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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder: Japan (4/4/81 – 5/12/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Caspar Weinberger to the President re Collision, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1-#130</i>	Nd	B1
2. Memo	Weinberger to the President re Collision, 1p <i>R " " #131</i>	5/4/81	B1
3. Cable	072220Z MAY 81, 3p <i>R " " #132</i>	5/7/81	B1
4. Memo	Richard Allen to the President re PM Suzuki's Visit, 2p <i>R " " #133</i>	5/12/81	B1
5. Cable	120900Z MAY 81, 2p <i>R " " #134</i>	5/12/81	B1
6. Cable	120821Z MAY 81, 1p <i>R " " #135</i>	5/12/81	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 MAY 81 17

TO PRES

*WSA
11/4/04*

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 04 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

INCIDENTS AT SEA

SUBJECT: DOD RPT ON US SUBMARINE COLLISION W/ JAPANESE FREIGHTER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 04 MAY 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

BLAIR

GREGG

SCHWEITZER

LENZ

URGENT

COMMENTS ** 1 HOUR TURN-AROUND **

STAFFING PER ADMIRAL NANCE; ORIGINAL W/ NANCE

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 11/2</i>	<i>obed; report handled in conjunction w/ Suzuki visit, per Colson</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 MAY 1981

The Honorable Masayoshi Ito
Minister for Foreign Affairs

The attached preliminary findings respond to the commitment of President Reagan to provide a report on the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and NISSHO MARU prior to Prime Minister Suzuki's visit to Washington.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Joseph W. Kerney", is located in the lower right portion of the page.

THE COLLISION BETWEEN USS GEORGE WASHINGTON
AND NISSHO MARU

Pursuant to the promise by the Government of the United States to deliver preliminary results from the investigation of the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and NISSHO MARU, the following report responds to the questions of the Government of Japan.

Question One. How did the collision occur?

At 9:00 A.M. Tokyo time on April 9, 1981, the United States ballistic missile submarine GEORGE WASHINGTON was in international waters conducting a submerged transit south of Japan enroute to a scheduled port visit in the Republic of Korea. The submarine was not in primary alert status as a part of U.S. strategic deterrent forces. It had, however, made itself available for an anti-submarine warfare exercise -- a normal procedure designed to help maintain a high state of proficiency among the U.S. Navy patrol plane squadrons on duty in Japan. As is normally done under such circumstances, the submarine's general location was made known to the Patrol Squadron. A P3C Orion was launched for training purposes to detect the submarine and fix its position accurately enough, if possible, to pursue a simulated attack. Knowing that it might be the object of such an exercise, the submarine continued its transit, trying to remain undetected.

In the area of the GEORGE WASHINGTON on the morning of April 9, the weather was low overcast and rain with visibility varying from good to very poor. The P3C, which normally operates at higher altitudes, was forced by the cloud cover to fly at low altitudes (between 500 and 1000 feet) for the exercise.

At 10:26 A.M., GEORGE WASHINGTON came to periscope depth to verify its position. GEORGE WASHINGTON's sonar, which was functioning properly, had not obtained information to alert the ship that she was approaching a collision situation with a surface ship. At this point the submarine raised its periscope. Visual conditions were poor with weather and high swells streaking and blurring vision through the periscope. Although two 360 degree sweeps with the periscope were made, the submarine did not see NISSHO MARU. The periscope was then lowered.

GEORGE WASHINGTON did not know that the P3C had detected and localized the submarine's position and at that very moment was in the process of simulating an attack, passing immediately overhead. Coming up to a somewhat shallower depth, the Officer of the Deck raised the periscope and immediately saw the P3C. He quickly lowered the periscope, trying to hide from the aircraft. At this

point sonar information was gained by the GEORGE WASHINGTON on NISSHO MARU. This information was passed to the ship's conning station, but was not heard or acknowledged by the Officer of the Deck. At this stage in the investigation it is not clear that the collision could have been avoided had the sonar information been acted upon promptly. The collision occurred at 10:32 A.M. at latitude 31 degrees-23 minutes North and longitude 129 degrees-05 minutes East in international waters.

Question Two. What sort of rescue efforts were made?

Immediately after the collision, the Commanding Officer of GEORGE WASHINGTON was motivated by several considerations. He was concerned about the safety of the vessel he had struck, he was concerned about the safety of his own ship, and he was concerned about concealment of his ship as a strategic missile submarine. The submarine came to the surface just after the collision, but the Commanding Officer returned it to periscope depth immediately after receiving internal reports that there was no significant damage to GEORGE WASHINGTON. He did so because, under the existing adverse weather conditions, his vessel was safer when submerged. He observed the NISSHO MARU through his periscope while on the surface and while submerging. In the 3 to 5 minutes before NISSHO MARU went out of sight in the deteriorating visibility at a distance of about 1250 yards, he did not note any signs that the ship was in distress. He even observed a man standing stationary on the starboard wing of the bridge, looking toward the submarine. He saw no signs of panic or disruption. Based on his brief observations of NISSHO MARU and his evaluation of the physical jolt experienced aboard GEORGE WASHINGTON, the Commanding Officer concluded that NISSHO MARU had not been seriously damaged. He was aware of his obligations under international law and U.S. Navy regulations to render assistance to ships and persons in distress, but was not aware that the crew of NISSHO MARU was in peril. Based on his evaluation, he withdrew the GEORGE WASHINGTON to a holding area approximately eight miles to the north and transmitted his initial report of the collision to higher authority. The initial report was made approximately one hour and twenty seven minutes after the collision. Shortly thereafter, to confirm his belief that NISSHO MARU had not been seriously damaged, the Commanding Officer of the GEORGE WASHINGTON asked the P3C to search the area looking for ships in distress. Searching 100 percent of the local area, three ships were sighted and inspected by the P3C aircraft, but none of these was in distress. This further reinforced GEORGE WASHINGTON's erroneous understanding of the situation.

Over the critical period of time, just prior to and after the collision, the crew of the P3C aircraft that was engaged in the exercise with GEORGE WASHINGTON was unaware of the impending collision and the subsequent plight of NISSHO MARU's crew. Intent on tracking the submarine, buffeted by high winds and turbulent air,

and hampered by weather-induced poor visibility, the crew flew the aircraft largely by instruments and rarely looked outside of the plane. Even after returning at the request of the submarine to locate NISSHO MARU, the aircraft never saw the raft and survivors.

Although the surviving NISSHO MARU crew members thought they had conveyed their distress to the submarine and had been sighted by the aircraft, neither U.S. Navy unit was in fact aware of the situation aboard NISSHO MARU. As a result, regrettably, neither the GEORGE WASHINGTON nor the P3C initiated the rescue actions that most assuredly would have been pursued had either unit realized that NISSHO MARU was in distress.

Question Three. Why was notification made to Government of Japan so late?

Preliminary investigation indicates that there were excessive delays in reporting the collision within U.S. communications channels. The single most important element contributing to these delays was the fact that no one realized that the NISSHO MARU was seriously damaged or had sunk as a result of the collision until the survivors were picked up. The investigation reveals that the NISSHO MARU's SOS probably was never transmitted because, according to the crew, the ship's radio antenna apparently was touching the hull of the ship. It also reveals that the Commanding Officer of the GEORGE WASHINGTON, believing the collision had not caused serious damage to the NISSHO MARU, initially reported the incident to a limited number of commands. His first message indicated the NISSHO MARU had been seen leaving the scene of the collision with no problems noted. Although U.S. Naval authorities in Japan received a report of the collision shortly after noon on April 9, the facts as known at the time led them to believe that the surface ship involved in the collision had not been seriously damaged. The fact that the NISSHO MARU had sunk was not known. In fact it was not until 8:45 A.M. on April 10, when Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, received a call from Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) liaison asking for information about the reported sinking of a Japanese ship by a submarine, that the serious nature of the event became apparent. A similar report was received by the U.S. Navy Patrol Squadron Commander from his JMSDF counterparts about 25 minutes later. It was not until this point that other U.S. authorities first realized that the collision had resulted in the sinking of the NISSHO MARU. The American Embassy in Tokyo was notified by phone through the Naval Attache of these developments and, in turn, notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shortly before noon on April 10.

Question Four. What sort of compensation arrangements can be expected?

A commission of United States officials has been appointed and is awaiting submission of the claims of the individual crew members. A claim for damages arising from the loss of the ship and

the portions of its cargo owned by Japanese interests was received by United States officials on May 1 in the approximate amount of yen 570 million (\$2.7 million). Further discussions with the claimant's attorneys are scheduled on May 7. The United States will continue to take vigorous action to ensure that fair and full compensation for all damages arising out of the collision will be expeditiously paid.

The United States emphasizes that the foregoing answers are based on the investigating officer's preliminary report of investigation. They are subject to change and modification as additional information is received and analysis conducted. Pending recommendations and possible action following receipt of the Seventh Fleet Commander's formal report, the Commanding Officer and the Officer of the Deck at the time of the collision have been transferred from the command.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DICK -

I have seen & read
this. SECDEF has cleared
it for delivery to SUZUKI
in NYC.

REC -

That you approve the
sending of this report,
which SUZUKI expects



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CLEARED BY
SEC DEF.
BEING HAND-CARRIED
TO WHITE HOUSE
FOR CLEARANCE.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Collision Between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and Japanese Merchant Vessel NISSHO MARU

(U) In order to support your commitment to Prime Minister Suzuki to provide an explanation of the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and the Japanese vessel NISSHO MARU prior to his visit to Washington, the report at Tab A has been prepared.

(U) This report will be delivered to the Prime Minister in New York on May 5, via Ambassador Okawara. A copy of the forwarding memorandum is at Tab B.

(S) For your information the following is the expected chronology of the case: The Investigating Officer will follow his preliminary report to the Commander of the SEVENTH Fleet with a formal, written report in about ten days. The Fleet Commander will then decide on what actions, punitive or administrative, might or might not be appropriate. If a type of reprimand or court martial is directed, there would of course be review procedures at a minimum, and there could be appeal actions. Thus the case might not be finally settled for a matter of months. Nevertheless, I think the report provided will at least remove much of the mystery from the case and hopefully ease the unwarranted media attention the incident has been receiving in Japan.

(U) Without trying to minimize the seriousness of the incident in Japanese perceptions, the U.S.-Japan relationship is certainly of more import, and of a totally different character, than this regrettable accident.

note - This is for your info - It has

not been cleared as yet -

Paul

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#130

BY hdt MARA DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

THE COLLISION BETWEEN USS GEORGE WASHINGTON
AND NISSHO MARU

Pursuant to the promise by the Government of the United States to deliver preliminary results from the investigation of the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and NISSHO MARU, the following report responds to the questions of the Government of Japan.

Question One. How did the collision occur?

At 9:00 A.M. Tokyo time on April 9, 1981, the United States ballistic missile submarine GEORGE WASHINGTON was in international waters conducting a submerged transit south of Japan enroute to a scheduled port visit in the Republic of Korea. The submarine was not in primary alert status as a part of U.S. strategic deterrent forces. It had, however, made itself available for an anti-submarine warfare exercise -- a normal procedure designed to help maintain a high state of proficiency among the U.S. Navy patrol plane squadrons on duty in Japan. As is normally done under such circumstances, the submarine's general location was made known to the Patrol Squadron. A P3C Orion was launched for training purposes to detect the submarine and fix its position accurately enough, if possible, to pursue a simulated attack. Knowing that it might be the object of such an exercise, the submarine continued its transit, trying to remain undetected.

In the area of the GEORGE WASHINGTON on the morning of April 9, the weather was low overcast and rain with visibility varying from good to very poor. The P3C, which normally operates at higher altitudes, was forced by the cloud cover to fly at low altitudes (between 500 and 1000 feet) for the exercise.

At 10:26 A.M., GEORGE WASHINGTON came to periscope depth to verify its position. GEORGE WASHINGTON's sonar, which was functioning properly, had not obtained information to alert the ship that she was approaching a collision situation with a surface ship. At this point the submarine raised its periscope. Visual conditions were poor with weather and high swells streaking and blurring vision through the periscope. Although two 360 degree sweeps with the periscope were made, the submarine did not see NISSHO MARU. The periscope was then lowered.

GEORGE WASHINGTON did not know that the P3C had detected and localized the submarine's position and at that very moment was in the process of simulating an attack, passing immediately overhead. Coming up to a somewhat shallower depth, the Officer of the Deck raised the periscope and immediately saw the P3C. He quickly lowered the periscope, trying to hide from the aircraft. At this

make - FYI. This has ~~not~~ been
cleared as yet
Rif

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Question Two. What sort of rescue efforts were made?

Immediately after the collision, the Commanding Officer of GEORGE WASHINGTON was motivated by several considerations. He was concerned about the safety of the vessel he had struck, he was concerned about the safety of his own ship, and he was concerned about concealment of his ship as a strategic missile submarine. The submarine came to the surface just after the collision, but the Commanding Officer returned it to periscope depth immediately after receiving internal reports that there was no significant damage to GEORGE WASHINGTON. He did so because, under the existing adverse weather conditions, his vessel was safer when submerged. He observed the NISSHO MARU through his periscope while on the surface and while submerging. In the 3 to 5 minutes before NISSHO MARU went out of sight in the deteriorating visibility at a distance of about 1250 yards, he did not note any signs that the ship was in distress. He even observed a man standing stationary on the starboard wing of the bridge, looking toward the submarine. He saw no signs of panic or disruption. Based on his brief observations of NISSHO MARU and his evaluation of the physical jolt experienced aboard GEORGE WASHINGTON, the Commanding Officer concluded that NISSHO MARU had not been seriously damaged. He was aware of his obligations under international law and U.S. Navy regulations to render assistance to ships and persons in distress, but was not aware that the crew of NISSHO MARU was in peril. Based on his evaluation, he withdrew the GEORGE WASHINGTON to a holding area approximately eight miles to the north and transmitted his initial report of the collision to higher authority. The initial report was made approximately one hour and twenty seven minutes after the collision. Shortly thereafter, to confirm his belief that NISSHO MARU had not been seriously damaged, the Commanding Officer of the GEORGE WASHINGTON asked the P3C to search the area looking for ships in distress. Searching 100 percent of the local area, three ships were sighted and inspected by the P3C aircraft, but none of these was in distress. This further reinforced GEORGE WASHINGTON's erroneous understanding of the situation.

Over the critical period of time, just prior to and after the collision, the crew of the P3C aircraft that was engaged in the exercise with GEORGE WASHINGTON was unaware of the impending collision and the subsequent plight of NISSHO MARU's crew. Intent on tracking the submarine, buffeted by high winds and turbulent air,

and hampered by weather-induced poor visibility, the crew flew the aircraft largely by instruments and rarely looked outside of the plane. Even after returning at the request of the submarine to locate NISSHO MARU, the aircraft never saw the raft and survivors.

Although the surviving NISSHO MARU crew members thought they had conveyed their distress to the submarine and had been sighted by the aircraft, neither U.S. Navy unit was in fact aware of the situation aboard NISSHO MARU. As a result, regrettably, neither the GEORGE WASHINGTON nor the P3C initiated the rescue actions that most assuredly would have been pursued had either unit realized that NISSHO MARU was in distress.

Question Three. Why was notification made to Government of Japan so late?

Preliminary investigation indicates that there were excessive delays in reporting the collision within U.S. communications channels. The single most important element contributing to these delays was the fact that no one realized that the NISSHO MARU was seriously damaged or had sunk as a result of the collision until the survivors were picked up. The investigation reveals that the NISSHO MARU's SOS probably was never transmitted because, according to the crew, the ship's radio antenna apparently was touching the hull of the ship. It also reveals that the Commanding Officer of the GEORGE WASHINGTON, believing the collision had not caused serious damage to the NISSHO MARU, initially reported the incident to a limited number of commands. His first message indicated the NISSHO MARU had been seen leaving the scene of the collision with no problems noted. Although U.S. Naval authorities in Japan received a report of the collision shortly after noon on April 9, the facts as known at the time led them to believe that the surface ship involved in the collision had not been seriously damaged. The fact that the NISSHO MARU had sunk was not known. In fact it was not until 8:45 A.M. on April 10, when Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, received a call from Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) liaison asking for information about the reported sinking of a Japanese ship by a submarine, that the serious nature of the event became apparent. A similar report was received by the U.S. Navy Patrol Squadron Commander from his JMSDF counterparts about 25 minutes later. It was not until this point that other U.S. authorities first realized that the collision had resulted in the sinking of the NISSHO MARU. The American Embassy in Tokyo was notified by phone through the Naval Attache of these developments and, in turn, notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shortly before noon on April 10.

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The United States emphasizes that the foregoing answers are based on the investigating officer's preliminary report of investigation. They are subject to change and modification as additional information is received and analysis conducted. Pending recommendations and possible action following receipt of the Seventh Fleet Commander's formal report, the Commanding Officer and the Officer of the Deck at the time of the collision have been transferred from the command.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

His Excellency Zenko Suzuki
Prime Minister of Japan

The attached preliminary findings are provided for use as
you see fit and support the commitment of President Reagan
to provide a report on the collision between USS GEORGE
WASHINGTON and NISSHO MARU prior to your visit to Washington.

Sincerely,

5/4/81

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JAY -

Attached is a
proposed forwarding memo
from SecDef to Suzuki.

Dick has not seen
it, as it was developed
at the action officer level.

If you don't like it,
throw it away.

Bob

The attached preliminary findings are provided for in support of the commitment of President Reagan to provide a report on the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and NISSHO MARU prior to your visit to Washington.

You should be aware that to convey preliminary information of this type to a foreign government is an unprecedented step. The procedures for investigating incidents at sea involving US naval forces incorporate the principles both of the uniform code of military justice, which has the force of national law, embodies the due process rights of the Constitution of the United States and International Admiralty Law.

In such cases the investigation and subsequent legal proceedings take months and interim results are never published in order not to influence the final results and not to make public preliminary conclusions which may be wrong.

However, in view of the importance of this incident, to US-Japanese relations, I am making this summary of preliminary results available to you. My aim is to reassure you that the tragic events of April 9th did not include a willful attempt by the United States to deceive and withhold information from the government and people of the United States.

I would strongly discourage speculation on personal responsibility for the events of April 9 - 10 based on the enclosed preliminary report. The responsibility will be determined in the course of the investigation and appropriate disciplinary action taken in accordance with judicial and nonjudicial procedures. The most important task before officials of the two countries is to draw the necessary lessons from the unfortunate incident to prevent a reoccurrence and to strengthen the fundamental mutual interests of our two countries.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 5, 1981

TO: KAY ZERWICK

FROM: CAROL CLEVELAND

Per our conversation, attached is the unclassified DOD report on the submarine incident.

I have given a copy to Mort Allen.

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Although the surviving NISSHO MARU crew members thought they had conveyed their distress to the submarine and had been sighted by the aircraft, neither U.S. Navy unit was in fact aware of the situation aboard NISSHO MARU. As a result, regrettably, neither the GEORGE WASHINGTON nor the P3C initiated the rescue actions that most assuredly would have been pursued had either unit realized that NISSHO MARU was in distress.

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Preliminary investigation indicates that there were excessive delays in reporting the collision within U.S. communications channels. The single most important element contributing to these delays was the fact that no one realized that the NISSHO MARU was seriously damaged or had sunk as a result of the collision until the survivors were picked up. The investigation reveals that the NISSHO MARU's SOS probably was never transmitted because, according to the crew, the ship's radio antenna apparently was touching the hull of the ship. It also reveals that the Commanding Officer of the GEORGE WASHINGTON, believing the collision had not caused serious damage to the NISSHO MARU, initially reported the incident to a limited number of commands. His first message indicated the NISSHO MARU had been seen leaving the scene of the collision with no problems noted. Although U.S. Naval authorities in Japan received a report of the collision shortly after noon on April 9, the facts as known at the time led them to believe that the surface ship involved in the collision had not been seriously damaged. The fact that the NISSHO MARU had sunk was not known. In fact it was not until 8:45 A.M. on April 10, when Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, received a call from Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) liaison asking for information about the reported sinking of a Japanese ship by a submarine, that the serious nature of the event became apparent. A similar report was received by the U.S. Navy Patrol Squadron Commander from his JMSDF counterparts about 25 minutes later. It was not until this point that other U.S. authorities first realized that the collision had resulted in the sinking of the NISSHO MARU. The American Embassy in Tokyo was notified by phone through the Naval Attache of these developments and, in turn, notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shortly before noon on April 10.

Question Four. What sort of compensation arrangements can be expected?

A commission of United States officials has been appointed and is awaiting submission of the claims of the individual crew members. A claim for damages arising from the loss of the ship and

the portions of its cargo owned by Japanese interests was received by United States officials on May 1 in the approximate amount of yen 570 million (\$4.7 million). Further discussions with the claimant's attorneys are scheduled on May 7. The United States will continue to take vigorous action to ensure that fair and full compensation for all damages arising out of the collision will be expeditiously paid.

The United States emphasizes that the foregoing answers are based on the investigating officer's preliminary report of investigation. They are subject to change and modification as additional information is received and analysis conducted. Pending recommendations and possible action following receipt of the Seventh Fleet Commander's formal report, the Commanding Officer and the Officer of the Deck at the time of the collision have been transferred from the command.

REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION

5 MAY 1981 14 35 DATE AND TIME TRANSMITTED	SITE <div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold; text-align: center;">D</div> 981 SSN NBR	RECEIVED MAY 5 P 2: 38 SITUATION ROOM DATE AND TIME RECEIVED
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TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER

FROM COL DUCHIN OFFICE/DESK OASD/PA/DDI PHONE NBR 75131
 SUBJECT Report of Submarine Collision
 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED PAGES 4

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

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HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS
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NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER HOUR DELIVERY.

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUALS NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
WII	ADM Nance	NSC	West Wing	456-2255

REMARKS:

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RR.

81 MAY 7 P2 36

2363

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

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~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

The President has seen per
Rd House



4 MAY 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Collision Between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and
Japanese Merchant Vessel NISSHO MARU

(U) In order to support your commitment to Prime Minister Suzuki to provide an explanation of the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and the Japanese vessel NISSHO MARU prior to his visit to Washington, the report at Tab A has been prepared.

(U) This report will be delivered to the Prime Minister in New York on May 5, via Ambassador Okawara. A copy of the forwarding memorandum is at Tab B.

(S) For your information the following is the expected chronology of the case: The Investigating Officer will follow his preliminary report to the Commander of the SEVENTH Fleet with a formal, written report in about ten days. The Fleet Commander will then decide on what actions, punitive or administrative, might or might not be appropriate. If a type of reprimand or court martial is directed, there would of course be review procedures at a minimum, and there could be appeal actions. Thus the case might not be finally settled for a matter of months. Nevertheless, I think the report provided will at least remove much of the mystery from the case and hopefully ease the unwarranted media attention the incident has been receiving in Japan.

(U) You will note that the forwarding letter to Suzuki has been prepared for my signature in order not to involve you in these preliminary findings. Should you nevertheless wish to forward the report, I have also attached a letter for your signature.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1#131
BY KOT DATE 7/24/06

Attachments

Classified by Sec Def
Declassify on 3 MAY 1987

~~SECRET~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. X 14133

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

His Excellency Zenko Suzuki
Prime Minister of Japan

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I trust that the attached preliminary findings fulfill my commitment to provide you with a report on the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and NISSHO MARU prior to your visit to Washington.

Let me take this opportunity again to express my deep regret over this tragic accident. I believe that the information compiled by the U.S. Navy will be responsive to your concerns.

I look forward to our meeting here in Washington and the opportunity to discuss our mutual interests.

Sincerely,

*Delivered
by Andrew
Hawthorne*

A

THE COLLISION BETWEEN USS GEORGE WASHINGTON
AND NISSHO MARU

Pursuant to the promise by the Government of the United States to deliver preliminary results from the investigation of the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and NISSHO MARU, the following report responds to the questions of the Government of Japan.

Question One. How did the collision occur?

At 9:00 A.M. Tokyo time on April 9, 1981, the United States ballistic missile submarine GEORGE WASHINGTON was in international waters conducting a submerged transit south of Japan enroute to a scheduled port visit in the Republic of Korea. The submarine was not in primary alert status as a part of U.S. strategic deterrent forces. It had, however, made itself available for an anti-submarine warfare exercise -- a normal procedure designed to help maintain a high state of proficiency among the U.S. Navy patrol plane squadrons on duty in Japan. As is normally done under such circumstances, the submarine's general location was made known to the Patrol Squadron. A P3C Orion was launched for training purposes to detect the submarine and fix its position accurately enough, if possible, to pursue a simulated attack. Knowing that it might be the object of such an exercise, the submarine continued its transit, trying to remain undetected.

In the area of the GEORGE WASHINGTON on the morning of April 9, the weather was low overcast and rain with visibility varying from good to very poor. The P3C, which normally operates at higher altitudes, was forced by the cloud cover to fly at low altitudes (between 500 and 1000 feet) for the exercise.

At 10:26 A.M., GEORGE WASHINGTON came to periscope depth to verify its position. GEORGE WASHINGTON's sonar, which was functioning properly, had not obtained information to alert the ship that she was approaching a collision situation with a surface ship. At this point the submarine raised its periscope. Visual conditions were poor with weather and high swells streaking and blurring vision through the periscope. Although two 360 degree sweeps with the periscope were made, the submarine did not see NISSHO MARU. The periscope was then lowered.

GEORGE WASHINGTON did not know that the P3C had detected and localized the submarine's position and at that very moment was in the process of simulating an attack, passing immediately overhead. Coming up to a somewhat shallower depth, the Officer of the Deck raised the periscope and immediately saw the P3C. He quickly lowered the periscope, trying to hide from the aircraft. At this

point sonar information was gained by the GEORGE WASHINGTON on NISSHO MARU. This information was passed to the ship's conning station, but was not heard or acknowledged by the Officer of the Deck. At this stage in the investigation it is not clear that the collision could have been avoided had the sonar information been acted upon promptly. The collision occurred at 10:32 A.M. at latitude 31 degrees-23 minutes North and longitude 129 degrees-05 minutes East in international waters.

Question Two. What sort of rescue efforts were made?

Immediately after the collision, the Commanding Officer of GEORGE WASHINGTON was motivated by several considerations. He was concerned about the safety of the vessel he had struck, he was concerned about the safety of his own ship, and he was concerned about concealment of his ship as a strategic missile submarine. The submarine came to the surface just after the collision, but the Commanding Officer returned it to periscope depth immediately after receiving internal reports that there was no significant damage to GEORGE WASHINGTON. He did so because, under the existing adverse weather conditions, his vessel was safer when submerged. He observed the NISSHO MARU through his periscope while on the surface and while submerging. In the 3 to 5 minutes before NISSHO MARU went out of sight in the deteriorating visibility at a distance of about 1250 yards, he did not note any signs that the ship was in distress. He even observed a man standing stationary on the starboard wing of the bridge, looking toward the submarine. He saw no signs of panic or disruption. Based on his brief observations of NISSHO MARU and his evaluation of the physical jolt experienced aboard GEORGE WASHINGTON, the Commanding Officer concluded that NISSHO MARU had not been seriously damaged. He was aware of his obligations under international law and U.S. Navy regulations to render assistance to ships and persons in distress, but was not aware that the crew of NISSHO MARU was in peril. Based on his evaluation, he withdrew the GEORGE WASHINGTON to a holding area approximately eight miles to the north and transmitted his initial report of the collision to higher authority. The initial report was made approximately one hour and twenty seven minutes after the collision. Shortly thereafter, to confirm his belief that NISSHO MARU had not been seriously damaged, the Commanding Officer of the GEORGE WASHINGTON asked the P3C to search the area looking for ships in distress. Searching 100 percent of the local area, three ships were sighted and inspected by the P3C aircraft, but none of these was in distress. This further reinforced GEORGE WASHINGTON's erroneous understanding of the situation.

Over the critical period of time, just prior to and after the collision, the crew of the P3C aircraft that was engaged in the exercise with GEORGE WASHINGTON was unaware of the impending collision and the subsequent plight of NISSHO MARU's crew. Intent on tracking the submarine, buffeted by high winds and turbulent air,

and hampered by weather-induced poor visibility, the crew flew the aircraft largely by instruments and rarely looked outside of the plane. Even after returning at the request of the submarine to locate NISSHO MARU, the aircraft never saw the raft and survivors.

Although the surviving NISSHO MARU crew members thought they had conveyed their distress to the submarine and had been sighted by the aircraft, neither U.S. Navy unit was in fact aware of the situation aboard NISSHO MARU. As a result, regrettably, neither the GEORGE WASHINGTON nor the P3C initiated the rescue actions that most assuredly would have been pursued had either unit realized that NISSHO MARU was in distress.

Question Three. Why was notification made to Government of Japan so late?

Preliminary investigation indicates that there were excessive delays in reporting the collision within U.S. communications channels. The single most important element contributing to these delays was the fact that no one realized that the NISSHO MARU was seriously damaged or had sunk as a result of the collision until the survivors were picked up. The investigation reveals that the NISSHO MARU's SOS probably was never transmitted because, according to the crew, the ship's radio antenna apparently was touching the hull of the ship. It also reveals that the Commanding Officer of the GEORGE WASHINGTON, believing the collision had not caused serious damage to the NISSHO MARU, initially reported the incident to a limited number of commands. His first message indicated the NISSHO MARU had been seen leaving the scene of the collision with no problems noted. Although U.S. Naval authorities in Japan received a report of the collision shortly after noon on April 9, the facts as known at the time led them to believe that the surface ship involved in the collision had not been seriously damaged. The fact that the NISSHO MARU had sunk was not known. In fact it was not until 8:45 A.M. on April 10, when Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, received a call from Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) liaison asking for information about the reported sinking of a Japanese ship by a submarine, that the serious nature of the event became apparent. A similar report was received by the U.S. Navy Patrol Squadron Commander from his JMSDF counterparts about 25 minutes later. It was not until this point that other U.S. authorities first realized that the collision had resulted in the sinking of the NISSHO MARU. The American Embassy in Tokyo was notified by phone through the Naval Attache of these developments and, in turn, notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shortly before noon on April 10.

Question Four. What sort of compensation arrangements can be expected?

A commission of United States officials has been appointed and is awaiting submission of the claims of the individual crew members. A claim for damages arising from the loss of the ship and

the portions of its cargo owned by Japanese interests was received by United States officials on May 1 in the approximate amount of yen 570 million (\$2.7 million). Further discussions with the claimant's attorneys are scheduled on May 7. The United States will continue to take vigorous action to ensure that fair and full compensation for all damages arising out of the collision will be expeditiously paid.

The United States emphasizes that the foregoing answers are based on the investigating officer's preliminary report of investigation. They are subject to change and modification as additional information is received and analysis conducted. Pending recommendations and possible action following receipt of the Seventh Fleet Commander's formal report, the Commanding Officer and the Officer of the Deck at the time of the collision have been transferred from the command.

B



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 May 1981

His Excellency Zenko Suzuki
Prime Minister of Japan

The attached preliminary findings respond to the commitment of President Reagan to provide a report on the collision between USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and NISSHO MARU prior to your visit to Washington.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Ronald W. Reagan".

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB: GREGG, RENT, STEARMAN
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHC #8859/01 1272251
R 072220Z MAY 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5531

INFO USMISSION USNATO 1673
WHITE HOUSE 6471
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 118859
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 5/6/2011

TAGS: NATO, PL

SUBJECT: JAPANESE RESPONSE TO BRIEFING ON NATO POLISH
CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. JAPANESE PROVIDED U.S., GERMANS, AND CANADIANS WITH A
RESPONSE TO EARLIER TRIO BRIEFING ON NATO MEASURES
(REPORTED SEPTEL).

2. FOLLOWING THE TRIO BRIEFING, THE JAPANESE MET
SEPARATELY WITH EB DAS JOHNSTON TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF
SEVERAL POINTS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE FUTURE RESPONSES.
JAPANESE QUESTIONS AND THE DEPARTMENT'S ANSWERS FOLLOW:

A) Q. THE NATO PAPER REFERS TO DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE
SPECIFIC POSITION OF CERTAIN ALLIES. WHAT CONCRETE IDEAS
DID THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE IN MIND?

SECSTATE WASHDC 8859

DTG: 072220Z MAY 81 PSN: 054342
TOR: 127/2251Z

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/1-132
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL IT WAS NOTED AS AN EXAMPLE THAT ICELAND GOT 70 PERCENT OF ITS OIL FROM THE USSR.

B) Q. THE NATO PAPER REFERS TO DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT AND TO PARALLEL STEPS TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION. WAS THE INTENDED DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN AN INVASION AND THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING?

A. YES.

Q. WHAT KIND OF PARALLEL STEPS ARE ENVISAGED?

A. PRECAUTIONARY STEPS LIKE THOSE WHICH THE U.S. TOOK DURING 1980 TO REDUCE (A) HIGH TECHNOLOGY APPROVED TO EASTERN EUROPE BUT CAUGHT BY THE NO-EXCEPTIONS POLICY ON EXPORTS TO THE USSR AND (B) GRAIN SHIPMENTS TO EASTERN EUROPE. THESE STEPS INCLUDED FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT DIVERSION WOULD RISK CONTINUATION OF THEIR FAVORED STATUS UNDER OUR CONTROLS.

Q. WOULD PARALLEL STEPS BE TAKEN WITH NON-NATO COUNTRIES?

A. WE ARE NOT NOW EXTENDING DISCUSSIONS ON POLISH CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO OTHER COUNTRIES EXCEPT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

C) Q. WHY DID THE NATO PAPER REFER TO SPECIAL EC CONSIDERATIONS? EXPERIENCE WITH IRANIAN SANCTIONS INDICATES THAT SEVERAL WEEKS WAS REQUIRED BETWEEN ACTION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION. IS SOME KIND OF TIME LAPSE EXPECTED?

A. IRAN IS NOT AN EXACT PARALLEL. NATO ALLIES WHO ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE EC STRESS THAT THE LATTER ORGANIZATION HAS SOME CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY IN THE TRADE FIELD. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE A DELAY.

D) Q. THE NATO PAPER REFERS TO DIFFERING MEASURES WHICH COUNTRIES MIGHT TAKE TO EMBARGO NEW CONTRACTS ON EXPORTS. DOES THIS MEAN THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAME MEASURES WOULD REQUIRE DIFFERENT ACTIONS BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT LEGAL PROCEDURES OR THAT COUNTRIES WOULD IMPLEMENT

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DATE 05/16/81

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PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DIFFERENT MEASURES?

A. THE FORMER. FOR EXAMPLE. THE UK NEEDS ONE KIND OF LEGAL PROCEDURE; THE US NEEDS AN ORDER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

E) Q. JAPAN WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY INDUCING INDUSTRY NOT TO USE THE TRANS SIBERIAN RAILROAD. THE IDEA WILL BE CONSIDERED FURTHER. DO EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE EFFECTIVE MEANS TO DISSUADE USE OF THIS RAILROAD?

A. NO GOVERNMENT SAID IT HAD THE LEGAL POWER TO FORCE NON-USE OF A GIVEN MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION. THE U.S. WOULD NOT HAVE SUCH AUTHORITY UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT WERE INVOKED TO PERMIT PROHIBITING FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH USE OF THE RAILROAD. WE DO NOT NOW PLAN TO INVOKE IEPPA. THE NATO COUNTRIES ARE INTERESTED IN JAPANESE VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE. HOW MUCH JAPANESE TRAFFIC IS THERE?

Q. TRAFFIC DATA ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON. THE JAPANESE EMBASSY WILL ASK TOKYO. ARE THE NATO ALLIES READY TO INVESTIGATE THIS MATTER?

A. YES.

F) Q. ANY FISHERY ACTION WOULD PRESENT GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR CERTAIN JAPANESE SECTORS BECAUSE OF RECIPROCAL JAPANESE-SOVIET ARRANGEMENTS. IS THE DANISH DIFFICULTY SIMILAR, I.E. CONCERNING THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF SOVIET FISH FACTORY SHIPS NEAR THE FAEROE ISLANDS?

SECSTATE WASHDC 8859

DTG:072220Z MAY 81 PSN: 054342
TOR: 127/2251Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: Prime Minister Suzuki's Visit

*OK
PR*

Mike Mansfield has sent you the following report on reaction to Suzuki's visit. *(C)*

Begin text.

What I have heard since returning to Tokyo reinforces my impression that Prime Minister Suzuki's recent visit marked the most successful U.S.-Japan summit in many years. The Japanese were deeply impressed by the obvious importance which the administration attached to the talks with Suzuki. Such unprecedented gestures as the impressive ceremonies surrounding the visit, the lengthy private meeting with you, and the granting of the privileges of the Senate floor to Suzuki and his party have both added to Suzuki's stature at home and conveyed an image of full and equal U.S.-Japan partnership. The special attention given to the Japanese media reps such as the advance background briefing was a very helpful symbolic demonstration of the importance we attached to visit. The Japanese were also highly pleased with the forthcoming administration posture with regard to the submarine incident, appreciation of their auto export restraints, recognition of the need for even closer consultations in the future on issues resembling the grain embargo, and a green light on nuclear reprocessing.

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BY HOT NARA DATE 7/24/06

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-2-

I find the Japanese unanimous in interpreting the characterization of the U.S.-Japan relationship as an alliance as marking a very important turning point in our relations. Most, such as the government and the ruling party, wax enthusiastic, while a minority is negative about the change. This is as it should be in a functioning democracy. Not surprisingly, the leftist opposition and some elements of the media tend to dominate the headlines as they seek to portray alliance as implying a Japanese military role beyond its constitutionally-imposed defense-only concept. There are the usual charges that Suzuki may have aroused in us expectations that Japan will be unable to fulfill. However, in responding to this criticism, Suzuki and Foreign Minister Ito have so far carried the day by their forthright definition of U.S.-Japan relations as an alliance based on common values and interests in the world and on a will to defend them. They have made clear that while the U.S.-Japan alliance contains a military element in the form of our mutual security treaty, it extends far beyond purely military considerations. In my view, this is the perfect keynote for our relationship. It provides a framework within which we can steadily expand our cooperation not only on defense but across the range of issues before us. Mansfield

End text.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE 05/16/81

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PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #8576 1320900
O 120900Z MAY 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9142

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 08576
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND NSC ADVISOR
RICHARD ALLEN
EO 12065: RDS-1 5/12/01 (MANSFIELD, M.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (SUZUKI, ZENKO), JA, US
SUBJECT: (U) THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHAT I HAVE HEARD SINCE RETURNING TO TOKYO REINFORCES MY IMPRESSION THAT PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S RECENT VISIT MARKED THE MOST SUCCESSFUL US-JAPAN SUMMIT IN MANY YEARS. THE JAPANESE WERE DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY THE OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION ATTACHED TO THE TALKS WITH SUZUKI. SUCH UNPRECEDENTED GESTURES AS THE IMPRESSIVE CEREMONIES SURROUNDING THE VISIT, THE LENGTHY PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND THE GRANTING OF THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SENATE FLOOR TO SUZUKI AND HIS PARTY HAVE BOTH ADDED TO SUZUKI'S STATURE AT HOME AND CONVEYED AN IMAGE OF FULL AND EQUAL US-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP. THE SPECIAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE JAPANESE MEDIA REPS SUCH AS THE ADVANCE BACKGROUND BRIEFING WAS A VERY HELPFUL SYMBOLIC DEMONSTRATION OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO VISIT. THE JAPANESE WERE ALSO HIGHLY PLEASED WITH THE FORTHCOMING ADMINISTRATION POSTURE WITH REGARD TO THE SUBMARINE INCIDENT, APPRECIATION OF THEIR AUTO EXPORT

TOKYO 8576

DTG: 120900Z MAY 81 PSN: 002357
TOR: 132/0903Z

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NLS FPO-037/1 #134
BY LOJ NARA DATE 7/24/06

DATE 05/16/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESTRAINTS, RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR EVEN CLOSER CONSULTATIONS IN THE FUTURE ON ISSUES RESEMBLING THE GRAIN EMBARGO, AND A GREEN LIGHT ON NUCLEAR REPROCESSING.

3. I FIND THE JAPANESE UNANIMOUS IN INTERPRETING THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP AS AN ALLIANCE AS MARKING A VERY IMPORTANT TURNING POINT IN OUR RELATIONS. MOST, SUCH AS THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RULING PARTY, WAX ENTHUSIASTIC, WHILE A MINORITY IS NEGATIVE ABOUT THE CHANGE. THIS IS AS IT SHOULD BE IN A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE LEFTIST OPPOSITION AND SOME ELEMENTS OF THE MEDIA TEND TO DOMINATE THE HEADLINES AS THEY SEEK TO PORTRAY ALLIANCE AS IMPLYING A JAPANESE MILITARY ROLE BEYOND ITS CONSTITUTIONALLY-IMPOSED DEFENSE-ONLY CONCEPT. THERE ARE THE USUAL CHARGES THAT SUZUKI MAY HAVE AROUSED IN US EXPECTATIONS THAT JAPAN WILL BE UNABLE TO FULFILL. HOWEVER, IN RESPONDING TO THIS CRITICISM, SUZUKI AND FOREIGN MINISTER ITO HAVE SO FAR CARRIED THE DAY BY THEIR FORTHRIGHT DEFINITION OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS AS AN ALLIANCE BASED ON COMMON VALUES AND INTERESTS IN THE WORLD AND ON A WILL TO DEFEND THEM. THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE CONTAINS A MILITARY ELEMENT IN THE FORM OF OUR MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY, IT EXTENDS FAR BEYOND PURELY MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. IN MY VIEW, THIS IS THE PERFECT KEYNOTE FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP. IT PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE CAN STEADILY EXPAND OUR COOPERATION NOT ONLY ON DEFENSE BUT ACROSS THE RANGE OF ISSUES BEFORE US. MANSFIELD

TOKYO 0576

DTG:120900Z MAY 81 PSN: 002357
TOR: 132/0903Z

DATE 05/25/81

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PAGE 01

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHKO #8560 132082Z

O 120821Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9135

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 08560

NODIS

EO 12065: RDS-1 5/12/01 (SHERMAN, W.C.) DR-M

TAGS: NATO, PL

SUBJECT: (S) BRIEFING ON NATO POLISH CONTINGENCY PLANNING

REF: STATE 118859

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE NOTE IN REFTEL THAT NO MENTION WAS MADE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH SPAIN IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON POLAND. SINCE WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED JAPANESE HERE THAT SPAIN AS WELL AS AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WERE BEING BRIEFED ON NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WE ASSUME THIS WAS AN UNINTENTIONAL OVERSIGHT. MANSFIELD

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BY

~~hdt~~

NARA, DATE

7/24/06

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