAPANESE DIET

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C **SEP 13 1982** *Ponderexter noted*

54

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (C)

~~SECRET~~

6243

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 8, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT: Visit of Mr. Motoo Shiina

NOTED
WPC HAS SEEN

I understand from the Japanese side that you will be meeting with Motoo Shiina, a member of the Japan Diet, on this coming Friday. Shiina was in to see me yesterday with Kay Sugahara of the US-Asia Institute and two of the latter's colleagues. They discussed with me their progress in having the Japanese private sector respond to support of development projects in this country. You are well aware of this program.

I believe that Shiina would particularly like to talk with you about defense issues. He is one of the strongest proponents in Japan of the closest ties with the US and of increased Japanese expenditures for defense. I know Shiina quite well and knew his father even better. His father was Deputy Prime Minister a number of years ago before his death. The son, Motoo Shiina, is a person to be trusted and you can speak very frankly to him.

cc: Dick Bovine

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1# 349
BY HOT, NARA, DATE 7/29/06

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 6243

82 SEP 8 P12:58

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Did not meet since Judge was out of town.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE (S)

RECEIVED 30 SEP 82 08

TO CLARK

FROM DUR

DOCDATE 29 SEP 82

BOVERIE

29 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY

JAPAN

ITO, SOICHIRO

AC

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR CLARK MTG W/ DIRECTOR JAPANESE DEFENSE AGENCY

Oct 1

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

SIGUR

BOVERIE

COMMENTS

URGENT

REF#

LOG 8206156

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Sigur	S SEP 30 1982	for revision		PD
Clark	K 9/30	For Decision/Redline	10/1	
	10/1 1982	Clark noted		SW, DUR

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

~~SECRET~~

6732 re-do

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 30, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

WPG HAS SEEN

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: Talking Points and Meeting Arrangement Facts for
Your Brief Meeting with Japanese Defense Agency
(JDA) Director-General Soichiro Ito. (S)

I have written-up a few talking points for your brief ten-minute meeting with Japanese Defense Minister Ito. They are at Tab A. The key points are: 1) Our recognition of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia and the Pacific; 2) the recognition of both of our countries of the growing Soviet military threat; and 3) the need to increase our spending for defense and to further technology exchange. (S)

I will meet the party at the entrance to the first floor lobby in the West Wing at 3:30 p.m. I will then escort them to the Map Room. Arrangements have been with the Chief Usher's office for the appropriate number of chairs. There will be 12 people altogether. Attached is a copy of the clearance list. The people from the NSC staff who will attend are: myself, Richard Boverie, David Laux and Philip Dur. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you meet us in the Map Room at 3:30 pm and that you make a few remarks based on the attached talking points. Please remember that what you say will require translation.

After you make your brief comments, the Japanese understand that you will excuse yourself from the meeting because of the press of business.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Clearance List

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-137/1#350

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

BY NOT, NARA, DATE 2/7/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH JAPANESE DEFENSE AGENCY
DIRECTOR GENERAL SOICHIRO ITO

President Reagan considers U.S.-Japanese alliance the cornerstone of East Asian security system and of pivotal importance to the U.S. interests in Asia and the Pacific. (S)

U.S.-Japan cooperation and collaboration are important, not only in regional sense, but also globally. (S)

Both U.S. and Japan are concerned about Soviet military build-up. We must do everything we can, together, to ensure that we deter Soviets from military adventurism and blackmail. This requires larger defense budgets for both of our countries and as full an exchange of high technology as possible. By doing these things, we will be able to secure our countries' safety in the years to come. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/#351

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, October 1, 1982

for DR. GASTON SIGUR of NSC
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

- 3:30 p.m. ARAI, Hirokazu
- ARMITAGE, Richard
- AUER, James
- CATES, Donald - *security detail - remain in car*
- EUBANKS, James - *will remain in car*
- IIDA, Cornelius (Interpreter)
- INGOLD, Larry - *security detail - remain in car*
- ITO, Minister Soichiro
- NATSUME, Haruo
- OKAWARA, Ambassador Yoshio

There will be 3 cars carrying the above, and they will drive in through the ~~Northwest Gate on Pennsylvania Avenue~~ and will be met at the entrance to the Lobby, 1st Floor, West Wing.

Southwest

MEETING LOCATION

Building Residence Requested by F. Bagnall
 Room No. MAP ROOM Room No. 302 Telephone 6173
 Time of Meeting 3:30 p.m. Date of request 9/30/82

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-5742

National Security Council
The White House

365

RECEIVED

Package # 6732

SEP 30 P 6: 19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

FOR 3:30 p.m. Meeting
Friday.

URGENT

*now -
scratched
9/30
abm*

303

**ional Security Council
The White House**

SEP 30 09:43

Package # 6732

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

SIGUR 2 A

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

*For Judge Clark's
Dropby Mtg 3:30 Fri, Oct 1
Boston,*

*This is a dropby (5-10 min).
Talking points are much too long.
Cut down. Also need memos giving
facts on meeting arrangements. Jol*

~~SECRET~~

6732

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD BOVERIE *B*
FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *W*
SUBJECT: Visit of Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) Director
General Ito

The talking points at Tab A are for your use during the meeting with Minister Soichiro Ito, Director General of the JDA. These points have been made by Cap Weinberger; they should be repeated during your meeting with Ito to emphasize our disappointment with the current Japanese Defense Program and to encourage greater effort.

The CIA memo at Tab B suggests that a strongly worded statement of our views may persuade Prime Minister Suzuki to push harder for an increase in defense expenditures.

Gastor *W* Sigur concurs.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points for Meeting with Minister Ito

Tab B CIA Memo

cc: Sigur
Boverie

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/1#352
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

WILLIAM P. CLARK MEETING WITH JDA MINISTER SOICHIRO ITO

- Add your welcome and that of President Reagan, and stress importance we place on frequent consultations with Japan on defense matters
- President Reagan considers US-Japanese alliance as the cornerstone of East-Asian security system and of pivotal importance to U.S. interests in Pacific
- US-Japan record of cooperation and collaboration for the past quarter-century has been model for other alliances
 - Host nation support provided by Japan significantly reduces burden of maintaining US forces overseas and is greatly appreciated
- Growth of Soviet military power and expansive Soviet policy have led this Administration to undertake greater defense effort. Of special interest to Japan is FY 81-86 US Navy ship building program which explicitly recognizes US interests and commitments beyond NATO, specifically in East Asia and Northern Pacific
- US cannot, however, bear increasing burden alone. As you know, we place great importance on increasing level of Japanese defense effort.
- Japan currently lacks capabilities to meet self defense roles
 - Defense of Japanese territory
 - Surrounding sea and air space
 - Sea lanes out to 1000 miles
- Our defense experts conclude that the Defense Plan for 1983-1987 is not adequate to meet established goals
- Real increases in the Defense budget of 10-12 percent are called for
- President Reagan would request that ITO convey message to Prime Minister Suzuki that Japan needs to do more
 - President understands and is sympathetic to need for fiscal restraints. Notwithstanding own efforts in this direction, he has accorded highest priority to improved defense capability. Japan should take a similar stand.
- Many influential members of US Congress growing impatient with perceived asymmetries in US-Japan defense arrangements. Two areas of principal concern:
 - Level of Japanese Defense spending
 - Making technology transfer a two-way street. Ease restrictions which currently limit transfer of Japanese technology to US Companies

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 10 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 OCT 82 18

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 04 OCT 82

*man
1/26/04*

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

SHINTARO, ABE

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR MTG W/ SHINTARO OCT 4

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8206657

NSC/ED

(R /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 10/5 noted by Clark

- SU

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

(C)

PA

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 OCT 82 18

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

MJM 11/26/82

DOC DATE 04 OCT 82

SIGUR

04 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

SHINTARO, ABE

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR MTG W/ SHINTARO OCT 4 + *Memcon*

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8206657

NSCIFID

(R / R)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 4, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: Your October 4 Meeting with Japanese MITI
Minister, Shintaro Abe

Participants

- Mr. Shintaro Abe, Minister of International Trade & Industry
- Mr. Yoshio Okawara, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.
- Mr. Shohei Kurihara, Vice Minister of MITI for International Affairs
- Ms. Hiroko Omori, Interpreter
- Dr. Gaston Sigur
- Mr. Charles Tyson

WPG HAS SEEN

The major issues raised in your fifteen-minute meeting with Minister Shintaro Abe dealt with defense, technology exchange and economic sanctions against the Soviet Union.

On defense, Abe agreed with your position that this was an important matter and said that, while he was the Minister of International Trade and Industry, he had a personal deep interest in defense. There is a strong mood in Japan today in greater self-defense capability and he supports this.

On technology transfer, Abe raised the matter himself and, in so many words, defended the proposal that the Japanese have made. (We believe the proposal to be woefully inadequate, as you know.) However, he went on to express his belief that continuing discussions between the two on technology transfer will result in a satisfactory agreement being reached. We can hope that this means that Japan may be willing to move toward our position on this important issue.

On economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, it was particularly critical that you placed the matter in proper perspective, as you did, by saying that these sanctions are a direct result of Soviet action against Poland. Abe had been broader in his initial comments.

In closing, your comments about the importance which you and the President attach to U.S.-Japan relations was right on the mark. Abe responded to this by stressing his commitment to the U.S.-Japan Alliance. He used the Japanese word domei for alliance which implies "alliance" in the full sense of the term.

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BY LOJ NARA DATE 7/24/06

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Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
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For meeting today at 4:15.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 4, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for Your Meeting with Japanese
MITI Minister, Shintaro Abe

You will be meeting with the MITI Minister at 4:15 p.m. today. Chuck Tyson and I will bring him to your office after his meeting here with members of the Council of Economic Advisers.

While his visit is simply a courtesy call, you may have a chance to make one or two points. These would be along the following lines:

Both the U.S. and Japan are concerned about Soviet military build-up. We must do everything we can, together, to ensure that we deter Soviets from military adventurism and blackmail. This requires larger defense budgets for both of our countries and as full an exchange of high technology as possible. By doing these things, we will be able to secure our countries' safety in the years to come.

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BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/24/86

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PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2776 DTG: 070624Z OCT 82 PSN: 006638
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 SECTO 13076

NOOIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P), UNGA, JA, PEPR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SAKURAUCHI

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN A TWO-AND-A-HALF HOUR LUNCHEON MEETING, THE SECRETARY BROUGHT SAKURAUCHI UP-TO-DATE ON PIPELINE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WEST EUROPEANS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT JAPAN COULD JOIN IN THE CONSENSUS THAT SEEMED TO BE EMERGING ON ECONOMIC ISSUES INVOLVING THE SOVIET UNION. SAKURAUCHI FORESAW LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN REGARD TO COCOM AND CREDITS AND THOUGHT JAPAN WOULD WISH TO JOIN IN A PROPOSED STUDY ON LONGER-TERM TRADE AND ECONOMIC POLICY BUT RESERVED JUDGMENT PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO GAS AND OIL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PENDING FURTHER DISCUSSION. HE INDICATED THE US ATTITUDE ON THE SAKAHLIN PROJECT WOULD BE A KEY DETERMINANT AND THE SECRETARY ASSURED HIM THAT SAKAHLIN WOULD BE TREATED IN PARALLEL WITH THE PIPELINE. SAKURAUCHI AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY ON THE NEED FOR A CONTINUING STRONG JAPANESE DEFENSE EFFORT BUT CALLED ATTENTION TO THE SEVERE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH NEXT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

YEAR'S BUDGET WAS BEING COMPILED. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO KEEP WORKING FOR A POLICY ON EXCHANGE OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY THAT WE COULD FIND ACCEPTABLE. A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE MEETING WAS TAKEN UP WITH DISCUSSION OF SAKURAUCHI'S CHINA VISIT, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO AND THE DISARMAMENT TALKS. IT WAS AGREED TO ANNOUNCE JAPAN'S PLANNED COLLABORATION IN THE TRAINING OF REFUGEES AT THE BATAAN CENTER TO BE RESETTLED IN THE US AND THERE WAS A CLEAR CONSENSUS THAT WE SHOULD WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER FOR A SUCCESSFUL GATT MINISTERIAL. SAKURAUCHI ASKED THE US TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD PERMIT BROADER ADHERENCE TO THE LAW OF THE SEA AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. SAKURAUCHI AT THE OUTSET OF HIS FIRST MEETING WITH

THE SECRETARY SINCE THE LATTER ASSUMED OFFICE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO DISCUSS BILATERAL ISSUES BUT THE MAJOR WORLD QUESTIONS WHERE WE BOTH HAD MUCH AT STAKE. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE LED OFF WITH COMMENTS ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO CHINA IN THE COMPANY OF PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI. THEY HAD ARRIVED JUST AFTER THE CCP PARTY CONGRESS AND WERE ABLE TO MEET WITH THE RECONFIRMED PRC LEADERSHIP. SAKURAUCHI WAS IMPRESSED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CHINESE EMPHASIZED THAT IN CONTAINING SOVIET HEGEMONISM, IT WAS NECESSARY TO JOIN FORCES WITH THE US AND OTHERS. THE CHINESE RAISED THE TEXTBOOK ISSUE IN WHICH JAPAN'S NEIGHBORS HAD BEEN KEENLY INTERESTED AND EXPRESSED CONCERN LEST THE JAPANESE LEADERSHIP ADVOCATE REVIVAL OF JAPANESE MILITARISM. SAKURAUCHI IN TURN RESPONDED THAT THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION COMMITTED IT TO PEACE, THE GOJ INTENDED TO ABIDE BY ITS THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES AND JAPAN WAS ONLY INTERESTED IN SELF-DEFENSE AND WOULD NOT BECOME A MAJOR MILITARY POWER. SAKURAUCHI SAID THAT THE CHINESE REACTION SHOWED THAT EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS SUCH CONCERNS HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

4. THE SECRETARY INTERJECTED THAT NO ONE WANTED JAPAN TO TURN MILITARISTIC BUT GIVEN THE "THREAT" MOUNTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY DIRECTED AT SEA LANES, WE HAD TO STRENGTHEN OUR DEFENSES. WHAT WE HAD MUTUALLY UNDERTAKEN AS DEFENSE MISSIONS WAS REGARDED AS IMPORTANT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BY US AND WE KNEW JAPAN ALSO FELT THE SAME WAY.

5. SAKURAUCHI SAID HE AGREED AND THIS WAS A MATTER IN WHICH JAPAN WOULD KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THE US, BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT DEFENSE POLICY WITH THE TOTAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN MIND. HE HAD FOUND AN INTERESTING CHINESE VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY SAID THAT IN THE PAST, CHINA LOOKED LIKE A MULBERRY LEAF ON THE MAP BUT THIS WAS NO LONGER SO (WHICH SAKURAUCHI TOOK TO MEAN MONGOLIA WAS NO LONGER INCLUDED). THE CHINESE LEADERS SAID THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT SOVIET HEGEMONY IN AFGHANISTAN OR KAMPUCHEA AND NO IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE UNLESS THE

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PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2776 DTG: 071557Z OCT 82 PSN: 006840
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KOREA NDR WOULD WE CONSIDER FAILING OUR FRIENDS IN JAPAN.

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SOVIETS ACCEPTED THIS VIEW.

6. IN REGARD TO INF AND START, SAKURAUCHI SAID JAPAN STRONGLY SUPPORTED DISARMAMENT TALKS AND HOPED FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION BUT IT SEEMED THAT WOULD TAKE TIME. WHEN HE MENTIONED THE SLOW PACE IN HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO THE DAY BEFORE, GROMYKO SAID THAT WAS BECAUSE THE US WAS TAKING A HARSH STAND. SAKURAUCHI CALLED ATTENTION TO SUZUKI'S SPEECH AT THE SSOD IN WHICH HE CALLED FOR DISARMAMENT, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, MAKING AVAILABLE THE RELEASED RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WHATEVER DISARMAMENT EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE WOULD BE WELCOMED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD.

7. ASKED BY THE SECRETARY FOR ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON HIS CHINA TRIP THAT WOULD BE OF US INTEREST, SAKURAUCHI SAID THAT THE CHINESE KEPT RAISING TAIWAN ARMS SALES CLAIMING THAT AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED AND THEY HOPED THE US WOULD GRADUALLY REDUCE AND EVENTUALLY CEASE ARMS DELIVERIES; THEY CLAIMED THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT CAST A SHADOW ON US-PRC RELATIONS. THE CHINESE ALSO SAID THE US SHOULD HAVE MORE UNDERSTANDING FOR NORTH KOREA WHICH WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

E.G., AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE COAST AND DEVELOPMENT OF ITS NON-FERROUS METAL INDUSTRIES, AND OFFERED NO THREAT TO THE SOUTH. THE JAPANESE HAD INFORMED THE CHINESE THAT JAPAN'S OWN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA WERE HAMPERED BY NORTH KOREA'S FAILURE TO REPAY PRIVATE CREDITS.

8. COMMENTING ON SAKURAUCHI'S IMPRESSIONS, THE SECRETARY SAID WHEN THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER RAISED THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT WITH HIM THE WEEK BEFORE, HE HAD ASSURED HIM THAT THE ACT HAD WIDE-SPREAD BACKING IN CONGRESS AND WAS WHOLE-HEARTEDLY SUPPORTED BY THE PRESIDENT. WE WANTED HUANG HUA TO KNOW THERE WAS NO CHANCE WE WOULD WANT TO CHANGE THE ACT AND WOULD, OF COURSE, OBSERVE CAREFULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMMUNIQUE WE HAD NEGOTIATED. THE US DID NOT FAIL ITS FRIENDS IN TAIWAN OR

9. IN REGARD TO ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAD TO CONTEND WITH THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD PUT IN PLACE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES AIMED AT EUROPE WHEN THE ALLIES HAD NONE IN PLACE. THAT WAS AN INDICATION OF HOW THE RUSSIANS PLAYED THE GAME. WE UNDERSTOOD AS MANY AS 100 SS-20'S WERE AIMED AT JAPAN SO WHEN WE TALKED TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT ARMS REDUCTION, WE WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO JAPAN. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY REALIZE WE WOULD INCREASE OUR STRENGTH AND IMPROVE OUR DEPLOYMENTS UNLESS THEY REDUCED WEAPONS AIMED AT OUR ALLIES. WHILE WE WOULD NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, WE WOULD NOT LEAVE OURSELVES VULNERABLE TO SOME SOVIET DOMINANCE IN THE MISSILE AREA. IT WOULD SEEM THAT GROMYKO'S DEFINITION OF US UNREASONABLENESS WAS THAT WE INSISTED THAT MASSIVE SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS THAT THREATENED FRIENDS SHOULD BE DISMANTLED; WE FELT THAT WAS REASONABLE AND THAT OTHERWISE OUR FRIENDS WOULD FEEL LET DOWN.

10. OUR NEGOTIATORS IN THE INF AND START TALKS, WHO WERE HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESSLIKE, REPORTED THAT THEY FOUND THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS ALSO BUSINESSLIKE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD COMMENTED TO THIS EFFECT IN HIS UNGA SPEECH AND IN HIS TWO MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO. THERE WAS NO PREDICTION WHEN AN AGREEMENT WOULD EMERGE BUT WE WERE VERY SERIOUS AND HAD JAPAN'S AND ALLIED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTERESTS VERY MUCH IN MIND.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IN HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO, BOTH AGREED US-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE TENSE AND STRAINED. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT SOVIET BEHAVIOR SEEN IN AFGHANISTAN, KAMPUCHEA, POLAND, ETC., WAS THE BASIC CAUSE. WHILE WE WERE PREPARED TO STANDBY OUR FRIENDS IN THE ENVIRONMENT THE SOVIETS HAD CREATED, WE WERE ALSO PREPARED FOR A BETTER RELATIONSHIP, BUT THAT CALLED FOR A CHANGE IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR. THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO CREATE A TRANSCRIPT THAT SOME INCOMING SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD HOPEFULLY READ, CONCLUDING THAT IT COULD HAVE A DIFFERENT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP IF IT SO DESIRED.

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PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2778 DTG: 071557Z OCT 82 PSN: 006841
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12. SAKURAUCHI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT THE SECRETARY WAS DRIVING AT. IN REGARD TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS, HE WAS MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THE PIPELINE ISSUE WHICH HE WAS FOLLOWING CLOSELY AND APPRECIATED THE STATUS REPORT THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED TO HAVE CONVEYED TO HIM THROUGH AMBASSADOR OKAWARA. IN REGARD TO THE VARIOUS MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION, HE THOUGHT THAT JAPAN COULD SUPPORT MEASURES TO MEET COCOM REQUIREMENTS AND THAT JAPAN WAS BASICALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE US ON CREDIT AS IT HAD INDICATED PRIOR TO AND DURING THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT. SHOULD OTHER COUNTRIES AGREE AND A RELAXATION OF THE JUNE SANCTIONS RESULT, HE WISHED TO STRESS JAPAN'S INTEREST IN THE SAKAHLIN PROJECT. IT WOULD BE UNTENABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE PIPELINE WENT AHEAD BUT LICENSES FOR THE SAKAHLIN PROJECT WERE STILL WITHHELD. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE SUPPORT JAPAN HAD GIVEN TO THE US LEAD IN RESPONSE TO THE SITUATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND. CONTROLS ON EXPORTS OF OIL AND GAS TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT COULD POSE DIFFICULTIES; FURTHER EXPLORATION WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE JAPAN COULD MAKE ITS VIEWS KNOWN.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

JAPAN'S INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS AND INTENDED TO KEEP JAPAN FULLY INFORMED EVERY STEP OF THE WAY. A CONSENSUS SEEMED TO BE EMERGING AND IT WAS VITAL JAPAN BE A PART OF IT. WE WOULD CERTAINLY TREAT SAKAHLIN IN PARALLEL WITH THE PIPELINE AND JAPAN COULD COUNT ON THIS.

14. SAKURAUCHI SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE SECRETARY'S KEEPING JAPAN INFORMED AND WOULD EXPRESS MORE DEFINITIVE VIEWS ONCE HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ABLE TO STUDY WHATEVER CONSENSUS WAS AGREED. HE ALSO THOUGHT JAPAN WOULD WANT TO JOIN IN ANY STUDY THAT MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN ON LONG-TERM TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

15. IN RESPONSE TO SAKURAUCHI'S INQUIRY ABOUT THE STATUS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEANS, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WERE PUTTING TOGETHER WHAT SEEMED TO

REFLECT THE SENSE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS, AS WELL AS AMBASSADOR OKAWARA, AT THE MEETING OF NATO MINISTERS IN CANADA OVER THE WEEKEND. EVERYONE HOPED JAPAN WOULD JOIN IN WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS WERE AGREED AND JUDGING FROM WHAT WE HAD HEARD THUS FAR, THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM. IN REGARD TO HIGH TECHNOLOGY, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT AS NOW PHRASED, GOVERNMENTS WOULD EXAMINE THE QUESTION, AND IF THEY AGREED ON NEW MEASURES, WOULD TAKE THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COCOM PROCESS.

16. AMBASSADOR OKAWARA SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT WHEN HE GAVE HIS REACTIONS TO UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER THE OTHER DAY, HE WAS NOT PRESENTING A DEFINITIVE GOVERNMENT POSITION; THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. ASKED BY SAKURAUCHI HOW HE SAW ARRANGEMENTS BEING FINALIZED, THE SECRETARY SAID WE WERE NOT SURE BUT A SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE THAT THERE MIGHT BE A MEETING OF THE SUMMIT AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON THE FOLLOWING WEEK WHICH COULD CONSIDER HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE AGENDA. WHEN WE SPOKE OF "CONSENSUS" WE HAD THUS FAR TALKED WITH EACH OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED IN VARIOUS WAYS, BUT UNTIL TODAY, THE SECRETARY HAD HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO TALK DIRECTLY TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER OR TO HAVE AN EXPLICIT DISCUSSION WITH THE JAPANESE.

17. SAKURAUCHI SAID HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE

USDEL SECRETARY IN 2778 DTG: 071557Z OCT 82 PSN: 006841
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROPOSED AMBASSADORIAL MEETING. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO LINE UP TOGETHER ON SUCH IMPORTANT ISSUES AND WOULD STRIVE TO THIS END.

18. WITH TIME RUNNING OUT, SAKURAUCHI SAID HE WISHED TO TOUCH ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES BRIEFLY, BUT FIRST WISHED TO ADD TO THE EXISTING INVITATION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN TO VISIT JAPAN, AN INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY. SUCH A VISIT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS IN DETAIL AND HE MIGHT WISH TO BRING SOME OF THE ECONOMIC MEMBERS OF THE CABINET ALONG TO TREAT WITH ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

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PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2778 DTG: Z PSN: 006845
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19. TURNING TO GATT, SAKURAUCHI SAID THE UPCOMING MINISTERIAL MEETING WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMICALLY, AND WE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN THE WORLD'S FREE TRADING SYSTEM IN ADDITION TO TREATING SUBJECTS SUCH AS SAFEGUARDS AND TRADE RELATED INVESTMENT. JAPAN WISHED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE US TO MAKE THIS A FRUITFUL MEETING.

20. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO FIND WE SAW THE WORLD THE SAME WAY: THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S EMPHASIS ON THE GATT MINISTERIAL WAS EXACTLY RIGHT. HE ALSO APPRECIATED THE INVITATION TO VISIT JAPAN AND ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN THERE TWICE EARLIER IN THE YEAR, HE HOPED TO GO IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY.

21. SAKURAUCHI CALLED ATTENTION TO JAPAN'S DECISION TO EXTEND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO PREPARE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES AT THE BATAAN CENTER FOR RESETTLEMENT IN THE US AND HE AND THE SECRETARY AGREED TO A PRESS RELEASE AFTER THE MEETING ANNOUNCING PLANS FOR THIS COOPERATIVE EFFORT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

22. SAKURAUCHI SAID HE WAS AWARE THE US WOULD NOT BECOME SIGNATORY TO THE LOS AGREEMENT BUT WE DID NOT WISH TO HAVE A TREATY SUPPORTED ONLY BY THE THIRD WORLD, THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST EUROPEANS AND HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD RECONSIDER SIGNING. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT WE WANTED OUR FRIENDS TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE MINING CONVENTION WHICH DID NOT SEEM TO OFFER A REALISTIC PROSPECT OF MINING THE DEEP SEA BEDS. HE WAS AWARE OF JAPANESE CONCERNS AND THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO EXPLORE WHETHER ANY ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

23. SAKURAUCHI SAID DEFENSE MINISTER ITO HAD HAD EXTENSIVE DEFENSE DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS THE WEEK BEFORE SO HE WOULD NOT DWELL ON DEFENSE AT THIS TIME. HE ONLY WISHED THE SECRETARY TO BE AWARE THAT THE GUIDELINE FOR THE

INCREASE IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET THIS YEAR OF 7.346 PERCENT CAME AT A TIME WHEN AN OVERALL GUIDELINE OF MINUS FIVE PERCENT WAS BEING APPLIED TO MOST OF THE BUDGET; THIS COMPARED WITH A DEFENSE BUDGET INCREASE OF 7.75 PERCENT LAST YEAR AGAINST AN OVERALL GUIDELINE OF ZERO PERCENT GROWTH. HE HOPED THE SECRETARY WOULD BEAR THIS IN MIND AS THE BUDGET COMPILATION REACHED ITS FINAL PHASES TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR.

24. IN REGARD TO EXCHANGE OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY, SAKURAUCHI DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT JAPAN KEPT PUTTING OFF A DECISION. THERE WERE THOSE WITHIN THE GOJ WHO UNDERSTOOD THE US POSITION AND WERE TRYING TO GET THE RIGHT POLICY BUT THEY WERE HAVING A HARD TIME. HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO GET THE RIGHT POLICY BUT PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI WOULD MAKE THE FINAL DECISION.

25. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD JAPAN'S BUDGET PROBLEMS BUT WE ALWAYS HAD TO COME BACK TO JUDGING THE BUDGET AGAINST MISSIONS AND THERE WAS GREAT NEED FOR SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT. NOTHING WOULD BE MORE DEMONSTRATIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OUR ARMS CONTROL TALKS THAN A GOOD DEFENSE EFFORT. IN REGARD TO DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY, THE SECRETARY SAID WE APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR CONSENSUS IN KEEPING WITH THE JAPANESE SYSTEM AND WOULD ONLY ADD THAT WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE AN ARRANGEMENT THAT WAS RECIPROCAL.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

26. IN CONCLUSION, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE PICTURE HE HOPED TO PAINT AS A RESULT OF HIS MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES WOULD SOLVE PROBLEMS AND FIND AGREEMENT. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND JAPAN WERE OF SUCH OVER-RIDING IMPORTANCE THAT HE WOULD GIVE THEM ALL THE TIME NEEDED TO MAKE SURE THEY WENT FORWARD IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE. SHULTZ

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COURSE, CALL AT AN EARLY DATE ON THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER AND WILL PRESS THIS ISSUE.

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DTG: 150552Z OCT 82 PSN: 017571

1. (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. APPRECIATE SECRETARY S CONCERN FOR A RAPID AND POSITIVE JAPANESE RESPONSE TO NON-PAPER. HOWEVER, RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI AND VIRTUAL CERTAINTY OF CABINET CHANGES IN THE NEAR FUTURE HAVE COMPLICATED HIGH LEVEL APPROACHES HERE. I WILL DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO GET A DEFINITIVE AND FAVORABLE JAPANESE RESPONSE TO WEST-EAST "NON-PAPER," KEEPING WELL IN MIND YOUR INJUNCTION NOT TO SHOW ANXIETY OR TO SEEM IN A RUSH TO SETTLE.

3. IN A PERIOD OF POLITICAL ADJUSTMENT IN TOKYO IT IS ALWAYS HELPFUL TO TRY TO PIN DOWN THE POWERFUL JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY. I WILL SEEK AN ANSWER FROM VICE MINISTER SUNOBE WHEN I SEE HIM FOR OUR MONTHLY LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY, OCT 20. PRIOR TO THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE WILL ADVISE HIM OF MY INTENTION TO RAISE THE ISSUE. IN PREPARATION FOR THIS WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE THE PAPER, WITH THE ONE CHANGE REGARDING NO NEW GAS CONTRACTS, AND ARE VERY MUCH AWARE THAT WE WANT JAPAN'S POSITIVE PARTICIPATION IN ACHIEVING THIS NEW CONSENSUS.

4. WITH RESPECT TO SAKURAUCHI, AN APPROACH TO HIM NOW WOULD BE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE WITHOUT A HIGH RISK OF POSSIBLY DAMAGING PUBLICITY. IN ANY EVENT, SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD NOT STRENGTHEN OUR CASE SINCE SAKURAUCHI CAN NO LONGER SPEAK WITH REAL AUTHORITY, SO I AM WITHHOLDING THAT STEP. AFTER THE EXPECTED CABINET RESHUFFLE I WILL, OF

5. AT MY REQUEST, EMIN PIEZ INFORMALLY DISCUSSED CURRENT STATUS WITH MOFA ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS TANAKA ON OCTOBER 14 AND GAVE HIM NEW TEXT FOR PARA 3 (C). TANAKA HAD FULL TEXT AND SAID INSTRUCTIONS WERE GOING OUT THAT DAY TO AMBASSADOR OKAWARA IN WASHINGTON TO SEEK CLARIFICATION ON A FEW POINTS. HE SAID AN EARLY RESPONSE FROM US TO OKAWARA WOULD BE HELPFUL. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT MOFA UNDERSTOOD SOME EUROPEANS WERE CONCERNED THAT CURRENT OECD CONSENSUS RATES ON CREDITS TO THE USSR WERE ALREADY PROVING TO BE VERY COSTLY. TANAKA SAID MOFA IS ALSO CHECKING CLOSELY IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS ON REACTIONS THERE. EMIN SAID WE WANTED TO DEAL WITH GOJ NEED FOR CLARIFICATION, BUT SITUATION NOW REQUIRED OVERALL POSITIVE COMMITMENT AND UNDERSTANDING ON THE NON-PAPER WITHOUT LETTING DETAILS DISTRACT US FROM REAL ISSUES. TANAKA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND WOULD SEEK TO HAVE A CLEARED GOJ RESPONSE BY OCT 20.
MANSFIELD

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NLS FOO-037/1#361

BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 18 OCT 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM OSBORNE, K

DOCDATE 18 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

AP

SASAKAWA, RYOICHI

FLETCHER, CHARLES K

SUBJECT: REQUEST APPT FOR SASAKAWA W/ PRES DURING 25 - 30 OCT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 19 OCT 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

MCGAFFIGAN

CHILDRESS

TYSON

SOMMER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Clark	X 10/20	For signature		
Clark	X 10/22	add-on / for info		
	OCT 25 1982	Clark noted		
	OCT 25 1982	McFarlane sig		KO SV, CT

DISPATCH ed mm OCT 25 1982

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) Rt

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1982

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR KEN DUBERSTEIN

FROM: BUD McFARLANE *Bud*
SUBJECT: Ryoichi Sasakawa from Japan

I do not believe the President should meet with Mr. Sasakawa, who is a highly controversial figure in Japan.

Could you call former Congressman Fletcher back and simply tell him that the President's schedule does not allow for a meeting with Mr. Sasakawa.

Attachment

Tab A Kathy Osborne's Memo to Judge Clark

cc Kathy Osborne

~~SECRET~~
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NLS F00-037/1-362
BY MOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7245

82 OCT 18 P 3: 21

MEMORANDUM

TO: JUDGE CLARK
FROM: KATHY OSBORNE
SUBJECT: RYOICHI SASAKAWA FROM JAPAN
DATE: October 18, 1982

I received a phone call from former Congressman Charles K. Fletcher of San Diego and Hawaii this afternoon. He is good friends with Mr. Ryoichi Sasakawa, one of the wealthiest men in the world (his net worth is estimated to be approx. 5 billion). There was a large article in the L.A. Times on September 24th about "The man behind the bullet train in Japan" regarding Mr. Sasakawa.

The reason Congressman Fletcher called is that he knew the President was going to be near the West coast next week and also knew that Mr. Sasakawa will be on the West Coast from the 25th through the 30th. He said that Mr. Sasakawa would like to meet with the President for a few moments and would fly anywhere during that time period to see him.

Mr. Sasakawa's international division secretary is Mr. Rioux at Tokyo 01-81-3, 508-2377

Kathy

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

October 22, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

WPC HAS SEEN

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting Between the President
and Ryoichi Sasakawa of Japan

At Jackie's request I returned a call to you from Congressman Burgener (R-CA). Burgener was calling at the behest of former Congressman Charles Fletcher to ask that the President meet with Ryoichi Sasakawa of Japan.

Burgener's call was very much in line with the memo that Kathy Osborne sent you concerning the same request and which Gaston has commented on (Tab A).

I told Burgener that the President's schedule was probably already booked, but promised to convey to you Burgener's request. Burgener's approach was very low key and he seemed satisfied.

cc: Gaston Sigur

~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

*MSP
11/26/04*

~~SECRET~~

7245

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

October 19, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting Between the President and Ryoichi Sasakawa of Japan

I suggest that the President not meet with Mr. Ryoichi Sasakawa. He is indeed one of the world's richest men and has contributed to numerous good works, both in Japan and in the United States, including several hundred thousand dollars to the United Nations. However, Mr. Sasakawa is believed by many Japanese to have close ties to the Japanese underworld. On the ABC 20/20 TV show, he was depicted several months ago as a kind of "godfather" Japanese. While I have no intention of passing judgment on the truth of these stories, the fact that they are given this kind of currency, leads me to the firm conclusion that the President should be too busy to see him.

RECOMMENDATION:

Ken Oberstein

That you sign the attached memo (Tab I) to Kathy Osborne, recommending that she call former Congressman Fletcher back and inform him of the President's inability to meet with Mr. Sasakawa.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Clark memo to Osborne
- Tab A Osborne memo to Clark

~~SECRET~~
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BY LOT 7/24/06

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 7245

82 OCT 22 P 6 : 46

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>KyI</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>4</u>		
Sit Room			

I-Information

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

[Handwritten signature]

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 7245

82 OCT 20 P 2: 29

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Notes

cc: Kathy Osborn

~~SECRET~~

7245

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR *Ken DuBerstein* ~~KATHY OSBORNE~~
FROM: ~~WILLIAM P. CLARK~~ *BOB McFARLANE*
SUBJECT: Ryoichi Sasakawa from Japan

I do not believe the President should meet with Mr. Sasakawa, who is a highly controversial figure in Japan.

Could you call former Congressman Fletcher back and simply tell him that the President's schedule does not allow for a meeting with Mr. Sasakawa.

Attachment:
Tab A ~~Your~~ memo to Judge Clark

KATHY OSBORNE'S

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BY LAT DATE 7/24/06

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