

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File:  
Records

**Folder Title:** Japan (05/20/1982-06/05/1982)

**Box:** RAC Box 8

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

**Archivist:** mjd

**OA/Box:**  
**File Folder:** Japan (5/20/82 – 6/5/82)

**FOIA ID:** F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
**Date:** 01/12/2004

| DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE   | DATE    | RESTRICTION       |
|---------------------|---|---------|-------------------|
| 1. Cable            | 200843Z MAY 82, 2p<br><i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 # 317</i>                                | 5/20/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 2. Memo             | Norman Bailey to William Clark re Sakhalin Project, 1p<br><i>R " " # 318</i>          | 5/25/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 3. Report           | 4p<br><i>D " " # 319</i>  | 5/19/82 | B1, <del>B3</del> |
| 4. Memo             | Bailey to Clark re Sakhalin Project, 1p<br><i>R " " # 320</i>                         | 5/25/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 5. Memo             | Bailey to Clark re Sakhalin, 1p<br><i>R " " # 321</i>                                 | 5/20/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 6. Report           | 4p<br><i>D " " # 322</i>  | 5/19/82 | B1, <del>B3</del> |
| 7. Cable            | 221626Z MAY 82, 1p  | 5/22/82 | B1                |
| 8. Cable            | 270812Z MAY 82, 2p<br><i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 # 324</i>                                | 5/27/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 9. Memo             | Bailey to Robert McFarlane re Cable to Ambassador Mansfield, 1p<br><i>R " " # 325</i> | 5/28/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 10. Cable           | Michael Wheeler to L. Paul Bremer re Cable to Mansfield, 1p<br><i>R " " # 326</i>     | Nd      | <del>B1</del>     |
| 11. Draft<br>Cable  | To Mansfield, 6p<br><i>D " " # 327</i>  | Nd      | B1                |
| 12. Memo            | Caspar Wienberger to Clark re Japan's Defense Efforts, 2p<br><i>R 1/9/07 " # 328</i>  | 6/1/82  | <del>B1</del>     |
| 13. Memo            | Donald Gregg to Clark re Japan's Defense Effort, 1p                                   | 6/2/82  | B1                |
| 14. Cable           | 040534Z JUN 82, 1p<br><i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 # 330</i>                                | 6/4/82  | <del>B1</del>     |
| 15. Cable           | 040800Z JUN 82, 1p<br><i>R " " # 331</i>  | 6/4/82  | <del>B1</del>     |

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

**Archivist:** mjd

**OA/Box:**  
**File Folder:** Japan (5/20/82 – 6/5/82)

**FOIA ID:** F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
**Date:** 01/12/2004

| DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE   | DATE   | RESTRICTION   |
|---------------------|---|--------|---------------|
| 16. Cable           | 050348Z JUN 82, 2p<br><i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #332</i> | 6/5/82 | <del>B1</del> |
| 17. Cable           | 050354Z JUN 82, 1p<br><i>R " " #333</i>               | 6/5/82 | <del>B1</del> |

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

**Archivist:** mjd

**OA/Box:**  
**File Folder:** Japan (5/20/82 – 6/5/82)

**FOIA ID:** F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
**Date:** 01/12/2004

| DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE   | DATE    | RESTRICTION       |
|---------------------|---|---------|-------------------|
| 1. Cable            | 200843Z MAY 82, 2p<br><i>R 7/24/06 Foo-037/1 # 317</i>                                | 5/20/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 2. Memo             | Norman Bailey to William Clark re Sakhalin Project, 1p<br><i>R " " # 318</i>          | 5/25/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 3. Report           | 4p<br><i>D " " # 319</i>  | 5/19/82 | B1, <del>B3</del> |
| 4. Memo             | Bailey to Clark re Sakhalin Project, 1p<br><i>R " " # 320</i>                         | 5/25/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 5. Memo             | Bailey to Clark re Sakhalin, 1p<br><i>R " " # 321</i>                                 | 5/20/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 6. Report           | 4p<br><i>D " " # 322</i>  | 5/19/82 | B1, <del>B3</del> |
| 7. Cable            | 221626Z MAY 82, 1p  | 5/22/82 | B1                |
| 8. Cable            | 270812Z MAY 82, 2p<br><i>R 7/24/06 Foo-037/1 # 324</i>                                | 5/27/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 9. Memo             | Bailey to Robert McFarlane re Cable to Ambassador Mansfield, 1p<br><i>R " " # 325</i> | 5/28/82 | <del>B1</del>     |
| 10. Cable           | Michael Wheeler to L. Paul Bremer re Cable to Mansfield, 1p<br><i>R " " # 326</i>     | Nd      | <del>B1</del>     |
| 11. Draft<br>Cable  | To Mansfield, 6p<br><i>D " " # 327</i>  | Nd      | B1                |
| 12. Memo            | Caspar Wienberger to Clark re Japan's Defense Efforts, 2p<br><i>R 1/9/07 " # 328</i>  | 6/1/82  | <del>B1</del>     |
| 13. Memo            | Donald Gregg to Clark re Japan's Defense Effort, 1p                                   | 6/2/82  | B1                |
| 14. Cable           | 040534Z JUN 82, 1p<br><i>R 7/24/06 Foo-037/1 # 330</i>                                | 6/4/82  | <del>B1</del>     |
| 15. Cable           | 040800Z JUN 82, 1p<br><i>R " " # 331</i>  | 6/4/82  | <del>B1</del>     |

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

**Archivist:** mjd

**OA/Box:**  
**File Folder:** Japan (5/20/82 – 6/5/82)

**FOIA ID:** F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
**Date:** 01/12/2004

| DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE   | DATE   | RESTRICTION   |
|---------------------|---|--------|---------------|
| 16. Cable           | 050348Z JUN 82, 2p<br><i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #332</i> | 6/5/82 | <del>B1</del> |
| 17. Cable           | 050354Z JUN 82, 1p<br><i>R " " #333</i>               | 6/5/82 | <del>B1</del> |

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 TOKYO 8412  
SIT022 DATE 05/24/82

DTG: 200843Z MAY 82 PSN: 036167  
TOR: 140/0858Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS GREGG  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: TO GREGG FOR ACTION

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #8412 1400844  
O 200843Z MAY 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1150

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6474  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TOKYO 08412

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: EEWT, EPET, JA

SUBJECT: SAKHALIN - PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

1. AS MENTIONED SEPTEL, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME  
MINISTER'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT ON SAKHALIN.

-  
BEGIN TEXT:  
-

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

- SINCE THE POLISH AUTHORITY PROCLAIMED MARTIAL  
LAW IN DECEMBER LAST YEAR, WESTERN COUNTRIES,  
INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, HAVE  
EXPRESSED THEIR GRAVE CONCERN THAT DEVELOPMENTS  
OF THE POLISH SITUATION COULD AFFECT SERIOUSLY  
THE EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL, AS WELL AS  
THE WORLD PEACE, AND ACCORDINGLY HAVE TAKEN  
CONCRETE MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WHILE  
POINTING OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION.  
THIS SHOWS THE UNITY AND COOPERATION AMONG  
WESTERN COUNTRIES, WHICH, I BELIEVE, IS HIGHLY  
VALUED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- IN THIS CONTEXT I WOULD LIKE TO REFER TO  
THE QUESTION OF THE RENEWAL OF THE LICENSES  
WITH REGARD TO THE SAKHALIN EXPLORATION PROJECT,  
WHICH HAS BEEN A PENDING ISSUE IN VIEW OF THE  
MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WHICH  
YOU ANNOUNCED LATE LAST YEAR. I HAVE PERSONALLY  
EXPLAINED OUR CONCERN AND ASKED THE COOPERATION  
OF THE US SIDE TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WHEN HE  
VISITED JAPAN RECENTLY.

- THE SAKHALIN PROJECT IS A ONGOING  
PROJECT WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE 1975,  
AND IF THE LICENSES OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ARE  
NOT ISSUED IN THE VERY NEAREST FUTURE, IT  
SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT THE EXPLORATION WORKS  
FOR THIS YEAR WILL VIRTUALLY BECOME IMPOSSIBLE.  
I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT,

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FDO-037/c#317

BY LOJ, NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 TOKYO 8412

DTG: 200843Z MAY 82 PSN: 036167

DESPITE OF THE INTENTION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN TAKING THE MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, IT WILL THEN BE THE JAPANESE SIDE RATHER THAN THE SOVIET SIDE WHO WILL BE MOSTLY DAMAGED BY SUCH AN OUTCOME.

- I AM FULLY AWARE OF YOUR VARIOUS DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN THIS QUESTION. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY INVOLVED IN THE TIMING OF THE ISSUE, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, YOUR PERSONAL COOPERATION IN BRINGING A FAVORABLE OUTCOME ON THIS ISSUE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT JAPAN HAS BEEN MAINTAINING A MOST CORRECT POSTURE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE AFGHANISTAN INCIDENT, EVEN COMPARED WITH THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE, AND FURTHER THAT, WE HAVE BEEN BASICALLY TAKING A COOPERATIVE POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINING THE EXTENSION OF OFFICIAL CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH ARE NOW BEING DISCUSSED AMONG THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONCERNED.

- I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN AT VERSAILLES EARLY NEXT MONTH.

-

SINCERELY,  
ZENKO SUZUKI  
PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN  
MANSFIELD

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM BAILEY

RECEIVED 21 MAY 82 14

DOC DATE 20 MAY 82

*11/27/82  
1/26/04*

TO CLARK

KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS

OIL

JAPAN

INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SOVIET JAPANESE AGREEMENT FOR REVISED SCHEDULE ON SAKHALIN PROJECT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

ROBINSON

GREGG

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8202436

NSCIFID

( C / )

| ACTION OFFICER (S) | ASSIGNED | ACTION REQUIRED        | DUE  | COPIES TO |
|--------------------|----------|------------------------|------|-----------|
|                    | 5/24     | Clark noted w/ comment |      |           |
| Bailey             | S 5/24   | further action         |      |           |
| Clark              | X 5/25   | Indecision             | 5/27 |           |
|                    | 5/28     | Clark approved #2 d 5  |      | UB, DG    |

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *JA* (C) *UB*



~~SECRET~~

*Talk to Judge  
Done.*

MEMORANDUM

3591

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 25, 1982

*5/27*

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Approaches to the Japanese on Sakhalin

*Passed this to  
the J. Bond for  
transmission  
to State. *J**

In response to your question on my memo of May 20, 1982 (Tab I) and in light of the results of the NSC meeting of May 24, 1982, two interrelated questions must be resolved: How do we inform the Japanese that no exception to the 12/30/81 sanctions will be made for the Sakhalin project for the time being, and do we quietly indicate to Japanese officials that SODECO has been, shall we say, less than candid with them as well as with us?

We will coordinate with State on these matters, of course. I have indicated State's preferences below.

*by* Don Gregg and Roger Robinson concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate your preference on the two issues:

Inform the Japanese of our Sakhalin decision by the following channel:

- OK  No  Through their Ambassador in Washington.
- OK  No  Through a cable to Mansfield
- OK  No  By sending a special representative to Tokyo.
- OK  No  If there is time, by briefing George Shultz before he goes to Tokyo. (State preference.)
- OK  No  Inform the Japanese of our suspicions with reference to SODECO practices. (State prefers no.)

*for Judge*

Attachment  
Tab I My Memo of May 20

~~SECRET~~  
Review May 25, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#318

~~SECRET~~

BY WAT 7/24/86

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 3 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

3591

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 25, 1982

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *MB*

SUBJECT: Approaches to the Japanese on Sakhalin

In response to your question on my memo of May 20, 1982 (Tab I) and in light of the results of the NSC meeting of May 24, 1982, two interrelated questions must be resolved: How do we inform the Japanese that no exception to the 12/30/81 sanctions will be made for the Sakhalin project for the time being, and do we quietly indicate to Japanese officials that SODECO has been, shall we say, less than candid with them as well as with us?

We will coordinate with State on these matters, of course. I have indicated State's preferences below.

*gg* Don Gregg and Roger Robinson concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate your preference on the two issues:

Inform the Japanese of our Sakhalin decision by the following channel:

- OK \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Through their Ambassador in Washington.
- OK \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Through a cable to Mansfield
- OK \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ By sending a special representative to Tokyo.
- OK \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ If there is time, by briefing George Shultz before he goes to Tokyo. (State preference.)
- OK \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Inform the Japanese of our suspicions with reference to SODECO practices. (State prefers no.)

Attachment  
Tab I My Memo of May 20

~~SECRET~~  
Review May 25, 1988

DECLASSIFIED:

NLS FOO-037/1#320

~~SECRET~~

BY LAI 7/24/06

MW

3591

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 20, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Sakhalin

Please note at least the emphasized section of the attached intelligence report. If it is correct, it is another indication that Roger Robinson has been right all along. It is another link in a rotten chain of deception and lies engaged in for years by SODECO and which continues unabated. The Japanese government may be unaware of all this. If they are, a way should be found to tell them. If they are not, they are ipso facto part of the deception.

Attachment  
As stated

*Norm: what about we do with it?  
up*

cc: Roger Robinson  
Don Gregg

~~SECRET~~  
Review on 5/20/88

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FDO-037/1#321  
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 7/24/06



RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 25, 1982

TO: BUD MCFARLANE  
FROM: NORMAN BAILEY

For your review prior  
to our meeting today  
at 4:30 p.m.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 25, 1982

TO: DON GREGG

FROM: NORMAN BAILEY

For your concurrence.

NORM - I do not consider  
these options mutually  
exclusive. We probably  
should do the first two  
& possibly Shultz as well.  
Dan

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

3591

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

DACOM # 91

DÉX # \_\_\_\_\_

TTY # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 7

RELEASER WHC

DTG 271904Z

FROM/LOCATION/

1. ROBERT McFARLANE/THE SITUATION ROOM/THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. RADM JOHNPOINDEXTER FOR JUDGE CLARK/SANTA BARBARA

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_ TOR: 271941Z MAY 82

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

27/1241 L

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DELIVER ASAP

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

*mjm 1/26/04*



RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 8829 DTG: 270812Z MAY 82 PSN: 046933  
SIT798 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 147/0834Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST01. SIT UL CAT FILE :DE

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #8829 1470812  
O 270812Z MAY 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1398

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 6056  
USMISSION GENEVA 5245  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TOKYO 08829  
PASS USTR ELECTRONICALLY  
BRUSSELS FOR USEC  
GENEVA FOR USTR DEL.  
E.O. 12065: NA  
TAGS: ETRD, JA  
SUBJECT: THE SECOND TRADE PACKAGE: THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
STATEMENT

1. THE STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH TWO WAS GIVEN TO THE  
AMBASSADOR BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER DURING HIS MEETING  
MORNING OF MAY 27. IT WILL BE RELEASED ON MAY 28.  
OTHER PORTIONS OF THE PACKAGE INCLUDING THE EIGHT  
POINTS OF THE PACKAGE AND THE LIST OF TARIFFS TO BE  
REDUCED WILL BE DELIVERED BY THE JAPANESE EMBASSY IN  
WASHINGTON ON MAY 27 WASHINGTON TIME.

2. QUOTE:  
STATEMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE OPENING OF THE  
JAPANESE MARKET - MAY 28, 1982  
- THE EXTREME STAGNATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY HAS  
GIVEN RISE TO MOUNTING PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES, AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE FREE TRADING SYSTEM, WHICH HAS SUSTAINED THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE POST-WAR WESTERN ECONOMY, IS TODAY  
ABOUT TO BE IN JEOPARDY. JAPAN, WHOSE ECONOMY  
REPRESENTS TEN PCT OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, IS ASKED TO  
MAKE INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTION COMMENSURATE WITH ITS  
OWN POSITION. WE HAD TAKEN A SERIES OF LIBERALIZATION  
MEASURES WHICH RENDERED THE JAPANESE MARKET NO LESS  
OPEN THAN THOSE OF THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES IN  
TERMS OF LEGAL INSTITUTION. WE CARRIED THE PROCESS  
ONE STEP FURTHER AND, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF MAKING  
INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE  
FREE TRADING SYSTEM, TOOK SUCH STEPS AS UNILATERAL  
REDUCTION OF TARIFFS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "OFFICE  
OF TRADE OMBUDSMAN". FURTHER, WE HAVE TODAY DECIDED  
ON A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF MEASURES TO OPEN OUR MARKET  
FURTHER.

- IN ORDER THAT THESE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL  
MEASURES BRING ABOUT CONCRETE RESULTS, WHAT IS  
NECESSARY IS THE ATTITUDE TO WELCOME FOREIGN PRODUCTS  
OR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN ACTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGE-  
MENT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES. JAPAN ALREADY ABOLISHED  
THE "BUY JAPANESE POLICY" ABOUT TEN YEARS AGO. SINCE  
THEN, JAPAN HAS BEEN MAKING A VARIETY OF EFFORTS, SUCH  
AS THE DISPATCHING OF IMPORT PROMOTION MISSIONS, TOWARD  
THIS END. IT IS A FACT THAT, EVEN TODAY, PERCEPTIONS  
ABROAD ARE STILL NOT WITHOUT MISUNDERSTANDINGS OR  
MISTAKEN IMAGES; IT IS ARGUED THAT JAPAN STILL USES  
ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE TO PROTECT ITS DOMESTIC  
PRODUCTS OR THAT THE JAPANESE CONSIDER EXPORT VIRTUE AND  
IMPORT VICE.

- I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ASK THOSE  
WHO ARE ENGAGED IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS WELL AS THE  
PEOPLE IN PRIVATE FIRMS WHO ARE BEARING THE BRUNT OF  
EVERYDAY ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES TO BE EVEN MORE CLEAR AND  
FORTHCOMING IN TAKING THE ATTITUDE OF EXTENDING A  
WELCOMING HAND TO FOREIGN PRODUCTS AND INVESTMENTS  
AND NOT DISCRIMINATING AGAINST THEM.

- IN ORDER TO EXPAND IMPORT OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS  
TO THE JAPANESE MARKET, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK THE PEOPLE  
CONCERNED TO GIVE THEIR MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN  
FIRMS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP PRODUCTS WHICH WILL  
MEET THE MARKET CONDITION AND CHOOSE THE DISTRIBUTION  
SYSTEM IN JAPAN, ETC.

- I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT IN TODAY'S WORLD ECONOMIC

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SITUATION, IT IS VITAL FOR JAPAN, ON THE BASIS OF ITS  
POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO MAKE  
CONTRIBUTIONS WORTHY OF ITS ABILITY TOWARDS THE  
REVITALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND EXPANSION OF  
THE WORLD TRADE.

- I APPEAL TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE FOR THEIR UNDER-  
STANDING AND COOPERATION.  
UNQUOTE.  
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 8829

DTG: 270812Z MAY 82 PSN: 046933

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FPO-037/1#324  
BY LOJ 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 8953 DTG: 280812Z MAY 82 PSN: 047877  
SIT577 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 148/0857Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #8953 1480813  
O 280812Z MAY 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1462

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 08953

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 5/28/02 (CLARK, WILLIAM) ORM

TAGS: PARM, PPDC, START, UR, US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ALLIES ON REAGAN-BREZHNEV

CORRESPONDENCE ON START

REF: STATE 145847

ON MAY 28 THE AMBASSADOR BRIEFED MOFA VICE MINISTER  
SUNOBE ON THE EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN  
THE PRESIDENT AND BREZHNEV ON START. SUNOBE  
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND REITERATED JAPAN'S  
STRONG INTEREST IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. HE EXPRESSED  
HOPE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD IN FACT BEGIN BY  
THE END OF JUNE AND NOTED THE  
IMPORTANCE OF THIS IN LIGHT OF THE SPECIAL  
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT IN NEW YORK.  
MANSFIELD

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Foo-037/1#3242

BY LOJ 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8203823

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*WSP  
1/26/04*

RECEIVED 28 MAY 82 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM BAILEY

DOCDATE 28 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

USSR

OIL

SANCTIONS

EXCHANGES

SUBJECT: DRAFT CABLE TO AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD RE SAKHALIN PROJECT

-----  
ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 29 MAY 82 STATUS X FILES

-----  
FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8203532 8203400 NSCIFID

( N / )

-----  
ACTION OFFICER (S)    ASSIGNED    ACTION REQUIRED    DUE    COPIES TO

5/28 McFarlane approved *WSP*  
C 5/28 Sent to State per McFarlane DG, WSP, R

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

3823

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 28, 1982

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Cable to Ambassador Mansfield

Attached per your request (Tab A) is a draft cable to Ambassador Mansfield briefing him on the information we have gathered on Sakhalin and instructing him to convey to the Japanese officials that their request for an exception to the December 30 sanctions for the Sakhalin project has been denied.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached draft cable (Tab A) and authorize Mike Wheeler to sign the memorandum to Bremer at Tab I forwarding the draft for transmission.

Approve

Disapprove

*I received a xerox of this before original. Don*

*To had edits Gregg's went ahead I sent it to transmission at 1900 5/28 RIM*

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Bremer
- Tab A Draft Cable to Mansfield

cc: Don Gregg  
Roger Robinson

~~SECRET~~

Review May 28, 1988

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/4#325

BY WJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3823

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Instructions to Ambassador Mansfield

The attached cable to Ambassador Mansfield instructing him to inform the Japanese that their request for an exception to the December 30, 1981 sanctions for the Sakhalin project has been denied is forwarded to you for transmission to Tokyo.

Michael O. Wheeler  
Staff Secretary

Attachment

~~SECRET~~  
Review May 28, 1988

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F00-037/1# 326  
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 11 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*WJH  
1/26/04*

RECEIVED 25 JUN 82 17

TO CLARK

FROM WEINBERGER

DOCDATE 01 JUN 82

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

MILITARY POSTURE

SUBJECT: JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORT

ACTION: NOTED BY POINDEXTER

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES *FD*

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NONE

GREGG

CHILDRESS

MCGAFFIGAN

MYER

BOVERIE

COMMENTS LOG IN & OUT PER JP/BTM

REF# 20046

LOG

NSCIFID

( V / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

W/ATTCH

FILE \_\_\_\_\_

(C)

~~SECRET~~

4505

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



RECEIVED

WPC HAS SEEN

MAY 1 P 7: 05

82 JUN 1 1982 P 7 02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Japan's Defense Efforts (U)

(S) - Japan increased its defense budget by 7.8 percent in nominal terms (approximately 4.8 percent real growth) for the fiscal year beginning on April 1, 1982. All other Japanese government ministries, including social welfare, education, and public works, averaged less than two percent nominal growth (negative in real terms). Despite this rather impressive effort which was responsive to U.S. urging and which cost Prime Minister Suzuki some political capital, the entire increase amounted to only slightly more than 800 million dollars. Japan still spends in 1982 only 0.93 percent of its GNP on defense. Many in the Congress consider the Japanese efforts miserly despite this year's increase.

(S) - In their joint communique last May, the President and the Prime Minister agreed to a rational division of labor in the defense area. Suzuki stated at the National Press Club that Japan could, within the limits of its Constitution, defend its own territory, its surrounding seas and skies, and its sea-lanes to a distance of 1000 miles (not said publicly is that 1000 miles constitutes the entire Northwest Pacific). He said that accomplishment of these missions was Japan's defense policy.

(S) - Japan's present armed forces cannot carry out these roles. All three services have serious logistic deficiencies, and the naval and air arms are not large enough to carry out the sea-lane protection role. We estimate that by increasing its defense budget by 10-12% a year in real terms, Japan could achieve the requisite capability by the end of this decade. Such increases would bring 1991 Japanese defense spending to 1.8% of GNP, a sum that the GOJ could clearly afford and that its populace would support.

(S) - Japan's achieving this capability would allow the U.S. Navy and Air Force, particularly, a great deal more flexibility in operations. Knowing that Japan could largely fend for itself in all but massive attacks from the USSR would allow us to operate mobile naval and air forces in other areas of the Pacific without having to worry about a Free World vacuum in the Northwest Pacific close to a Soviet air and naval stronghold in the Vladivostok area.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1 # 328

Classified by Sec Def  
Declassify on 1 JUN 88

BY WDT

IE 1/4/07

~~SECRET~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. X20046



(S) - If the President raises this subject, Suzuki will try to say a 10-12% real increase is too difficult politically and/or financially for several years (i.e. until he leaves office). There has been some CIA reporting that Suzuki will raise the subject, stating that Japan will do as much as possible but that it would like the U.S. to fill in its gaps within the 1000 miles, e.g. the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet would be expected to provide Japan's air defense within the 1000 miles (unsaid is that this greatly reduces the Japanese costs).

(S) - No matter which side leads, the defense issue should be discussed as an important subject between the President and the Prime Minister. The President's comments should minimally include the following points:

-- the U.S. greatly appreciates the significant efforts the Prime Minister made in 1982 to increase defense spending while other departments were curtailed;

-- further Japanese increases are necessary to demonstrate that Suzuki is realistically moving to accomplish the policy goals he endorsed last year;

-- Japanese accomplishment of the ability to sustain its territorial defense, the defense of its surrounding sea and air, and its sea-lanes to a distance of 1000 miles must be accomplished within this decade if deterrence is to be made more effective;

-- the U.S. will complement Japan offensively in the Northwest Pacific and bear its burden in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans but we cannot fill in conventional gaps for Japan in the Northwest Pacific. The antisubmarine, anti-surface and anti-air defense in that area must be borne by Japan;

-- we look forward to hearing of Japan's 1983-1987 defense program as a signal of its resolve to do what is necessary to carry out the Prime Minister's policy.

(S) - Without the President's firm support, Suzuki is likely to feel that only the Defense Department is serious on Japan's defense efforts. The President's involvement would drastically influence Japan's perception of the serious nature of this issue which has important international security implications for the Pacific and the Free World.

Copy to: Counsellor to the President

~~SECRET~~

NON-LOG

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 2, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Japan's Defense Effort

Secretary Weinberger sent over last evening the attached paper on Japan's defense effort. He urges that this issue be discussed during the President's bilateral meeting with Suzuki.

Current talking points incorporate the issue, but perhaps not with the vehemence that Mr. Weinberger desires.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OK

No

1. That this paper be incorporated into the President's briefing book.

2. That the President raise the issue of Japan's defense spending, if Suzuki does not, making the following points:

- \* Express appreciation for last year's increase.
- \* We look for further increases.
- \* We hope that Japan will move to take over defense of the sea lanes within 1,000 miles of Japan; these efforts should include anti-submarine, anti-surface and anti-air capabilities.
- \* We look forward to hearing of Japan's onward defense planning, and hope that Prime Minister Suzuki's stated defense goals can be carried out.

Attachment

Tab I Weinberger Memorandum dated 6/1/82

cc: Henry Nau

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 2, 1988

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F00-137/1 #329  
BY LOT NARA, DATE 2/7/07



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 9323 DTG: 040534Z JUN 82 PSN: 001117  
SIT426 DATE 06/11/82 TOR: 155/12312

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #9323/01 1550535  
O 040534Z JUN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1662

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1514  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 09323  
EX015

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD  
USOECDC

E.O. 12865: GDS 5/2/88 (MANSFIELD, MICHAEL) OR-M  
TAGS: EEWT, JA  
SUBJECT: SAKHALIN OIL PROJECT  
REF: STATE 146949

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. WE HAVE ADVISED THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT THAT THE U.S. IS NOT ABLE AT THIS TIME TO AUTHORIZE EXPORT LICENSES FOR OIL EXPLORATION EQUIPMENT FOR THE SAKHALIN PROJECT AND HAVE FORWARDED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI. THE JAPANESE ARE CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED BY OUR RESPONSE AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO PURSUE THE ISSUE FURTHER, PROBABLY DURING THE BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI AT THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT.

3. APPRECIATE THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROVIDED IN THE REFERENCED TELEGRAM REPRESENTING CLAIMS MADE BY SODECO. MEMBERS OF SODECO HAVE DISCUSSED OUR CONTINUING CONCERNS REGARDING THE RELIABILITY OF CERTAIN INFORMATION FROM SODECO WITH THE APPROPRIATE JAPANESE OFFICIALS, BUT FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONCERN DOES NOT CENTER ON THE RATE OF SODECO. THE PRIORITY IS THE BROADER ONE OF MAINTAINING JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR SOLIDARITY WITH U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY RESPECTING THE U.S. CR. MOFALIC AFFAIRS THAT BECAUSE MANY JAPANESE BELIEVE U.S. DENIAL OF LICENSES FOR THE SAKHALIN PROJECT WOULD BE MORE HARMFUL TO JAPAN THAN TO THE U.S. CR, DENIAL OF LICENSES WOULD SERIOUSLY WEAKEN PUBLIC TOLERANCE OF CURRENT

JAPANESE COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. RESPECTING SOVIET TRADE. IT WAS THIS THOUGHT THAT WAS BEHIND PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S REQUEST TO THE PRESIDENT FOR APPROVAL OF THE EXPORT LICENSES, NOT REPRESENTATIONS FROM SODECO.

4. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS STATE THAT THEIR CONCERN ABOUT PUBLIC REACTION TO U.S. DENIAL OF LICENSES STEMS FROM AN INABILITY CONVINCINGLY TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL EITHER ABROGATE THE AGREEMENT OR USE THE THREAT OF ABROGATION TO EXACT CONCESSIONS FROM SODECO. THEY SHARE WASHINGTON AGENCIES ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTEREST IN CONTINUING JAPANESE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE PROJECT AND IN MARKETING GAS AND OIL OUTPUT IN JAPAN. HOWEVER, THEY REGARD CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACTUALLY DO AS SPECULATION.

5. AS I SEE IT, THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE SAKHALIN CASE IS THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. AND JAPAN TO RELY ON ONE ANOTHER, NOT THE RELIABILITY OF ALLEGATIONS BY A FIRM WITH ITS OWN SELF-INTERESTS TO SERVE. JAPAN HAS CONSISTENTLY AND FIRMLY SUPPORTED THE U.S. IN RESPECT TO ECONOMIC

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND IS EVEN NOW SUPPORTING U.S. LED EFFORTS TO RESTRICT SOVIET ACCESS TO WESTERN SOURCES OF CREDIT. JAPANESE AUTHORITIES APPROVED JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN THE SAKHALIN PROJECT AT A TIME WHEN SUCH PARTICIPATION WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH U.S. LAWS AND POLICY. JAPAN NOW SEEKS ONLY THE CONTINUANCE OF EARLIER U.S. COOPERATION AND SUPPORT FOR JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROJECT.

6. I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT NO COUNTRY IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ENERGY SECURITY THAN JAPAN; IT IMPORTS 99 PERCENT OF ITS PETROLEUM AND 66 PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL ENERGY REQUIREMENTS. IT CURRENTLY IMPORTS LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF ITS ENERGY REQUIREMENTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND DOES NOT EXPECT THE SAKHALIN PROJECT TO SUPPLY MORE THAN 5 PERCENT OF FUTURE JAPANESE ENERGY NEEDS.

7. I RECOGNIZE THAT WE MUST SEEK TO BE

TOKYO 9323

DTG: 040534Z JUN 82 PSN: 001117

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#330

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY LSI DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 9357 DTG: 040800Z JUN 82 PSN: 001254  
S17423 DATE 06/12/82 TOR: 155/0812Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

5. A SEPARATE MESSAGE ON SUBSTANCE OF NAKAGAWA'S VISIT WILL FOLLOW.  
MANSFIELD

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

TOKYO 9357

DTG: 040800Z JUN 82 PSN: 001254

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #9357 1550801  
O 040800Z JUN 82  
FM ANEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1675

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 09357

FOR SECRETARY HAIG FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD  
PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK  
LINDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS, 6/4/88 (MANSFIELD, MICHAEL) OR-M  
TAGS: TNUC, PINT, OVIP, JA (NAKAGAWA, ICHIRO)  
SUBJECT: VISIT TO US OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
AGENCY: DIR GEN ICHIRO NAKAGAWA

1. (ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY DIRECTOR GENERAL  
ICHIRO NAKAGAWA WILL BE VISITING WASHINGTON JUNE  
18-24 TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR ENERGY ISSUES, PARTICULARLY  
THE REPROCESSING OF NUCLEAR FUEL IN JAPAN. HE  
WOULD LIKE WHILE IN WASHINGTON, TO CALL ON  
THE PRESIDENT AND YOU IN ADDITION TO MEETING WITH  
DOE SECRETARY EDWARDS.

3. NAKAGAWA IS THE LEADER OF HIS OWN LIBERAL  
DEMOCRATIC PARTY FACTION, A POTENTIAL PRIME  
MINISTER AND A LONG TIME FRIEND OF THE US.  
A STaunch ADVOCATE OF A STRONGER JAPANESE ROLE  
IN THE US - JAPAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENT, HE HAS  
BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN MOVING THE GOV TOWARD  
GREATER DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. HE WAS ALSO INSTRU-  
MENTAL IN THE REPEALMENT OF QUOTAS ON BEEF,

MESSAGE (CONT NEEDED):

CITRUS AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS DURING HIS  
TENURE AS MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY  
AND FISHERIES IN 1977-78.

4. WHILE I AM AWARE OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON YOUR  
TIME, I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN NAKAGAWA'S  
WISDOM, EXPERIENCE AND POTENTIAL, A CALL ON YOU  
BY HIM WOULD SERVE TO FURTHER OUR BILATERAL  
CONCERN AND ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN JAPAN.  
I THEREFORE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU  
TO SEE NAKAGAWA BRIEFLY DURING HIS STAY IN  
WASHINGTON. FOR ALL THE ABOVE REASONS I WOULD  
ALSO HOPE THAT MINISTER NAKAGAWA WOULD BE ALLOWED  
TO SEE THE PRESIDENT BRIEFLY. IN MY OPINION,  
IT WOULD BE IN OUR BEST INTERESTS TO WOULD  
APPRECIATE YOUR HELP.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#331

LOT DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 0417 DTG:050346Z JUN 82 PSN: 002316  
SIT400 DATE 06/12/82 TOR: 156707521

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #9417/01 1560351  
O 050346Z JUN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1717

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1522  
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5272  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4088  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 09417  
EXDIS

PARIS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY  
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/5/88 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-M  
TAGS: JA UN PARM OCON  
SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S SSOD ADDRESS  
REFS (A) TOKYO 8409 (B) STATE 137574

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT:

2. SUMMARY: ON JUNE 4 MOFA UN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL KADOTA CALLED IN DCM TO INFORM HIM THAT BECAUSE OF CONCERN VOICED BY US, PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI WOULD NOT PUT FORWARD IN HIS SSOD SPEECH A DRAFT CONVENTION PROHIBITING ATTACKS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FACILITIES NOR WOULD HE OFFER TO HOST SSOD III IN TOKYO. KADOTA SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS ON THE ISSUE OF GUARANTEEING THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES WOULD BE VERY GENERAL AND NO MENTION WOULD BE MADE OF "ATTACKS" ON SUCH FACILITIES. KADOTA OUTLINED THE MAIN THEMES OF SUZUKI'S SPEECH AND SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GIVE US DELEGATION A FURTHER BRIEFING IN NEW YORK.  
END SUMMARY.

3. ON JUNE 4 MOFA UN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL KADOTA CALLED IN DCM TO BRIEF HIM ON PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S SSOD II SPEECH. KADOTA RECALLED THAT MOFA HAD COINED OUT THE US ON TWO POSSIBLE INITIATIVES THAT SUZUKI MIGHT TAKE IN HIS SPEECH: OFFER A DRAFT CONVENTION BANNING ATTACKS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FACILITIES; AND OFFER TO HOST A THIRD SSOD IN TOKYO. KADOTA SAID THE US HAD RESPONDED WITH SOME SPECIFIC CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO EACH OF THESE INITIATIVES AND ON THE GOV APPROVED AND HAD TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. AS A RESULT, KADOTA SAID, THE GOV HAD DECIDED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT PUT FORWARD AT SSOD A DRAFT CONVENTION CALLING FOR THE

PROTECTION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FACILITIES NOR WOULD SUZUKI SPECIFICALLY MENTION ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES OR OTHERWISE IMPLY CRITICISM OF ISRAEL. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIMIT HIS COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT TO SUGGESTING THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF MAINTAINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE NOT ONLY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS BUT ALSO TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES. KADOTA SAID THAT SUZUKI WOULD SUGGEST THAT THIS QUESTION BE STUDIED IN A "BUSINESS-LIKE MANNER" AT THE CD IN GENEVA.

4. KADOTA SAID THAT MOFA HAD ALSO DROPPED THE IDEA OF INCLUDING IN SUZUKI'S SPEECH AN OFFER THAT JAPAN HOST THE NEXT SSOD. HE SAID MOFA OFFICIALS AND THE PRIME MINISTER, WHOSE IDEA IT HAD BEEN, "SAW MERIT" IN THE RESERVATIONS WE RAISED ABOUT THE DANGER OF INSTITUTIONALIZING THE SPECIAL SESSION AND THE RISK OF ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT OF "OUT OF TOWN" UNGA MEETINGS THAT WOULD PLACE A SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL BURDEN ON THE UN.

5. THE DCM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED INITIATIVES AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE GOV HAD TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION OUR CONCERNS. THE DCM SAID THAT WHILE HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE LANGUAGE ON THE NEED TO PROTECT NUCLEAR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FACILITIES WOULD BE VERY GENERAL, HE REMAINED CONCERNED THAT EVEN AN OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES COULD BE SEEN AS AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL. KADOTA, WHO IS TRAVELING TO NEW YORK ON SUNDAY, PROMISED TO NOTE THIS CONCERN AND SAID HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH US OFFICIALS AT SSOD ON THIS OR OTHER QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH.

6. KADOTA THEN PROVIDED AN OUTLINE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH. SUZUKI WOULD FIRST DISCUSS DISARMAMENT IN GENERAL TERMS, BEGINNING WITH A REVIEW OF THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH AN EMPHASIS ON SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETERIORATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN WOULD DISCUSS THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY BUT EMPHASIZE THAT THE REAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC BALANCE COULD NOT BE IGNORED. SUZUKI WOULD CONCENTRATE PARTICULARLY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION AND WOULD SUGGEST AN EXPANDED UN ROLE IN THIS

TOKYO 0417

DTG:050346Z JUN 82 PSN: 002316

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Foo-037/14#332

BY HOJ, 7/24/86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 9417  
SIT399 DATE 06/12/82

DTG: 050348Z JUN 82 PSN: 002317  
TOR: 156/0754Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #9417/02 1560353  
O 050348Z JUN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TOKYO 9417

DTG: 050348Z JUN 82 PSN: 002317

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1718

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1523  
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5273  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4089  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 09417  
EXDIS

AREA. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD GO ON TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ISSUES, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANCE JAPAN ATTACHED TO A CTB, A STRENGTHENED NPT, A BAN ON CHEMICAL WARFARE, AND THE HOPE FOR SUCCESSFUL START AND NF NEGOTIATIONS. SUZUKI WOULD THEN SUGGEST THAT IF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL, THE RESOURCES RELEASED FROM ARMS PRODUCTION SHOULD BE REDIRECTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF THE THIRD WORLD AND THE REVITALIZATION OF THE ECONOMIES OF ALL COUNTRIES.

7. KADOTA SAID THAT SUZUKI WOULD CONCLUDE BY DISCUSSING THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE KEEPING FUNCTIONS OF THE UN. SUZUKI WOULD REITERATE EARLIER GOV SUGGESTIONS THAT, AT LEAST FOR FACT FINDING ACTIVITIES, THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE USE OF THEIR VETS AND THAT ART. 99 OF THE CHARTER SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO ALLOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PERFORM FACT FINDING MISSIONS. SUZUKI WOULD ALSO INDICATE THAT JAPAN WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INCREASE ITS SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

8. KADOTA CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING THAT MOFA WAS NOT BEING ANY OTHER COUNTRY OR THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND WAS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO HOLD IT CLOSELY WITHIN THE GOV.

9. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THE JAPANESE HAVE BEEN FAVORABLY RESPONSIVE TO OUR CONCERNS ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH. TO ENCOURAGE FUTURE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS OF THIS KIND, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE US OFFICE ALSO TO EXPR TO EXPRESS THEIR APPRECIATION TO THE JAPANESE DELEGATION FOR

SOLICITING AND TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION OUR VIEWS. KADOTA INDICATED THAT THE FINAL TEXT OF SUZUKI'S JUNE 9 SPEECH WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL JUNE 8 AND THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE US DELEGATION WITH FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS. WE SUGGEST THAT HE MAKE CONTACT WITH AMB. SHERMAN IN THIS REGARD WHICH HE INDICATED HE WOULD DO.  
MANSFIELD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 9418  
SIT402 DATE 06/12/82

DTG: 050354Z JUN 82 PSN: 002231  
TOR: 156/0410Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #9418 1560354  
O 050354Z JUN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1719

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1524  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8860  
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 6925  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 3840  
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 5657  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4090  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 09418  
PARIS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY  
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/5/88 (IMMERMAN, ROBERT) OR-P  
TAGS: PEPR JA US  
SUBJ: JAPANESE REACTION TO US-JAPAN SUMMIT AT  
- VERSAILLES

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. OVERNIGHT REACTION TO PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S JUNE 4 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT VERSAILLES HAS BEEN VERY FAVORABLE. PRESS REPORTS HAVE HIGHLIGHTED SUZUKI'S PLEDGE TO INCREASE JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE SATISFACTION REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH JAPAN'S EFFORTS TO ENHANCE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND OPEN ITS DOMESTIC MARKETS. THE PRESS HAS ALSO FOCUSED ON THE REPORTED EXCHANGE ON CREDIT SUPPLY TO THE SOVIET UNION,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INDICATING THE US EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT WHILE JAPAN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN GENERALLY AGREED WESTERN CREDIT RESTRAINTS BUT ASKED THE US TO REVIEW THE BAN ON THE EXPORT OF US MACHINERY AND MATERIALS FOR THE SAKHALIN PROJECT.

3. THE JAPANESE PRESS ALSO REPORTS THAT THE TALKS COVERED SUCH ISSUES AS JAPANESE CONCERN ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES IN THE FAR EAST (THE PRESIDENT REPORTEDLY RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD JAPAN'S CONCERN AND NOTED THAT SS-20'S IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST COULD STRIKE CHICAGO), RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS AT THIS FALL'S GATT MINISTERIAL.

4. MOFA FIRST NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION DIRECTOR KARITA SAID THE MINISTRY WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE MEETING HAD GONE. HE SAID REPORTING FROM THE JAPANESE EMBASSY IN PARIS EMPHASIZED THE TONE WAS VERY WARM AND THAT THE BASIC AGENDA ITEMS HAD BEEN WELL COVERED. KARITA SAID THAT NO AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED DURING THE SUMMIT ITSELF, BUT IT HAD BEEN THE "FORCING EVENT" THAT PRODUCED THE INTERIM AVIATION AGREEMENT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS AND HAD BEEN THE STIMULUS BEHIND THE GOJ'S SECOND TRADE PACKAGE. FOR THIS REASON ALONE, THE SUMMIT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. MANSFIELD

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#333

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~