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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
Country File  
**File Folder:** Germany, FRG Vol. I (1/20/81-6/30/81) (5)  
Box 91325

**Archivist:** mjd  
**Date:** 12/17/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1.</del> memo (8100918)	Alexander Haig to the President re: Visit of FRG Foreign Minister, 4p P 7/29/80 NLSF97-030 #140	<del>3/5/81</del> R 12/7/05 m1460 #2	P1/F1
<del>2.</del> memo	Richard Allen to the President re: Additional information, 1p P 5/18/80 NLSF97-030 #141	<del>3/6/81</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>3.</del> memo	Allen to the President re: Additional information, 1p P " " #142	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
4. memcon (8100362)	Edwin Meese/Manfred Lahnstein meeting, 2p P " " #143	3/6/81	P1/F1
5. routing slip	1p P " " #144	3/4/81	P1/F1
6. bio	2p P " " #145	1/30/81	P1/F1
<del>7.</del> memo (8100910)	<del>James Rentshler to Allen re: meeting with Lessler- Kiep, 1p P " " #146</del>	<del>3/3/81</del>	<del>P1/F1</del> F6
<del>8.</del> memo (no number)	<del>Allen to the President re observations, 1p P " " #147</del>	<del>1/23/81</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED 11 MAR 81 18

TO PRES

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOC DATE 10 MAR 81

*PS*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
*MSP  
12/16/98*

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

AP

APEL, HANS

AA

SUBJECT: REQUEST PRES TO SEE GERMAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE APEL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 12 MAR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

SCHWEITZER

TYSON

DERUS

COMMENTS NSC/S HAS NO RECORD OF TENTATIVE APPT W/ RVA.

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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<i>C</i>	<i>3/18</i>	<i>noted by LVA w/comment</i>		<i>Rentschler Derus</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

# 1132

g

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

To Rentschler:

I have spoken  
with Weinberger  
He knows Appel  
will not be received.

I said I would go over  
to the Pentagon to meet  
Appel. He agrees. Will  
notify us of a suitable time,  
which I will then try to make.

3/A

1132

ED

81 MAR 16 A 9: 57

JANET COLSON

jc

BUD NANCE

bn

DICK ALLEN

\_\_\_\_\_

IRENE DERUS

\_\_\_\_\_

JANET COLSON

\_\_\_\_\_

BUD NANCE

bn

KAY

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO VP

✓

SHOW CC

✓

CY TO MEESE

✓

SHOW CC

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CY TO BAKER

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CY TO DEEVER

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

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CY TO BRADY

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

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*Hand del  
- I return  
class files*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *JMR*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal: Presidential Meeting  
with FRG Defense Minister

The Schedule Proposal at Tab I incorporates Cap Weinberger's request that the President meet briefly with FRG Defense Minister Hans Apel during the latter's visit here March 24 - 25.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

cc: Allen Lenz  
Bill Stearman  
Bob Schweitzer  
Phyllis Kaminsky

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DATE:  
FROM: Dick Allen  
VIA: Gregory Newell

MEETING: With FRG Defense Minister Hans Apel. (U)

DATE: Anytime March 24 - 25, 1981. (C)

PURPOSE: To underscore the seriousness of our approach to defense-related issues and their implication for the Western Alliance. (U)

FORMAT: - Oval Office  
- Secretaries Haig and Weinberger; Dick Allen  
- 15 minutes (U)

CABINET PARTICIPATION: The Vice President, Secretaries Haig and Weinberger (U)

SPEECH MATERIAL: Background information and talking points will be provided by the NSC staff. (U)

PRESS COVERAGE: The meeting will be announced; pool photo opportunity. (U)

STAFF: Dick Allen; Senior NSC staff member. (U)

RECOMMENDED: Defense (see personal memo to you from Cap Weinberger, attached). (U)

OPPOSED: None (U)

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None (U)

BACKGROUND: The German Defense Minister is visiting Washington at Cap Weinberger's invitation; the latter strongly feels that it is important for the Germans to understand clearly our policies in the defense field and believes your participation in Apel's schedule will promote that objective. In addition, meeting with the Defense Minister so soon following your meeting with the German Foreign Minister will help lay solid groundwork for Chancellor Schmidt's visit in May. (C)

White House  
By m77 August 28, 1987  
12/16/98



## THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 MAR 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of German Minister of Defense

West German Minister of Defense Hans Apel will visit Washington at my invitation on 24 and 25 March. We have tentatively scheduled an office call with Dick Allen, but I believe it would be useful for you to see him briefly as well.

Our relationship with Germany revolves to a large extent around defense related issues and it is important that they clearly understand our objectives. Your participation would underscore our seriousness and reinforce what Al Haig and I will tell him.





RECEIVED 06 MAR 81 17

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 06 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

AP

GENSCHER, HANS D

VISIT

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR GENSCHER VISIT - US-FRG COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 09 MAR 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LENZ

NAU

POATS

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8100918

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*MB*

Re: 0998

VED

81 MAR 6 All : 35

*[Handwritten signature]*  
3/12/81

JANET COLSON

*[Handwritten signature]*

BUD NANCE

*[Handwritten signature]*

DICK ALLEN

\_\_\_\_\_

IRENE DERUS

\_\_\_\_\_

JANET COLSON

\_\_\_\_\_

BUD NANCE

\_\_\_\_\_

KAY

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO VP

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER

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SHOW CC

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CY TO DEAVER

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SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Genscher Meeting with the President:  
US-FRG Commercial Relations

Lionel Olmer, Commerce's Under Secretary for International Trade, is pushing the attached status report on US-FRG commercial relations and feels that it would be a useful addition to the President's briefing materials on Genscher. Maybe so, but he brought it to me this morning, i.e., long after we moved the Genscher briefing package to you.

The material is informative, but in my view non-essential for the purposes of the President's 30-minute meeting on Monday. I forward it nonetheless in case you want to include it in either the President's reading for Camp David or brief him orally about it Monday morning. (I have red-pencilled key points.)

RECOMMENDATION

That you dispose of the attached Commerce material on US-FRG Commercial relations.

- Tab into Genscher briefing materials \_\_\_\_\_
- Will brief orally \_\_\_\_\_
- Forget it \_\_\_\_\_
- Other \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Allen Lenz  
Henry Nau  
Rud Poats  
Chuck Tyson

## U.S. Commercial Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany

### U.S.-German Trade

Germany is our most important market in Europe. In 1980, our exports to Germany rose more than 29 percent to \$11 billion, while our imports from Germany rose only 12 percent to \$12.2 billion, giving us a bilateral trade deficit of \$1.2 billion. This is a significant improvement over previous years, reflecting a strengthening of our competitive position in the German market, the delayed effect of the depreciation of the U.S. dollar and the relative strength of the German economy which led to greater demand for imports.

### Investment

At the same time, generally lower production costs in the U.S. and an externally overvalued Mark have been attracting massive inflows of German private direct investments. For the first time in the post-war period, direct investment flows from Germany to the United States exceeded the flows in the opposite direction. German private direct investments in the U.S. at year-end 1979 stood at \$5.0 billion, up from \$3.7 billion a year earlier. Preliminary data indicate a new record in 1980 in the level of such investments, the bulk of which are in manufacturing, particularly in chemicals and pharmaceuticals.

The United States is still the ranking private direct investor in Germany. At year-end 1979, American direct investments in Germany stood at \$13.5 billion, up from \$12.7 billion at year-end 1978.

Most of it is in manufacturing and petroleum refining and retailing, with substantial investment also in the service sectors, including banking, brokerage and insurance.

### German Economy

This year and 1982 are shaping up as years of declining German growth, rising unemployment and rising inflation. In addition, Germany is troubled by shrinking overall trade surpluses, inordinately large current account deficits and limited room for maneuver in either the monetary or fiscal policy area. Since September 1980, the Mark has depreciated approximately 15 percent against the dollar. High interest rates outside of Germany, particularly in the United States, make it rather difficult for the German Bundesbank to ease up on credit availability by lowering domestic interest rates and thus ease the recession. German industry sectors hardest hit by the recession are construction, automobiles and steel.

### Trade Policy

Germany is strongly dedicated to a free market and a free trade philosophy. In the councils of the European Economic Community (EC), Germany consistently opposes policies which result in trade restrictions or government intervention in industry. For example, Germany is against any further EC restrictions on Japanese products. We can expect that Germany will be disturbed if the U.S. imposes restrictions on Japanese automobiles. Germany is also concerned that the recent increase in the trigger price for steel imports will have an adverse effect on their exports to the United States.

RECEIVED 04 MAR 81 12

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 04 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

AP

GENSCHER, HANS D

SUBJECT: PARTICIPANTS IN GENSCHEER MTG W/ PRES ON MAR 9

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 05 MAR 81 STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8100076

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( C / H )

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	- 3/9	allen approved recon		RE/CT
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W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 6, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN  
 THROUGH CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*  
 FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *JMR*  
 SUBJECT: Participants in the President's March 9 Meeting With FRG Foreign Minister Genscher

State has come in with a proposed list of participants for the President's March 9 meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher which begins to resemble the Michigan State Marching Band (Tab A). We have vetted the list and believe the composition for that meeting should look like this:

- | <u>US</u>  | <u>FRG</u>                  |
|--|-----------------------------|
| The President  | Foreign Minister Genscher   |
| The Vice President   | FRG Ambassador Peter Hermes |
| Secretary Haig   | Heinz Weber, Interpreter    |
| Ed Meese, Jim Baker, and/or Mike Deaver may want to sit in |                             |
| Richard Allen  |                             |
| Under Secretary Walter Stoessel, Jr.                       |                             |
| Larry Eagleburger  |                             |
| James Rentschler (Notetaker)                               |                             |

The above does not conform with the practice we followed for the previous visits of François-Poncet and Colombo. You may want to eliminate Walter Stoessel.

*Hard to do, since he was recently Ambassador there*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the list of participants for the President's meeting with Genscher as indicated above.

Approve                      As Amended                     

cc: Allen Lenz

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*They can't change*

*What was done w/ Blech and Pfeffer?*



# REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 9, 19 81

for The President of White House  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

U.S.

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary Alexander Haig  
Mr. Edwin Meese  
Mr. Jim Baker  
Mr. Mike Deaver  
Mr. Richard Allen  
Under Secretary Walter Stoessel, Jr.  
Ambassador Larry Eagleburger  
Mr. James Rentschler

FRG:

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher  
FRG Ambassador Peter Hermes  
Heinz Weber, Interpreter  
Mr. Karl Paschke (Personal Aid to Genscher)  
Mr. Theodor Wallau (Personal Aid to Genscher)  
Mr. Reinhold Schenk (Director for Genscher on USA Affairs)  
Mr. Leopold-Bill Berdow (Deputy Chief of Protocol)  
Franz Pfeffer, Director-Designate, Political Department II,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs)  
Klaus Blech, Director, Political Department II, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs  
Per Fischer, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

## MEETING LOCATION

Building White House Requested by Judy Lane  
Room No. Oval Office Room No. 368 Telephone 5026  
Time of Meeting 2:00 p.m. Date of request March 9, 1981

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 4, 1981

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher:  
Participation in Meeting with the President,  
March 9, 2:30-3:00 p.m.

We suggest the following participation in the meeting  
between the President and Foreign Minister Genscher:

FRG

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister  
Klaus Blech, Director, Political Department II,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Franz Pfeffer, Director-Designate, Political  
Department II, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Dr. Peter Hermes  
Heinz Weber, Interpreter

US

The President  
The Secretary  
Mr. Richard V. Allen  
Under Secretary Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.  
Ambassador Lawrence S. Eagleburger

*John H. Kelly*  
for L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

MSP 12/16/98

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *WJD 12/16/88*

RECEIVED 05 MAR 81 18

TO PRES FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 05 MAR 81

RENTSCHLER

05 MAR 81

STEARMAN

05 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

TALKER

GENSCHER, HANS *D*

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR PRES MTG W/ FRG FORN MINISTER GENSCHER ON MAR 9

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 06 MAR 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF# 8106831

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( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 3/6</i>	<i>for info</i>		
<i>C</i>	<i>3/13</i>	<i>Pres. has seen</i>		<i>LEV SR</i>

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C) *H.*

~~SECRET~~  
*a. Haschment*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

March 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher  
(Monday, March 9, 1981; 2:00 - 2:30 p.m.)

Attached are key briefing materials for use during your Monday afternoon meeting with Federal Republic Foreign Minister Hans-Diedrich Genscher. These include:

- a series of substantive "ice-breaking" questions you might care to raise with Genscher at the outset of your discussion (Tab A);
- Secretary Haig's background memo, which incorporates relevant talking points (Tab B);
- a brief memo from me which complements the Secretary's information (Tab C).

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

*MSM  
2/16/81*

KEY QUESTIONS FOR USE DURING MEETING WITH FRG  
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER


(Monday, March 9, 1981)

- U.S.-German Consultation. What specific advice does the Foreign Minister have for strengthening both the form and the content of U.S.-German consultative practices?
- Theatre Nuclear Forces. How does the Foreign Minister assess the prospects of moving ahead on schedule with deployment of theatre nuclear forces on West German territory?
- Germany and The Alliance. Given what seems to be an increasingly assertive position of the SPD's left wing, how does the Foreign Minister assess both the strength of the governing coalition and the Federal Republic's capacity to improve its contribution to the common defense?
- Germany and East-West Relations. What is the present German mood concerning developments in Poland, Afghanistan, and El Salvador? To what extent do these affect German perceptions of "detente"?
- Schmidt's Remarks about High U.S. Interest Rates. Is this a serious concern of the Chancellor's, or was it overblown in the press? Will the Chancellor raise this issue when he visits here in May?
- Germany and the Future. Where does the Foreign Minister see his country going over the next five to ten years?



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.   
Subject: Visit of FRG Foreign Minister  
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, March 9, 1981

I. SETTING

Genscher comes to Washington both hopeful and apprehensive. His visit, and those later in the month by Defense Minister Apel and Economics Minister Lambsdorff, will set the stage for Chancellor Schmidt's visit in May and, indeed, for this Administration's relationship with the FRG. Genscher and his colleagues hope for greater "calculability" in US policy.

FRG leaders are worried about how the US will manage its relations with the Soviet Union and the world's developing countries during the next three years, until the West restores an overall military balance with the Soviet Union.

The combined challenges of Soviet military preponderance in some areas, opposition by some Europeans (including some in the SPD) to NATO rearmament, the threat hanging over Poland and economic woes require skillful leadership and close policy coordination in the Alliance. Economic retrenchment and political uncertainty in the FRG will challenge the Schmidt/Genscher leadership, and could affect the FRG's relations with the Alliance and the US.

Foremost among German international concerns is the decline of "detente," for many Germans the best hope in the postwar era for the FRG peacefully to realize its broad political-economic interests, including progress toward eventual German reunification. Thus, the FRG strives to preserve at least a negotiating process. Schmidt's trip to Moscow last July and Genscher's trips to Warsaw and Moscow later in March are part of Schmidt's concept of "crisis management," an essential feature of which is maintenance of the East-West dialogue. It is a view which finds strong support in German public opinion, particularly within the SPD.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

M 1460 #2

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1 3/3/81

BY CS, NARA, DATE 12/1/05

Although re-elected in October with a substantially increased majority, the SPD/FDP coalition and, in particular, the SPD, are divided on many key issues, including nuclear energy, worker co-determination, anti-recessionary policy, increased defense spending, and, potentially, LRTNF deployment, as well as policies toward the developing countries, including El Salvador. Although not in danger of collapse, the coalition is going through a bad time, exacerbated by the Chancellor's apparent reluctance or inability to deal with the increasingly rambunctious left within his own party.

You last met with Genscher, along with Chancellor Schmidt, on November 20, 1980.

## II. OBJECTIVES

To make clear your commitments to:

-- meet the challenges presented by the USSR through enhanced Western security based on a stronger defense posture and meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements linked to overall Soviet behavior;

-- close and continuing consultations with our Allies;

-- an economic policy which will ensure US recovery while taking account of the economic interests of our Allies and of the world economy.

## III. ISSUES

### Enhanced Defense

Genscher will stress that maintaining the momentum in the FRG toward enhanced defense, including conventional force improvement, LRTNF deployment and assistance to US forces, requires that the US be seen as committed to meaningful and verifiable arms control.

### East-West Relations

Most Germans agree that the FRG's interests lie with the West, although the realities of Germany's status, geography and national objectives require a continuing effort to develop and maintain ties with the East.

### The Economy

The FRG realizes that a stable world economy is dependent on the economic strength of the United States and welcomes your initiatives to control



inflation. They are concerned, however, about the possible recessionary effects of our policies, particularly high interest rates, and about decreases in development assistance, which they fear will lead to increased instability in the developing countries and greater opportunities for Soviet and Cuban involvement.

TALKING POINTS

Enhanced  
Defense

-- Emphasize our determination to correct the East-West military imbalances and increase resources for defense. Note that we all must do more.

-- Assure Genscher that the United States is committed to meaningful and verifiable arms control. We are reviewing the entire range of arms control efforts with a view to pursuing those which contribute to our national security and the security of our Allies.

-- Reaffirm our commitment to both elements of the LRTNF decision. Note that for LRTNF arms control efforts to have any chance of success, the Soviets must be convinced that Allies will carry through LRTNF modernization and deployment.

-- Stress our commitment to continuing early and frank consultations.

-- Stress your commitment to programs designed to improve the military readiness of US Forces in Germany, including rapid reinforcement facilities, restationing and facilities improvement.

East-West  
Relations

-- Raise El Salvador as an example of unacceptable Cuban and Soviet behavior, asking Genscher to resume assistance to the Government of El Salvador for agricultural reform.

-- We will continue to exchange views with our Allies on Brezhnev's speech. The Allies should stay in step in responding to the Soviet proposals.

The  
Economy

-- Restate your determination to set the American economy on a new footing with greatly reduced inflation and resumed growth and investment. Success will also mean lower interest rates.

~~SECRET~~

-4-

-- Restate our commitment to development assistance, but note that setting our domestic house in order and redressing the military imbalance must be our first priority tasks.

-- Inform Genscher of our intent to participate in the Mexico summit, provided Cuba does not attend, it is scheduled in the Fall and it is agreed that the meeting is to examine problems, not arrive at agreements.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

918

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 6, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN 

SUBJECT: Additional Background for Genscher Meeting (U)

The Secretary's rundown of issues, together with the tack he suggests for dealing with each of them, is very sound. In a larger sense, however, your talks with Genscher can be seen as a mini-dress rehearsal for the Schmidt visit on May 21. There is no doubt that the U.S.-German relationship is subject to increasing sensitivities on both sides of the Atlantic; because these involve potentially differing approaches to defense-sharing, economic priorities, regional disputes, and both East-West and North-South relations, it will be important to manage the German connection, directly from the outstart, with a mixture of firm leadership and understanding. (C)

The fact is, the U.S. may have tended to overestimate the Federal Republic's potential impact on the world stage during the past few years, and Bonn may well have underestimated it. Growing concerns over its own economy, the increasingly strident tone of the ruling coalition's left wing, and the extreme reluctance to look beyond the immediate obsessions with inner-German contacts and East-West trade significantly inhibit a larger world role for the Federal Republic. No one is more acutely aware of this than Genscher, the junior member in his government's troubled coalition. The most effective overall message for him to take back to Schmidt can be summarized as follows: (C)

- This Administration intends to consult closely with the FRG; there will be no surprises; (U)
- Consultation is a two-way street; this means that on issues involving our vital interests - for example, the Arab-Israeli conflict - we will look to our European partners for adequate consultation and coordination. (U)
- The primacy of our commitment to the Western Alliance is a fact; however, public and Congressional pressure in the U.S. will not permit us to accept a situation in which we are perceived to be more interested in West European defense than the West Europeans themselves; we both have a responsibility to manage the politics of that perception. (U)

NB. Genscher might raise Namibia, a personal hobby-horse; if he does, you should simply hear him out in a non-committal way.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 3/5/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY mjh

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F47-030 #141

NARA, DATE 5/14/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

ACTION

March 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES RENTSCHLER <sup>Jim</sup>  
WILLIAM STEARMAN <sup>WS</sup>

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with FRG Foreign  
Minister Genscher (Monday, March 9, 1981;  
2:00-2:30 p.m.)

Your covering memo to the President at Tab I transmits key briefing materials for his use during his March 9 meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Diedrich Genscher (the order of these and their contents closely follow the guidance you gave us during last week's senior staff meeting in the Sit Room).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ *RVA Signed 3/6/81*  
As Amended \_\_\_\_\_ *Hand carried to Dorman's ofc.*

*Dick - this material replaces the earlier "original" Chuck gave you for Miami last nite. Jim  
It is a complete package.*

cc: Chuck Tyson

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~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

*MJD  
12/18/98*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dick -  
this is your memo to  
the President on the Genscher  
meeting - State's briefing book  
has not yet arrived -  
CPT

*redone*  
*3/6/81*

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENTSACTION

March 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES RENTSCHLER  
WILLIAM STEARMANSUBJECT: The President's Meeting with FRG Foreign  
Minister Genscher (Monday, March 9, 1981;  
2:00-2:30 p.m.)

Your covering memo to the President at Tab I transmits key briefing materials for his use during his March 9 meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Diedrich Genscher (the order of these and their contents closely follow the guidance you gave us during last week's senior staff meeting in the Sit Room).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENTS*MSP*  
*12/16/98*



## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
*vice President*  
 FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
 SUBJECT: Your Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher  
 (Monday, March 9, 1981; 2:00 - 2:30 p.m.)

Attached are key briefing materials for use during your Monday afternoon meeting with Federal Republic Foreign Minister Hans-Diedrich Genscher. These include:

- a series of substantive "ice-breaking" questions you might care to raise with Genscher at the outset of your discussion (Tab A);
- Secretary Haig's background memo, which incorporates relevant talking points (Tab B);
- a brief memo from me which complements the Secretary's information (Tab C).

NOTE: GENSCHER is a member of the Free Democrat  
Party, which is in coalition with ~~the Socialists~~  
 Schmidt's SPD (Socialists). As such, he is  
 not a doctrinaire leftist. It is conceivable that,  
 should the Schmidt go to

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CC E. Vance  
 J. Baker

MAR 10 1981



KEY QUESTIONS FOR USE DURING MEETING WITH FRG  
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

(Monday, March 9, 1981)

- U.S.-German Consultation. What specific advice does the Foreign Minister have for strengthening both the form and the content of U.S.-German consultative practices?
- Theatre Nuclear Forces. How does the Foreign Minister assess the prospects of moving ahead on schedule with deployment of theatre nuclear forces on West German territory?
- Germany and The Alliance. Given what seems to be an increasingly assertive position of the SPD's left wing, how does the Foreign Minister assess both the strength of the governing coalition and the Federal Republic's capacity to improve its contribution to the common defense?
- Germany and East-West Relations. What is the present German mood concerning developments in Poland, Afghanistan, and El Salvador? To what extent do these affect German perceptions of "detente"?
- Schmidt's Remarks about High U.S. Interest Rates. Is this a serious concern of the Chancellor's, or was it overblown in the press? Will the Chancellor raise this issue when he visits here in May?
- Germany and the Future. Where does the Foreign Minister see his country going over the next five to ten years?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Additional Background for Genscher Meeting (U)

The Secretary's rundown of issues, together with the tack he suggests for dealing with each of them, is very sound. In a larger sense, however, your talks with Genscher can be seen as a mini-dress rehearsal for the Schmidt visit on May 21. There is no doubt that the U.S.-German relationship is subject to increasing sensitivities on both sides of the Atlantic; because these involve potentially differing approaches to defense-sharing, economic priorities, regional disputes, and both East-West and North-South relations, it will be important to manage the German connection, directly from the outstart, with a mixture of firm leadership and understanding. (C)

The fact is, the U.S. may have tended to overestimate the Federal Republic's potential impact on the world stage during the past few years, and Bonn may well have underestimated it. Growing concerns over its own economy, the increasingly strident tone of the ruling coalition's left wing, and the extreme reluctance to look beyond the immediate obsessions with inner-German contacts and East-West trade significantly inhibit a larger world role for the Federal Republic. No one is more acutely aware of this than Genscher, the junior member in his government's troubled coalition. The most effective overall message for him to take back to Schmidt can be summarized as follows: (C)

- This Administration intends to consult closely with the FRG; there will be no surprises; (U)
- Consultation is a two-way street; this means that on issues involving our vital interests - for example, the Arab-Israeli conflict - we will look to our European partners for adequate consultation and coordination. (U)
- The primacy of our commitment to the Western Alliance is a fact; however, public and Congressional pressure in the U.S. will not permit us to accept a situation in which we are perceived to be more interested in West European defense than the West Europeans themselves; we both have a responsibility to manage the politics of that perception. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 3/4/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 NLS F97030 #142  
 BY MSJ NARA DATE 5/17/02

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

FROM:


RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*

SUBJECT:

MemCon of your meeting with Manfred Lahnstein

Attached for your information is a memorandum of conversation which summarizes the March 6 meeting you and Jim Baker had with FRG State Secretary Manfred Lahnstein.

cc: James Baker ✓



A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NSG F97-030 #143  
MSM NARA Date 5/18/00

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Memorandum of conversation between Edwin Meese III  
and Manfred Lahnstein ~~(U)~~

Time and Place: March 6, 1981; 3:00-3:45 p.m., West Wing, White House

Participants: US: The Hon. Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the  
President  
The Hon. James Baker III, White House Chief of Staff  
James M. Rentschler, Senior NSC Staff

FRG: The Hon. Manfred Lahnstein, State Secretary,  
Federal Chancery  
The Hon. Peter Hermes, FRG Ambassador to the US  
Mr. Peter Basing, Political Counselor, FRG Embassy

Mr. Meese welcomed Mr. Lahnstein and recalled with pleasure his encounter with Ambassador von Staden during the transition period. He described the relationship between himself and Mr. Baker and emphasized the closeness of their teamwork, with the Counselor concentrating on policy formulation and the Chief of Staff responsible for implementation. He pointed out that both he and Mr. Baker sat on the National Security Council and were thereby better positioned to carry out a major Presidential determination, i.e., to make more effective use of the various Government agencies and departments. Mr. Meese added that the Federal Republic was well represented by Ambassador Hermes; Mr. Meese enjoyed his contacts with the Ambassador, as did Secretary Haig and National Security Advisor Allen. ~~(U)~~

Mr. Lahnstein thanked Mr. Meese for his time, recounted his Washington program (which included an excellent briefing by CIA Director Casey and his associates), characterized both himself and Chancellor Schmidt as "renowned Americanophiles despite some of the press comment one might see," and expressed the very favorable impression the FRG Government had of this country's new leadership; it seemed to be both clear and reliable. ~~(U)~~

Mr. Meese said he was pleased to hear Mr. Lahnstein's initial assessment and emphasized that this Administration intended to avoid surprises. In response to a question concerning Presidential travel plans, Mr. Meese and Mr. Baker asserted the President's priority concern with his economic program and the need to work closely with Congress over the coming months. This meant that there would probably be no Presidential travel in prospect before the Fall; the President does not believe that he personally needs to go everywhere to make a point and will therefore make much more use of his Ambassadors, who will be his personal representatives in foreign capitals. They added that they expected a new Ambassador to be appointed to Bonn very shortly, which they considered a high-priority post and which had been much sought after. ~~(U)~~

Mr. Lahnstein stated that the new Administration can count on the support of his government. The Federal Republic has some problems with public opinion, the result of certain societal developments over which the government itself could exercise little control. People in Western Europe seem to have forgotten that they live under the shadow of Soviet missiles targeted on them, and this is a problem in terms of ensuring adequate defense contributions. In that connection, he added, the German government saw the economic situation as a major factor in Western strategy and would welcome a relatively early and rapid discussion of this subject. The Federal Republic itself was experiencing its worst period of unemployment since the end of the war (1.3 million Germans were unemployed, representing 4½ percent of the national population). For this reason, the FRG viewed the Economic Summit in Ottawa as very important; economic growth and development were critical agenda topics, as was the question of oil supply and pricing. (C)

Ambassador Hermes raised the question of US policy concerning nuclear reprocessing, to which Mr. Meese responded that the Administration will soon be issuing some signals with which the German government was likely to feel quite comfortable. Mr. Meese went on to assert that the US considers the Federal Republic one of the mainstays of the Western Alliance. In that regard, the President has talked a great deal about the benefits of private diplomacy. We intend to deal with our friends in a quiet and reasonable manner. (C)

Concerning Mr. Lahnstein's earlier allusion to a trip by former Vice President Mondale and the "unfortunate locomotive theory" which later characterized US policy *vis-à-vis* its European partners, Mr. Meese said that we were cognizant of the stop-and-go nature of previous US - German relations. We cannot rewrite history. There may still be issues on which we may not fully agree, but the Federal Republic can count on us for consistency in our conduct of policy and consultation. The main thing he would like to get across is that this government knows what it is doing, that American interests are not antithetical to Western European interests, and that we intend to cooperate. (C)

Mr. Lahnstein expressed his appreciation for Mr. Meese's remarks and pledged that his government will do its utmost to stick to all aspects of the December 1979 NATO decision on theater nuclear forces.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A big asset for US interests in Europe is the fact that the Federal Republic has a centrist government and is animated by politics of the center; the US need not worry about the extreme sides of the political spectrum in West Germany: the Schmidt coalition is a reliable coalition; there is no Moscow wing. (C)

The meeting concluded with an exchange of reminiscences concerning Bohemian Grove activity. (C)

D  
D  
O

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Deputy Director for Operations

5 MAR 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 March 1981

Dick:

Attached for your information is  
a bio [REDACTED] He will be accom-  
panied at your 1000 on Monday by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
~~REDACTED~~  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Arrangements for clearing them in  
have been made by our respective secre-  
taries.

Regards,



John N. McMahon

Attachment

The Honorable Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

DCL  RVW 4 Mar 01  
DRV D9c.1 BY Signer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Handwritten notes:  
F97-030 #144  
5/14/00



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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *M77 11/16/81*  
FROM RENTSCHLER

RECEIVED 03 MAR 81 15

DOCDATE 03 MAR 81

TO ALLEN

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

GAS

LESSLER-KIEP, WALTER

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR ALLEN 3 MAR MTG W/ LESSLER-KIEP

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

DEAL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*RE* ✓

*3/4 RVA has seen (orig returned this to nsc/s)*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*PA* (C)

*clm*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

910 ✓

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 3, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES RENTSCHLER *J.R.*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Walter Lessler-Kiep  
(Tuesday, March 3, 1981 - 11:00 a.m.) ~~(U)~~

Lessler-Kiep has left his post as Finance Minister for Lower Saxony and has moved to Bonn as shadow economics minister and opposition spokesman. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ He will have one main issue on his mind - the Siberia gas pipeline deal with U.S. policy in connection with it - which I recommend you handle as follows: ~~(C)~~

- we are aware of German concerns over this issue and your hope that we will come up with a clear policy very soon; (U)
- the Siberia deal is under very careful examination; the previous Administration had some serious reservations about the deal, and while our policy has not yet been staked out, it is fair to say that the reservations in this Administration are even more serious. ~~(C)~~
- whatever we decide on the issue will be in the context of an overall East-West policy; ~~(U)~~

NB. Kiep may note that the CDU/CSU fraction is under some pressure to produce a negative position on the gas pipeline issue; he will probably emphasize that he and his colleagues are prepared to support an anti-deal position but will need a clear U.S. statement before doing so (sensitized by previous U.S. performance - or lack of it - they do not want to get out in front on this business). ~~(C)~~

One other possible area of discussion involves the economic assistance effort for Turkey, in which Kiep played a major role as coordinator the first time around. He may allude to SPD antsiness over the role of the military in Turkey and seek assurances from you that we are fully focused on the need for return to democratic rule there. ~~(U)~~

- tell him we appreciate the lead role the FRG has played in shoring up this vital part of NATO's southern flank. Our entire Eastern Mediterranean policy is under review, and while we share German hopes for a return to full democracy in Turkey ASAP, the basket-case economy there continues to require urgent attention - without which there can be no hope for a stable political environment. ~~(C)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 3/3/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED -> release impact

EX-107-030 #146

100-11307

5/18/00

11A 3/15/81

RECEIVED 30 JAN 81 12

TO ALLEN

FROM TARNOFF

DOCDATE 29 JAN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MSP  
12/16/98

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

VISIT

SCHMIDT, HELMUT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED DATES FOR VISIT BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 02 FEB 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

TYSON

RENTSCHLER

FARRAR

Colson

COMMENTS

*OK*

REF# 8102304

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( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>RA</i>	<i>7 2/3</i>	<i>To be decided</i>		<i>CF, Ty</i>
<i>Rentschler</i>	<i>5 2/4</i>	<i>for resol/further action</i>		
	<i>2/6</i>	<i>(see RVA comments)</i>		<i>CF, TY, RE</i>
	<i>2/7</i>	<i>see #288 for final action</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*RA*

(C)

*MB*

*for CNS*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THRU: CHARLES P. TYSON  
FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *J.M.*  
SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for a Visit by Chancellor Schmidt

The Schedule Proposal at Tab A recommending an April meeting between the President and FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is self-explanatory.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove ✓ \_\_\_\_\_

*check -  
check dates on  
the proposal.*

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

Review February 3, 1987

*12/16/98*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8102304 *cm*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Dates for Visit by FRG Chancellor  
Helmut Schmidt

The German Embassy has advised us that Chancellor Schmidt is most anxious to visit Washington during April to meet with President Reagan, and the Germans have proposed the dates April 12-15 or April 22-25 as alternatives for such a visit. We believe that a visit by Chancellor Schmidt at an early stage to establish a close personal relationship with the President is highly desirable, and we recommend approval of one of the alternative timeframes proposed by the Germans if the President's schedule permits. Should neither of these dates be possible, we believe that we should propose an alternative to the Germans.

Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By M217 NARA, Date 10/16/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 1/28/87

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DATE:

FROM: Richard V. Allen

VIA: Michael Deaver

**THE WHITE HOUSE**

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING: FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (U)

DATE: April 12-15, 1981 or April 22-25, 1981 (C)

PURPOSE: To meet with you in the context of an official visit and conduct substantive discussions on key international policy issues (U)

FORMAT: -- The Oval Office (restricted session) and Cabinet Room (expanded meeting)

-- Key Cabinet officers and Chancellor's senior party

-- 90 minutes (U)

CABINET PARTICIPATION: -- Vice President; Secretary Haig; others as appropriate (U)

SPEECH MATERIAL: -- Background papers and talking points will be provided by the NSC (U)

PRESS COVERAGE: -- The meeting will be announced;

-- full-blown photo opportunity preceding meeting;

-- informal statements by you and the Chancellor following meeting (U)

STAFF: -- Mr. Allen; Mr. Rentschler (NSC staff) (U)

RECOMMEND: -- State (U)

OPPOSED: -- None (U)

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: You met with the Chancellor as President-elect during the transition period (December, 1980) (U)

BACKGROUND: The German Embassy advised State that Chancellor Schmidt is most anxious to visit Washington in April to meet with you at that early point in the Administration. His visit will provide a timely opportunity to build on the personal relationship you have already established and to discuss a full range of sensitive policy concerns (including Soviet posture vis-a-vis the West, Poland, NATO burden-sharing, etc.) which underlie our relations with this key European ally. ~~(C)~~

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review February 3, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines August 28, 1997

By WSP NARA, date 12/16/98



RECEIVED 07 FEB 81 12

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 27 JAN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*MJD 12/16/98*

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

SCHMIDT, HELMUT

GENSCHER, HANS D

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE TIMES FOR GENSCHER & SCHMIDT VISITS

ACTION: NOTED BY ALLEN W/ COMMENT DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

FARRAR

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8100288 NSCIFID ( D / D )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

K

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK ALLEN  
 FROM: JIM RENTSCHLER  
 SUBJECT: FRG Visitors (U)

Fredo Dannenbring (Number 2 in the FRG Embassy here) called to relay some information anent the Genscher and Schmidt visits. You may already be fully au courant, but just in case, here is what Dannenbring told me (he will also be informing State): (U)

--- Genscher. State and the German Foreign Ministry agreed to a March 9-11 timeframe for his visit. Genscher very much desires to meet with the President on that occasion. (S)

I know.

--- Schmidt. He is proposing two desirable timeframes from his point of view, the first being Sunday, April 12-Wednesday, April 15 (with Monday, April 13 preferred for the meeting with the President); and the second being Wednesday, April 22-Saturday, April 25. (S)

We know  
Presumably been  
evaluated.

The Germans would appreciate having confirmation as soon as possible on the timeframe for Schmidt's visit which we prefer. (U)

↓  
It will come  
when we're ready.

cc: Chuck Tyson

DECLASSIFIED  
 White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
 By M711 NARA, Date 12/16/98

2/6/81  
RVA how new~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review January 27, 1987

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1981

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*  
SUBJECT: Chancellor Schmidt's Observations

Ambassador Stoessel paid a farewell call upon Chancellor Schmidt. These insights are from his cable to the State Department:

During Ambassador Stoessel's farewell call on Wednesday, Chancellor Schmidt displayed obvious pleasure over the President's telephone call. He expressed interest in an early visit to Washington, perhaps this spring, but does not want to impose himself on the President. He believes the meeting should be serious and substantive with a portion devoted to world economic matters. Schmidt was extremely gloomy about the world economic situation and believes the prospects are for a downturn worse than the one in 1975, but he does not have any ready solution or suggestion for improving the situation. Regarding overall U.S.-German relations, Schmidt was confident that the new administration would have a clearer and more consistent line in foreign policy, but at this point he is not too sure of the substance of that policy. Schmidt expressed his strong personal commitment to fulfilling the TNF decision, but indicated it would become virtually untenable if the Italians were to reverse their stand and leave the FRG alone. He recalled that the NATO decision was a double one which also emphasized the need for arms control discussions with the Soviets concerning TNF. He understands that we would wish to move deliberately with regard to resuming the SALT process and TNF talks, but he hopes the delay would not be too long.

In discussing the consultative process, Schmidt remembered bitterly the neutron bomb decision and hoped if the U.S. decided to move on this issue, there would be private and thorough advance consultation. Schmidt welcomes indications that we intend more thorough and intensive consultations with the Europeans, but thinks that none of the present fora is ideal. The four power format is the most effective, but if it were used too much the Italians, Japanese and Canadians would raise objections.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030 #147

~~SECRET~~

BY WJD NARA, DATE 5/18/00



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