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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (4/6/81 - 4/17/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	060858Z APR 81, 2p R 7/24/06 F00-037/i #84	4/6/81	B1
2. Cable	060902Z APR 81, 11p R " " #85	4/6/81	B1
3. Memo	Donald Gregg to Richard Allen re Japan, 2p PART " " #86	4/7/81	B1
4. Cable	100310Z APR 81, 2p R " " #87	4/10/81	B1
5. Cable	100928Z APR 81, 2p R " " #88	4/10/81	B1
6. Cable	101011Z APR 81, 2p R " " #89	4/10/81	B1
7. Cable	131015Z APR 81, 2p R " " #90	4/13/81	B1
8. Cable	141148Z APR 81, 5p R " " #91	4/14/81	B1
9. Memo	Allen to the President re Collision, 2p R " " #92	4/15/81	B1
10. Memo	Gregg to Allen re Collision, 1p R " " #93	4/15/81	B1
11. Note	Allen to Gregg re Collision, 1p R " " #94	4/14/81	B1
12. Situation Room Note	1p R " " #95	4/14/81	B1
13. Cable	161127Z APR 81, 4p R " " #96	4/16/81	B1
14. Memo	Gregg to Allen re Lunch with Secretary of Defense, 1p R " " #97	4/16/81	B1
15. Cable	170819Z APR 81, 1p R " " #98	4/17/81	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (4/6/81 – 4/17/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
16. Cable	170846Z APR 81, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037/i #99</i>	4/17/81	B1
17. Cable	172144Z APR 81, 2p <i>R " " #100</i>	4/17/81	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 7/19/2007

File Folder JAPAN (4/6/81-4/17/81)

FOIA

F00-037 (F1539)

Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
14	MEMO	GREGG TO ALLEN, RE LUNCH WITH SEC OF DEFENSE (F00-037/1#97)	1	4/16/1981	<i>MVH 5/21/08</i>

DATE 04/07/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL VP
EOB: EA //STEARMAN// EUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHKO #6110 0960059
O 060858Z APR 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7925

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 06110

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/6/01 (SHERMAN, W.) OR-M
TAGS: PL, JA, UR
SUBJECT: POLAND - MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY
REF: STATE 85272

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. EMROFF DELIVERED LETTER REPTEL TO MOFA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL DONOWAKI SATURDAY, APRIL 4.
3. DONOWAKI SAID THAT SINCE CERTAIN ILL-DEFINED TERMS USED IN DEPARTMENT'S NON-PAPER -- SUCH AS "EXISTING CONTRACTS" -- HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE IRAN EMBARGO, GOJ WOULD PROBABLY SEEK FURTHER CLARIFICATION SHORTLY.
4. DONOWAKI SAID GOJ WAS NOT PLANNING FORMAL RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S LETTER. OFFERING HIS PERSONAL REACTION, HE SAID POLITICAL MEASURES SUGGESTED THEREIN WERE LARGELY THE PROVINCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND THEREFORE COULD PROBABLY BE IMPLEMENTED ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. HOWEVER, THE VARIOUS ECONOMIC MEASURES SUGGESTED IN LETTER WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS INVOLVING OTHER MINISTRIES. BECAUSE OF DANGER OF LEAK, MOFA

DECLASSIFIED
 NLS FOO-037/1484
 BY AST NARA, DATE 7/24/08

TOKYO 6110

DTG:060858Z APR 81 SSN: 012921
TOR: 096/1013Z

DATE 04/07/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DID NOT WISH TO BEGIN NEGOTIATING WITH OTHER MINISTRIES UNTIL SOVIETS ACTUALLY INTERVENED. NOTING THAT IT TOOK GOJ ABOUT A MONTH TO REACH UNIFIED POSITION ON IRANIAN SANCTIONS, HE ESTIMATED IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST AS LONG FOR JAPANESE TO ARRIVE AT DECISION ON ECONOMIC MEASURES TO BE APPLIED AGAINST SOVIETS AS VOLUME OF TRADE WAS MUCH LARGER AND REPRISALS ENVISAGED WERE MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE.

5. DONOWAKI SAID WASHINGTON WOULD BE A SATISFACTORY LOCALE TO CONTINUE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS MENTIONED REPTEL. MANSFIELD

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DTG:060858Z APR 81 SSN: 012021
TOR: 096/1013Z

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

060902Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7927

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3720
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6359

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 06112

EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/6/01 (SHERMAN, W.) OR-
TAGS: PEPR, JA, KS
SUBJECT: MOFA VIEWS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN
AND ROK

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: MOFA OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT WHILE GOJ HAS TAKEN NUMEROUS STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE ROK IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE KIM DAE JUNG AFFAIR, ALL ITS EFFORTS HAVE HAD LITTLE EFFECT IN THAWING THE ICE. FOR THE GOJ THE CRUX OF THE MATTER LIES IN ITS INABILITY FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL AS WELL AS SEMANTIC REASONS TO DEFINE THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA OR IN ANY OTHER REGION AS A "THREAT" AND THE KOREANS' REFUSAL TO ACCEPT FROM THE JAPANESE ANYTHING LESS THAN ITS OWN FORMULATION. MOFA IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT KOREA'S SECURITY AND BELIEVES IT HAS SAID AS MUCH BY HAILING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REAFFIRMATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE ROK'S DEFENSE. MOFA OFFERED THREE POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE CONTINUED ROK INSISTENCE THAT JAPAN EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT: (A) MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE WAY EXTERNAL PRESSURE CAN BE APPLIED TO JAPAN, (B) EMOTIONAL CATHARSIS, (C) CHANGE IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH KOREA. MOFA HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE CURRENT UPSURGE OF ROKG ANIMOSITY TOWARD JAPAN ORIGINATED IN THE BLUE HOUSE, AND THAT

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
EA, PRC

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/1#85
BY KAT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS FALLEN IN LINE TO PREVENT DEROGATION OF ITS AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, THE JAPANESE SEE ROK AMBASSADOR CHOI AS AN ASSET TO BOTH KOREA AND JAPAN BUT THEY RECOGNIZE HE MUST BE CIRCUMSPECT IN WHAT HE ADVISES SEUL UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY FAVOR A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PM SUZUKI AND PRESIDENT CHUN AS ONE MEANS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS, AND LOOK UPON ROK FOREIGN MINISTER LHO'S TRIP TO JAPAN IN JUNE AS WELL AS THE SEPTEMBER MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE AS PREPARING THE WAY FOR A SUMMIT. MOFA ALSO RECOGNIZES BUT DOES NOT CONDONE THE PERSONAL ANTI-PATHY KOREAN LEADERS SEEM TO FEEL TOWARD FOREIGN MINISTER ITO, AND ASSUMES THEY WILL REACT POSITIVELY IF HE IS REPLACED IN A CABINET RESHUFFLE LATER THIS YEAR. AWARE THAT THE NORTH KOREANS ARE TRYING TO CAPITALIZE ON CURRENT TENSIONS BETWEEN THE ROK AND JAPAN BY MAKING FRIENDLY GESTURES TO JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN BEHIND THE SCENES, MOFA IS CONCERNED THAT SOME ELEMENTS WITHIN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY HERE MIGHT BE ENTICED REGARDLESS OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE. THE GOVERNMENT FEARS THAT ITS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA MIGHT BE RETARDED OWING TO ROK SENSITIVITY OVER JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE NORTH. END SUMMARY.

3. OUR EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH WORKING LEVEL OF MOFA INDICATE THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS NONPLUSSED, AND MORE THAN A LITTLE CONCERNED, OVER ITS CONTINUING SOUR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA IN SPITE OF ITS EXPECTATION THAT WITH THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KIM DAE JUNG AFFAIR IN LATE JANUARY RELATIONS WOULD RAPIDLY IMPROVE. MOFA BELIEVES GOJ HAS TAKEN NUMBER OF STEPS SINCE THEN TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTEREST IN BETTER TIES, SUCH AS APPROVAL OF 19 BILLION YEN IN CREDITS TO THE ROKG, AGREEMENT TO A KOREAN REQUEST TO SUPPLY RICE, AND DISCUSSION IN TOKYO WITH ROKG REPRESENTATIVES ON THE STATUS OF KOREAN RESIDENTS HERE. MOFA ALSO NOTES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ITO HEADED GOJ DELEGATION TO PRESIDENT CHUN'S INAUGURATION IN SPITE OF STRENUOUS OBJECTIONS FROM OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE DIET AND INVITED ROK FOREIGN MINISTER LHO TO VISIT JAPAN AS HIS GUEST. IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, JAPAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY CHAIRMAN NAGANO AND KEIDANREN CHAIRMAN INAYAMA HAVE BOTH VISITED SEUL TO DISCUSS WAYS OF EXPANDING BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT. HAVING GIVEN WHAT IT CONSIDERS AMPLE PROOF OF ITS DESIRE TO RETURN

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RELATIONS TO A MORE NORMAL FOOTING, GOJ IS PERPLEXED BY WHAT IT REGARDS AS PETULANT KOREAN RESPONSE. THE JAPANESE LIST OF PERCEIVED GRIEVANCES INCLUDES ITO'S BEING TOLD BY ROKG LEADERS THAT JAPAN MUST RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA AS A THREAT, ROK EMBASSY OFFICERS MAKING REMARKS CRITICAL OF JAPAN IN OTHER NATIONS, INSPIRED LEAKS FROM SEUL THAT ROKG IS UNHAPPY WITH AMBASSADOR MAEDA'S APPOINTMENT, AND KOREAN MEDIA DISTORTING OF OFFICIAL GOJ STATEMENTS.

4. THE CRUX OF THE MATTER, AS MOFA SEES IT, IS THAT THE ROKG INSISTS THAT GOJ DEFINE THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN SAME MANNER AS IT AND THE U.S. DOES BY LABELING NORTH KOREA PUBLICLY AS A THREAT TO THE SOUTH AND TO PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA.

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

0 060902Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7928

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3721
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6360

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 TOKYO 06112

EXDIS
IN THE JAPANESE POLITICAL CONTEXT, THE WORD "THREAT"
IMPLIES MORE IMMEDIACY THAN IT DOES IN OUR LEXICON
AND CONNOTES NOT ONLY THE POTENTIAL BUT ALSO THE
INTENT TO USE FORCE. THERE IS A LONG HISTORY OF
DIET DEBATE OVER THIS CONCEPT. MOFA SAYS THE DOMESTIC
POLITICAL SITUATION HERE DOES NOT PERMIT GOJ TO
NAME ANY NATION, NOT EVEN SOVIET UNION, AS A THREAT
TO JAPAN. THE LOCAL PRESS WOULD JUMP ON SUCH A
FORMULATION AS GOJ JUSTIFICATION FOR A MASSIVE MILITARY
BUILDUP, THEREBY SETTING BACK CAREFUL GOJ EFFORTS
TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF INCREASED DEFENSE
SPENDING. IF GOJ WERE TO SPECIFY NORTH KOREA AS A
THREAT TO THE SOUTH, AND BY EXTENSION TO JAPAN, THE
OPPOSITION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO MAKE A MAJOR
ISSUE OUT OF IT BY CHARGING, ERRONEOUSLY OF COURSE,
THAT THE GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO PROVIDE MILITARY
EQUIPMENT TO THE ROK, OR PERHAPS EVEN ENTER INTO A
DEFENSE TREATY RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH KOREA IN ORDER
TO COUNTER THE ALLEGED THREAT. MOFA WORRIES THAT
SUCH A COURSE OF EVENTS WOULD QUICKLY DEGENERATE INTO
A FUTILE AND IRRELEVANT SEMANTIC DEBATE IN THE DIET
AND THE PRESS WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY IMPEDE RATIONAL
CONSIDERATION OF LEGITIMATE SECURITY ISSUES BUT ALSO
COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE TIES WITH THE ROK.
5. MOFA IS DISQUIETED THAT THE KOREANS HAVE TAKEN TO

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE MEDIA TO COMPLAIN ABOUT JAPAN'S SUPPOSED INDIFFERENCE TO THE IMPORTANT ROLE KOREA PLAYS IN JAPAN'S SECURITY, AND IS ANNOYED THAT THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT ISSUE HAS BEEN RESURRECTED NOW. ACCORDING TO NORTHEAST ASIA (KOREA) DIVISION POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF SAITO, THE GOJ POSITION HAS REMAINED BASICALLY UNCHANGED SINCE 1973, WHEN THEN FOREIGN MINISTER KIMURA TOLD THE DIET THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS A THREAT TO SOUTH KOREA FROM THE NORTH. SAITO EXPLAINED THAT FOR THE JAPANESE, "THREAT" COMPRISES NOT ONLY CAPABILITY BUT ALSO INTENTION; AND SINCE GOJ DOES NOT BELIEVE THE DPRK INTENDS TO ATTACK THE ROK IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, IT DOES NOT PERCEIVE A THREAT. BE THAT AS IT MAY, THE JAPANESE FEEL THEY HAVE MORE THAN ADEQUATELY SIGNALLED THEIR CONCERN FOR SOUTH KOREA'S SECURITY. GOJ HAILED THE USG'S REAFFIRMATION OF ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ROK DURING PRESIDENT CHUN'S VISIT TO THE U.S. IN FEBRUARY, AND PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY STATES THAT "MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS IMPORTANT FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN EAST ASIA, INCLUDING JAPAN" -- A FORMULATION WHICH SAITO SAID WAS TANTAMOUNT TO AGREEING WITH THE ROK'S POSITION, YET AVOIDS THE POLITICALLY EXPLOSIVE WORD "THREAT". THIS BEING SO, MOFA ARGUES, CONTINUED KOREAN EMPHASIS ON THE THREAT ISSUE CREATES MUCH ILL-WILL FOR NO GOOD PURPOSE.

6. WE ASKED NORTHEAST ASIA DIVISION DIRECTOR OGURA WHY THE ROK IS STRESSING THE THREAT ISSUE AT THIS TIME. HE SUGGESTED THREE POSSIBLE REASONS: (A) MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE WAY EXTERNAL PRESSURE CAN BE APPLIED TO JAPAN; THE ROK HAS ASSUMED THAT THE USG CAN BULLY THE JAPANESE INTO LINE BY ARGUING THAT IF GOJ DOES NOT ADOPT THE "CORRECT" VIEW, THE U.S. WILL BE ANGRY. OGURA LAUGHED THAT THIS TACTIC MIGHT WORK WHERE AUTOMOBILES ARE CONCERNED, BUT NOT ON KOREA. KOREA, UNLIKE AUTOS, IS NOT A US-JAPAN BILATERAL ISSUE AND WERE U.S. PRESSURE TO BE APPLIED IT WOULD BE RESISTED. (B) EMOTIONAL CATHARSIS: THE ROK WAS DISPLEASED WITH JAPAN'S HANDLING OF THE KIM DAE JUNG AFFAIR, PIQUED THAT FM ITO LEFT CHUN'S INAUGURAL FESTIVITIES EARLY, AND IS GENUINELY ANNOYED THAT ITS NEIGHBOR WILL NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT IN THE SAME TERMS AS THEY THEMSELVES SEE IT. ACCORDING TO MOFA THE LATTER ISSUE HAS BECOME FOR THE KOREANS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE RELEASE OF A GENERALIZED FEELING OF FRUSTRATION AND IRRITATION AT OUTSIDERS' MISUNDERSTANDING OF AND

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LACK OF REGARD FOR KOREAN SENSIBILITIES. (C) CHANGE IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE ROK: THE POLITICIANS AND THOSE WHO HAD POWER IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER PARK CHUNG HEE ARE GONE NOW. THE NEW LEADERS DO NOT KNOW JAPANESE POLITICIANS AND, BEING HIGHLY NATIONALISTIC, ARE GENERALLY SUSPICIOUS OF THEIR NEIGHBOR. THESE PEOPLE MAY BELIEVE THAT BY APPLYING PRESSURE TO JAPAN NOW, EVEN IF GOJ DOES NOT BUDGE ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUE AT HAND, AN ADVANTAGE WILL ULTIMATELY ACCRUE TO KOREA BY KEEPING JAPAN ON THE DEFENSIVE. THERE MAY NOT BE ANY IMMEDIATE GAIN, BUT KOREA WILL COME OUT AHEAD IF JAPAN CAN BE MADE TO FEEL BEHOLDEN TO THE ROK FOR ANY FUTURE IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS.

7. MOFA SAYS IT IS PREPARED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE TO OVERLOOK KOREAN PRESS ATTACKS ON JAPAN, BELIEVING THAT THERE IS NOTHING TO BE GAINED FROM A MUD-SLINGING

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 060902Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7929

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3722
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6361

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 TOKYO 06112

EXDIS
CONTEST. HOWEVER, THE MINISTRY IS DISMAYED AT REPORTS IT HAS RECEIVED THAT ROK OFFICIALS ARE SPEAKING ILL OF JAPAN IN THE PRESENCE OF THIRD COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES OVERSEAS. THE NORTHEAST ASIA DIVISION TOLD US IT HAS BEEN RECEIVING CABLES FROM JAPANESE EMBASSIES "ALL OVER THE WORLD" REPORTING ON ROK CRITICISM OF JAPAN. MOFA SEES THESE ATTACKS AS SERVING NO CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSE AND FEARS THAT THEY MIGHT EVENTUALLY PROVOKE EMOTIONAL JAPANESE REACTION WHICH WOULD MOST LIKELY SET OFF THE PROVERBIAL VICIOUS DOWNWARD CYCLE. MOFA HAS CONCLUDED THAT WHAT IT TERMS THE ROK'S "HIGH POSTURE" TOWARD JAPAN ORIGINATED IN THE BLUE HOUSE, AND THE KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS FALLEN IN LINE TO HUSBAND ITS INFLUENCE FOR LATER USE. ROK AMBASSADOR CHOI IS CONSIDERED A GREAT ASSET BOTH TO KOREA AND JAPAN, BUT MOFA BELIEVES HE TOO FEELS THAT THOSE CRITICAL OF JAPAN ARE TOO STRONG TO BE TACKLED FRONTALLY AT THIS STAGE. IF HE URGES HIS GOVERNMENT TO SHOW MORE UNDERSTANDING OF JAPAN'S POSITION ON THE THREAT ISSUE HE WOULD NOT BE LISTENED TO, MOFA BELIEVES, AND MIGHT EVEN LOSE CREDIBILITY AT HOME. HE THUS HAS TO BE CIRCUMSPECT IN WHAT HE ADVISES SEOUL.

8. FOREIGN MINISTER ITO IS A VERY IMPORTANT ACTOR IN THIS PIECE, FOR BOTH JAPAN AND THE ROK. HE REALIZES

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT HE IS A SYMBOL TO THE KOREANS FOR ALL THE ANXIETY THEY FEEL IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. HE WAS HIS GOVERNMENT'S POINT OF PRESSURE ON THE ROKG DURING THE KIM DAE JUNG AFFAIR, FOR WHICH HE IS RESENTED IN SEOUL, AND ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT PERCEIVED AS ACTIVELY HOSTILE TO THE ROK, NEITHER IS HE CONSIDERED A FRIEND AS, FOR EXAMPLE, IS FORMER PM FUKUDA. ITO IS ALSO IN SOME WAYS AN UNCOMPLICATED MAN WHO SOMETIMES HAS A TENDENCY TO SEE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN BLACK AND WHITE TERMS. WHEN HE TOLD SECRETARY HAIG THAT GOJ DOES NOT SEE NORTH KOREA AS A THREAT TO THE SOUTH, HE MEANT IT FOR ALL THE ESTABLISHED JAPANESE REASONS, BUT, AGAIN ACCORDING TO MOFA, PERHAPS EVEN MORE BECAUSE CCP VICE CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING PERSONALLY ASSURED HIM IT IS SO. HIS REMARKS ON THE DPRK THREAT WERE DISTORTED IN THE ROK PRESS, BUT HE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK THAT HE WOULD NOT APOLOGIZE FOR ANY OF THE FUROR THEY OCCASIONED IN KOREA BECAUSE HE HAD SPOKEN ONLY THE TRUTH AND THERE WAS NOTHING TO APOLOGIZE FOR. OUR MOFA CONTACTS FEEL THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PERSONALITY AND DIRECT, UNSUBTLE STYLE, (SOMEWHAT UNCHARACTERISTIC OF A JAPANESE POLITICIAN), AND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIM MATTER, HAVE MADE HIM A LIABILITY IN GOJ EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH SEOUL. THEY BELIEVE THAT A CABINET RESHUFFLE, WHICH PM SUZUKI WOULD UNDERTAKE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS BUT WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN ITO'S REPLACEMENT AS FOREIGN MINISTER, COULD VERY WELL REMOVE AN IRRITANT TO BETTER TIES.

9. THE MOFA PLAN FOR DISSOLVING ROK HOSTILITY IS A SERIES OF OFFICIAL MEETINGS CULMINATING IN A VISIT TO SEOUL BY PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI TOWARD THE END OF THIS YEAR. (A VISIT HERE BY CHUN DDD HWAN WOULD PROBABLY BE GREETED BY ANTI-ROK DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH WOULD LEAVE A BAD TASTE WITH THE KOREANS WHICH MIGHT ACTUALLY SET BACK THE RELATIONSHIP.) TOO EARLY A VISIT BY SUZUKI MIGHT BE SEEN IN THE ROK AS A BLATANT JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE "THREAT" ISSUE. THE JAPANESE THEREFORE HOPE TO BUILD UP TO SUCH A VISIT BY A SERIES OF STEPS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE OFFICIAL CONTACTS, BEGINNING WITH A VISIT HERE IN JUNE BY ROK FONMIN LHO SHIN YONG (POSTPONED FROM APRIL BECAUSE OF WHAT MOFA TELLS US ARE LEGITIMATE SCHEDULE CONFLICTS) FOLLOWED BY A ROK-JAPAN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE IN SEPTEMBER. THESE WOULD HOPEFULLY GRADUALLY CREATE A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE IN THE

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RELATIONSHIP THAN NOW EXISTS. MOFA ALSO FEELS IT WILL ONLY BE A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR MAEDA OVERCOMES THE INITIAL NEGATIVE REACTION WHICH HIS ASSIGNMENT GENERATED IN SOME ROK CIRCLES AND BEGINS TO WORK EFFECTIVELY TO FURTHER IMPROVE ROK-JAPAN ATMOSPHERICS.

10. NORTH KOREA IS THE MONKEY WRENCH WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY UNTRACK MOFA PLANS FOR A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH THE ROK. OGURA SAID THAT AS THE ROK BAIT'S JAPAN, THE NORTH KOREANS ARE MAKING FRIENDLY GESTURES BEHIND THE SCENES IN SPITE OF THEIR HOSTILE PUBLIC RHETORIC. HE NOTED THAT PYONGYANG HAD PAID THE LAST THREE INSTALLMENTS OF ITS DEBT TO JAPAN ON TIME AND HAS BEEN DISCUSSING MINERAL DEVELOPMENT WITH JAPANESE MINING AND SMELTING COMPANIES. MOFA DOES

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7930

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3723
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6362

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 TOKYO 06112

EXDIS
NOT BELIEVE THE GOJ WILL BE MOVED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE DPRK, BUT IS NOT SURE THAT SOME ELEMENTS WITHIN THE JAPANESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY MIGHT NOT BE ENTICED REGARDLESS OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE. IF NORTH KOREA BEGINS A MAJOR NEW CAMPAIGN DIRECTED AT JAPANESE BUSINESS--WHICH THE NORTHEAST ASIA DIVISION FEARS MAY BE IN FULL GEAR BY SUMMER OR EARLY AUTUMN--AND JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN RESPOND FAVORABLY, THERE IS THE DANGER THAT TOKYO'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH SEOUL MAY BE SET BACK OWING TO SOUTH KOREAN SENSITIVITY OVER JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE NORTH.

11. COMMENT: THE JAPANESE CONSIDER THEMSELVES THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE CURRENT DISPUTE. THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SOUTH KOREA'S STABILITY BECAUSE IT DIRECTLY AFFECTS THEIR OWN. THEY ALSO VERY MUCH WANT TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ROK, AND ARE FRUSTRATED AND PERPLEXED THAT SEOUL KEEPS THROWING THE "CORRECT ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT" AT THEM AT EVERY TURN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE VIEW THAT THE KOREANS ARE IMMATURE AND POORLY BEHAVED SEEMS TO PERVADE EVEN THE SOPHISTICATED FOREIGN MINISTRY. (WE WERE TOLD AT ONE POINT THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONSENSUS IS THAT JAPAN SHOULD ADOPT AN "ADULT" ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ROK IN THE CURRENT SITUATION AND

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WAIT FOR IT TO COME TO ITS SENSES.) SUCH RIGHTEDUS
INDIGNATION IS BEING SAVED, HOWEVER, FOR PRIVATE
CONVERSATIONS WITH CLOSE FRIENDS AND THE JAPANESE
SEEM TO HAVE THEMSELVES UNDER CONTROL IN PUBLIC.
BOTH SIDES ARE CLEARLY THE VICTIMS, HOWEVER, OF THEIR
PAST COLONIAL RELATIONSHIPS. THE JAPANESE SCENARIO
FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS WILL BE TIME CONSUMING,
BUT GIVEN POLITICAL REALITIES HERE, THERE IS LIKELY
TO BE LITTLE ELSE THAT THE JAPANESE CAN DO. IN THE
MEANTIME, WHILE IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR INTERESTS TO
SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND WE
SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE IT, WE SHOULD
AVOID BEING CAST BY EITHER PARTY IN THE ROLE OF
MIDDLEMEN. END COMMENT. MANSFIELD

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MSJ
112404

RECEIVED 07 APR 81 19

DOCDATE 07 APR 81

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

GUEST LIST

MEYER, CORD

SUBJECT: MEYER VISIT TO JAPAN & SOME OBSERVATIONS - POSSIBLE ADDITIONS TO
GUEST LIST FOR THE SUZUKI DINNER

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

TYSON ✓

LILLEY ✓

COMMENTS

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ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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W/ATTCH FILE

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

April 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT:

Japan Potpourri

In answer to two of your questions:

-- Cord Meyer did see the people I recommended in Japan. The person who impressed him most was Sadako Nakamura Ogata, scholar and former Chief of Japan's Mission to the UN General Assembly. (U)

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RVA — Don is too modest to say it, but I will! he is not on the guest list. The NSC staffer ought to be included. Janet.
Guest List for Suzuki Dinner. I agree the list is dull. It seems loaded with has-beens and some never-wases. A few suggestions might include:

-- Professor and Mrs. John Curtis Perry of Harvard. He has just published a significant book on the American occupation of Japan. (U)

-- Mr. and Mrs. Edson W. Spencer, President of Honeywell, member of the Wise Men, promoter of tremendously successful joint venture in Japan. (U)

-- Mr. and Mrs. Dave McEachron, President of the Japan Society. (U)

-- Professor and Mrs. Robert Scalapino, University of California. (U)

More Thoughts on the Suzuki Visit. The Japanese Embassy is being inspected by the Foreign Office from Tokyo. I was asked to testify as to the local embassy's effectiveness, or lack thereof, at a very nice lunch today. My friendly inquisitor was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. He has some stimulating thoughts on the Suzuki visit which I provoked by my comments about Mr. Ito's recent sojourn. Among other things, [REDACTED] said that Suzuki:

-- Needs to be educated. (U)

-- Needs to be told that there are limits to the U.S. defense capability and that Japan must take up the slack. (U)

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By 62J, NARA, Date 7/24/06

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-- Needs to be told that we are not running away from economic aid -- are doing all we can and count on Japan to supplement. (S)

██████████ said Suzuki is coming to Washington prepared to deal with our pressure like a man playing judo. If we don't put pressure on him in specific terms but state the limits of what we can do plus our expectation that Japan will take up the slack, Suzuki will be left with a disturbing sense of obligation which he will then seek to implement. He urged us to move beyond the expression of generalities to a frank discussion of what we can and cannot do. I found the lunch most useful. (S)

Yes. I agree

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JANET COLSON	<u>JC</u>		
BUD NANCE	<u>BN</u>		
DICK ALLEN	<u>DA</u>	14/23/63	
IRENE DERUS	<u>ID</u>	15/09/63	
JANET COLSON	<u>JC</u>	15/09/57	
BUD NANCE	<u>BN</u>		
KAY	<u>_____</u>		
CY TO VP	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>
CY TO MEESE	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>
CY TO BAKER	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>
CY TO DEAVER	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>
CY TO BRADY	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHKO #6412 1000311
O 100310Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8061

~~S E C R E T~~ TOKYO 06412
NODIS
EO 120651 RDS-1 4/10/81 (SHERMAN, W.C.) DR-M
TAGS: NATO, UR, PL, JA
SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ POLAND; BRIEFING JAPANESE ON NATO CON-
- TINGENCY PAPER
REF: STATE 85964

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POL COUNSELOR TOLD DONOWAKI APRIL 9 THAT US AS WELL AS CANADIANS AND WEST GERMANS HOPED THAT JAPANESE RE-
SPONSE TO APRIL 3 BRIEFING COULD BE MADE TO ALL MEMBERS OF TRIP AT SAME TIME AND WOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE AND CANDID. DONOWAKI ADVISED THAT IF DEPARTMENT CALLS NEXT MEETING, EITHER TO HEAR JAPANESE RESPONSE OR TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON NATO PLANNING, AND SEES TO IT THAT CANADIANS AND WEST GERMANS ARE PRESENT, JAPANESE EMBASSY WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS WITH SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. MOFA WOULD LEAVE TO DISCRETION OF DEPARTMENT WHETHER FUTURE SESSIONS INCLUDE THE ENTIRE TRIO OR JUST THE US.
3. DONOWAKI OFFERED AS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT JAPANESE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE REPLY IN NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE. REPLY WOULD BE VERY SPECIFIC ON POLITICAL MEASURES (WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE COORDINATION

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BY MS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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DTG:100310Z APR 81 PSNI 019057
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DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OUTSIDE OF MOFA) AND WOULD OUTLINE IN GENERAL TERMS THOSE ECONOMIC MEASURES WHICH COULD CLEARLY BE TAKEN AND THOSE WHICH WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT. HOWEVER, AS MOFA STILL IS RELUCTANT TO PASS CONTINGENCY PAPER TO OTHER MINISTRIES IN ORDER TO AVOID LEAKS, RESPONSES ON ECONOMIC MEASURES MAY NOT BE AS FORTHCOMING AS TRIO WOULD LIKE.

4. DONOWAKI NOTED THAT LORD CARRINGTON HAD TOLD FONMIN ITO THAT SINCE NATO COUNCIL AT FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL WOULD PROBABLY ADOPT MEASURES VERY RAPIDLY AFTER SOVIET INTERVENTION, HE SHOULD ALSO COME TO BRUSSELS. ITO RULED OUT HIS PRESENCE AS POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE HERE BUT SUGGESTED THAT JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH AT THAT POINT. DONOWAKI SAID THIS INDICATED ITO'S THINKING HAD EVOLVED TO POINT WHERE HE WOULD PERMIT MOFA WORKING LEVEL TO TRAVEL TO BRUSSELS IMMEDIATELY AFTER INTERVENTION IF SITUATION IS PRESSING ONE; OTHERWISE, ITO STILL WANTED THE WASHINGTON CHANNEL USED FOR DAY-TO-DAY CONSULTATIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT TO IMPLEMENT INDIVIDUAL ITEMS ON WHAT DONOWAKI TERMED A "SHOPPING LIST."

5. COMMENT. IT IS CLEAR FROM COMMENTS OF MOFA'S WORKING LEVEL OFFICERS THAT THEY ARE INCREASINGLY DISCOMFITED BY THIS ELABORATE SCENARIO. THEY RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY MUST ACT ACCORDING TO IT SO LONG AS ITO REMAINS IN OFFICE BECAUSE HE BELIEVES ANY PERCEPTION HERE THAT JAPAN IS COORDINATING DIRECTLY WITH NATO WOULD CAUSE POLITICAL STORM JEOPARDIZING JAPANESE COOPERATION WITH OUR JOINT EFFORTS. MANSFIELD

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TOR: 100/0742Z

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8111

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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: ETRD, JA
SUBJECT: U.S. AUTO BRIEFING MISSION: FINAL REPORT
REF: TOKYO 06294

1. THE U.S. AUTO MISSION CONCLUDED ITS BRIEFING OF GOJ OFFICIALS APRIL 10. JAPANESE CHAIRMAN, MOFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL HAZUMI, EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH COMPLETENESS OF BRIEFING AND CONCURRED WITH U.S. SIDE'S STATEMENT THAT THERE WERE NO OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE PURPOSES OF THE MISSION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED: TO DEEPEN THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ON DOMESTIC U.S. MEASURES BEING UNDERTAKEN TO PROMOTE THE REVITALIZATION OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY, TO PUT THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM AND TO EXPLAIN TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S. BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THAT NO NEGOTIATION HAD BEEN CONDUCTED DURING THE MISSION AND THAT, BY PRE-AGREEMENT, NO ANTI-TRUST ISSUES HAD BEEN RAISED. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE MISSION, AS CHARACTERIZED BY HAZUMI ON APRIL 7, HAD ENGAGED IN A DIALOGUE WITH GOJ OFFICIALS SO AS TO FURTHER ENHANCE JAPANESE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESSES AND FORCES AT WORK IN THE U.S. REGARDING AUTOS.

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

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BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/29/06

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2. APRIL 10 [LOCAL] PRESS STORIES CONTINUED TO BE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND GENERALLY FACTUAL. MOST EMPHASIZED THAT PROSPECTS REMAIN SERIOUS THAT THE CONGRESS COULD PASS SOME TYPE OF PROTECTIONIST LEGISLATION AND THAT THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY FACES SEVERE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS ESPECIALLY OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS. POINTING OUT THAT THE U.S. IS SEEKING HELP FROM JAPAN, MANY PAPERS THEN REPORTED THAT THE GOJ WOULD HOLD CABINET-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS DURING WEEK APRIL 13, TO DISCUSS JAPAN'S MEASURES TOWARD THE AUTO PROBLEM. THERE WERE REPORTS (APPARENTLY TRUE) THAT SOME LDP DIETMEN PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. SHORTLY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH COUNTERPARTS IN THE CONGRESS. SUCH PRESS REPORTS REINFORCE THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT THE GOJ IS MOVING TO SOLVE THIS ISSUE PRIOR TO PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S VISIT. ABSENT FROM PRESS REPORTS AT END OF MISSION WERE ANY OPINION THAT THE USG'S EFFORTS HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY EXTENSIVE (SEE REFTEL). PRESS CONTINUED TO REFLECT DIVISIONS IN JAPAN BETWEEN THOSE WHO ADVOCATE SOME TYPE OF RESTRAINT FOR ONLY ONE YEAR AND THOSE WHO SEE NEED FOR LONGER PROGRAM.

3. COMMENT: THE MISSION SERVED ADMIRABLY THE PURPOSE OF MARSHALLING THE FACTS AND REALITIES OF THE AUTO PICTURE IN THE U.S. ARMED WITH THIS INFORMATION, THOSE GOJ OFFICIALS WHO BELIEVE A COOPERATIVE RESPONSE TO THE U.S. IS NECESSARY WILL PROCEED TO TRY AND BRING ALONG THOSE WHO ARGUE AGAINST PRECIPITIOUS JAPANESE ACTION ON EXPORTS. WE EXPECT THE GOJ'S TIMETABLES OF REACHING SOME TYPE OF SOLUTION PRIOR TO THE SUZUKI VISIT WILL HOLD.

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O 101011Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8120

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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 04/10/01 (SHERMAN, R.C.) FROM
TAGS: ETRD, PIAT, JA
SUBJECT: (N) LDP DELEGATION PLANS VISIT TO U.S. TO
DISCUSS AUTO PROBLEM

1. (A - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. LOWER HOUSE DIET MEMBER HEIJI OGAWA, CHAIRMAN OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) SUB-COMMITTEE ON AUTO INDUSTRY, ON APRIL 9 ANNOUNCED PLANS TO LEAD DIET DELEGATION TO U.S. TO DISCUSS AUTO TRADE PROBLEM WITH CONGRESSIONAL COUNTERPARTS. ALTHOUGH SENIOR LDP AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED DOUBTS AS TO ADVISABILITY OF SUCH A MISSION AT THIS TIME, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF UPCOMING EASTER CONGRESSIONAL BREAK, WE UNDERSTAND MITI MINISTER TANAKA ENCOURAGED VISIT AS MEANS OF SENSITIZING JAPANESE POLITICIANS OPPOSED TO VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS TO VIEWS ON CAPITOL HILL. MOFA HAS INFORMED US THAT DELEGATION PRESENTLY PLANS TO LEAVE JAPAN APRIL 15 AND THAT JAPANESE EMBASSY WASHINGTON WILL BE SEEKING TO ARRANGE MEETINGS. WE WILL PROVIDE NAMES OF OTHER MEMBERS WHEN AVAILABLE.
3. OGAWA (71), 12-TERM DIETMAN WHO HAS SERVED IN PAST AS MINISTER OF LABOR AND OF HOME AFFAIRS, IS A KEY MEMBER OF PM SUZUKI'S OWN FACTION. AS "CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE" OF SUZUKI FACTION, HE COMES NEXT AFTER SUZUKI IN SENIORITY AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES AND FINANCES. OGAWA IS UNCLE OF CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYAZAWA. HE HAS LONG BEEN KNOWN FOR CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH AUTO INDUSTRY. HIS PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS UP TO NOW HAVE

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
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NLS F00-0371 #89
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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TOR:1001020

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DATE 04/17/81//107

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BEEN WITH CHINA. AN EARLY PROPONENT OF JAPAN-CHINA
RELATIONS, HE HAS VISITED CHINA ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS
AND HIS YOUNGER BROTHER, HEISHIRO OGAWA, WAS JAPANESE
AMBASSADOR TO CHINA 1975-78. FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT
OF AUTO MISSION, OGAWA TOLD REPORTERS THAT HE HAD
NEVER BEEN TO U.S. BUT THAT HE FELT WELL QUALIFIED
TO EXPLAIN SITUATION OF JAPANESE AUTO INDUSTRY TO
HIS AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS.
MANSFIELD

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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O 131015Z APR 81 ZPF4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8184

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 06614
NDDIS
E.O. 12065; GDS 4/13/87 (SHERMAN, W.) OR-M
TAGS: TOCY, PLOS, JA
SUBJECT: NEXT SESSION OF LOS CONFERENCE; JAPANESE
VIEWS
REF: STATE 091940

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. BECAUSE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF TREATIES BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL AND URGENCY OF INSTRUCTIONS, POLITICAL COUNSELOR CALLED ON HIS DEPUTY, TAKAKAZU KURIYAMA, AFTERNOON OF APRIL 13 TO MAKE REPTEL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LIMITING PROPOSED LOS CONFERENCE SUMMER SESSION TO MAXIMUM OF FOUR WEEKS AND TO DELAY DRAFTING COMMITTEE MEETING UNTIL JULY 13 AT EARLIEST.
3. KURIYAMA STATED THAT GOJ WAS AWARE THAT THERE COULD BE NO SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION OF LOS NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL USG COMPLETED ITS CURRENT REVIEW. ON THIS BASIS, AMBASSADOR NAKAGAWA HAS ALREADY INDICATED, IN ASIAN GROUP MEETINGS AS WELL AS TO OTHER WEO MEMBERS, THAT IDEAL SOLUTION WOULD BE TO POSTPONE NEXT CONFERENCE SESSION UNTIL NEXT YEAR. KURIYAMA ASSURED US THE JAPANESE DELEGATION WOULD THEREFORE HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN SPEAKING UP IN SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION

TOKYO 6614

DTG: 131015Z APR 81 PSNI 022816
TORI 103/1139Z

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BY NOT NARA DATE 7/24/06

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AT APRIL 13 WEO MEETING IN NEW YORK.

4. KURIYAMA TOOK OPPORTUNITY AGAIN TO URGE USG TO COMPLETE ITS TREATY REVIEW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT LOS CONFERENCE COULD COMPLETE ITS WORK WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY. HE ALSO WELCOMED REPTEL OFFER OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS AS OUR REVIEW PROCEEDS, INDICATING THAT THIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO WAITING UNTIL USG REACHES FINAL POSITION ON ALL ASPECTS OF DRAFT TREATY.

5. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK.
MANSFIELD

TOKYO 6614

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
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O 141148Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8235

INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
COMUS KOREA PRIORITY
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY
COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 06727

COMUS PASS ADM LONG
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 04/14/01 (SHERMAN, WILLIAM C) DR-N
TAGS: MPELL, MARR, JA, US
SUBJECT: SUBMARINE COLLISION INCIDENT
REF: TOKYO 06527

1. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER HAS CALLED US ATTENTION TO VARIOUS UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT COLLISION INCIDENT IN HOPING FOR THOROUGH AND EXPEDITIOUS INVESTIGATION. AMBASSADOR OKAWARA HAS BEEN ASKED TO CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO SECDEF ASAP AND EMBASSY RECOMMENDS SECDEF SEE HIM, EVEN IF BRIEFLY. ALTHOUGH PRESS COVERAGE HAS FALLEN OFF SOMEWHAT IN PAST FEW DAYS, INCIDENT IS ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED IN DEGREE OF PUBLIC INTEREST IT HAS ENGENDERED. THOROUGH, EXPEDITIOUS INVESTIGATION, PROMPT COMPENSATION AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT JUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE WILL BE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN LAYING MATTER TO REST. END SUMMARY.
2. MOFA SECURITY DIVISION DIRECTOR TANBA CALLED EMOFF TO MINISTRY AFTERNOON APRIL 14 TO NOTE FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMENT TO DIET TO EFFECT

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL - VP
EA, ASIMET

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-0371 #91
BY WJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

PSN:024271

DTG:141148

TOR:1041211

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME WIDE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN US NAVY'S ACCOUNT OF INCIDENT AND THAT OF SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS OF JAPANESE FREIGHTER. FOR EXAMPLE, ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, SURVIVORS CLAIM WEATHER WAS NOT AS BAD AS USN MAINTAINS AND THAT THEY COULD CLEARLY SEE CIRCLING SEARCH AIRCRAFT TO WHICH THEY SIGNALLED. SOME ALSO MAINTAIN THAT SUBMARINE OBSERVED RUBBER RAFTS WITH PERISCOPE. MINISTER ASKED THAT THESE AND OTHER DISCREPANCIES (E.G. NOTIFICATION TIMES) BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF US AND TO EXPRESS TO US HIS HOPE THAT INVESTIGATION WILL TAKE ALL OF ABOVE INTO CONSIDERATION AND THAT IT WILL BE COMPLETED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

3. TANBA SAID THAT DIET SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SECURITY HAD DEVOTED SEVERAL HOURS TO INCIDENT MONDAY FOLLOWED BY LENGTHY INTERPELLATIONS IN CABINET AND STEERING COMMITTEES TODAY. CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYAZAWA HAD BEEN CALLED TO DIET TODAY TO MEET DEMAND THAT GOJ CONVENE PLENARY SESSION OF DIET FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING INCIDENT. TANBA OBSERVED THAT IN HIS THREE YEARS ON JOB, HE HAD NEVER SEEN A SINGLE INCIDENT RECEIVE SUCH MAGNITUDE OF ATTENTION AND COMMENT AS SUBMARINE INCIDENT. HE SAID VIEW OF MOST OF HIS COLLEAGUES WAS THAT INCIDENT COULD RESULT IN "SERIOUSLY NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS" ON PART OF JAPANESE TOWARDS US UNLESS IT WERE EFFECTIVELY HANDLED.

4. TANBA SAID MINISTER'S COMMENTS REPRESENTED VIEWS OF MOFA BUREAUCRACY AS WELL, I.E. THAT THE SOONER THE US SIDE CAN COME UP WITH RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION, THE BETTER FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS. HE SAID HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE READY TO ASSIST IN EVERY WAY TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE FALLOUT BUT NOTHING RIGHT NOW WAS SO IMPORTANT TO DOING THIS AS AN EXPEDITIOUSLY-COMPLETED INVESTIGATION. HE SAID IT WOULD HELP IF US SIDE COULD PROVIDE GOJ SOME SORT OF SCHEDULE FOR INVESTIGATION AND SOME INDICATIONS OF HOW LONG IT MIGHT TAKE. EMBOFF REITERATED THAT US NAVY HAD PROMISED THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND WANTED TO COMPLETE IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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SENSITIVE

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BUT IN VIEW OF LIKELY NECESSITY TO INTERVIEW
ALL CONCERNED IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO SET A
DEFINITE TIMEFRAME FOR COMPLETION.

5. TAMBA DISCLOSED THAT MOFA HAD INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR
OKAWARA TO SEE SECDEF WEINBERGER AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE TO CONVEY TO HIGHEST RELEVANT OFFICIAL
IN WASHINGTON FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONCERN.

6. JAPANESE MEDIA INTEREST SINCE SATURDAY IN THE
SUBMARINE COLLISION INCIDENT REMAINED HIGH BUT
NOT AT THE LEVEL OF THE WEEKEND COVERAGE. BY
TUESDAY EVENING MANY PAPERS HAD RELEGATED DISCUSSION
OF THE ISSUE TO THE INSIDE PAGES REFLECTING PERHAPS

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

0 141148Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8236

INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
ZENZENZ/COMUS KOREA PRIORITY
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY
COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 06727

THE ABSENCE OF ANY MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE. SUNDAY EDITIONS OF NATIONAL DAILIES CARRIED EDITORIALS PROBING ISSUES SUCH AS WHY DID THE SUBMARINE NOT STOP TO LOOK FOR SURVIVORS, WHY THE ACCIDENT WENT UNREPORTED FOR SO LONG, AND WARNING OF IMPLICATIONS OF THE INCIDENT FOR U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS. MOST SAID ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WERE ESSENTIAL TO LAYING MATTER TO REST. FACTUAL COVERAGE WAS GIVEN OVER PAST TWO DAYS TO THE NAMING OF AN INVESTIGATOR BY THE U.S. NAVY AND THE QUESTIONING OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE DIET.

7. JDA DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OKAZAKI CONCEDED THAT DIET INTEREST WAS VERY HEAVY, BUT REMARKED THAT IT WAS APPARENT MOST QUESTIONERS RETAINED HIGH DEGREE OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN BASIC FAIR PLAY OF AMERICANS. OKAZAKI SHARED VIEW THAT RAPID COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION REPORT WOULD MINIMIZE DAMAGE AND HE SAID IT WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT

PSN:024272

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

JUSTICE BE SEEN TO BE DONE BY US SIDE.

8. PRIME MINISTER MONDAY SAID HE APPRECIATED US SINCERITY AND EFFORTS NOT TO LET INCIDENT CAST SHADOW OVER US-JAPAN RELATIONS. HE NOTED US HAD UNDERTAKEN TO FIND OUT TRUTH ABOUT INCIDENT AND TO CONSIDER COMPENSATION, AS WELL AS PRESIDENT'S EXPRESSION OF REGRET.

9. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FIVE PROTEST GROUPS THUS FAR; FUKUYAMA HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL PROTEST GROUPS AND REPORTED AT LEAST ONE DEMONSTRATION. AMBASSADOR ALSO RECEIVED LETTER FROM HOKKAIDO ALL JAPAN SEAMEN'S UNION DELIVERED THROUGH LABOR ATTACHE CALLING FOR MEASURES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF INCIDENT, PROMPT AND ADEQUATE COMPENSATION AND THOROUGH INVESTIGATION.

10. COMMENT: WE AGREE THAT, DESPITE SOME LETUP IN PRESS COVERAGE (MUCH OF WHICH WAS FOCUSED ON SPACE SHUTTLE), SUBMARINE COLLISION HAS COMMANDED MORE WIDESPREAD AND INTENSE PUBLIC ATTENTION THAN ANY OTHER INCIDENT IN PAST SEVERAL YEARS. OBVIOUSLY, FASTER INVESTIGATION IS FINISHED, LESS EXTENSIVE WILL BE ADVERSE FALLOUT. PROMPT AND ADEQUATE COMPENSATION IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SETTLEMENT. ABOVE ALL, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INCIDENT BE DEALT WITH COMPLETELY AND EFFECTIVELY IN THE REPORT AND THAT THE FINAL US DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BE PERCEIVED AS METING OUT JUSTICE.

11. NOFA HAS TOLD US THAT AMBASSADOR'S PROMPT CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER HELPED IMMEASURABLY TO KEEP INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL. WE BELIEVE AMBASSADOR KAWARA'S MEETING WITH SECDEF WILL SERVE SIMILAR PURPOSE AND STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT SECDEF SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER BEING ASKED, EVEN IF ONLY BRIEFLY.
MANSFIELD

BT

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

April 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Collision Incident

On the morning of April 9, the US submarine George Washington was conducting an anti-submarine warfare exercise with an American P3 aircraft in international waters off the coast of Japan. Visibility, as reported by the Americans, was poor. The submarine was at periscope depth as part of the exercise and surfaced after the indication of a possible collision. The submarine Commander, feeling there was no immediate danger to life and limb, submerged and left the scene for an area where the communication possibilities were better, then he voice radioed notification of a collision some two hours after the time now established as the collision time. The submarine also asked the P3 aircraft to search the area to determine whether a ship had been damaged.

Eighteen hours later, a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel picked up 13 members of a Japanese freighter which had sunk as a result of a collision with the submarine. Two members of the crew, the Captain and Chief Engineer, are missing. The State Department notified the Japanese government on April 10 that apparently a collision had taken place. The surviving crew members state that they saw the circling American aircraft which did not respond to their distress signals. Some crew members also claim that the submarine surfaced to periscope depth and observed them in life rafts. Follow-up reports from the American submarine indicate that after sensing that a collision might have taken place, the submarine surfaced and saw the Japanese freighter which did not appear to be in difficulty. After notifying the P3, the submarine submerged. The P3 aircraft claims that they searched but saw no life rafts or signs of a collision.

The US Navy has admitted culpability and will pay appropriate compensation to Japan. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations has assured that an expeditious investigation will take place. A Navy Captain from CINCPAC is now in Japan and conducting the investigation.

There has been heavy and critical press play in Japan and speculation that the American submarine may have wittingly

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-03711-92

BY LOT NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

left the scene of the accident. There is no evidence to support this. The collision took place in international waters but the fact that the submarine is of the missile firing variety has added to the speculation.

Ambassador Mansfield has formally apologized to the Japanese Foreign Minister but a quick and thorough investigation will be necessary to clear up some of the existing anomalies in the case.

cc: The Vice-President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL SENSITIVE~~

BRIAN - Although
 this is OTS, there are
 so many cc's going that
 it might be best
 to go thru you.

81 APR 15 P12: 0

~~to be taken care of~~

JANET COLSON

15/1334

BUD NANCE

15/1445

DICK ALLEN

15/1651

IRENE DERUS

15/1712

JANET COLSON

_____ TO

BUD NANCE

KAY

_____ ✓

CY TO VP

_____ ✓

SHOW CC

_____ ✓

CY TO MEESE

_____ ✓

SHOW CC

_____ ✓

CY TO BAKER

_____ ✓

SHOW CC

_____ ✓

CY TO DEAVER

_____ ✓

SHOW CC

_____ ✓

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

now

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SIGNED
SIGNED

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

April 15, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*
SUBJECT: Submarine Collision

Attached per your request is a memorandum to the President summarizing the submarine incident in the Sea of Japan.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/1-#93
BY KTS NARS DATE 7/24/06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1981

NOTE FOR: DON GREGG
FROM: DICK ALLEN *Dick*

PRIORITY

"Please prepare memo for the President
on background of incident and status."

Attachment (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on April 14, 2001

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-037/1# 94
BY LOI MARK DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL-SENSITIVE~~

April 14, 1981

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

McCorik
Don Gregg
Pls prepare
memo for Pan
back ground of
incident and
Stahley

1. Submarine Collision Incident: Japanese foreign ministry official Tanba called in an embassy officer yesterday to ask for an immediate U.S. investigation of alleged "wide divergences" between the U.S. Navy's account of the recent submarine collision and that of surviving crew members of the Japanese freighter. Tanba said it was the view of most in the ministry that this incident could result in "seriously negative perceptions" on the part of the Japanese towards the U.S. unless it were effectively handled. He also said he and his colleagues stood ready to assist in every way to minimize adverse fallout from the incident, but it would help, he added, if the U.S. could provide some sort of schedule for the investigation and some indication of how long it might take. He also noted that Ambassador Okawara had been instructed to meet immediately with Secretary Weinberger to convey Foreign Minister Ito's concern. Ambassador Mansfield believes Okawara's meeting with Weinberger will help immeasurably to keep this incident under control and he strongly recommends that the meeting be held as soon as possible after being asked, even if only briefly. (Tokyo 6727, PSN 24271, 24272) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REVIEW ON APRIL 14, 2001
CLASSIFIED BY EMBASSY TOKYO

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/1495
BY hjt NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

U 161127Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0336

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA IMMEDIATE
COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 06901

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 4/16/01 (KELLEY, J.) DRIP
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, JA, US
SUBJECT: ~~?~~ SUBMARINE COLLISION INCIDENT

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. TAMBA CALLED IN EMB OFF APRIL 16 TO SAY THAT INTENSE NATIONAL INTEREST IN SUBMARINE COLLISION INCIDENT CONTINUES. HE NOTED THAT INCIDENT WAS FOCUS OF QUESTIONING IN ALMOST EVERY DIET COMMITTEE, INCLUDING TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE AND OTHER BODIES WITH NO RELATION TO DEFENSE. HE REITERATED HIS JUDGEMENT THAT HE HAD SEEN NOTHING LIKE IT IN OVER ALMOST THREE YEARS ON JOB.

3. GIVEN THIS SITUATION, FOREIGN MINISTER ITO BELIEVED GOJ NEEDED TO MAKE SOME FURTHER EXPLANATION TO PEOPLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF ISSUE AND TO CONTAIN DIET QUESTIONING. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT MEAN TO INTERFERE WITH PROGRESS OF INVESTIGATION, BUT ASKED FOR U.S. COOPERATION IN COPING WITH HIGH-PRESSURE SITUATION. TAMBA HOPED U.S. WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON FOLLOWING POINTS NOT LATER THAN NEXT WEEK:

- (A) COMMENT ON WHY NOTIFICATION TOOK SO LONG;
- (B) DETAILS OF SUBMARINE'S RESCUE EFFORTS;

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN CCL VP
EA, ASINET

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 100-0371#96
BY LoJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

PSN:02710B

DTG:161127

TCR:1061239

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

- (C) DESCRIPTION OF INVESTIGATION SET-UP (INVESTIGATION OFFICER'S AUTHORITY, REVIEW PROCESS, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.).
 - (D) COMMENT ON PROGRESS OF INVESTIGATION (WHAT INVESTIGATING OFFICER HAS DONE SO FAR, HOW HE PLANS TO PROCEED, ETC.).
 - (E) PROSPECTS FOR COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION.
 - (F) MORE DETAILS ON COMPENSATION ISSUE.
4. FOREIGN MINISTER HAS ASKED TO SEE AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD ON SATURDAY MORNING (APRIL 18) TO DISCUSS SUBMARINE COLLISION INCIDENT FURTHER.
5. EMBOFF OBSERVED THAT FIRST TWO POINTS WENT TO HEART OF ENTIRE INVESTIGATION AND THAT ANY COMMENT FROM U.S. SIDE ON THESE TWO ISSUES (NOTIFICATION, RESCUE EFFORTS) WAS UNLIKELY BEFORE INVESTIGATION COMPLETED.
6. CINCPAC IS COVERING SOME OF THESE POINTS (E.G., (C), (D), (E) AND (F) IN HIS MEETINGS TODAY WITH PM SUZUKI AND FOREIGN MINISTER ITO WHICH WILL BE COVERED SEPTEL. COMNAVFOR HAS PROVIDED SOME COMMENT ON POINTS (C) AND (F) TO EMBASSY WHICH WE WILL SHORTLY PASS TO MOFA.
7. PRESS COVERAGE. COVERAGE OF THE SUBMARINE COLLISION INCIDENT RECEIVED MODERATE PLAY ON WEDNESDAY DURING IN PART TO THE OVERWHELMING INTEREST IN THE SPACE SHUTTLE'S RETURN AND THE LACK OF MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS. FEATHERSTONE VISIT TO FOREIGN MINISTRY ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON RECEIVED COVERAGE IN ALL WEDNESDAY A.M. PAPERS AS DID A STORY ON CAPTAIN RICH'S ARRIVAL TO BEGIN INVESTIGATIONS. WEDNESDAY ALSO SAW INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE COMPENSATION ISSUE WITH THE VISIT OF LAWYERS REPRESENTING THE SHIP OWNERS AND THE CREW TO THE EMBASSY GETTING SOME PLAY.
8. HEAVY COVERAGE RESUMED ON THURSDAY MORNING. TOP PLAY WAS GIVEN IN VIRTUALLY ALL MEDIA TO PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS IN DIET THAT HE MAY TAKE UP SUBJECT OF THE COLLISION IN HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN NEXT MONTH. TV COVERAGE ON WEDNESDAY EVENING AND THURSDAY MORNING WAS ALSO HEAVY. FOCUS OF TV COVERAGE WAS FM ITO'S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD CALL AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD IN THIS WEEK TO HEAR AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION BECAUSE A DELAY WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION. NHK HAD A STORY SOURCED TO THE U.S. NAVY IN YOKOSUKA WHICH STATED THAT IN THE PAST TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN FIVE COLLISIONS IN THE WATERS AROUND JAPAN INVOLVING U.S. NAVY VESSELS INCLUDING THE MIDWAY, THE CONSTELLATION, RANGER AND OTHERS. MORNING TV ALSO CARRIED REPORT THAT WHITE

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAD STATED THAT INVESTIGATION WOULD
BE COMPLETED BY APRIL 30 (SIC) AND THAT PRESIDENT
REAGAN WANTS ISSUE SETTLED QUICKLY. ONLY EDITORIAL

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

O 161127Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8337

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA IMMEDIATE
COMSEVENTHFLT IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 06901

OVER THE TWO DAYS OCCURRED IN MAINICHI ON THURSDAY
MORNING. IT CALLED FOR A QUICK CONCLUSION TO THE
INVESTIGATION.

9. COMMENT. DIET AND VISIT OF CINCPAC HAVE SERVED TO
KEEP INTEREST AT HIGH LEVELS. EMBASSY WILL PROVIDE
REPORT ON CINCPAC'S TALKS AS SOON AS RECORD IS
AVAILABLE. END COMMENT. MANSFIELD

TO

BT

PSN:027107

DTG:161127

TOR:1061237

SENSITIVE

DATE 04/22/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: EA
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7863 1061833
O 161815Z APR 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4874

UNCLAS STATE 097863
E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PPDC, JA

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR MRS. FUKUDA FROM MRS. REAGAN.

1. PLEASE CONVEY TO MRS. TAKEO FUKUDA THE FOLLOWING LETTER
FROM MRS. REAGAN:

QUOTE:

DEAR MRS. FUKUDA: IT WAS A SPECIAL PLEASURE FOR THE
PRESIDENT AND ME TO WELCOME YOU AND MR. FUKUDA TO THE WHITE
HOUSE. I ESPECIALLY ENJOYED THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE YOU
FOR TEA.MY HUSBAND AND I ARE DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE CLOISONNE MUGS.
WE DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR KINDNESS AND SHALL VALUE YOUR
LOVELY GIFT AS A REMINDER OF YOUR FRIENDSHIP.THE PRESIDENT AND I SEND OUR WARM GOOD WISHES TO YOU AND
TO MR. FUKUDA. WE HOPE THAT YOU BOTH ENJOYED YOUR VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES. SINCERELY, NANCY REAGAN. UNQUOTE.

SECSTATE 97863/TOKY 7863

DTG:161815Z APR 81 PSNI 027513
TOR: 106/1834Z

DATE 04/22/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED TO EMBASSY FOR DELIVERY TO
MRS. FUKUDA. HAIG

SECSTATE 97883/TOKY 7883

DTG:161815Z APR 81 PSN: 027513
TOR: 106/1834Z

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 APR 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

mm 11/1/04

DOCDATE 16 APR 81

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

WEINBERGER, C

SUBJECT: SUBMARINE ISSUE & LUNCH W/ SECDEF

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

4/16

Noted by RUA

DC ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

SA (C) 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVA HAS SEEN

2132

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Your Lunch with SecDef -- the Submarine Issue

You should know the following:

-- Today in Tokyo Admiral Long (CINCPAC) told both Suzuki and Ito that 30 days was the "target" for completing the U.S. investigation of the submarine incident. This statement was most welcome in Tokyo as it ended considerable confusion.

-- Secretary Weinberger's receiving Ambassador Okawara on short notice was also most welcome as a sign of American concern.

-- The chief Japanese worry is that the issue will cast a cloud over Suzuki's visit.

-- The Japanese believe that a carefully crafted interim report issued in the near future could defuse the issue, without prejudicing the outcome of the case. (Comment: Mr. Weinberger apparently has reacted negatively to this suggestion when it was raised by Okawara.)

I believe that if there is any way to get this issue out of the headlines well before the Suzuki visit, we should do it. The very fact that we make special efforts in this case will have additional side benefits with the Japanese -- the reverse is also true. My feeling is that an interim report might well be a route to consider once Captain Rich's initial impressions have been received and weighed.

I would very much appreciate feedback from your meeting with the Secretary on this. I am working closely with the Japanese to try to keep the fever level down.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review April 16, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1 #97

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 170819Z APR 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8366

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 06962

EXDIS
FOR AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE AND EA/J DIRECTOR CLARK FROM
AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
EQ 12065: GDS 4/17/81 (MANSFIELD, M.) OR-M
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, JA
SUBJECT: SUBMARINE INCIDENT

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY FOREIGN
MINISTER ITO TO MEET WITH HIM TOMORROW MORNING AT
10:00 AT WHICH TIME I AM SURE THAT THE SSBN INCIDENT
WILL BE RAISED AGAIN BY HIM. I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE
MAY BE SOME POSSIBILITY OF WASHINGTON ISSUING A MORE
FORTHCOMING INTERIM STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. IF
SO, IT WOULD HELP ENORMOUSLY IN DEFUSING THE MATTER
IF I COULD PASS ELEMENTS OF THIS STATEMENT TO FOREIGN
MINISTER ITO TOMORROW. REGARDS.
MANSFIELD

BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#98

BY LBI, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

NAN COL VP
EA, ASIMET

PSN:028582

DTG:170819

TOR:1071242

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 170846Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA IMMEDIATE
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8369
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 06975

CINCPAC FOR POLAD
E.O. 12065: GDS 4/17/87 (IMMERMAN, R.) DR-p
TAGS: MARR, JA, US
SUBJECT: MOFA RECOMMENDS INCREASE SOLATIUM PAYMENTS
1. (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. MOFA IS OF VIEW THAT SOLATIUM PAYMENTS IN AMOUNT
OF YEN 50,000 FOR FAMILIES OF MISSING SEAMEN AND
YEN 20,000 FOR SURVIVORS COULD BE MISLEADING IN THAT
AMOUNTS ARE SO SMALL AS TO INVITE ADVERSE COMMENT
AND PRESS COVERAGE. (MOFA FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT
PAYMENTS ARE NOT MEANT AS COMPENSATION BUT AS TOKEN
OF U.S. SINCERITY).

3. ASKED FOR BALL-PARK FIGURE OF NATURE WHICH WOULD
NOT ENGENDER ADVERSE REACTION, TAMBA CITED
YEN 200,000 AND 100,000 RESPECTIVELY.
4. EMBASSY APPRECIATES DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED BUT,
IN VIEW OF MASSIVE PUBLICITY AND CONTINUED CONCERN
AND HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOJ IN THIS CASE, RECOMMEND
SEEKING PAYMENTS OF SIZE MOFA INDICATED.
MANSFIELD

BT

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA, NAN, COL, VP
EA, ASIMET

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-037/1#99

BY 101 NARA, DATE 7/24/96

PSN:028362

DTG:170846

TOR:1070854

SENSITIVE

SITS17 R

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SITS: NAN COL VP
EOB: EA, ASIMET
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9584 1072205
O 172144Z APR 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4919

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 099584
E.O. 12065 GDS 4/17/87 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: MPOL, MARR, JA

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI ON THE
SUBMARINE COLLISION

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I WANT TO TELL YOU
PERSONALLY HOW MUCH ALL OF US IN THE UNITED STATES
REGRET THE EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT INVOLVING A
COLLISION BETWEEN A U.S. NAVY SUBMARINE AND A JAPANESE
FREIGHTER. PARTICULARLY REGRETTABLE WAS THE TRAGIC
LOSS OF THE LIVES OF TWO CREWMEN FROM THE JAPANESE
SHIP, AND I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR EXTENDING MY
DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO THEIR FAMILIES. YOU MAY BE ASSURED
THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THIS INCIDENT IS RECEIVING MY
PERSONAL ATTENTION, AND I HAVE EVERY EXPECTATION THAT
SUFFICIENT PROGRESS WILL BE MADE PRIOR TO YOUR WASHING-
TON VISIT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ON BOTH SIDES.

SECSTATE WASHDC 9584

DTG: 172144Z APR 81 PSN: 029166
TOR: 107/2234Z

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FOUO-037/1 #100
BY NSJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9584

DTG:172144Z APR 81 PSN: 029166
TOR: 107/2234Z

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~