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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (6/4/81 – 6/23/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Allen Lenz to Richard Allen re State Cable, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #164</i>	6/4/81	B1
2. Cable	032200Z JUN 81, 2p	6/3/81	B1
3. Cable	130941Z JUN 81, 2p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #166</i>	6/13/81	B1
4. Cable	140005Z JUN 81, 3p	6/14/81	B1
5. Cable	<i>R</i> " " #167 150843Z JUN 81, 4p	6/15/81	B1
6. Cable	<i>R</i> " " #168 160647Z JUN 81, 15p	6/16/81	B1
7. Memo	<i>D</i> " " #169 Donald Gregg to Allen re Japan and the Defense Issue, 1p	6/22/81	B1
8. Memo	<i>R</i> " " #170 Allen to the President re Japan, 1p	6/23/81	B1
9. Memo	<i>R</i> " " #171 Gregg to Allen re Cable, 1p	6/22/81	B1
10. Cable	5p <i>D 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #173</i>	6/18/81	B1, B3
11. Memo	Allen to the President re Japan, 1p	6/23/81	B1
12. Memo	<i>R</i> " " #174 Caspar Weinberger to Alexander Haig re Defense Minister Omura Visit to US, 2p	6/23/81	B1
13. Memo	<i>R</i> " " #175 Same as item # 12, 2p	6/23/81	B1
	<i>R</i> " " #176		

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM LENZ
MZA
1/12/04

ID 8103275

RECEIVED 05 JUN 81 10

DOCDATE 04 JUN 81

TO ALLEN

KEYWORDS: EAST WEST ECONOMICS USSR HAIG, A
JAPAN

SUBJECT: STATE CABLE 6360 TO TOKYO RE SALE OF JAPANESE PIPELAYERS TO USSR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

PIPES

NAU

STEARMAN

BAILEY

SCHWEITZER

COMMENTS ATTACHED CABLE MENTIONED WAS NOT XEROX

REF# LOG NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 6/8	Noted by RVA		L2, RP, SC

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE PA (c) 2103

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3275

ajl

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

June 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: ALLEN J. LENZ *ajl*
SUBJECT: State Cable 6360 to Tokyo re Sale of Japanese Pipelayers to the USSR

I have heard that your memo to Haig on the Pipeline is stirring some activity at the State Department.

The attached cable is either part of that activity, or perhaps a result of some conversation you may have had with Haig. Has he responded informally in any way?

not yet.

Note the final paragraph of the outgoing cable, which refers to the likelihood of a senior level meeting on the Caterpillar license application in the near future.

Attachment
Tab A - State Cable 6360

cc: Pipes
Nau
Stearman
Bailey
Schweitzer

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1#164
BY FBI NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review 6/4/87

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

VED

81 JUN 5 AIO: 08

JANET COLSON

JCS/1026

BUD NANCE

JCS/1200

DICK ALLEN

JWA/2231

IRENE DERUS

JJD 8/0758

JANET COLSON

JCS 8/0941

BUD NANCE

Ba

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE740
UTS9579
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHKD #0973 1640941
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130941Z JUN 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0379
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 10973

NDDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 06/13/87 (BARRACLOUGH, WM.) DR-M

TAGS: UNSC, XF, IS, JA

SUBJECT: UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON ISRAELI
ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY

REF: STATE 155292

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. EMBOFF MET JUNE 13 WITH MOFA UN POLITICAL DIVISION
DIRECTOR NONOYAMA, INFORMED HIM OF U.S. STRATEGY AND
APPROACH TO UNSC MEETING ON ISRAEL'S ATTACK ON THE
IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR A
FIRM, UNIFIED WESTERN POSITION AS INSTRUCTED IN REFTEL.

3. NONOYAMA SAID THE GOJ AGREES THAT THE WESTERN
NATIONS' POSITION SHOULD BE UNITED IF POSSIBLE AND
SAID JAPAN WOULD OPPOSE EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM UN,
BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN AT U.S. OPPOSITION TO ANY SANCTIONS
AND INTENTION TO VETO A RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR
SANCTIONS. HE SAID IF U.S. REMAINS TOTALLY OPPOSED
TO ANY SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, THERE IS A CHANCE
THAT THE U.S. AND JAPANESE POSITIONS WILL NOT BE UNITED
SINCE JAPAN BELIEVES THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO APPLY
MODEST SANCTIONS TO ISRAEL IN ADDITION TO CONDEMNING
THE ISRAELI ACTION IN ORDER TO MAKE THE POINT THAT
IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE FOR ISRAEL TO ACT AS THE POLICE-
MAN OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID,
HOWEVER, THAT THE GOJ WILL HAVE TO STUDY THE DRAFT
RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE IRAQI'S AS IT DEVELOPS AND
ITS DECISION ON HOW TO VOTE WOULD DEPEND ON THE WORDING
OF THE RESOLUTION.

4. NONOYAMA NOTED THAT JAPAN HAD VOTED IN FAVOR OF
IAEA COUNCIL RESOLUTION JUNE 12 WHICH RECOMMENDED

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/c #166

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE STUDY THE SUSPENSION OF ISRAEL'S IAEA RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES BECAUSE THE GOJ REGARDED THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY AS AN ATTACK ON THE IAEA. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT JAPAN DID NOT REGARD THIS AS A PRECEDENT FOR THE ISSUE IN THE UN AND WAS OPPOSED TO THE EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM THE UN.

5. COMMENT: FOR THE JAPANESE, THIS ISSUE COMBINES BOTH THE QUESTION OF THE APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR PREVENTING NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION, CONCERNING WHICH THEY ARE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE, AND EVEN-HANDEDNESS IN DEALING WITH THE ARABS AND ISRAELI'S, AN ISSUE ON WHICH THEIR POSITION HAS BEEN MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE ARAB CAUSE THAN HAS THE U.S. POSITION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE JAPANESE DO NOT WANT TO BE ISOLATED FROM THE U.S. AND ITS OTHER ALLIES ON THIS ISSUE. IF WE CAN HOLD THE OTHER WESTERN UNSC MEMBERS IN LINE ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP THE JAPANESE WITH US AS WELL IN THE EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE A SATISFACTORY DRAFT RESOLUTION. BUT IF A RESOLUTION OTHERWISE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. BUT WITH A "MILD" SANCTIONS PROVISION COMES TO A VOTE, JAPAN MAY VOTE IN FAVOR OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE WEST IS NOT UNIFIED ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE.

BARRACLOUGH

RT

#0973

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

FHA529
 OO RUEADWW
 DE RUEHC #5881 1650006
 7NY CCCCC ZZH ZK
 O O 140005Z JUN 81 ZFF6
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 6733
 INFO RUEHLI/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 4048
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8427
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8992
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4860
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7229
 RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 9899
 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0775
 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1245
 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 5208
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 6939
 RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1574
 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1745
 RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE 6590
 BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 155881 TUSEC 040132
 NODIS
 F.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/13/01 (STOESSEL, WALTER J.)

TAGS: UNSC, XF, IS

SUBJECT: UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON ISRAELI ATTACK ON
 IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY
 PARIS FOR CLARK TODEP 1095
 REF: (A) STATE 155292, (B) TOKYO 10973 NOTAL;
 (C) VIENNA 6881 NOTAL.

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE GO BACK TO THE JAPANESE, AT A HIGHER LEVEL IF
 NECESSARY, TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN ABOUT THEIR POSITION ON
 IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL
 (REF A). THIS CONCERN IS HEIGHTENED BY THE FACT THAT JAPAN
 VOTED IN FAVOR OF IAEA RESOLUTION WHICH RECOMMENDED
 SUSPENSION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND QUESTIONED
 ISRAEL'S RIGHTS OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE IAEA (REF C). YOU
 SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#167

BY LBJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- WE ARE DISTURBED TO HEAR THAT JAPAN MIGHT GO ALONG WITH "MODEST" OR "MILD" SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

-- THE US POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IS FIRM. WE WILL REITERATE OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK DURING

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS AND COULD SUPPORT A RESOLUTION WHICH CONDEMNS THE ATTACK, BUT WE WILL OPPOSE VIGOROUSLY ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL OR LIMIT ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE APPROPRIATE OR EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DEALING WITH THE SITUATION.

-- WE EXPECT THERE WILL BE PRESSURES ON THE WEST TO GO ALONG WITH THE IMPOSITION OR THREAT OF FUTURE SANCTIONS. THIS INCREASES THE IMPORTANCE OF A FIRM UNITED WESTERN POSITION AGAINST THESE PRESSURES. SPLITS IN THE POSITIONS OF WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL ONLY ALLOW EXPLOITATION OF THE ISSUE BY THE SOVIETS AND THE RADICAL ARABS.

-- IN ADDITION DIVISIONS AMONG THE WESTERN MEMBERS COULD POSSIBLY STIMULATE MOVES TO EXPEL ISRAEL FROM THE UN OR REJECT ITS CREDENTIALS, MOVES WE ASSUME THE JAPANESE OPPOSE. FOR EXAMPLE, WESTERN DIVISIONS OVER A SANCTIONS VOTE COULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS AND RADICALS TO PRESS FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNDER THE UNITING FOR PEACE PROCEDURE (I.E. AFTER A VETO), AT WHICH ISRAEL'S PARTICIPATION IN THE UN COULD BE QUESTIONED. IF THE WEST IS TOGETHER AND FIRMLY OPPOSES A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION, WE BELIEVE THE CHANCES OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WILL BE DIMINISHED.

-- CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL'S ATTACK, IN OUR VIEW, CAN BE SEPARATED FROM THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS. IT SEEMS TO US THOROUGHLY CONSISTENT TO CONDEMN THE RAID BUT OPPOSE SANCTIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THEY WILL NOT ASSIST IN STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT WILL ONLY INCREASE TENSIONS AND ENMITY.

-- WE HOPE THE JAPANESE WILL CONSIDER CAREFULLY OUR ANALYSIS AND POSITION AS THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE CONTINUES AND DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BEGIN TO CIRCULATE.

3. FYI. AT IAEA, ONLY CANADA JOINED U.S. IN OPPOSTNG

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RESOLUTION CITED PARA 2, WHICH SUGGESTS THE DIFFICULTY OF
KEEPING THE WEST UNITED AT THE UNSC. JAPAN'S POSITION
WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE THINKING OF THE OTHER WECS
REPRESENTED ON THE SC.

STOESSEI
PT
#5881
NNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE082

UTS0093

NO RUEHC

DE RUFHKU #1013/01 1660851

7NY CCCCC ZZH

O 150843Z JUN 81

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0401

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 11013

NODIS

F.O. 12065; RDS-3 6/15/01 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) DR-M

TAGS: UNSC, XF, IS, JA

SUBJECT: UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON ISRAELI ATTACK
ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY

REFS: (A) STATE 155881; (B) USUN 2008

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ADCM MADE DEMARCHE ON MOFA UN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL KAYA MORNING OF JUNE 15 TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN REGARDING JAPANESE POSITION ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL BY UNSC AND URGE THAT GOJ NOT SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION CONTAINING LANGUAGE ON SANCTIONS.

3. DRAWING ON REFTEL POINTS, ADCM NOTED THAT US FIRMLY OPPOSED ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL OR LIMIT ITS UN MEMBERSHIP AND EMPHASIZED NEED TO MAINTAIN WESTERN SOLIDARITY SO AS TO PREVENT EXPLOITATION OF ISSUE BY SOVIETS AND RADICAL ARABS AND FORESTALL POSSIBLE MOVES TO EXPEL ISRAEL FROM UN OR REJECT ITS CREDENTIALS. HE SAID US CONSIDERED IT POSSIBLE AND CONSISTENT TO SEPARATE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI ATTACK FROM QUESTION OF SANCTIONS, NOTING THAT RATHER THAN CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY IN MIDDLE EAST, SANCTIONS WOULD EXACERBATE SITUATION.

4. KAYA REPLIED THAT JAPAN ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO WESTERN SOLIDARITY ON ISSUES OF SIGNIFICANCE BROUGHT BEFORE UNSC AND HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED US POSITION ON SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO DISCUSS ISRAELI ATTACK. JAPAN WAS AWARE OF AND CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE POSITION IT ADOPTED IN SC. JAPAN, HE CONTINUED, HAS BEEN LEADER IN HOPING FOR EARLY SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST QUESTION, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS OIL DEPENDENCE JAPAN WAS VULNERABLE TO ARAB SANCTIONS AND HAD TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT. GOJ

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1 #168

BY 18T NARA, DATE 1/29/06

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

APPRECIATED THAT US WAS NOT IN POSITION TO REFRAIN FROM COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL BUT US SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT ITS PARTNERS' POSITIONS MIGHT DIFFER BECAUSE OF THEIR DIFFERENT HISTORIES AND VULNERABILITIES. HE SAID THAT AMONG WESTERN SC MEMBERS, SPAIN AND IRELAND WERE AMONG COUNTRIES WHOSE POSITIONS REFLECTED THESE DIFFERENCES AND JAPAN WOULD VERY CLOSELY FOLLOW POSITIONS THEY ADOPT ON SANCTIONS ISSUE. HE ALSO WONDERED ABOUT POSITION FRANCE WOULD ADOPT, TO WHICH ADCM SAID BRITISH AND FRENCH HAD INDICATED TO US THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT CHAPTER VII LANGUAGE (REFTEL B).

5. KAYA SAID GOJ ASSESSMENT, BASED ON SC DISCUSSION THUS FAR, IS THAT SOME LANGUAGE ON SANCTIONS WAS BOUND TO APPEAR IN SC RESOLUTION AND OUR ATTENTION MIGHT BEST BE FOCUSED ON FORM THAT LANGUAGE WOULD TAKE. HE SAID THAT GOJ CONSIDERED SANCTIONS LANGUAGE IN IRAQI DRAFT RESOLUTION AND RESOLUTION INTRODUCED BY UGANDA ON BEHALF OF NON-ALIGNED SC MEMBERS TO BE RATHER RESTRAINED AND THAT MOFA WAS STUDYING PARAGRAPH TWO LANGUAGE OF NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION TO SEE IF IT COULD BE MODIFIED TO SATISFACTION OF BOTH JAPAN AND THE U.S. HE ALSO SAID SC DELIBERATIONS WERE JUST GETTING UNDERWAY, AND ARGUED THAT SC MEMBERS WOULD SEEK TO TAILOR RESOLUTION SO AS TO AVOID A VETO. CONSEQUENTLY, IN HIS VIEW, WEST STILL HAD TIME TO DELIBERATE AND MANEUVER BEFORE ADOPTING FINAL POSITION ON RESOLUTION WHICH ULTIMATELY WOULD BE VOTED ON.

6. ADCM ANSWERED THAT US APPRECIATED FACTORS WHICH OCCASIONALLY LED ITS ALLIES TO ADOPT DIFFERENT POSITIONS FROM US ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS BUT WAS CONCERNED THAT INCLUSION OF LANGUAGE ON SANCTIONS IN SC RESOLUTION WOULD PREJUDICE LONGER TERM PROSPECTS FOR SOLUTION OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT OPENING OF DOOR TO POSSIBILITY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL WOULD ONLY LEAD TO ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS IN FUTURE.

7. KAYA CONCLUDED BY STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN AND US CONTINUING TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON THIS ISSUE HERE AND IN NEW YORK AND NOTING THAT IN SC SPEECH WHICH AMBASSADOR NISHIBORI PLANNED TO DELIVER JUNE 15, NISHIBORI WOULD STRONGLY CONDEMN ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY BUT WOULD NOT TOUCH ON SANCTIONS ISSUE.

8. COMMENT: DESPITE MOFA THINKING OUTLINED BY KAYA, GOJ HAS NOT MADE A FIRM DECISION TO ACCEPT REFERENCE TO SANCTIONS IN SC RESOLUTION AND WILL BE RELUCTANT TO BE ISOLATED FROM ITS WESTERN ALLIES. THUS OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE POSITION JAPAN WILL ULTIMATELY

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ADAPT WILL BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO DEGREE TO WHICH
SOLIDARITY OF WESTERN SC MEMBERS CAN BE MAINTAINED.
IF CONCUR IN KAYA'S JUDGMENT REGARDING IMPORTANCE OF
CONSULTING CLOSELY ON ISRAELI SANCTIONS ISSUE IN COMING
FT
#1013
NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATALOGY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

FCF083
ST08537
TO RUEHC
RF RUEHKO #1013/02 1660853
7NY CCCCC 27H
O 150843Z JUN 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0402
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 11013
NO DIS
GAYS, AND THINK ANY POSITIVE INFORMATION ON POSITIONS
OF OTHER WESTERN SC MEMBERS WHICH WE CAN PASS TO
JAPANESE HERE AND IN NEW YORK WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL.
END COMMENT. MANSFIELD
BT
#1013
FMNN

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 22, 1981

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD W. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *dg*

SUBJECT: Japan and the Defense Issue

The problem with Japan on the defense issue at the moment is that they are not certain who speaks with authority. Suzuki explained Japan's defense dilemmas at length to the President at the Summit, and got a basically supportive response, which said:

- We don't want you to change your Constitution.
- We are not going to put heavy pressure on you.
- We hope you can do more, given your constraints.

At Hawaii, following a tumultuous intervening period, the Japanese got a much stronger message from DOD, urging quick completion of their 1976 plan, and rapid deployment of more aircraft and anti-submarine forces. Sonoda met with Haig in Manila to query and protest. Rich Armitage told Jim Lilley that Haig said in effect "we all stand together in terms of what we want Japan to do on defense." Sonoda, not liking this, went out and said publicly that the Summit communique was not binding on Japan. He then quickly retracted this statement. Haig, on his aircraft, apparently backed off from what he told Sonoda, and created the impression in Bernie Gwertzman's mind that State and DOD are taking different approaches to the issue, with State being more moderate.

The key is Weinberger's meeting with Omura on June 29. What is said there must be the definitive statement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you pass the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve Disapprove

That you place the Japan defense issue on this week's NSC agenda, or talk to Weinberger prior to his meeting with Omura.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 22, 1987

~~SECRET~~

RVA 6/23

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 100-03711#170
BY ADT DATE 7/24/06

for next NSC occasion - but reportedly not before 6/29!

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 23, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: What Upsets the Japanese

The Japanese are confused because they are not certain what signals we are sending them on the defense spending question. Prime Minister Suzuki left Washington basically at ease on this issue, having explained Japan's constraints at length, and receiving from you an understanding and supportive reply--we want them to do more, but understand their problems.

After a very disorderly period of time following your meeting in May (brought on largely by Suzuki, Reischauer and the naval incidents), the Japanese got a stronger push on defense spending at Hawaii from DOD officials. Subsequent talks by Japanese officials with Secretary Haig's party has left confusion as to what our message really is.

Secretary Weinberger's meeting on June 29 with the Japanese Defense Agency Chief is the chance to clear this up.

The recent tumult in Japan over use of the word "alliance" demonstrates that the formulation you used with Suzuki is the one to adhere to. I will work with DOD and State, so that we can be certain that all our major players are speaking with one voice on this important issue. We want the Japanese to do more on defense, but are aware that over the next two years it will be hard for them to expand their defense budget by more than seven or eight percent.

cc: Ed Meese
James Baker

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1 #171

BY NOT NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 22, 1987

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) MJA 11/2/04

RECEIVED 22 JUN 81 14

DOCDATE 22 JUN 81

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

MILITARY POSTURE

SUBJECT: JAPANESE REACTION TO HAWAII DEFENSE TALKS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LILLEY

SCHWEITZER

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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COPIES TO

C 6/23 noted by Colson

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JUN 22 1981

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81 JUN 22 P 4: 07

J 22/1117

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

[Handwritten checkmarks and lines next to names]

Don - The Situation Room brought this to Dick's attention this morning. Thanks

J

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

[Handwritten lines for routing]

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 23, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: What Upsets the Japanese

The Japanese are confused because they are not certain what signals we are sending them on the defense spending question. Prime Minister Suzuki left Washington basically at ease on this issue, having explained Japan's constraints at length, and receiving from you an understanding and supportive reply--we want them to do more, but understand their problems.

After a very disorderly period of time following your meeting in May (brought on largely by Suzuki, Reischauer and the naval incidents), the Japanese got a stronger push on defense spending at Hawaii from DOD officials. Subsequent talks by Japanese officials with Secretary Haig's party has left confusion as to what our message really is.

Secretary Weinberger's meeting on June 29 with the Japanese Defense Agency Chief is the chance to clear this up.

The recent tumult in Japan over use of the word "alliance" demonstrates that the formulation you used with Suzuki is the one to adhere to. I will work with DOD and State, so that we can be certain that all our major players are speaking with one voice on this important issue. We want the Japanese to do more on defense, but are aware that over the next two years it will be hard for them to expand their defense budget by more than seven or eight percent.

cc: Ed Meese
James Baker

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Review on June 22, 1987

BY LOT 7/24/06

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

23 JUN 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Japanese Defense Minister Omura: Visit to the
U.S. (U)

(S) At the Suzuki visit and the security discussions held last week in Hawaii (SSC), we have clearly and concretely delineated the division of labor between Japan and ourselves that we believe necessary in the defense area. The Japanese have gotten this message, but all indications point to no movement in next year's defense budget:

- The Ministry of Finance has set a maximum nominal increase in the defense budget for JFY83 of 7.5%; this equates to a very small real growth;

- Omura's public statements indicate he will tell the U.S. on his visit (29-30 June) that Japan can not meet our request for significant increases in capability in the next five years;

- Omura has said publicly that the USG may be divided on this issue and the pressure for increased efforts is lodged solely in the Pentagon.

(S) It is essential that we all continue to speak with one voice during the Omura visit so that we give Japan no maneuver room to deflect dealing with our views. I suggest that we should all make these points to Omura:

- The President and the entire Administration are firmly committed to a more rational division of labor as outlined at the SSC in Hawaii;

- Japan has little or no capability to defend itself, and even the defense burden for Japanese territory still lies with the U.S.;

- The objectives and pace Japan has set in its defense planning are unacceptably low in view of the threat Japan faces;


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- We will not ask anything of Japan which is outside the limits of its Constitution and will not publicly criticize Japan's performance in the defense area;

- Nonetheless, we will continue to urge in private meetings with responsible Japanese officials that necessary efforts for legitimate self-defense required to meet the threat of the 1980s be expeditiously pursued within the next five years.



cc: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Counsellor to the President



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

24 JUN 1981

Staff
3830

23 JUN 1981

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BY HDI NARA, DATE 7/24/06


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~~SECRET~~

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cc: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Counsellor to the President

REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION

MAIL FAX

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
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SITUATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER

FROM CDR AUER OFFICE/DESK ISA/EAPR PHONE NBR 695-886

SUBJECT OMURA VISIT

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PAGES 2

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS
IMMEDIATELY

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER HOUR DELIVERY.

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUALS NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
NSC	DON GREAF	EOB	300	395-4682
	COL NAM JP			
	(NSC)			
	Lilly			
	CT			
LRC EAST				

REMARKS:

RECEIVED

JUN 24 2:11

JUN 11 1981