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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (5/15/81 – 5/19/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	152237Z MAY 81, 2p R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #136	5/15/81	B1
2. Cable	160652Z MAY 81, 1p R " " #137	5/16/81	B1
3. Cable	160906Z MAY 81, 3p R " " #138	5/16/81	B1
4. Cable	161054Z MAY 81, 3p R " " #139	5/16/81	B1
5. Cable	170830Z MAY 81, 3p R " " #140	5/17/81	B1
6. Cable	180324Z MAY 81, 1p R " " #141	5/18/81	B1
7. Cable	180554Z MAY 81, 2p R " " #142	5/18/81	B1
8. Cable	180732Z MAY 81, 5p R " " #143	5/18/81	B1
9. Cable	181056Z MAY 81, 4p R " " #144	5/18/81	B1
10. Memo	Donald Gregg to Richard Allen re Japan, 1p R " " #145	5/18/81	B1
11. Cable	190012Z MAY 81, 2p	5/19/81	B1
12. Cable	190943Z MAY 81, 2p R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #147	5/19/81	B1
13. Cable	191102Z MAY 81, 3p R " " #148	5/19/81	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: KEMP,GREGG,LILLEY
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7342 1352243
O 152237Z MAY 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 5814
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON NIACT IMMEDIATE 5993
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA NIACT IMMEDIATE 1498
AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE 3178
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 127342
NODIS
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 5/14/01 (EAGLEBURDER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: LE

SUBJECT: LEBANON

1. AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO FOREIGN MINISTERS WITHOUT DELAY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:
I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN LEBANON. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD IS UNWILLING TO COMPROMISE WITH REGARD TO THE SYRIAN MILITARY POSITION IN LEBANON. HABIB HAS INFORMED PRIME MINISTER BEGIN OF THIS OUTCOME, AND WILL NOW PROCEED TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR CONSULTATIONS, BEFORE RETURNING TO DAMASCUS FOR ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO ELICIT MOVEMENT FROM THE SYRIANS.

SECSTATE WASHDC 7342

DTG:152237Z MAY 81 PSN: 007856
TOR: 135/2357Z

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/14136
BY 605 NARA DATE 7/24/06

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. WE HAVE THUS ARRIVED AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE. WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP THE PARTIES FIND AN HONORABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IN ORDER TO GIVE OUR EFFORTS THE BEST CHANCE FOR SUCCESS, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SHOWN CONSIDERABLE MILITARY RESTRAINT, AND OFFERED WHAT WE

BELIEVE TO BE A REASONABLE COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT LOOKING TO A RETURN TO A SITUATION WHICH BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL LIVED WITH FROM 1976. THE SYRIANS HAVE REFUSED THIS REASONABLE OFFER AND REMAIN INTRANSIGENT. IF THE SYRIANS CONTINUE THEIR REFUSAL TO COMPROMISE, THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO WITHDRAW FROM ITS ROLE AS INTERMEDIARY. WHILE WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO ASK ALL THE PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, OUR ABILITY TO AFFECT EVENTS WILL BE GRAVELY WEAKENED.

4. THE SOVIET ROLE HAS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING. THEY HAVE FAILED TO COUNSEL RESTRAINT AND FLEXIBILITY ON THE SYRIANS; APPARENTLY THEY BELIEVE THAT LIMITED HOSTILITIES BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL WOULD BE IN THEIR INTERESTS. WE HAVE MADE A FURTHER DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS CONVEYING OUR SOBER EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION, EMPHASIZING THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA HAS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. WE ARE REQUESTING THEM AGAIN TO URGE FLEXIBILITY ON THE SYRIANS. IF CONFLICT SHOULD RESULT YOU CAN BE SURE THAT THE US WOULD EXERCISE EXTREME RESTRAINT. WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO DO LIKEWISE AND HAVE SO INFORMED THEM.

5. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS, SINCE WE FACE A GRAVE SITUATION WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECTS OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE PRESENT A UNITED FRONT. END TEXT

6. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO STRESS SENSITIVITY OF THIS INFORMATION. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 7342

DTG:152237Z MAY 81 PSN: 007856
TOR: 135/2357Z

DATE 05/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: KEMP, GREGG
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #8910 1360652
O 160652Z MAY 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9313

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 08910

NODIS
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 (SHERMAN, WILLIAM C.) OR-M
TAGS: LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON
REF: STATE 127342, TOKYO 08579

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY OFFICER DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE AT 2:30 P.M. LOCAL TIME MAY 16 TO MOFA FIRST MIDDLE EAST DIVISION DEPUTY DIRECTOR OHKI, WHO REFERRED TO FOREIGN MINISTER ITO'S RESIGNATION EARLIER IN DAY BUT ASSURED EMBASSY OFFICER THAT MESSAGE WOULD BE PASSED TO RESPONSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WITHOUT DELAY. HE ALSO INFORMED EMBASSY OFFICER THAT MOFA HAD INSTRUCTED ITS AMBASSADOR IN SAUDI ARABIA MAY 15 TO ASK THAT THEY URGE SYRIANS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT.

3. IN CONVEYING MESSAGE, WE STRESSED SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION. MANSFIELD

TOKYO 8910

DTG: 160652Z MAY 81 PSN: 008307
TOR: 130/0747Z

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NLS F00-037/1-137
BY AOJ, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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DE RUEHKO #8912/01 1360910
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O 160906Z MAY 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9315
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUYNSDK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA IMMEDIATE
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 08912
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: XDS 5-15-01 (SHERMAN, WILLIAM C.) DR-M
TAGS: MPOL, MARR, JA

SUBJECT: US SHIPS ALLEGEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGE TO
JAPANESE FISHING OPERATIONS

1. SUMMARY. INCIDENT INVOLVING CUTTING OF JAPANESE
FISHING VESSEL LINES ALLEGEDLY BY USN SHIPS HAS
RECEIVED TOP PLAY. TIMING OF INCIDENT IN WAKE OF
NISSHO MARU, ITS SCALE AND FACT THAT GOJ GOVERNMENT
CRISIS IS NOW UNDERWAY HAVE MADE IT INTO COMPLEX PROBLEM
THAT COULD BRING US MORE GRIEF THAN IT SHOULD. WHAT IS
NEEDED TO MINIMIZE PROBLEM IS PROMPT USN ACTION TO
REPORT ON US ROLE IN INCIDENT AND TO TENDER APOLOGY
IF APPROPRIATE. IF THIS IS NOT DONE IMMINENTLY, WE WILL
BE FACED WITH INCREASING DIFFICULTIES IN CONDUCTING
SUCH EXERCISES IN FUTURE. WE MAY ALSO BE FORCED TO
CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ASKING USN TO CALL OFF REMAINDER OF
ASWEX EXERCISES. END SUMMARY

2. MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY (MSA) INFORMED MOFA EVENING
MAY 15 THAT SOME 48 JAPANESE LONG LINE FISHING VESSELS
OPERATING IN SEA OF JAPAN WEST OF TSUGARU STRAIT HAD
THEIR LINES AND EQUIPMENT CUT AND DAMAGED BY SEVERAL
SHIPS AND A SUBMARINE, APPARENTLY AMERICAN. DAMAGE
OCCURRED NIGHT OF MAY 14 (AFTER 2300) AND EARLY MORNING
OF MAY 15. TWO OF LOCATIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS: (A) 43
DEGREES 45 MINUTES NORTH, 138 DEGREES 55 MINUTES EAST;
(B) 43 DEGREES 10 MINUTES NORTH, 138 DEGREES 46 MINUTES
EAST. THIRD LOCATION WAS SOUTH AND SLIGHTLY WEST OF
FIRST TWO LOCATIONS.

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NLS FPO-037/1 #138
BY 601 NARA DATE 7/24/96

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3. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION MOFA RECEIVED FROM FISHERIES AGENCY, SHIPS INVOLVED WERE ENGAGED IN LONG-LINE FISHING FOR SALMON TROUT (SAKE MASU) AND KARAFUTO TROUT (KARAFUTO MASU) USING LINES WITH FLOAT DEVICES WHICH EXTEND AS FAR AS 30 KM BEHIND SHIP WITH SERIES OF HOOKS AND BAIT ABOUT 1 1/2-7 METERS BELOW SURFACE OF SEA. FISHING VESSELS AT LOCATION (A) SHORTLY BEFORE DAMAGE OCCURRED OBSERVED 4 SHIPS FLYING US FLAG (TWO OF WHICH BORE NUMERALS 24 AND 25) BEARING DOWN ON THEM. THEY THEN FOUND THEIR LINES WERE CUT AND THEY WERE FORCED TO DISCONTINUE OPERATIONS.

4. SHIPS AT LOCATION (B) OBSERVED SIX DESTROYERS (NUMERALS OBSERVED WERE 1041; 24, 25 AND 950) AND ALSO EXPERIENCED DAMAGE TO THEIR LONG-LINES AND EQUIPMENT. SHIPS AT THIRD LOCATION WHICH LOST LONG LINE EQUIPMENT SAW SUBMARINE AT ABOUT TIME THEIR EQUIPMENT WAS DAMAGED.

5. MOFA HAS MADE FORMAL REQUEST TO EMBASSY TO DETERMINE WHETHER US SHIPS WERE INVOLVED; THEIR NAMES AND NATURE OF OPERATIONS, WHAT MEASURES US WILL TAKE TO PREVENT RECURRENCE AND WHAT SORT OF COMPENSATION MIGHT BE EXPECTED. (NEWSPAPERS NOTED EQUIPMENT LOSS ALONE WILL EXCEED YEN 30 MILLION.) MOFA ALSO ASKED US TO CANCEL SECOND HALF OF ASWEX 81-2J, SCHEDULED TO START MAY 19.

6. MOFA CONTACTED EMBASSY AFTERNOON MAY 16 TO SAY THAT IT HAD JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM FISHERIES AGENCY TO EFFECT THAT AS OF 1223 MAY 16 THREE US SHIPS (TWO BEARING NUMERALS 24 AND 1041) WERE STILL OPERATING IN VICINITY OF 43 DEGREES 51 MINUTES NORTH; 138 DEGREES 29 MINUTES EAST AND THAT THEIR ZIG-ZAG OPERATIONS WERE RESULTING IN FURTHER CUTTING OF FISHING LINES AND EQUIPMENT. MOFA HAS ASKED THAT OPERATIONS WHICH DAMAGE FISHING ACTIVITIES BE HALTED AND EMBASSY HAS RELAYED THIS TO USN.

7. FISHING LINE INCIDENT RECEIVED WIDE COVERAGE MAY 16. ALMOST ALL PAPERS GAVE STORY TOP BILLING AS WAS THE CASE WITH TV. MOST PAPERS PRINTED DETAILED ACCOUNT OF INCIDENT FROM FISHERIES AGENCY INFORMATION. MOST SPECULATED THAT SHIPS WERE VERY LIKELY US WARSHIPS ON WAY TO PHASE TWO OF JOINT EXERCISES WITH MSDF. MOST PAPERS SPECULATED THAT INCIDENT, COMING IN WAKE OF STILL-UNRESOLVED NISSHO-MARU INCIDENT, WOULD "CAST SHADOW" OVER US-JAPAN RELATIONS AND WOULD BE SUBJECT OF DIET DEBATE. MOST PAPERS ASSERTED THAT OPPOSITION PARTIES WOULD DEMAND IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF JOINT EXERCISE IN JAPAN SEA.

8. JDA AND JMSDF MET MAY 16 TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT DMSDF SHOULD PLAN TO PARTICIPATE IN SECOND HALF OF ASWEX EXERCISE. DECISION WAS MADE TO GO AHEAD ON RATIONALE THAT FAILURE TO DO SO COULD LEAD

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TO PROBLEMS REGARDING FUTURE JOINT EXERCISES WITH USIN.
o. COMMENT. INCIDENT OF THIS TYPE CAN NORMALLY BE
KEPT WITHIN MANAGEABLE PROPORTIONS, BUT SCALE OF THIS
INCIDENT, FACT THAT IT HAS OCCURRED IN WAKE OF

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DE RUEHKO #8912/02 1360916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
O 160906Z MAY 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9316
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUYNSDK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA IMMEDIATE
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 08912

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
NISSHO-MARU COLLISION AND IN MIDST OF JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT CRISIS HAVE MADE IT INTO COMPLEX PROBLEM
THAT COULD WELL BRING US MORE GRIEF THAN IT SHOULD. WHAT
NEEDS TO BE DONE URGENTLY IS TO HAVE US NAVY REPORT
FACTS, INCLUDING EXTENT OF ANY US INVOLVEMENT, TENDER
APOLOGY IF WE ARE AT FAULT AND ASSURE GOJ THAT COMPENSA-
TION WILL BE ADDRESSED PROMPTLY THROUGH EXISTING CHANNELS.
UNLESS THIS IS DONE, AND DONE PROMPTLY, WE WILL LIKELY
FACE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES WITH MEDIA, DIET, AND WITH GOJ
THAT WILL MAKE FOR FURTHER DIFFICULTIES IN SCHEDULING
EXERCISES OF THIS TYPE IN FUTURE. WE MAY ALSO BE FORCED
TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY GOJ REQUEST TO CALL OFF REMAINDER
OF ASWEX WITHIN NEXT DAY OR SO, DEPENDING ON HOW REACTION
TO THIS INCIDENT DEVELOPS.

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DD RUEHC
DE RUEHKO #8913/01 1361057
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
O 161054Z MAY 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9317
INFO RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 08913
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
F.O. 12065: GDS 5-16-87 (HUBBARD, THOMAS C.) DR-P
TAGS: PINT, JA
SUBJECT: RESIGNATION OF FOREIGN MINISTER ITO
REF: TOKYO 8907

1. AT HASTILY-CALLED PRESS CONFERENCE AT FOREIGN
MINISTRY AT ABOUT ONE P.M. ON MAY 16, FOREIGN MINISTER
ITO ANNOUNCED HIS RESIGNATION AND THAT OF VICE MINISTER
TAKASHIMA TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCORD WITHIN GOJ
OVER THE TIMING OF THE RELEASE OF THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE.
FOLLOWING ITO'S PRESS CONFERENCE, CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY
MIYAZAWA TOLD REPORTERS THAT BOTH HE AND PM HAD ATTEMPTED
TO DISSUADE ITO FROM RESIGNING THE PREVIOUS EVENING BUT
THAT RESIGNATION HAD BEEN ACCEPTED WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR
THAT ITO WAS DETERMINED TO QUIT. MIYAZAWA ALSO INDICATED
THAT SELECTION OF A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY
BE ANNOUNCED LATER TODAY (MAY 16) AFTER AN EVENING MEETING
OF THE FOUR TOP LDP EXECUTIVES. AT MEETING, WHICH WAS
HELD AT 6:30 P.M. LOCAL TIME, SUNAO SONODA (CURRENTLY
WELFARE MINISTER) WAS SELECTED AS ITO'S SUCCESSOR AND
TATSUO MURAYAMA WAS DESIGNATED TO REPLACE SONODA.
2. MEDIA SPECULATE THAT IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF ITO'S
RESIGNATION WAS PM'S REPEATED PUBLIC CRITICISM DURING
PAST WEEK OF RELEASE OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE PRIOR TO COM-
PLETION OF SECOND ROUND OF SUMMIT TALKS IN WASHINGTON.
(SUZUKI HAD COMPLAINED THAT EARLY RELEASE OF COMMUNIQUE
PREVENTED INCLUSION OF HIS REMARKS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
EMPHASIZING THAT JAPAN'S FUTURE DEFENSE EFFORTS WOULD
DEPEND ON JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION, BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS,
OTHER POLICY PRIORITIES, AND REACTION OF NEIGHBORING ASIAN
COUNTRIES.) MEDIA NOTE THAT PM REITERATED HIS DISSATIS-
FACTION WITH TIMING OF COMMUNIQUE'S RELEASE DURING WHAT WAS
SUPPOSED TO BE OFF-THE-RECORD CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY
EVENING. AFTER WHICH ITO HAD CALLED ON SUZUKI AT HIS

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BY NET NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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PRIVATE RESIDENCE TO PRESENT HIS AND TAKESHIMA'S RESIGNATIONS.

3. AMONG LDP DIETMEN MENTIONED IN MEDIA AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO ITO WERE: MIYAZAWA, FORMER FOMMIN OKITA AND SONODA AS WELL AS LESSOR KNOWN FIGURES SUCH AS FORMER LABOR MINISTER HEIJI OGAWA, FORMER MITI MINISTER YOSHITAKE SASAKI, FORMER LABOR MINISTER YUKIO KURIHARA (ALL FROM SUZUKI FACTION), LDP EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHAIRMAN NIKAIKO, FORMER MITI MINISTER MASUMI ESAKI, AND FORMER ECONOMIC PLANNING MINISTER TOKUSABURO KOSAKA (BOTH OF TANAKA FACTION) AND FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER TOSHIO KIMURA, WHO IS NOT CURRENTLY A MEMBER OF ANY LDP FACTION.

4. INITIAL MEDIA COMMENTARY SUGGESTS THAT ITO'S RESIGNATION MAY WEAKEN PM'S POSITION WITHIN LDP AND JEOPARDIZE HIS CHANCES FOR REELECTION TO PARTY PRESIDENCY AT NEXT FALL'S LDP CONVENTION. (MAINICHI NOTES IN THIS CONTEXT IRONIC FACT THAT RESIGNATION COINCIDES WITH FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE IN DIET THAT FORCED RESIGNATION OF OHIRA CABINET, AND WONDERS WHETHER THIS INCIDENT MIGHT PROVOKE RESUMPTION OF OPEN INTER-FACTIONAL FEUDING THAT PLAGUED OHIRA AND HIS PREDECESSORS.) MEDIA ALSO SPECULATE THAT EPISODE MIGHT CAST PALL OVER US-JAPAN RELATIONS, AND CREATE IMPRESSION THAT RECENT SUMMIT HAD BEEN A "FAILURE".

5. COMMENT: THIS EPISODE SHOULD BE SEEN AS CLASSICAL DOMESTIC POLITICAL FLAP STEMMING FROM TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF FACE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, SUZUKI'S CRITICISM OF MOFA'S HANDLING OF SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH SPARKED ITO'S RESIGNATION, HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ITSELF, WHICH SUZUKI SUPPORTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTROVERSY ILLUSTRATES FACT THAT WHILE PUBLIC OPINION HAS COME A LONG WAY, ANYTHING THAT CAN BE CONSTRUED AS GREATER JAPANESE DEFENSE COOPERATION REMAINS HIGHLY DELICATE IN DOMESTIC CONTEXT.

6. COMMENTING ON BACKGROUND OF THIS FLAP, SOURCES CLOSE TO PM SPECULATE THAT SUZUKI, WHO HAD UNDERGONE LITTLE MEDIA CRITICISM SINCE TAKING OFFICE, WAS SURPRISED AND DISMAYED WHEN HE RETURNED HOME TO FIND PRESS CHARACTERIZING COMMUNIQUE AS OVERLY MILITARISTIC AND REACTED, IN WHAT WERE SUPPOSED TO BE PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, BY COMPLAINING THAT EARLY RELEASE OF COMMUNIQUE PREVENTED HIS CLEAR EXPOSITION OF JAPANESE DEFENSE CONSTRAINTS FROM BEING INCORPORATED. (NO ONE IS SURE WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAKING SUZUKI'S REMARKS). ASAHI SHIMBUN ARTICLE, ASSERTING THAT MOFA BUREAUCRATS HAD PUT COMMUNIQUE TOGETHER ON THEIR OWN, ALSO TOUCHED DEEP-SEATED RESENTMENT AMONG POLITICIANS AT LEADING ROLE PLAYED BY BUREAUCRATS IN JAPANESE SYSTEM. ITO HAD THROUGHOUT INSISTED THAT COMMUNIQUE WAS DRAFTED UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, AND, ONCE FLAP DEVELOPED, TRADITIONAL

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DE RUEHKO #8913/02 1361059
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N 161054Z MAY 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9318
INFO RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 08913

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
JAPANESE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY ALMOST COMPELLED HIM
AND VICE MINISTER TAKESHIMA TO OFFER RESIGNATION. WE
UNDERSTAND THAT SUZUKI, MIYAZAWA AND LDP EXECUTIVE BOARD
CHAIRMAN NIKAI DO (TANAKA FACTION STRONGMAN) SOUGHT
VIGOROUSLY TO DISSUADE ITO FROM THIS ACT.
7. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS INCIDENT, WHICH HAS
BEEN PORTRAYED BY MANY AS EVIDENCE OF SUZUKI'S INEXPERIENCE
AND INEPTNESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAS HURT THE PM
POLITICALLY. SOME FEEL IT HAS SERIOUSLY SET BACK WHAT
HAD SEEMED TO BE HIS CLEAR PATH TOWARD REELECTION AS LDP
PRESIDENT (AND AUTOMATICALLY PRIME MINISTER) IN NOVEMBER
OF NEXT YEAR. HOWEVER, FEW CONSIDER HIS GOVERNMENT TO BE
IN SERIOUS DANGER OF FALLING IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HIS
SOURCE OF STRENGTH IS THE SUPPORT OF THE LARGE TANAKA AND
FUKUDA FACTIONS OF LDP AND, ALTHOUGH LEADERS OF BOTH
FACTORS ARE SAID TO BE DISMAYED WITH SUZUKI'S HANDLING OF
COMMUNIQUE ISSUE, THERE ARE THUS FAR NO SIGNS THAT THEY
MAY TURN TO SOMEONE ELSE.

8. IN RESPONSE TO MEDIA INQUIRIES HERE, WE ARE DESCRIBING
ITO'S RESIGNATION AS PURELY JAPANESE DOMESTIC MATTER AND
WE RECOMMEND THAT OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON DO THE SAME.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE858
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OO RUEHC
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9321
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3932
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6458
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3882
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 08916

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 5-17-87 (HUBBARD, THOMAS H.) DR-P

TAGS: PINT, JA

SUBJECT: ITO RESIGNATION

1. (U) IN PRESS CONFERENCE SHORTLY AFTER HE WAS NAMED FOREIGN MINISTER, SUNAO SONODA STRESSED THAT HIS APPOINTMENT WAS INTENDED IN PART TO BE SIGNAL TO US THAT ITO'S RESIGNATION DID NOT IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN US-JAPANESE RELATIONS OR IN JAPAN'S HIGH EVALUATION OF RECENT SUMMIT. VOWING TO WORK TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN US-JAPAN RELATIONS, ITO STATED THAT TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE BASED ON EXTREMELY SOLID FOUNDATION EXTENDING FAR BEYOND WORDING OF ONE COMMUNIQUE. HE WENT ON TO ENDORSE CHARACTERIZATION OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS AS "ALLIANCE", SAYING HE HAD OFTEN USED THE WORD IN HIS PREVIOUS STINTS AS FOREIGN MINISTER TO DESCRIBE THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE LONG-STANDING BILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP.

2. (U) PM SUZUKI HAS ALSO ATTEMPTED TO DEFUSE COMMUNIQUE ISSUE, CONFIRMING TO REPORTERS SHORTLY AFTER ITO'S RESIGNATION THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING USE OF WORD "ALLIANCE". SUZUKI REITERATED THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH WORDING OF COMMUNIQUE AND STATED THAT HIS PROBLEMS WERE WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS PUT TOGETHER, NOT WITH SUBSTANCE.

3. (U) ACCORDING TO MEDIA, EXTERNAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE SABURO OKITA HAS ALSO VOICED HIS INTENTION TO RESIGN IN NEAR FUTURE. OKITA HAS REPORTEDLY MAINTAINED THAT HIS RESIGNATION HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH

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NLS FOO-037/1-#146

BY SAJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

COMMUNIQUE FLAP BUT, RATHER, THAT HE FELT HE HAD OUTLIVED HIS USEFULNESS WITH RESIGNATION OF HIS CLOSE FRIEND ITO. ACCORDING TO PRESS, BOTH SUZUKI AND SONODA HAVE URGED VICE MINISTER TAKASHIMA TO REMAIN IN HIS POST UNTIL AFTER PM'S EUROPEAN VISIT AND OTTAWA SUMMIT. PRESS SPECULATES, HOWEVER, THAT TAKASHIME IS FIRM IN HIS INTENTION TO STEP DOWN IMMEDIATELY.

4. (X) MEANWHILE, ALL MAJOR NEWSPAPERS HAVE CARRIED FRONTPAGE COMMENTARY AND EDITORIALS ESSENTIALLY PLACING BLAME ON SUZUKI FOR PROVOKING THIS CRISIS, TOTALLY APART FROM SUBSTANCE OF WHETHER US-JAPAN RELATIONS SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AS ALLIANCE, ALL EDITORIALS CHARGE THAT SUZUKI DEMONSTRATED HIS INEXPERIENCE AND LACK OF LEADERSHIP IN EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION WITH COMMUNIQUE TO WHICH HE HIMSELF HAD AGREED IN WASHINGTON. MEDIA ASSERT THAT THIS WILL AFFECT NOT ONLY US-JAPAN RELATIONS BUT ALSO CONFIDENCE OF EUROPEAN AND OTHER FOREIGN LEADERS IN SUZUKI'S RELIABILITY AND LEADERSHIP. ALL PAPERS PREDICT ROUGH SAILING IN UPCOMING DEFENSE CONSULTATIONS WITH US.

5. (X) MOST OBSERVERS EXPECT DOMESTIC POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS TO BE SERIOUS. OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE GEARED UP TO PURSUE LACK OF UNITY WITHIN SUZUKI'S GOVERNMENT IN DIET NEXT WEEK. MOREOVER, IN VIEW OF MOST OBSERVERS, BY FAILING TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP IN HANDLING HIS VISIT TO US, SUZUKI HAS CALLED INTO QUESTION HIS ABILITY TO MANAGE OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY. RESIGNATION FROM CABINET OF A LEADING MEMBER OF HIS OWN FACTION HAS SEVERELY WEAKENED SUZUKI'S POLITICAL BASE, A SITUATION WHICH AMBITIOUS MEMBERS OF OTHER FACTIONS WILL BE TEMPTED TO EXPLOIT. CONSENSUS VIEW IS THAT, WHILE SUZUKI MAY NOT BE IN IMMEDIATE DANGER, EARLIER EXPECTATIONS OF A LENGTHY PERIOD IN OFFICE HAVE BEEN CAST INTO DOUBT.

6. (X) COMMENT: WE AGREE THAT SONODA'S APPOINTMENT TO SUCCEED ITO WAS MOTIVATED IN LARGE PART BY DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT THIS ESSENTIALLY DOMESTIC FLAP DOES NOT SPILL OVER INTO US-JAPAN RELATIONS. INDICATIONS ARE STRONG THAT ITO'S DECISION TO RESIGN WAS NOT A HASTY ONE BUT THE RESULT OF LONG-STANDING DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SUZUKI, ON ONE HAND, AND WITH MOFA OFFICIALS ON THE OTHER. FOR ITO, SUZUKI'S CRITICISM OF HANDLING OF US-JAPAN COMMUNIQUE WAS SIMPLY THE FINAL STRAW. IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT EFFECT ITO'S GESTURE WILL HAVE ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE BUT DESIRE TO PREVENT THIS EPISODE FROM AFFECTING CONFIDENCE BETWEEN US AND JAPAN SEEMS STRONG INDEED.

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SITUATION LISTING

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MANSFIELD
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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE998
STU9394
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHKO #8939 1380325
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 180324Z MAY 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 9327
BT

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 08939

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EO 12065: RDS-1 5/18/01 (SHERMAN, W.C.) DR-M

TAGS: MPOL, JA, US

SUBJECT: REISCHAUER INTERVIEW RE NUCLEAR-ARMED WARSHIPS

REF: TOKYO 8923

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL ASAO CALLED POLITICAL COUNSELOR MONDAY MORNING, MAY 18, TO TRANSMIT STRONG WISH OF PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI THAT USG "NOT ENDORSE" FORMER AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER'S STATEMENTS REGARDING INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON US NAVAL VESSELS. ACCORDING TO ASAO, PRIME MINISTER BELIEVED THAT ANY USG CONFIRMATION WOULD HAVE "MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES" FOR GOJ.

3. POLCOUNS ASSURED ASAO THAT BOTH DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY WOULD MAINTAIN LONG-STANDING POSITION OF NEITHER CONFIRMING NOR DENYING PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD HAVE "NO COMMENT" ON REISCHAUER'S VIEWS, EXCEPT POSSIBLY TO ADD THAT REISCHAUER WAS SPEAKING AS PRIVATE CITIZEN. MANSFIELD

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NLS FOO-037/c#141

BY LBT, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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OO RUEHC
DE RUEHKO #8951 1380639
ZNY TTTT ZZH
O 180554Z MAY 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9335
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~~TOP SECRET~~ TOKYO 08951

NODIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-1,3 05/08/11 (SHERMAN, W. C.) DR-M

TAGS: MNUC, MPOL, JA, US

SUBJECT: REISCHAUER INTERVIEW; MIYAZAWA COMMENTS

1. (~~TOP SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. DCM CALLED ON CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYAZAWA MORNING MAY 18 TO DISCUSS BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S AND VICE MINISTER'S RESIGNATIONS (THIS PORTION OF CONVERSATION BEING REPORTED SEPTEL). FOLLOWING DISCUSSION RELATING TO REISCHAUER INTERVIEW OCCURRED AT END OF TALK WITH CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY.

3. DCM NOTED THAT REISCHAUER INTERVIEW APPEARING IN MAINICHI TODAY (5/18) ALLEGING THAT NUCLEAR-ARMED U.S. WARSHIPS HAD BEEN CALLING AT JAPANESE PORTS FOR LAST TWO DECADES COULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. MIYAZAWA RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING PRESS FOR REGULAR DAILY BRIEFING SHORTLY AND IF ASKED, WOULD REPLY THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER WAS SPEAKING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN. HE WOULD SAY THAT GOJ WAS CONVINCED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPAN IN VIEW OF U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN'S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. MIYAZAWA SAID THAT REISCHAUER HAD BEEN RETIRED FOR SOME TIME, AND THAT WHAT HE SAYS HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON THE USG POSITION. ASKED WHETHER GOJ WOULD UNDERTAKE TO CHECK STORY OUT WITH USG, MIYAZAWA SAID IT WOULD DECLINE TO DO SO. HE ADDED THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED MANY TIMES IN PAST YEARS, AND THAT NOTHING NEW HAD EMERGED FROM REISCHAUER INTERVIEW. DCM ASKED MIYAZAWA WHETHER GOJ WOULD HOLD THAT LINE; MIYAZAWA SAID IT INTENDED TO DO SO.

4. DCM SAID THAT AS MIYAZAWA WELL KNEW, U.S. POSITION WAS NEITHER TO CONFIRM NOR DENY EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WEAPONS. THIS WAS A FIRM POSITION WHICH HAD BEEN REITERATED MANY TIMES OVER THE YEARS. HE RECALLED THAT IN 1974, THEN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE INGERSOLL HAD TOLD THEN AMBASSADOR YASUKAWA FORMALLY THAT THE U.S. HAD FAITHFULLY OBSERVED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY. THIS REMAINED THE U.S. POSITION. ASKED WHETHER USG WOULD HOLD THAT LINE, DCM REPLIED THAT IT WOULD ENDEAVOR TO DO SO. DCM ADDED THAT SO LONG AS GOJ MAINTAINED ITS POSITION, USG WOULD ALSO DO SO; BOTH SIDES NEEDED TO STAND FIRM AND A GREAT DEAL WOULD DEPEND ON TYPES OF QUESTIONS GOJ WOULD RECEIVE IN DIET, AND GOJ RESPONSES TO THESE QUESTIONS. DCM NOTED THAT REISCHAUER DID ENJOY SOME CREDIBILITY INASMUCH AS HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR MATTERS IN THE 1960S. MIYAZAWA ASKED WHETHER THE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS REMAIN CLASSIFIED. DCM SAID THEY WERE, AND THAT USG HAD NO INTENTION OF DECLASSIFYING THEM.

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE061
UTS2047
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHKO #8967/01 1380734
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 180732Z MAY 81 ZFF=4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9342
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 08967

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE FROM SHERMAN
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 5/18/11 (MANSFIELD, MICHAEL) OR-M

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, JA

SUBJECT: DCM'S MEETING WITH CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY
MIYAZAWA

REF: STATE 128439

1. I MET AT 1020 MAY 18 WITH CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY
MIYAZAWA AS REQUESTED. HE OPENED BY SAYING THAT PRIME
MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM PERSONALLY TO EXPLAIN THE WEEKEND'S
EVENTS TO US RATHER THAN GOING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS
BECAUSE THE GOJ REGARDED THE INCIDENT AS PURELY INTERNAL,
NOT INVOLVING JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS.

2. MIYAZAWA THEN SAID THAT ITO'S RESIGNATION IN JAPANESE
TERMS HAD TWO ASPECTS: FIRST, IT WAS A PROTEST AGAINST
PRIME MINISTER'S PUBLIC CRITICISM OF FOREIGN OFFICE;
SECONDLY, IT WAS AN ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
"UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE" OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, NOT
JUST WITH RESPECT TO THE HANDLING OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
BUT IN GENERAL. MIYAZAWA SAID THAT FORMER FOREIGN MINIS-
TER ITO'S DISSATISFACTION WITH MOFA'S PERFORMANCE HAD COME
AS A SURPRISE TO HIM, SINCE HE HAD NEVER MENTIONED ANY
UNHAPPINESS; HOWEVER, HE HAD MADE HIS FEELINGS CLEAR IN
CONVERSATIONS WITH MIYAZAWA ON EVENING MAY 15 AND AGAIN ON
MORNING MAY 16. ITO SAID AT THAT TIME THAT HE INTENDED
RESIGN AND ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY, BUT THAT HE ALSO BELIEVED
THAT MOFA VICE MINISTER TAKASHIMA, AS SENIOR PROFESSIONAL
BUREAUCRAT, SHOULD ALSO RESIGN. ITO HAD ASKED HIM TO DO
SO. MIYAZAWA SAID HE HAD CONFIRMED WITH TAKASHIMA HIMSELF
THAT HIS RESIGNATION HAD NOT BEEN VOLUNTARY BUT AT REQUEST
OF ITO.

3. MIYAZAWA EXPLAINED THAT PM'S CRITICISM HAD TO DO SOLELY
WITH WAY JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS DRAFTED AND DISTRIBUTED, NOT
WITH CONTENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ITS RELEASE UNDER

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BY HOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EMBARGO PRIOR TO SECOND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HAD BEEN OVER OBJECTION OF STATE DEPT., AND SAID WRYLY THAT THIS REPRESENTED GOJ'S "OVER-SERVICE" TO ITS OWN PRESS CORPS. NEVERTHELESS, PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN UPSET--HE BELIEVED JOINT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD REPRESENT VIEWS OF PARTICIPANTS AND NOT JUST BUREAUCRATS' IDEAS OF WHAT PRINCIPALS WERE SUPPOSED TO SAY. HIS PUBLIC CRITICISM HAD BEEN AIMED AT IMPROVING THE DRAFTING AND RELEASING PROCESS IN THE FUTURE.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER ITO'S PROTEST WAS MOTIVATED NOT BY THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CRITICISM BUT BY THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN UTTERED FIRST AT A CABINET MEETING AND SUBSEQUENTLY AT A SESSION OF THE HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS. ITO HAD STRONGLY ADVISED THAT NO PUBLIC MENTION BE MADE OF THE DISPUTE BUT THE UPPER HOUSE STATEMENT COULD NOT BE KEPT QUIET. ITO INTERPRETED THE PRIME MINISTER'S PUBLIC REMARKS AS AN INCONTROVERTIBLE EXPRESSION OF SUZUKI'S LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN HIM PERSONALLY.

5. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIQUE'S MENTION OF THE WORD "ALLIANCE" HAD BEEN PLAYED UP IN THE PRESS, THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN TAKEN CARE OF BY THE ISSUANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S UNIFIED VIEW. THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT IN RETROSPECT HE HAD NOT BEEN CAREFUL ENOUGH IN EXPLAINING THIS MATTER. HIS REMARKS HAD IN NO WAY BEEN DESIGNED TO "CHEAPEN" THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERM. MIYAZAWA ADDED "PARENTHETICALLY" THAT MOFA BUREAUCRATS MIGHT HAVE MORE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE WORD "ALLIANCE" THAN SOME OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS, BUT IN ANY CASE NOW THAT THE TERM HAD BEEN USED, THE PUBLIC HAD BEEN "IMMUNIZED" AND WOULD NOT REACT ALLERGICALLY AGAIN. THIS WAS, ACCORDING TO MIYAZAWA, A SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT.

6. MIYAZAWA AGAIN RETURNED TO ITO'S OWN ALLEGED UNHAPPINESS WITH THE MOFA BUREAUCRACY SAYING ITO WAS AS DISPLEASED WITH THEIR PERFORMANCE AS WAS THE PRIME MINISTER. MIYAZAWA SENSED "INADEQUATE COMMUNICATION" BETWEEN THE BUREAUCRATS AND THEIR MINISTER WHO HAD "NOT TAKEN COMMAND." HOWEVER, ITO HAD SAID HE WOULD MAKE NO PUBLIC CRITICISM OF MOFA AND HE DID NOT. THIS UNFORTUNATELY GAVE THE IMPRESSION TO THE PRESS THAT TAKASHIMA'S RESIGNATION WAS A VOLUNTARY ONE WHICH ITO HAD SIMPLY ENDORSED, BUT THE ACTION WAS REALLY ITO'S. MIYAZAWA SAID THAT ON SATURDAY, MAY 16, BOTH HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER DESIGNATE SONODA NOT TO ACCEPT TAKASHIMA'S RESIGNATION, BUT TAKASHIMA FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE IN FACE OF ITO'S DIRECT REQUEST. MIYAZAWA ADDED THAT SONODA MIGHT STILL ASK TAKASHIMA TO RECONSIDER, AND THAT A DECISION WOULD BE REACHED TODAY. (OUR SOURCES IN MOFA SAY THERE IS ONLY A ONE PERCENT CHANCE THAT TAKASHIMA WILL STAY ON.) MIYAZAWA SAID "OUR PLAN" IS

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FOR HIM TO STAY IN THE JOB AND ACCOMPANY THE PRIME MINISTER
TO EUROPE IN JUNE AS SCHEDULED.

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DATE 06/01/81//152

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE062
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 08967
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7. MIYAZAWA ASKED ME TO INFORM USG AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRIME MINISTER:

A - THE RESIGNATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS A PURELY DOMESTIC MATTER WHICH HAS NO RELATION WHATEVER TO US-JAPANESE RELATIONS;

B - THERE HAS BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO CHANGE IN WHAT WAS AGREED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT IN THE COURSE OF THEIR WASHINGTON MEETING;

C - THERE HAS BEEN AND WILL BE NO CHANGE IN THE CORDIAL AND CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN. THESE ALREADY FIRM RELATIONS WERE FURTHER ENHANCED BY THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

8. AFTER THIS PRESENTATION, MIYAZAWA SAID HE WANTED TO MENTION FOR MY PERSONAL BACKGROUND (AND NOT RPT NOT FOR REPORTING) A COUPLE OF ADDITIONAL POINTS. FOREIGN MINISTER ITO HAS SUFFERED FROM DIABETES FOR TEN YEARS AND THE ILLNESS HAS BEEN PROGRESSING. RECENTLY, HE HAS HAD SPELLS OF PARALYSIS OR LOSS OF FEELING IN HIS LEGS. MIYAZAWA SAID HE THOUGHT THE DISEASE MIGHT ALSO HAVE HAD AN EFFECT ON ITO'S JUDGMENT, SENTIMENTS, AND TEMPER--PARTICULARLY IN DELICATE PERSONAL DECISIONS. HE WAS "MAKING HIS HOME IN THE HOSPITAL" THESE DAYS. SECONDLY, MIYAZAWA CALLED MY ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT ITO WAS A DIRECT DESCENDANT OF ONE OF THE LAST OF THE TOKUGAWA FEUDAL RETAINERS. UNSWERVING LOYALTY TO LEADERS AND CLOSE FRIENDS (IN ITO'S CASE, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OHIRA) WAS A MAJOR ATTRIBUTE OF HIS PERSONALITY. PERHAPS, MIYAZAWA SPECULATED, THIS FEELING MULTIPLIED BY HIS UNSTABLE HEALTH HAD HAD A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON ITO'S JUDGMENT.

9. I TOLD MIYAZAWA I WOULD CONVEY HIS REMARKS PROMPTLY AND FAITHFULLY. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO RESPOND TO PRESS QUERIES DESCRIBING THE EVENT AS A PURELY DOMESTIC MATTER ON WHICH IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO COMMENT. I

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ALSO USED AND STRESSED THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED TO ME IN PARAS TWO AND THREE OF DEPT'S VERY HELPFUL AND TIMELY STATE 128439. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT PRESS TO BECOME AWARE OF OUR MEETING, BUT THAT IF IT DID, HE WOULD SAY SIMPLY THAT HE HAD CONVEYED PM'S VIEWS OF ITO'S RESIGNATION AND RELATED EVENTS TO U.S. SINCE IT WAS A DOMESTIC MATTER, DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS HAD NOT BEEN USED.

10. I HAVE REPORTED ALL THIS IN DETAIL TO GIVE THE FLAVOR OF WHAT SEEMED TO ME A SELF-SERVING, NOT TO SAY DEVIIOUS PRESENTATION, VERY MUCH A PART OF THE POLITICAL MANEUVERING GOING ON. SUZUKI CERTAINLY WANTS TO DISARM OR DEFLECT THE CRITICISM THAT HE IS RECEIVING FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO MANAGE JAPAN'S ALL IMPORTANT U.S. CONNECTION. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THE GAME IS EVEN HALF OVER.

11. AN INTERESTING RELATED EVENT WHICH MAY ADD SOME PERSPECTIVE WAS A DINNER GIVEN AT FOREIGN MINISTRY GUEST HOUSE MAY 17. IT WAS IN HONOR OF FORMER AMBASSADOR AND FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY ROBERT S. INGERSOLL AND WAS HOSTED BY VICE MINISTER TAKASHIMA AS HIS "LAST OFFICIAL ACT." OTHER GUESTS WERE FORMER MOFA VICE MINISTERS USHIBA, HOGEN, YASUKAWA, AND TOGO, NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GENERAL ASAO AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GENERAL FUKADA AND THEIR WIVES. ONLY AMERICAN GUESTS WERE THE INGERSOLLS, SHERMANS, AND FORMER AMBASSADOR AND MRS. RICHARD SNEIDER WHO ARE VISITING TOKYO. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS SEETHING WITH BARELY CONCEALED RESENTMENT AND CONTEMPT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE PRESENT FOR SUZUKI AND HIS ADVISERS. HE WAS DESCRIBED AS NAIVE, BIG FISH IN LITTLE POND, TOTALLY UNAWARE OF HOW THINGS ARE DONE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT TAKASHIMA FEELS PARTICULARLY ILL-USED, AND HIS PREDECESSORS AND SUBORDINATES ARE RALLYING AROUND HIM. WHEN A TOAST WAS DRUNK TO AMBASSADOR INGERSOLL, ONE JAPANESE CHANGED IT "TO ALLIANCE!" AND IT WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY SECONDED AROUND THE TABLE.

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RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 09021

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 5-18-11 (FEATHERSTONE, EDWARD) DR-P
TAGS: MNVC, MPOL, MARR, JA, US
SUBJECT: REISCHAUER INTERVIEW
SUMMARY. (U) REISCHAUER INTERVIEW IS TOP STORY MAY 18,
RECEIVING WIDE ATTENTION IN ALL MEDIA. PM SUZUKI AND
GOJ SPOKESMEN HAVE HEWN TO TRADITIONAL GOJ POSITION THAT
BRINGING IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS SUBJECT TO PRIOR CONSULTATION,
BUT HAVE FENDED OFF REQUESTS TO ASK USG ABOUT INCIDENT IN EFFORT
TO KEEP ISSUE UNDER CONTROL. GOJ HAS URGED USG OFFICIALS TO
AVOID ANY COMMENT ON INTERVIEW AND HAS SAID THAT ANY CONFIRMATION
OF REISCHAUER'S REMARKS WOULD CREATE "GRAVE CRISIS". INTERVIEW
HAS BECOME ISSUE OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS AND WE SHOULD GAIN BETTER
EXTENT OF PROBLEM AS MEDIA AND DIET REACTION DEVELOP. IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT USG HOLD TO "NO COMMENT" LINE. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) MAINICHI INTERVIEW BY FORMER AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER AND
HIS ALLEGATIONS THEREIN THAT THE U.S. AND JAPAN AGREED TO
"TRANSIT" THROUGH JAPAN PORTS OF NUCLEAR-ARMED U.S. WARSHIPS
HAS RECEIVED TOP PLAY IN TV AND EVENING PAPERS MAY 18. (MAINICHI
MORNING EDITOR CARRIED EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW TEXT OF WHICH SENT TO
ADDRESSEES VIA USINFO CABLE). REISCHAUER'S ASSERTION THAT
TRANSLATION OF "INTRODUCTION", MEANING TO INSTALL PERMANENTLY AS
"MOCHIKOMI" IN JAPANESE HAS LED TO MISUNDERSTANDING. THIS,
COUPLED WITH FAILURE OF GOJ TO FACE FACT THAT U.S. SHIPS WITH
NUKES MUST CALL AT JAPANESE PORTS AND MUST TRANSIT JAPANESE
TERRITORIAL WATERS, HAS LED TO SITUATION WHERE GOJ ASSERTS
FALSELY IN DIET AND PUBLICLY THAT ENTRY OF NUKES INTO JAPAN IS
PROHIBITED AND REMAINS SUBJECT TO PRIOR CONSULTATION. REISCHAUER
CALLED ON GOJ TO RECONIZE REALITY AND TAKE MORE SUPPORTIVE
POSTURE REGARDING U.S.

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BY AS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. MOST MAJOR EVENING DAILIES CARRIED WIRE SERVICE STORIES OR TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS WITH REISCHAUER CONFIRMING GENERAL LINE OF MAINICHI INTERVIEW. TV ALSO CARRIED INTERVIEW AND AFTERMATH AS TOP STORY. FURTHER DETAILS ON PRESS COVERAGE BEING CONVEYED SEPTEL.

3. (U) GOJ COMMENTS. PM SUZUKI ADDRESSED ISSUE AT NOON PRESS CONFERENCE, SAYING THAT MAJOR CHANGES IN US DEPLOYMENTS AND EQUIPMENT WERE SUBJECT TO PRIOR CONSULTATION PROCESS. HE ADDED THAT, IF WHAT REISCHAUER SAID WAS TRUE, IT WOULD BE AN INFRINGEMENT UPON PRIOR CONSULTATION AGREEMENT AND UPON JAPAN'S NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE MOFA LOOK INTO REISCHAUER ALLEGATIONS. CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYAZAWA TOLD REPORTERS HE SAW NO NEED TO INVESTIGATE REISCHAUER ALLEGATIONS; THAT BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPAN IN WHATEVER WAY WAS SUBJECT TO PRIOR CONSULTATIONS AND THAT WHATEVER AGREEMENT REISCHAUER CLAIMED EXISTED WAS NOT VALID IF ONE OF PARTIES -- JAPAN -- DOES NOT AGREE. FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA ECHOED MIYAZAWA'S REMARKS THAT NUKES WERE SUBJECT TO PRIOR CONSULTATIONS AND SAID THAT "GOJ OFFICIALS" WERE NOT THINKING OF ASKING US ABOUT STORY. SONODA DID NOT GOJ WOULD PRODUCE UNIFIED VIEW ON REISCHAUER ALLEGATION TO BE PRESENTED DURING COURSE OF DIET DEBATE.

4. (U) FORMER PM KISHI IS SAID TO HAVE TOLD TOKYO SHIMBUN REPORTER THAT HE HAD NO RECOLLECTION OF ANY ORAL AGREEMENT, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WERE INSTANCES OF US SHIPS AND PLANES BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPANESE TERRITORY AND AIRSPACE. (HE NOTED THAT MANY SHIPS AND PLANES WERE EQUIPPED WITH NUKES). KISHI REPORTEDLY SAID DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN "TRANSIT" AND "INTRODUCTION" MADE NO SENSE. FORMER DG OF MOFA AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU MORI TOLD PRESS THAT THERE WAS ORAL AGREEMENT BUT THAT HE HAD NO RECOLLECTION OF US-JAPAN DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SAID HE KNEW NOTHING OF REISCHAUER'S APPROACH TO OHIRA ON THIS SUBJECT.

5. (U) AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD, ON SPEAKING TRIP IN OSAKA MAY 18, WAS ASKED BY MAINICHI REPORTERS TO COMMENT ON REISCHAUER INTERVIEW. HE SAID HE HAD NO COMMENT ON INTERVIEW AND REAFFIRMED STANDARD USG POLICY OF NEITHER CONFIRMING NOR DENYING PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6. (U) GOJ HAS ASKED U.S. TO REFRAIN FROM COMMENTING ON REISCHAUER INTERVIEW AND ALLEGATIONS. SENIOR GOJ OFFICIAL TOLD EMBOFF THAT GOJ INTENDED TO HOLD LINE OF NOT REQUESTING USG TO CHECK STORY OUT ON BASIS THAT SUBJECT HAS BEEN OFTEN DISCUSSED IN PAST AND NOTHING NEW HAD EMERGED FROM REISCHAUER INTERVIEW. EMBOFF SAID U.S. WOULD RESPOND TO ANY QUERIES THAT USG POLICY WAS

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NCND; THAT REISCHAUER WAS SPEAKING AS PRIVATE CITIZEN
AND AVOIDING FURTHER COMMENT ON STORY. EMBOFF STRESSED
THAT BOTH SIDES NEEDED TO STAND FIRM AND THAT MUCH

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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
WOULD DEPEND ON DIET QUESTIONS AND GOJ RESPONSES OVER
NEXT FEW WEEKS.

7. (N) SECURITY DIVISION DIRECTOR TAMBA DISCLOSED TO
EMBOFF THAT PM HAD INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR OKAWARA TO
CONTACT AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE TO EFFECT THAT IF ANY
U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OR AUTHORITY MAKES ANY KIND
OF PUBLIC COMMENT OR STATEMENT TENDING TO CONFIRM
REISCHAUER ALLEGATIONS, IT WOULD CREATE GRAVE POLITICAL
CRISIS IN JAPAN WHICH COULD EVEN SHAKE FOUNDATIONS OF
POLITICAL POWER. HE ADDED THAT HE FORESAW EVENTUAL
NEED TO RESOLVE ISSUE WITH HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGE ALONG
LINES OF INGERSOLL-YASUKAWA LETTER AT TIME OF LAROCQUE
AFFAIR IN 1974.

8. (N) COMMENT: COMING IN WAKE OF SSBN INCIDENT,
IMBROGLIO OVER JOINT COMMUNIQUE
LEADING TO FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESIGNATION AND ALLEGED
LARGE SCALE DAMAGE TO JAPANESE FISHING LINES BY USN
SHIPS, REISCHAUER INTERVIEW HAD BECOME ISSUE OF
MAJOR PROPORTIONS AND IS BUILDING UP RAPIDLY. THUS
FAR, PM AND OTHER GOJ SPOKESMEN HAVE HEWN TO
TRADITIONAL POSITIONS IN EFFORT TO KEEP THINGS UNDER
CONTROL, BUT WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED HIGHPOINT OF THIS
ISSUE. WE SHOULD GAIN BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EXTENT
OF PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AS MEDIA AND DIET
REACTION DEVELOP. IN MEANTIME IT IS ABSOLUTELY
ESSENTIAL FOR USG TO HOLD NO COMMENT LINE ON
REISCHAUER INTERVIEW.

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*MSD
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TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

DOCDATE 18 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

SUBJECT: RPT ON CURRENT SITUATION IN JAPAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

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COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM

2857

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 18, 1981

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~~INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN ✓

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: The Situation in Japan

I would unscramble the current Japanese situation in the following fashion

- Suzuki went home feeling very good about his meeting with the President, took unexpected heat on the term "alliance," and did not deal with the pressure forthrightly.
- Suzuki chose to dump on the Foreign Ministry blaming them for issuing a joint communique which he had approved. Ito's resignation was inevitable.
- That issue probably would have gone away had it not been for the Reischauer interview. Apparently Reischauer made his statements last week prior to the Ito flap. Reischauer may have thought that the time was auspicious to raise this issue, following the very good Summit meeting.
- As it turned out his timing was exquisitely bad. Raising the nuclear issue at this time will compound the difficulties Suzuki stirred up by his inept performance in Tokyo.

The new Foreign Minister Sonoda is able but has a quick tongue which he has already demonstrated by speaking critically of the US Navy.

In sum, I think Suzuki is in for a very rough patch of ground and we can be extremely thankful that we did not push any harder than we did on the defense issue.

Reischauer is scheduled to make another statement at 2:30 P.M. today. State is going to try to get Alex Johnson to shut him up.

cc: J. Lilley

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BY LOT DATE 7/24/06

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Review on May 18, 1987

JANET COLSON

gc 18/1534

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bn 18/1610

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/01/81//152

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 05/19/01 (SHERMAN, WILLIAM C.) OR-M

TAGS: PERP, MOPS, LE, SY, IS, JA, US

SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS -- JAPANESE INITIATIVE

REF: (A) TOKYO 8910 (NODIS); (B) TOKYO 8785;

(C) TOKYO 8579; (D) STATE 122278

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. MOFA FIRST MIDDLE EAST DIVISION DIRECTOR SHIBUYA TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER MAY 19 THAT, BECAUSE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOT AVAILABLE, JAPANESE EMBASSY OFFICER IN JIDDA HAD MADE DEMARCHE TO SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR ARAB AFFAIRS SHOLAR MAY 16 ASKING THAT SAUDIES URGE SYRIANS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN LEBANESE CRISIS.
3. SHOLAR, WHO DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY TO JAPANESE REQUEST, ARGUED INSTEAD THAT INTRODUCTION OF MISSILES INTO LEBANON BY SYRIAN FORCES WAS COMPLETELY LEGAL AND THAT ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON WOULD BE UNJUSTIFIED. FOR THIS REASON, SHOLAR SAID, SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH WAS GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT LEBANESE CRISIS, HAD CALLED IN U.S., UK AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS IN JIDDA TO ASK THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS PERSUADE ISRAEL NOT TO USE

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FORCE IN LEBANON. ACCORDING TO SHOLAR, SARG WAS CONCERNED THAT IF SITUATION WORSENER, USSR WOULD BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN AREA, AND HE HOPED BOTH US AND USSR WOULD PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY IN THIS CRISIS. SHOLAR ALSO SAID SARG DID NOT THINK UN WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY TO SOLUTION OF CRISIS.

4. SHIBUYA NOTED THAT, WHILE OFFICIAL SAUDI RESPONSE WAS NOT VERY ENCOURAGING, MOFA THINKS ACTUAL SARG POSITION IS MORE HELPFUL. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE CITED SYRIAN GOVERNMENT MAY 17 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PRESIDENT ASAAD HAD RECEIVED PERSONAL LETTER FROM KING KHALID, WHICH MOFA ASSUMED WOULD BE COUNSELING MODERATION.

5. SHIBUYA ALSO SAID THAT IN VIEW OF DISPATCH TO DAMASCUS OF ALGERIAN PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL ENVOY, WHOM MOFA ALSO THOUGHT WOULD URGE SYRIANS TO BE MODERATE, MOFA HAD DECIDED NOT TO PROCEED WITH DEMARCHE TO ALGERIANS AT THIS TIME, BUT MIGHT DO SO AT LATER DATE.

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PAGE 01

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 05/19/01 (SHERMAN, W.C.) DR-M

TAGS: MPOL, US, JA

SUBJECT: PREVIEW OF AMBASSADOR'S MAY 20 MEETING WITH

FM SONODA

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT).

2. MOFA (ASAO, TAMBA AND KURITA) REHEARSED WITH DCM AND POL COUNSELLOR LATE AFTERNOON MAY 19 WHAT THEY WERE FAIRLY CERTAIN WOULD BE FORMIN SONODA'S PRESENTATION TO AMBASSADOR AT TOMORROW'S 10:00 A.M. MEETING.

3. SONODA WILL ASSURE AMBASSADOR OF HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO US-JAPAN RELATIONS IN GENERAL AND MAY 8 JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN PARTICULAR, AND HIS DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONSHIP. HE WILL SAY THAT REGARDLESS OF RECENT (DOMESTIC) FUSS HERE OVER COMMUNIQUE, THERE WERE NOW NO DIFFERENCES IN INTERPRETATION WITHIN THE CABINET AND, IN HIS VIEW, NONE BETWEEN THE GOJ AND USG.

4. WITH REGARD TO REISCHAUER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR TRANSIT, SONODA WILL REINFORCE WHAT YOU HAVE HEARD FROM AMBASSADOR OKAWARA AND WHAT WE HAVE BEEN HEARING

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DATE 05/25/81

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PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FROM LOWER LEVELS OF MOFA TO EFFECT THAT IF THEY ARE CONFIRMED IN ANY WAY BY USG OFFICIAL NOW IN OFFICE, GOJ WOULD FACE "GRAVE SITUATION". SONODA WILL MAKE CLEAR ON BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER, THAT GOJ WILL CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH ISSUE JUST AS IT HAS DONE IN THE PAST. HE WILL MOST LIKELY ADD HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT CURRENT "ABNORMAL SITUATION" SHOULD BE "REGULARIZED" SOMETIME IN FUTURE AFTER FIRES FROM CURRENT CONTROVERSY ARE EXTINGUISHED. TAMBA, WHO IS PREPARING PRESS GUIDANCE, MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT MEDIA WILL BE TOLD ONLY THAT SONODA EXPLAINED HOW JAPANESE PEOPLE WERE REACTING TO REISCHAUER'S REMARKS AND STATED THAT GOJ WOULD DEAL WITH THE ISSUE ON THE CONVICTION THAT THE USG WAS HONORING ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS. WE ARGUED, WE BELIEVE SUCCESSFULLY, AGAINST MOFA BRIEFERS MENTIONING 3 NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES IN THIS CONTEXT.

5. SONODA WILL ALSO TOUCH LIGHTLY ON RECENT INCIDENT IN WHICH U.S. NAVY VESSELS ALLEGEDLY DAMAGED JAPANESE FISHING LINES IN SEA OF JAPAN BY EXPRESSING HOPE THAT APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE HANDLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

6. AMBASSADOR PLANS TO CONGRATULATE SONODA ON HIS APPOINTMENT, REASSURE HIM THAT RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS HERE HAVE NOT DIMINISHED SIGNIFICANCE OF SUMMIT SINCE USG VIEWS IT AS MOST SUCCESSFUL SUCH MEETING IN RECENT YEARS, AND EXPRESS FULL AGREEMENT WITH GOJ'S UNIFIED VIEW ON THE MEANING OF ALLIANCE. AMBASSADOR WILL ALSO TELL SONODA THAT CAPTAIN RICH HAS FORWARDED HIS REPORT ON SSBN COLLISION TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK FOR RESOLUTION OF ISSUE IN MANNER WHICH ACCORDS WITH JAPANESE SENTIMENT. HE WILL ALSO EXPRESS REGRETS OVER DAMAGES SUFFERED BY LONG-LINE FISHERMEN IN SEA OF JAPAN AND SUGGEST THEY SUBMIT DETAILED CLAIMS PROMPTLY THROUGH GOJ TO USN.

7. NOTING THAT REISCHAUER WAS SPEAKING MERELY AS PRIVATE CITIZEN, AMBASSADOR WILL NONETHELESS REGRET THAT NUCLEAR TRANSIT ISSUE HAS AGAIN SURFACED. HE WILL REAFFIRM USG'S INTENTION TO STICK TO "NEITHER CONFIRM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOR DENY" LINE ON PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORLD-
WIDE AND TO REFRAIN FROM COMMENTING ON REISCHAUER'S
REMARKS. MOFA WOULD LIKE BOTH SIDES TO TELL PRESS AT
CONCLUSION OF MEETING THAT AMBASSADOR RECONFIRMED NOT
ONLY WORLDWIDE NO COMMENT POLICY, BUT SUBSTANCE OF 1974
INGERSOLL-YASOKAWA UNDERSTANDING AS WELL.

8. WE WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS PRESS GUIDANCE
AGAIN BEFORE MEETING BEGINS. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY
MODIFICATIONS IN THE PRESENTATION OR ADDITIONAL SUGGES-
TIONS WHICH YOU MIGHT HAVE.
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