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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (7/8/81 – 7/26/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	080914Z JUL 81, 2p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #190</i>	7/8/81	BT
2. Cable	101015Z JUL 81, 5p <i>R " " #191</i>	7/10/81	BT
3. Letter	Richard Allen to Ambassador Mike Mansfield re Meeting with Omura, 1p <i>R " " #192</i>	7/13/81	BT
4. Memcon	Allen – Omura Meeting, 3p <i>R " " #193</i>	6/30/81	BT
5. Letter	Mansfield to Allen re US – Japan Relations, 1p <i>R " " #194</i>	6/28/81	BT
6. Memcon	Same as item # 4, 3p <i>R " " #195</i>	6/30/81	BT
7. Cable	141843Z JUL 81, 6p <i>R " " #196</i>	7/14/81	BT
8. Cable	140856Z JUL 81, 1p <i>R " " #197</i>	7/14/81	BT
9. Cable	230856Z JUL 81, 2p <i>R " " #198</i>	7/23/81	BT
10. Cable	250255Z JUL 81, 3p <i>R " " #199</i>	7/25/81	BT
11. Cable	260852Z JUL 81, 2p <i>R " " #200</i>	7/26/81	BT

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 56

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA707
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHKO #2624 1890915
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 080914Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEADWW/WHITE/HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1248
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 12624
FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN FROM AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD
E.O. 12065: GDS 7/8/87 (MANSFIELD, MIKE) DR-M
TAGS: OVIP, JA

SUBJECT: JDA DIRECTOR GENERAL OMURA; HENRY KISSINGER
REF: WHO 3830, WHO 3782

1. APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGE ON GDA DIRECTOR GENERAL OMURA'S DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. DISCOUNTING PROCLIVITIES OF THE JAPANESE PRESS, OF WHICH YOU ARE AWARE, I BELIEVE THAT THE IMPRESSION LEFT WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL WAS ONE OF A SINGLE U.S. VOICE CALLING ON JAPAN TO PERFORM MORE ADEQUATELY IN ITS OWN DEFENSE. THIS IS EXACTLY THE RIGHT APPROACH AND MOST JAPANESE AGREE WHEN THE QUESTION IS POSED IN THIS MANNER. YOUR MEETING WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL OMURA, FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARIES WEINBERGER AND HAIG, SERVED TO UNDERLINE THE UNITY WHICH NOW EXISTS WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON THE CRITICAL DEFENSE ISSUE. WE WILL CONTINUE HERE TO REINFORCE THE EXCELLENT EFFORTS OF THE WASHINGTON TEAM.

2. I LOOK FORWARD TO HENRY KISSINGER'S VISIT AND TO SEEING HIM WHILE HE IS IN JAPAN. I HAVE AN ENGAGEMENT WHICH WILL PREVENT MY SEEING HIM UPON HIS ARRIVAL. HOWEVER, I HOPE TO HAVE LUNCH WITH HIM ON JULY 21 OR BREAKFAST WITH HIM ON JULY 25. I HAVE A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT ON JULY 22 AT FUJIYOSHIDA FOR THIRTEENTH SEMINAR FOR TOP MANAGEMENT. OUR POLITICAL COUNSELOR, BOB IMMERMANN, WILL MEET HIM ON ARRIVAL AND BILL CLARK, THE DCM, WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE LOCAL SITUATION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING HIS ARRIVAL.

3. NEW SUBJECT THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH YOU SENT TO ME ON JUNE 23. YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. I AM DELIGHTED TO RECEIVE THEM AND APPRECIATE THE THOUGHTFULNESS OF EVERYONE CONCERNED IN SENDING THEM TO ME.
MANSFIELD

BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1 #190

BY HAT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 57

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

#2624
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 55

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE376
STU7432
UD RUFHC
DF RUEHKU #2630 1890936
ZNR UUUUU Z7H
U 080935Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1258
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 12630
PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR RICHARD ALLEN
EO 12065: N/A
TAGS: NVIP (KISSINGER, H.), JA
SUBJECT: KISSINGER VISIT TO JAPAN
REF: WH 3830
1. ACCORDING TO JAYCEE HOSTS, HENRY KISSINGER IS
SCHEDULED TO DEPART US ON JULY 20 BUT ARRIVE IN TOKYO,
AS RESULT OF INTERNATIONAL DATELINE CHANGE, ON JULY 21
VIA JAL FLIGHT 1 FROM SAN FRANCISCO. PLEASE CLARIFY.
2. JAYCEES ALSO ADVISE THAT, ACCORDING TO THEIR
SCHEDULE, HENRY KISSINGER'S FIRST APPOINTMENT ON
JULY 25 IS AT 9:45 A.M. AMBASSADOR WOULD THEREFORE
LIKE TO INVITE MR. AND MRS. KISSINGER TO BREAKFAST
AT RESIDENCE EITHER 7:30 OR 8:00 A.M. ON JULY 25TH.
MANSFIELD
BT
#2630
NNNN

SENSITIVE

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1359
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
OMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
OMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY
OMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
OMUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JA PRIORITY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1359

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
OMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
OMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY
OMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
OMUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JA PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 12821

INCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
D. 12000; XDS-1 07-10/11 (CLARK, W.) OR-M
AGS; MPOL, MARR, US, JA
SUBJECT: (X) OMURA'S REPORT RECEIVES FAVORABLE CABINET
RECEPTION
(X - ENTIRE TEXT.)

SUMMARY: PM SUZUKI AND CABINET HEARD JDA DIRGEN
OMURA CONCLUDE THAT USG VIEW WAS UNIFIED AND THAT
JAPAN NEEDED TO DO MORE IN DEFENSE AREA TO MAINTAIN
BILATERAL TRUST. PM CHARACTERIZED OMURA VISIT AS
"EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT" IN DEEPENING U.S.-JAPAN
DIALOGUE. HE RECONFIRMED CENTRAL POSITION OF U.S.-
JAPAN RELATIONS, AS SET FORTH IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
TO JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AND EXPRESSED INTENTION
TO DEEPENING BILATERAL DIALOGUE ON SECURITY MATTERS.
MIYAZAWA TOLD REPORTERS FOLLOWING MEETING THAT JAPAN
SHARED U.S. ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET BUILDUP AND THAT
IT WOULD EXERT MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO ENHANCE ITS DEFENSES.
CABINET MEETING HAS DONE MUCH TO REDRESS PUBLIC PERCEPTION
THAT U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE "GAP" EXISTS. END SUMMARY.

JDA DIRGEN OMURA GAVE REPORT ON HIS DEFENSE DISCUSSION
WITH U.S. LEADERS AND HIS VISIT TO U.S. AND EUROPE
TO PM AND CABINET MORNING OF JULY 10. OMURA, AFTER

COL: VP
REG: GREGG, KIMMITT
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

TOKYO 2821
RECALLED

DTG: 101015Z JUL 81 P8N1021849
TOR: 191/1035Z

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Feb-03/11*191

BY ASJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

PROVIDING SUMMARY DETAILS OF TALKS, CONCLUDED THAT USG EXPECTED JAPAN TO EXERT UTMOST DEFENSE EFFORTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND HE TOLD PM THAT JAPAN MUST DO SO IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN U.S. TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. (SUMMARY OF OMURA'S REMARKS FOLLOWS IN PARA 6.)

AFTER CABINET DISCUSSION OF OMURA'S WRITTEN REPORT, SUZUKI READ MEMO (CHARACTERIZED BY HIM AS SUMMARIZING SENSE OF THE CABINET MEETING" AND LATER RELEASED IN FULL TO PRESS) WHICH CHARACTERIZED U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP "LYNCHPIN" OF JAPAN'S DIPLOMACY, GROUNDED IN SOLIDARITY AND TRUST, GROWING IN IMPORTANCE DURING DIFFICULT DECADE OF 1980s. MEMO QUOTES PM AS HAVING CONFIRMED HIS CHARACTERIZATION DURING HIS RECENT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT. PM ALSO SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO DEEPEN ALREADY CLOSE DIALOGUE WITH U.S., AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH ISSUES SUCH AS SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN AN EFFECTIVE AND APPROPRIATE WAY. HE ALSO CHARACTERIZED OMURA'S CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AS EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT AND PART OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH U.S. ON DEFENSE.

WE UNDERSTAND FROM MOFA SOURCES THAT DURING CABINET MEETING, STA DIRECTOR GENERAL NAKAGAWA STRONGLY SUPPORTED GREATER DEFENSE EFFORTS AND FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA EXPRESSED VIEW THAT U.S. DESIRE TO REDRESS IMBALANCE BETWEEN ITS MILITARY FORCES AND THOSE OF SOVIETS BEFORE ENTERING INTO DISARMAMENT TALKS WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE. AFTER MEETING, CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYAZAWA TOLD REPORTERS THAT JAPAN SHARED U.S. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP AND WOULD MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

SUMMARY OF OMURA'S REPORT FOLLOWS:
OMURA KEENLY FELT THAT U.S. VIEWS ON SOVIET THREAT AND NEED TO COUNTER IT WERE STRONGLY HELD.
GOJ AND USG WERE AGREED THAT SOVIET THREAT AND INTERNATIONAL TENSION HAD GREATLY INCREASED.
OMURA EXPLAINED GOJ'S CONSTRAINTS ON SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDING DEFENSE SPENDING; HE EXPRESSED GOJ DETERMINATION TO ATTAIN OUTLINE GOALS AS EARLY AS IT COULD INCORPORATING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF USG VIEWS.
U.S. SIDE RESPONDED THAT:
-GIVEN SMALL BASE AND PRESENT INFLATION RATE, 7.5 PERCENT INCREASE WAS TOO SMALL;
-OUTLINE IS OUTDATED, AND ITS FORCE LEVELS ARE TOO LOW TO INCREASE EFFECTIVELY JAPAN'S DETERRENT POWER;

BTB IMMED
BTB 03111
FM RUEHKO #2821702 1911019
TO 101015Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1360

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
COMUSJAPAN HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
COMUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JA PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 12821

ARTICLE VI OF MST)
-U.S. AND JAPAN NEEDED TO CONTINUE DEFENSE DIALOGUE.
OMURA CONCLUDED THAT USG VIEW WAS UNIFIED; THAT USG WAS
MAKING BUDGETARY SACRIFICE TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING
AND EXPECTED JAPAN TO DO LIKEWISE.
HEIGHTENED JAPANESE DEFENSE EFFORTS WERE EXPECTED BY
USG AND IN FACT, WERE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN U.S. TRUST
AND AN EFFECTIVE TREATY STRUCTURE.
OMURA HAD PRODUCTIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH NATO
AND FRG LEADERS.

PM STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING CABINET MEETING:
QUOTE: PM MEMO (FOR USE AT 7/10 CABINET MEETING)
JDA DIRECTORGENERAL OMURA'S U.S. VISIT WAS VERY
SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT SEEMED TO DEEPEN U.S.-JAPAN
UNDERSTANDING ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES AND
AGREEMENT THAT OUR CONSULTATIONS ON THESE
PROBLEMS MUST BE CONTINUED. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE
USG SHARES OUR EVALUATION THAT THE VISIT WAS
SIGNIFICANT FOR THESE REASONS.
THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP IS STRONGLY GROUNDED IN
SOLIDARITY AND MUTUAL TRUST WHICH I AND PRESIDENT
REAGAN ALSO CONFIRMED DURING OUR RECENT MEETING. AS
WE PROCEED INTO THE DIFFICULT DECADE OF THE 1980'S,
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP, THE LYNCH
PIN OF OUR COUNTRY'S DIPLOMACY, WILL GROW AND WITH THIS
THOUGHT IN MIND AT THE OUTSET, I INTEND TO DEEPEN

BTB
RQB: GREGG, SCHWEITZER
WHBR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

TOKYO 2821
RECALLED

DTG: 101015Z JUL 81 PSN: 021848
TOR: 191/10332

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 JUL 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

*W 7/10
1/21/04*

DOCDATE 10 JUL 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

OMURA, JOJI

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF ALLEN 30 JUN MTG W/ JAPANESE DEFENSE MINISTER

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

SCHWEITZER

LILLEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8103830

8103856

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

- 7/13 RVA apud memcon

C 7/13 Allen Schult to Mansfield 16, 52, 5C

DISPATCH

ed via RVA's ofc. 7/13

W/ATTCH

FILE **PA** (C) H.

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1981

Dear Mike,

Thank you very much for your letter of June 28. I appreciate your response, and I am most particularly heartened by your agreement with the views that I have been advancing here.

Enclosed is the Memorandum of Conversation from my meeting with Mr. Omura. I thought you would like to have it for your files.

Of course, you already know that the Japanese side distorted the actual meeting, but I do agree with you that the desired result has been achieved. One of these days I hope to have the opportunity to discuss this with you in detail, as I am convinced that we seem to go out of our way to be insensitive to conveying the message to the Japanese in a manner appropriate to their expectations. It does not hurt to change the style of delivering a message as long as essential violence is not done to the substance. With this I am sure you are in complete agreement.

Pat and I would love to have the opportunity to pass through Tokyo and to see you and Mrs. Mansfield. Perhaps that time will come in the not distant future.

With the Economic Summit upon us and the anticipated visit of President Sadat, we will have our plates full through the first part of August. Following the Sadat visit, the President will be in California for about three weeks, and I hope to be able to snatch two weeks for sometime at our place at the beach in New Jersey. After Labor Day, we can discuss a travel schedule!

Pat joins me in sending our very best to Mrs. Mansfield and to you.

*Sincerely,
Avis*

The Honorable
Mike Mansfield
American Ambassador
Tokyo

P.S. I envy you — for your extraordinary fraction of reading hand written letters. J.

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS F00-037/1#192
BY 105 NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4033

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of Richard V. Allen's Meeting with Minister of State for Defense and Director General, Japan Defense Agency Joji Omura

PARTICIPANTS: Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James W. Nance, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Poindexter, Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Armitage, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Major General Robert Schweitzer, NSC Senior Staff Member
James Lilley, NSC Senior Staff Member
Norman Bailey, NSC Senior Staff Member
Donald Gregg, NSC Senior Staff Member (Notetaker)

Minister of State for Defense and Director General, Japan Defense Agency Joji Omura
Isuke Watanabe, Director General, Defense Facilities, Administration Agency
Akira Shiota, Director General, Bureau of Defense Policy, Japan Defense Agency
Hisahiko Okazaki, Director General for Foreign Relations, Japan Defense Agency
Lieutenant General Nobuo Katao, Director Joint Staff, Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency
Colonel Mikio Kuga, Defense and Military Attache, Embassy of Japan, Embassy Escort Officer
Minoru Tanba, Director of Security, North American Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Japanese Ambassador Yoshio Okawara
Colonel Charles W. Chapman, U.S. Army Attache, Tokyo
Sadaaki Numata, First Secretary, Political Section, Embassy of Japan
Tatsuo Arima, Counselor, Political Section, Embassy of Japan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on July 2, 2011

Classified and Extended by Richard V. Allen

Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#193

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY LOT NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE, TIME June 30, 1981
AND PLACE: 5:00-6:15 p.m., Indian Treaty Room

After an exchange of greetings and introduction of staff, Richard Allen asked Minister Omura if he had received a clear message from his visit and whether he was satisfied with the talks that had been held.

Minister Omura replied that he was very satisfied, that he had a series of long and detailed meetings, and that he will carry back to Tokyo with him a clear impression of strong United States concern--we clearly want our allies to do more and to do it faster. Mr. Omura said that message had been absolutely clear.

Minister Omura then went into a standard defense explanation of what Japan has done, citing the domestic factors which limit Japan's ability to expand its defense expenditures rapidly. He ended his explanation by stating that the Japanese aim is to have a radically improved defense capability by 1987. Mr. Omura urged our understanding for the delays between now and then.

Mr. Allen responded by thanking Mr. Omura for his presentation and then reviewed the 90-minute meeting between Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan which remained the basis for our understanding with Japan. Mr. Allen stated that the United States is appreciative of Japan's defense efforts and the common perceptions that we share regarding the Soviet threat, the Peoples Republic of China, ASEAN, Korea, and the Pacific Basin. Mr. Allen said we understood the peculiarities of Japan's situation, including the need for consensus and the limits that constitutional provision and Diet debate impose. Mr. Allen noted that some aspects of political discourse and press reporting underscored the perception that Japan is not doing enough. He said he hoped that eventually Japan would show the same enthusiasm for defense that it has shown toward the commercial sector. Mr. Allen stressed that we intend to be consistent allies, springing no surprises on our friends. He urged Japan to do more in defense spending just as we are doing more.

Minister Omura replied by running over the current positions of the various opposition parties in Japan. He noted that while the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito are becoming more supportive, Japan's Socialists and the Japanese Communists remain adamantly opposed to the security treaty with the United States and to the very existence of Japan's Self-Defense forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Minister Omura said that Japan would make its best efforts to increase defense spending. He stressed that Japan is rapidly increasing its developmental aid to the emerging countries and that Japan is also stressing diplomatic efforts.

Mr. Allen responded by saying that these supplementary efforts were appreciated. He said that if we agree between us that more must be done, he is certain that ways can be found to do more. He said that restoration of security in and around Japan is in Japan's interest as well as ours. Mr. Allen noted the heavy sacrifices which America was making in order to build up its defense, even at the cost of social programs, and urged Japan to give full consideration to this.

Minister Omura responded by saying that he understood the seriousness of the United States posture but that the facts are such that Japan cannot achieve the speed and intensity of the United States defense buildup. Mr. Omura said that it was his desire to move in the same direction as quickly as possible.

Mr. Allen said that if this can be achieved we can be successful. He said that the message needs to be repeated in Japan and that we, in the United States, need to know that active efforts are being devoted to building the necessary consensus to support an expanded defense effort.

Mr. Omura noted that twenty years ago the budgetary allocations to social security and defense were equal. As a result of the intervening years of economic growth, spending for social security benefits are now 3.5 times as large as those for defense. Mr. Omura said that twenty years of history lie behind this trend and that while he sees and understands the American point of view, this trend and balance of resource allocation cannot be overturned overnight.

Mr. Allen concluded the meeting by thanking Mr. Omura for his visit and by noting that we did not expect "the impossible" from Japan but that "the improbable" would be most welcome.

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DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS FOO-0371#194
BY HOI NARA DATE 7/24/06

(Dict)

8 JUL 1981

AMBASSADOR OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TOKYO

June 28, 1981

Dear Dick, -

Thank you for your good letter of the 13th, your very kind but much appreciated words, + the copy of Bill Gwinn's speech which I thought was excellent + a good guide for the future of U.S. - Japan relations. I am glad that, through you, the Administration will be taking it to heart. Unfortunately, the picture which I requested + you sent did not arrive at the same time but for arriving it will come in a separate envelope.

I have been most impressed by your remarks + your most recent speech on our bilateral relationship. You have shown the necessary balanced view + I agree fully with your prognosis. The Japanese should, can + will do more but they will have to be encouraged in the right way. That is where I think you are being + will be most effective. I am deeply appreciative for the time, the content + the understanding you have shown.

Maurice + I send you + your family our best personal wishes + we hope it will not be too long before we see you out here. Sincerely
Mike Mansfield



AMBASSADOR OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TOKYO

Dick, -

The autographed picture just arrived. It is superb! Thank you very much & know that I am deeply appreciative of your kindness & your good words. All the best - as always.

Mike Mansfield

At RVA HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

July 10, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DGG*

SUBJECT: Your June 30, 1981 Meeting with Minister of State for Defense and Director General, Japan Defense Agency Joji Omura

Here is a Memorandum of Conversation of your meeting with Joji Omura.

Attachment
Tab I MEMCON of June 30, 1981

*Thanks, Don -
Copy of this should
go to Mansfield.
He just wrote to me for
faster you have a copy,
and if not, please look at it.
and I could enclose a
copy with my report.*

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

*miss
17/1/81*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4033

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of Richard V. Allen's Meeting with Minister of State for Defense and Director General, Japan Defense Agency Joji Omura

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Richard Armitage, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Major General Robert Schweitzer, NSC Senior Staff Member
James Lilley, NSC Senior Staff Member
Norman Bailey, NSC Senior Staff Member
Donald Gregg, NSC Senior Staff Member (Notetaker)

Minister of State for Defense and Director General, Japan Defense Agency Joji Omura
Isuke Watanabe, Director General, Defense Facilities, Administration Agency
Akira Shiota, Director General, Bureau of Defense Policy, Japan Defense Agency
Hisahiko Okazaki, Director General for Foreign Relations, Japan Defense Agency
Lieutenant General Nobuo Katao, Director Joint Staff, Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency
Colonel Mikio Kuga, Defense and Military Attache, Embassy of Japan, Embassy Escort Officer
Minoru Tanba, Director of Security, North American Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Japanese Ambassador Yoshio Okawara
Colonel Charles W. Chapman, U.S. Army Attache, Tokyo
Sadaaki Numata, First Secretary, Political Section, Embassy of Japan
Tatsuo Arima, Counselor, Political Section, Embassy of Japan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on July 2, 2011
Classified and Extended by Richard V. Allen
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1-#195

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY NOJ DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE, TIME June 30, 1981
AND PLACE: 5:00-6:15 p.m., Indian Treaty Room

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Minister Omura replied that he was very satisfied, that he had a series of long and detailed meetings, and that he will carry back to Tokyo with him a clear impression of strong United States concern--we clearly want our allies to do more and to do it faster. Mr. Omura said that message had been absolutely clear.

Minister Omura then went into a standard defense explanation of what Japan has done, citing the domestic factors which limit Japan's ability to expand its defense expenditures rapidly. He ended his explanation by stating that the Japanese aim is to have a radically improved defense capability by 1987. Mr. Omura urged our understanding for the delays between now and then.

Mr. Allen responded by thanking Mr. Omura for his presentation and then reviewed the 90-minute meeting between Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan which remained the basis for our understanding with Japan. Mr. Allen stated that the United States is appreciative of Japan's defense efforts and the common perceptions that we share regarding the Soviet threat, the Peoples Republic of China, ASEAN, Korea, and the Pacific Basin. Mr. Allen said we understood the peculiarities of Japan's situation, including the need for consensus and the limits that constitutional provision and Diet debate impose. Mr. Allen noted that some aspects of political discourse and press reporting underscored the perception that Japan is not doing enough. He said he hoped that eventually Japan would show the same enthusiasm for defense that it has shown toward the commercial sector. Mr. Allen stressed that we intend to be consistent allies, springing no surprises on our friends. He urged Japan to do more in defense spending just as we are doing more.

Minister Omura replied by running over the current positions of the various opposition parties in Japan. He noted that while the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito are becoming more supportive, Japan's Socialists and the Japanese Communists remain adamantly opposed to the security treaty with the United States and to the very existence of Japan's Self-Defense forces.

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Minister Omura said that Japan would make its best efforts to increase defense spending. He stressed that Japan is rapidly increasing its developmental aid to the emerging countries and that Japan is also stressing diplomatic efforts.

Mr. Allen responded by saying that these supplementary efforts were appreciated. He said that if we agree between us that more must be done, he is certain that ways can be found to do more. He said that restoration of security in and around Japan is in Japan's interest as well as ours. Mr. Allen noted the heavy sacrifices which America was making in order to build up its defense, even at the cost of social programs, and urged Japan to give full consideration to this.

Minister Omura responded by saying that he understood the seriousness of the United States posture but that the facts are such that Japan cannot achieve the speed and intensity of the United States defense buildup. Mr. Omura said that it was his desire to move in the same direction as quickly as possible.

Mr. Allen said that if this can be achieved we can be successful. He said that the message needs to be repeated in Japan and that we, in the United States, need to know that active efforts are being devoted to building the necessary consensus to support an expanded defense effort.

Mr. Omura noted that twenty years ago the budgetary allocations to social security and defense were equal. As a result of the intervening years of economic growth, spending for social security benefits are now 3.5 times as large as those for defense. Mr. Omura said that twenty years of history lie behind this trend and that while he sees and understands the American point of view, this trend and balance of resource allocation cannot be overturned overnight.

Mr. Allen concluded the meeting by thanking Mr. Omura for his visit and by noting that we did not expect "the impossible" from Japan but that "the improbable" would be most welcome.

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CY TO BAKER

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14 JULY

4033

MR. ALLEN'S COMMENT SAYS:

Copy of this should go to Mansfield. He just wrote to me (I gather you have a copy, and if not, please look at it), and I could enclose a copy with my response.

(see copy of Mr. Allen's letter to Amb. Mansfield, dtd 13 July, attached)

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP
EOB: GREGG
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #4480/01 1951906
O 141843Z JUL 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7605

INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 5176
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6685
BT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 184480
NODIS
E.O. 12065:RDS-1 7/10/01 (ARMACOST, MICHAEL)
TAGS: JA, USSUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN
MINISTER SUNAO SONODA AT MANILA, JUNE 30.1. ENTIRE CABLE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~2. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH MET WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER
SONODA FOR THIRTY MINUTES ON JUNE 30 IN MANILA WHERE BOTH
WERE ATTENDING THE INAUGURAL OF PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT
MARCOS. PRESENT ON THE US SIDE WERE ADMIRAL DANIEL MURPHY,
AMBASSADOR MURPHY, NANCY BEARG DYKE, JOHN NEGROPONTE,
CHASE UNTERMYER, AND CORNELIUS IIDA (INTERPRETER AND MEM-
CON DRAFTER).3. AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, MR. SONODA SAID HE
WOULD ENJOY HEARING THE VICE PRESIDENT-S VIEWS ON CHINA

SECSTATE WASHDC 4480

DTG:141843Z JUL 81 PSN: 026873
TOR: 195/1907Z*****~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*****DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1#196
BY LOI NACA, DATE 7/24/06

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND ASIA, BUT FIRST HE WISHED TO ADDRESS THE U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS ENTERING A VERY IMPORTANT PERIOD BECAUSE OF THE INTENSIFYING WORLD SITUATION, AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN TO STAND CLOSELY TOGETHER. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS CLOSELY OBSERVING THE U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP, AND HE THEREFORE WISHED THAT SUCH MEETINGS AS THIS BE FRANK AND FREQUENT.

4. SONODA SAID THAT ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE U.S. JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP TODAY WAS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BEGAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER WORLD WAR II, AS ONE BETWEEN A DEFEATED COUNTRY AND AN OCCUPYING NATION. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CONTINUE TO ASSESS U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE WAY IT STARTED. THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WERE GRADUALLY BECOMING AWARE OF THIS.

5. SONODA SAID HE BELIEVED THE U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD TO BE BASED ON MUTUAL HELP AND COOPERATION. NOT ONLY THE WESTERN WORLD BUT ALSO THE ENTIRE WORLD WAS AFFECTED BY THE WAY THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN CONDUCTED THEIR BILATERAL AFFAIRS. THERE MIGHT NOT BE MANY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES WHO WERE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE ORIENT AND JAPAN. HOWEVER, THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS ONE SUCH KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON, AND SONODA WISHED TO HAVE A FRANK AND FRUITFUL DISCUSSION WITH HIM.

6. SONODA SAID THAT BECAUSE THE U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP WAS OF ENORMOUS SCOPE, THERE HAD BEEN MINOR FRICTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO IN THE PAST, AND THERE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SUCH FRICTIONS IN THE FUTURE. WHEN THE RELATIONSHIP WAS THIS PROFOUND, FRICTIONS WERE BOUND TO OCCUR, BUT SOLUTIONS WERE LIKELY. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR THE LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO EXCHANGE OPINIONS FREELY. HE HAS TALKED WITH SECRETARY HAIG ONLY TEN DAYS AGO; IN ABOUT A WEEK HE WOULD MEET HIM AGAIN IN NEW YORK.

7. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH SONODA'S THESIS COMPLETELY: THE TWO NATIONS MUST COOPERATE CLOSELY.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE REAGAN-SUZUKI COMMUNIQUE

8. VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE UNITED STATES WAS SO PLEASED WITH THE SUZUKI-REAGAN BILATERAL MEETING WAS THAT IT WAS HELD EARLY IN THE ADMINISTRATION. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT BILATERAL CONSULTATION HAD TAKEN PLACE EARLY. IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VIEW, THERE WAS A SYMBOLISM IN HOLDING THE MEETING EARLY. THE OTHER NATIONS OF THE WORLD ALSO NOTICED THIS SYMBOLISM. REGARDING THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IT EXPRESSED THE UNDERSTANDING BOTH LEADERS HAVE OF THE ISSUES. THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING AND NOT WHAT CAME AFTERWARDS. SONODA INTERJECTED THAT HE COMPLETELY AGREED. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE SOME TOPICS AND QUESTIONS THAT WERE SENSITIVE IN JAPAN. HE UNDERSTOOD THESE SENSITIVITIES, AND TO PRESSURE JAPAN OR TO BULLDOZE JAPAN ON THESE ISSUES WOULD NOT BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. IT WOULD ONLY SERVE TO WEAKEN A GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES, FRANKLY, PLACED FULL CONFIDENCE.

DEFENSE

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT AND SUZUKI UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER ON DEFENSE ISSUES. FOREIGN MINISTER RESPONDED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THE JAPANESE SITUATION, AND HE FOR ONE WAS DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE LINE SET FORTH IN THE REAGAN-SUZUKI COMMUNIQUE WITH THE SAME ATTITUDE. HE SAID HE WAS GRATIFIED TO KNOW ABOUT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT, AND THAT WHATEVER DIFFICULTY MAY HAVE OCCURRED AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT WAS ENTIRELY A DOMESTIC JAPANESE MATTER THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COMMUNIQUE. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S WORDS ON THE DEFENSE ISSUE ALONE HAD MADE SONODA'S TRIP TO MANILA WORTH WHILE. AS VICE PRESIDENT BUSH OBSERVED, THE U.S.-JAPANESE

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #4480/02 1951906
O 141843Z JUL 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7606

INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 5177
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6686
BT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 184480NODIS
RELATIONSHIP WAS TOO STRONG TO BE AFFECTED IN ANY SIGNI-
FICANT MANNER BY ONE INCIDENT OR ANOTHER; IT WAS IN "GOOD
SHAPE." THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO RESPECT
JAPANESE INTERNAL CONDITIONS.

FRANCE

10. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN FRANCE HE DISCUSSED WITH MITTERAND, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THE PRIME MINISTER U.S. CONCERN OVER THE INCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE FRENCH CABINET -- THE US HAD LONG EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING COMMUNISTS IN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, BECAUSE OF ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT ON NATO. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT FRANCE HAD BEEN, AND WOULD REMAIN, A FRIEND. HOWEVER, HE ASKED THE FRENCH LEADERS TO TAKE A LOOK AT A BROAD RANGE OF U.S. CONCERNS, NOT IN TERMS OF FRENCH DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, BUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXTERNAL CONNOTATIONS OF THE PRESENCE OF COMMUNIST MEMBERS IN THE FRENCH CABINET. HAD HE FAILED TO RAISE THIS POINT, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A GOOD FRIEND TO FRANCE.

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DATE 07/21/81

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

11. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT PRESIDENT MITTERAND EXPRESSED TO HIM AT LENGTH THE THOUGHT THAT THE MORE OVERWHELMING THE SOCIALIST VICTORY OVER THE COMMUNISTS IN THE FRENCH ELECTION, THE MORE IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR MITTERAND TO BRING THE COMMUNISTS INTO HIS GOVERNMENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT MITTERAND FELT THAT THIS INCLUSION WOULD HELP FURTHER DIMINISH THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S POWER BASE AND STRENGTH, AND THAT MITTERAND, WHO BEAT THE COMMUNISTS DOWN TO 16 PERCENT FROM THE 26 PERCENT LEVEL,

WOULD BE ABLE TO DIMINISH FURTHER COMMUNIST INFLUENCE. ACCORDING TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, MITTERAND, WHO WAS MORE POWERFUL THAN ANY OTHER DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED LEADER OF A EUROPEAN NATION, WAS READY TO USE THIS POWER TO DISMISS MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT

12. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT MITTERAND FELT UNEASY ABOUT THE HIGH INTEREST RATES PREVAILING IN THE UNITED STATES. THE HIGH RATES WERE NOT U.S. POLICY; AND AS THE UNITED STATES SUCCEEDED IN STRENGTHENING ITS ECONOMY, THE INTEREST RATES WOULD FALL AND MIGHT INDEED FALL RAPIDLY.

OTTAWA

13. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI AND PRESIDENT REAGAN AGREED IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN MAY THAT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD DEAL WITH SUBJECTS IN A BROAD MANNER, AND THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THE FORM OF EUROPE VERSUS U.S. OR EUROPE VERSUS JAPAN. SUCH DETAILED MATTERS AS QUOTAS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN UP. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE FRENCH PRESIDENT ALSO ESPOUSED THIS APPROACH OF DEALING WITH MACRO-ECONOMICS AND THE BROAD TOPICS OF EAST-WEST AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIPS, AND ENERGY, WHILE NOT DELVING INTO DETAILS WITH REGARD TO QUOTAS AND OTHER SPECIFICS. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH SAID THAT MITTERAND'S STANCE TOWARDS THE SUMMIT'S AGENDA WAS COMPATIBLE WITH JAPANESE VIEWS.

THE U.S. INTEREST RATE

SECSTATE WASHDC 4480

DTG:141043Z JUL 81 PSN: 026876
TOR: 195/1909Z

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

14. SONODA BROUGHT UP THE HIGH U.S. INTEREST RATES, NOTING THAT IN WEST GERMANY AND OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI HEARD STRONG CRITICISM OF THE HIGH RATES. HE SAID THAT HE ADVISED CRITICS THAT THEY SHOULD BEAR IT A LITTLE WHILE LONGER BECAUSE THIS WAS INEVITABLE AS THE UNITED STATES ATTEMPTED TO REVERSE ITS ECONOMIC SETBACKS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT EUROPEAN DISCONTENT, IF LEFT ALONE, MIGHT SEEK EXPRESSION DURING THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT CONFERENCE. SONODA THEREFORE ADVISED THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE SOME MEASURES TO FORESTALL SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.

15. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT HIGH INTEREST RATES WERE NOT UNITED STATES POLICY, AND IT WAS ALL RIGHT IF THE ISSUE CAME UP AT OTTAWA. CLARK

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DTG:141843Z JUL 81 PSN: 026876
TOR: 195/1909Z

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 393

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/29/81//210

SITUATION! CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

MESSAGE:

HCE047
UTS7021
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHKO #2992 1950857
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140856Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1460
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 12992

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12065: GDS 07/14/87 (IMMERMAN, R.M.) DR=P
TAGSI MARR, MNUC, MPOL, JA, US
SUBJECT: (N) KYODO; DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENT INDICATES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE IN JAPAN
1. (N) KYODO ITEM DATED WASHINGTON JULY 13 REPORTS
THAT DECLASSIFIED 1957 ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF REPORT
INDICATES THAT HONEST JOHN ROCKETS, THEN PART OF
EQUIPMENT OF U.S. ARMY JAPAN, MAY HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED
WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS. REPORT RECOMMENDED THAT HONEST
JOHN BE MAINTAINED IN JAPAN TO "INSURE CAPABILITY
FOR GROUND DELIVERY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS FOR IMMEDIATE
USE IN KOREA OR ELSEWHERE IN FAR EAST."
2. (N) COMMENT: WE EXPECT THAT ITEM WILL RECEIVE
PROMINENT TREATMENT IN JULY 15 PAPERS. EMBASSY PLANS
TO NOTE IF ASKED THAT HONEST JOHN WAS DUAL-CAPABLE
SYSTEM AND ITS PRESENCE ALONE DID NOT INDICATE PRESENCE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER
INFORMATION ON DOCUMENT AND ANY ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE.
MANSFIELD

BT
#2992
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#197

BY MS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SENSITIVE

DATE 07/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #3605 204000Z
O 230000Z JUL 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1735

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 13605

INFO: FOR DES
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 7/23/88, (CLARK, WILLIAM), OR-M
TAGS: ENRG, TECH, MNUC, SCSSA, JA
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON TOKAI MURA
REF: STATE 192200

I. (- ENTIRE TEXT)

POLCOUNS AND EMSOFF MET WITH YATABE AND KANEKO ON AFTERNOON OF JULY 23 TO DISCUSS ELEMENTS OF PROPOSED NEW TOKAI MURA COMMUNIQUE. BOTH EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF DEPARTMENT'S EFFORTS IN PROVIDING SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR TALKS ON THE FORMULATION OF A SOLUTION TO THE TOKAI MURA ISSUE. YATABE ASKED FOR TIME TO STUDY THE POINTS IN FULL BEFORE GIVING A DETAILED RESPONSE, BUT DID INDICATE THAT THERE WOULD BE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTY WITH PRESENTATION OF PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE AS AN EXTENSION OF THE 1977 AGREEMENT. PACKAGING OF ANY US/JAPAN AGREEMENT EMERGING FROM THE MONDAY TALKS IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE PERCEIVED BY THE JAPANESE PUBLIC AS A NEW INSTRUMENT OR DOCUMENT, ACCORDING TO YATABE. YATABE WILL CONTACT EMBASSY TOMORROW TO INDICATE WHETHER JAPANESE REACTIONS TO PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE WILL BE PRESENTED IN TOKYO OR BY KANEKO TEAM IN WASHINGTON.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F20-037/#198
BY hst NARA DATE 7/24/06

TOKYO 3605

DTG:230000Z JUL 81 RSN: 036020
TOR: 204/1200Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 07/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

S. KANEKO MENTIONED NIHON KEIZAI ARTICLE WHICH REPORTED THAT DURING JULY 27 TALKS BETWEEN DOE SECRETARY EDWARDS AND MITI MINISTER TANAKA, US WILL EXTEND PERMISSION TO JAPAN TO REPROCESS 200 ADDITIONAL TONS OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AT TOKAI MURA. POLCOUNS AND EMBOFF REPLIED THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THESE REPORTS, BUT WERE CERTAIN THAT THE ISSUE, IF MENTIONED DURING TANAKA/EDWARDS MEETINGS, WOULD BE TREATED IN GENERAL TERMS. MANSFIELD

TOKYO 3805

DTG: 230856Z JUL 81 PONI 030320
TORI 204/1200Z

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 07/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

WHTS: ROBI GREGG, GUHIN, HUBERMAN
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS.

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #3749 2060256
O 260255Z JUL 81 ZFP-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1008

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 13749

NODIS
FPR, DES
E.O. 120651 RDB-1, 07/26/88 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-M
TAGS: ENRG, TECH, MNUC, SCSA, JA
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON TOKAI MURA
REF: (A) STATE 192200 (NODIS) (B) TOKYO 13685 (NODIS)

1. (R) ENTIRE TEXT.

ON JULY 24, KANEKO OFFERED ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO THOSE MADE AT JULY 23 MEETING WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS ON JULY 27-28 TOKAI MURA TALKS IN WASHINGTON (REFTEL (A)). THOUGH GOJ APPRECIATES U.S. SENSITIVITIES IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ AND OPINION IN WASHINGTON, IT IS DISAPPOINTED IN THE PROPOSED RETENTION OF RESTRICTIONS ON BOTH THE AMOUNT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TO BE REPROCESSED AT TOKAI MURA AND THE PERIOD OF OPERATION AT THE FACILITY. IT ALSO SEES THE PROPOSED ELEMENTS AS ESSENTIALLY RETAINING THE "NO MAJOR MOVES" RESTRICTIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SECOND REPROCESSING PLANT. IF COMMUNIQUE IS PRESENTED TO JAPANESE PUBLIC IN FORM PROPOSED BY U.S., JAPANESE PUBLIC WILL PERCEIVE IT AS THE PROLONGATION OF THE UNPOPULAR 1977 COMMUNIQUE. KANEKO STRESSED THAT IN LIGHT OF THE GREAT OPTIMISM ENGENDERED BY ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCEMENTS ON TOKAI MURA AND NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY, THE DISAPPOINTMENT FELT

TOKYO 3749

DTG: 260255Z JUL 81 P8N1 041000
TOR: 206/0517Z

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 800-037/1#199
BY ADJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 07/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BY JAPANESE INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE PRONOUNCED.

KANEKO STATED THAT THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THE ISSUE WILL BE BASED ON THEIR PROPOSALS MADE EARLIER THIS YEAR. THESE PROPOSALS ARE CONTAINED IN TWO PAPERS PASSED TO THE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THE EMBASSY OF JAPAN IN LATE MARCH. THE PAPERS ARE ENTITLED "PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A NEW JOINT DETERMINATION FOR REPROCESSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS OF U.S. ORIGIN" AND "ELEMENTS TO BE CONTAINED IN A NEW JOINT COMMUNIQUE." DRAWING UPON THIS POSITION, THE JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS WILL WORK TOWARD THE ABOLITION OF TIME AND QUANTITY RESTRICTIONS ON THE OPERATION OF THE TOKAI MURA FACILITY, AND THE LIFTING OF ALL "NO MAJOR MOVES" RESTRICTIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SECOND REPROCESSING FACILITY. KANEKO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR DEPARTMENT'S FURNISHING OF ADVANCE NOTICE OF U.S. PROPOSALS FOR TOKAI MURA DISCUSSIONS. HE WILL PRESENT THE GOJ'S DETAILED RESPONSE TO THESE PROPOSALS AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON.

EMBASSY NOTES KYODO NEWS SERVICE STATEMENTS WHICH REPORT U.S. ACCEPTANCE, IN PRINCIPLE, OF JAPANESE REQUEST FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE REPROCESSING OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN JAPAN. THE REQUEST WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY ROKUSUKE TANAKA IN HIS MEETINGS WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM BROCK, ENERGY SECRETARY JAMES EDWARDS AND OTHER U.S. LEADERS. AS NOTED IN REPTEL (A), YATASE QUERIED EMBASSY OFFICERS AS TO ACCURACY OF THESE REPORTS, IN LIGHT OF POTENTIAL JURISDICTIONAL FRICTION BETWEEN MITI AND MOFA. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO CLARIFY PRESS REPORTS ON TANAKA MEETINGS TO MEMBERS OF JAPANESE DELEGATION. EMBASSY WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE BEING ADVISED AS TO THE CONTENT OF DISCUSSIONS ON TOKAI MURA ISSUE BETWEEN MINISTER TANAKA AND VARIOUS U.S. OFFICIALS.

MANSFIELD

TOKYO 3749

DTG:260205Z JUL 81 PSNI 041000
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DATE 07/27/81

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PAGE 03

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

TOKYO 3749

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TOR: 226/0517Z

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*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHOR COMMENT:

EOBIEA, WEUR

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #3344 057005Z
O 200802Z JUL 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6568

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 03344

NODIS
EO 12065: RDS-1 2/27/81 (SHERMAN, W.C.) OR-M
TAGS: NATO, JA, PL
SUBJECT: (S) CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH JAPAN ON
- POLISH MEASURES; CANADIAN APPROACH
REF: (A) STATE 48630; (B) STATE 48154; (C) TOKYO 3192

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CANADIAN EMBASSY POL COUNSELOR LONGMUIR CALLED ON POLCOUNS FEB 26 TO DISCUSS INSTRUCTION HE HAD RECEIVED FROM OTTAWA AUTHORIZING HIM, AT HIS DISCRETION, TO ASCERTAIN MOFA'S REACTION TO NATO PROPOSAL, AS CONVEYED BY US PERM REP TO JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS LAST WEEK, THAT JAPAN BE BRIEFED BY NATO TROIKA IN BRUSSELS ON NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH REGARD TO POLAND. LONGMUIR SAID THAT HIS EMBASSY HAD ADVISED OTTAWA SOME MONTHS AGO THAT JAPANESE WOULD PROBABLY SHY AWAY FROM ANY CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS AND SUGGESTED THAT IF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WERE TO BE INVOLVED IN DIALOGUE WITH GDS ON POLAND, TOKYO BE THE VENUE. LONGMUIR TOLD POL COUNSELOR THAT, GIVEN WIDE LATITUDE OF HIS INSTRUCTION, HE THEREFORE WOULD NOT ASK MOFA DIRECTLY FOR ITS REACTION BUT WOULD INSTEAD TAKE MORE GENERAL SOUNDING OF JAPANESE PREFERENCES ON THE MANNER AND PLACE OF CONSULTATIONS. LONGMUIR PROMISED TO INFORM US OF RESULTS OF HIS SOUNDINGS. POLCOUNS DID NOT REFER TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH DONOWAKI ON SAME SUBJECT (REF C). MANSFIELD

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1 #200
BY MS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

*****S E C R E T*****

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

PSN: 017796

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