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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File:  
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**Folder Title:** Japan (09/01/1981-09/30/1981)

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:  
File Folder: Japan (9/1/81 – 9/30/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	010931Z SEP 81, 2p <i>PART 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #211</i>	9/1/81	B1
2. Cable	080759Z SEP 81, 2p <i>R " " #212</i>	9/8/81	<del>B1</del>
3. Cable	110817Z SEP 81, 2p <i>R " " #213</i>	9/11/81	<del>B1</del>
4. Cable	181312Z SEP 81, 1p <i>R " " #214</i>	9/18/81	<del>B1</del>
5. Cablé	241111Z SEP 81, 2p <i>D " " #215</i>	9/24/81	B1
6. Memo	Norman Bailey to Richard Allen re Trilateral Trade Meeting, 2p <i>R " " #216</i>	9/25/81	<del>B1</del>
7. Memcon	Under Secretary Rashish – Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kikuchi Meeting, 3p <i>R " " #217</i>	9/24/81	<del>B1</del>
8. Cable	260205Z SEP 81, 2p <i>R " " #218</i>	9/26/81	<del>B1</del>
9. Cable	302218Z SEP 81, 2p <i>R " " #219</i>	9/30/81	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 7/19/2007

**File Folder** JAPAN (9/1/81-9/30/81)

**FOIA**

F00-037 (F1539)

**Box Number**

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
<del>6</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>BAILEY TO ALLEN RE TRILATERAL TRADE MEETING (F00-037/1#216)</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>9/25/1981</del>	<i>nww 5/21/08</i>

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE322  
STU3794  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHKO #6150 244093Z  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 010931Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2982  
BT

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 16150

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR RICHARD ALLEN, NSC, FROM  
DDN GREGG

ED 12065; XDS-1 9/1/01 (CLARK, W.) OR-M

TAGS: PFDR, JA, KS

SUBJECT: JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HAVE SPENT A USEFUL TWO DAYS IN TOKYO, FOLLOWING  
A GOOD APPOINTMENT SCHEDULE SET UP BY THE EMBASSY [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] ONE STRONG IMPRESSION EMERGES FROM THESE  
CONTACTS; THAT IS THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR NEXT WEEK'S  
MINISTERIAL MEETING BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA ARE  
STRONGLY NEGATIVE AT THIS POINT. ROK DEMANDS FOR AID  
(\$6 BILLION IN AID OVER FIVE YEARS PLUS \$4 BILLION  
IN EX-IM BANK LOANS) ARE IMPOSSIBLE FOR JAPAN TO MEET.  
KOREANS HAVE MADE THEIR DEMANDS PUBLIC, AND JAPANESE  
EFFORTS TO BUILD FLEXIBILITY INTO THE UPCOMING MEETING  
HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. EMBASSY HAS DONE A GOOD JOB  
IN MAKING CLEAR TO JAPANESE THAT THE KOREAN DEMANDS  
HAVE BEEN INDEPENDENTLY DEVELOPED, WITH NO US INPUT.  
PROSPECT NOW SEEMS TO BE FOR A CONFRONTATIONAL MEETING,  
WITH POSSIBLE DAMAGING POLITICAL FALL-OUT IN JAPAN AND  
KOREA AND SERIOUSLY SETTING BACK ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS.

3. THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST A MORE DIRECT US ROLE AT  
THIS POINT. I AM CONCERNED THAT OTHER PROBLEMS MAY  
HAVE ALLOWED THIS ISSUE TO CREEP UP ON WASHINGTON,  
AND AM THUS ALERTING YOU TO A SITUATION WHICH MAY  
REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.  
THE EMBASSY CONVEYED THIS MOOD OF IMPENDING CRISIS  
HERE ON THIS ISSUE IN ITS CABLE 15821 LAST WEEK AND WILL  
BE REPORTING IN GREATER DETAIL. MANSFIELD

BT

#6150

NNNN

FOIA(b) (1)

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS FOO-037/1#211

By LOJ, NARA, Date 7/24/06

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 281

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE347  
UTS2808  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHKO #6505 2510759  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 080759Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3157  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA  
RUYN5DK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
RUHPDBA/COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI  
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT  
RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 16505

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065; GDS 9/8/87 (IMMERMAN, R.) OR=P

TAGS: MPDL, MARR, JA, US

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTERS LETTER OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT;  
- NISSHO MARU REPORT

REF: TOKYO 16051

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER EMBASSY RECEIVED TODAY  
FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA TO SECDEF ACKNOWLEDGING  
RECEIPT OF NISSHO MARU FINAL REPORT.

3. QUOTET DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

- I WISH TO THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF  
AUGUST 24, 1981, TOGETHER WITH THE FINAL REPORT OF  
THE COLLISION BETWEEN NISSHO MARU AND USS GEORGE  
WASHINGTON.

- HAVING MADE A CAREFUL STUDY OF THE REPORT, I AM NOW  
CONVINCED THAT YOU CONDUCTED A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION  
INTO THE INCIDENT. THE REPORT GIVES A FULL EXPLANATION  
ON THE CAUSES OF THE INCIDENT AND ITS AFTERMATH. I  
HAVE FOUND THE OPINIONS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT AND THE  
MEASURES TAKEN THEREUPON BY THE US NAVY FAIR AND  
SATISFACTORY. I BELIEVE THAT YOUR EFFORTS FOR PROVIDING  
SUCH A REPORT AMPLY DEMONSTRATE THE SINCERITY OF THE  
US GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS ITS DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW THE  
INCIDENT TO CAUSE UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS ON THE FRIENDLY

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#212

BY LSI NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

- I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT TO YOU THE REQUEST I MADE ON AUGUST 31 TO HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT AND NAVY TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE.

- FURTHER, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH TO EXERCISE YOUR GOOD OFFICES SO THAT THE PENDING CLAIMS CASES WILL BE SETTLED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

- SINCERELY,

- SUNAO SONOYA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

END TEXT.

4. LETTER IS BEING FORWARDED BY POUCH TO EA/J FOR DOD/ISA. MANSFIELD

BT

#6505

NNNN

RECEIVED

81 SEP 9 11:58

JANET COLSON

gc

BUD NANCE

BN

DICK ALLEN

DA

IRENE DERUS

id

JANET COLSON

JC

BUD NANCE

BN

PETER

P

CY TO VP

VP

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE

M

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER

B

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEEVER

D

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY

B

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

Comments:



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 9, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *dg*  
 SUBJECT: My Week in Japan

Following are highlights of my week in Japan which encompassed the Shimoda Conference and visits with various Japanese officials.

- The Shimoda Conference dealt with the defense issue, energy, US-Japan economic ties, and Japan's role in Asia. The discussions were marked by very frank responses from the Japanese. No breakthroughs were scored, but I believe most participants emerged with the belief that the Japan-US relationship, while strong, needs working at. Improved technology transfer, more sale of US goods into Japan, and a possible trade of Alaskan oil to Japan in return for Mideast oil were all specifics that were mentioned. Ambassador Brock was a strong participant.

- Met with three bureau chiefs from the Japanese foreign ministry, all of whom were concerned about ROK demands for aid. All also expressed real resentment toward Foreign Minister Sonoda, and stated their hope and expectation that he would be removed in the autumn cabinet reshuffle.

- Lunched with Cabinet Research Office Director Fukuda and alerted him to our perceptions of the current ROK leadership. At the Shimoda Conference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa came up to me and thanked me for my report to Fukuda which he had gotten quickly and verbatim (I had met Miyazawa in Korea in 1974 at the end of a previous ROK-Japan imbroglio erupting from the Kim Dae Jung case).

All in all an extremely useful week. I now am in touch with all the key players at the Foreign Ministry, the Cabinet Research Office and the US Embassy. Many old contacts were restored at the Conference, and I also made many new friends.

*good!*  
*Found it an interesting experience*  
*Dick*  
*9/14/81*

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 2

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE582  
STU5542  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUEHKU #6753 2540818  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 110817Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3285  
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6810  
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI  
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 16753

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-3 9/11/01 (CLARK, W.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, TW, JA

SUBJECT: JAPAN-TAIWAN MARITIME BORDER DISPUTE

REF: TOKYO 15709 (NODIS)

1. (1-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. MOFA HAS INFORMED EMBASSY THAT TENSIONS HAVE EASED CONSIDERABLY CONCERNING ISSUE OF DRILLING BY TAIWAN CONTROLLED VESSEL ON CONTINENTAL SHELF IN EAST CHINA SEA AREA CLAIMED BY JAPAN. A RECENT TYPHOON CAUSED THE EVACUATION FROM THE AREA OF THE DRILLING RIG, THE TAIWAN NAVAL VESSEL, AND JAPAN'S MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY PATROL BOAT. AFTER THE STORM, ONLY THE DRILLING RIG RETURNED, AND THE GOJ AND TAIWAN AUTHORITIES ARE NOW NEGOTIATING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED INTERMEDIARIES A RESOLUTION TO THE ISSUE. ACCORDING TO MOFA, THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE JAPANESE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE DEMARCATION LINE, BUT HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. THEY HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THE VESSEL IN QUESTION IS ENGAGED IN EXPLORATION RATHER THAN EXPLOITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF RESOURCES. MOFA IS AVOIDING A DEBATE ON THE LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED AND IS FOCUSING INSTEAD ON SIMPLY GETTING THE DRILLING SHIP REMOVED FROM THE AREA. THE MINISTRY SAYS THAT IT IS HOPEFUL THAT THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

3. THE ISSUE HAS STILL RECEIVED NO PRESS ATTENTION IN JAPAN, AND MOFA HOPES THAT THIS WILL REMAIN THE CASE.  
MANSFIELD

BT

#6753

NNNN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FOO-037/1#213  
BY hgt NARA, DATE 7/24/01

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 5

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION:            REF ID:  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FI

MESSAGE / ANNOTATED :

SENSITIVE

ACTION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 ACTION EA-12

TOKYO 16894 180220Z

0220

INFO OCT-81 ADS-08 SS-18 DEPARTMENT OF STATE NSCE-08 /028 W 172578 180233Z /72

P 180233Z SEP 81 1981 SEP 14 PM 11 51  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3373

UNCLAS TOKYO 16894

FOR EA/J -- FOR AL SELIGMANN FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD

E. O. 12865: N/A  
TAGS: OTRA, JA WILLIAMS, HOSEA  
SUBJECT: VISIT OF REVEREND HOSEA WILLIAMS TO JAPAN

REF: A) STATE 238091 B) TOKYO 13438 AND PREVIOUS

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD TO MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

"DEAR DICK: IN REPLY TO YOUR LETTER INFORMING US OF THE PLANNED VISIT OF THE REVEREND HOSEA WILLIAMS TO JAPAN PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT, SHOULD THE VISIT TAKE PLACE, MY STAFF AND I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH HIM AND ASSISTING HIM IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS WITH APPROPRIATE JAPANESE OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. HOWEVER, MY STAFF HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH OFFICIALS OF THE JAPANESE AFRO-AMERICAN SOCIETY AND THE INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF JAPAN REGARDING REVEREND WILLIAMS' VISIT AND HAS SOME DOUBTS THAT THE VISIT WILL, IN FACT, TAKE PLACE. THESE JAPANESE SPONSORS HAVE MADE IT A CONDITION OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR REVEREND WILLIAMS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WRITE DIRECTLY TO PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI REQUESTING SUPPORT FOR THE VISIT. SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THEIR WASHINGTON SOURCES THAT SUCH A LETTER WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING, THEY ARE RETHINKING THEIR POSITION BEFORE ADVISING REVEREND WILLIAMS TO COME TO JAPAN. IN ANY EVENT, THE EMBASSY IS READY TO PROCEED WITH HIS PROGRAM ONCE AN ITINERARY HAS BEEN FIXED. WE WILL KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE JAPANESE SPONSORS. MAUREEN AND I SEND OUR BEST PERSONAL WISHES. MIKE MANSFIELD"

MANSFIELD

DEPT OF STATE  
FORM 8-C 50130

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*MSD  
1/21/04*

RECEIVED 23 SEP 81 18

DOC DATE 23 SEP 81

TO ALLEN

FROM PIPES

KEYWORDS: USSR

JAPAN

SUBJECT: US - JAPANESE SOVIETS EXPERTS TALK

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~PIPES~~  
*Allen*

GREGG

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC IF ID

( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*C 10/06 noted by RVA w/comment RP, Dg*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*Pa (C) MR*

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 23, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *nl*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Japanese Soviet Experts Talk

As you will see from the attached cable (Tab I), the leading lights on Soviet affairs in State are attending a conference in Tokyo to discuss matters of common interest with Japanese Soviet experts. Apparently State thinks NSC has no Soviet experts because we were not notified of this exchange, let alone invited to participate. *(C)*

## Attachment:

Tab I State cable to Tokyo 249864 of September 18, 1981

*Don't be concerned. I can tell you what such sessions are like. Who wants to go to Tokyo, anyway?*

*Besides, this is an all-State affair.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Derivative from State  
Review September 17, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By M70 NARA, Date 1/21/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01  
ORIGIN EUR-12

STATE 249864

0116

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 EA-10 NSC-05  
NSAE-00 PM-09 SMS-01 SP-02 /064 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SOV: GLRUECKERT: COS  
APPROVED BY EUR: JDSCANLAN  
EUR/SOV: TWSIMONS, JR.  
PM: JAZRAEL  
INR: PCOOK  
EUR/J: MVAETH

-----342410 190218Z /67

R 181312Z SEP 81  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 249864

E. O. 12065: GDS 9/17/87 (SCANLAN, JOHN D.)

TAGS: PEPR, XG, US, JA, UR

SUBJECT: U. S. -JAPANESE SOVIET EXPERTS TALKS

REF: A) STATE-239247 B) TOKYO 15048

1. (a - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. TRAVEL AND ACCOMMODATION PLANS OF US DELEGATION MEMBERS TO US-JAPANESE SOVIET EXPERTS TALKS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN TOKYO OCTOBER 12-13 ARE CONTAINED BELOW: EMBASSY SUPPORT IN MEETING AND ASSISTING WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

SCHEDULED ARRIVAL PLANS:

--SIMONS, RUECKERT, COOK AND AZRAEL WILL ARRIVE TOKYO ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10 AT 1440 HRS VIA NORTHWEST FLIGHT 3.  
--DAS SCANLAN WILL ARRIVE SUNDAY, OCTOBER 11, ALSO AT 1440 HRS VIA NORTHWEST FLIGHT 3.

ACCOMMODATIONS:

PLEASE BOOK ACCOMMODATIONS FOR DELEGATION AT HOTEL OKURA, OR ALTERNATE CONVENIENTLY LOCATED HOTEL, AS FOLLOWS:

-- SCANLAN, OCTOBER 11 TO 13 (TWO NIGHTS)  
-- SIMONS, RUECKERT, AND COOK OCTOBER 10 TO 14 (FOUR NIGHTS)  
-- AZRAEL, OCTOBER 10 TO 15 (FIVE NIGHTS).

2. BRUCE ROSENBERG, EUR/SOV ECON/COMMERCIAL OFFICER, WHO WILL INFORMALLY SIT IN ON TALKS, WILL MAKE HIS OWN ARRIVAL AND ACCOMMODATION ARRANGEMENTS. PLEASE INFORM BEN TUA THAT ROSENBERG WILL BE IN TOKYO AREA OCTOBER 9-13.

3. WE DO NOT YET HAVE THE PROPOSED JAPANESE SCHEDULE FOR TALKS BUT ASSUME JAPANESE WILL SCHEDULE LUNCHEON FOR THE US DELEGATION OCTOBER 12 WHICH US SIDE SHOULD RECIPROCATE ON OCTOBER 13. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IN PAST EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR HAS PREFERRED HOST RETURN LUNCHEON. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER EMBASSY WOULD WISH TO HOST LUNCHEON AGAIN THIS YEAR OR WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE THIS TO US DELEGATION. HAIG

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-03711#214

BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED  
81 SEP 24 9:10

JANET COLSON

Janet Colson

BUD NANCE

\_\_\_\_\_

DICK ALLEN

Dick Allen

IRENE DERUS

Irene Derus

JANET COLSON

Janet Colson

BUD NANCE

\_\_\_\_\_

PETER

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO VP

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEEVER

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

Comments:

"Don't be concerned. I can tell you what such sessions are like. Who wants to go to Tokyo, anyway?"

Besides, this is an all-State affair."



RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM BAILEY

ms: 1/21/04

RECEIVED 25 SEP 81 16

DOC DATE 25 SEP 81

TO ALLEN

KEYWORDS: INTL TRADE

JAPAN

RASHISH, M

KIKUCHI

SUBJECT: JAPANESE OUTRAGE RE TREATMENT IN CONNECTION W/ PROJECT OF  
TRILATERAL TRADE MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

GREGG

POATS

NAU

RENTSCHLER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( D / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	c 10/1	allen approved from		NB, DG ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

(C)

dom

#5650

RECEIVED


81 SEP 25 P 1: 44

JANET COLSON



BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN



IRENE DERUS



JANET COLSON



BUD NANCE



PETER



CY TO VP

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

Comments:

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

5650

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 25, 1981

~~SECRET~~

URGENT ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *MB*

SUBJECT: Japanese Outrage at Their Treatment in  
Connection with the Project of a Trilateral  
Trade Meeting

The afternoon of September 24, I met in Mike Rashish's office with the Japanese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kikuchi) and two officials of the Japanese Embassy (including Minister Hatano). Marshall Casse of Rashish's office was also present and took notes, which I attach (Tab I).

Deputy Minister Kikuchi expressed in an unusually forceful manner the outrage of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the whole process used by USTR in attempting to call a trilateral meeting on trade at the margin of GATT and the other established mechanisms. Most of the details are in the Memcon -- I will highlight only the following points:

1. The original invitation was extended to the EC and to MITI Minister Tanaka in a letter from Brock but signed on his behalf by Macdonald. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was not notified of this attempt to set up a meeting at the Ministerial level. As you know, there was also no prior consultation with any other agency of our government.
2. After protest, the invitation was reissued in the proper form and Macdonald invited his subcabinet counterparts (Denman and Kurihara of MITI) for a preliminary meeting 9/24 in Chicago.
3. When Macdonald was forced to cancel the meeting due to the Canadian flap, he invited Denman and the Japanese (Sonoda had insisted Kikuchi go since he outranks Kurihara) to dinner Wednesday evening. Following dinner, a meeting was held to discuss timing, place and agenda over Kikuchi's protests. In other words, exactly what would have been discussed at the cancelled Thursday meeting.

~~SECRET~~

Review 9/24/2001

Derivative Classification by  
Myer Rashish/Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1 #216

BY LOI DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

4. Apparently, the meeting was held in a very tense atmosphere. At one point, Macdonald is alleged to have said to Kikuchi, "Don't come if you don't want to come." Macdonald and Denman wanted a non-paper prepared, but Kikuchi refused, as he put it, to "allow this non-meeting to produce a non-paper." He then told Macdonald to do nothing further until hearing officially from the Japanese government and left. He told us this would not take place until the end of November, after an expected Cabinet shakeup in Tokyo -- it is Kikuchi's belief that Tanaka will be out.

5. After the Japanese left, Mike told me he had spoken to Brock and that Brock intends to issue shortly a formal invitation to MITI and the EC to meet formally "in four to six weeks," thus ignoring the Japanese request. Apparently, he is resigned to Canadian participation if this is the only way he can get the meeting.

Mike will urge Haig, and I urge you, to have a meeting with Brock as soon as possible to resolve this matter. The best solution would be to cancel the meeting in some face-saving way for Brock. Barring that, hold the meeting at the subcabinet level including the Canadians, with one agenda item -- fighting protectionist pressures.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you meet with Ambassador Brock and Secretary Haig to resolve this matter.

Approve OK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Don Gregg  
 Rud Poats  
 Henry Nau  
 Jim Rentschler

*I have discussed w/ my brock Haig how it's any , dec of this And I don't he'll develop on -*

Attachment

Tab I Memcon of September 24 Meeting with Kikuchi

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Japan

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kikuchi  
Minister Hatano, Japanese Embassy  
Counselor Tanaka, Japanese Embassy

U.S.

Under Secretary Rashish  
Dr. Norman Bailey, NSC Staff  
Marshall Casse, Special Assistant

DATE: September 24, 1981

Kikuchi opened the conversation by stating that he arrived in Chicago at 1:00 p.m. on the day before (9/23), after an 8,000 mile journey and was told at 3:00 p.m. that the meeting he had come to participate in had been cancelled. He indicated that he was shocked and surprised, but, in fact, was somewhat relieved by the prospect that it presaged cancellation of the Ministerial-level Trilateral meeting. In the course of the dinner, however, Macdonald proceeded as if the meeting had not been cancelled.

Kikuchi objected, but first said to Macdonald that he had to have some explanation to give to his authorities as to why they had spent money to send him to a meeting only to have it cancelled. Macdonald replied that a problem had arisen concerning an invitation to Canada, that it had not been possible to invite Canada in time to be at the meeting, and because of a misunderstanding in the NSC staff, it had been decided to cancel the meeting. Hatano asked whether we could clarify the "misunderstanding on the part of the NSC staff." Bailey replied that there had been, in fact, many misunderstandings on the whole issue of a Trilateral Trade Meeting but that on this point there was no misunderstanding. The NSC staff was opposed to the Chicago meeting and that opposition resulted in its cancellation. The Canada angle was simply the fuse which provoked the action. The proposed dinner was not revealed to the NSC staff until all of the participants were already on airplanes, at which point it would have seemed discourteous to insist that the dinner be cancelled. He stated that the NSC staff opposes the Trilateral meeting and that the Canadian angle is only one of several considerations. He noted in passing that Canada is

after all the single largest trading partner with the U.S. (Kikuchi requested, and received, permission to transmit verbally Bailey's position to Foreign Minister Sonoda and Prime Minister Suzuki.)

Kikuchi stated that he took a fundamental position throughout the dinner, namely that the question is still open as to whether there should be a Trilateral Trade Meeting at Ministerial level. He cited his 9/16 conversation with Ambassador Brock as support for that position. The decision to hold such a meeting would depend on the development of an "appropriate" agenda, that is, one acceptable to the three parties involved, to the non-participant developed countries, such as Canada, Australia, even to the OECD and to the LDCs. He felt that such an agenda would be impossible to develop and, therefore, felt that an attempt to do so would effectively kill the meeting. It was with that purpose that he came to the Chicago meeting on the orders of Foreign Minister Sonoda. He stated that all the other relevant Japanese ministries, except for MITI, insisted that he attend the Chicago meeting for that purpose.

He indicated that this issue was creating a serious political problem within Japan. MITI Minister Tanaka is simply "grand-standing" to enhance his political future and wants the Trilateral meeting to take place before the Cabinet reshuffle in November. Kikuchi said Prime Minister Suzuki is in a difficult spot since he has already delivered two damaging blows to Tanaka: first, he was not permitted to attend the Ottawa Summit and, second, he was prevented from visiting the USSR. Suzuki is highly embarrassed by Tanaka running around the world acting like the Foreign Minister or even the Prime Minister. Tanaka has visited everywhere and wanted badly to go to the Soviet Union, but Suzuki forbade that since the Japanese Government, after Afghanistan, has had a policy of prohibiting high-level exchanges with the Soviet Union. Suzuki may be forced to allow Tanaka to attend a Trilateral meeting, as a consolation prize for being excluded from Cancun. Kikuchi indicated that MITI officials would also like for the concept of a trilateral meeting to go away.

Kikuchi noted that he had taken a very negative position throughout the dinner which resulted in Macdonald, at one point, saying that if the Japanese don't want to come, then they shouldn't come. Kikuchi protested this approach as an insult to Japan.

Kikuchi then went on to the discussion of a possible agenda for the Ministerial as discussed at the dinner. Macdonald suggested a number of topics, such as trade trends, the overall outlook for trade in the '80s, trade problems among the three

participants, multilateral trade problems, a review of trade in critical sectors, such as high-technology and steel and finally efforts to uphold free trade. He reported that Kurihara quickly agreed with Macdonald's request but added structural adjustment, industrial cooperation among the three participants and research and development. Kurihara wanted to exclude any discussion of GATT matters, MFA, agriculture or services. Kikuchi noted that such a list would confine the meeting to matters of direct authority in MITI. While reserving his position on the meeting, Kikuchi suggested a one sentence agenda "how to maintain the free multilateral trade and investment system and resist protectionist pressures." Macdonald and Denman liked that suggestion and Macdonald suggested that he would develop a non-paper on the agenda based on that suggestion with some sub-headings.

Mr. Rashish noted that apart from disagreement on whether or not to have a Trilateral Ministerial meeting there seemed to be a major Japanese internal problem which it would be difficult for the U.S. to address. Kikuchi replied that there was indeed an internal problem and that the best way to avoid exacerbating the problem would be for the U.S. to delay any invitation until after the Cabinet reshuffle. In fact, when Macdonald was discussing next steps, Kikuchi insisted that the U.S. take no further action until it receives a formal reply from the GOJ on Brock's original invitation.

Two closing notes: First, asked what Denman's role was at the dinner, Kikuchi reported that Denman was fully supportive, even enthusiastic about a Trilateral meeting and wanted to link it directly to the Ottawa communique. Discussion on this point noted that a power play was occurring both in Japan and in Europe where the EC was attempting to gain ground on the major member countries by participating in a Trilateral meeting. Second, Hatano said that USTR has told him that USTR has the right to act on trade matters and is not required to coordinate within the government, and to call a meeting such as the one Brock envisaged. Bailey replied that, indeed, USTR has authority in trade matters, but any discussion of a meeting at Ministerial level requires the concurrence of the other affected departments or a White House decision.



SITUATION: CHECK  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA682  
 DD RUEADWW  
 DE RUFHKU #7631 2690205  
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 O 260205Z SEP 81  
 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3763  
 RUEADWW/WHITE/HOUSE WASHDC  
 BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 17631  
 WHITE HOUSE FOR RICHARD ALLEN  
 E.O. 12065: GDS 9/26/87 (KEYWORTH, G.) OR-S  
 TAGS: DVIP, SCSA, JA  
 SUBJECT: KEYWORTH MEETING WITH PM SUZUKI

1. (A-ENTIRE TEXT).  
 2. DURING COURSE OF FIRST US-JAPAN JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISOR GEORGE KEYWORTH HELD MEETING WITH PM SUZUKI. KEYWORTH DELIVERED PERSONAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT AND PRESENTED JAPANESE FLAG FLOWN ON FIRST FLIGHT OF SHUTTLE. HE DESCRIBED THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL INTERESTS IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITH JAPAN AND PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT INVESTMENT IN THESE AREAS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE LONG TERM HEALTH OF THE U.S. ECONOMY. KEYWORTH EXPLAINED TRADITIONAL USG SUPPORT FOR BASIC RESEARCH AND URGED A PARALLEL EFFORT BY GOJ.  
 3. PM SUZUKI REPLIED THAT GOJ SHARED SIMILAR PHILOSOPHY AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. FUTURE PROSPERITY OF JAPAN MADE IT IMPERATIVE TO PLACE HIGH PRIORITY NOW ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. FOR SUCCESS IN THIS FIELD THERE WILL NEED TO BE COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THE U.S. THE WORK UNDER THE US-JAPAN JOINT COMMITTEE WILL PLAY A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THIS FAR INTO THE FUTURE. AS FOR BASIC RESEARCH, SUZUKI ADMITTED THAT JAPAN WAS NOT AT WORLD LEVELS IN THIS AREA, UNLIKE THE AREA OF APPLIED TECHNOLOGY. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE REMEDIED THROUGH STRENUOUS EFFORTS.

4. SUZUKI THANKED KEYWORTH FOR HIS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE JOINT COMMITTEE AND SENT HIS BEST REGARDS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. MEETING ALSO ATTENDED BY AMBASSADOR, ASST SEC MALONE AND OSTP DEPUTY DIRECTOR HUBERMAN, MANSFIELD

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#218

BY LOS NARA DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

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MESSAGE:

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TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 9909  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 262241

NODIS

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/30/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)  
TAGS: DVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.), PARM, PEPR, US, UR, JA, CH

SUBJECT: MY SECOND MEETING WITH GROMYKO, SEPTEMBER 28

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~
2. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA.
3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:
4. I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU AN ACCOUNT OF MY SECOND MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 28.
5. IN A PRIVATE SESSION LASTING FOUR-AND-ONE-HALF HOURS, WE DISCUSSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY-INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. BILATERAL QUESTIONS WERE RESERVED FOR THE SHORT PLENARY SESSION WHICH FOLLOWED.
6. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES INCLUDED BOTH REGIONAL TOPICS AND ARMS CONTROL. WE WENT INTO MORE DETAIL ON MANY OF THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TOUCHED ON IN OUR FIRST MEETING LAST WEEK, AND INCLUDED SOME NEW ONES. FOR EXAMPLE, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO PRESENTED THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AT LENGTH FOR THE FIRST TIME. HE DID SO IN FAMILIAR TERMS, AND MY RESPONSE WAS EQUALLY STANDARD. IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO NOTE THAT HE DID NOT RAISE THE MIDDLE EAST, EXCEPT BY REFERENCE TO THE PERSIAN GULF. FOR MY PART, I GAVE A FULLER EXPLANATION OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT CUBAN ACTIVITIES BOTH IN THE CARIBBEAN/

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#219

BY LJS, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CENTRAL AMERICAN AREA AND FURTHER AFIELD.

7. WITH REGARD TO ARMS CONTROL, WE DISCUSSED BOTH SALT AND TNF, FOLLOWING UP IN SOMEWHAT MORE DETAIL ON OUR JOINT STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 24 CONCERNING TNF NEGOTIATIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE APPROACHING BOTH SETS OF ISSUES WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS. AS IN EVERY OTHER FIELD, I STRESSED TO HIM THAT WE CONSIDER THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR ALLIES TO BE OUR OWN VULNERABILITY.

8. THE TONE OF DISCUSSION IN THE SECOND MEETING CONTINUED TO BE FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE. GROMYKO WAS UNBENDING ON SUBSTANCE, AND WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, NARROW OUR DIFFERENCES. THE SOBER TONE OF THE MEETINGS ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS; AT THE SAME TIME, OUR TALKS WERE SERIOUS AND DETAILED ENOUGH TO MERIT CONTINUATION, HENCE WE AGREED TO A FURTHER-MEETING EARLY NEXT YEAR. IN FACT, WE AGREED TO MEET IN GENEVA, ALTHOUGH PUBLIC CONFIRMATION MUST AWAIT OUR FORMAL APPROACH TO THE SWISS AUTHORITIES.

9. OUR AGREEMENTS TO BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO MEET AGAIN ARE SMALL BUT REAL STEPS FORWARD. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THESE MEETINGS WILL HAVE BEGUN A PROCESS OF SERIOUS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON MAJOR ISSUES. SUCH A PROCESS CAN ONLY BE BASED, HOWEVER, ON REALSOVIET POLICY ADJUSTMENT TO THE NEW AMERICAN APPROACH, AND, I AM CONVINCED, ON THE CONTINUED ADVICE AND COUNSEL OF OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE UNITED STATES HAS NO MORE IMPORTANT ALLY AND NO MORE CHERISHED FRIEND THAN JAPAN.

10. SALUTARY CLOSE. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT. HAIG  
BT  
#2241  
NNNN

RECEIVED 30 SEP 81 20

TO ALLEN

FROM POATS

DOC DATE 30 SEP 81

BAILEY

KEYWORDS: INTL TRADE

JAPAN

EC

SUBJECT: US / EEC / JAPAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

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NSC IF ID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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PK

(CH)

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

September 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: NORMAN BAILEY *NB*

FROM: RUTHERFORD POATS *RP*

SUBJECT: US/EEC/Japan Trade Consultations

In the event you talk with Brock and/or Haig about the proposed trilateral or quadrilateral meeting of trade ministers, the attached paper, distributed by Macdonald at the end of his dinner session with the vice ministers in Chicago September 24, will be useful background. Note that it does give the Japanese continuing freedom to scrap the whole idea, if Suzuki wants to side with Foreign Affairs over MITI, or to stall a decision until after the Cabinet reshuffle in late November.

I told Macdonald you want no invitation sent, proposing a date, or other US pressure put on the Japanese while they are sorting out their internal disagreement. I said the larger question of whether such an elite group meeting should ever be held was still open for decision, and if Brock wants to pursue it he should initiate a decision session with you and Haig. He is on notice that if the meeting does occur, you will insist that Canada be invited.

Attachment

Tab I Memo fr Macdonald, Sep 28, 81

*Thanks*  
*Good advice*  
*to him -*  
*10/5/81*

DEPUTY UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506  
202-395-5114

September 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. RUTHERFORD M. POATS  
STAFF MEMBER  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM: David R. Macdonald *DM*

I enclose the U.S. Non-Paper, which came out of the dinner at my home on Wednesday. As you can see, the first two points were specifically added in order to meet the sensitivities of the Japanese MOFA. We are now waiting for a Japanese response. No pressure is being placed by us on the Japanese to transmit a response, although MITI will undoubtedly press for an early response. This, of course, is an internal Japanese matter.

Enclosure

U.S. NON-PAPER

- 1) The question of whether a meeting will be held is still open.
- 2) The parties discussed on a hypothetical basis what subjects would be discussed if a meeting were thought to be desirable, and the U.S. suggested the following AGENDA:

Primary Objective: To defend free trade principles and consider approaches for resisting protectionist pressures.

1. Recent international trade and related economic developments, especially among EC, Japan and U.S.
2. Longer term prospects for our trade relations, including projections on trade. Patterns and composition of trade among three areas would be considered.
3. Longer term developments in industry structure (e.g., productivity, marketing, R&D) leading to review of critical sectors (e.g., high technology) in which we share interest in maintaining or extending open trading system.
4. Approaches among the three governments to achieve the primary objective.

Several subjects were mentioned as inappropriate for discussion, including:

- GATT matters
- Agricultural problems
- Services problems
- Export restraints
- "Hot issues" currently being negotiated elsewhere

- - - - -

Procedural Points

- Date of Meeting: U.S. suggests November 16-17  
MITI suggests October 31-November 1  
E.C. suggests December 2-4  
MOFA suggests Sometime in December
- Place: U.S. suggests New York
- Participants: Principals plus enough aides to assure adequate interagency representation
- Duration: One day, keep second day free if necessary



- Nature of Meeting:
- (1) Very informal;
  - (2) No decisions will be made;
  - (3) No specific items will be negotiated;
  - (4) No communique to be issued;
  - (5) No press conference to be held.

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JANET COLSON

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BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

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IRENE DERUS

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JANET COLSON

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BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

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CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments: