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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
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File Folder: Japan (4/18/81 – 4/27/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	180110Z APR 81, 11p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #101</i>	4/18/81	B1
2. Cable	180542Z APR 81, 5p <i>R " " #102</i>	4/18/81	B1
3. Cable	200942Z APR 81, 4p <i>R " " #103</i>	4/20/81	B1
4. Cable	221650Z APR 81, 3p <i>R " " #104</i>	4/22/81	B1
5. Memo	Caspar Weinberger to the President re Japanese Defense Effort, 1p <i>R " " #105</i>	4/20/81	B1
6. Talking Points	For Meeting with PM Susuki, 1p <i>R " " #106</i>	Nd	B1
7. Memo	Rutherford Poats to Richard Allen re Japanese Automobiles, 1p <i>R " " #107</i>	4/23/81	B1
8. Cable	230814Z APR 81, 2p <i>R " " #108</i>	4/23/81	B1
9. Cable	230817Z APR 81, 2p <i>R " " #109</i>	4/23/81	B1
10. Memo	Donald Gregg to Allen re Cable, 1p <i>R " " #110</i>	4/24/81	B1
11. Cable	6p <i>D " " #111</i>	4/24/81	B1 , <i>B3</i>
12. Cable	240853Z APR 81, 1p <i>R " " #112</i>	4/24/81	B1
13. Cable	250229Z APR 81, 3p <i>R " " #113</i>	4/25/81	B1
14. Cable	270805Z APR 81, 5p <i>R " " #114</i>	4/27/81	B1
15. Memo	Allen to the President re Japanese, 1p <i>R " " #115</i>	4/27/81	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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MESSAGE:

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O 100110Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0300

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 07004
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 120651 XDS 1,3 04/17/2001 (SHERMAN, W) DR-M
TAGS: MPOL, MARR, JA, US
SUBJECT: CINCPAC MEETING WITH PM, FOREIGN MINISTER

1. SUMMARY: CINCPAC MET APRIL 16 WITH PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI FOR 45 MINUTES AND FOR 1 1/2 HOURS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ITO. DISCUSSIONS OF SUBMARINE COLLISION INCIDENT FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN BOTH MEETINGS. PM SUZUKI UNDERLINED NEED TO CLARIFY DOUBTS ABOUT INCIDENT AND STRESSED JAPAN'S FIRM MAINTENANCE OF THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. CINCPAC RESPONDED THAT INVESTIGATION WAS UNDERWAY AND OUTLINED STEPS U.S. WAS TAKING TO DEAL WITH ISSUE. PM SAID IT WAS HIS CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT SECURITY WOULD BE MAJOR TOPIC OF HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO IT. FONMIN ITO EXPLAINED DIFFICULT

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GOJ POSITION IN DIET, JAPANESE PENCHANT FOR EARLY ADMIS-
SION OF ERROR AND APOLOGY AND URGED PROMPT RELEASE OF
ANSWERS TO OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS: CAUSE OF ACCIDENT,
ADEQUACY OF RESCUE EFFORTS AND NOTIFICATION DELAY. NOTING
THAT RECEIPT OF INFORMATION WOULD TAKE MORE THAN MONTH,
HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT WHAT PM COULD SAY TO PRESIDENT
AND DISCLOSED THAT HE WOULD ASK AMBASSADOR FOR INTERIM
REPORT. CINCPAC AGAIN EXPLAINED U.S. ACTIONS UNDERWAY
BUT STRESSED LEGAL DANGER THAT PREMATURE RESPONSES WOULD
POSE TO USG AND TO INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN INCIDENT.
CINCPAC BRIEFED FONMIN ON WESTERN PACIFIC SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING SOVIET AND NORTH KOREAN THREATS.
END SUMMARY.
PRIME MINISTER

2. PM SUZUKI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO CINCPAC FOR HIS
EFFORTS IN MAINTAINING ASIAN PEACE AND SECURITY; CITED
VALUE OF US - JAPAN RELATIONSHIP AND HIS DETERMINATION
TO STRENGTHEN THIS; TERMED MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY BASIS
FOR JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS AND PLEDGED TO INCREASE
THESE EFFORTS. PM HAD LOOKED FORWARD TO SPEAKING AT
GREATER LENGTH WITH CINCPAC ON SECURITY MATTERS, BUT,
UNFORTUNATELY, SUBMARINE COLLISION INCIDENT HAD FORCED
CHANGE IN ORIGINAL PLANS.

3. CINCPAC AGREED THAT MST WAS CORNERSTONE OF U.S.
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN ASIA AND EXPRESSED
REGRETS OVER TRAGIC SUBMARINE INCIDENT.

4. ON SUBMARINE INCIDENT, CINCPAC RECOGNIZED TREMENDOUS
POLITICAL PRESSURE WHICH COLLISION INCIDENT HAD ENGENDER-
ED AND WAS AWARE THAT GOJ NEEDED ASAP ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
SUCH AS WHY SUBMARINE DID CERTAIN THINGS AT TIME OF
COLLISION. UNFORTUNATELY, HE CONTINUED, ANSWERS TO THESE
QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE TO WAIT IN ORDER NOT TO PREJUDICE
INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT NOW UNDERWAY. ADMIRAL LONG
SAID HE COULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS AT THIS TIME:
(A) FORMAL INVESTIGATION ORDERED BY COMSEVENTHFLT WAS
NOW UNDERWAY AND OFFICER IN CHARGE IS EXPERIENCED
AND HIGHLY RESPECTED.
(B) U.S. INTENDED TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATION AS RAPIDLY
AS POSSIBLE WHILE INSURING OBJECTIVITY AND THOROUGHNESS.
OBJECTIVE WAS TO COMPLETE INVESTIGATION IN 30 DAYS TO
BE FOLLOWED BY COMMAND REVIEW. FINAL RESULTS WILL BE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FORWARDED TO GOJ.

(C) COMNAVFOR HAD CONVENED CLAIMS BOARD TO EXPEDITE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS OF CREW MEMBERS AND SURVIVORS. (D) CONDOLENCE PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN INITIATED BY COMNAVFOR IN CONJUNCTION WITH AMEMBASSY. COMNAVFOR HAD INSTITUTED PROCEDURE TO EXPEDITE CLAIMS CONCERNING SHIP AND CARGO.

5. ADMIRAL LONG SAID THAT REVIEW PROCESS ENTAILED SENDING A REPORT UPWARD FROM SEVENTH FLEET TO CINCPACFLT, CNO, AND, FINALLY, SECNAV. CINCPAC REITERATED THAT, AS THE SENIOR U.S. MILITARY COMMANDER, HE WISHED TO REPEAT HIS DEEPEST REGRET AND ASSURANCE TO PM THAT INVESTIGATION WILL PROCEED THOROUGHLY AND AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

6. PM THANKED CINCPAC, SAID HE SHARED REGRET AND APPRECIATED SINCERE STATEMENTS OF REGRET CONVEYED THUS FAR BY AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD. PM NOTED POINTS COVERED PREVIOUSLY BY FM ITO AND AMBASSADOR OKAWARE TO EFFECT THAT CAUSES OF INCIDENT, ADEQUACY OF SUBMARINE RESCUE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0309

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OPERATIONS AND NOTIFICATION DELAY MUST BE PURSUED. PM
NOTED THAT COLLISION TOOK PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS,
BUT THAT PROXIMITY TO JAPANESE TERRITORY CAUSED CONCERN
IN LIGHT OF JAPAN'S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. HE
OBSERVED THAT JAPAN FIRMLY MAINTAINS THESE PRINCIPLES, AND
APPRECIATED U.S. FORCES SINCERE EFFORTS IN ATTEMPTING
TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THIS UNFORTUNATE
INCIDENT. IN PARTICULAR, HE APPRECIATED HEARING DIRECTLY
FROM CINCPAC.

7. CINCPAC ASSURED PM THAT U.S. WAS SEEKING ANSWERS
TO THESE SAME QUESTIONS AS WELL AS HOW TO PREVENT FUTURE
INCIDENTS OF THIS NATURE AND HOW TO EXPEDITE CLAIMS
SETTLEMENTS. HE ASSURED PM THAT U.S. HAD IN PAST, AND
WILL CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE, TO RESPECT JAPAN'S POLICY
REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PM THANKED CINCPAC AND

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PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RECALLED JAPANESE PROVERB SAYING THAT "RAIN OFTEN BRINGS FORTH FIRMNESS TO THE GROUND", MEANING ADVERSITY SOMETIMES RESULTS IN EVEN FIRMER RELATIONSHIPS. CINCPAC REITERATED THAT U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IS AS STRONG AS IT HAS EVER BEEN. HE ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS LOOKING FORWARD TO PM'S VISIT AND THAT SECURITY ISSUE WOULD BE MAJOR TOPIC AT HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO SPEAK IN FRIENDLY, SINCERE, AND CANDID MANNER. PM SAID HE, TOO, WAS LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO HIS VISIT. MEETING WITH FONMIN

8. FONMIN ITO GREETED CINCPAC, NOTED THAT U.S. - JAPAN RELATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN BETTER AND EXPRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THEM THAT WAY. HE SAID MUTUAL TRUST WAS FOUNDATION OF THIS RELATIONSHIP. CINCPAC REPLIED THAT WE SHARED THIS OBJECTIVE AND THAT HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING HE COULD TO MAINTAIN OUR TIES IN THE SECURITY FIELD.

9. CINCPAC EXPRESSED HIS DEEPEST REGRETS OVER THE VERY SERIOUS RECENT INCIDENT INVOLVING JAPANESE SHIP AND U.S. SUBMARINE. HE SAID HE HAD JUST GONE OVER SOME INFORMATION RELATING TO THIS INCIDENT WITH PM SUZUKI, BUT WOULD BE GLAD TO DO SO AGAIN. FONMIN RESPONDED THAT HE FIRST WISHED TO EXPRESS JAPAN'S APPRECIATION FOR CINCPAC EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY IN PACIFIC AREA. HE STRESSED THAT JAPAN'S OWN SECURITY DEPENDED ON CINCPAC EFFORTS AND ON STAINCH RELATIONS WITH U.S.

10. FONMIN SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED SUBMARINE INCIDENT WITH PM AND WOULD LIKE TO SHARE HIS OWN VIEWS WITH CINCPAC. HE HAD BEEN ANSWERING QUESTIONS IN DIET FROM MORNING UNTIL LATE AT NIGHT AND WOULD DO SO AT LEAST THROUGH REMAINDER OF THIS WEEK. HE DID NOT BELIEVE ISSUE WAS BASICALLY RELATED TO US - JAPAN SECURITY STRUCTURE AND SAID EFFECTS SHOULD NOT SPILL OVER INTO THAT AREA, BUT OPPOSITION PARTIES WANTED TO USE ACCIDENT TO ATTEMPT TO SHAKE FOUNDATION OF BILATERAL TRUST THAT EXISTS. THERE ARE, FOR INSTANCE, SOME WHO WILL WANT TO USE INCIDENT TO ASSERT THAT U.S. WAS BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CONTRAVENTION OF JAPAN'S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. FONMIN SAID HE WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT THIS ASPECT OF INCIDENT WOULD AFFECT OVER-ALL U.S. - JAPAN RELATIONS

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PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND THAT HE KNEW HE MUST RESPOND TO DIET QUESTIONING IN THAT LIGHT.

11. FONMIN SAID THAT ONE JAPANESE CHARACTERISTIC WAS THAT THEY WERE VERY RECEPTIVE AND SYMPATHETIC TO THOSE WHO ADMITTED FAULT AT AN EARLY STAGE, BUT THEY TENDED TO BE HARSH ON THOSE WHO TENDED TO DELAY SUCH ADMISSION UNTIL LATER. IF THERE WERE CAUSE, AN APOLOGY SHOULD BE MADE EARLY. BOTH PRESS AND PUBLIC IN GENERAL FELT THAT ACCIDENT INDICATES THAT U.S. MAY NOT TRUST JAPAN AND THAT THIS IS THE BASIC REASON THERE HAS BEEN NO REPORT ABOUT THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A 36-HOUR DELAY IN NOTIFYING THE GOJ AND APPARENTLY NO INTENSIVE EFFORT TO SAVE THE CREW. THE U.S. HAS NOT GIVEN DUE WEIGHT TO HUMAN ASPECTS OF THIS ACCIDENT. JSP, FOR INSTANCE, CAN USE THIS TO CAST DOUBTS ABOUT DEGREE OF MUTUAL TRUST AND PERHAPS ABOUT RELIABILITY OF DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS.

12. FONMIN SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD ABOUT INVESTIGATION AND COMPENSATION EFFORTS, BUT, IN ORDER TO COPE WITH DOUBTS THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED IT IS IMPERATIVE TO LET JAPAN KNOW ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS. HE SAID THAT IT WAS UNWISE TO TAKE A STAND THAT NOTHING

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8390

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
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CAN BE DONE UNTIL THE REPORT IS COMPLETED. ITO SAID HE
AND AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TO
MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS, BUT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT
SOMETHING BE DONE RAPIDLY. IF INVESTIGATION REPORT
WILL BE DELAYED, HE INTENDED TO ASK AMBASSADOR FOR
INTERIM REPORT WHEN HE SAW HIM SATURDAY (APRIL 18).

13. CINCPAC NOTED THAT, FROM PRESIDENT ON DOWN, U.S. SIDE
HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED DEEPEST REGRETS AND WE APPRECIATED
JAPAN'S FRUSTRATION OVER KEY QUESTIONS OF WHY ACCIDENT
HAPPENED, WHY THERE WAS A DELAY, WERE RESCUE OPERATIONS
ADEQUATE AND THE ISSUES OF COMPENSATION AND PREVENTIVE
MEASURES. HE SAID THAT U.S. HAD SAME QUESTIONS AND THAT
WAS WHY WE HAD INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY. HE NOTED U.S.
WAS A COUNTRY OF LAW, AS WAS JAPAN, AND IT WOULD BE
INAPPROPRIATE TO COMMENT BEFORE COMPLETION OF AN

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INVESTIGATION. IT WAS OUR OBJECTIVE THAT INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 30 DAYS.

14. CINCPAC NOTED THAT OTHER ACTIONS WERE ALSO BEING TAKEN REGARDING CLAIMS AND COMPENSATION. COMNAVFOR HAS CONVENED A BOARD TO CONSIDER THE CLAIMS OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSES AND CREW MEMBERS. PROCEDURE IS UNDERWAY TO RECEIVE ADMIRALITY CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION AND SOLATIA. THUS, PROCESS IS PROCEEDING ON TWO LEVELS, THAT IS AN INVESTIGATION TO LOOK INTO THE LEGAL ACTS OF PEOPLE AND A PARALLEL EFFORT TO DEAL WITH CLAIMS AND COMPENSATION. AS A COUNTRY OF LAW, U.S. MUST RESPECT RIGHTS OF PEOPLE INVOLVED. AS INVESTIGATION MIGHT BE RELATED TO PUNISHMENT, PEOPLE IN HIS POSITION MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO PREJUDICE CASE BY JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS OR BY MAKING STATEMENTS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF FACTS THAT MIGHT PREJUDICE SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURES. HE ASSURED FONMIN ITO AS SENIOR U.S. COMMANDER IN THE REGION THAT SPEEDY INVESTIGATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

15. REGARDING FONMIN ITO'S COMMENT ON JAPAN'S NON-NUCLEAR POLICY, CINCPAC SAID U.S. FULLY RESPECTED IN PAST AND WILL CONTINUE TO RESPECT IN FUTURE JAPAN'S CONSTITUTION AND RELATED POLICIES.

16. ITO SAID IT WAS PERSONAL AND FRANK OPINION, THAT DIET MIGHT SAY THAT U.S. THINKS IT CAN SOLVE EVERYTHING WITH MONEY IF HE SHOULD TELL THEM THAT THE U.S. IS PAYING CLAIMS, BUT DOING NOTHING ABOUT REST OF PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT, FROM JAPANESE POINT OF VIEW, IF YOU CAN FIND FACTS THEY SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR IMMEDIATELY, UNLESS THESE STEPS ARE TAKEN, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ERASE FEELING OF FRUSTRATION. ITO FORESAW THAT GOJ WILL HAVE VERY DIFFICULT TIME IN THE DIET NEXT WEEK.

17. CINCPAC SAID HE UNDERSTOOD ITO DESIRE AND WOULD LIKE TO GIVE HIM ALL FACTS, BUT IF WE RELEASED SOMETHING PREMATURELY, WE WOULD HAVE GREAT PROBLEMS AS THIS WOULD AFFECT PUNISHMENT OF THOSE INVOLVED. U.S. UNDERSTOOD GOJ NEED AND WILL DO WHAT IT CAN TO SATISFY IT. THERE MAY BE SOME INFORMATION WE CAN PROVIDE, BUT IF IT AFFECTS FATE OF INDIVIDUALS, THIS WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT. HE SAID WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT INCIDENT DOES NOT CLOUD OUR RELATIONSHIP, ESPECIALLY WITH SUMMIT MEETINGS COMING

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UP. HE UNDERSTOOD DEFENSE WILL BE A MAJOR ISSUE THERE AND EXPECTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD SPEAK IN FRIENDLY, SINCERE AND CANDID TERMS.

18. FONMIN ITO SAID THAT THE SUMMIT WAS THE VERY REASON HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR A SPEEDY ANSWER TO THE DOUBTS THAT EXISTED. HE SAID THAT THESE WILL INCREASE TO EXTENT THAT THERE WAS DELAY. CINCPAC SAID INVESTIGATION OBJECTIVE WAS 30 DAYS, BUT THERE WILL THEN BE REVIEW PROCESS AND THAT WILL TAKE MORE TIME. IF THAT IS SCHEDULE, FONMIN SAID THEN PRIME MINISTER WILL GO TO WASHINGTON WITH NO INFORMATION. IN THAT CASE, FONMIN WORRIED ABOUT WHAT PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE TO SAY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

19. CINCPAC SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. HE SAID FONMIN HAD BEEN GENEROUS WITH HIS TIME AND HE HOPED THAT ON NEXT OCCASION HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS OTHER THINGS HE HAD WANTED TO, INCLUDING INCREASED SOVIET STRENGTH, INCREASED THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA WHICH IMPACTS ON JAPAN'S SECURITY, ETC. FONMIN RESPONDED THAT HE DID WISH TO HEAR ABOUT THESE THINGS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT VIETNAM, INDIAN OCEAN AND NORTH KOREA, AND HE HOPED THAT CINCPAC WOULD BE ABLE TO REVIEW THESE BRIEFLY FOR HIM.

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20. CINCPAC SAID THAT USSR FORCES CONTINUE TO EXPAND IN THE PACIFIC THEATER. 10 YEARS AGO SOVIETS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO PREPARE FOR TWO FRONT WAR -- EUROPE AND FAR EAST. THEY HAVE NOW ESTABLISHED COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND LOGISTICS SET UP TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ACHIEVED THAT CAPABILITY. SOVIET GROUND FORCES HAVE RECENTLY INCREASED IN STRENGTH FROM 46 TO 51 DIVISIONS. SOVIETS ADDED LAST YEAR MORE MODERN FIGHTERS TO THEIR INVENTORY THAN TOTAL NUMBER OF U.S. FIGHTERS IN PACIFIC AREA. BACKFIRES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO THE AREA NORTH OF VLADIVOSTOK WHERE THEY POSE A THREAT TO SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS. SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET IS NOW THE LARGEST.

21. THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA HAS BEEN INCREASING AND

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PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE THEIR CAPABILITIES OR CONFUSE THEIR INTENTIONS. SOUTH KOREA HAS RELATIVELY STABLE POLITICAL SITUATION, BUT THAT COULD CHANGE. SO LONG AS U.S. FORCES REMAIN, THINGS ARE RELATIVELY STABLE, BUT NORTH KOREA HAS CAPABILITIES TO POSE SERIOUS THREAT.

22. ARABIAN GULF OIL IS VITAL TO JAPAN, U.S. AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES. U.S. HAS HAD TO DRAW FORCES FROM ELSEWHERE TO SUSTAIN WHAT WE HAD THERE. U.S. EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SUBSTANTIAL FORCES IN THAT AREA.

23. CINCPAC CONCLUDED BY SAYING U.S. WAS DOING WHAT IT COULD. PRESIDENT HAS NOW ADDED \$25 BILLION SUPPLEMENT TO FY 82 DEFENSE BUDGET AND THERE WILL BE MORE USG REQUESTS TO ALLIES AND FRIENDS TO HELP SHARE BURDEN.
MANSFIELD

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O 180542Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8395

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI IMMEDIATE
COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
NOF SASEBO JA IMMEDIATE
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 07010
SASEBO PASS CINCPAC
E.O. 120651 GDS 4/18/87 (IMMERMAN, R.) OR-P
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, JA, US
SUBJECT: 88BM INCIDENT
REF: STATE 99584

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. AT FOREIGN MINISTER'S REQUEST, AMBASSADOR OUTLINED HIS VIEWS ON 88BM ISSUE MORNING OF APRIL 18.
3. AMBASSADOR, INDICATING THAT HE WOULD BE AS FORTHRIGHT, CANDID, AND HONEST AS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ADMIRAL LONG APRIL 16, SAID

TOKYO 7010

DTG: 180542Z APR 81 PSNI 029610
TOR: 100/0558Z

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-237/1#102
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HE AND FOREIGN MINISTER NEEDED TO DO THEIR BEST TO KEEP THIS ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE AND UNDER CONTROL IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SOLID AND ENDURING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. HE NOTED HE HAD MUCH IN COMMON WITH FOREIGN MINISTER: BOTH HAD SERVED IN CHINA AS ENLISTED MEN, BOTH HAD HAD LONG POLITICAL CAREERS AND BOTH HAD BECOME DIPLOMATS LATE IN LIFE; THEY BOTH THEREFORE RECOGNIZED POLITICAL NECESSITIES AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR TELLING THE TRUTH AND "GETTING AT THE FACTS."

4. AMBASSADOR THEN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- GOJ HAS RAISED THE QUESTIONS THAT LIE AT THE VERY HEART OF THIS WHOLE UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT; NAMELY, HOW DID IT HAPPEN, WHAT RESCUE EFFORTS WERE UNDERTAKEN AND WHY DID IT TAKE SO LONG TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE ACCIDENT.

-- THESE ARE PRECISELY THE QUESTIONS WHICH ALSO INTEREST USG AND WHICH WE HAVE INSTRUCTED CAPTAIN RICH TO INVESTIGATE. USG DESIRE TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THIS AFFAIR IS JUST AS STRONG AS JAPANESE.

-- CAPTAIN RICH IS DEALING WITH THE MOST SERIOUS ISSUES ONE CAN FACE: TO DETERMINE THE FACTS OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH MAY HAVE COST TWO LIVES AND THE LOSS OF A VESSEL. HIS FINDINGS WILL ALSO HAVE AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON THE LIFE AND CAREER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE SHIP AND POSSIBLY OTHERS. WE ARE CONSTRAINED UNDER U.S. CONSTITUTION AND OUR OTHER LAWS, AS WELL AS NAVY REGULATIONS, TO PROTECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. IT WOULD BE IMPROPER AND PERHAPS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE A JUDGMENT INVOLVING CULPABILITY OR NEGLIGENCE, FOR INSTANCE, BEFORE ALL OF THE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN GATHERED AND DULY WEIGHED. A PREMATURE RELEASE INVOLVING SUCH MATTERS BEFORE THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETED, FOR EXAMPLE, MIGHT BE OVERLOOKING IMPORTANT EVIDENCE NOT YET BROUGHT TO LIGHT. SUCH AN ACTION COULD RESULT IN A COURT CASE BEING DECLARED INVALID AND BEING DISMISSED FROM COURT. SUCH A RESULT COULD HAVE AN EVEN MORE GRAVE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION THAN THE INCIDENT ITSELF.

-- THERE ARE VAST CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICANS AND JAPANESE, AND THIS FREQUENTLY MAKES FOR MISUNDERSTANDINGS. HOWEVER, IN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES, NOTHING IS SO IMPORTANT AS RESPECT FOR THE LAW. LAW

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PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IS THE CEMENT WHICH HOLDS OUR SOCIETIES AND COUNTRIES TOGETHER. I REQUEST YOUR UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT AND ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL BE AS FORTHCOMING AS WE CAN ON THE OTHER INFORMATION YOU SEEK, BUT THAT WE CANNOT FORCE PREMATURE JUDGMENTS REGARDING THE ESSENTIAL ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

- -- I REALIZE THE TREMENDOUS POLITICAL PRESSURE YOU ARE UNDER AND I FULLY UNDERSTAND IT. HOWEVER, WE HOPE YOUR GOVERNMENT CAN KEEP THIS MATTER IN PERSPECTIVE. PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ACTIONS OF AN INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP OF PEOPLE WILL DETERMINE THE FATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP ARE NOT HELPFUL AND COULD INDEED HAVE A DECIDEDLY ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE SUMMIT MEETING NEXT MONTH. SUCH A RESULT WOULD BE FAR MORE SERIOUS THAN ANY ACTION OF A RELATIVELY FEW PEOPLE.

- -- ADMIRAL LONG APPRECIATED YOUR SEEING HIM

TOKYO 7010

DTG: 180542Z APR 81 PSN: 020610
TOR: 100/0558Z

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DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #7010/02 1000547
O 180542Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8396

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
NOF SASEBO JA IMMEDIATE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 07010
YESTERDAY. HE HAD LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING BROADER
SECURITY ISSUES WITH YOU AND WAS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED
THAT THE DISCUSSION OF THIS TRAGIC INCIDENT HAD TO
OVERSHADOW COMPLETELY HIS MEETING WITH YOU. HE HOPES
THAT THIS UNFORTUNATE OCCURRENCE WILL NOT BE PERMITTED
TO OBSCURE THE LARGER OBJECTIVES WHICH WE ARE STRIVING
TO ACHIEVE.

5. HE EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE THAT ISSUE WOULD NOT
"BE CLOUD" THE SUMMIT. AMBASSADOR DISMISSED JAPANESE
PRESS ASSERTION THAT THERE WOULD BE COVERUP, NOTING
THAT IN HIS ENTIRE CAREER HE HAD NEVER BEFORE SEEN
SUCH PROMPT ACTION ON PART OF THE U.S. NAVY AND
BELIEVED THAT BOTH SIDES SHARED A COMMON INTEREST IN

TOKYO 7010

DTG:180542Z APR 81 PSN: 020013
TOR: 108/0602Z

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DATE 04/27/81

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GETTING TO THE BOTTOM OF THE MATTER.

6. AMBASSADOR TOLD FONMIN THAT SECRETARY OF NAVY LEHMAN WOULD BE ISSUING STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT U.S. ASSUMED CULPABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDEMNITY. HE THEN ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER TO TRANSMIT PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF REGRET TO THE PRIME MINISTER (REFTEL). AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER, IN ORDER TO RESTORE PERCEPTION OF CALMNESS, ISSUE STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

"I HAVE RECEIVED POSITIVE ASSURANCES FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT THE U.S. IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE SATISFACTORILY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY. THESE ASSURANCES CONVINCE ME THAT THE U.S. IS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND IN FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FEELINGS OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE."

7. FOREIGN MINISTER ITO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR AMBASSADOR'S "MOVING PRESENTATION" OF USG POSITION AND HIS EFFORTS AT MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS AT THIS DIFFICULT MOMENT. HE SAID HE UNDERTOOK TO URGE PROMPT INVESTIGATION TO GET AT THE TRUTH PRECISELY IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY DAMAGE TO U.S.-JAPAN FRIENDSHIP AND TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF SUMMIT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT USG WAS DEALING SINCERELY WITH ISSUE. ITO SAID HE WOULD COOPERATE IN SEARCHING FOR SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT WHICH HE HOPED WOULD MAKE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS EVEN STRONGER THAN THEY HAD BEEN. HE PROMISED TO TRANSMIT IMMEDIATELY TO PRIME MINISTER PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND SAID HE WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTION THAT HE ISSUE STATEMENT.

8. COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND THAT GOJ PLANNING TO RELEASE TO MEDIA PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND SUBSTANCE OF AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATION, WITH EXCEPTION OF SUGGESTED MINISTERIAL STATEMENT. END COMMENT.

MANSFIELD

TOKYO 7010

DTG:180542Z APR 81 PSN: 029513
TOR: 108/0602Z

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRIVACY
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
MESSAGE:

OO YEKUHR
DE YEKADS #1987 1081320
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 181329Z APR 81 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 7YH
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY MANILLA
ZEM

UNCLAS VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WHO1987
FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

FOR: AMBASSADOR MURPHY

1. THERE WAS AN INQUIRY RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE AS TO WHETHER VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SUGGESTED THAT JOHN NEGROPONTE MEET WITH OPPOSITION OFFICIALS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

2. PLEASE ASSURE PRESIDENT MARCOS THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MEETING NEGROPONTE HAD WITH THE OPPOSITION.

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*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #7111/01 1100944
O 200942Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8441

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5784
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3798
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8409
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4358
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2598
USMISSION USNATO 0722
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 07111

EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/20/01 (SHERMAN, W.) DR-M
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, JA
SUBJECT: ~~UN~~ SOVIET PROPOSALS ON FAR EAST CBM'S
REFS: (A) TOKYO 6978; (B) STATE 97683; (C) STATE 81276

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: JAPANESE REPLY ON CBM'S WILL BE VERY NEGATIVE AND WILL CHALLENGE SOVIETS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE BY WITHDRAWING TROOPS FROM NORTHERN TERRITORIES AND REDUCING FAR EAST TROOP BUILDUP. IT WILL MAKE NO MENTION OF OR QUERIES ABOUT ANY SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF SOVIET PROPOSALS. GOJ IS CONCERNED ABOUT APPEARANCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRC AND JAPAN ON ONE HAND AND U.S. ON THE OTHER IF U.S. REPLY MENTIONS SUCH SPECIFIC ISSUES AS MONGOLIA OR ROK WHICH WILL BE USED BY SOVIETS AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO EMBARRASS GOJ. IT HOPES

TOKYO 7111

DTG: 120094Z APR 81 PSN: 031506
TOR: 110/1219Z

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1 #103
BY LD NARA, DATE 7/24/06

*****~~E~~C R E T*****

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT OUR RESPONSE WILL BE AS NEGATIVE AND NON-SPECIFIC AS GOJ'S. END SUMMARY.

3. MOFA SOVIET DIVISION DIRECTOR HYODO PROVIDED EMOFF APRIL 20 WITH GIST OF GOJ REPLY TO SOVIET FAR EAST CMB'S, AS APPROVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ITO, WHICH HE SAID WOULD DEAL ONLY WITH (A) JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, TO WIT, THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE AND (B) FAR EAST CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. HE DID NOT SUMMARIZE FIRST SECTION OF JAPANESE REPLY, WHICH HE MERELY CHARACTERIZED AS DEALING WITH NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE AT GREAT LENGTH. HE CHARACTERIZED THE SECOND

4. "THE SOVIET SIDE IN THE LATTER PART OF BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT REFERRING TO CMB'S IN THE FAR EAST EMPHASIZED THAT APPLICATION OF CMB'S IN THE MILITARY FIELD WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING AMONG VARIOUS NATIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS THE SIGNIFICANT BUILDUP OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST, ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, WHICH HAS MOST SEVERELY DAMAGED THE JAPANESE PEOPLES' TRUST IN THE USSR. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP RUNS COUNTER TO THE SPIRIT OF TRUST, GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS AND FRIENDSHIP. THE FIRST STEP IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE USSR SHOULD BE THE PROMPT REVERSAL OF THE SOVIET BUILDUP. FURTHERMORE, JAPAN WISHES TO STRESS THAT TO BUILD CONFIDENCE POLITICALLY THE USSR MUST REVIEW THE HISTORY OF THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE AND FACE UP TO ITS REALITY INSTEAD OF PRETENDING AS WAS DONE BY MINISTER FUIYUBIN ON FEBRUARY 16, 1981, THAT THE ISSUE DOES NOT EXIST.

5. "IT IS INDESPENSIBLE FOR THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF ASIA AS WELL AS FOR FIRM, GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE USSR TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO STRENGTHEN THE SPIRIT OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN THE FAR EAST. IN THIS CASE NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN FOR THE USSR TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AND SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE FOR TALKS TO SOLVE THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE AND CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN."

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DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. HYODO SAID THE JAPANESE REPLY WOULD GIVE ABSOLUTELY NO INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND WOULD NOT EVEN MENTION THEM. HE CHARACTERIZED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AS JUST ANOTHER PROPAGANDA VERSION OF THEIR 1969 ASIAN SECURITY PROPOSAL AND SAID IT WAS NONSENSE TO TALK OF CBM'S WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE TAKING CONFIDENCE-DESTROYING MEASURES. HE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE THE FIRMNESS OF THE JAPANESE ANSWER INTO ACCOUNT AND NOT GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PRC ON THE ONE HAND AND THE U.S. ON THE OTHER. HYODO NOTED THAT IF THERE WAS THE APPEARANCE OF ANY DIFFERENCE THE SOVIETS WOULD STRESS IT IN THEIR PROPAGANDA AND THE JAPANESE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES WOULD HAVE A FIELD DAY CRITICIZING THE GOJ FOR BEING LESS FORTHCOMING THAN EVEN THE U.S. WHICH WOULD BE RATHER EMBARRASSING. HE, THEREFORE, ASKED THAT THE U.S. REPLY BE AS VAGUE AND NON-SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE.

7. HYODO SAID THE JAPANESE REPLY WAS NOW BEING REVIEWED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND WOULD PROBABLY BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW BY THE END OF THIS WEEK. HE URGED, THEREFORE, THAT IF THE U.S. WISHED

TOKYO 7:11

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TOR: 110/1219Z

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DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #7111/02 1100940
O 200942Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8442

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5785
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3799
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6410
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4357
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2899
USMISSION USNATO 0723
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 07111
EXDIS
JAPAN TO DELAY SUBMISSION OF ITS REPLY WE NOTIFY
HIM IMMEDIATELY.

8. COMMENTS: WHILE THE GOJ DOES NOT WANT TO TELL US
WHAT TO SAY IN OUR REPLY, THEY ARE AT THE SAME TIME
VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH WHAT THEY SEE AS THE APPEARANCE
OF AN EXPLOITABLE DIFFERENCE DEVELOPING BETWEEN OUR
RESPONSES TO THE SOVIETS. THEY WOULD CLEARLY BE GREATLY
RELIEVED IF WE WERE TO ABANDON MAKING SPECIFIC COMMENTS
OR INQUIRIES ABOUT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN OUR REPLY
AND WE SHOULD DO SO IF POSSIBLE.
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 7111

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TOR: 110/1219Z

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DATE 04/27/81

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PAGE: 01

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SIT: RA NAN COL VP

FOR:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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DE RUEHC #3061 1121715

O 221650Z APR 81 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 5045

~~SECRET~~ STATE 103061

NODIS

-STADIS////////////////////////////////////

E.O. 120651 GDS: 4/21/87 (HAIG, ALEXANDER)

TAGS: EPAP, EAGR, EEW

SUBJECT: DECISION ON GRAIN EMBARGO

1. YOU SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO FOREIGN MINISTER ITO ASAP, REQUESTING THAT THE LETTER BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. MINISTER:

IN VIEW OF OUR PREVIOUS PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND OF THE EXEMPLARY COOPERATION WHICH JAPAN HAS SHOWN IN SANCTIONS TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL TO INFORM YOU IMMEDIATELY OF A MAJOR DECISION ON THE PARTIAL GRAIN EMBARGO AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE WE WILL MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON LIFTING THE EMBARGO.

AFTER GIVING THOROUGH AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO

SECSTATE WASHDC 3061

DTG: 221650Z APR 81 PSN: 037433

TOR: 114/1431Z

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1#104
BY BJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ISSUE, THE PRESIDENT HAS CONCLUDED THAT OUR EMBARGO ON GRAIN SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE OF INFLICTING A SIGNIFICANT COST ON THE USSR FOR ITS INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, BUT THAT THE EMBARGO IS NO LONGER HAVING A SIGNIFICANT

ECONOMIC IMPACT NOR SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING SOVIET GRAIN IMPORTS.

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN OPPOSED ALL ALONG TO THE EMBARGO AS LEVYING A DISPROPORTIONATE BURDEN ON U.S. AGRICULTURE. HE HAS BEEN UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO MEET HIS EARLIER PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO LIFT THE EMBARGO. HE HAS NEVERTHELESS SO FAR REFRAINED FROM DOING SO. HOWEVER, IT HAS NOW BECOME APPARENT THAT CONTINUATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD JEOPARDIZE NOT ONLY HIS FARM LEGISLATION BUT ALSO HIS ENTIRE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM, WHICH IS NOW AT A CRUCIAL STAGE.

THE FACT THAT THE SITUATION IN POLAND HAS IMPROVED SOMEWHAT HAS NOW MADE THIS ACTION POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IF THAT SITUATION SHOULD CHANGE AND THE SOVIETS WERE TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN POLAND, ALL ASPECTS OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD BE PLACED IN JEOPARDY. IN SUCH A CASE, WE WOULD EXPECT TO SEVERELY RESTRICT TRADE ACROSS THE BOARD INCLUDING GRAIN. THE DECISION ON THE EMBARGO DOES NOT AFFECT OUR BELIEF THAT POLAND CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS VITAL TO ENABLE THE WEST TO TAKE TIMELY, CONCERTED ACTION IF THE SOVIETS DO INTERVENE IN POLAND.

THE DECISION ON THE EMBARGO DOES NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN BASIC U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE USSR, OR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO IN AFGHANISTAN. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE TO YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO RESIST SOVIET AGGRESSION WHEREVER IT OCCURS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SCRUTINIZE ALL OUR COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION CAREFULLY, AND WE URGE OUR ALLIES TO DO THE SAME, THOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT OUR DECISION ON THE GRAINS EMBARGO MAY LEAD YOU TO

SECSTATE WASHDC 3081

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TOR: 114/1431Z

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DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MODIFY YOUR CURRENT CREDIT POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.

I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN OUR DEFENSE POSTURE GLOBALLY AND, IN PARTICULAR, ENHANCE OUR CAPABILITY IN SOUTH-WEST ASIA TO RESIST SOVIET AGGRESSION. WE ARE DISCUSSING WITH PAKISTAN WAYS TO BUILD A NEW RELATIONSHIP AND WE HOPE OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS WILL ALSO INCREASE THEIR SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN.

THE UNITED STATES DEEPLY APPRECIATES THE SUPPORT WHICH JAPAN, SECOND TO NONE, HAS SHOWN IN CONSULTATION AND IN THE SUPPORT OF SANCTIONS IN THE WAKE OF AFGHANISTAN. YOUR ACTION HAS CONVINCED ME AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE STRONG VALIDITY OF OUR ALLIANCE--A MESSAGE THAT HAS NOT BEEN LOST ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THIS POSITION IN THE FACE OF CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER HAIG. END TEXT. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 3061

DTG: 221650Z APR 81 PONI 037433
TOR: 114/1431Z

~~*****S E R E T*****~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MSN 11/210⁴

SECRET ATTACHMENT

April 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Weinberger Report on Japanese Defense Efforts

Attached herewith is a memorandum from Secretary Weinberger concerning Japanese Defense Efforts and the Suzuki visit.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Richard Allen

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

20 APR 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Japanese Defense Efforts (U)

(S) As part of your National Security Policy we have urged a much better and more equitable sharing with us of the burdens of defense. I have just stressed this point with the NATO Defense Ministers. Japan is our only Asian ally with the potential significantly to increase its defense efforts. Therefore, your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Suzuki provides a fine opportunity to urge Japan to help provide for its own defense while the U.S. continues to provide the offensive capability in the region.

(S) Every administration in the last twenty years tried unsuccessfully to persuade Japan's Government to increase its defense spending.

- This is partly because we have never determined what role Japan should play in their common defense.

- Also, Japanese political and constitutional problems prevented realistic discussion of defense issues in Japan until recently; and,

- No President has ever stated flatly that Japan must become a full partner with the U.S. in defending their country -- a full partner in the sense of sharing some of the costly burden we have borne since 1945 -- a burden, incidentally, which we had to shoulder because of Japan's own conduct.

(S) The U.S. needs a clear commitment from the Japanese that they will move rapidly toward adequate self-defense forces. Japanese political considerations make it essential that Prime Minister Suzuki be informed as directly as possible if our deep concern is to be understood. Tab A has the points you may wish to make in talking with him. The Japanese have said to us that we have never told them just what it is we want them to do. The talking points at Tab A attempt to do this.

(S) I will also meet with Suzuki to reinforce your presentation. Later in June we can work out the technical aspects at a security consultative meeting and in my session with Japanese Defense Minister Omura.

cc: Vice President
Secretary Haig
Ed Meese
Dick Allen"

Sap

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-0371#105
BY LOJ NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

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Talking Points on Japanese
Defense Efforts for Meeting with PM Suzuki

- (U) I have recently ordered an increase of 15% in this year's defense budget. For our common defense, the US simply has to spend and to sacrifice more.
- (U) A prominent new defense burden we are undertaking is the US naval forces in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf to preserve access to oil for Japan, Western Europe and the US. As we increase defense by one or two percentage points of GNP, we increase the burden on our economy.
- (S) Some changes are clearly needed. As we protect Japanese interests by our forces in the Indian Ocean, we believe it is in both our interests if Japan assumes a greater share of the burden of its own self-defense.
- (S) Constitutionally we know you can help in a military sense only in the Northwest Pacific, but your attainment of an effective self-defense capability there can help to guarantee your security, and aid US and Free World interests as well.
- (S) Today your Self-Defense Forces cannot defend against even limited attack because of very inadequate logistical support.
- (S) Yet the Soviets continue their military expansion -- for example, last year they added more aircraft to their Far East forces than the whole present inventory of US Pacific Air Forces.
- (S) In view of the extraordinary times we both presently face, I recommend you consider a significant supplementary defense budget for your FY 81 to procure critical items such as ammunition, missiles, mines, torpedoes, and hardened aircraft shelters. We are not trying to intervene in your internal affairs -- but the defense of Japan is of enormous importance to the whole Free World and justifies, in our opinion, much greater efforts by both the US and Japan.
- (S) I hope you can authorize your delegation to the forthcoming Japan-US Security Subcommittee meeting in Hawaii to discuss the implementation of a division of labor that will involve far more Japanese support for our realistic mutual security.
- (S) Perhaps the most helpful single action you could take would be to achieve your Standard Defense Force Program Outline in the next five years, and approximately double your maritime and air defense capability in the Northwest Pacific within this decade.
- (S) This means the Self-Defense power to protect shipping lanes north of the Philippines and west of Guam plus the air defense of Japan.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#106

~~SECRET~~

BY LET NARA, DATE 7/24/06

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *m 7/12/04*
FROM POATS

RECEIVED 23 APR 81 19

DOC DATE 23 APR 81

TO ALLEN

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

IMPORT CONTROLS

OKAWARA, YOSHIO

BROCK, R

SUBJECT: JAPANESE AUTOMOBILES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

GREGG

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

 C 4/27 noted by RVA Lo ✓

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C) *H*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

April 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RUTHERFORD POATS *RP*
SUBJECT: Japanese Automobiles (u)

Act II, Scene 3, Kabuki Jidosha-kai:

Ambassador Okawara yesterday urged Brock to come to Tokyo next week and by his presence help the Japanese Government complete the process of consensus-forming on automobile export restraint. Brock saw the trap and evaded it, saying he could not negotiate or be seen to be negotiating trade restraint; he might consider going to receive a Japanese decision that he knew in advance was likely to solve our congressional problem. (u)

Today Okawara flew back to Tokyo. Shortly thereafter, MITI's representative here advised State that MITI Minister Tanaka planned to convene the Japanese auto companies' CEOs tomorrow, press them to accept an export quota scheme, then meet with Ito and Okawara Saturday and Suzuki Sunday or Monday. Then, according to the MITI scenario, Vice Minister Amaya would fly to Washington and try the Japanese offer out on the USG, with a view to a final Suzuki decision May 2. (u)

Later today Brock decided that there is no way he could go to Tokyo without appearing to be negotiating. He will so advise the Japanese shortly. He is inclined to leave it up to the Japanese whether to send Amaya here. (u) *Smart*

If you see Brock at the Cabinet meeting Friday you might suggest that he send his response via Mansfield and ask Mansfield to offer to act as the conduit of Suzuki's tentative decision, tacitly discouraging Amaya's coming here to conduct a visible negotiation. (u) *ol*

Norman Bailey concurs *NB*

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/1*107
BY LOT DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on
April 23, 1981

SIT406 R

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA, NAN, COL, VP
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #7402 1130822
O 230814Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8671

~~S E C R E T~~ TOKYO 07402

NODIS
STADIS ///
E.O. 12865: GDS 4/22/87 (MANSFIELD, MIKE) OR-M
TAGS: EPAP, EAQR, EEWT
SUBJECT: DECISION ON THE GRAIN EMBARGO
REF: STATE 103061

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHEN WE DELIVERED THE LETTER ON THE GRAIN EMBARGO TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS SAID THAT THEY COULD OFFER NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS. THEY ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD HAVE DETAILED QUESTIONS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THE EMBARGO AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THIRD COUNTRIES LIKE JAPAN WHICH HAD IMPOSED THEIR OWN SANCTIONS ON THE SOVIET UNION AFTER THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THEY ARE MOST INTERESTED IN WHEN THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO WILL BE ANNOUNCED. THEY HAVE ASKED WHETHER AFTER THE U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT, THEY CAN STATE PUBLICLY THAT THE U.S. HAD NOTIFIED JAPAN BEFOREHAND AND HOW MUCH OF THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER THEY CAN REVEAL.

3. ACCORDINGLY, WE ASK THE DEPARTMENT TO PROVIDE US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS AND INFORMATION ON THE TIMING AND MANNER OF THE LIFTING

TOKYO 7402

DTG: 230814Z APR 81 PSN: 037512
TOR: 114/15332

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

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NLS FOO - 0371/108

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

*****~~S~~ E C R E T*****

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ON THE EMBARGO; THE EFFECT ON OTHER U.S. POLICIES TOWARD THE USSR OF THE LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO; THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S EXPECTATIONS WITH REGARD TO JAPANESE AND EUROPEAN SANCTIONS POLICIES; AND MORE DETAIL ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE TIMING OF THE DECISION TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND.

4. THE JAPANESE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT EVENTS IN POLAND AND EXPECT TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH US IN DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. THE MORE INFORMATION WE CAN PROVIDE AND THE GREATER THE DEPTH AND BREADTH OF CONSULTATION ON OUR POSITION ON SACTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, THE CLOSER THEIR COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH US WILL BE.
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 7402

DTG: 230814Z APR 81 PBN: 037512
TOR: 114/0533Z

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*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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SIT: RA NAN CL VP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHKO #7403 1130823

O 230817Z APR 81

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8572

~~S E C R E T~~ TOKYO 07403

NODIS

STADIS:////////////////////

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/22/87 (MANSFIELD, MIKE) OR-M

TAGS: EPAP, EAGR, EEWI

SUBJECT: DECISION ON THE GRAIN EMBARGO

REF: STATE 103061

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR GIVING ME THE CHANCE TO PROVIDE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE DECISION TO LIFT THE GRAIN EMBARGO. FOREIGN MINISTER ITO WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT YOU HAD HONORED HIS REQUEST FOR ADVANCE NOTICE. I BELIEVE THE EARLY NOTICE WAS MOST HELPFUL AND WILL MAKE OUR COORDINATION WITH THE JAPANESE ON POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION EASIER.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT WHEN WE DELIVERED THE LETTER. THEY SAID THEY WOULD STUDY AND DISCUSS IT AND OFFER THEIR COMMENTS TO US LATER. WE WILL REPORT THOSE COMMENTS AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE THEM. MANSFIELD

TOKYO 7403

DTG:230817Z APR 81 PBN: 037446
TOR: 114/1439Z

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-0371#109
BY KWJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

TOKYO 7403

DTG: 230817Z APR 81 PSN: 037446
TOR: 114/1439Z

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 27 APR 81 13

DOC DATE 24 APR 81

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

*MAN
11/2/04*

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

INCIDENTS AT SEA

SUBJECT: SUBMARINE INCIDENT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LILLEY

SCHWEITZER

PIPES

BLAIR

COMMENTS

REF#

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NSCIFID

(C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C #/28 noted by RVA w/Comment DC/SL/CT

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W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 24, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *Dg*

SUBJECT: The Submarine Incident

The attached intelligence report is but the latest indication of the fact that the submarine incident has the potential of souring the Suzuki meeting. The Japanese clearly need some sort of additional report or statement from the US side, indicating how the investigation is proceeding. Halloran's article in the Times has worsened this issue. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you get in touch directly with Secretary Weinberger, asking that he work out a formulation that will get the submarine issue off the front burner. He can be told that leaks to the press, attempting to explain how the sinking took place, have worsened the situation, angering the Japanese, and making some sort of "interim report" all the more necessary. (S)

*I will speak again with Weinberger.
Rov*

Looks to me as if this incident may be deliberately exploited during the meeting with a view to using it as an excuse for non-cooperation on autos and defense. This is a very risky thing if it is true!

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Review on April 24, 2001

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BY LOJ NAME, DATE 7/24/06

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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81 APR 25 A 9: 32

JANET COLSON

Y 25/0744

BUD NANCE

B 25/1000

DICK ALLEN

wa 26/2330

IRENE DERUS

lid 27/0915

JANET COLSON

J 27/1321

BUD NANCE

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KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

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CY TO BAKER

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CY TO DEAVER

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CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
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 WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
 DE RUEHKO #7532 1140920
 Q 240853Z APR 81 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8635

~~S E C R E T~~ TOKYO 07532
 NODIS

3.0. 12065: GDS 4/24/87 (SHERMAN, W.) OR-M

TAGS: EPAP, EAGX, EEWT

SUBJECT: DECISION ON THE GRAIN EMBARGO

REF: (A) STATE 105475 (B) TOKYO 7402

1. ~~KSECRET-ENTIRE~~ TEXT).

2. EMBASSY ADVISED MOFA EARLY EVENING APRIL 24 OF ANTICIPATED ANNOUNCEMENT TIME, THAT GOJ COULD, AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT, CONFIRM ADVANCE CONSULTATION AND THAT TEXT OF LETTER SHOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT BE DRAWN UPON, ALTHOUGH MANY POINTS IN ANNOUNCEMENT MAY BE SAME. MOFA OFFICIAL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR PROMPT RESPONSE TO REF B REQUEST AND SAID GOJ WOULD NOT DRAW UPON TEXT OF LETTER ITSELF.

MANSFIELD
 ,,,VZCZ

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO 037/1#112BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

TOKYO

DTG:240853Z APR 81 PSN: 037417
 TOR: 114/1417Z

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: EA, EUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6773 1150300
O R 250229Z APR 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 5170
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1355

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1208
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0816
AMEMBASSY MADRID 0001
WHITE HOUSE 6444

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 100773
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/24/01 (HOLDRIDGE, J.)

TAGS: JA, US, PL

SUBJECT: POLAND: CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN

REF: TOKYO 6412, STATE 85964

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. JAPANESE POLCOUNSELOR ARIMA CALLED ON EUR DAS BARRY
APRIL 23 AND LEFT WITH HIM A NON-PAPER CONSISTING OF
JAPAN'S FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 3 TRIO BRIEFING.
TO WIT:

"NATO'S BASIC RECOGNITION WITH REGARD TO THE GENERAL FRAME-

SECSTATE WASHDC 6773

DTG: 250229Z APR 81 PSN: 038409
TOR: 115/0310Z

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-0371 #113

BY KAT NARA DATE 7/24/06

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WORK OF POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE WEST IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET AND/OR OTHER WARSAW PACT MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLAND ("WESTERN OBJECTIVES") COINCIDES WITH THAT OF JAPAN IN GENERAL. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS TO THE "POSSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIONS" AND THE "POSSIBLE ECONOMIC ACTIONS", IT IS DIFFICULT FOR JAPAN AT THE PRESENT STAGE TO MAKE CONCRETE COMMENTS ON EACH SPECIFIC ITEM SINCE THE DETAILS ARE STILL AMBIGUOUS AND FURTHER CAREFUL STUDY IS NEEDED.

"HOWEVER, JAPAN'S TENTATIVE NOTIONS AT PRESENT ARE THAT, APART FROM BASIC PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE MEASURES THAT WOULD

BE IN CONFLICT WITH OBLIGATIONS UNDER EXISTING TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS (MAINLY WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC ACTIONS), IT SEEMS THAT, IN THE FIELD OF "POLITICAL ACTIONS", JAPAN CAN IN GENERAL TAKE CONCERTED ACTIONS SO FAR AS THEY ARE AGREED UPON BY THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES OF THE WEST EXCEPT FOR THOSE MEASURES JAPAN IS NOT RELATED TO, SUCH AS THOSE WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH CSCE; AND THAT, IN THE FIELD OF "ECONOMIC ACTIONS", THEY APPEAR TO INCLUDE CERTAIN MEASURES DIFFICULT FOR JAPAN TO APPLY, SUCH AS MEASURES IN THE AREA OF FISHING SINCE THE DEGREE OF JAPAN'S DEPENDENCE UPON SOVIET FISHING RESOURCES IS SO GREAT.

"IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION, MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEED TO EXTEND FOR A CONSIDERABLY LONG PERIOD. UPON SUCH ASSUMPTION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE WEST MUST BE FEASIBLE FOR THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEST TO APPLY IN CONCERT AND FOR A LONG DURATION. AND IT WOULD BE MEANINGLESS TO APPLY MEASURES THAT CANNOT PREVENT BACKDOOR DEALINGS BY SUCH MEANS AS ROUND-ABOUT TRADE THROUGH NON-NATO WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS THROUGH THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES.

"AT ANY RATE, CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE POLISH PROBLEM, JAPAN'S DECISION ON SPECIFIC MEASURES DEPEND GREATLY UPON THE EXTENT TO WHICH NATO COUNTRIES WILL ACTUALLY IMPLEMENT CONCRETE MEASURES IN COOPERATION. IT IS TO BE HOPED THEREFORE THAT JAPAN RECEIVES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE RELEVANT INFORMATION IN THE CASE THAT NATO COUNTRIES DISCUSS IN

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DTG:250229Z APR 81 PSN: 038409
TOR: 115/0310Z

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ADVANCE IN NATO THE CONTENTS OF FEASIBLE MEASURES TO BE CONCERTEDLY TAKEN, WHICH WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE THE STUDY ON THE PART OF JAPAN."

2. ARIMA WAS SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED BY THE BREVITY OF THE REPLY AND SOUGHT ADVICE AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO HOLD ANOTHER MEETING OF THE TRIO OR MERELY TO PASS THE PAPER. BARRY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE HAD EXPECTED SOMETHING MORE DETAILED, BUT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE BRIEFED FORMALLY TO THE TRIO ANYWAY. HE PROMISED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO SET UP ANOTHER MEETING AT THE OCM LEVEL WITH CANADIAN AND FRG EMBASSIES. REACTING TO THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE TEXT, BARRY CLARIFIED THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ANOTHER STEP IN THE NATO PROCESS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE FULLER ACCORD SINCE THE NEXT STEP WAS THE CONVENING OF A NATO MINISTERIAL TO PICK FROM THE SANCTIONS MENU SHOULD THE CONTINGENCY ARISE.

3. ARIMA REVEALED THAT HE HAD ALSO RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RAISE SOME QUESTIONS OF A TECHNICAL NATURE ABOUT THE SANCTIONS, BUT THAT GOJ PREFERRED TO DO SO ONLY WITH THE US. HE ALSO HINTED THAT JAPAN MAY HAVE MORE TO SAY TO THE US AT THAT TIME. HE DESCRIBED HIS VISIT AS VERY OFF THE RECORD AND ASKED THAT IT NOT BE MENTIONED TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT--INCLUDING HIS HOME OFFICE--UNTIL THE TRIO BRIEFING.

HAIG

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DTG:250229Z APR 81 PSN: 038409
TOR: 115/0310Z

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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EOB: ECON,EA,EURE
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #7606/01 1170808
O 270805Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8688

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 07606

NDDIS
E.O. 12958: GDS 04/27/81 (SHERMAN, WILLIAM C.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, EPAP, EAGR, EEW, ETRD, UR, US
SUBJECT: (R) GRAIN EMBARGO REMOVAL
REF: STATE 105465

1. (R-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPTTEL, WE PROVIDED GOJ WITH FURTHER BRIEFING ON U.S. DECISION TO LIFT GRAIN EMBARGO. GOJ INTENDS TO RESPOND PUBLICLY WITH INDICATION OF UNDERSTANDING FOR U.S. DECISION AND AFFIRMATION OF BASIC JAPANESE POLICY RESPECTING AFGHANISTAN. AT SAME TIME GOJ IS PRIVATELY GREATLY CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. DECISION MAY RESULT IN EROSION OF THE BASIC ALLIED STANCE RESPECTING THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND MAY COMPLICATE ALLIED COORDINATION OF POSSIBLE ECONOMIC MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND. THE GOJ SEEKS CLOSER CONSULTATIONS ON THESE ISSUES, AND PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THEM DURING HIS VISITS TO THE U.S. AND EUROPE AND AT THE SUMMIT. END SUMMARY.

3. POLCOUNS AND ECOUNS MET APRIL 25 WITH MITSURO DONOWAKI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR EUROPEAN

TOKYO 7606

DTG: 270805Z APR 81 PSN: 040592
TOR: 117/1036Z

DECLASSIFIED
NLS - 800-0371-#114
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AFFAIRS IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO PASS TO GOJ FURTHER DETAILS CONTAINED REPTEL RESPECTING U.S. DECISION TO LIFT GRAINS EMBARGO. DONOWAKI EXPRESSED GOJ APPRECIATION FOR BRIEFING AND SAID GOJ HAD ALREADY PREPARED RESPONSES AS FOLLOWS TO ANTICIPATED DIET QUESTIONS RESPECTING U.S. ACTION:

Q. HOW DOES THE GOJ REGARD THE DECISION?

A. THE GOJ WAS PREPARED FOR THE OFFICIAL LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO SINCE PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD MADE A PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO DO SO DURING HIS CAMPAIGN. THE ACTION WILL NOT ALTER BASIC U.S. POLICY IN RESPECT TO THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE; OTHER U.S. MEASURES RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT. MOREOVER, THE EFFECT OF THE EMBARGO ON U.S.-SOVIET TRADE HAS BEEN MUCH GREATER THAN ON JAPANESE AND WESTERN EUROPEAN TRADE WITH THE USSR.

Q. WHAT WILL JAPAN DO? SHOULD JAPAN ALSO LIFT ITS SANCTIONS?

A. THE GOJ HAS NO INTENTION OF CHANGING ITS BASIC POLICY IN RESPECT TO THE AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS. THE GOJ MEASURES RESPECTING AFGHANISTAN WERE NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE OLYMPIC GAMES, CAUTIOUS HANDLING OF CREDITS AND COOPERATION IN COCOM, PARTICULARLY TIGHTENING OF RESTRICTIONS ON SECURITY RELATED TRADE. THE GOJ HAS BEEN HANDLING OFFICIAL CREDIT ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IN A CAUTIOUS WAY. JAPANESE-SOVIET TRADE HAS BEEN INCREASING: 84.6 BILLION BOTH WAYS LAST YEAR, UP 6.1 PERCENT; 82.78 BILLION IN JAPANESE EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION LAST YEAR, UP 12.9 PERCENT. COCOM CONSULTATIONS ARE CONTINUING.

Q. HAS THERE BEEN ADVANCE NOTICE?

A. WE RECEIVED ADVANCE NOTICE LATE AFTERNOON ON APRIL 24 BUT CANNOT REVEAL THE CONTENTS. (FYI: BECAUSE OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF U.S. NOTICE, GOJ OFFICIALS WHEN QUESTIONED BY DIET MEMBERS MIDDAY APRIL 24, HAD DENIED RECEIPT OF IT. END FYI)

Q. WILL THERE NOW BE AN EXCHANGE OF HIGH LEVEL VISITS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE USSR?

A. THE QUESTION WILL BE STUDIED FURTHER IN THE LIGHT OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. (ACCORDING TO DONOWAKI, THERE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ANY

TOKYO 7606

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TORI 117/1036Z

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DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RELAXATION OF GOJ OPPOSITION TO MINISTERIAL-LEVEL VISITS.)

4. DONOWAKI COMMENTED THAT WHILE GOJ WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO SUPPORT U.S. IN ITS DECISION, IT WAS, NONETHELESS, GREATLY CONCERNED. GOJ DOES NOT THINK SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN HAS CHANGED. MOREOVER, IN DONOWAKI'S PERSONAL VIEW, THE GRAIN EMBARGO HAD SUCCEEDED IN FORCING THE SOVIETS TO PAY A HIGHER PRICE FOR GRAIN BECAUSE OF HIGHER TRANSPORTATION COSTS AND LESS RELIABILITY OF SUPPLY. GOJ FEARS U.S.

TOKYO 7606

DTG: 270805Z APR 81 PSNI 040592
TOR: 117/1035Z

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DATE 04/27/81

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PAGE 01

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #7606/02 1170800
O 270805Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8689

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 07606

NODIS
ACTION MAY LEAD TO COLLAPSE OF OTHER MEASURES
RESPECTING SANCTIONS. THE GOJ BELIEVES SUCH A
TREND WOULD BE VERY UNFORTUNATE; IT DOES NOT
WANT TO SEE THE BASIC STANCE OF THE ALLIES
AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION ERODED. DONOWAKI SAID
HE PERSONALLY FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO ARGUE THAT
THE U.S. ACTION DOES NOT REPRESENT A RELAXATION
OF THE SANCTIONS EFFORT.

5. DONOWAKI ANTICIPATES FURTHER PRESSURES FOR
RELAXATION OF JAPANESE STANCE TOWARD SOVIET
TRADE. HE NOTED GROWING DISSATISFACTION
AMONG JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN ON GROUNDS THAT
JAPAN WAS BEARING A LARGER COST THAN OTHER
COUNTRIES AND SAID COMPLAINTS FROM THEM WOULD
GROW LOUDER. SOVIET UNION WILL PROBABLY
MAKE FURTHER OVERTURES TO THEM TO EXPLOIT
THEIR DISSATISFACTION. WHILE THE GOJ CAN
PROBABLY HOLD BACK ON THE YAMBURG PROJECT SO
LONG AS WESTERN EUROPEANS DO SO,, U.S. ANNOUNCE-
MENT MAKES JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROJECT
AT THAT POINT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN.

6. IN THE JAPANESE VIEW, THE U.S. DECISION
UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREFUL COORDINATION

TOKYO 7606

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TOR: 117/1036Z

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~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

DATE 04/27/81

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PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMONG THE ALLIES OF ANY ECONOMIC MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND, POSSIBLE LOOPHOLES FOR EVASION OF THE SANCTIONS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN ADVANCE.

7. PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI WILL WANT TO DISCUSS COORDINATION OF OVERALL ALLIED POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION DURING HIS VISITS TO THE U.S. AND EUROPE AND AT THE SUMMIT. HE IS INTERESTED IN UPHOLDING A STRONG POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN AND IN DEMONSTRATING THE ALLIED RESOLVE RESPECTING POLAND. HE ATTACHES THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO COORDINATION AMONG THE ALLIES ON POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION.

8. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE GOJ WILL STRIVE TO PREVENT THE U.S. DECISION FROM UNDERMINING SUPPORT IN JAPAN FOR A STRONG ALLIED POSITION IN RESPECT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS, IT CANNOT HELP BUT FIND THE U.S. DECISION DISCOURAGING AND DISAPPOINTING. GOJ LEADERS ARE OF MIND THAT IF THE U.S., AS THE LEADER OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, IS UNWILLING TO BEAR THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, THEY WILL HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN PERSUADING THE JAPANESE PEOPLE THAT JAPAN SHOULD BEAR SUCH COSTS.

MANSFIELD

TOKYO 7606

DTG: 270805Z APR 81 PSN: 040593
TOR: 117/1036Z

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL SENSITIVE~~

April 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Richard*

SUBJECT: Japanese Concerned Over Lifting Grain Embargo

Ambassador Mansfield reports that while the Japanese intend to respond publicly with understanding for the lifting of the embargo, they are greatly concerned that the decision may result in erosion of the basic allied stance respecting the Soviet action in Afghanistan and may complicate allied coordination of possible economic measures in response to a Soviet invasion of Poland. (C)

In addition, the Japanese anticipate further pressures from Japanese businessmen and Moscow for relaxation of their stance toward Soviet trade. (C)

The ambassador adds that Prime Minister Suzuki attaches the highest importance to coordination among the Allies on policy toward Moscow and will want to discuss this during his travels to the U.S. and Europe. (C)

Ambassador Mansfield comments that the Japanese cannot help but find our decision discouraging and disappointing and are of mind that if the U.S. is unwilling to bear the costs of economic sanctions, they will have great difficulty in persuading the Japanese people that Japan should bear such costs. (C)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/24/06