

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File:  
Records

**Folder Title:** Japan (06/24/1981-07/02/1981)

**Box:** RAC Box 8

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

**Archivist:** mjd

**OA/Box:**  
**File Folder:** Japan (6/24/81 – 7/2/81)

**FOIA ID:** F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
**Date:** 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	240616Z JUN 81, 5p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #177</i>	6/24/81	<del>B1</del>
2. Cable	250936Z JUN 81, 4p <i>R " " #178</i>	6/25/81	<del>B1</del>
3. Memo	Donald Gregg to Richard Allen re Meeting with Defense Agency Chief Omura, 2p <i>R " " #179</i>	6/29/81	<del>B1</del>
4. Talking Points.	Re Treat, 2p <i>R " " #180</i>	Nd	<del>B1</del>
5. Talking Points	Re Defense Cooperation, 3p <i>R " " #181</i>	Nd	<del>B1</del>
6. Talking Points	Re Bilateral Military Planning, 1p <i>R " " #182</i>	Nd	<del>B1</del>
7. Talking Points	Re Japanese Assistance to U.S. Forces, 1p <i>PART " " #183</i>	Nd	<del>B1</del>
8. Cable	290847Z JUN 81, 2p <i>R " " #184</i>	6/29/81	<del>B1</del>
9. Memo	Gregg to Allen re Update on Omura's Visit, 1p <i>R " " #185</i>	6/30/81	<del>B1</del>
10. Memo	Same as item # 9, 1p <i>R " " #186</i>	6/30/81	<del>B1</del>
11. Memo	Gregg to Allen re Your Meeting with Omura, 2p <i>R " " #187</i>	6/29/81	<del>B1</del>
12. Cable	021010Z JUL 81, 4p <i>R " " #188</i>	7/2/81	<del>B1</del>
13. Cable	021020Z JUL 81, 3p <i>R " " #189</i>	7/2/81	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-FLT

24 JUN 1981

SUBJECT: Visit of Minister Joji OMURA, Minister of Defense,  
Japan

Mrs. Darus  
Office of the National Security Advisor  
The White House

1. Minister OMURA is scheduled to meet with Mr. Allen on 30 June 1981, at 1700 hours in the Roosevelt Room.
2. Request the listed persons clearance to enter the White House grounds:

Joji OMURA

Minister of State for Defense and  
Director General  
Japan Defense Agency

Isuke WATANABE

Director General  
Defense Facilities  
Administration Agency

Akira SHIOTA

Director General, Bureau of Defense  
Policy, Japan Defense Agency

Hisahiko OKAZAKI

Director General for Foreign Relations  
Japan Defense Agency

Lt. General Nobuo KATAO

Director Joint Staff  
Joint Staff Council  
Japan Defense Agency

Norio KITAZAKI

Security Officer to Minister Omura

Colonel Mikio KUGA  
Defense and Military Attache  
Embassy of Japan  
Embassy Escort Officer

Minoru TANBA  
Director of Security, North American Bureau  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs


His Excellency Yoshio OKAWARA  
Ambassador from Japan

Colonel Charles W. Chapman  
U.S. Army Attache, Tokyo  
510-44-6823

Special Agent Billy Evans  
US Army Criminal Investigation Command  
Protective Services Division  
526-48-2564

LTC Frederic J.G. Caristo  
Chief, Tours, Department of the Army  
025-30-6787

3. Individuals underlined in red will attend meeting with Mr. Allen.

  
FREDERIC J.G. CARISTO  
LTC, GS  
Chief, Tours Branch  
Foreign Liaison

Mr. Sadaaki Numata  
First Secretary

Mr. Tatsuo Arima  
Counselor



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
ATTENTION: Ms. Irene Derus

SUBJECT: Visit of Director General, Japan Defense Agency

It is hoped the following Japanese press will accompany Minister of State Joji Omura, Director General, Japan Defense Agency, on his visit with you on Tuesday, June 30, 1981, at 5 p.m. Request appropriate brief photo opportunity be arranged.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>EMPLOYER</u>
Fumiaki Nishiwaki	The Jijitsushin
Shimon Yamamoto	Fuji Telecasting Co., Ltd.
Kenichi Tatsuno	The Kyodo
Toshichika Ishihara	TBS
Tamizo Suzuki	The Nihow Keizai
Kazuhiro Kobayashi	The Tokyo
Nagahiro Kuniyoshi	The Okinawa Times
Masahiko Tanaka	The Yomiuri
Takashi Shindo	NTV
Yoshitaka Sasaki	The Asahi
Hidetoshi Kaneko	The Maimichi
Akiyoshi Sekine	N. H. K.
T. Yamashita	Information Officer, Japanese Embassy

Akihiko Ushiba

Sankei


John Lieb

NTV Japan

Jude Ryan

NTV Japan

Lieutenant Commander Mark Brender, USN, of my staff will be accompanying the Japanese press.



Shigetada Kishii

Maimichi

Makoto Ishihara

TV Asahi

Satoshi Tominaga

Hokkaido Newspaper

Noboru Okamoto

Nishi Nihon Newspaper

LTC Mark Brender, USN

DATE 06/20/01

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NA NAN COL VP JP

EOB: GREGG

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHKO #1680/01 170002Z

O 240010Z JUN 01

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0792

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 11080

NODIS

DEPT PASS SEOUL FOR CHARGE

STATE FOR SECRETARY HAIG, HOLDRIDGE, S/AL FROM WALTERS

E.O. 120001 XDS-1, 6/24/01 (BARRACLOUGH, WILLIAM G.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, KS, CH, JA

SUBJECT: GENERAL WALTERS; MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHUN

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE MONJO, MR. WILLIAM KOPE AND LCDR. MARTINY, I MET WITH PRESIDENT CHUN, FURMIN LHM AND TWO OTHER KOREAN ASSISTANTS FOR ABOUT 90 MINUTES IN THE BLUE HOUSE. WE BEGAN BY EXTENDING THE WARM REGARDS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY HAIG TO PRESIDENT CHUN AND EMPHASIZED THAT SOUTH KOREA WAS THE ONLY ASIAN COUNTRY TO WHICH SECRETARY HAIG SENT A SPECIAL ENVOY TO BRIEF THE CHINA VISIT. I POINTED OUT THAT SECRETARY HAIG WAS THE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL TO VISIT CHINA SINCE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT MEETING BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES WANTED TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD FOSTER FUTURE FRUITFUL DEVELOPMENTS.

3. BEFORE I WENT INTO THE DETAILS OF THE CHINA TRIP, HOWEVER, I ATTEMPTED TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT CHUN THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE TRIP TOOK PLACE. I STATED THAT

TOKYO 1600

DTG: 240010Z JUN 01 PSN: 001008  
IOR: 17571231Z

DATE 06/20/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMERICA IS A CHANGED COUNTRY TODAY FROM THE AMERICA OF THE 1970'S. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ELECTION IS A REFLECTION OF A GENUINE SHIFT IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WE KNOW WE ARE POWERFUL AND WITH POWER COMES RESPONSIBILITY. WE INTEND TO SHOULDER OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO USE OUR POWER RESPONSIBLY. THE GREATEST THREAT TO FREEDOM AND WORLD PEACE TODAY IS SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES REALIZES IT MUST LEAD THE FREE WORLD TO STAND ATHWART THE PATH OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. TO DO SO WE ARE SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDING OUR MILITARY BUDGET OVER THAT PROPOSED BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.

4. WE ALSO INTEND TO ASSIST OUR ALLIES IN THEIR MILITARY DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE ON OCCASION THE MONEY WILL GO FARTHER THAT WAY. MORE BANG FOR THE BUCK-- PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF PERSONNEL COSTS. WE INTEND TO CONSULT OUR ALLIES REGULARLY, NOT SIMPLY TO STATE OUR INTENTIONS, BUT TO SEEK ADVICE AND TO ALTER OUR ACTIONS WHEN WE FIND THAT ADVICE PERSUASIVE. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, OF COURSE, THE US MUST PUT ITS ECONOMIC HOUSE IN ORDER. WE CANNOT BUILD MILITARY STRENGTH ON ECONOMIC WEAKNESS. THE NEW REAGAN BUDGET WILL REFLECT THIS DETERMINATION. PLEASE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT OUR ECONOMIES ARE NOT PRODUCING MILITARY CUTS. WE REALIZE THAT WE MUST PURSUE FISCAL AND MILITARY INTEGRITY SIMULTANEOUSLY. I CAME TO KOREA TO EXPLAIN SECRETARY HAIG'S TRIP TO CHINA, TO ANSWER ANY OF THE PRESIDENT'S QUESTIONS, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, TO CONSULT WITH AN OLD AND FAITHFUL ALLY WITH WHOM WE STOOD ON THE BATTLEFIELDS OF KOREA AND VIETNAM. WITH RESPECT TO CHINA, I EXPLAINED THAT SECRETARY HAIG DID NOT VISIT BEIJING TO SELL ARMS. SECRETARY HAIG SIMPLY STRESSED THAT AS TWO GREAT NATIONS WE WERE DRIVEN TOGETHER TEN YEARS AGO BY A COMMON THREAT. WE HAVE DIFFERENCES AND WE WILL OCCASIONALLY UPSET EACH OTHER, BUT WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES OF A DECADE AGO REMAIN TODAY. WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW MINOR ISSUES TO UNDERMINE OUR STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE. I POINTED OUT THAT WE RECEIVED FAR MORE TAIWAN RHETORIC FROM THE POLITICAL LEADERS THAN FROM THE MILITARY. I SAID MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE MILITARY WAS PRINCIPALLY DRIVEN BY CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA AND VIETNAM. VIETNAM, IN PARTICULAR, IS A SCORE WAITING TO BE SETTLED BY CHINA.

TOKYO 1650

DTG: 240016Z JUN 81 PSN: 001008  
TOR: 17571231Z



DATE 06/20/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. THE CHINESE MADE PRO FORMA STATEMENTS ABOUT REMOVING AMERICAN TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA, BUT WHEN I POINTED OUT THE PROBABLE RESULT OF SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE TO DESTABILIZE NORTHERN ASIA, TO DRIVE THE JAPANESE TO ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIETS AND TO CREATE ANOTHER VIETNAM ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER, THEY WENT ON TO ANOTHER SUBJECT. I OFFERED MY PERSONAL OPINION TO PRESIDENT CHUN THAT IF THE US ABANDONED EITHER TAIWAN OR SOUTH KOREA, THE CHINESE WOULD SAY, "IF THEY ABANDONED OLD ALLIES TO PLACATE WEAK CHINA TODAY, WHAT WILL THEY DO TO US TOMORROW."

6. MY IMPRESSSION, I WENT ON, OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP WAS THAT THERE WAS A COLLEGIAL SYSTEM IN CONTROL. EVERYONE SEEMED TO BE TIPTOEING AROUND TRYING TO REASSURE EVERYONE ELSE OF HIS DETERMINATION TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY

TUKYU 1600

DTG 1240016Z JUN 81 PSNI 001008  
TORI 17571231Z

DATE 06/20/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHRU #1680/02 1700024  
O 240016Z JUN 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0703

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 11080

NODIS

DEPT PASS SEOUL FOR CHARGE  
STATE FOR SECRETARY HAIG, HOLDRIDGE, S/AL FROM WALTERS  
WITH THE AMERICANS. NO SPECIFIC ARMS DISCUSSIONS TOOK  
PLACE. WE DID NOT GO TO CHINA TO SELL ARMS. WE ARE  
MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF CHANGING CHINA'S STATUS FROM  
THAT OF A HOSTILE COUNTRY TO THAT OF A NON-HOSTILE  
COUNTRY. WE WILL WEIGH EACH TRANSACTION WITH CHINA--  
ARMS OR OTHERS--CAREFULLY. WE INTEND TO CONSULT WITH  
OUR ALLIES BEFORE MAKING ANY SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS ON  
A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IN THIS AREA. OF COURSE, WE WILL  
CONSULT WITH OUR CONGRESS.

7. PRESIDENT CHUN WAS CLEARLY PLEASED TO BE BRIEFED  
AND ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO SECRETARY HAIG HIS WARM  
THANKS FOR THE SPECIAL EMISSARY. HE ALSO SENT PRESIDENT  
REAGAN HIS SINCERE PERSONAL REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR  
EXCELLENT HEALTH.

8. PRESIDENT CHUN'S QUESTIONS THEN CARRIED US WELL  
BEYOND OUR ALLOTTED 30 MINUTES. HE FIRST ASKED THE  
IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA OF THE LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN  
CHINA. CHINA, HE SAID, NEEDS STRONG LEADERSHIP. IF  
THE REGIME IS NOT STRONG AND STABLE, THE NORTH KOREANS  
WILL HAVE LITTLE INCLINATION TO RELY ON THE CHINESE.  
HE FELT PYONGYANG IS HEAVILY ORIENTED TOWARDS MOSCOW

TOKYO 1680

DTG:240016Z JUN 81 PSN: 001041  
TOR: 17571235Z

DATE 06/20/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(THE FORMIN FELT THE RELATIONSHIP 60/40 TOWARDS RUSSIA). THE AMBIGUITY IN BEIJING LEADERSHIP ENCOURAGES THIS SLANT. STRONG STABLE LEADERSHIP IN CHINA SHOULD PULL KIM IL SUNG IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. HAD WE, HE ASKED, DIVINED CHINA'S LARGER INTENTIONS? I INDICATED THAT AT PRESENT CHINA IS STRUGGLING TO MAKE UP ITS MIND. DEBATES CONTINUE OVER ECONOMIC POLICY, OVER WHETHER TO RELY UPON IMPORTS TO SPUR MODERNIZATION, ETC. NEVERTHELESS, CLEARLY MOSCOW AND HANOI ARE CHINA'S TWO PRIME BETE NOIRES AND THIS FACT WOULD DRIVE THEIR POLICIES.

9. WITH RESPECT TO THE LEADERSHIP QUESTION, WE EXPECTED TO HAVE A CLEARER IMPRESSION FOLLOWING THE SIXTH PLENUM. PARTICULARLY, MR. ROPE NOTED, IF CHAIRMAN HUA IS DEMOTED FAR DOWN IN THE POLITBURO, DENG WILL HAVE TRIUMPHED. IF HE REMAINS IN A HIGH POSITION, IT WOULD INDICATE THE DIVISIVE ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED.

10. WITH RESPECT TO OUR APPROACH TO BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA, OUR EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH PLEASED PRESIDENT CHUN. HE FELT WE WERE ON THE CORRECT PATH. HE DID NOT COMMENT ON THE ARMS SALE QUESTION, BUT CLEARLY APPRECIATED OUR REASSURANCE OF PRIOR CONSULTATIONS BEFORE MOVING AHEAD.

11. PRESIDENT CHUN ASKED ABOUT JAPANESE FORMIN SONODA'S REPORTED STATEMENT REPUDIATING THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER. CHUN SAID IF THIS STORY IS TRUE, HE IS DISCONCERTED. HE PLANS A SUMMIT WITH THE JAPANESE SHORTLY AND IF THEY BEHAVE SIMILARLY FOLLOWING THAT MEETING IT WOULD MAKE THINGS EXTERMEY DIFFICULT FOR HIM.

12. BOTH PRESIDENT CHUN AND I GREATLY APPRECIATED THE ABLE AND PERCEPTIVE COMMENTS MADE BY BILL ROPE SUPPLEMENTING AND ROUNDING OUT MY BRIEFING.  
MANSFIELD

TUKYU 1600

DTG: 240018Z JUN 81 PSN: 001041  
PORT: 17571235Z

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 274

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE692

STU1775

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHKD #1854/01 1760938

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

U 250936Z JUN 81

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0853

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 11854

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 06/25/01 (MANSFIELD M.) OR-M

TAGS: MPOL, MARR, JA

SUBJECT: (U) OMURA-WEINBERGER MEETING: JDA PREPARATIONS

REF: TOKYO 11670

1. (U - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO DEFENSE POLICY BUREAU DIRGEN SHIOTA, JDA DIRGEN OMURA WILL ASK SECDEF FOR MORE DETAILED RATIONALE FOR SDF FORCE LEVELS OUTLINED AT SSC XIII.

OMURA WILL OWN AND GOJ

INTENTION TO MD ON IKEGO HOUSING AND ACMI

PROJECTS, ALTHOUGH COMPLETION OF LATTER TWO WILL REQUIRE TIME. OMURA WILL CONVEY GOJ VIEW THAT NO FURTHER COST-SHARING IS POSSIBLE IN LABOR OR UTILITIES AREAS. SHIOTA SAID OMURA PARTY NEEDS TO KNOW ASAP ATTENDANCE AT WASHINGTON MEETINGS. END SUMMARY.

3. JDA DEFENSE POLICY BUREAU DIRGEN SHIOTA AND DEFENSE DIVISION DIRECTOR SAWADA MET WITH EMBOFF AND ARMY ATTACHE JUNE 25 TO DISCUSS AGENDA AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR OMURA VISIT. SHIOTA OUTLINED FOLLOWING AGENDA:

(A) RECOGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS.

(1) RECOGNITION OF SOVIET THREAT.

(2) APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION OF U.S. DEFENSE EFFORTS.

(3) JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS:

-- A. EFFORTS TO ATTAIN DEFENSE OUTLINE LEVELS THROUGH JFY 1981 MTOE.

-- B. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SDF CAPABILITIES.

-- C. JFY 1982 JDA BUDGET REQUEST CEILING.

(B) NEXT PHASE OF STUDIES BASED ON "GUIDELINES" (SUMMARY OF PHASE 1 STUDIES AND OPENING OF PHASE 2 STUDIES)

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#178

BY WJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(C) COST-SHARING FOR USFJ

(1) EXPANSION OF FACILITIES PROVIDED USFJ (INCREASE IN FACILITIES COST-SHARING FUNDS).

(2) EXPANSION OF LABOR COSTS ASSUMED FOR (U.S. FORCES) JAPANESE EMPLOYEES.

(3) ASSUMPTION OF U.S. FORCES UTILITIES COSTS, ETC.

(4) FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AT IKEGO AMMO STORAGE AREA.

(5) CONSTRUCTION OF AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING INSTRUMENTATION RANGE.

4. ON SPECIFIC ITEMS, SHIOTA SAID JDA EXPECTED U.S. TO LEAD OFF ANY DISCUSSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, SOVIET THREAT AND U.S. MILITARY EFFORTS TO COUNTER IT. JDA WOULD EXPECT TO LEAD ON ITEMS PERTAINING TO JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS.

--

5. SHIOTA SAID THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR JDA'S PLANNING EFFORT, WHICH WOULD SOON BEGIN IN EARNEST, TO HAVE MORE PRECISE RATIONALE SUPPORTING SDF FORCE LEVELS U.S. SIDE OUTLINED AT SSC XIII. OMURA HIMSELF WAS VERY KEEN TO HEAR MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION AS TO ORIGIN OF NUMBERS OF SHIPS, PLANES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT MENTIONED IN JCS PRESENTATION AT HAWAII.

--

6. ON PHASE 2 GUIDELINES STUDIES, SHIOTA ASKED WHAT SORT OF PRESENTATION U.S. WOULD MAKE. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT, WHILE WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF HOW SECDEF MIGHT PROCEED, HE MIGHT EXPRESS APPRECIATION THAT GOJ HAD AGREED TO EXPLORE ISSUE OF FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER ARTICLE VI OF MST AND WOULD SEEK JDA COOPERATION AND HELP IN MOVING FORWARD ON THIS IN FUTURE.

--

7. REGARDING COST-SHARING, SHIOTA SAID THERE WOULD BE A FINANCIAL INCREASE FOR FACILITIES IN JFY 1982 BUT WAS UNABLE TO SPECIFY SIZE AT THIS TIME. HE ALSO SAID THAT OMURA WOULD INFORM SECDEF OF GOJ VIEW THAT NOTHING FURTHER WAS POSSIBLE UNDER SOFA IN LABOR COST-SHARING OR IN GOJ ASSUMPTION OF UTILITIES COSTS.

8. RE IKEGO HOUSING AND ACMI, SHIOTA SAID OMURA WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY THAT GOJ WOULD WISH TO ACHIEVE BOTH BUT THAT DOING SO WILL REQUIRE SOME TIME. HE WILL ASK THAT U.S. BE PATIENT WHILE GOJ WORKS PROBLEMS OUT.

9. SHIOTA SAID GOJ NEEDED TO KNOW ASAP WHO ON U.S. AND JAPANESE SIDES WOULD BE ATTENDING VARIOUS MEETINGS AND BRIEFINGS. IF THIS INFORMATION WERE AVAILABLE, HE ASKED USG TO CABLE IT TO CINCPAC DURING OMURA PARTY'S STOPOVER

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 276

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THERE.

10. EMBUFF ALSO MENTIONED THAT U.S. SIDE WOULD WISH TO

BT

#1854

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 273

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE693

STU1776

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHKO #1854/02 1760940

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 250936Z JUN 81

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0854

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 11854

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

STRESS IMPORTANCE OF MAKING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TWO-WAY STREET. SHIOTA INDICATED THIS WAS EXPECTED BY JDA.

11. COMMENT: ONE OF OMURA'S MAIN CONCERNS WILL BE TO SOUND U.S. OUT FURTHER ON RATIONALE FOR FORCE LEVELS MENTIONED AT SSC XIII. IF WE PRESENT GOOD CASE, JDA WILL TRY TO ADJUST ITS PLANNING ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN, OF COURSE, EXISTING CONSTRAINTS.

12. DESPITE NEGATIVE RESPONSE ON GOJ SHARING FURTHER LABOR AND UTILITIES COSTS, WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT GOJ RECEPTIVITY IF, FOR INSTANCE, SOME OF THESE ITEMS COULD BE "PACKAGED" IN DIFFERENT MANNER (E.G., HAVING GOJ ASSUME SECURITY FUNCTIONS AT U.S. BASES). WE UNDERSTAND JDA POSITION IS RESULT OF HARD-NOSED ATTITUDE BY MOFA'S TREATIES BUREAU. WE HOPE THAT SECDEF COULD EXPRESS DESIRE TO EXPLORE THESE ITEMS FURTHER AT WORKING LEVEL.

MANSFIELD

BT

#1854

NNNN

SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 29 JUN 81 16

DOC DATE 29 JUN 81

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

*M-37  
11/21/04*

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

MILITARY POSTURE

OMURA, JOJI

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER & DOD PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR OMURA VISIT W/ ALLEN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 30 JUN 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LILLEY

SCHWEITZER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8103830

NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 7/1</i>	<i>RVA has seen</i>		<i>D G</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

*PA*  
*CC*



~~SECRET~~

3856

MEMORANDUM

RVA HAS SEEN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 29, 1981

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN,

FROM: DONALD GREGG dg

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Japanese Defense Agency  
Chief Omura

Over the past several days, including the weekend, there have been intense negotiations designed to produce DOD talking points for the Omura visit which will be basically consonant with the more restrained line to be taken here and at the Department of State. These negotiations have been only partially successful. Bing West seems set on rubbing Japanese noses in the fact that they are not doing enough in defense. State has importuned. I have called. Some changes have been made, but not enough.

It may well be that Omura will arrive at the White House tomorrow afternoon with his tail feathers ruffled by what he has heard at the Pentagon. (The latest version of DOD's talking points are attached for your information.)

Your meeting with Omura is an important chance to:

- Learn what he has heard.
- Discern how he has digested what he has heard.
- Clear up any confusion in his mind as to what the definitive US position is.

RECOMMENDATIONS

After initial greetings, I would suggest the following scenario:

- ✓ - Ask Omura what he has heard in Washington and whether there is any confusion in his mind as to what he should report to Tokyo.
- If Omura indicates some confusion, reiterate to him that the essential message on US attitudes toward Japan's defense spending was enunciated by the President to Prime Minister Suzuki. This message was:

- \* We understand your restraints.
- \* We don't want you to change your Constitution.

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 29, 1987

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS Feb-03/179  
BY [signature] DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

- \* We will not put public pressure on you.
- \* We hope and expect you will do more.
- Express our determination to move forward into more detailed joint planning.
- Recall the late Prime Minister Ohira's description of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and express interest in developing a role for the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force against ships--a type of utilization which could dramatically increase the impact of Japan's existing forces.

COMMENT: First thing tomorrow morning, I will take a reading as to how the meetings with Omura went at DOD and State. If these meetings have been significant, I will get word to you in a supplement to this briefing paper.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I          DOD Talking Points

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION

27 JUN 68 11 35

SITE

**D**

RECEIVED

JUN 27 10:43

DATE AND TIME TRANSMITTED

**823**

SSN NBR

DATE AND TIME RECEIVED

TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER

FROM DR AUER OFFICE DESK ISA/EAPR PHONE NBR 695-7886

SUBJECT OMIRA TALKERS(U)

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PAGES 8

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS  HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS  
 IMMEDIATELY

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER HOUR DELIVERY.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *m/pulom*

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUALS NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
NSC	<u>DON GREGG</u>	EOB	300	395-4682
	<i>Mance</i>			
	<i>Calson</i>			
	<i>Poindexter</i>			

REMARKS:

## COURTESY POINTS

-- On behalf of the Department of Defense it is a pleasure to welcome you formally to the Pentagon.

-- Many of my predecessors have visited Japan and I hope to have the opportunity to visit your country in the not too far distant future.

-- At the recently concluded SSC in Hawaii we have had a frank exchange of views which I followed with great interest. The press has reported that we had large differences in perceptions and views. My belief is that both of our countries share similar goals, on defense as well as in other areas.

-- After a frank SSC which brought many issues to the surface, I hope we can discover much that is possible for us to accomplish together.

-- I propose we discuss today the following four subjects:

- The Reality of the Threat We Face;
- Defense Cooperation in the 1980s -- Military Roles and Missions;
- Bilateral Military Planning;
- Japanese Assistance to US Forces (Cost-Sharing);

but first, I would welcome any subjects you might desire to discuss.

ISSUE: REALITY OF THE THREAT

OUR TALKING POINTS:

(S) -- Not only is the Soviet threat considerable today with fully one-fourth to one-third of their general purpose forces stationed in Asia, but the projections for the next ten years are extremely discouraging to the Free World.

(S) -- For example, in tactical aviation, just last year the Soviets added more new fighters to their Far East Force than the U.S. has in its entire Pacific Air Force; and their total air forces in Asia are expected to increase 80% by 1990. Your National Defense Program Outline calls for no numerical increases in tactical fighters in the same period of time.

(S) -- The Soviet theater nuclear delivery capability continues to expand both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Backfire bomber, now stationed near the central Mongolian border and near Sakhalin (pronounced sock-hall-leen) Island, can strike any target in China, Japan, and shipping as far south as the South and East China Seas.

(S) -- Also, in the last three to four years, about 50 SS-20 mobile IRBMs have been deployed to the Soviet Far East. With its inherent freedom of movement and almost 3000-mile range, the SS-20 poses a threat to Free World forces throughout Northeast Asia.

(S) -- Soviet naval forces in the Pacific are a cause for serious concern. Of 136 Soviet submarines in the current inventory, about half (65) are nuclear-powered, and include SSBNs with the long-range multi-warhead SS-N-18 missile, and SSGNs that fire cruise missiles, with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. Despite this ominous force which is being strengthened at an alarmingly rapid rate, your projected submarine force for the 1990s is virtually the same size as your presently small submarine fleet.

(S) -- Since 1973, the number of major Soviet surface combatants has increased from 59 to 82. Moscow's second aircraft carrier, the MINSK, was deployed to the Far East in 1979. Other new combatants include Kara and Krasta-II guided missile-equipped cruisers and Krivak-I and I guided-missile frigates; all carry the latest Soviet surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and anti-submarine warfare systems.

(S) -- By the end of the 1980s, they could introduce a nuclear-powered attack carrier with high performance fighters and fighter-bombers, and we expect to see other nuclear powered surface combatants. Yet your surface fleet is projected to remain the same size as at present into the 1990s.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-0371-180

BY NOT 7/24/06

(S) -- The Soviet Union is a powerful and increasing threat and yet another potentially volatile and unpredictable threat lies close to Japan, namely North Korea. Some say our fear of the Soviets and North Korea is excessive. Japan has a longer history than does the United States in dealing with Tsarist and Soviet Russia. You presently have territory under Soviet occupation. We both have observed a massive expansion of the Soviet nuclear and conventional military establishment during a period of so-called detente, and we both have watched their imperialism in action by Cuban surrogates in Africa and directly in Afghanistan.

(S) -- I have great fears of what could happen if we allow them to continue to expand without challenge even another five years. If we err at all, we should do so on the side of doing too much. I don't believe we can or will do that, but we definitely and dangerously err if we do too little.

(U) -- War is unlikely and deterrence can be effective only if we are strong. We have no fear of negotiating with the Soviets. We welcome negotiation, but we can only meet them at the conference table if we do so not from a position of inferiority. The threat they pose makes our job formidable.

566  
8575

~~SECRET~~

ISSUE: Defense Cooperation in the 1980s--Military Roles and Missions (S)

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

(S) - In Hawaii we presented you with a four-part proposal for a credible, more equitable, and constitutionally acceptable sharing of defense responsibilities covering the entire Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans' areas, and the area of defense technology (USE FLIP CHART).

(S) -- In that proposal we affirmed our intention to continue providing:

- the nuclear umbrella for Japan;
- offensive striking power to support you;
- the nuclear umbrella and offensive striking power to support South Korea and our allies and friends in South Asia;
- defensive sea control forces in the Southwest Pacific and the Indian Oceans;
- a continuation of generous U.S. technology transfer policy with Japan.

(S) -- To complement these efforts, we proposed that you achieve effective, sustained conventional capability to defend your territory, and develop maritime and air forces sufficient to defend the seas and air surrounding Japan and the sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles.

(S) -- We also asked you to help make the technology transfer flow a two-way street.

(S) -- The Prime Minister agreed with President Reagan about the seriousness of the threat we face. They acknowledged the desirability of an appropriate division of roles. We believe there is no disagreement on the roles and missions each of our countries needs to carry out.

(S) -- Your Self-Defense forces have impressive potential. We appreciate the efforts you have made to develop a ground force of 12 divisions against a threat we estimate at 3-5 divisions as a maximum. Also your maritime and air forces have some excellent equipment. We admire the morale and sharpness of all your defense personnel.

(S) -- But as your own defense White Paper points out, your Self-Defense Forces have shortcomings which should be corrected to make them more effective.

(S) -- Thus, in our military preparedness planning, due to your logistic shortfalls, we have to evaluate your present readiness as below a level necessary to constitute effective self-defense.

(S) -- Despite the threat we face and your limitations, we understand you to say:

~~SECRET~~

BY 101 7/24/06  
100-03711-1B

- you will study for one year to see if you can plan to contract, not procure, by 1988 a minimum defense level which you outlined in 1976;

- If that plan is successful, you would obtain that minimum level of capability sometime in the 1990s.

(S) -- Meanwhile your proposed defense budget for next year, entails no more than slight real growth.

(S) -- There are several critical questions left unanswered:

- there is nothing in your 1976 outline concerning sustainability. If your 1990 forces don't have enough ammunition they will not be any more effective than your forces today;

- you don't say whether the outline you made in 1976 is adequate to deal with the threat you will face in the 1990s. We feel you are aiming much too low, and we hope to demonstrate this to you during our next military planning study;

- and most important of all, you will not have an effective defense capability in this critical decade of the 1980s.

(U) -- The Congress and the American people will not continue to support what they view as an unequally-shared burden indefinitely.

(S) -- We are carrying out our parts of the division of labor which I outlined. Prime Minister Suzuki said Japan would do AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

(S) -- The decisions are yours but I urge you to make very significant efforts within each of the next five years to:

- improve the READINESS of your existing forces;

- give proper attention to COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, and INTELLIGENCE improvements of your forces;

- provide minimum levels of SUSTAINABILITY including 60-90 days of combat supplies to all of your services;

- MODERNIZE your ground, sea, and air forces to the levels necessary to provide effective defense against Soviet capability and EXPAND your air and maritime forces to the size needed to defend your surrounding seas and air and the sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles.

(S) -- If you immediately increase your logistics budget significantly, your present equipment would achieve a sizable capability within this year or next year.



~~(S)~~ -- If you begin now and act each year for the next five years:

- your capability will rapidly increase within this decade and you can meaningfully participate in a rational division of labor;

- the Soviets will receive a stronger signal that the U.S. and Japan are serious about defense and might finally begin to get serious about negotiating arms reduction--in that regard I agree with your late Prime Minister Ohira (pronounced oh-hee-rah) that the Soviets are a cautious country--but they are cautious only when they see strength, not weakness.

~~(S)~~ The U.S. will not conduct a public campaign to berate you regarding your defense efforts. We believe these discussions should take place out of the public eye in meetings such as these. We hope Japanese officials will not see it necessary to publicly criticize U.S. officials for privately setting forth the deteriorating military balance around Japan.

ISSUE: Bilateral Military Planning (U)

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

(S) -- The first phase of planning by Japanese and American military staffs has been completed, and is now being reviewed.

(S) -- We look forward to a continuing dialogue with you in order that the plan for the defense of Japan can be revised -- from time to time -- to reflect what we are hopeful will be a rapidly growing combined capability to provide for the defense of Japan by securing its territory, air space, surrounding waters, and sea lanes.

(S) -- While the planning we have done thus far has been valuable, it is unrealistic to think of Japan's defense solely in isolation. We thus look forward to additional studies using other scenarios so that you might have a more realistic idea of what American forces might be available to aid Japan's self-defense efforts.

(S) -- Using this methodology we can refine and jointly validate the required force levels you need to provide for your self-defense in consonance with our mission-sharing concept.

-----

(S) NOTE: (NOT A TALKING POINT HERE -  
In Tab E, "Japanese Assistance to US Forces," you will also mention that under the US-Japan "Guidelines for Defense Cooperation" (which govern bilateral military planning) we also wish to begin studies of Facilitative Assistance in order to determine ways in which Japanese support during a Far East contingency can complement US Forces, i.e., these studies will introduce wartime Host Nation Support (HNS) to the GOJ which has thus far provided only peacetime cost-sharing for the United States.)

ISSUE: Japanese Assistance to U.S. Forces (Cost Sharing and HNS) (X)

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

(X) -- In the joint communique issued in Washington in May, Prime Minister Suzuki pledged efforts to further alleviate the financial burden of U.S. Forces in Japan.

(X) -- As we told your delegation in Hawaii, the extraordinary times we face are calling forth extraordinary efforts by the United States, many in far away places like the Indian Ocean. These efforts are in Japan's interest, as well as our own.

(X) -- We sincerely appreciate the significant efforts you have already made in labor and facilities cost sharing.

(X) -- But we have to ask you to do more for us, as we are doing more for you.

FOIA(b) (1)

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~  
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~  
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~  
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

(S) -- For 1982 it appears that a 50 percent increase in the Facilities Improvement Program is the minimum needed if U.S. Forces Japan's requirements are to be met in a meaningful time period. Our most pressing requirement is for Navy family housing in the Yokosuka (pronounced yoh-koh-sue-kah) area.

(S) -- You began operational cost sharing this year, and we need to continue to expand these vital efforts which will contribute significantly to our ability to defend Japan.

(S) -- We wish to begin studies of Facilitative Assistance under the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in order to determine ways in which Japanese support during a Far East contingency can complement otherwise constrained U.S. Forces. We would like to study areas such as transportation; external security for U.S. facilities; ship, aircraft and vehicle repair for U.S. Forces in Japanese facilities, etc.

(S) -- Our utilities' costs in Japan have also grown to an unacceptable degree, and Japanese help in offsetting these costs is required. In cooperation with you we are attempting to make our Japan facilities more energy efficient.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

RVA HAS SEEN

6/30/81

June 29, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*

SUBJECT: Seating Chart for your Meeting  
with Japanese Minister of State  
for Defense and Director General,  
Japan Defense Agency, Joji Omura  
-- Tuesday, June 30, 5 p.m.  
-- Indian Treaty Room

Attached at Tab A is a seating chart for your  
meeting with Japanese Minister of State for  
Defense Joji Omura.



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 212

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE830  
STU8093  
UN RUEHC  
DE RUEHKU #2026 1800848  
ZNY CCCCC Z7H  
U 290847Z JUN 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0945  
INFO RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 2339  
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4146  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 12026

E.O. 12065: GDS, 6/29/87 (IMPERMAN, RUBERT M.) UR-P

TAGS: PINT, MARR, MPOL, JA

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DSP CHAIRMAN SASAKI

RFF: A) TOKYO 3494, B) TOKYO 11541

1. (A-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. JUNE 26 LUNCHEON HOSTED BY AMBASSADOR FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY (DSP) CHAIRMAN SASAKI AND OTHER PARTY LEADERS PROVIDED OCCASION FOR GENERAL EXCHANGE ON CURRENT STATE OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS. DURING COURSE OF LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE, AMBASSADOR SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE USG EXPECTED THE GOJ TO DO MORE TO ASSURE ITS OWN DEFENSE. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT IF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR JFY-82 WERE TO REACH 7.5 PERCENT CEILING ALREADY ESTABLISHED BY THE GOJ, THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED "STEADY AND SIGNIFICANT" PROGRESS IN LIGHT OF DOMESTIC FINANCIAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. AMBASSADOR, AT SAME TIME, MADE CLEAR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S HIGH EXPECTATIONS VIS-A-VIS JAPAN AND EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT JAPAN COULD AND WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPAND ITS CAPABILITY TO OFFEND ITS OWN TERRITORY AND SURROUNDING SEA AND AIR SPACE. AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT USG WAS NOT ASKING JAPAN TO DO MORE SO THAT IT COULD DO LESS BUT THAT USG WAS INCREASING ITS OWN DEFENSE EFFORTS SUBSTANTIALLY-- DESPITE ITS OWN FINANCIAL PROBLEMS--IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CREATED BY SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND MILITARY BUILDUP. IN THAT REGARD, AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO DSP FOR ITS REALISTIC SECURITY POLICIES.

3. ASKED ABOUT THE IMPACT ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS OF FONMIN SONODA'S RECENT STATEMENT IN MANILA CONCERNING

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#184

BY HOI NAC. DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE REAGAN-SUZUKI COMMUNIQUE, AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT OUR TIES WERE MUCH TOO STRONG TO BE AFFECTED BY SUCH REMARKS. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT PERSONALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SONODA'S STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH SOME OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT DISTURBED.

4. SASAKI NOTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH THE AMBASSADOR EARLIER THIS YEAR ABOUT A POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE US (REF A) AND ASKED IF THE FALL STILL APPEARED TO BE THE BEST TIME FOR SUCH A VISIT. AMBASSADOR ADVISED SASAKI TO PLAN HIS TRIP FOR SOME TIME AFTER SEPTEMBER 10 TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CONGRESSIONAL CALENDAR AND ASSURED HIM WE WOULD DO OUR UTMOST TO MAKE HIS VISIT SUCCESSFUL. SASAKI ALSO STATED THAT DSP STANDING ADVISOR IKKO KASUGA WOULD BE VISITING WASHINGTON IN A PRIVATE CAPACITY O/A JULY 20 (REF B) AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT KASUGA WOULD MEET WITH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THIS TIME FRAME WOULD COINCIDE WITH OTTAWA SUMMIT BUT SAID WE WOULD NONETHELESS DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT KASUGA HAD USEFUL MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON.

5. JAPANESE PRESS ON JUNE 27 CARRIED BRIEF ACCOUNTS OF AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS AS RELATED BY DSP OFFICIALS, FOCUSING ON PORTIONS CONCERNING SONODA STATEMENT AND GOJ DEFENSE EFFORT. MOST PAPERS NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT TO SASAKI WAS FIRST OFFICIAL USG COMMENT ON SONODA'S MANILA STATEMENT AND INTERPRETED IT TO MEAN THAT WHILE THE USG MAY FEEL SOME DISSATISFACTION, IT DID NOT INTEND TO RAISE THE ISSUE PUBLICLY. WITH REGARD TO DEFENSE, PAPERS NOTED THAT WHILE AMBASSADOR TERMED POSSIBLE 7.5 PERCENT INCREASE A "FAIR" EFFORT, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE USG EXPECTED STILL FURTHER INCREASES.

MANSFIELD

BT

#2026

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTSIDE  
RVA HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM

CHI

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 30, 198

1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG dg

SUBJECT: Update on Omura's Visit

I talked to Rich Armitage and the Japan Desk Officer and get a basically consistent picture of yesterday's meetings:

- Weinberger kept up the pressure on the Japanese but in a gentlemanly fashion that did not offend the sensibilities. The meeting was characterized as civilized and businesslike.
- At the State meeting, Haig did most of the talking, placing development of Japan's defense expenditures in historical context. The pressure was there but less open.
- Omura's reply was essentially we cannot do everything you want us to, but we will do what we can.

One additional point for you to raise with Omura is the question of technology transfer:

- In our coproduction of fighter aircraft, such as the F4 and F15, we have given the Japanese much technology.
- The Japanese have given us virtually nothing in response.
- A technology forum for sharing dual techniques has met two or three times with nothing coming from Japan.

RECOMMENDATION

Urge Japan to be more forthcoming in sharing dual purpose technology as we have with them.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review on June 30, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS Foo-037/1#185

BY LOJ 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 30, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG DG

SUBJECT: Update on Omura's Visit

I talked to Rich Armitage and the Japan Desk Officer and get a basically consistent picture of yesterday's meetings:

- Weinberger kept up the pressure on the Japanese but in a gentlemanly fashion that did not offend the sensibilities. The meeting was characterized as civilized and businesslike.
- At the State meeting, Haig did most of the talking, placing development of Japan's defense expenditures in historical context. The pressure was there but less open.
- Omura's reply was essentially we cannot do everything you want us to, but we will do what we can.

One additional point for you to raise with Omura is the question of technology transfer:

- In our coproduction of fighter aircraft, such as the F4 and F15, we have given the Japanese much technology.
- The Japanese have given us virtually nothing in response.
- A technology forum for sharing dual techniques has met two or three times with nothing coming from Japan.

RECOMMENDATION

Urge Japan to be more forthcoming in sharing dual purpose technology as we have with them.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review on June 30, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F00-037/1#186  
BY hst P&PA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

3856  
*af*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 29, 1981

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*  
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Japanese Defense Agency  
Chief Omura

Over the past several days, including the weekend, there have been intense negotiations designed to produce DOD talking points for the Omura visit which will be basically consonant with the more restrained line to be taken here and at the Department of State. These negotiations have been only partially successful. Bing West seems set on rubbing Japanese noses in the fact that they are not doing enough in defense. State has importuned. I have called. Some changes have been made, but not enough.

It may well be that Omura will arrive at the White House tomorrow afternoon with his tail feathers ruffled by what he has heard at the Pentagon. (The latest version of DOD's talking points are attached for your information.)

Your meeting with Omura is an important chance to:

- Learn what he has heard.
- Discern how he has digested what he has heard.
- Clear up any confusion in his mind as to what the definitive US position is.

RECOMMENDATIONS

After initial greetings, I would suggest the following scenario:

- Ask Omura what he has heard in Washington and whether there is any confusion in his mind as to what he should report to Tokyo.
- If Omura indicates some confusion, reiterate to him that the essential message on US attitudes toward Japan's defense spending was enunciated by the President to Prime Minister Suzuki. This message was:
  - \* We understand your restraints.
  - \* We don't want you to change your Constitution.

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 29, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#187

~~SECRET~~

BY

KAT

DATE

7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

- \* We will not put public pressure on you.
- \* We hope and expect you will do more.
- Express our determination to move forward into more detailed joint planning.
- Recall the late Prime Minister Ohira's description of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and express interest in developing a role for the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force against ships--a type of utilization which could dramatically increase the impact of Japan's existing forces.

COMMENT: First thing tomorrow morning, I will take a reading as to how the meetings with Omura went at DOD and State. If these meetings have been significant, I will get word to you in a supplement to this briefing paper.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I

DOD Talking Points

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

RVA HAS SEEN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 1, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Asahi Editorial Writer

Hiroshi Shinohara, an Asahi editorial writer specializing in security matters will be in Washington on a USICA grant until July 10. The State Desk thinks it would be a valuable educational experience for the man if you were to meet him. I tend to agree. Shinohara is one of those whose writing for the Asahi has been highly critical of our efforts to get Japan to do more in the defense arena. I doubt that Shinohara has run into anyone who could be as direct and forceful on this issue as you.

RECOMMENDATION

That you consider giving Shinohara 30 minutes.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove ✓

If you do not want to spend that time, shall I offer myself up?

Yes ✓

No \_\_\_\_\_

Gerald Sutton's note to me on Shinohara is attached.

Attachment  
Tab I

G. Sutton memo to D. Gregg, dated  
June 26, 1981

*Maybe I could  
Say "hello,"  
but I cannot  
"fit" with him.  
Sorry  
RVA  
7/6*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Mr. Donald Gregg  
National Security Council  
Room 300  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington D.C.

June 26, 1981

Dear Don:

As I mentioned to you the other day, Hiroshi Shinohara, an editorial writer specializing in security matters for Asahi Shinbun, will be in Washington on a USICA invitation\* and we think it would be highly useful if Richard Allen would meet with him for an off-the-record chat.

Asahi's editorial position on security tends to be utopian, neutralist and highly suspicious of the US-Japanese relationship. While the segment of public opinion supporting this philosophy has diminished slowly through the years, Asahi's influence guarantees that this attitude will continue to present the Japanese Government with difficulties as it attempts to prepare a basis for greater defense cooperation. For some years we have tried to get someone in Shinohara's position to the United States where he would have a chance to match wits with US opinion leaders. We doubt that Asahi is going to change its editorial policy overnight, but Shinohara's visit presents us with an excellent opportunity to insinuate some doubts, provided he gets access to the proper people. Unfortunately, bureaucratic problems have prevented us from making a formal pitch on this, but you know how strongly we feel that he be seen there.

Sincerely,

Gerald M. Sutton  
Deputy Director  
Office of Japanese Affairs

June 30 - July 10.  
\* ~~July 30~~

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 183

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE848

STU7163

DD RUEHC

DE RUEHKU #2354/01 1831012

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

U 021010Z JUL 81

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1118

INFO RUEHFK/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0186

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 12354

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 07/01/01 (CLARK, W.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, JA

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JULY 1 DINNER WITH PRIME MINISTER (U)

REF: TOKYO 12103

1. (R - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI SPENT MUCH OF HIS JULY 1 DINNER FOR AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD DISCUSSING HIS RECENT TRIP TO EUROPE. THE AMBASSADOR REITERATED OUR GREAT SATISFACTION WITH HIS VISIT TO THE US.

3. WITH REGARD TO EUROPE, SUZUKI SAID HE FOUND MITTERAND HIGHLY CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITY TO GOVERN FRANCE EFFECTIVELY. MITTERAND STRONGLY MAINTAINED THAT FRANCE WOULD REMAIN AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IN BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND DEFENSE TERMS, FULLY HONORING ITS NATO COMMITMENTS. AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN OVER THE INCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE FRENCH CABINET. SUZUKI SAID MITTERAND APPARENTLY FELT HE HAD OBTAINED SUFFICIENT POLICY CONCESSIONS FROM COMMUNISTS AND THOUGHT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE FRENCH LABOR UNIONS MORE MANAGEABLE.

4. SUZUKI WENT ON TO OFFER THE VIEW THAT COALITION POLITICS WAS A MAJOR CONSTRAINT ON FOREIGN POLICIES OF EUROPEAN NATIONS. WHEN PROBLEMS ARISE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS EXPERIENCE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES, WITH THE RESULT THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO HARMONIZE THEIR APPROACHES TO EXTERNAL PROBLEMS. THIS WAS TRUE EVEN FOR UK, WHERE THERE WAS SINGLE PARTY RULE BUT THE WIDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CONSERVATIVE AND LABOR PARTIES POSED DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. HE THOUGHT SUCH INTERNAL STRAINS WERE ONE REASON EUROPEANS HAD BEEN SLUGGISH IN RECOVERING FROM THE TWO OIL CRISES. SUZUKI NOTED WITH OBVIOUS SATISFACTION

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1\*188

BY LOT DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT JAPAN HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL.

5. SUZUKI SAID HE HAD HEARD EXPRESSIONS OF CONSIDERABLE DISCONTENT WITH HIGH U.S. INTEREST RATES IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN CAPITALS, ESPECIALLY WEST GERMANY. HE HAD TRIED TO COUNTER THESE VIEWS BY REPEATING WHAT TREASURY SECRETARY REGAN HAD SAID TO HIM IN WASHINGTON, I.E., THAT BECAUSE OUR FRIENDS WANT STRONG U.S. ECONOMY AND STABLE DOLLAR, THEY SHOULD BEAR WITH HIGH INTEREST RATE PHENOMENON A BIT LONGER. HE ADVISED THE EUROPEANS NOT TO DRIVE THE U.S. INTO CORNER ON THIS ISSUE AT OTTAWA, PROPOSING RATHER THAT VIEWS SHOULD BE COORDINATED AT THE OECD. AMBASSADOR TOLD PRIME MINISTER THAT EUROPEANS HAD ALSO INDICATED AN INTEREST IN FOCUSING ON TRADE AT OTTAWA. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S., CANADA AND JAPAN NOT BECOME DIVIDED BY SUCH TACTICS. WE BELIEVE HE TOOK THE POINT.

6. WITH REGARD TO U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, AMBASSADOR SAID HE CONSIDERED PRIME MINISTER'S U.S. VISIT TO HAVE MARKED THE MOST SUCCESSFUL MEETING EVER HELD BETWEEN A JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER AND U.S. PRESIDENT. OBVIOUSLY DELIGHTED, SUZUKI SAID HE HAD BEEN GRATIFIED BY HIS RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON AND FULLY SATISFIED WITH HIS MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER LEADERS. HE HAD VOICED HIS VIEWS FRANKLY AND FULLY, AND THE PRESIDENT HAD RECIPROCATED IN THE SAME MANNER.

7. ON DEFENSE, SUZUKI REPEATED THE VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED DURING HIS MEETING WITH THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, I.E., THAT, IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED THREAT, HE WAS DETERMINED TO STRENGTHEN JAPAN'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITS OWN TERRITORIES AND SURROUNDING SEAS AND AIR SPACE WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF ITS PEACE CONSTITUTION, WHICH REQUIRED THAT JAPAN'S FORCES FOLLOW A DEFENSE-ONLY CONCEPT. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT U.S. WAS AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES FACED BY JAPAN IN INCREASING ITS DEFENSE EFFORTS, BUT STILL DESIRED MORE FROM JAPAN IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA. SUZUKI DID NOT RESPOND WHEN AMBASSADOR LATER RAISED THE OMURA-WEINBERGER TALKS.

8. SUZUKI SAID THAT HE HOPED TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH THE PRESIDENT AT OTTAWA, EVEN IF MEETING WERE ONLY A BRIEF ONE. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS SURE THE PRESIDENT WOULD DESIRE SUCH A MEETING. SUZUKI REPEATED HIS INVITATION TO PRESIDENT TO VISIT JAPAN, SUGGESTING THAT CHERRY BLOSSOM SEASON (MID-APRIL) MIGHT BE THE BEST TIME. HE SAID THE EMPEROR WAS DELIGHTED WHEN HE REPORTED TO HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT COME TO JAPAN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 185

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IN 1982.

BT

#2354

NNNN

SENSITIVE



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 182

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE847

STU7168

DD RUEHC

DE RUEHKU #2354/02 1831014

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

U 021010Z JUL 81

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1119

INFO RUFHFK/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0187

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 12354  
9. MAJOR JAPANESE DAILIES GAVE BRIEF, FRONT-PAGE  
COVERAGE TO MFETING. ARTICLES ALL QUOTED AMBASSADOR  
AS HAVING SAID THAT U.S.-JAPAN SUMMIT TALKS IN MAY  
WERE MOST SUCCESSFUL EVER, TO WHICH PM REPORTEDLY  
RESPONDED HE TOO WAS "PLEASED"/"FULLY SATISFIED" WITH  
TALKS, SINCE HE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO SAY WHAT HE WANTED  
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. ASAHI SHIMBUN SPECULATED THAT  
PM'S RESPONSE WAS INDIRECT SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENT  
REAGAN SHOULD THEREFORE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE JAPANESE  
POSITION ON DEFENSE. ARTICLES INDICATED THAT WHILE  
AMBASSADOR DID NOT TOUCH ON DEFENSE ISSUE DIRECTLY,  
HE STATED THAT WEINBERGER-UMURA TALKS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE  
IN THAT BOTH SIDES WERE ABLE TO EXPLAIN THEIR POSITIONS.  
NO REJOINER FROM PM WAS REPORTED. IN A DISCUSSION OF  
PM'S TRIP TO EUROPE, SUZUKI WAS QUOTED IN NIHON  
KEIZAI AS HAVING SAID THAT EVEN IF PARTICIPATING  
COUNTRIES COMPLAIN ABOUT HIGH US INTEREST RATES, THEY  
COULD NOT EXPECT "CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS" AT THE OTTAWA  
SUMMIT AND THAT EUROPEAN LEADERS ARE NOT THINKING IN  
TERMS MAKING US INTEREST RATES AN AGENDA ITEM AT  
OTTAWA.

10. COMMENT: DINNER APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE PRIME  
MINISTER'S THANK YOU FOR THE SMOOTH ARRANGEMENTS FOR  
HIS VISIT TO THE U.S. HE WAS RELAXED AND TALKATIVE  
THROUGHOUT, REFRAINING FROM ANY TOPICS WHICH MIGHT MAR  
THE OCCASION.

MANSFIELD

BT

#2354

NNNN

SENSITIVE

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL VP JP  
EOBI GREGG  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #2356 1831021  
O 021020Z JUL 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1120  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY  
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY  
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY  
COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY  
COMUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JA PRIORITY  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 18356  
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD  
E.O. 120651 GDS 7/2/87 (IMMERMAN, R.I.) OR-P  
TAGS: MPOL, MARR, JA, US  
SUBJECT: REACTION TO OMURA-ALLEN MEETING

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ALL PAPERS JULY 2 FRONT PAGED JDA DIRECTOR GENERAL  
JDAI OMURA'S JUNE 30 DISCUSSION WITH U.S. NATIONAL  
SECURITY ADVISOR RICHARD ALLEN. ALMOST EVERY PAPER  
HEADLINED THAT ALLEN FOUND OUTLINE TO BE INADEQUATE,  
THAT HE STRESSED GRAVITY OF SOVIET THREAT AND THAT HE  
HAD JUST SEEN PRESIDENT WHO CONFIRMED THAT WHAT OMURA  
HAD HEARD WAS UNIFIED USG VIEW, NOT JUST THAT OF DOD.  
STORIES EMPHASIZED ALLEN'S REPORTED CALL FOR JAPAN TO  
MAKE GREATER DEFENSE EFFORTS AS EXPRESSED IN JOINT  
COMMUNIQUE SO THAT IT WOULD SEND MESSAGE TO AMERICAN  
PEOPLE THAT IT IS DOING ITS PART. MOST PAPERS HIGH-  
LIGHTED ALLEN'S REMARKS TO EFFECT THAT U.S. CONSIDERED

TOKYO 2356

DTG:021020Z JUL 81 PONI 012122  
THR: 183/1836Z

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FOO-037/1#189  
BY WJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

1978 OUTLINE INADEQUATE AND WISHED GOJ TO REVISE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT FRESH DEFENSE PROGRAM INCORPORATING MORE SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN SDF CAPABILITIES.

3. EVENING ASAHI JULY 1 CARRIED GIST OF OMURA-ALLEN TALKS AT WHICH ALLEN WAS REPORTED TO HAVE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF JAPAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CONSTRAINTS, BUT NOTED THAT U.S. ALSO MUST CONSIDER ITS PUBLIC WHICH HELD VIEW THAT JAPAN WAS NOT DOING ENOUGH. HE NOTED THAT U.S. WAS NOW MAKING EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS TO INCREASE ITS DEFENSE EFFORT AND HAD BEEN FORCED TO CUT OTHER PROGRAMS, INCLUDING SOCIAL WELFARE, TO DO SO. HE CONCLUDED THAT JAPAN SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS FACT AND SAID THAT HE WANTED MESSAGE FROM JAPAN THAT WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO AMERICAN PEOPLE JAPAN'S DEFENSE GOALS AND WHAT IT IS DOING TO REACH THEM. OMURA IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD ALLEN THAT JAPAN COULD NOT MOVE AT PACE DESIRED BY U.S. AND THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR GOJ TO MAKE DRAMATIC INCREASES. ALLEN REPORTEDLY ENDED MEETING BY SAYING USG WAS NOT ASKING IMPOSSIBLE OF JAPAN, ONLY WHAT WAS DIFFICULT. HE STRESSED THAT WHITE HOUSE SHARED VIEWS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE THAT JAPAN SHOULD DO MORE.

4. CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYAZAWA MADE STATEMENT EVENING JULY 1 ON OMURA'S DISCUSSIONS WITH SECDEF, SECSTATE AND ALLEN NOTING UNANIMITY OF US VIEWS ON JAPAN'S DEFENSE AND EXPRESSING OPINION THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEET US REQUEST, GIVEN JAPAN'S BUDGETARY SITUATION. JAPAN HAD ALREADY GIVEN SPECIAL PRIORITY TO DEFENSE, AN ACTION WHICH WAS UNDER FIRE AND GOJ COULD SAY WITHOUT SHAME THAT IT WAS DOING ITS UTMOST. AN INCREASE BEYOND PRESENT CEILING WAS JUST NOT POSSIBLE. HE SAID PRIORITIES US HAD OUTLINED WOULD SERVE AS REFERENCE POINTS FOR MTOE PREPARATION BUT THAT, IN ANY CASE, JAPAN COULD NOT EXCEED OUTLINE LEVELS WITHOUT FIRST ATTAINING THOSE LEVELS. (OTHER COVERAGE OF MIYAZAWA INTERVIEW IN SEPTEL.) ACCORDING TO MOFA, MIYAZAWA TOLD PRESS THAT THERE WERE NO BASIC US-JAPAN DIFFERENCES IN RESPECTIVE VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, BUT THAT THERE MAY BE DEGREE OF VARIATION IN ASSESSMENT OF HOW SERIOUS THINGS NOW ARE. ADDITIONALLY, EACH SIDE MAY HAVE DIFFERING IDEA OF PRECISELY

TOKYO 2356

DTG 001020Z JUL 81 P0N1 012122  
TOR1 183/1036Z

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHAT COUNTERMEASURES MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE. MOREOVER, AS EACH NATION HAD ITS OWN SITUATION TO CONSIDER, PACE AT WHICH EACH OF US DEALS WITH PROBLEMS WILL VARY. THERE WERE, AFTER ALL, THINGS JAPAN COULD DO AND THINGS WHICH IT COULD NOT DO AND THIS FACT SHOULD NOT GIVE RISE TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS OR HURT US-JAPAN FRIENDSHIP.

5. COMMENT: SOME PAPERS REPORTED MIYAZAWA'S COMMENTS AS BEING SHARPER AND MORE NEGATIVE IN TONE THAN IN FACT THEY WERE. MOFA IMPRESSION IS THAT HE WAS TRYING TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE BY PLACING OMURA DISCUSSIONS IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE WITH EMPHASIS ON SHARED VIEWS, WHILE NOTING DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH.  
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 2306

DTG: 021020Z JUL 81 P3N1 012122  
TIME 103/1030Z