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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (3/5/82 – 3/28/82)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	052039Z MAR 82, 2p <i>R</i> 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #264	3/5/82	B1
2. Memo	George Bush to Judge Clark re Suzuki Visit, 1p <i>R</i> " " #265	3/5/82	B1
3. Cable	170508Z MAR 82, 4p <i>R</i> " " #266	3/17/82	B1
4. Cable	170751Z MAR 82, 1p <i>R</i> " " #267	3/17/82	B1
5. Cable	170751Z MAR 82, 1p <i>R</i> " " #268	3/17/82	B1
6. Cable	171831Z MAR 82, 2p <i>R</i> " " #269	3/17/82	B1
7. Cable	181938Z MAR 82, 1p <i>R</i> " " #270	3/18/82	B1
8. Cable	198036Z MAR 82, 1p <i>R</i> " " #271	3/19/82	B1
9. Cable	251014Z MAR 82, 3p <i>R</i> " " #272	3/25/82	B1
10. Cable	280345Z MAR 82, 3p <i>PART</i> " " #273	3/28/82	B1
11. Cable	280345Z MAR 82, 4p <i>PART</i> " " #274	3/28/82	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 7/19/2007

File Folder JAPAN (3/5/82-3/28/82)

FOIA

F00-037 (F1539)

Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date		
3	CABLE	170508Z MAR 82 (F00-037/1#266)	4	3/17/1982	MVH	5/21/08
4	CABLE	170751Z MAR 82 (F00-037/1#267)	1	3/17/1982	MVH	5/21/08
5	CABLE	170751Z MAR 82 (F00-037/1#268)	1	3/17/1982	MVH	5/21/08
7	CABLE	181938Z MAR 82 (F00-037/1#270)	1	3/18/1982	MVH	5/21/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 9084
SIT510 DATE 03/08/82

DTG: 052039Z MAR 82 PSN: 042172
TOR: 064/2055Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9084 0642051
O 052039Z MAR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 4437

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 059084
E. O. 12065: GDS 2/25/88 (JOHNSTON, ERNEST B.)
TAGS: EAIR, JA
SUBJECT: U. S. -JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION TALKS

REF: TOKYO 3187

1. ~~(X)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI THROUGH APPROPRIATE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. (BEGIN TEXT):
"DEAR MR. MINISTER:

" AS YOU ARE AWARE, CIVIL AVIATION NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE. AFTER NUMEROUS ROUNDS OF TALKS WE ARE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON SOME ISSUES, BUT STILL FAR APART ON OTHERS.

" DURING THE JANUARY NEGOTIATING SESSION, THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION PRESENTED ANOTHER COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL INTENDED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE VIEWS AND CONCERNS OF BOTH PARTIES. WE HOPE THAT THE PROMISED JAPANESE RESPONSE WILL BE FORTHCOMING, SO THAT WHEN OUR NEGOTIATORS MEET IN THE UNITED STATES MARCH 10-19 THEY WILL BE ABLE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. SHOULD WE FAIL TO REACH AGREEMENT, I FEAR THAT WE WILL HAVE EXHAUSTED THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO REACH A SOLUTION TO THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP.

" I HAVE STRESSED TO OUR NEGOTIATING TEAM THE SIGNIFICANCE THESE TALKS HAVE FOR OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PERSONALLY ADVISE YOUR NEGOTIATORS OF THE IMPORTANCE THESE TALKS HAVE FOR OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP.

" WITH ALL BEST WISHES,

"SINCERELY,

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#264

BY LST NTRV, DAL. 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 9084

DTG: 052039Z MAR 82 PSN: 042172

/S/ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

3. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9084

DTG: 052039Z MAR 82 PSN: 042172

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~




THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE CLARK

Bill:

I saw your item to the President on a possible Suzuki visit in May prior to the Versailles Summit. If the President would prefer not to meet with Suzuki, I would be glad to talk to him in Japan, if the President wanted me to. I'll be in the area in that time frame for the Asia/Australia/New Zealand visit.


George Bush

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT
REVIEW ON MARCH 5, 1988

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1#265
BY WJS, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

PAGES

1

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 50

RELEASER

AD

PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG

051812Z MAR 82

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADM POINDEXTER FOR JUDGE CLARK - SB. / TOR 051820Z
LM

2.

3.

4.

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

NSA 11/2/04

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

02 MAR 82 5 11:31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 TOKYO 4497
SIT107 DATE 03/17/82

DTG: 170508Z MAR 82 PSN: 000703
TOR: 076/0538Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #4497/01 0750510
O 170508Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9087

INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5043
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 04497
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/17/88 (MANSFIELD, MICHAEL J.) OR-M
TAGS: EGEN, ETRD, JA
SUBJECT: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF FOREIGN MINISTER
- SAKURAUCHI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, MARCH 22-24
REFS: (A) TOKYO 4146; (B) TOKYO 4304

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY. THE GROWING TENSION IN US-JAPAN RELATIONS CAUSED BY TRADE FRICTION WILL INEVITABLY BE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MIND DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE POLITICAL EFFORT THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS THE GOJ FACES, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS HOME OUR MESSAGE THAT MEANINGFUL ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY BY JAPAN TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.
3. DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI WILL HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE GROWING TENSION IN US-JAPAN RELATIONS CAUSED BY TRADE FRICTION. HE WILL ATTEMPT TO REASSURE SENIOR US OFFICIALS THAT JAPAN IS MAKING A SERIOUS EFFORT TO FURTHER OPEN ITS MARKET, STRESSING THAT THE POLITICAL EFFORT AND GOOD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTENTION DEMONSTRATED BY THE CABINET DECISIONS OF LAST NOVEMBER AND OF JANUARY 30 THIS YEAR WILL CONTINUE AND WILL LEAD TO FURTHER DECISIONS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. ALTHOUGH HE MAY PRIVATELY RECOGNIZE THAT THE STEPS TAKEN SO FAR ARE MODEST WHEN EVALUATED AGAINST THE NEED AS WE SEE IT, HE WILL LOOK FOR APPRECIATION OF THE POLITICAL EFFORTS THEY REPRESENT. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE, BUT THAT IT CONSTITUTES ONLY THE FIRST SMALL STEP ON WHAT PROMISES TO BE A LONG AND DIFFICULT JOURNEY.

4. AN IMPORTANT ASPECT FOR US IN THE CURRENT DOMESTIC DEBATE IN JAPAN ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE TRADE ISSUE IS THE PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS MOST EVIDENT THROUGH THE WORK OF THE LDP COMMITTEE LED BY MR. ESAKI. AS WITH US, JAPANESE POLITICIANS HAVE TO

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BY LSI

7/24/06

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 TOKYO 4497

DTG: 170508Z MAR 82 PSN: 000703

SPEAK TO A DOMESTIC AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE AND WHAT SOUNDS GOOD IN ONE PLACE MAY SOUND BAD IN THE OTHER. THUS, WE SHOULD NOT PUT TOO MUCH STRESS ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION, PARTICULARLY THOSE MADE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERESTS WHICH WILL BE MOST AFFECTED BY THE TOUGH DECISIONS WE ARE ASKING JAPAN TO MAKE. WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO UNDERCUT THE EFFORTS OF THOSE IN JAPAN'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO MOVE EVENTS IN THE PROPER DIRECTION. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS HOME OUR MESSAGE, BUT WE SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE "POSITIVE REINFORCEMENT" FOR MOVES IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. JUST AS WE MUST AVOID BEING THOUGHT TO BE TOO WILLING TO ACCEPT VERY LITTLE IMPROVEMENT, SO MUST WE AVOID CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE ARE NO REALISTIC STEPS WHICH WILL SATISFY THE USG AND THEREFORE THERE IS LITTLE POINT IN THE GOJ INCURRING ADDITIONAL DOMESTIC POLITICAL COSTS IN A FRUITLESS EFFORT TO MEET US DEMANDS. BOTH ARGUMENTS ARE BEING USED BY THOSE HOPING TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO.

5. SAKURAUCHI WILL NOT BRING WITH HIM ANY SPECIFIC CONCESSIONS RELATED TO THE TRADE ISSUE. RATHER HE WILL EXPLAIN THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH THEY HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE (REF B) WHICH REPORTEDLY IS TO CONCENTRATE ON FIVE AREAS: QRS; TOBACCO; TARIFFS; SERVICES AND STANDARDS. HE WILL EXPRESS JAPANESE CONCERN OVER RECIPROCITY LEGISLATION NOW BEFORE CONGRESS. HE WILL, WE BELIEVE,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

USE HIS MEETING WITH USTR BRDCK TO SUPPORT OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES AT A GATT MINISTERIAL MEETING THIS NOVEMBER, INCLUDING A GATT INITIATIVE ON TRADE IN SERVICES. HE WILL MOST LIKELY PROPOSE THAT DEPUTY MINISTER MATSUNAGA VISIT WASHINGTON IN LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY TO REVIEW STEPS TAKEN ON THE TRADE ISSUE. HE MAY ALSO NOTE JAPAN'S EFFORTS TO STIMULATE GROWTH IN ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY (ON WHICH WE SHOULD OFFER NO ADVICE) AND THE CONSTRAINT IMPOSED ON JAPANESE ECONOMIC GROWTH BY HIGH US INTEREST RATES. HE WILL WANT TO REVIEW OUR ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES FOR THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT, STRESSING, WE BELIEVE, THE NEED FOR GREATER COORDINATED STEPS TO STIMULATE GROWTH IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. HE WILL, NO DOUBT, REITERATE JAPAN'S INTEREST IN HAVING ACCESS TO ALASKAN OIL, NOTING THAT THIS COULD HELP SOLVE THE TRADE IMBALANCE.

6. SAKURAUCHI HAS ALREADY SIGNALLED THAT HE WILL RAISE OUR POSITIONS AT THE LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS WHERE JAPAN, ALTHOUGH SYMPATHETIC TO THE THRUST OF THE CHANGES WE ARE PROPOSING, WILL WANT TO BE MORE ACCOMMODATING TO THE INTERESTS OF THE LDCS. HE MAY ALSO RAISE THE WHALING ISSUE WHERE JAPAN AND THE US ARE ON A CONFRONTATION COURSE.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT THE US SIDE SHOULD CONTINUE TO REITERATE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT

TOKYO 4497

DTG: 170508Z MAR 82 PSN: 000703

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECALLED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01
SIT207

TOKYO 4497
RECALLED

DTG: 170508Z MAR 82 PSN: 000100
TOR: 076/0539Z

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001

OP IMMED
STU0754
DE RUEHKO #4497/02 0750512
O 170508Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9088

INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5044

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 04497

ADDITIONAL STEPS BY THE GOJ TO OPEN ITS DOMESTIC MARKET TO FOREIGN PRODUCTS, SERVICES AND INVESTMENT. ACKNOWLEDGING WHAT HAS BEEN DONE AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT MOMENTUM HAS BEGUN TO BUILD IN JAPAN FOR THE LONG PROCESS AHEAD, WE MUST IMPRESS UPDN THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT DIFFICULT DECISIONS MUST BE MADE ON BOTH SIDES, MORE BY JAPAN. THE U.S. WILL BE LOOKING TO SEE IF SUCH DECISIONS ARE FORTHCOMING AND ITS RESPONSE WILL BE GREATLY INFLUENCED AS A RESULT. MANAGEMENT OF OUR DIFFERENCES WILL REQUIRE DETERMINATION ON BOTH SIDES.
MANSFIELD -
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 3/17 4497
SIT106 DATE 03/17/82

DTG: 170508Z MAR 82 PSN: 000705
TOR: 076/0539Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #4497/02 0750512
O 170508Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9088

INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5044
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 04497
ADDITIONAL STEPS BY THE GOJ TO OPEN ITS DOMESTIC MARKET
TO FOREIGN PRODUCTS, SERVICES AND INVESTMENT.
ACKNOWLEDGING WHAT HAS BEEN DONE AND EXPRESSING THE
HOPE THAT MOMENTUM HAS BEGUN TO BUILD IN JAPAN FOR THE
LONG PROCESS AHEAD, WE MUST IMPRESS UPDN THE FOREIGN
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SIDES, MORE BY JAPAN. THE U.S. WILL BE LOOKING TO SEE
IF SUCH DECISIONS ARE FORTHCOMING AND ITS RESPONSE WILL
BE GREATLY INFLUENCED AS A RESULT. MANAGEMENT OF OUR
DIFFERENCES WILL REQUIRE DETERMINATION ON BOTH SIDES.
MANSFIELD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 4529
SIT108 DATE 03/17/82

DTG: 170751Z MAR 82 PSN: 000702
TOR: 076/1000Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHKO #4529 0750754
R 170751Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9101

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 04529

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 3/17/02 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, CH, JA, TW, US
SUBJECT: ~~IN~~ FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI'S VISIT
TO WASHINGTON: POSSIBLE CHINA ANGLE
REF: A. STATE 68552, B. TOKYO 3262, C. TOKYO 1206,
D. TOKYO 762 (NOTAL)

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE BELIEVE THE JAPANESE WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO
OUR APPROACH ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY EMBASSY
BEIJING. DURING HIS JAN. 15 STOP IN TOKYO, AMB.
HOLDRIDGE SUGGESTED TO MOFA VICE MINISTER YANAGIYA
THAT THE GOJ COULD HELP US BY STRESSING TO THE
CHINESE THE U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICAL
REALITIES. SINCE THAT TIME, MOFA HAS TOLD US THAT
JAPANESE OFFICIALS HAVE EMPHASIZED TO THEIR CHINESE
COUNTERPARTS THE IMPORTANCE THE GOJ ATTACHES TO GOOD
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. IF THE SECRETARY SUGGESTS TO
FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI A MORE SPECIFIC JAPANESE
INITIATIVE IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE SAKURAUCHI
WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY. OUR ONLY CAUTIONARY NOTE
IS THAT THE GOJ WOULD WANT A CLEARER READING OF
WHERE U.S. POLICY IS HEADING ON THE TAIWAN ARMS
SALES ISSUE BEFORE GETTING ITSELF TOO FAR OUT ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A LIMB IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POSITION.

3. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO
BEIJING FOR ITS INFO.
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 4529

DTG: 170751Z MAR 82 PSN: 000702

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NLS FOO-037/1#267

~~SECRET~~

BY L0J NADA DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 3/17 4529 DTG: 170751Z MAR 82 PSN: 000297
SIT027 DATE 03/17/82 TOR: 076/1000Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHKO #4529 0750754
R 170751Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9101

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 04529

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 3/17/02 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, CH, JA, TW, US
SUBJECT: ~~N~~ FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI'S VISIT
TO WASHINGTON: POSSIBLE CHINA ANGLE
REF: A. STATE 68552, B. TOKYO 3262, C. TOKYO 1206,
D. TOKYO 762 (NOTAL)

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE BELIEVE THE JAPANESE WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR APPROACH ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY EMBASSY BEIJING. DURING HIS JAN. 15 STOP IN TOKYO, AMB. HOLDRIDGE SUGGESTED TO MOFA VICE MINISTER YANAGIYA THAT THE GOJ COULD HELP US BY STRESSING TO THE CHINESE THE U. S. DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES. SINCE THAT TIME, MOFA HAS TOLD US THAT JAPANESE OFFICIALS HAVE EMPHASIZED TO THEIR CHINESE COUNTERPARTS THE IMPORTANCE THE GOJ ATTACHES TO GOOD U. S. -CHINA RELATIONS. IF THE SECRETARY SUGGESTS TO FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI A MORE SPECIFIC JAPANESE INITIATIVE IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE SAKURAUCHI WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY. OUR ONLY CAUTIONARY NOTE IS THAT THE GOJ WOULD WANT A CLEARER READING OF WHERE U. S. POLICY IS HEADING ON THE TAIWAN ARMS SALES ISSUE BEFORE GETTING ITSELF TOO FAR OUT ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A LIMB IN SUPPORT OF THE U. S. POSITION.

3. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO BEIJING FOR ITS INFO.
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 3/17 4529

DTG: 170751Z MAR 82 PSN: 000297

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#268

~~SECRET~~

BY LOT

7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0731
SIT882 DATE 03/26/82

DTG: 171831Z MAR 82 PSN: 001070
TOR: 076/2322Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WHLR VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0731 0761847
O 171831Z MAR 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4782
AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 9651
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 1320

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 5536
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 8603
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE 7238
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 070731
EXDIS MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/17/8; (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN)
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), EA
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO EAST ASIA

REF: TOKYO 3965

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE VICE PRESIDENT IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT AUSTRALIA
APRIL 29-MAY 3 AND NEW ZEALAND MAY 3-5, TO JOIN IN
ACTIVITIES MARKING THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE
OF THE CORAL SEA AND THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ANZUS
ALLIANCE. IF CONVENIENT TO GOVERNMENTS OF JAPAN, KOREA
AND SINGAPORE, THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THOSE THREE COUNTRIES ENROUTE TO AUSTRALIA.

3. FOLLOWING IS HIGHLY TENTATIVE ITINERARY FOR FRONT
END OF VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP:

MORNING -- APRIL 22 -- LEAVE WASHINGTON

NOON ----- APRIL 22 -- ARRIVE ANCHORAGE

EARLY AFTERNOON -- APRIL 22 -- DEPART ANCHORAGE

EVENING ----- APRIL 23 -- ARRIVE JAPAN (YOKOTA AFB)

MORNING ----- APRIL 25 -- DEPART JAPAN (YOKOTA AFB)

MORNING ----- APRIL 25 -- ARRIVE KOREA

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NLS FOO-037/1#269

BY LOJ 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0731

DTG: 171831Z MAR 82 PSN: 001070

MORNING ----- APRIL 26 -- LEAVE KOREA (ALTERNATIVELY
----- LEAVE APRIL 27 -- SEE PARA 5 BELOW)

AFTERNOON ----- APRIL 28 -- ARRIVE SINGAPORE

EARLY MORNING ----- APRIL 29 -- ARRIVE CANBERRA

4. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD INFORMALLY RAISE POSSIBILITY OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL VISITS AS OUTLINED ABOVE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS. IF REACTION IS POSITIVE, YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE HOST GOVERNMENT TO EXTEND FORMAL INVITATION, PHRASED IN A WAY WHICH PRESERVES REQUISITE FLEXIBILITY AS TO ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE DATES AND TIMES.

5. FOR SEOUL (FYI): MAJOR UNCERTAINTY REMAINS WITH RESPECT TO KOREA STOP. THE VICE PRESIDENT WISHES TO PRESERVE THE OPTION OF MAKING ANOTHER BRIEF STOP BETWEEN THE ROK AND SINGAPORE. IN THE EVENT SUCH AN ADDITIONAL STOP IS NOT SCHEDULED, HIS PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO KOREA COULD BE EXTENDED TO NOON, APRIL 27. UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE OBJECTION, YOU SHOULD INFORM ROK AUTHORITIES THAT VICE PRESIDENT PLANS TO VISIT KOREA, TENTATIVELY FOR ONE DAY, APRIL 25-26. EXACT TIMING, HOWEVER, MAY NOT BE RESOLVED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. FYI, EMBASSY SHOULD START PLANNING FOR BOTH EVENTUALITIES -- A ONE DAY VISIT

SECSTATE WASHDC 0731

DTG: 171831Z MAR 82 PSN: 001070

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

APRIL 25-26, AND A THREE DAY VISIT APRIL 25-28. DO NOT, HOWEVER, RAISE ROK HOPES FOR LONGER VISIT.

6. FOR TOKYO: REFTTEL INDICATES JAPANESE WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY VICE PRESIDENT ON DATES WHICH PERMITTED SCHEDULING A MEAL WITH THE EMPEROR. THE VICE PRESIDENT DEEPLY REGRETS THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE IN JAPAN ON EITHER OF THE DATES SUGGESTED BY THE IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD (APRIL 22 AND 27). HE WOULD OF COURSE BE HONORED IF A MEAL AT THE IMPERIAL PALACE COULD BE

ARRANGED WITHIN THE EVENING APRIL 23 TO NOON APRIL 25 PERIOD. (FYI: WE HAVE TOLD AMBASSADOR OKAWARA OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, AND HE HAS DOUBTLESS ALREADY REPORTED SAME).

7. FOR SINGAPORE: PROJECTED STOP IN SINGAPORE IS SPECIFICALLY FOR PURPOSE OF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF US DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES WITH PM LEE. IN VIEW OF SHORTNESS OF STOP, SANDWICHED BETWEEN TWO LONG FLIGHTS, WE URGE THAT CEREMONY BE HELD TO A MINIMUM.

HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 0731

DTG: 171831Z MAR 82 PSN: 001070

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 2147 DTG: 181938Z MAR 82 PSN: 002414
SIT862 DATE 03/26/82 TOR: 077/2104Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: JP WHLR VP EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #2147 0772023
O 181938Z MAR 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4820
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7281

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6202
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2019
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 072147
EXDIS WHITE HOUSE PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT
E. O. 12065: GDS 3/27/88 (STREEB, GORDON L.)
TAGS: ICJ, JA, EG
SUBJECT: ICJ ELECTIONS

REFS: A) USUN 646, B) STATE 67639, C) USUN 586

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DEPARTMENT CONCURS IN USUN'S RECOMMENDATION (REFTEL A) AND REQUESTS THAT AMBASSADOR URGE THAT JAPAN SUPPORT MEGUID, EMPHASIZING OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT JAPAN'S ICJ CANDIDATE IN 1984. ELECTION WILL TAKE PLACE FRIDAY, MARCH 19. SEE REFTELS B AND C FOR BACKGROUND. PLEASE NOTE TO JAPANESE THAT OUR UNDERTAKING ON BEHALF OF THEIR CANDIDATE SHOULD OF COURSE BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. ALSO, YOU SHOULD STRESS IMPORTANCE OF THIS ELECTION TO US. STOESSEL

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1#270
BY LOS, NLS, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 4715
SIT860 DATE 03/26/82

DTG: 190836Z MAR 82 PSN: 003165
TOR: 078/0838Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP MR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: FYI/RICHARD ALLEN

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #4715 0780836
O 190836Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE 4559

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9194
AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2752
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5522
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ TOKYO 04715
PLEASE PASS TO RICHARD ALLEN
E. O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: OTRA (ALLEN, RICHARD V.), JA
SUBJ: ARRANGEMENTS IN TOKYO FOR RICHARD ALLEN
REF (A) STATE 67616 (B) TOKYO 4431

1. FORMER PRIME MINISTER TAKEO FUKUDA HAS EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO SEE MR. ALLEN WHILE HE IS IN TOKYO AND HAS INDICATED THAT HE WILL BE AVAILABLE "ALMOST ANYTIME" DURING THE DAYS OF MARCH 30 AND 31. PLEASE ADVISE IF MR. ALLEN WISHES THE EMBASSY TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT FOR HIM ON ONE OF THOSE DAYS, INCLUDING PREFERRED TIME.

2. MR. M. MAKIHARA OF MITSUBISHI CORP. HAS INFORMED EMBASSY THAT HE IS UNABLE TO ATTEND AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD'S LUNCH FOR MR. ALLEN ON MARCH 27 DUE TO A PRIOR ENGAGEMENT. MAKIHARA WISHES TO ARRANGE ANOTHER OCCASION TO SEE MR. ALLEN AND WILL TELEPHONE HIM AT THE SHILLA HOTEL IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SEOUL FOLLOWING HIS ARRIVAL THERE FOR THAT PURPOSE.

3. FOR HONG KONG: PLEASE PASS COPY OF REF B TO MR. ALLEN.
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 4715

DTG: 190836Z MAR 82 PSN: 003165

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NLS FOO-037/1#271

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BY HOI, NAPA, DATE 7/24/06

RECEIVED 20 MAR 82 11

TO CLARK

FROM TYSON

DOCDATE 19 MAR 82

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

VISIT

SAKURAUCHI

FRENCH SUMMIT

SUZUKI, ZENKO

SUBJECT: SAKURAUCHI VISIT & SUZUKI BILATERAL MTG

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

GREGG

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	3/22	Clark sgd memo		
Deaver M	3/22	For decision		
C	3/23	OBE by meeting		

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Sakurauchi Visit and Suzuki Bilateral Meeting

*filed
This came to me
after Sakurauchi
meeting.*

An informal request has been received from the Japanese Embassy regarding the possibility of a bilateral meeting between the President and Prime Minister Suzuki of Japan during the Versailles Summit. State has informally concurred with NSC's strong recommendation regarding the necessity of the bilateral -- although a specific time cannot be addressed until the Summit schedule is confirmed.

I suggest that the President, during his meeting with Foreign Minister Sakurauchi on Monday, indicate that he is looking forward to a bilateral meeting with Suzuki during the Versailles Summit. Not only would this be a gracious gesture on the part of the President, it would be unexpected by the Japanese at this point -- and this positive gesture might help to reinforce the strong concerns the President will express during his meeting with Sakurauchi. Therefore, we might gain something out of the offer, rather than going through diplomatic channels.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the bilateral meeting with Suzuki and the President's reference to it during his meeting with Sakurauchi.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

MW

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1982

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON 

SUBJECT: Sakurauchi Visit and Suzuki Bilateral Meeting

An informal request was received by Don Gregg and me regarding the possibility of a bilateral meeting between the President and Prime Minister Suzuki of Japan during the Versailles Summit. Your staff will be forwarding a memorandum recommending very strongly, as will State, the necessity of the bilateral -- although a specific time cannot be addressed until the Summit schedule is confirmed.

I suggest that the President, during his meeting with Sakurauchi on Monday at 11:00 a.m., indicate that he is looking forward to a bilateral meeting with Suzuki during the Versailles Summit. Not only would this be a gracious gesture on the part of the President, it would be unexpected by the Japanese at this point -- and this positive gesture might help to reinforce the strong concerns the President will express during his meeting with Sakurauchi.

In the end there is no doubt in my mind that we will have the bilateral meeting with Suzuki. Therefore, we might gain something out of the offer, rather than going through diplomatic channels.

Don Gregg  concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Mike Deaver at Tab I recommending the bilateral meeting with Suzuki and the President's reference to it during his meeting with Sakurauchi.

Approve 

Disapprove

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1982

Brian:

The original of the attached was placed
in Deaver's early morning briefing book.

Kay

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Judge Clark

Subject: A Bilateral Meeting with Suzuki at
Versailles

The attached paper urges that you seek agree-
ment for the President to have a bilateral
meeting with PM Suzuki in Versailles.

Apparently State concurs.

Still before you stick your neck out with
Mike, you ought to know how much time is
available for bilaterals, how many others
are going to want them and whether it will
fit.

Bud

*Time for bi-laterals
will be set aside for Friday
4 June. Also breakfasts may
be available.*

79

National Security Council
The White House

D

Package # 1725

82 MAR 19 P 6 54

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
I-Information	A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch		

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: *Judge Clark*

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEEVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff

Information

Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 TOKYO 5022
SIT810 DATE 03/26/82

DTG: 251014Z MAR 82 PSN: 011485
TOR: 084/1042Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #5022/01 0841016
O 251014Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9338

INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7406
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5567
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 05022

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/25/88 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) OR-M

TAGS: PINT, JA

SUBJECT: INITIAL JAPANESE ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN
- MINISTER SAKURAUCHI'S VISIT

1. (E-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. INITIAL JAPANESE ASSESSMENTS OF SAKURAUCHI'S VISIT TO THE US INDICATE GENERAL SATISFACTION THAT DISCUSSIONS OF THE TRADE ISSUE WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL, AND THAT ON THE OVERALL THE VISIT WAS A MODEST SUCCESS. JAPANESE APPREHENSION LAST WEEK THAT TRADE ISSUES MIGHT FIGURE TOO HEAVILY IN DISCUSSIONS AND SOUR THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE VISIT GAVE WAY TO RELIEF AS REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON INDICATED TALKS WERE PROGRESSING IN COOL, DISPASSIONATE TONES.

3. WHILE SAKURAUCHI WAS ENROUTE BACK TO TOKYO, MOFA SOURCES TOLD EMBOOF THEY WERE QUITE PLEASED WITH THE VISIT. THEY SAID SAKURAUCHI HAD PRESENTED JAPAN'S

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

VIEW ON THE TRADE ISSUE CAPABLY, AND THEY WERE PLEASED THAT THE DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY HAIG HAD RANGED BROADLY OVER A NUMBER OF TOPICS; THEY SAID THE DISCUSSION OF EAST-WEST ISSUES HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY PRODUCTIVE.

4. OTHER OBSERVERS WERE SOMEWHAT MORE MUTED IN THEIR ASSESSMENT. SEVERAL MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AND POLITICIANS OBSERVED TO EMBOFFS THAT, WHILE SAKURAUCHI HAD INDEED HAD SOME GOOD DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH MODULATED APPROACHES BY BOTH THE JAPANESE AND US SIDES HAD HELPED PUT THE TRADE ISSUE INTO A LESS CONFRONTATIONAL CONTEXT, THE VISIT DID NOT BRING AN ACTUAL SOLUTION TO THE TRADE ISSUE ANY CLOSER. MUCH ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FIRM MESSAGE ON TRADE AND TO THE DISCUSSION OF DEADLINES. GENERALLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLS FOO-037/1#272
BY WOT NARA DATE 7/24/06

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 TOKYO 5022

DTG: 251014Z MAR 82 PSN: 011485

SAKURAUCHI HAS BEEN CREDITED WITH ABLY EXPLAINING THE DIFFICULTY JAPAN WOULD HAVE IN PRODUCING REAL SOLUTIONS BEFORE THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PERSISTENCE OF US DEMANDS FOR SIGNIFICANT ACTION SOON APPEARS TO HAVE DEEPEDED UNDERSTANDING HERE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM AND THE NEED FOR PROMPT ACTION.

5. THIS INCREASED SENSE OF URGENCY HAS LED TO SOME CRITICISM IN THE MEDIA OF THE GOJ'S FAILURE TO ADOPT A FORTHCOMING APPROACH IN THE TRADE ISSUE. POLITICIANS AND POLITICAL OBSERVERS HAVE ALSO COMMENTED TO US ON THE NEED FOR THE GOJ TO FORMULATE A UNIFIED, MORE POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE TRADE ISSUE. PERHAPS RESPONDING TO THESE PRESSURES, PM SUZUKI SAID IN A MEETING WITH REPORTERS MARCH 24 THAT HE INTENDED TO ADDRESS THE TRADE PROBLEM FORTHRIGHTLY AND TO "PROVIDE LEADERSHIP" IN REACHING A SOLUTION.

6. REGARDING NON-TRADE ASPECTS OF THE VISIT, THE IMPRESSION IN JAPAN IS THAT THE VISIT WENT FAIRLY SMOOTHLY. DISCUSSIONS OF CIVIL AVIATION WERE PORTRAYED BY MEDIA AS RESTRAINED, WITH SAKURAUCHI QUOTED AS SAYING HE HOPED TALKS WOULD BE RESUMED SOON. DIFFERENCES OVER EXPORT OF PIPELAYING EQUIPMENT TO THE SOVIET UNION WERE REPORTED BRIEFLY AND MATTER-OF-FACTLY.

-

TOKYO 5022

DTG: 251014Z MAR 82 PSN: 011485

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. COMMENT: THE MOST VISIBLE INITIAL JAPANESE REACTION TO THE SAKURAUCHI VISIT IS RELIEF THAT AT LEAST IT DID NOT GO BADLY: THE FOREIGN MINISTER MADE NO GAFFES, AND THERE WAS NO EMOTIONAL CONFRONTATION OVER TRADE ISSUES. THE JAPANESE WERE PREPARED TO HEAR SOME TOUGH TALK ON TRADE, AND THEY WERE GLAD THEY RECEIVED IT WITHOUT STRIDENCY OR SHARPNESS. THEIR SENSE OF RELIEF HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY SOME SERIOUS SELF-REFLECTION ON WHAT MUST BE DONE TO SOLVE THE TRADE PROBLEM.

-

8. THUS WE SHARE, THOUGH FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, THE INITIAL JAPANESE ASSESSMENT THAT THE VISIT WAS A SUCCESS. THE AMOUNT OF PRESSURE EXERTED ON SAKURAUCHI SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ABOUT RIGHT: THE JAPANESE DO NOT FEEL THEY WERE APPROACHED TOO STERNLY, YET THEY APPRECIATE THE FIRMNESS OF OUR MESSAGE ON TRADE. THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAIG, BY REEMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, PUT THE TRADE ISSUE INTO A WIDER AND MORE CONVINCING PERSPECTIVE. GENERALLY, THE NEED FOR ACTION SEEMS TO BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD IN JAPAN BECAUSE OF THE TRIP.

-

9. SAKURAUCHI IS SCHEDULED TO GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE TONIGHT, AND OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS THE MEDIA,

TOKYO 5022

DTG: 251014Z MAR 82 PSN: 011485

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 5022
SIT809 DATE 03/26/82

DTG: 251014Z MAR 82 PSN: 011487
TOR: 084/1040Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #5022/02 0841018
O 251014Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9339

INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7407
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5568
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 05022
POLITICIANS, AND SENIOR BUREAUCRATS
WILL BE FORMING THEIR FINAL ASSESSMENTS OF SAKURAUCHI'S
TRIP. ONCE THAT PROCESS IS COMPLETED WE WILL HAVE A
BETTER SENSE OF THE EFFECT SAKURAUCHI'S CONVERSATIONS
IN WASHINGTON WILL HAVE ON THE TRADE ISSUE.
MANSFIELD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECDEF AIRCRAFT 0001
SIT207 DATE 04/06/82

DTG: 280345Z MAR 82 PSN: 015847
TOR: 088/0118Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP MR SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE AFBAF #0001 0880345
O 280345Z MAR 82
FM SECDEF AIRCRAFT

TO WHITE HOUSE/FOR THE PRESIDENT AND JUDGE CLARK
SECDEF/FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI
SECSTATE/FOR SECSTATE HAIG

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOUR

MY TWO DAYS OF TALKS IN TOKYO (MARCH 26-27) WERE, I THINK SUCCESSFUL IN CONVEYING TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT YOUR BELIEF IN (1) THE REALITY AND NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT BOTH WORLDWIDE, AND ESPECIALLY AS IT AFFECTS ASIA; AND (2) THE NEED FOR ALL OF US, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING THE JAPANESE, TO MOVE TO SHARE THE INCREASING BURDEN OF CONTAINING THIS THREAT.

PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI APPRECIATED VERY MUCH HAVING YOUR LETTER (HE DID NOT READ IT WHEN I HANDED IT TO HIM, BUT HE MAY HAVE ALREADY BEEN SHOWN THE TEXT EARLIER). HE EXPRESSED HIS WARM ADMIRATION OF YOU AND THE HOSPITALITY HE HAD RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. HE ASKED TO SEE ME WITH ONLY AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD PRESENT (PLUS AN INTERPRETER) ON OUR SIDE, AND CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYASAWA AND A NOTE TAKER ON THEIR SIDE.

DURING THIS TALK OF NEARLY AN HOUR, I ADVISED HIM, AS I HAD DEFENSE MINISTER ITO EARLIER, THAT OUR ANALYSIS OF WHAT THEY NEEDED TO FULFILL THE SELF-DEFENSE ROLE HE HAD ACCEPTED IN CONVERSATION WITH YOU LAST YEAR IN WASHINGTON, I. E., DEFENSE OF THE HOME ISLANDS, AND AIR AND SEA DEFENSE OF THE SURROUNDING WATERS, AND SEA LANES OUT TO 1,000 MILES. WOULD REQUIRE THEM TO INCREASE THEIR DEFENSE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXPENDITURES BY MORE THAN 10 PERCENT EACH YEAR IN REAL TERMS. I TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT USING THIS FIGURE IN PUBLIC, BUT WANTED THEM TO KNOW OF IT.

THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT CHALLENGE THE FIGURE DIRECTLY, NOR HAD ITO EARLIER. BUT SUZUKI MADE FOUR POINTS:

(1) HE FAVORS THE WESTERN CAMP MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE GLOBAL PEACE STRUGGLE. TO DO THIS, UNDER US LEAD, IT IS VITAL TO PUSH FOR NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS TO PREVENT WAR, AND THE US, AS LEADER OF THE WESTERN BLOC, SHOULD COOPERATE TO SECURE UNITY WITHIN THIS BLOC -- THIS MAY HAVE BEEN SUBTLE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD NOT PUSH THEM TOO HARD ON DEFENSE SPENDING, OR TRADE.

(2) THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE USSR AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WERE SEVERE AND WORSE THAN THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES THE WESTERN NATIONS ARE TEMPORARILY EXPERIENCING. SO THE WEST

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS FOO-037/1#273

By LAT, NARA, Date 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 280345Z MAR 82 PSN: 015847

SHOULD REFRAIN FROM HELPING THE SOVIET BLOC OUT OF ITS DIFFICULTIES. SO JAPAN HAS BEEN COOPERATING WITH THE US IN VARIOUS MEASURES AGAINST THE POLISH SITUATION, ECT.

JAPAN IS REFLECTING ON WHAT THEY HAVE DONE TO HELP USSR AND IN THAT CONNECTION REGRETS THAT THEY SOLD [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

(3) WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE PRC IN OUR WESTERN CAMP, ALREADY BREZHNEV IS TRYING TO MAKE OFFERS TO THE PRC AND TO JAPAN TO LEAD THEM AWAY FROM THE WEST. [REDACTED]

(4) THERE ARE ECONOMIC AND TRADE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY JAPAN AND THE WEST AND BY EUROPE. SO US AND JAPAN SHOULD TRY TO SETTLE THEIR TRADE PROBLEMS THROUGH MULTI-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS OECD.

HE ALSO SAID IT WOULD BE VERY BAD IF WORD LEAKED OUT THAT WE FELT THEY HAD TO INCREASE THEIR SPENDING MORE THAN 10 PERCENT IN REAL TERMS EACH YEAR. HE (AND ITO EARLIER) STRESSED THAT THEY HAD TO FOLLOW JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION, AND THEY WERE A "CONSENSUS SOCIETY", AND TOO MUCH DEFENSE INCREASE MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTED AND INDEED MIGHT CAUSE AN ANTI-AMERICAN AND ANTI-NUCLEAR BACKLASH. EARLIER ITO HAD SAID THE SAME THING, MENTIONING A POLL WHICH SHOWED ONLY ABOUT 20 TO 25 PERCENT FAVORED INCREASED SPENDING.

I TOLD BOTH ITO AND THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WE TOO HAD PEOPLE WHO, WITHOUT KNOWING THE FACTS ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT,

SECDEF AIRCRAFT 0001
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 280345Z MAR 82 PSN: 015847

WOULD OPPOSE THE IDEA OF INCREASING DEFENSIVE STRENGTH; THAT YOUR LEADERSHIP HAD PROJECTED BIG INCREASES IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET LAST YEAR, AND YOU HAD THE LEADERSHIP COURAGE TO ASK FOR MORE THIS YEAR; THAT WHILE WE WOULD NOT MENTION THE MORE THAN 10 PERCENT PER YEAR IN REAL TERMS PUBLICLY, THEY NEEDED TO KNOW SO THEY MIGHT TRY TO PREPARE THEIR PUBLIC ACCORDINGLY.

WHILE I THINK THEY MAY WANT TO DO MORE, AND THEIR DEFENSE AGENCY PROBABLY AGREES WITH US, IT WILL BE VERY HARD TO GET REAL INCREASES OF THE SIZE NEEDED IN SUBSEQUENT YEARS WITHOUT CONSTANT QUIET PRESSURES ON THEM, IN THE TERMS OF FACTS ABOUT THE DANGER THEY ARE IN, AND OTHER AMMUNITION THEY COULD USE, IF THEY CAN BE PERSUADED, TO CONVINCING THEIR PUBLIC THEY NEED TO DO MORE.

OBVIOUSLY, NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS PROPOSALS WILL BE VERY POPULAR HERE, AND INDEED WOULD BE A MOST PERSUASIVE POINT IN CONVINCING THEM OF OUR SINCERITY AND OF THE NEED TO GAIN STRENGTH AS THE ONLY MEANS OF PERSUADING THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO REAL REDUCTIONS.

OUR JOINT MILITARY TECHNICAL GROUP IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH THEIRS IN HAWAII THIS SUMMER. ALTHOUGH THE JAPANESE CONTENT THEIR MID-TERM MILITARY PLANS THE BASIS FOR NEXT YEAR'S BUDGET) WILL NOT BE READY BY THEN, NOR WOULD THEY GIVE ANY PRELIMINARY IDEA OF WHERE THEY ARE HEADING FOR 83. THIS MAY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY WILL ELECT (AND PROBABLY RE-ELECT SUZUKI) A CHAIRMAN IN NOVEMBER, AND HE DOES NOT WISH TO DISTURB ANYONE BEFORE THEN.

GENERALLY, THEIR OFFICIALS (SUZUKI, SAKARAUCHI, THE FOREIGN MINISTER) AND ITO ARE VERY WARM AND CORDIAL, BUT ARE AFRAID OF LOSING PUBLIC OPINION AT HOME, BOTH BECAUSE IT WOULD PUT THEM OUT OF OFFICE, AND BECAUSE IT MIGHT TURN THE MAJORITY AGAINST THE WEST.

I BELIEVE THEY WILL BE QUITE RESPONSIVE TO ANY REQUEST FROM US COUCHED IN TERMS OF ASKING THEM NOT TO HELP THE SOVIETS BY TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY USEFUL TO THE SOVIET MILITARY. ALSO, THERE MAY BE A FAVORABLE REACTION TO OUR REQUEST FOR A TWO WAY STREET ON THEIR TRANSFERS TO US.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECDEF AIRCRAFT 0001

DTG: 280345Z MAR 82 PSN: 015847

SECDEF AIRCRAFT 0001

DTG: 280345Z MAR 82 PSN: 015847

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECDEF AIRCRAFT 0001
SIT167

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TOR: 088/0118Z

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OP IMMED
OO NMCC
DE AFBAF #0001 0880345
O 280345Z MAR 82
FM SECDEF AIRCRAFT

TO WHITE HOUSE/FOR THE PRESIDENT AND JUDGE CLARK
SECDEF/FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI
SECSTATE/FOR SECSTATE HAIG

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOUR

MY TWO DAYS OF TALKS IN TOKYO (MARCH 26-27) WERE, I THINK SUCCESSFUL IN CONVEYING TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT YOUR BELIEF IN (1) THE REALITY AND NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT BOTH WORLDWIDE, AND ESPECIALLY AS IT AFFECTS ASIA; AND (2) THE NEED FOR ALL OF US, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING THE JAPANESE, TO MOVE TO SHARE THE INCREASING BURDEN OF CONTAINING THIS THREAT.

PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI APPRECIATED VERY MUCH HAVING YOUR LETTER (HE DID NOT READ IT WHEN I HANDED IT TO HIM, BUT HE MAY HAVE ALREADY BEEN SHOWN THE TEXT EARLIER). HE EXPRESSED HIS WARM ADMIRATION OF YOU AND THE HOSPITALITY HE HAD RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. HE ASKED TO SEE ME WITH ONLY AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD PRESENT (PLUS AN INTERPRETER) ON OUR SIDE, AND CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYASAWA AND A NOTE TAKER ON THEIR SIDE.

DURING THIS TALK OF NEARLY AN HOUR, I ADVISED HIM, AS I HAD

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS FOO-037/1 #274

By LOT, NARA, Date 7/24/06

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DEFENSE MINISTER ITO EARLIER, THAT OUR ANALYSIS OF WHAT THEY NEEDED TO FULFILL THE SELF-DEFENSE ROLE HE HAD ACCEPTED IN CONVERSATION WITH YOU LAST YEAR IN WASHINGTON, I.E., DEFENSE OF THE HOME ISLANDS, AND AIR AND SEA DEFENSE OF THE SURROUNDING WATERS, AND SEA LANES OUT TO 1,000 MILES. WOULD REQUIRE THEM TO INCREASE THEIR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BY MORE THAN 10 PERCENT EACH YEAR IN REAL TERMS. I TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT USING THIS FIGURE IN PUBLIC, BUT WANTED THEM TO KNOW OF IT.

THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT CHALLENGE THE FIGURE DIRECTLY, NOR HAD ITO EARLIER. BUT SUZUKI MADE FOUR POINTS:

(1) HE FAVORS THE WESTERN CAMP MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE GLOBAL PEACE STRUGGLE. TO DO THIS, UNDER US LEAD, IT IS VITAL TO PUSH FOR NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS TO PREVENT WAR, AND THE US, AS LEADER OF THE WESTERN BLOC, SHOULD COOPERATE TO SECURE UNITY WITHIN THIS BLOC -- THIS MAY HAVE BEEN SUBTLE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD NOT PUSH THEM TOO HARD ON DEFENSE SPENDING, OR TRADE.

(2) THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE USSR AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WERE SEVERE AND WORSE THAN THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES THE WESTERN NATIONS ARE TEMPORARILY EXPERIENCING. SO THE WEST SHOULD REFRAIN FROM HELPING THE SOVIET BLOC OUT OF ITS DIFFICULTIES. SO JAPAN HAS BEEN COOPERATING WITH THE US IN VARIOUS MEASURES AGAINST THE POLISH SITUATION, ECT.

JAPAN IS REFLECTING ON WHAT THEY HAVE DONE TO HELP USSR AND IN THAT CONNECTION REGRETS THAT THEY SOLD

FOIA(b) (1)

(3) WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE PRC IN OUR WESTERN CAMP, ALREADY BREZHNEV IS TRYING TO MAKE OFFERS TO THE PRC AND TO JAPAN TO LEAD THEM AWAY FROM THE WEST.

(4) THERE ARE ECONOMIC AND TRADE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY JAPAN AND THE WEST AND BY EUROPE. SO US AND JAPAN SHOULD TRY TO SETTLE

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THEIR TRADE PROBLEMS THROUGH MULTI-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS OECD.

HE ALSO SAID IT WOULD BE VERY BAD IF WORD LEAKED OUT THAT WE FELT THEY HAD TO INCREASE THEIR SPENDING MORE THAN 10 PERCENT IN REALTERMS EACH YEAR. HE (AND ITO EARLIER) STRESSED THAT THEY HAD TO FOLLOW JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION, AND THEY WERE A "CONSENSUS SOCIETY", AND TOO MUCH DEFENSE INCREASE MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTED AND INDEED MIGHT CAUSE AN ANTI-AMERICAN AND ANTI-NUCLEAR BACKLASH. EARLIER ITO HAD SAID THE SAME THING, MENTIONING A POLL WHICH SHOWED ONLY ABOUT 20 TO 25 PERCENT FAVORED INCREASED SPENDING.

I TOLD BOTH ITO AND THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WE TOO HAD PEOPLE WHO, WITHOUT KNOWING THE FACTS ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT, WOULD OPPOSE THE IDEA OF INCREASING DEFENSIVE STRENGTH; THAT YOUR LEADERSHIP HAD PROJECTED BIG INCREASES IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET LAST YEAR, AND YOU HAD THE LEADERSHIP COURAGE TO ASK FOR MORE THIS YEAR; THAT WHILE WE WOULD NOT MENTION THE MORE THAN 10 PERCENT PER YEAR IN REAL TERMS PUBLICLY, THEY NEEDED TO KNOW SO THEY MIGHT TRY TO PREPARE THEIR PUBLIC ACCORDINGLY.

WHILE I THINK THEY MAY WANT TO DO MORE, AND THEIR DEFENSE AGENCY PROBABLY AGREES WITH US, IT WILL BE VERY HARD TO GET REAL INCREASES OF THE SIZE NEEDED IN SUBSEQUENT YEARS WITHOUT CONSTANT QUIET PRESSURES ON THEM, IN THE TERMS OF FACTS ABOUT THE DANGER THEY ARE IN, AND OTHER AMMUNITION THEY COULD USE, IF THEY CAN BE PERSUADED, TO CONVINCING THEIR PUBLIC THEY NEED TO DO MORE.

OBVIOUSLY, NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS PROPOSALS WILL BE VERY POPULAR HERE, AND INDEED WOULD BE A MOST PERSUASIVE POINT IN CONVINCING THEM OF OUR SINCERITY AND OF THE NEED TO GAIN STRENGTH AS THE ONLY MEANS OF PERSUADING THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO REAL REDUCTIONS.

OUR JOINT MILITARY TECHNICAL GROUP IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH THEIRS IN HAWAII THIS SUMMER. ALTHOUGH THE JAPANESE CONTENT (THEIR MID-TERM MILITARY PLANS THE BASIS FOR NEXT YEAR'S BUDGET) WILL NOT BE READY BY THEN, NOR WOULD THEY GIVE ANY PRELIMINARY

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IDEA OF WHERE THEY ARE HEADING FOR 83. THIS MAY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY WILL ELECT (AND PROBABLY RE-ELECT SUZUKI) A CHAIRMAN IN NOVEMBER, AND HE DOES NOT WISH TO DISTURB ANYONE BEFORE THEN.

GENERALLY, THEIR OFFICIALS (SUZUKI, SAKARAUCHI, THE FOREIGN MINISTER) AND ITO ARE VERY WARM AND CORDIAL, BUT ARE AFRAID OF LOSING PUBLIC OPINION AT HOME, BOTH BECAUSE IT WOULD PUT THEM OUT OF OFFICE, AND BECAUSE IT MIGHT TURN THE MAJORITY AGAINST THE WEST.

I BELIEVE THEY WILL BE QUITE RESPONSIVE TO ANY REQUEST FROM US COUCHED IN TERMS OF ASKING THEM NOT TO HELP THE SOVIETS BY TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY USEFUL TO THE SOVIET MILITARY. ALSO, THERE MAY BE A FAVORABLE REACTION TO OUR REQUEST FOR A TWO WAY STREET ON THEIR TRANSFERS TO US.

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