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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File

Archivist: mjd

OA/Box:  
File Folder: Japan (3/19/81 - 4/3/81)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer  
Date: 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Richard Allen to the President re Visit of former PM Fukuda Takeo, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037, #67</i>	3/19/81	<del>B1</del>
2. Paper	Fukuda's Positions and Concerns, 1p <i>R " " #68</i>	Nd	<del>B1</del>
3. Memo	Alexander Haig to the President re Meeting with Fukuda, 2p <i>R " " #69</i>	3/16/81	<del>B1</del>
4. PAPER	2p <i>D " " #70</i>	3/12/81	B1, <del>B3</del>
5. Memcon	Haig - Fukuda Meeting, 4p <i>R " " #71</i>	3/19/81	<del>B1</del>
6. Cable	201029Z MAR 81, 5p <i>R " " #72</i>	3/20/81	<del>B1</del>
7. Cable	231013Z MAR 81, 2p <i>R " " #73</i>	3/23/81	<del>B1</del>
8. Cable	260917Z MAR 81, 1p <i>R " " #74</i>	3/26/81	<del>B1</del>
9. Cable	270310Z MAR 81, 1p <i>R " " #75</i>	3/27/81	<del>B1</del>
10. Cable	300813Z MAR 81, 2p <i>R " " #76</i>	3/30/81	<del>B1</del>
11. Cable	010837Z APR 81, 2p <i>R " " #77</i>	4/1/81	<del>B1</del>
12. Cable	010952Z APR 81, 2p <i>R " " #78</i>	4/1/81	<del>B1</del>
13. Memo	Robert Hormats to the Secretary re Meeting with Vice President, 3p <i>R " " #79</i>	Nd	<del>B1</del>
14. Talking Points	Re Meeting with Vice President, 1p <i>R " " #80</i>	Nd	<del>B1</del>
15. NSC/S Profile Sheet	Casefile 8101919, 1p <i>R " " #81</i>	04/7/81	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC  
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**Date:** 01/12/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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16. Memo	Donald Gregg to Allen re cable, 1p <i>PART 7/24/06 F00-037/1 #82</i>	4/3/81	B1
17. Cable	5p <i>D " " #83</i>	4/2/81	B1 <i>103</i>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 7/19/2007

**File Folder** JAPAN (3/19/81-4/3/81)

**FOIA**

F00-037 (F1539)

**Box Number**

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
<del>13 MEMO</del>	<del>HORMATS TO THE SECRETARY, RE MEETING WITH VP (F00-037/1#79)</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>ND</del> mva 5/21/08

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1981

MR. PRESIDENT:

The suggested guidance herein re  
autos is superseded, I presume,  
by any further conversations you,  
Ed Meese, Jim Baker and Secretary  
Haig may have had on the subject --  
following the report of the Auto  
Task Force.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "R. G. Darman".

Richard G. Darman

~~SECRET~~

487  
9710

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen --

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *rus*

SUBJECT: The Visit of Former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo

Attached are Department of State briefing papers for your March 20 meeting with former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo. When you meet with Fukuda, he will have spent 45 minutes with the Vice President. He will be accompanied by six other Japanese Diet members, who will withdraw after a brief photo opportunity.

I have suggested to the Vice President that he be quite specific in telling Fukuda what current U.S. concerns are on the automobile and defense issues. I have also suggested that he voice opposition to the Japanese meeting with Arafat, should the subject have arisen.

The background to Fukuda's mission is spelled out in the brief outline attached to this memorandum. It is important that Fukuda take back with him a clear and accurate perception of current American positions on the defense spending and automobile issues. It would thus be appropriate for you to ask Mr. Fukuda how he perceives the two issues at the moment, and what he feels Japan should do. You are not expected or obligated to say anything in response. Anything you chose to comment on would, of course, have great impact on Fukuda.

We are basically in a very strong position in dealing with the Japanese on both key issues. Suzuki's hold on the Prime Minister's position depends upon a successful meeting with you. The more clearly Fukuda knows how we feel on the two issues, the better advice he can give to Suzuki. Fukuda is an old friend of the United States, and Suzuki was wise to send him on this important mission.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1#67

BY ROS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

Review: March 1987

~~SECRET~~

AH.

FUKUDA TAKEO'S POSITIONS AND CONCERNS

Fukuda Takeo is conducting a critical reconnaissance for Suzuki Zenko, whose ability to function effectively as Japan's Prime Minister depends upon his ability to manage the U.S. relationship skillfully. At this point, from Tokyo's perspective, prospects for Suzuki's meeting with President Reagan in May are uncertain. Suzuki feels he must obtain U.S. "understanding" for Japan's limited increases in defense spending. He also knows that Japan must do something to ease pressure on the U.S. automobile issue. He is still uncertain of what to do on either issue, and is looking for concrete advice from Fukuda. (S)

Fukuda believes that Suzuki must develop specific plans on both the defense and automobile issues that can be looked at in Washington and, if necessary, negotiated with the U.S. side before Suzuki meets President Reagan. With such plans accepted, the stage would be set for a successful meeting. Fukuda will urge Suzuki to take specific steps in the defense field, once he comes to know what the U.S. wants. He will also urge Suzuki to pass legislative restrictions, limiting Japanese automobile exports to the U.S. if the U.S. Task Force report indicates that such a step would be helpful. (S)

Fukuda supports Suzuki as Prime Minister, and believes that he may have to serve for several years, until the "younger generation" of Japanese leaders matures. Fukuda is aware that there are other LDP factional leaders who would not be sorry to see Suzuki fail, but Fukuda feels that Suzuki is the best man available, and wants to do all possible to help him succeed. To this end, Fukuda will urge U.S. patience toward Suzuki, until the defense and automobile issues are successfully adjusted. (S)

Given the above background, U.S. interests can best be served in dealing with Fukuda by being as frank as possible in acquainting him with current realities influencing the defense and automobile issues. (S)

DECLASSIFIED


NLS FOO-037/1#68BY LOI NARA DATE 7/24/06



State  
Paper

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.   
SUBJECT: Meeting with Takeo Fukuda, former  
Prime Minister of Japan, Thursday,  
March 19

I. SETTING

Fukuda's visit to Washington will foreshadow subsequent visits by Foreign Minister Ito on March 23-24, and Prime Minister Suzuki, May 7-8. His purpose is to meet the key figures in your Administration, and to sound out U.S. intentions on major multilateral and bilateral issues.

Our relations with Japan are in good working order and Japan is politically stable and economically healthy. Tokyo has provided strong diplomatic support on Iran and Afghanistan, is expanding its aid and directing it toward countries of strategic consequence. It has acknowledged its need to do more on defense, and consulted closely with us and other industrial democracies on international political and security issues (e.g. Poland).

II. OBJECTIVES

-- To reassure Japan of our interest to consult closely on international political and security issues; signal the need for all of our allies to improve their security; urge the Japanese to handle the auto issue with sensitivity to political pressures in the U.S.; and discourage an Arafat visit to Japan.

III. ISSUES (In Priority Order)

1. Basic Relationship

We are very pleased with our present relationship: Japan's political, economic, and security importance to our interests is undeniable. We intend to advance them further through full and frank consultations at all levels.

~~SECRET~~  
RDS-1 3/13/87

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NLS F00-037/1#69  
BY LBT, NADA, DATE 7/24/06

2. Automobiles

The Administration has not adopted a position on the role, if any, of import restraints in ameliorating the plight of the U.S. auto industry. In the absence of a restraint policy, Japan can demonstrate its sensitivity to the political pressures on this issue by greater investment in U.S. auto facilities, increased purchase of auto parts, and prudence in its exports to the U.S. Japan's record on investment and purchases is not very good compared to the benefits it has reaped in our free market.

3. Arafat Visit

Yassir Arafat of the PLO has accepted "in principle" a two-year-old invitation extended by some Japanese parliamentarians to visit Japan, and may realize the trip sometime this year. If he does, Prime Minister Suzuki is committed to meet with Arafat. The Japanese Government, which first believed that the visit would enhance its image with Arab oil producers, may now be having second thoughts owing to our opposition. We believe that a reception of Arafat by Suzuki would be read as de facto recognition of the PLO achieved without any change in its objections to the principles of recognition of Israel as a state and to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

4. Defense Efforts

Japan recognizes the need to upgrade its forces for self-defense purposes, but it fell short of its goal of accelerating its planned build-up last year because of budgetary stringency. Fukuda will want to verify how specific the U.S. plans to be in requesting improved efforts under your Administration, and particularly whether we will choose to push Japan to accept a military role which impinges on its "peace" constitution. We do not intend to push Japan directly on specific budget increases, but, in view of our defense build-up, we expect all allies to do more not only on defense, but on a broad range of security interests, including the strategic application of foreign economic assistance and political/diplomatic cooperation. We will not ask Japan to assume any role that would be in conflict with its constitutional restraints.

Bio.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *mjp 11/12/04*  
FROM ADAMS, A

RECEIVED 01 APR 81 18

DOCDATE 19 MAR 81

TO ALLEN

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

ECONOMICS

FUKUDA, TAKEO

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF MTG W/ SECRETARY HAIG & FORMER PM FUKUDA 19 MAR

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES

**PA**

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

GREGG

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DEAL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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( J / F )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

986-442

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(Classification)

Date March 19, 1981  
(Memcon received in S/S-S  
for processing on 3/27/81)

TO: S/S - Raymond G. H. Seitz  
FROM: Director, S/S-S - Alvin ~~R.~~ Adams  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

The Secretary/Former Prime Minister Fukuda  
Date March 19, 1981  
Notetaker EA/J:WClark

\* The attached memorandum of conversation is submitted for an S/S clearance and approval of distribution. A brief summary of any action commitments made at the meeting and an indication of any follow-up action being taken on those commitments follow below, together with suggested distribution. Please return the memcon directly to my office for distribution by S/S-I.

ACTION COMMITMENTS:

None made.

FOLLOW-UP:

None necessary.

Distribution: S, D, P, S/P, (NSC) S/S  
Other E, C, EA, PM, EB

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(CLASSIFICATION)

Cleared S/S  
Noted S/S-S

A H C JR  
JAV

MST  
11/2/04

S  
D  
P  
S/P  
NSC  
S/S

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: March 19, 1981  
Time: 5:50 PM  
Place: Secy's Conf. Rm.

**SUBJECT:** General Review of Foreign Policy Perspectives

EA  
PM  
EB  
**PARTICIPANTS:**

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION  
MADE BY S/S-I.  
DATE APR 01 1981  
Initial                     

US

Japan

The Secretary  
Ambassador Holdridge  
Mr. Armacost  
Mr. Sherman  
William Clark, Jr.  
Mr. Iida (interpreter)

Former Prime Minister Fukuda  
Ambassador Okawara  
Shintaro Ishihara, Member Japanese Diet  
Yoshihiko Tsuchiya, Member Japanese Diet  
Kichizo Hosada, Member Japanese Diet  
Michio Ochi, Member Japanese Diet  
Tomio Yamamoto, Member Japanese Diet  
Mr. Owada, Japanese Diplomat now at  
Harvard  
Mr. Numata (interpreter)

-----  
The Secretary reiterated the firm conviction of this administration that a strong anchor in our relations in the world is the alliance between the United States and Japan. Former Prime Minister Fukuda said that all leaders in Japan are deeply interested in the policies of the new administration. For this reason, both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister planned visits to the United States in the near future. He said he was here to attend the Trilateral Commission meeting and had seized the opportunity for a meeting with Secretary Haig. The Secretary briefly outlined the framework of US foreign and security policies as he hoped to see them evolve in the months ahead. First, he emphasized the hope that we would show to the world a more consistent and balanced policy than that of the past several years in political, economic and security matters. As building blocks to achieve our more ephemeral objectives, we require first and foremost a rebuilding of the military strength of the United States. Second, we believe the time has come for the United States, and other nations who share our values, to stand up to Soviet imperialist interventions throughout the world. These interventions

EA/J:WClark:eh  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

Clearances: EA - J Holdridge  
EA - M Armacost

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GDS 3/20/87

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FDO-037/1#71  
BY                      NARA: DATE 7/24/06



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- 2 -

have taken place in the developing world and also in areas closer to Japan. There are some who say the US speaks too loudly about our concerns over Soviet actions. This administration believes that now is the time to speak and to speak honestly about our view of the world. The Secretary said that, when he had finished his brief summary, former Prime Minister Fukuda might wish to comment on Japanese defense efforts, which were of great concern to the United States and our other allies.

A third area of our activity would be a concerted effort to improve our relations in the Third World. With recession in the industrialized democracies, accompanied by an even more severe recession in the Third World, there is always the danger that Third World countries will seek a closer association with the Soviet Union.

A fourth point is to reinvigorate and reshape, in light of modern conditions, our association and alliance with countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East--and in our own hemisphere as well. Some have said that these comments sound very much like those of former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and, said the Secretary, he takes this as a compliment. In recent days there has been some concern that we might overdo our actions. We believe through consultations and flexibility we will be able to develop a policy that takes the concerns of our friends and allies into full account.

Finally, none of the above policies are possible if we do not recreate a sound economic base in the United States. There will undoubtedly be some difficulty, some sparks, as we proceed with our belt-tightening operation. As the American public responds to more stringent conditions, there will be pressure in the trade area. There will be serious concern about our trade balance. The current automobile situation is a case in point. The Secretary said he had not mentioned terrorism or human rights or a change in our approach to arms control and non-proliferation. He assured Mr. Fukuda that we remain committed to positive efforts in all these areas. However, the trends recently exhibited by the Soviet Union are dangerous and can only be met by a firm, united posture on the part of the Western world. If we can develop such a united front then, we believe, it will be possible to reverse these trends.

Former Prime Minister Fukuda said he had been impressed the other day both to hear and read President Reagan's statement in which he compared economic conditions today with conditions that

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- 3 -

existed in the 1930's. Mr. Fukuda said he could recall the 1930's, which started with the Wall Street depression in the United States. This threw the US economy into confusion. This confusion spread to a worldwide depression. In such circumstances, all countries took the easy road and adopted very severe protectionist measures. The leaders of the various countries were powerless to stop this trend toward protectionism. The result was social instability. In Japan there were many terrorist acts and two prime ministers were assassinated. In Europe there was perhaps even more confusion, which led to the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. We are all aware that the final results of this were World War II.

The problems now faced by the world stem in large part from the oil problem. The world economy is in serious trouble. The difficulties faced by the United States, unemployment and double-digit inflation, are also faced by other countries. If these ills are not quickly corrected, there is always the possibility that the world might follow the path of the 1930's. This is a matter of great concern. While we are concerned about recession in industrial democracies, the non-oil producing, less developed countries are in even more serious difficulty. The result can be greater social instability, which could lead eventually to marxist or even fascist political structures. Thus, when we look at the world today we must realize that the problems are not merely economic, but have very serious political implications.

In East-West relations the problem stems from the fact that over the last decade the Soviet military establishment has been built up to a massive extent. More recently, the Soviet Union has been reaching out in more aggressive ways. If this situation is left unattended, it could have serious consequences for the entire world. Therefore, he agreed with the Secretary that unity in the Western World was of the greatest importance. The question was how to strengthen the West in these circumstances. First, the primary engine of the Western World, the United States, has to be strong. He said he was delighted to hear that this Administration is committed to the development of a strong United States. He said that he and the Japanese people look forward to a successful fulfillment of this policy. With the United States restored to a leadership role, the Western World can unite and strengthen its posture. In this manner, it will be possible to stand up to Soviet power and work out ways to cope with Soviet intervention. He said he had long said that "a strong United States means a more peaceful world" and expressed the hope that the United States would lead the free world into unity within the western camp. This would be the greatest possible contribution toward world peace.

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- 4 -

Responding to the Secretary's question on defense, he said that he was totally in agreement that the West needed to have a strategy to deal with the world as it exists today. Such a strategy had to encompass not only military aspects, but must look to economic factors as well. We must develop policies that adapt to or are designed to cope with the change in the economic situation of the Soviet Union. We must look at our problems in the context of a comprehensive strategy. Within such a framework, we must consider how each country can best fulfill its role and help share the burden of a common strategy. This, he believed, was the manner in which we should view the question of Japanese defense efforts. Specific details on how such a policy might be implemented would be, of course, raised by both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister when they visit the United States.

The Secretary expressed appreciation for the former Prime Minister's comments, which showed his breadth and depth of experience. He said he had perhaps been too telegraphic in his summary of our position. We were very much aware that the less developed countries had a trade deficit of between \$60 and \$70 billion for oil alone. This deficit was matched by a deficit in their trade balance of a similar magnitude. These economic conditions were further complicated by the population explosion faced by these countries. The result was, as the former Prime Minister pointed out, a condition that can only be described as a tinderbox. In such a situation, Japan can play a very important role. However, Japan must maintain a true sovereignty and this will require expanded defense capabilities. The greatest contribution Japan can make to the Western world is as a sovereign member of that community.

The Secretary then referred to the former Prime Minister's reference to the economic conditions of the 1930's. He said he lived everyday in Washington with similar tensions and he assured the Prime Minister that the protectionist pressure on automobiles was much more advanced than he would have hoped for and than he had anticipated. He did not have sufficient words to express the potential for trouble on the horizon if the Congress should proceed with restriction through legislation to limit automobile imports. He expressed the sincere hope that Foreign Minister Ito would speak frankly and constructively on this issue next week.

Former Prime Minister Fukuda said he would certainly convey the Secretary's message to the Foreign Minister.

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 78

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

O 201029Z MAR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7415

INFO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0071  
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 0040  
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0053  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0229  
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0048  
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0044  
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0030

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 05026

ED 12065: XDS-1 3/20/01 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) DR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, JM, NU, ES, JA  
SUBJECT: (X) GOJ VIEWS ON JAMAICA, EL SALVADOR, AND  
- NICARAGUA

REF: (A) TOKYO 3869; (B) TOKYO 3364; (C) TOKYO 4416;  
- (D) TOKYO 3010

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. MOFA LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL EDAMURA PRESENTED TO POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARCH 19 GOJ'S OFFICIAL REPLY TO OUR REPRESENTATIONS OF FEB 5 (REF A) ON AID TO JAMAICA AND FEB 26 (REF B) ON EL SALVADOR. HE ALSO OUTLINED GOJ EFFORTS TO MODERATE POLICIES OF NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT. PRESENTATION INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE, ON EVE OF FOREIGN MINISTER ITO'S VISIT, GOJ EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF OUR CENTRAL AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN POLICIES, AS WELL AS TO WARN US THAT THESE EFFORTS COULD BE HAMSTRUNG IF WE SUDDENLY CALL ON JAPAN TO OFFER SIZABLE ECONOMIC AID TO EL SALVADOR. END SUMMARY.
3. EDAMURA SAID THAT BY POINTING OUT DESIRABILITY OF JAPANESE AID TO JAMAICA IN HIS FIRST LETTER TO FONMIN

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENTS \*\*\*\*\*

RA NAN CCL VP  
EA,ARA

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FOO-037/1#72  
BY FOJ NARA, DATE 1/24/06

PSN:047532

DTG:201029

TOR:0791046

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ITD, SECRETARY HAD IMPRESSED UPON HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOJ IMPORTANCE WHICH US ATTACHED TO MATTER AND HAD HELPED MOFA CONVINCED SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT FINANCE MINISTRY THAT GOJ SHOULD PLEDGE YEN EQUIVALENT OF \$10 MILLION IN A SOFT LOAN FROM THE OVERSEAS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FUND, CALLING ATTENTION TO MOFA MARCH 12 PRESS RELEASE ANNOUNCING EMERGENCY AID, EDAMURA SAID IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IN FUTURE WITHOUT PROVOKING DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTROVERSY, GOJ WOULD CONTINUE PUBLICLY TO PORTRAY THIS AID AS PART OF COOPERATIVE EFFORT OF INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES UNDER WORLD BANK AUSPICES TO ASSIST A FREE MARKET ECONOMY IN TROUBLE RATHER THAN AS A RESPONSE TO A USG REQUEST TO HELP A CARIBBEAN NATION RESIST LEFT WING EXTREMISM.

4. EDAMURA SAID GOJ INTERPRETED OUR FEB 26 DEMARCHE ON EL SALVADOR AS REQUEST FOR GOJ CONDEMNATION OF OUTSIDERS SUPPLYING ARMS TO INSURGENTS AND SUPPORT OF DUARTE GOVERNMENT. EDAMURA HOPED FONMIN ITD'S MARCH 10 DIET DEBATE REPLY OPPOSING SUCH SHIPMENTS (REF C) WOULD SATISFY FIRST PART OF REQUEST. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD MADE SAME POINT IN FEB 26 AND MARCH 4 BRIEFINGS OF MEDIA EDITORIAL STAFFERS BUT THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, HIS COMMENTS HAD NOT BEEN WIDELY REPORTED. EDAMURA CALLED OUR ATTENTION TO PUBLIC INFORMATION BUREAU DIRGEN AMAU'S MARCH 12 STATEMENT TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS THAT GOJ VIEWED SMUGGLING OF ARMS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO SALVADORAN INSURGENTS AS VERY GRAVE MATTER AND CONSIDERED DUARTE GOVERNMENT TO BE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR WORKING VERY HARD FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS AND PLANNING TO HOLD ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR. EDAMURA SAID AMAU'S REMARKS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS ANSWER TO SECOND PART OF OUR REQUEST AS WELL. HE SAID THAT MOFA WOULD CONTINUE ITS EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS WITH MEDIA REPS IN ORDER TO CORRECT THEIR STEREOTYPED VIEW OF SALVADORAN CONFLICT AS CLEARCUT CONTEST BETWEEN LEFT WING PROGRESSIVES AND REACTIONARY MILITARY OFFICERS. HE FOUND RECENT EDITORIALS HAD BEEN HELPFUL AND NOTED SERIES OF ARTICLES IN TOKYO SHIMBUN FROM JAPANESE CORRESPONDENT TRAVELING IN AREA HAD HIGHLIGHTED SALVADORAN POPULAR DISENCHANTMENT WITH AND CHANGED ATTITUDE OF CATHOLIC CHURCH TOWARDS REBELS.

5. EDAMURA SAID BECAUSE PUBLIC ATTITUDES HERE WERE SO UNCERTAIN, GOJ WAS NOT NOW IN POSITION TO CONSIDER LARGE SCALE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING ANY EXTENSION OF CREDITS, AND HAD DENIED THAT IT HAD BEEN ASKED BY US TO FURNISH SUCH ASSISTANCE. HE INDICATED THAT MODEST

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE POSSIBLE AND HINTED GOJ MIGHT WELL RESPOND POSITIVELY IF SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT FOLLOWED

P ON AMB PAZ LARIN'S PERSONAL SUGGESTION THAT JAPAN INVITE FOR ADVANCED TRAINING YOUNG TECHNICIANS AND ENGINEERS, PARTICULARLY IN FIELDS OF ELECTRIC POWER AND RAILROADS. (WE HAVE ENCOURAGED PAZ TO FOLLOW UP.)

6. AS HAD AMB PAZ A FEW DAYS EARLIER, EDAMURA RAISED WITH POLCOUNS GOES REQUEST THAT JAPAN AGREE TO POSTPONE REPAYMENT OF 18 MILLION DOLLAR AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION LOAN EXTENDED TO EXIM BANK IN 1975 AND COMING DUE NEXT YEAR. EDAMURA SAID HE HAD TOLD PAZ THAT WHILE JAPANESE

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

O 201029Z MAR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7416

INFO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0072  
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 0041  
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0054  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0230  
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0049  
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0045  
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0031

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 05026

FINANCIAL REGULATIONS FORBADE UNILATERAL FORGIVENESS, GOJ WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN OVERALL CONFERENCE, UNDER WORLD BANK OR IMF AUSPICES IF POSSIBLE, TO CONSIDER SALVADOR'S FOREIGN DEBT LOAD. EDAMURA HOPED US WOULD TAKE LEAD IN THIS MATTER.

7. TURNING TO NICARAGUA, EDAMURA SAID GOJ CONSIDERED ITS ATTITUDE TO BE KEY TO HALTING FLOW OF ARMS TO GUERRILLAS. WANTING TO BE HELPFUL ON THIS, EDAMURA TOLD VISITING FOREIGN MINISTER D'ESCOTO (REF D) THAT IN ORDER TO PROMOTE FRIENDLY BILATERAL RELATIONS, JAPAN NEEDED TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN NICARAGUA'S FUTURE, INCLUDING EMERGENCE OF A TRULY PLURALIST DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, REESTABLISHMENT OF A FREE MARKET ECONOMY AND EVIDENCE OF CON'S SUPPORT FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN REGION BASED ON PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION. EDAMURA ALSO UNDERLINED TO D'ESCOTO THAT BECAUSE OF ITS CLOSE ALLIANCE WITH THE US, GOJ ALSO ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO STATE OF NICARAGUAN-US RELATIONS. EDAMURA SAID THAT WHEN NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR JJEZO SOUNDED HIM OUT ON MARCH 16 ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF GOJ GRANTS FOR MODERNIZATION OF TWO HOSPITALS AND LOAN FOR TRANS-ISTHMUS RAILWAY "LAND

PSN:047537

DTG:201029

TDR:0791050

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BRIDGE" PROJECT, HE REITERATED THAT UNLESS NICARAGUA MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS WITH US, JAPAN WOULD NOT FEEL CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO APPROVE SUCH ASSISTANCE AND, IF US WERE TO STOP ALL ITS BILATERAL AID, NEW JAPANESE ASSISTANCE WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY OUT OF QUESTION.

8. EDAMURA SAID ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF NICARAGUAN INTEREST IN JAPANESE ECONOMIC AID WAS FURNISHED BY NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR TO PANAMA QUINONES, WHO, REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS CLOSE CONFIDANT OF RULING JUNTA, PROPOSED TO HIS JAPANESE COUNTERPART LAST WEEK THAT GOJ INVITE TWO JUNTA MEMBERS, ORTEGA AND CORDOVA. ON INSTRUCTIONS, JAPANESE AMBASSADOR HAS SUBSEQUENTLY REPLIED THAT GOJ DECISION ON FINANCIAL OR TECHNICAL AID WOULD REST ON SUCH FACTORS AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CENTRAL AMERICAN STABILITY AND THAT, IN VIEW OF US INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZING MULTINATIONAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS TO NICARAGUA AFTER REVOLUTION, JAPAN HOPED NICARAGUA WOULD DISPLAY GREATER "UNDERSTANDING" TOWARDS US.

9. COMMENT. EDAMURA'S CAREFUL PRESENTATION, ON EVE OF FONMIN ITO'S VISIT, WAS DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE GOJ SUPPORT OF OUR CENTRAL AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN POLICIES AS WELL AS TO WARN US THAT THESE EFFORTS COULD BE HAMSTRUNG BY TOO RAPID OR PUBLIC A CALL FROM US FOR JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR. EDAMURA, WHO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN OKINAWAN REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS TEN YEARS AGO, KNOWS US WELL AND IS VERY FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO OUR AIMS IN REGION. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD FOLLOW HIS ADVICE CLOSELY IN SEEKING TO ASSOCIATE JAPAN MORE CLOSELY WITH EFFORTS TO BLOCK INCREASE IN COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. MANSFIELD

BT

SENSITIVE



SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

O 231013Z MAR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7468

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4310  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2559  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5734  
USMISSION USNATO 0701

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 05139

EXDIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/23/81 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) DRIM  
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, JA  
SUBJECT: (U) BREZHNEV FAR EAST CONFIDENCE BUILDING  
MEASURES PROPOSALS  
REFS: (A) STATE 64859; (B) STATE 67149; (C) STATE 64759;  
(D) TOKYO 4802

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. EMBOFF SHARED SUBSTANCE OF BREZHNEV LETTER AND U.S. ANALYSIS AND VIEWS REGARDING COORDINATED RESPONSE WITH MOFA SOVIET DIVISION DIRECTOR HYODO MARCH 20.
3. HYODO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR BRIEFING AND SAID JAPANESE WOULD NOT RESPOND TO NON-PAPER LEFT BY AMB. POLYANSKIY CONCERNING BREZHNEV FAR EAST CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBM'S) UNTIL AFTER FOREIGN MINISTER ITD'S RETURN FROM THE U.S. MARCH 25. HE SAID THAT IN ANY CASE GOJ WISHED TO CONSULT WITH USG WHILE PREPARING RESPONSE TO NON-PAPER IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT JAPANESE ANSWER WAS CONSISTENT WITH OURS. THE JAPANESE DO NOT INTEND TO CONSULT WITH THE EUROPEAN NATIONS OR WITH AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND OR THE PRC.
4. HYODO SAID GOJ FULLY AGREED WITH U.S. THAT NON-PAPER WAS PART OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENTS \*\*\*\*\*

RA, NAN, COL, VP  
EA, EURE, NUCUN

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F00-037/1 #73  
BY 107 NARA, DATE 7/24/06

PSN:051286

DTG:231013

TDR:0821215

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 125

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DIVIDE THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES AND UNDERMINE THEIR INCREASED DEFENSE EFFORTS

5. HYODO SAID SOVIET NOTE TO JAPANESE WAS GENERALLY SIMILAR AS THAT PORTION OF LETTER TO U.S. WHICH DEALT WITH FAR EAST CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. THERE WERE TWO DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET APPROACH TO JAPAN; NO REFERENCE TO EUROPEAN CBM'S IN THE NOTE (ALTHOUGH POLYANSKIY MENTIONED THEM ORALLY) AND NO REFERENCE IN ANY FORM TO THE ROK. HYODO SAID THE CONTENTS OF THE APPROACH TO THE PRC SEEMED IDENTICAL TO THAT TO JAPAN.

6. HYODO SAID GOJ IS PRESENTLY INCLINED TOWARD A COOL AND TOUGH RESPONSE TO THE BREZHNEV CBM'S PROPOSAL, POINTING OUT PARTICULARLY VARIOUS SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH RUN COUNTER TO THE CONCEPT OF FAR EAST CBM'S AS WELL AS FOCUSING ATTENTION ON THE BUILDUP OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE OCCUPIED NORTHERN TERRITORIES OF JAPAN AND CALLING FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL. IN ORDER NOT TO GIVE USSR PRETEXT FOR RECOMMENDING A BILATERAL CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS CBM'S FURTHER, GOJ IN ITS REPLY WILL NOT ASK FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION OR CLARIFICATION OF BREZHNEV PROPOSAL. GOJ WILL PROBABLY RESPOND EVENTUALLY IN MOSCOW, WITH JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SEEKING APPOINTMENT WITH GROMYKO IN ORDER TO PARALLEL POLYANSKIY'S ORIGINAL APPROACH.

7. HYODO SAID MOFA WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN SPECIFIC U.S. PROPOSALS FOR RESPONDING TO THE SOVIET FAR EAST CBM'S INITIATIVE. EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER GUIDANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MANSFIELD

BT

SENSITIVE

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL  
EOB: EA, ASIMET  
WHSR COMMENTS:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #5413 0850928  
Q 280917Z MAR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7586

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4317  
BT

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 05413

NDDIS  
E.O. 12065: XDS-3 3/26/01 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) OR-M  
TAGS: MNUC, MARR, JA, US, AS  
SUBJECT: (A) US-JOA B-52 AGREEMENT  
REF: CANBERRA 2945

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. WE SHARE VIEW THAT USG SHOULD STICK TO DEPARTMENT'S  
PRESS GUIDANCE (STATE 02541). MANSFIELD

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-037/1#74

BY NT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

TOKYO 5413

DTG: 280917Z MAR 81 08N: 054975  
TOR: 085/12532

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~~\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*~~

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:  
EOB: EA, DEPOL  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7938 0860320  
O 270310Z MAR 81 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4188

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 077938

NDDIS  
E.O. 12065: GDS 3-26-87 (ARMACOST, M.)

TAGS: NATO, PC, UR, JA

SUBJECT: BRIEFING JAPAN ON POLISH CONTINGENCY

REF: TOKYO 4414

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~

2. NATO PERMREPS HAVE OPTED TO BRIEF JAPANESE IN WASHINGTON ALONG LINES OF POINT 2 IN DONOWAKI'S PAPER AS REPORTED REFTEL. ASSUME THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO GOJ AND DEPARTMENT WILL GO AHEAD AND MAKE PLANS WITH FRG AND CANADIAN EMBASSIES HERE FOR FORMAL BRIEFING AS SOON AS ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT. WE DISCUSSED THIS BRIEFLY WITH ARIMA MARCH 26 BUT HE REQUESTED FOR OWN REASONS THAT IT BE CONVEYED IN EMBASSY TOKYO - MOFA CHANNEL. HAIG

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F00-037/1 #15  
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

SECSTATE WASHDC 7938

DTG: 270310Z MAR 81 SSN: 056081  
TOR: 086/0447Z

~~\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*~~

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN, COL, VP  
EOBI: EA, DEPOL  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHKO #5584 0800014  
O 300813Z MAR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7668

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 05584

NODIS  
SUBJECT: (S) BRIEFING JAPAN ON POLISH CONTINGENCY  
EO 120651 RDS-1 3/30/81 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) OR-M  
TAGS: NATO, PC, UR, JA  
REF: (A) STATE 77938 (B) TOKYO 4414

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MOFA EUROPEAN BUREAU DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL DONOWAKI RECONFIRMED TO POL COUNSELOR MARCH 30 THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ITO HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED FORMAL CONSULTATIONS ALONG LINES OF POINT 2 MOFA PAPER. DONOWAKI UNDERSTANDS FORMULA TO BE FOLLOWING: THREE NATIONS (US, CANADA, AND FRG) WILL BRIEF JAPANESE IN WASHINGTON; GOJ WILL COMMUNICATE ANY RESPONSE WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED OFFICIALLY ONLY TO US BUT MAY ALSO INFORM OTHER TWO NATIONS. DONOWAKI SAID MOFA STRONGLY HOPED THAT APART FROM FORMAL CONSULTING MECHANISM, WE WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH ON ALL ASPECTS OF POLISH QUESTION BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON.

3. DONOWAKI HAS RECEIVED REPORT FROM JAPANESE EMBASSY WASHINGTON OF OFFER TO HOLD FIRST FORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON APRIL 3. HE HAS INSTRUCTED EMBASSY TO ACCEPT THIS OFFER. MANSFIELD

TOKYO 5584

DTG: 300813Z MAR 81 58N1 002731  
TOR: 080/0958Z

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FOO-037/1 #76  
BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*~~

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

TOKYO 5584

DTG: 300013Z MAR 81 SSN: 002731  
TOR: 080/0958Z

~~\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*~~

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DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
PRIORITY

P 010837Z APR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7752

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 05781

EXDIS  
PASS USTR  
E.O. 12065: GDS 04/01/87 (BARRACLOUGH, WILLIAM) DR-M  
TAGS: ETRD, JA  
SUBJECT: AUTO ISSUE: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN  
MINISTER ITO, MARCH 31

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. MUCH OF AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD'S POST-VISIT DEBRIEFING MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ITO WAS SPENT ON THE AUTO ISSUE. IN PROVIDING A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE IN WASHINGTON, ITO STRESSED THE NEED FOR A U.S. BRIEFING MISSION TO COME TO JAPAN SO THE GOJ COULD GAIN A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION IN THE U.S., PARTICULARLY THE ACTIONS THE USG WILL TAKE TO ASSIST ITS AUTO INDUSTRY. HE SAID IT WOULD BE MOST CONVENIENT FOR THE U.S. MISSION TO VISIT TOKYO NEXT WEEK SINCE BY THEN THE BUDGET WOULD BE PASSED IN THE DIET AND HE WOULD BE FREER TO GIVE THE AUTO ISSUE HIS PERSONAL ATTENTION. HE SAID THAT IF THE U.S. SIDE WAS HEADED BY A U.S. OFFICIAL OF SUFFICIENT RANK, THE COUNTERPARTS IN JAPAN WOULD BE DR. OKITA, EXTERNAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE AND MITI MINISTER TANAKA OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE. INDICATING THAT THEY WISHED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE BEFORE PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S VISIT, HE EXPRESSED SOME ANXIETY THAT THE U.S. DECISION ON OUR DOMESTIC MEASURES MIGHT BE DELAYED OWING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECOVERY FROM HIS SURGERY. ITO CLEARLY WANTED TO MOVE AHEAD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FOLLOW UP ON HIS WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS.

\*\*\*\*\* WHSK COMMENTS \*\*\*\*\*

RA NAN COL VP  
ECON,EA

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Feb-037/1-77

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/24/06

PSN:006169

DTG:010837

TOR:0911220

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

3. NOTING THAT BOTH SIDES SEEMED TO HAVE HAD A PROBLEM IN SORTING OUT WHO WOULD BE ITS PRIMARY SPOKESMAN ON THE AUTO ISSUE, ITO STRESSED THE NEED FOR BOTH SIDES TO SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE. (THE SAME POINT WAS MADE TO EMIN THE DAY BEFORE BY CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIYAZAWA). THE AMBASSADOR, DRAWING ON REFTEL, SAID OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE MISSION'S VISIT WERE BEING FULLY COORDINATED. HOWEVER, WE DID NOT YET HAVE CONFIRMATION OF A DATE OR THE LEVEL OF U.S. REPRESENTATION BUT WOULD HOPE TO HAVE THAT SOON.

4. ITO ALSO STRESSED THE NEED TO MINIMIZE PUBLIC COMMENT BY OFFICIALS ON BOTH SIDES ON THE AUTO ISSUE.  
MANSFIELD

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

0 010952Z APR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7770

INFO AMEMBASSY SEDUL 3696  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 05801

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD  
EO 12065: GDS 4/1/87 (BARRACLOUGH, W.) DR-  
TAGS: PGDV, JA, US  
SUBJECT: (U) AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 31 MEETING WITH FOREIGN  
- MINISTER ITO: ISSUES OTHER THAN AUTOS  
REF: STATE 80742 (NOTAL)

1. (U) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSION OF AUTO ISSUE (REPORTED SEPTTEL), WHICH OCCUPIED MOST OF HOUR-LONG MEETING MARCH 31, FOREIGN MINISTER ITO AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED FOLLOWING TOPICS.
3. AMBASSADOR, DRAWING EXTENSIVELY ON TALKING POINTS REFTEL, INDICATED THAT TOP LEVELS OF USG WERE IMPRESSED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ITO'S PERFORMANCE AND WELCOMED HIS REAFFIRMATION OF JAPAN'S INTENTION TO CARRY ITS SHARE OF WESTERN ALLIANCE BURDEN, THANKED HIM FOR GOJ'S AID PLEDGE TO JAMAICA, AND OFFERED ADVICE, NOW THAT ITO HAD COVERED SUCH WIDE RANGE OF SPECIFIC ISSUES, THAT PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S CONVERSATIONS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON BROAD ASPECTS OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. ITO EXPRESSED PLEASURE OVER RECEPTION HE RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON, SAID TALKS WERE QUITE USEFUL AND ATMOSPHERE VERY GOOD, AND AGREED THAT PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI SHOULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN DETAILS DURING HIS TALKS.
4. FOREIGN MINISTER TERMED DEFENSE (AS OPPOSED TO

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENTS \*\*\*\*\*

RA NAN CDC VP  
EA

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 800-037/1#78  
BY WOT, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

PSN:006030

DTG:010952

TOR:0911001

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AUTOS, WHICH HE LABELED A TEMPORARY PROBLEM; THE IM-  
PORTANT LONG-TERM BILATERAL ISSUE BETWEEN OUR TWO  
NATIONS. HE UNDERSTOOD IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE TO BOTH  
NATIONS AND FAVORED GENERAL DISCUSSIONS OF DEFENSE WITH  
PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI ("WHO WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY  
ON THE ISSUE DURING HIS VISIT") BUT INDICATED THAT DE-  
TAILS OF WHAT US AND JAPAN CAN AND SHOULD DO WOULD BE  
BEST LEFT TO UPCOMING TALKS BETWEEN JDA DIRECTOR  
GENERAL OMURA AND SECRETARY WEINBERGER AS WELL AS TO  
CONTINUOUS WORKING LEVEL CONSULTATIONS.

5. ITC AGAIN REQUESTED USG SUPPORT OF IMAI'S CANDIDACY  
FOR IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL, CALLING IMAI BEST QUALIFIED  
CANDIDATE AND INDICATING THAT HE HAD BEEN LED TO BE-  
LIEVE HE WOULD BE GIVEN US RESPONSE WHILE STILL IN  
WASHINGTON.

6. ACTING DCM AND POL COUNSELOR EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT  
IF GOJ CONTINUED (AS THEY DID DURING FOREIGN MINISTER'S  
VISIT) TO BRIEF MEDIA IN SUCH DETAIL ON CONTENTS OF  
DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR USG OFFICIALS, US SIDE MIGHT  
FEEL IT UNWISE TO BE SO FRANK AND FORTHCOMING IN FUTURE  
TOP LEVEL MEETINGS. ITC SEEMED TO AGREE, NOTING THAT  
HE WAS NOW BRUNT OF ATTACKS EMANATING FROM ROK BECAUSE  
OF ERRONEOUS PRESS ACCOUNTS OF WHAT HE ALLEGEDLY SAID  
TO SECRETARY ABOUT SITUATION ON KOREAN PENINSULA, IN-  
CLUDING NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. (FYI: SENIOR AMERICAN  
AFFAIRS BUREAU OFFICIAL URGED US TO WEIGH IN WITH  
FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS ISSUE. WE UNDERSTAND VICE  
MINISTER TAKASHIMA HAS TAKEN SERIOUS ISSUE WITH MOFA'S  
PRESS BRIEFERS' HANDLING OF FONMIN'S VISIT AND THAT MORE  
DISCRETION WILL BE EXERCISED IN FUTURE. CONTENTS OF  
YESTERDAY'S MEETING, FOR INSTANCE, WERE RELAYED TO PRESS  
IN ONLY MOST GENERAL TERMS. END FYI.)

MANSFIELD

BT

#5801

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RECEIVED

81 APR 2 12:51

JANET COLSON

*JA* 2/1333

BUD NANCE

*JA* 2/1520

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

*(C)* RVA  
4/6/81

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 2, 1981

TO: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RUTHERFORD POATS 

I am giving Frank Hodsoll this background for Baker's use in view of the fact that Haig would not have an opportunity to make these points at a meeting today.

*free*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Frank:

The internal State Department memo for Haig's use in the canceled Cabinet meeting today, per our conversation.

RP *[Signature]*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

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TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: E - Mr. Rashish

FROM: EB - Robert Normats

SUBJECT: Meeting With the Vice President on Auto  
Import Policy, April 2, 11:15 a.m.

SUMMARY: The Vice President will review the state of play on auto imports with key members of the Cabinet. A low-level "briefing mission" headed by USTR plans to leave for Tokyo over the weekend to explain to the Japanese what domestic actions the U.S. Government will take to assist its auto industry. Following this visit, the Japanese should assess what they can do to help. Japan wants the issue settled before Prime Minister Suzuki's visit in early May.

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES:

Ito left the United States uncertain about the course of action the United States wants Japan to follow on automobiles, and even more uncertain about the course that Japan should follow in its own interests. For Japan to restrain its auto exports, and particularly to roll them back below 1980 levels, is no easy task. To escape U.S. antitrust liability, any sharing of the U.S. market among Japanese auto companies must result from "sovereign compulsion" -

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BY LOJ NARA DATE 7/24/06

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that is, from Japanese Government actions having the force of law. The Japanese Government, and the current LDP leadership, would have to pay a high political cost if it uses public and heavy-handed measures to curb auto exports at a time of heavy Japanese current-account deficit (\$10.8 billion in 1980).

A strong appeal from the United States (that does not blame Japan but asks Japan's help) would ease Japan's internal political problem, but a U.S. shift away from free-trade principles could pose serious risks of cascading protectionism. The President apparently prefers that Japan take responsibility for this issue, and that the United States not negotiate a restraint agreement with Japan.

Our reading of the Congress is that quota legislation will pass the Senate if it is reported out of the Finance Committee. Senator Danforth has asked Chairman Dole to schedule an early mark-up of his quota bill (1.6 million Japanese cars - a 15 percent rollback - for each of the next three years). In the House Sam Gibbons (Chairman of the Trade Subcommittee at House Ways and Means) could delay the bill for some weeks, but could not kill it. Such quota legislation is, of course, the worst solution.

The U.S. "briefing mission" that will leave this weekend will be at the deputy-assistant-secretary level. It will provide some ammunition for Japanese policymakers who want to argue in favor of export restraint to help the American industry. It will not, however, negotiate. Following the mission, and following some subsequent explanations of U.S. anti-trust laws by Justice officials, Japan would presumably indicate what it is prepared to do, or to talk about.

The risk in all of this is a sort of prolonged "Kabuki" -- with us suggesting restraint in a delicate way, Japan professing sympathy but raising

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questions and asking for "clear" U.S. signals, and nothing happening. Ultimately we will have to determine precisely what we want of Japan or press them hard for a figure to which we can react. It is imperative, however, that the antitrust question be cleared up before there is any discussion of a number. Without this being done first, Japanese companies and U.S. negotiators are vulnerable to antitrust action.

Attachment:

Talking Points.

Drafted by: EB/TDC:nKopp:tlw  
x22532:4/1/81

Clearances: EA - Mr. Albrecht  
EUR/RPE - Mr. Beaudry  
S/P - Mr. Kaplan

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TALKING POINTS

- Public attention must be turned toward the program of domestic measures (economic recovery program, regulatory reform) and away from the import issue.

- The antitrust problem is serious. The auto-import dealers will litigate any trade restraint. Invocation by Japan of legal authority to control exports is a costly political step for the Japanese leadership. We need to give Japan clear and honest advice about the political situation and antitrust action.

- The "briefing mission" to Japan is only a holding action. It will be helpful, but not definitively so, with the Japanese. It will not mollify the Congress.

- Congressional pressure will sharpen after the Easter recess, in the two weeks before Suzuki's visit. At that time, we will have to be less nuanced and more decisive, or be blamed for confusion and disarray.

- Our position should support the President's desire for a non-protectionist solution that minimizes interference in the free market.

- We should keep Europe and Canada briefed on what we are doing, to ease their suspicions and head off unilateral actions.

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TO ALLEN

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BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/24/06

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

ITO, MASAYOSHI

SUBJECT: FOMIN ITO IMPRESSIONS OF TRIP TO US

ACTION: NOTED BY ALLEN W/ COMMENT      DUE:      STATUS C      FILES PA

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 3, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: DONALD GREGG *DS*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Minister Ito's Impressions  
of His Trip

FOIA(b) (1)

The attached [REDACTED] gives a good summary of Foreign Minister Ito's reactions to his trip to the US. Key points:

- The auto issue dominated to the extent that discussion of other important issues, including defense, was minimized.
- Ito feels the US automobile industry is in deep trouble, and will not become truly competitive quickly.
- Ito feels there is an even chance that a voluntary formula "solving" the auto issue can be worked out before Suzuki's visit.
- Ito felt that the US had not worked out its basic positions on either the defense or auto issues, and that we did not speak with one voice on either subject;
- Ito feels that Suzuki has not changed his mind on the matter of Japanese defense spending, and that he will not significantly increase defense spending levels.

COMMENT: This report confirms my feeling that the Fukuda trip went better than the Ito visit. Weinberger was the only one to hit the defense issue. By not being better orchestrated, we have given the Japanese an opportunity to whip-saw us on the defense issue, and perhaps on the auto issue as well.

Attachment

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Review on April 3, 1987

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By LOJ, NARA, Date 7/24/06

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